The Marriage Debt

64. The use of marriage consists in that action of spouses which was instituted by nature for conserving and propagating the human race, namely in carnal intercourse. By the Apostle this action of spouses is called the debt,² because spouses, from the matrimonial contract, mutually owe it to one another. We must treat: a. of the liceity of the conjugal act in itself; b. of its liceity by reason of circumstances; c. of its obligation; d. of those things which are licit for spouses in marriage; e. of the impediments of the conjugal act.

a. Intercourse or the conjugal act, from the things said above, n. 6, on the part of the man consists in penetration of the womanly vessel and is completed by effusion of semen joined with carnal delectation; on the part of the woman it consists in reception of the virile semen and is completed by effusion of vulvo-vaginal humor likewise joined with carnal delectation. From these things it is understood what is signified by the name of insemination. Insemination on the part of the man is the emission of semen; on the part of the woman it is the emission of vulvo-vaginal humor.

b. For effecting generation in the woman neither the sense of pleasure nor insemination is necessary: for experience establishes that women have been made pregnant without these things. Nevertheless insemination helps to render fecundation easier, because the spermatozoa can move more easily and more swiftly in the vulvo-vaginal humor and proceed toward the interior organs of the woman.

¹ St. Alphonsus, l. 6, De usu matrimonii, n. 900-954; Thomas Sanchez, De matrimonii sacramento, l. 9, De debito coniugali; Sporer-Bierbaum, Theologia mor. sacram. (Paderborn: Typograph. Bonifac., 1901), III, pr. 4, De peccatis coniugum in usu matrimonii, n. 467-520; Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theolog. mor.^3 (Prati: Giachetti, 1900), VI, n. 306-416; Lehmkuhl II, n. 833-859; Jos. Aertnys, Fasciculus theol. mor.^5 (Leipzig: Kittler, 1888), tr. 2, De usu matrimonii; Antonelli II, n. 354-479.

² 1 Cor. 7, 3.

The circumstances which can bring it about that the conjugal act becomes illicit and morally evil are its end, mode or situation, time, and place.

78. There are several ends on account of which the conjugal act can be exercised; some of these are proper and essential, others improper and accidental. The proper ends are: a. for generating offspring; b. for avoiding incontinence or quieting libido; c. for satisfying the obligation toward the other spouse. Of these essential ends the first indeed, the generation of offspring, is the primary end; the others are secondary ends of marriage. Besides this threefold proper end, there are other improper ends, e.g. for conserving and fostering mutual love, for preserving or recovering health of body, etc.

1. The conjugal act can licitly be exercised on account of any honorable end whatever. If a proper end is in question, the reason is that an action fitting to nature is licitly exercised on account of those ends for which the author of nature instituted it. But if an improper end is in question, the reason is that an action not evil can licitly be applied to an honorable end for the obtaining of which it is useful.

a. There are those who with St. Thomas say that the conjugal act performed for avoiding one's own incontinence, not the spouse's, is a venial sin.¹ But in truth a. this end is not only honorable and laudable in itself, but also belongs to the essential ends of marriage; but to exercise an act indifferent in itself on account of an honorable end cannot be sin. b. St. Paul teaches that this end was intended by God in instituting marriage, 1 Cor. 7, 2, 5, and since the Apostle assigns this end alone to the conjugal act, he manifestly supposes that the work of marriage performed for this end alone is licit. c. The Church blesses the nuptials of old persons whom it knows to enter marriage for avoiding their own incontinence; this indeed the Church could not do if the use of marriage performed on account of that end were illicit.²

b. To exercise the conjugal act with affection toward another person whom one represents to himself, so that from that person he may take venereal delectation, is mental adultery and therefore a grave sin. In the conjugal act to represent another person to oneself, so that from that person's beauty one may take delectation and be excited to the conjugal act, is indeed not a sin but is very dangerous. Finally, if spouses put beautiful images before their eyes and look at them, either to excite themselves or to conceive more beautiful offspring, they do not commit sin, provided the images are not sacred.

2. To exercise the conjugal act on account of pleasure alone is a venial sin: for it is a disorder, although not grave, to will to rest in some thing as an end which the author of nature willed as a means to an end.³

But if no honorable end is positively intended, and the conjugal act occurs with this positive intention of taking pleasure, the act seems to have to be called honorable, provided in its exercise nothing is exceeded on any side against the prescriptions of reason, and the act is apprehended as licit or at least not as illicit. For the act itself is licit; the delectation which is sought is likewise licit; in the manner of exercising the act and taking pleasure, the order prescribed by reason is preserved, i.e. concupiscence is ruled by reason and will. Therefore nothing is understood to be lacking to the act that would prevent it from being fitting to rational nature and therefore orderable and objectively ordered to God, the ultimate end.⁴

Whether the conjugal act is licit if it is established that the woman will suffer miscarriage or bring forth dead offspring. It must be affirmed, at least if it is done for avoiding the danger of incontinence: for on the one hand, even for such offspring it is better to exist with original sin than not to exist at all; on the other hand, exclusion from supernatural beatitude is permitted by the parents from a grave cause, for avoiding the sin of incontinence.

3. It is not necessary that spouses in the use of marriage will the generation of offspring; indeed, from a just cause they can wish that it not be generated and from this desire restrict the use of marriage to that time at which there is less hope of future conception. Nevertheless, it is required that the intention of offspring not be positively excluded, i.e. that nothing be done by which offspring is impeded, but that the order of generation be preserved.

¹ Supplementum, q. 49, a. 5.

² Cf. Roman Catechism, pr. 2, c. 8, q. 14; St. Alphonsus, n. 882.

³ This proposition, 9, was condemned by Innocent XI: "The work of marriage exercised on account of pleasure alone is entirely without all fault and venial defect."

⁴ De principiis^3, n. 87 ff.

87. Declaration. Of itself it belongs to the man to ask, and to the wife to render the debt: for to women, on account of their innate modesty, asking is ordinarily very troublesome; but men, on account of modesty, are ordinarily not kept from asking. Wherefore the wife is not bound to render the debt unless the husband asks: for if he does not ask, the wife can presume that the husband does not demand the debt. But accidentally even the woman is bound to ask: for if the husband is in danger of incontinence, she is bound from charity to free him from danger; but since charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience, she is not bound to ask if she cannot do so without grave inconvenience, e.g. great shamefacedness.

From express asking, which is done by words or equivalent signs, interpretative asking must be distinguished, which is gathered from certain indications. Thus if a wife existing in danger of incontinence wishes to use marriage, but because of shamefacedness does not dare to ask expressly, she is said to ask interpretatively, and the husband, noticing these things, is bound himself to ask, or rather to render the debt to one asking interpretatively.

88. Principles. 1. There exists no obligation of asking the conjugal debt except sometimes accidentally from charity: for there exists for individual spouses no obligation of using marriage, but they have only a right to that use; but no one is bound to use his own right.

Accidentally, however, there can be an obligation of asking, especially in the man: a. if he judges that the other party is placed in danger of incontinence and because of shamefacedness does not ask: for each one is bound from charity to impede the sin of another if he can conveniently do so; b. if the use of marriage is necessary for fostering love or for averting dissensions.

Although the use of marriage is ordinarily to be advised to spouses, especially to those who can nourish offspring and suitably educate them, nevertheless by mutual consent it is also licit for them to abstain from the use of marriage, provided there is no danger of incontinence. And indeed, if they abstain from a motive of virtue, with danger of incontinence excluded, this is to be praised; if it is done from another reasonable motive, and there is no danger of sin, it is at least to be permitted.

2. There exists an obligation of justice, of itself grave, of rendering the debt whenever the other spouse expressly or tacitly asks seriously.

a. For by the matrimonial contract the spouses mutually transfer to each other the right and power over the body in order to the conjugal act; but to the right of asking there corresponds in the other the obligation of rendering the debt. The Apostle expressly teaches the same: let the husband render the debt to the wife, and the wife likewise to the husband.¹ Moreover, one who denies the debt often exposes the other party to danger of grave sins.

Wherefore it is not licit voluntarily to render oneself impotent, e.g. by excessive labors, vigils, austerities, etc.: for the spouse has a right to the conjugal act; therefore one who renders himself impotent makes himself unable to pay the debt. Nor is it licit, without necessity or the consent of the other party, to be absent for a notable time: for an absence of this kind would be equivalent to denial of the debt.

b. The object of the mutual contract is of itself a thing of grave moment: for it concerns the generation of offspring, the avoidance of incontinence, and the signifying of conjugal love for preserving peace; therefore to render the debt is of itself a grave obligation of justice when the other asks seriously, namely in such a way that, when asked, he would not wish to yield. Nevertheless denial of the debt can be a light sin in a twofold case: a. from smallness of matter, if it is done only rarely, if, e.g., it is denied once in a month to one asking often, or if it is not denied altogether, but is only deferred for a short time, e.g. until the night; yet with danger of incontinence excluded; b. if the other asks not seriously but only weakly, so that he is judged benevolently to remit the debt.

a. Therefore of itself a spouse sins gravely who denies the debt to the other asking seriously, even only one time, especially if in the other party there is danger of incontinence or grave trouble; and indeed not only against justice, because he denies what is owed, but also against charity, because he exposes the other party to danger of grave sins.

b. Men also sin gravely who, whether from avarice, lest they have to nourish offspring, or from malevolence, never or almost never know their own wives, although they ought to presume that the wives bear this with the greatest difficulty.

c. Women, especially those who are already of more advanced age and burdened with numerous offspring, sometimes think that by denying the debt they do not sin gravely unless it is done almost always or unless the husband is placed in danger of sinning. But if the confessor discovers this, let him beware lest he fruitlessly take good faith away from them.

d. For the rest, women must be seriously and gravely admonished not to show themselves difficult and peevish to their husbands if the husbands demand intercourse, or other things which are licit for spouses, from them, lest namely they expose them to the danger of leaving their own wives and approaching other women.

3. A spouse is bound to render the debt to one asking seriously, even if from this he fears light harm or inconvenience: for light harm or inconvenience in no way excuses from a grave obligation, which moreover is one of justice.

Although a light inconvenience, e.g. a bad odor which the wife emits from her mouth and nostrils, does not excuse from asking or rendering the debt, nevertheless an inconvenience truly grave excuses even from this obligation, as from others, as will be said in what follows, n. 91 ff.

4. Within the first two months, by a special concession of law, spouses are not bound to render the debt.² This privilege is indeed conceded to spouses by law for deliberating about entrance into religion; nevertheless they can probably use it even if they do not wish to enter religion. But once the debt has been rendered, the privilege ceases. Spouses, however, are not accustomed to use this privilege, both because they are ignorant of it and because, even if they know it, they do not wish to use it, and indeed deservedly, on account of the danger of sinning.³

a. Although many authors deny this privilege to those who do not think about entrance into religion, nevertheless, since St. Alphonsus (n. 958) affirms it, a spouse who wished to use it could not be compelled to render the debt.

b. This privilege refers only to a religion in which solemn vows are emitted, since marriage is dissolved only by solemn vows.

c. The two-month period begins from the day of the contracted marriage (others think from the day which the ecclesiastical judge determines), and when this period has elapsed the privilege ceases.

d. A spouse who contracts marriage with the intention of entering religion, without the other party being forewarned, sins because he deceives the other party.

e. The obligation of rendering the debt, which presses from the time of the contracted marriage, is suspended by force of this privilege. But if the bride enters religion, the husband, in order that he may be able to enter another marriage, must wait until, after the novitiate has been completed, or rather after the three-year period has been completed, she emits the profession of simple vows, by which the bond of marriage is dissolved.

¹ 1 Cor. 7, 3.

² Council of Trent, sess. 24, canon 6. C. Ex publico 7. De convers. coniug. (III. 32).

³ Cf. De sacramentis n. 522.

89. When the right of asking is lost. The cases in which the right of asking is lost are chiefly the following:

1. If one of the spouses has committed adultery, and a fortiori if he has committed incest. The right of departing from an adulterous spouse is conceded to the innocent party, whether it is the man or the woman, from the very nature of the matrimonial contract: for fidelity is not owed to one breaking fidelity. In order that the right of asking be judged lost, it is required that the adultery be formal, certain, not committed by both, and not explicitly or implicitly condoned: for if it has been committed by both, there is compensation, and if the innocent party asks the debt or freely renders it to one asking, the injury is judged implicitly condoned.

A husband who, without his wife's knowledge, has committed adultery can ask: for by adultery he is not deprived of the use of marriage as by incest; moreover he does not lose the right of asking by the adultery itself, but when the innocent party, after the adultery has been known, deprives him of his right by denying the debt for a long time (n. 100), nor is he bound to manifest his crime to the other party.

2. If the one asking lacks the use of reason, as if he is insane or drunk, because the asking of one who lacks the use of reason is not a human act; moreover by marriage there has not been contracted an obligation except to the conjugal act to be performed in a human manner. But it is licit for the party in possession of reason to render the debt to an insane or drunk person, especially if he is in danger of incontinence. But if the insanity is not perfect, of itself there exists in the other party an obligation of rendering.

Whether a spouse is bound to render the debt to one perfectly drunk or insane if the one asking is in danger of committing pollution, there is not one opinion of authors. Many affirm it, because the spouse is bound from charity to impede the sin of the other, even if it is only material.¹ Their opinion is to some extent confirmed by the judgment of those physiologists who assert that harm is not to be feared for offspring from intercourse had at the time of drunkenness: for if offspring of a drunken spouse is born infirm or dull, this does not arise from intercourse had at the time of drunkenness, but from the organic constitution of the drunken person, altered by frequent drunkenness.² Some, however, deny this obligation, because a spouse is excused from the precept of charity by a just cause; but a just cause is a founded fear lest offspring arisen from intercourse of this kind contract not only grave defects of body, but also depraved habits of soul.³ Practically, therefore, a spouse cannot be obliged to render the debt to one perfectly drunk, even if the one asking is placed in danger of incontinence.

¹ St. Alphonsus n. 984. Sanchez l. 9, disp. 23, n. 11.

² Olfers, Pastoralmedicin^2, p. 70, to whom however others are opposed, judging that from intercourse with a drunk person there arises danger lest offspring be born infirm.

³ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri VI, n. 407 ff.

90. Whether the wife is bound to render the debt to one asking illicitly. If the conjugal act is illicit on account of some circumstance which is had on the part of the person asking, the wife not only can, but also must render; but if the act is illicit either in itself or on account of a circumstance which is referred to the conjugal act, she is not bound and cannot render.

a. He asks illicitly to whom the conjugal act is illicit; but the conjugal act can be illicit on account of a circumstance which is in the one asking himself, as if he asks from a depraved end, for taking pleasure alone, or if the one asking is bound by a vow of chastity; moreover the conjugal act can be illicit in itself, as if an onanistic or sodomitic act is asked; finally the conjugal act can be illicit because of some circumstance which is on the part of the act, as if it is asked in a public or sacred place.

b. Now there are some who with Pontius answer the proposed question, with no distinction made, that it is not licit to render the debt to one asking illicitly: for he asks formal cooperation with sin, with the single case excepted in which the one asking, if he wished, could also actually have intercourse licitly, as if he asks for pleasure alone; but it is never licit formally to cooperate with sin.¹

c. But others, making the distinction which is set forth above, with Sanchez teach that the wife can and must render the debt if the conjugal act is illicit on account of a circumstance which is in the one asking: for the conjugal act on the wife's part is licit, and because the husband, on account of that circumstance which renders the act illicit, has not lost the right of asking, the act is also owed from justice. And Sanchez indeed illustrates this doctrine by these examples: if someone demanded coins deposited with another in order to fornicate, the latter would have to return the coins; and if one having a credit with another vows that he will not exact the credit and nevertheless exacts it, the other can and must render the debt.²

¹ Cf. Pontius l. 10, c. 3, n. 3.

² Sanchez l. 9, disp. 6, n. 7. Cf. St. Alphonsus n. 944. 947.

91. When the obligation of rendering ceases. A spouse is not bound to render the debt if from this he ought justly to fear grave harm, which is not of itself annexed to marriage, for himself or for conceived offspring: for those entering marriage are not judged to bind themselves to the conjugal act with so great an inconvenience. The cases in which for this reason a spouse is not bound to render are chiefly the following:

1. If the asking is immoderate: for intercourse performed immoderately exhausts strength and harms health. Asking can be immoderate absolutely, if it is asked more than once in one night, or relatively by reason of illness or weakness of body, according to the judgment of prudent men.

a. How often spouses can perform the conjugal act without detriment to health cannot be determined by a general rule: for it depends on the physical constitution of the spouses themselves and on other circumstances. According to medical authors, the use of marriage which occurs twice in a week does no harm, and if spouses are vigorous and of firm constitution, they can use it even three or four times, excepting times in which nature itself advises that they abstain from the conjugal act, as at the time of menstrual flow, pregnancy, etc. But spouses who are weak and of infirm constitution, especially men who are occupied for a long time and seriously with mental labors, can exercise the conjugal act without detriment only once in a week. If in a concrete case doubt arises about this matter, it will be helpful to consult a physician.¹

b. Therefore a wife does not sin by denying the debt to a man for whom intercourse had once on any night is not sufficient, so that he asks even during the day or more often in the same night, unless this occurs in an extraordinary case, e.g. in danger of incontinence.

2. If grave danger of life or health is to be feared according to the judgment of a prudent physician.

a. Therefore there is no obligation of rendering the debt to one who labors under a contagious disease, nor to one who labors under a strong fever or another grave disease. If, e.g., a wife labors under an organic disease of the heart, intercourse can bring sudden death, and therefore she is not bound to render the debt; if the husband labors under the same disease, he cannot ask, and the wife is not bound to render to him asking; if nevertheless because of danger of incontinence he asked, the wife could render the debt, unless sudden death were certain.

b. Likewise a woman is not bound to render the debt who has experienced that she cannot give birth without danger of death; nevertheless a woman is not excused from rendering the debt who underwent danger of death in the first childbirth or suffered extraordinary pains, because experience establishes that women experience greater difficulties in the first childbirth than in those following.

c. If from the judgment of a skilled and prudent physician it were established that the one rendering would be exposed to a grave disease or to death itself, he would not be bound to render; nevertheless in these circumstances it would be licit to render if the danger is not altogether certain and proximate, because always to abstain would be most difficult.

d. If a woman rendering the debt is exposed to danger of grave and long-lasting infirmity, which would bring only a slow death, she is not bound to render: for she is not bound to this with danger of death, even if only of a slow one.

3. Inconveniences which are internal to the condition of marriage do not excuse from rendering the debt: for those entering marriage are judged by that very fact to wish to undergo these inconveniences. Inconveniences of this kind are held to be: a. ordinary inconveniences of pregnancy and of nourishment; the ordinary difficulty of childbirth; b. some weakening of health; c. pains which are indeed grave but not long-lasting, or long-lasting but moderate, such as headaches for several months after childbirth.

¹ Cf. S. Ribbing, Die sexuelle Hygiene, p. 58 f.

92. 1. If spouses already gifted with numerous offspring are so poor that they cannot nourish further offspring, with danger of incontinence of each party excluded, they are probably excused from rendering the debt on account of the grave harm which is to be feared for the wife and for the offspring already born.

Although spouses already gifted with numerous offspring can abstain from the use of marriage, nevertheless if danger of falling into grave temptations is imminent, it is rather to be advised to them that, committing themselves to divine providence, they use marriage, supported by this hope, that God who gives fecundity will also give nourishment.

2. A husband who, having no care of the family, leaves the burden of nourishing the offspring to the wife, loses the right of asking; wherefore the debt can be denied to him without sin. And this indeed can be done even when the husband is placed in danger of incontinence: for the wife cannot be obliged to rescue the husband from this danger with so great an inconvenience.¹

Whether and what kind of harm to offspring excuses from rendering the debt. Universally it can be said: if for the offspring it is better thus to exist than not to exist at all, harm to offspring, at least when danger of incontinence exists, does not excuse from rendering the debt. Wherefore fear does not excuse, lest offspring be born infirm, nor fear lest it have to live in need and want; indeed not even a fear founded on experience lest offspring be brought forth by abortion or be born dead, because it is better for it to exist in original sin than not to exist at all. Nevertheless, if offspring is already conceived, it is not licit for spouses to perform intercourse or any other action whatsoever which may harm its life or formation.

In all these cases the wife not only can licitly render, but also, for avoiding the danger of incontinence, which scarcely is not always present or must be presumed in one or the other party, she is even bound to render if the husband asks seriously, especially because these harms occur accidentally, and therefore do not certainly happen.

¹ Lehmkuhl, II, n. 853.

93. Principles. The question is whether and when internal acts of lust (thoughts, delectations, and desires) and imperfect acts (touches, kisses, embraces, looks, and conversations) are licit for spouses. Further, spouses perform these acts either alone or mutually; and if the acts are mutual, they either have an order to intercourse or do not have this order. Here, however, we consider actions which do not have an actual order to having intercourse, since above (n. 70) it has been said concerning those which are ordered to intercourse actually to be had. Now, for solving the proposed question, two principles must be noted:

1. In spouses that alone is a grave sin which is against the primary end of marriage; but apart from voluntary pollution, whether solitary or onanistic, and the crime of sodomy, nothing is against the primary end of marriage, which is the generation of offspring. All other actions in themselves, or considered in their nature, are licit for spouses, and become sins if they are exercised for pleasure alone or with foreseen danger of pollution without a just cause.

a. Pollution and its proximate danger are no less illicit in married persons than in the unmarried; indeed both pollution itself and actions which induce its proximate danger are a graver sin in married persons than in the unmarried, because through them not only chastity, but at the same time the right of the other spouse, is injured. For this reason married persons are bound under grave sin to avoid pollution and its danger, just as the unmarried are bound to this.

b. They ask whether also in wives pollution, namely complete venereal delectation which occurs with the effusion of vaginal humor, and its proximate danger, is a grave sin. Those who affirm this bring forward these reasons: because there occurs an effusion of humor, not indeed prolific, which nevertheless is uniquely destined by nature to generation, namely to rendering it easier and more pleasurable; because the effusion occurs with the greatest organic commotion; because it brings complete delectation.

2. Venereal delectation sought within marriage is in itself licit for spouses: for marriage, since it grants a right to the conjugal act, brings it about that the delectation instituted for that act, which is gravely illicit for the unmarried, becomes licit for the married. Nor is it licit to them only when they intend intercourse, but also when they either cannot have intercourse or do not wish to have it.

a. Sought within marriage, i.e. by acts ordered by their nature to the conjugal act, such as mutual touches, looks, conversations, etc., which by their nature are apt to dispose to intercourse and prepare it. And since even touches and looks which a married person exercises upon his own body can be ordered to the conjugal act, the married person who shamefully touches or looks at himself does not seek delectation outside marriage, but within marriage.

b. Venereal delectation is licit for married persons, upon whom there lies the office of conserving and propagating the human race, just as the delectation of food and drink is licit for men universally, upon whom there lies the office of conserving the human individual. And just as excess in the use of the delectation of foods is a venial sin because of defect of an honorable end, so excess in the enjoyment of venereal delectation, with proximate danger of pollution excluded, is a venial sin because of defect of an honorable end.

c. Therefore those acts which by their nature excite lust, such as touches, kisses, looks, etc., are in themselves licit for spouses apart from proximate danger of pollution, provided they have an honorable end. The honorable end on account of which acts of this kind are performed by married persons is chiefly this, that conjugal love may be manifested and fostered.¹

¹ Cf. Sanchez l. c., disp. 41, n. 2 ff. Sporer l. c., n. 502 ff. Gobat, Experient. theol. de sacram., tr. 10, n. 666 ff.

94. Corollaries. From these principles the following corollaries are now inferred: a. concerning mutual imperfect acts; b. concerning solitary imperfect acts; c. concerning morose delectations in spouses.

1. Mutual imperfect acts which are not joined with proximate danger of pollution are no sin if they are done from a reasonable cause; they are a venial sin if they are exercised without a reasonable cause from pleasure alone.

a. Therefore one who looks at or touches his wife immodestly, without the intention of intercourse and from mere pleasure, does not sin mortally, provided danger of pollution is absent: for looks and touches of this kind are licit for spouses of themselves; but if they are done without an honorable end, they are a venial sin, because the disordered use of a thing otherwise licit is only a venial sin.

b. There are some who condemn enormously obscene acts between spouses as grave sin, even apart from danger of pollution. Among acts of this kind they recount: if they touch themselves with mouth or tongue on the genitals, and similar things. But in these acts, as in the rest, two elements must be distinguished. The first is danger of pollution. This is common to them, even though in a greater degree, with all imperfect acts; therefore insofar as this danger is considered, a special malice does not belong to them. The other element is the obscenity or foulness, as it is called. But between married persons there is no action, nor can one be imagined, which on account of foulness alone is so intrinsically evil that it can never become licit. Therefore authors are not lacking (Sanchez, Filliuci, Sporer, Ballerini, Berardi, etc.) who judge that those acts are not to be exempted from the common rule concerning the liceity of imperfect acts. Therefore if by experience it were established that in determined persons those acts do not induce proximate danger of pollution, at least they would not be gravely sinful.

2. Mutual imperfect acts which are foreseen to be joined with proximate danger of pollution are no sin if they are exercised from a grave cause of necessity, utility, or decency, and there is no danger of consent. For just as the unmarried can perform licit acts from a grave cause, even if pollution follows from them besides the intention (n. 36 ff.), so married persons can perform licit acts from a grave cause, even if pollution is foreseen to follow; but acts of this kind are licit for married persons.

a. A cause of this kind, sufficiently grave, is: for fostering or restoring mutual love; for averting suspicion of infidelity or of love toward another person; for obeying the other party asking that those acts be permitted or rendered.

b. Since pollution itself is illicit in itself, it is not permitted to consent to the delectation joined with pollution; nevertheless most spouses are ignorant of the malice of this consent, and it is not expedient to admonish them about this matter, lest from material sins there be made formal sins.¹

3. Mutual imperfect acts which are foreseen to be joined with proximate danger of pollution are a grave sin if by their nature they induce that danger and are exercised without a just cause: for pollution is no less illicit for spouses than for the unmarried; therefore whatever of itself induces its proximate danger is also illicit for them.

Spouses who, because of supervening impotence, cannot have the conjugal act can licitly perform mutual imperfect acts from an honorable end, provided proximate danger of pollution is excluded, even if sometimes it follows accidentally. Nevertheless they must beware of consent to its pleasure, since it is illicit.

¹ Cf. Lehmkuhl, II, n. 836.

95. Solitary imperfect acts in married persons are venial sins if they are done without danger of pollution; and they are mortal sins if by their nature they induce proximate danger of pollution. The reason for the first is that they are done from pleasure alone; the reason for the second is that married persons must avoid pollution and its danger no less than the unmarried.

It is said that imperfect acts, e.g. shameful touches which a spouse performs upon his own body, apart from danger of pollution are light sins, because the opinion teaching that they are grave sins is not certain. The reason of St. Alphonsus, who says that the contrary opinion is more probable (n. 936), is this: marriage does not confer upon a spouse a right over his own body, except that he may dispose himself for intercourse; therefore if he does not dispose himself for this, he can no more use his own body than an unmarried person. The reason of those who with Sanchez¹ hold that those acts are only a venial sin is this: they would be mortal because of venereal delectation directly willed; but venereal delectation directly willed, apart from foreseen danger of pollution, pertains to those things which in marriage are licit by their nature; therefore in married persons, if it is admitted from pleasure alone without a just cause, it is a venial sin (n. 93).

¹ Cf. Sanchez l. 9, disp. 44, n. 16.

96. 1. Morose delectations (joys) and desires concerning those things which are licit for spouses are no sin; concerning those things which are prohibited under light sin, they are a light sin; concerning those things which are prohibited under grave sin, they are a grave sin, because delectation receives its morality from its object.

a. Therefore delectation concerning intercourse thought of as present, joy concerning intercourse had or to be had, and desire for it, with proximate danger of pollution nevertheless excluded, is not a sin, even if venereal delectation arises from them: for it is joy and desire concerning a licit thing. In practice, however, complacency of this kind concerning conjugal intercourse, although by reason of the object it is licit in itself, nevertheless is not free from light sin, because it is an idle occupation and has no other end besides pleasure. But if a thought of this kind and the delectation arising from it is admitted from a reasonable end, e.g. for driving away melancholy, it is altogether without sin.

b. If a married person is spiritually delighted about intercourse with another person, he commits grave sin, because the object of the delectation is gravely illicit; for he is delighted about adultery.

2. Venereal delectation from a licit thought, voluntarily admitted outside intercourse, with proximate danger of pollution excluded, is of itself not a sin, because the matrimonial state makes it licit; moreover, considering the circumstances in which spouses are found, venereal delectations easily and frequently arise; hence an intolerable burden would be imposed upon them if they had to avoid consent in those things.

From these things it is clear that morose delectations, and venereal delectations arising from them, of spouses concerning acts had or to be had with the other party are not sins except by reason of idleness; but delectations concerning gravely dishonorable acts with an extraneous person are grave sins, because they are delighted about an illicit object. Therefore spouses who accuse themselves of morose delectations should be asked whether they were delighted about their own spouse or about an extraneous person, and they should be suitably instructed not to take delectation from an illicit object.¹

¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus l. 5, n. 25. Ballerini-Palmieri I, n. 555 ff.

Let the words of St Paul serve us as a preface, who are about to treat this unseemly matter briefly: "Let the husband render the debt to his wife," says the Apostle, "and in like manner the wife also to the husband.

The woman hath not power of her own body, but the husband; and in like manner the husband also hath not power of his own body, but the wife. Defraud not one another, except perhaps by consent for a time, that you may give yourselves to prayer; and return together again, lest Satan tempt you for your incontinency." Accordingly the use of marriage is not only lawful, but the debt must be rendered in justice, under grave obligation, to the other party asking seriously and reasonably. Although this is most certain, causes are nevertheless admitted which excuse from this obligation, so that there is no obligation of rendering the debt when it cannot be rendered without danger of life or of grave illness, or when it is not reasonably asked — as by one insane or drunk — or when it is asked too often, as several times in the same night. Even to one half drunk it seems lawful to refuse the debt, especially because of the danger of grave defects, both bodily and moral, in the offspring that might be conceived, unless quarrels, discord and incontinence on the part of the one asking are thereby feared. It has been said that in these circumstances there is no obligation of rendering the debt; indeed it would of itself be unlawful to render it with proximate danger to life or health. Nevertheless, if the disease were long-lasting and not tending proximately to death, such as syphilis, the healthy party is permitted to render the debt with danger of infection, in order to avoid incontinence or to foster conjugal love.

A greater difficulty arises when, in the judgment of a physician, the offspring to be conceived would be death to the mother. Such cases, however, are not easily to be admitted; and indeed physicians pronounce judgment about danger to life the more readily because they see that women are angling for it. Unless, therefore, the case be altogether special, a confessor will safely give this counsel to a woman alleging such a judgment of a physician: that she study to please her husband, and commit herself to God with great confidence.

Since married persons are bound to render the debt to one another, it is clear that they are as a rule bound also to live together, except when necessity does not allow it, or when by mutual consent it is otherwise arranged without danger of incontinence and without scandal. To married persons who are old or weak, and who often perform the act only imperfectly, the use of marriage is not to be denied, provided there is some hope that they can duly complete the act.

¹ 1 Cor. vii-3-5.

What is lawful and what is not lawful for married persons is contained in the following general rule: what is useful for performing the conjugal act is lawful; what is against the generation of offspring, or tends to impede it, is gravely unlawful; what is not against the generation of offspring, although it be beside it, is at least not gravely unlawful.

It is lawful for a married person to excite himself to intercourse by immodest touches and looks, and, after the husband has withdrawn, it is lawful for the wife to excite herself by touches to complete venereal pleasure. Sodomitical intercourse, and intercourse begun but broken off with emission of seed outside the woman’s vessel, is gravely unlawful. If, however, it is established by experience that the spouses can break off intercourse once begun without proximate danger of pollution, this does not seem to be mortal if both consent. A fortiori other shameful touches and looks allowed by the spouses without proximate danger of pollution do not seem to be mortal sins, and they are excused from all sin if they are done for a just cause, as to foster conjugal affection.

A husband who, in incomplete intercourse, voluntarily withdraws from his wife and sheds the seed outside the vessel commits a grave sin against nature and against the end of marriage. From the deed of Onan the sin is called onanism. It is established that it is a grave sin from Holy Scripture, from the fact that it frustrates the principal end of marriage, and tends to the ruin of the human race. It is established also from several replies of the Sacred Congregations. Morally it makes no difference by what means this sin of frustrated nature is committed — whether by some instrument, or by a sheath, or by washing the woman’s vessel after intercourse, or by the mere withdrawal of the husband before emission.

If such a thing is done by the mutual counsel and consent of the spouses, both sin gravely. If, however, the husband’s withdrawal displeases the wife, and she has vainly tried to induce him to complete the act rightly, she does not seem to be forbidden to render the debt to her husband when he asks it, or even to ask it herself for a grave cause. For she co-operates only materially with the husband’s sin, and such co-operation is lawful for a grave cause. And there is a grave cause both on the husband’s side, lest he be offended, and on the wife’s side, who is not to be deprived of her marital rights with danger of incontinence. It is lawful, therefore, for the woman, even though the husband act onanistically, to take venereal pleasure in the use of marriage; indeed it is lawful for her, after the husband has withdrawn, to excite herself by touches to complete satisfaction if she has not yet experienced it. Confessors ought not as a rule to question married people about the manner in which they exercise their marital rights. If, however, a spouse proposes doubts about the lawfulness of onanism, the confessor ought briefly to explain the Catholic doctrine to him. Indeed, if he has a well-founded suspicion that the spouses are acting onanistically, whether in good or in bad faith, he ought to warn them, since a grave sin is in question, very harmful to the spouses themselves and to human society. A spouse who will not acquiesce in the Catholic doctrine on this matter is of himself incapable of absolution.

¹ Gen. xxxviii 9.

Provided intercourse can be duly completed, no posture in performing it is gravely unlawful, and an unnatural posture is made honourable, so that it is not even venially unlawful, provided some just cause is present. By the old law approach to a wife was forbidden at the time of the menses and of purgation, and indeed a similar prohibition was in force in the ancient ecclesiastical law. It seems must be said that those laws were positive and no longer bind Christians. The opinions of the Doctors vary concerning the lawfulness of such approach. The reasons which many brought forward to show the unlawfulness of the act rested on fables; nevertheless physiological science confirms the opinion according to which, on account of the nervous state of the woman at the time of the menses and of purgation, a man must abstain at least under venial sin unless a just cause excuses him. The same seems to be said of the time of pregnancy; indeed, if intercourse involved proximate danger of abortion, one would then have to abstain under grave sin. Such danger, however, can scarcely be established, and hence the obligation of abstaining cannot be urged. The opinion of many seems probable, according to which immodest touches which a spouse performs upon himself in the absence of the other party are not mortal sins, provided there is no proximate danger of pollution. The married state itself, they say, makes such acts less unbecoming, so that what in the unmarried is grave is in the married only venial. Nor does morose delectation about intercourse had or to be had — excluding again proximate danger of pollution — seem to be forbidden to married persons under grave sin. Indeed a merely rational delectation about a lawful object,

such as intercourse is for married persons, would not be even venial; in practice, however, delectation about the conjugal act can scarcely be merely rational, inasmuch as it naturally excites the senses and the members. Hence morose delectation about intercourse had or to be had is as a rule forbidden, at least under venial sin, to married persons also. To have intercourse with one’s spouse with an adulterous mind, thinking of another person besides the spouse, is a grave sin by reason of the adulterous mind.

(St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 49, aa. 4-6; St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, VI, 900-954; Homo Apostolicus, tract XVIII, nn. 35-50).¹

As we noted above, conjugal chastity is that by which spouses exclude the unlawful use of venereal things, but prudently moderate the lawful use. We shall discuss first lawful things, then unlawful things; and in treating lawful things, we shall also explain to what extent they are perhaps obligatory for spouses.

¹ Cf. Sanchez, De matrimonii sacramento, book 9; De Smet, De sponsalibus et Matrimonio, I, nn. 207-248; Vlaming, Praelectiones iuris matrimonii, II, nn. 623-638.

The principal act, or conjugal intercourse, and accessory acts are distinguished.

I. The intrinsic ends of conjugal intercourse, namely, of the work itself, are: the principal end is the procreation of offspring; the secondary ends are the quieting of appetite or concupiscence, both in oneself and in the partner, the signification of conjugal love, and the increase of this love (cf. can. 1013, § 1). Finally, many other ends can be intended by the one acting, as for example the procuring of health, etc. (St. Alphonsus VI, 882, 883).

II. Intercourse, if it is performed, can be performed only for an honorable end. Nevertheless any honorable end suffices, and it is enough that the honorable end be virtually intended. I said:

1. Intercourse can be performed only for an honorable end. For every human act, in order to be good, must be done only for that end which befits the nature of man, that is, rational nature. But it befits rational nature to act for an honorable end, and not for another (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2; St. Alphonsus V, XLIV).

Corollary I. It is unlawful to have intercourse for pleasure alone, as is clear from what has been said and from proposition 9 condemned by Innocent XI, which said: "The work of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is entirely free from fault and venial defect" (St. Alphonsus VI, 912). Nevertheless one who performs intercourse for pleasure alone sins only venially, since the disordered use of a thing lawful in itself, such as intercourse, does not contain grave disorder, since the defect does not fall upon the substance of the act. Make exception if someone actually or virtually had pleasure as his ultimate end (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Corollary II. It is unlawful to have intercourse also for pleasure, by resting also in it as such, because pleasure as such is not an honorable end. Yet to someone this will seem lawful, insofar as the honorable act and its pleasurableness constitute one thing.

Corollary III. It is lawful to have intercourse for pleasure insofar as, from the intention of the Author of nature, it entices to an act ordered in itself, that is, to conjugal intercourse; likewise insofar as it conduces to the well-being and operation of the body or soul. The reason is that pleasure considered as such has the character of an honorable end (St. Alphonsus VI, 912; cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 34, a. 1; II-II, q. 141, a. 6, ad 2; II-II, q. 168, a. 2; Contra Gentiles, book 3, c. 9, n. 1).

2. Any honorable end suffices, whether of the work or another intended by the agent, whether conceived specifically or in a vague way. The reason is that the ends of the work themselves do not fall under precept; this being laid down, it is free to the agent to set before himself another honorable end (St. Alphonsus VI, 927, compared with 882 and 883).¹ Many, however, judge, as we shall note presently, that the end of the work itself is at least implicitly intended by the very fact that it is not positively excluded.

Corollary. Spouses do not sin who, in intercourse had for an honorable end, desire that conception not follow, provided the act placed is of itself apt for the primary end, or the procreation of offspring (St. Alphonsus VI, 831, 927).

3. It is enough that an honorable end be virtually intended, or that intercourse be virtually referred to an honorable end; this follows from the fact that, in view of the nature of such a relation, intercourse is truly referred by it to an honorable end; and this suffices (St. Alphonsus V, XLIV).

It is disputed whether one who performs intercourse, and does not positively exclude the honorable end of the work, for example procreation, by that very fact intends an honorable end, at least implicitly. Most more recent authors affirm this, but it seems that it must be denied. For what is distinguished from the work is not implicitly intended by the very fact that the work is performed. But the end of the work, for example procreation, is distinguished from the work itself as effect from cause; hence, in order that it be intended, a new act of the will is required. But the controversy is less practical, because one who places in due manner and order an act which by its nature is ordered to an honorable end, and does not positively exclude that end, commonly positively includes that end, although perhaps only confusedly and weakly.

¹ St. Thomas teaches thus: "In two ways alone spouses come together without any sin, namely, for the sake of procreating offspring, and for rendering the debt; otherwise there is always sin there, at least venial" (Supplement, q. 49, a. 5). And again: "But if someone through the act of marriage intends to avoid fornication in his spouse, there is no sin, because this is a certain rendering of the debt, which pertains to the good of fidelity; but if he intends to avoid fornication in himself, thus there is some superfluity there; and according to this there is venial sin there; nor was marriage instituted for this except according to indulgence, which concerns venial sins" (loc. cit., ad 2). Finally: "It must be said that although to intend the preservation of health is not evil in itself, nevertheless this intention becomes evil if health is intended from something which of itself is not ordered to this; as if someone were to seek only bodily health from the sacrament of baptism; and similarly also in the proposed case, in the act of marriage" (loc. cit., ad 4).

Accessories to intercourse chiefly are: touches, kisses, embraces, and looks, both modest and less modest and immodest, whether done with venereal commotion or without it. But accessory acts are either mutual or solitary.

I. Mutual acts are to be judged thus:

1. If they are referred to intercourse, that is, if they are done with the intention of carrying out intercourse, whether absolutely or conditionally, namely if danger of pollution presses, they are lawful; and this holds even if the acts are very immodest. The reason is "because to him for whom the end is lawful, the means also are lawful; and to him to whom the consummation is lawful, the beginning also is lawful. Hence they lawfully excite nature by such things toward intercourse" (St. Alphonsus VI, 932). The danger of pollution, indeed, ought of itself to be avoided; but if the acts are referred to intercourse, the danger is commonly absent, unless you except certain acts which are of such a kind that pollution can hardly be timely averted. Such is, for example, begun intercourse from which the spouses desist before insemination. Acts of this sort, therefore, are scarcely free from grave sin, unless with respect to those who know by experience that grave danger of pollution is absent (St. Alphonsus VI, 934). On the insertion of the male member into the mouth of the wife, see n. 107.

2. If they are not referred to intercourse, they are lawful provided the danger of pollution is absent. The reason is that for those to whom intercourse is permitted, that is, the perfect mutual act, those acts also are lawful which by their nature are ordered to intercourse, that is, to the perfect mutual act; and of this kind are incomplete mutual acts. And this holds even if intercourse itself were forbidden to the spouses because of illness, or impossible because of impotence which had supervened; but otherwise if the spouse were bound by a vow of chastity (St. Alphonsus VI, 933; n. 85). If grave danger of pollution is present in either spouse, they are of themselves gravely unlawful; they become lawful if a proportionate cause for permitting the danger of pollution is present.¹ Moreover, the more an act influences pollution, the graver the cause required. Mutual love to be fostered makes honorable even less modest acts; indeed, generally a serious petition of the partner is a sufficient cause for admitting even more shameful acts, unless they are quasi-begun pollution, that is, such that pollution can scarcely be averted, according to what was said under 1 (St. Alphonsus VI, 934).

Note. What has been said about the obligation of asking and rendering intercourse is also applied to mutual accessory acts, with the things set forth above preserved, especially with the danger of pollution excluded.

¹ As is clear, it is not lawful to consent to a pollution that will follow; but many spouses are ignorant of the malice of consent in pollution following beyond intention, nor is it commonly expedient to warn them about that malice.

II. External solitary acts are certainly gravely unlawful if they bring with them grave danger of pollution; if they do not induce that danger, but nevertheless are placed with venereal commotion, they must be spoken of thus:

1. If they are referred to intercourse now to be had, they are lawful, as was said about mutual acts referred to intercourse (n. 101).

2. If they are not referred to intercourse, there is dispute. Some judge that the said acts are not unlawful in themselves, because venereal commotion in spouses always by its nature has an order to conjugal intercourse. Others hold acts of this sort to be gravely unlawful: first, because the spouse of himself does not have a right over the use of his own body, but only accidentally insofar as the use of it is referred to intercourse, that is, to the use of the body of the partner, according to these words of the Apostle: "The woman does not have power over her own body, but the man. Likewise also the man does not have power over his own body, but the woman."¹ Then, they say, incomplete solitary acts of themselves seem to be ordered to a complete solitary act, that is, to pollution. St. Alphonsus (VI, 936) says that the stricter opinion is to be advised; and let this also be done by those who adhere to the more benign opinion, because rarely will every danger of pollution be absent.

¹ 1 Cor. 7:4.

III. Internal acts, if they are concerned with an act unlawful to spouses, such as morose pleasure concerning intercourse with a third party, are manifestly sinful, as is explained more fully in the appendix (n. 120). If they are concerned with an act lawful to spouses, such as morose pleasure concerning intercourse with the partner, joy over intercourse had with that partner, or the proposal of having intercourse with that partner, they are likewise unlawful if they carry with them grave danger of pollution. If they do not induce that danger, even if they are exercised with venereal commotion, they are, with sufficient probability, equated with the mutual acts of which it was said under I, that is, they are lawful (St. Alphonsus V, 25;¹ n. 118 and 121).

Corollary. Of himself the spouse does not sin who excites himself to intercourse by looking at, or representing to himself, either shameful images or, for example, a beautiful person distinct from the partner, provided that he does not with complacency revolve in his mind an act which would be unlawful for him with respect to that person.

¹ Cf., however, St. Alphonsus VI, 937 and Homo Apostolicus, tr. 18, n. 42; these places create difficulty unless we say that the Holy Doctor is speaking there of graver venereal pleasure, which always brings on danger of pollution.

The Obligation of Paying the Conjugal Debt.—(a) The duty is one of justice, since it arises from the contract of marriage, in which the parties freely and solemnly bind themselves to it as the subject-matter of their pact.

(b) The obligation is grave, since the marriage contract is one of the most momentous of human agreements, its direct end being the propagation of the race, while the denial of its essential right is productive of most serious evils, such as incontinence, scandals and the disruption of families. There is light matter, however, as when the request is not imperative, or the denial is infrequent and without danger of incontinence.

Absence of Obligation.—The obligation of paying the conjugal debt does not exist, however, when the right to make the request has been lost or when the request is unreasonable.

(a) Thus, the right to make the request is lost when one party has broken faith by committing adultery and has not been forgiven by the innocent party, and also when one party is incapable (e.g., on account of insanity or drunkenness) of asking in a rational manner.

(b) The request is unreasonable, first, when it is immoderate (e.g., when it cannot be granted without serious and unusual detriment to health, or without danger of death, or without likelihood of abortion or other great harm to a child conceived or to be conceived); secondly, when it is seductive (e.g., when it is an invitation to commit onanism).

Suspension of Obligation.—The obligation of granting and the right of requesting conjugal relations are suspended when the marriage is discovered to be null or uncertain.

(a) Thus, if the marriage is certainly null, abstinence is necessary until the marriage is made valid; otherwise the parties are guilty of fornication. But if nullity is due to a merely ecclesiastical impediment, the impediment probably ceases in cases of most grave inconvenience when the nullity is known to only one spouse and the dispensation cannot be obtained at once.

(b) If the marriage is only doubtfully null, abstinence is not necessary unless both parties have a serious doubt and no examination has yet been made. Light doubts should not be considered, nor doubts that have not been corroborated by investigation; while, if only one party doubts, he or she cannot refuse the debt lest injustice be done the other.

Is There an Obligation of Requesting Conjugal Intercourse?—(a) Per se, there is no obligation, since one may lawfully decide not to enjoy one’s right, and not to use what belongs to one. As man and wife were free to marry or not to marry, so are they free to agree either to consummate or not consummate marriage. It is even lawful for married people to contract together to abstain temporarily or permanently from marriage relations (e.g., for the sake of health, or of economy, or of mortification). By mutual consent one or both may make a vow of chastity, as was done by St. Joseph and the Blessed Virgin, or the husband may enter the priesthood and the wife become a nun.

(b) Per accidens, there is often an obligation of requesting intercourse, for experience shows that continual non-use of marriage often leads to incontinence or to loss of affection (see 2228).

Contraception.—Contraception in all its forms (onanism, condonism, vaginal irrigation, spermatocide) is a grave crime.

(a) It is an Injury to God.—Marriage was instituted by God to propagate the human race (Gen., i. 27, 28) and to bless homes with children (Ps., cxxvi, cxxvii), and He has made it a sacred institution and a Sacrament. Contraception defeats the ends of marriage and degrades it to the level of a mere instrument of carnal gratification. The hatred of God for this sin appears in general from the horror with which Scripture speaks of unnatural lust, and in particular from the case of Onan, whose sin is called detestable and whom God slew in punishment (Gen., xxxviii. 10).

(b) It is an Injury to Society.—The perpetuation of the human race is endangered as soon as marriage is abused as to its natural end. Hence, after the crime of homicide which destroys human life already in existence, contraception seems to rank next in enormity, since it prevents human life from coming into existence. This vice spreads moral degeneracy and decay from the home itself, and is rightly called race-suicide, since it depopulates and destroys the nation by the act of its own people.

(c) It is an Injury to the Family.—The happiness and success of the home depend chiefly on the respect which its members have one for the other and on the cultivation of the sturdy virtues that strengthen character. The husband and wife who practise onanism or other similar carnal vices cannot have the mutual respect they should have; the wife is deprived of the treasure of her modesty and is treated as a prostitute rather than as an honored wife and mother, and the husband is brutalized by the removal of the natural restraint to his sex passion. Such self-indulgent persons will either selfishly neglect the one or two children they may have, or will spoil them for life by the luxury and laziness in which they are reared.

(d) It is an Injury to the Individual.—As concerns the body, there is a perversion of the sex act from its definite use and specific end, and hence contraception has been described as “reciprocal masturbation.” As regards the soul, its higher goods of will and intellect are subordinated by the contraceptionist to the delight of passion, the lower impulses are greatly strengthened and self-control made more and more difficult, and the spiritual objectives that should prompt a rational creature are sacrificed for the passing gratification that moves the beasts.

Some Arguments of Neo-Malthusians and Other Advocates of Contraception.—(a) Necessity for the Individual.—“This practice is demanded by comfort (e.g., in order to have a good and easy time, to have more opportunity for pleasures and occupations outside the home, to preserve form and beauty, to escape the troubles of child-bearing and child-rearing), or by utility (e.g., in order that suffering wives be freed from the slavery of excessive child-bearing, in order that children receive more attention and care than is possible in large families).” This argument from comfort is unworthy of any but a pagan or materialist, for the end of existence is something higher than pleasure or escape from all hardship. But even if happiness alone be considered, the childless home is not the most cheerful, and it often happens that parents who have sinfully limited their parenthood will lose an only child and be left sterile and desolate. The argument from utility proves only that sometimes (not often) it is inadvisable for a couple to have any or many children, but it does not prove that family limitation through means forbidden by the laws of God and of nature is permissible. The normal woman is not harmed but helped by child-bearing, whereas onanism and other unnatural vices are fearfully damaging both to mental and physical health. Experience too shows that mothers of five or more children live longer, and that children from large families are very often superior in qualities and achievements and stand a better chance in life. Exceptions only emphasize the rule.

(b) Necessity for the Family.—“Large families are impossible to many persons because the high cost of children today (expenses for clothing, food, medical care, schooling, etc.) is beyond their means.” The inability to support many children is often due to extravagance or to insufficient wages, and the remedy lies in prudent economy or in improvement of the economic condition of workers, not in the abuse of marriage. The weakness of the objection is shown from the fact that race-suicide is more common among the well-to-do than among the poorer classes. However, in a genuine case of inability to maintain a large family, limitation of children is a duty, but not by means of the sin of contraception or onanism.

(c) Necessity for the Community.—“The cause of unemployment, destitution, famine and war is the overpopulation of the world. Moreover, if the poorer classes would practise contraception and the better-to-do classes have larger families, the standard of living of the former would be raised, the culture of the latter would be preserved, and the quality of the whole race be greatly improved.” The resources of the earth are easily adequate to support many times the present population, and the misfortunes referred to are due, not to the number of people who inhabit the earth, but to accident or to human greed or imprudence. The eugenic argument is a vain dream, for the history of nations and modern facts show that the ideal of race improvement makes little appeal when the easier way of indulgence has been learned. As said above, it is the wealthy and educated classes who have the fewest children.

(d) Necessity of a Moral Kind.—“Contraception is a useful control of nature similar to that employed by physicians, surgeons and other scientists; it is not a contradiction of nature, since it preserves the end of the sexual faculty in expressing physical love. The motives of those who use it are not necessarily carnal, but may be of a very Christian kind (e.g., the need of limitation of family in order the better to practise one’s vocation, or in order to spare one’s wife, or to keep her from abortion), and they may sincerely believe it to be lawful.” Contraception does not control, but defeats nature, by voluntarily frustrating the primary end which nature has in view, and, if permitted, it logically leads to every kind of sensual indulgence. The motives or conscience of those who use it cannot change its character, for the end does not justify the means and a wrong conscience does not change the law. Those who have not been spoiled or misled by contraceptive propaganda or advice, instinctively regard artificial birth-control as well as onanism with disgust.

Is Birth-Control Ever Lawful?—(a) If this refers to an end (viz., the limitation of the number of children or the spacing of their arrival), it is not unlawful in itself (see 2617); and it is sometimes a duty, as when the wife is in very poor health or the family is unable to take care of more. But in view of the decline and deterioration in populations today, it seems that couples who are able to bring up children well should consider it a duty to the common welfare to have at least four children, and it should be easy for many to have at least a dozen children. The example of those married persons of means who are unable to have a number of children of their own, but who adopt or raise orphaned little ones, is very commendable.

(b) If birth control refers to a means of family limitation, it is lawful when that means is continence or abstinence from marital relations, not if it is onanism or the use of mechanical or chemical means to prevent conception. The objection that husbands cannot restrain themselves is really an insult to God’s grace and is contradicted by numerous facts. A man of manly character should be ashamed to admit that he is the slave of passion, and the fact that God commands chastity and that millions obey Him both in the wedded and single state is sufficient proof that, even though hard, sexual abstinence is not impossible, if there is a real resolve and the right means are employed, such as rooming apart and concentration on other and higher things.

Continence or abstinence is counselled by the Church should conditions make the conception of children inadvisable. It is counselled, not commanded, since it involves heroic sacrifice which makes it all the more meritorious and praiseworthy: “It is wronging men and women of our times to deem them incapable of continuous heroism. Today, for many reasons—perhaps with the goad of hard necessity and even sometimes in the service of injustice—heroism is exercised to a degree and to an extent which would have been thought impossible in days gone by. Why. then, should this heroism, if the circumstances really demand it, stop at the borders established by the passions and inclinations of nature? The answer is clear. The man who does not want to dominate himself is incapable of so doing. He who believes he can do so, counting merely on his own strength without seeking sincerely and perseveringly help from God, will remain miserably disillusioned” (Pope Pius XII, Allocution to the Italian Catholic Union of Midwives, Oct. 29, 1951).

Another lawful means of family limitation is “periodic continence” or “rhythm,” the deliberate avoidance of conception by restricting intercourse, temporarily or permanently, to the days of natural sterility on the part of the wife. Many of the faithful are under the impression that the system has received the unqualified approval of the Church, that it constitutes a form of “Catholic Birth-Control.” This is not completely true.

All theologians agree that the use of marriage during the sterile period is not per se illicit. The act is performed in the natural way; nothing has been done positively to avoid conception; and the secondary ends of matrimony, mutual love and the quieting of temptation, have been fostered. “If the carrying out of this theory means nothing more than that the couple can make use of their matrimonial rights on the days of natural sterility, too, there is nothing against it, for by so doing they neither hinder nor injure in any way the consummation of the natural act and its further natural consequences” (Pope Pius XII, ibid.).

“If, however, there is further question—that is, of permitting the conjugal act on those days exclusively—then the conduct of the married couple must be examined more closely” (ibid).

The following points summarize papal teaching on this aspect:

1. A premarital agreement to restrict the marital right and not merely the use to sterile periods, implies an essential defect in matrimonial consent and renders the marriage invalid. 2) The practice is not morally justified simply because the nature of the marital act is not violated and the couple are prepared to accept and rear children born despite their precautions. 3) Serious motives, (medical, eugenic, economic and social), must be present to justify this practice. When present, they can exempt for a long time, perhaps even for the duration of the marriage, from the positive obligations of the married state. 4) The married state imposes on those who perform the marital act the positive obligation of helping to conserve the human race. Accordingly, to make use of the marital act continuously and without serious reason to withdraw from its primary obligation would be a sin against the very meaning of conjugal life (ibid.).

Pope Pius explicitly confirmed the common teaching of theologians: 1) Rhythm, by mutual consent, for proportionate reasons, and with due safeguards against dangers would be licit. 2) Without a good reason, the practice would involve some degree of culpability. Not expressly confirmed, but simply an expression of common moral principles is the common agreement: 3) That the sin could be mortal by reason of injustice, grave danger of incontinence, serious family discord, etc.

Since the Allocution, the more common opinion in this country asserts that the Holy Father taught: 1) that married people who use their marital right have a duty to procreate; 2) that this duty is binding under pain of sin; 3) there are, however, reasons that excuse the couples from this obligation and, should they exist for the whole of married life, the obligation does not bind them at all; 4) the sin does not consist in the exercise of marital rights during the sterile periods; but in abstention from intercourse during the fertile periods precisely to avoid conception, when the couple could have and should have made its positive contribution to society. Sin is present when the practice is unjustifiedly undertaken; 5) the formal malice of illicit periodic continence is not against the sixth commandment; i.e., against the procreation of children or the use of the generative faculty, but against the seventh commandment, i.e., against social justice. The couple is not making its contribution to the common good of society; 6) from 4 and 5 above, it follows that the individual acts of intercourse during a period of unjust practice of rhythm do not constitute numerically distinct sins. Rather, granting the continuance of a single will act to practice rhythm, there is one sin for the whole period of illicit abstention during the fertile periods.

Since the Pope abstained from an explicit statement on the gravity of the sin, the controversy of whether the practice intrinsically is a mortal sin or not continued. The opinion in this country which holds the greatest authority states that mortal sin is involved in the case of continued practice with a total exclusion of children and frequent use of marital rights during the sterile period.

Diversity of opinion has arisen as to the means of estimating when a serious sin has been committed. Some have used a temporal norm, e.g., unjustified use of rhythm for five or six years would constitute a serious matter. Undoubtedly most of the proponents of this norm would not accuse a couple of certain mortal sin if they already have one or more children; after that, indefinite use of the practice without excusing causes would not be a mortal sin. (This is admitted by most theologians.) Others have proposed a numerical norm as a basis to determine whether or not a couple has made its contribution to the conservation of the race. Concretely the proponents of this theory regard four or five children as sufficient to satisfy the obligation in such a way;

a) that the use of rhythm to limit the family to this number is licit provided the couple is willing and morally able to practice it;

b) that the limitation through rhythm to less than four requires a serious justifying cause. The intention involved to prevent conception would be seriously sinful in itself, since it causes great harm to the common good and involves in practice subordination of the primary to the secondary end or ends of matrimony. At the present time this opinion seems to be more favored in America than the first which places the gravity of the sin in the unjustified practice of rhythm for five years. (For a survey of recent opinion, see the Conference Bulletin of the Archdiocese of New York, Vol. XXXIV, No. 1, pp. 36 ff.)

On the other hand, some European theologians have denied that the practice constitutes a mortal sin in itself, independently of circumstances such as injustice and danger of incontinence.

The present state of opinion, then, is definitely undecided and calls for caution both in dealing too severely with penitents or too readily recommending the practice. The response of the Sacred Penitentiary of June 16, 1880, affords a safe guide in practice: “Married couples who use their marriage rights in the aforesaid manner are not to be disturbed, and the confessor may suggest the opinion in question, cautiously, however, to those married people whom he has tried in vain to dissuade from the detestable crime of onanism.”

As to the theological censure to be attached to “rhythm,” it is not approved, nor recommended, but seems to be tolerated for sufficiently grave reasons. “Instead of being freely taught and commended, it is rather to be tolerated as an extreme remedy or means of preventing sin” (Official Monitum, Patrick Cardinal Hayes, Sept. 8, 1936, Conference Bulletin of Archdiocese of New York, Volume XIV, No. 2, p. 78).

27. It is a principle, already commonly admitted among theologians, that in this matter all things are lawful for spouses, except pollution and those things which participate in the malice of pollution, without grave sin, and without even venial sin, if a reasonable cause is present. Hence kisses, embraces, and other touches, even base ones, and generally all incomplete acts, whatever they may be and in whatever way they are performed, per se speaking, contain among spouses no grave guilt of fault, and with a sufficient reason added are not imputed even to venial fault. The reason is that in the married state, since intercourse is lawful, venereal delectation not consummated outside intercourse is lawful. For to him to whom the complete and consummated act is lawful, the incomplete begun act also is lawful, which from its intrinsic nature tends to the complete and consummated act; and such is the carnal venereal motion bringing venereal delectation. But those incomplete acts, which from their intrinsic nature do not pertain to lust but to sensuality, are prohibited insofar as they contain the proximate danger of venereal delectation, which, outside intercourse, not consummated, is not prohibited to spouses. Therefore, etc. Busenbaum apud L., l. 6, n. 932.

28. Corollaries. 1. Looks, kisses, embraces, and touches upon parts both honorable and even less honorable, indeed even simply base, are free from grave fault among spouses, provided, however, that they are done cautiously, so that the danger of pollution is absent. Thus the commoner and truer opinion from St. Alphonsus. "The reason is that, just as the conjugal state makes intercourse honorable, so also it makes touches and looks of this kind honorable; otherwise, since there is so great a society between spouses, and they often cannot have intercourse, they would be exposed to continual dangers if such acts were gravely illicit for them. But just as delectation sought in intercourse does not exceed venial fault, so also in these touches and looks." L., l. 6, n. 933; G., v. 2, n. 910.

2. The aforesaid looks and touches are per se altogether free from every fault, provided, however, as has been said, that they are done cautiously, so that danger of pollution is absent, whenever they are exercised for the sake of showing conjugal affection or fostering love. The reason is that such acts are in reality from their intrinsic nature means to this end of signifying and fostering conjugal love, and therefore lawful to those who by the matrimonial bond ought to become one heart and one flesh. - A fortiori the aforesaid looks and touches are per se free from fault if they are immediately referred to intercourse, or are necessary or useful for exciting nature; for then they are a certain preparation for intercourse and, as it were, its beginning. But if these acts, by which a spouse disposes himself or herself to the conjugal act, are such that they per se easily provoke pollution, they can be culpable if diligence is lacking for avoiding pollution outside congress; and omission of diligence of this kind, where it is such that through it one is thought nearly to will pollution outside the vessel, can even be grave fault. But if, due diligence having been used, such pollution follows beyond intention, there is no fault. G., l. c.; L., l. 6, n. 934.

3. Spouses do not sin gravely, even if from the aforesaid looks and touches, had even without intention of intercourse, there arises a commotion of the spirits or of the members serving generation, or if distillation follows; although these would be mortal in the unmarried. The reason is that, the crime of voluntary pollution outside the vessel or of sodomy being excluded, nothing is done against the good of marriage. But the light fault which can be in acts of this kind is easily excused by ends intrinsic to marriage itself or other extrinsic ends; for example because they are suitable for fostering affection or for calming concupiscence. - Indeed it is even probable, and an opinion sufficiently common, that these acts are excused from every fault even in the one requesting, although pollution is foreseen as about to follow in oneself or in the other, if nevertheless the pollution is not intended, nor is there danger of consent to it, and provided some grave cause is present, for example to foster mutual love or to avert the jealousy of the other. The reason is that then that just cause makes such acts honorable, which otherwise are not illicit among spouses; and if pollution occurs this will be per accidens. Wherefore, as is consequent, it is also probable that these acts are altogether lawful for the one rendering, although there is danger of pollution in either one, because then the one rendering gives his work to a lawful thing. - Diana, tr. 6, de Sacr. Matr., R. 207; L., l. 6, n. 934; Tamburini, Explic. Decal., l. 7, c. 3, n. 56; G., l. c.

But this doctrine, as is clear of itself, is not to be extended to those acts which so tend to pollution that they are, as it were, pollution begun, as if a woman were very lingeringly to touch and stimulate the genital members of the man, or a man were wholly lingeringly to insert a finger within the female vessel. Cf. Sanchez, l. 9, D. 45, 46.

Finally, to this doctrine a question is joined: Do spouses sin if, intercourse having been begun, they restrain insemination? - R. Per se speaking, they do not sin, at least mortally, if both spouses consent in this. The reason is that this penetration of the female vessel is reckoned as, so to speak, a touch of the private parts, which is by no means prohibited under grave sin to spouses. But it is said: 1. per se speaking; for an act of this kind, considered concretely, since it tends to pollution and is, as it were, pollution begun, is illicit concretely. Wherefore, if pollution would always or at least ordinarily follow in reality, then that withdrawal would per se in reality tend to pollution, and then it would be gravely illicit. But if pollution either never followed, or at least did not follow ordinarily, and only sometimes pollution followed, since this would be per accidens and beyond intention, that withdrawal would not then be gravely illicit. 2. At least mortally; for if there is a just cause for acting thus, for example because of poverty and multitude of offspring, and at the same time for calming concupiscence, every fault will be absent. 3. If both consent; for if one withdraws without the consent of the other, he certainly sins gravely. - L., l. 6, n. 918; Diana, tr. 6, de Sacr. Matr., R. 205, n. 2; R. 207; Sporer, de Matr., n. 500; Sanchez, de Matr., l. 9, d. 19, n. 3.

4. "Touches with oneself from venereal delectation, the other spouse being absent, according to the opinion of many, cannot be excused from grave sin, even with pollution or its proximate danger excluded. The reason is that the spouse does not have the right of using his own body in order to unfold pleasure with himself, but only in order to intercourse. La-Croix, n. 339, etc.; L., l. 6, n. 936. Yet not a few others apud St. Alphonsus say that, with the danger of pollution excluded, this does not exceed venial fault. St. Alphonsus judges the first opinion more probable and to be recommended." G. 920. Tamburini, however, says that each opinion is probable, Explic. Decal., l. 7, c. 3, n. 45. And Sanchez says the second is more probable, l. 9, d. 44, n. 16.

Now it must be noted here, according to the reason explained above in n. 27, that these acts, if they are venial, are venial only on account of the extrinsic disorder of the agent. Wherefore, consequently to the principle established above, we say that even these acts, exercised by one spouse alone, altogether apart from the other, per se speaking, or from their intrinsic nature, probably contain not even venial fault. And the reason is: 1. because if these acts are intrinsically culpable, since the matter here is always grave, they are either gravely culpable or in no way; 2. because mutual touch of a spouse with a spouse is probably lawful outside consummated intercourse precisely because that touch from its intrinsic nature is ordered to intercourse. Wherefore, just as consummated intercourse is lawful for spouses, so also intercourse only begun is lawful, which is contained in those acts. But any voluptuous touch of a married person from itself is referred to intercourse, which is already lawful to him or her. Therefore the light fault which can be in these acts can easily also be excused on account of an honorable end, because, for example, they are suitable for calming concupiscence and for avoiding another grave sin.

29. "How ought a woman conduct herself who is touched by a man not her own?" - R. "If she is touched in dishonorable parts, she ought in every morally possible way to repel the one touching. But that is called morally impossible which cannot be applied without such inconvenience as would outweigh, or at least be equal to, the endurance of this touch, such as would be danger of death, infamy, grave loss of goods, and similar things, if she resisted the one touching; in which cases, according to Lessius, l. 4, c. 3, n. 64, and Loth, the woman would not be bound to resist the exterior touch, because such a touch according to species is not evil on the part of the woman, as fornication would be, provided, however, that danger of consenting to interior lust is absent. Since I judge this to be very rare and very difficult, I also think that a woman is regularly bound to resist in every possible and lawful way, whatever may threaten her. But if a woman is touched in honorable parts, yet notices the lustful mind of the one touching, a distinction is needed. Either she is touched in the presence of others, who from the woman's resistance would conceive an evil suspicion concerning the one touching or embracing, or not. If the first, she is not bound to withdraw herself, because there is present a cause of neglecting the other's sin; if the second, she is bound, because we are bound to impede the sin of our neighbor when we conveniently can. Thus Sylvius here, conclusion 1, and others." Billuart, l. c. See about corollary 4. Cf. here n. 25.

137. We have spoken chiefly in the preceding chapters about sins outside the use of marriage; now we must speak about sins within the very use of marriage. Therefore first it must be said concerning the lawfulness of this use, with attention to its intrinsic nature and extrinsic circumstances, and then concerning the right with respect to it and the consequent obligation.

138. The use of marriage can be considered in two ways, physically and morally; and, inspected physically and morally, it can still be considered in two ways according to the twofold circumstance physically affecting the aforesaid use, namely outside the case of impotence, and when impotence is present for completing that act.

139. If the use of marriage is considered physically and morally as to its lawfulness, it is had by the coitus of man and woman, with the bond of marriage preceding, and by the emission of the man's semen into the natural vessel of the woman and its retention there, so that generation can follow, whether the woman also seminates or not. The first reason is that the generation of offspring, which is the primary end of marriage, is naturally impossible unless the male semen is inserted and retained within the natural vessel of the woman. Therefore conjugal and lawful copulation must necessarily take place with the insertion and retention of semen within the natural vessel of the woman. The second reason is that generation is also naturally impossible if, although the male semen is inserted and retained within the natural vessel of the woman, that is, within the vagina, nevertheless by the use of some instrument it is impeded from reaching the uterus. Therefore that insertion and retention of semen must be such that from it generation can naturally follow. The third reason is that the semen of the woman is not absolutely necessary for generation. For today it is known that the true germ of offspring is present in the woman; but this consists not in the woman's semination, as it is called, or in the emission of vulvo-vaginal humor, but in the ovule secreted from the ovary, adhering to its surface, which gradually grows until, mature of itself, even without coitus, it is shed. This chiefly happens at the time of menstruation; and when thus shed, if it is still apt and nothing else stands in the way, it is fecundated by the male semen, and then offspring is conceived. Hence a certain sign of aptitude for fecundation in a woman is had from the presence of menstruation, since menstruation perfectly corresponds to ovulation; although the absence of menstruation cannot always be a certain sign of incapacity for fecundation, because several examples show the contrary.

140. Corollaries. 1. If, when copulation has begun, "the woman has already seminated, or is in probable danger of seminating, the man indeed cannot deliberately withdraw himself from semination without grave fault, because then he himself is the cause that the semen of the wife is wasted." L. 918.; Billuart, de Matr. Diss. 4. art. 3. at the beginning. Cf. here n. 136. But if the man has already seminated, whether the woman sins lethally if she withdraws from seminating is disputed among theologians. Some affirm, because the semen of the woman at least contributes much to the certainty and perfection of the offspring, since it was instituted by nature at least for this. But others more commonly and more probably deny, because the semen of the woman is not necessary for generation. Nor is it truly an objection that the semen of the woman contributes to the perfection of the offspring; for spouses are not bound to the more suitable mode of generating, but it is enough if they do not stand in the way of generation. L. ibid.

Concerning the first conclusion, modern authors say that the reason of St. Alphonsus rests on a false supposition, namely that the semen of the woman is frustrated. But the aforesaid reason does not rest on a false supposition. For although that semination of the woman is not necessary for generation, nevertheless, if it exists, it is intrinsically ordered by nature itself to generation. Hence it is that those same authors, with others, agree that it renders generation easier and more certain; and because it is destined by nature itself to generation, when copulation has already been consummated on the part of the man, the woman, if she has not completed the act, can seminate and complete the act. Therefore, if after the semination of the woman the man does not also seminate, the semination of the woman is altogether frustrated against the order of nature, and altogether against generation.

2. It is not necessary that each spouse seminate at the same time. For "since generation follows without that semen of the woman, not only where it is not poured forth at the same time, but afterward, no precept constrains them to pour it forth equally." Sanchez, l. 9. disp. 17. n. 9. Nor again is it an objection that this is more suitable for generation, because, as was just said, "spouses are not bound to choose the more suitable and easier way of generating, but it is enough for them if they do not stand in the way of generation." Sanchez, l. c. Therefore, if the man withdraws himself after his own semination but before the semination of the woman, she can at once excite herself by touches, because that semination of the woman pertains to completing the conjugal act. Likewise, immediately at the very beginning of copulation, the woman can prepare herself by semination itself for completing it, because that semination of the woman then pertains to the beginning of copulation and in reality, as physicians and experience testify, often renders it easier; and although it is not necessary for fecundation, nevertheless it is very useful, rendering fecundation more certain.

141. Note. Generation can take place without any introduction of the penis, but by the presence alone of sperm at the orifice of the vagina. Therefore, if by reason of the narrowness of the woman, or by reason of disease by which the organs of generation are affected, the man cannot penetrate the feminine vessel, it will be enough that he pour forth and apply the semen at the mouth of the vagina, the copulation being only begun. It is said, if by reason of narrowness, or by reason of disease; for this most imperfect mode of congress will be illicit if they can come together in the ordinary and natural mode. For although spouses are not bound to use extraordinary diligence so that offspring may more certainly follow, nevertheless they are bound to abstain from a less natural mode of coming together, by force of which generation can very easily be impeded, if they can come together in the natural mode.

But whether impotence is had and the marriage is null if the man, for example, from excessive heat or frigidity, cannot pour forth semen except above the vulva or near the opening of the vagina, is disputed. Some affirm, because there is truly power to generate. Others deny, because there is not power to generate in the natural mode. And otherwise excessive heat or frigidity would no longer be impediments of marriage, against the common opinion of the doctors and against the laws themselves. Acta S. Sedis, vol. 4. pp. 196. 197. Cf. here n. 152.

142. Is it a mortal sin to pour forth part of the semen outside the vessel?

These are the words of Sanchez, de matr. l. 9. D. 17. n. 12. 13.: "Voluntary effusion of semen outside the vessel, or that mode of coming together from which it follows, is a manifest mortal crime against nature, because it is opposed to the end of natural generation, to which nature itself has destined semen.... And this indeed must be taken whether in the whole conjugal act, or in part, or at its end, the whole semen or a part of it is poured outside the vessel. Thus Cajetan, 2. 2. q. 154. n. 1. Yet this must be tempered. For the man can be excused from fault if, besides his intention, while he is trying to come together legitimately, from a certain hastiness he pours semen outside, even if he approached with some motion of pouring forth in that way. For this must be attributed not to vice, but to the hastiness of nature." Diana, tr. 6. de matr. Res. 181. 185. 186. 187. But in the emission of sperm very many nemasperms or spermatozoa are emitted, of which only one is sufficient for generation. Antonelli, p. 108.

143. Corollary. Hence a woman who would try to cast out the semen, or part of it, after copulation has been had, can sin mortally, although this should be had in those circumstances in which generation perhaps cannot follow, or at least ordinarily does not follow, for example in the time of pregnancy. For then generation would now not follow from the very act of expelling the semen; and therefore that act, as being contrary to generation of itself, is mortal. Sporer, de matr. 490. 514.

144. Because of the sterility of a woman who cannot conceive, can the husband pollute himself outside copulation, so that afterward a physician may introduce the collected semen by means of an instrument into the uterus of the woman, and this in those circumstances in which it is morally certain, as the physician himself asserts, that generation will follow?

Resp. This is illicit, because that pollution outside conjugal copulation of itself in no way tends to generation; indeed, it is against generation. But that generation can be had, this is outside the intrinsic nature of that act, altogether from without and by accident; namely, it happens from without to that act already intrinsically evil. Nor does this principle stand in the way: in marriage there is lawful, at least without grave sin, whatever is not against generation. For this is true only in this sense: that, namely, at least gravely illicit is not whatever from its intrinsic nature does not impede generation. Cf. here n. 146.; Sanchez, l. 2. d. 12. n. 2. de Matr.; L. l. 6. n. 917. par. Dicunt.

Hence, with perfect copulation excluded, artificial fecundation of the woman is illicit. Holy Office, March 24, 1897. Artificial fecundation, namely, by which art is substituted for nature, not by which nature is merely aided by art.

Art is indeed substituted for nature if the man is first polluted and then the semen collected from that pollution is inserted into the vagina by some instrument. But nature is only aided if copulation is first performed in the natural mode, and then, whether by fingers or by a little syringe, the semen already inserted into the vagina is driven farther up to the opening of the uterus for more certainly obtaining fecundation. According to Sanchez, by illicit fecundation marriage is consummated. For he says: "Likewise they agree that marriage is consummated, by whatever art the semen is received within the natural vessel, without its penetration." L. 2. d. 21. n. 2. Sanchez cites several authors. But the contrary seems to have to be said. For that fecundation is not done by natural copulation. For marriage by nature itself is ordered to copulation and to generation through copulation, and through perfect copulation, which cannot exist without that penetration and the effusion of semen on the part of the man and the woman.

And of the woman: for if many ancient theologians denied this, this was because they thought that "feminine semen is not necessary for generation." Sanchez, l. c. n. 10. But, because then the opposite was also probable, the same Sanchez, l. c. n. 11., says: "Therefore I conclude that it is probable that marriage is not consummated unless the woman also seminates, because for the consummation of marriage there is required copulation from which generation can follow." If, therefore, it is certain that for generation on the part of the woman the ovule and the fecundation of the ovule are required, it must consequently be said that marriage cannot be present if the woman perfectly lacks ovaries, or had an impervious vagina, so that the ovules could not be fecundated. Cf. here n. 150.

145. Does a man sin mortally by beginning copulation in the mouth, so that afterward he may consummate it in the due vessel?

Resp. These are the words of St. Alphonsus, 235.: "Sanchez, etc., deny, provided the danger of pollution is absent; but Sporer, etc., more truly affirm, both because in this act, because of the heat of the mouth, there is present the proximate danger of pollution, and because this of itself seems a new species of lust against nature, called by some irrumation; for whenever some other vessel besides the natural vessel instituted for copulation is sought by the man, there seems to be a new species of lust. Yet Sporer with Filliucci and Marchant excepts the case if it is done in passing; and Sanchez also seems really to think this, when he excuses that act from mortal sin if every danger of pollution ceases. Palaus, p. 4. par. 2. n. 6., excepts the case if the man did this so that he might excite himself toward natural copulation; but from what has been said, I think neither is to be admitted." Nevertheless the opinion of Sanchez does not seem altogether improbable; for as to the first reason, it does not seem true that there is always proximate danger of pollution if those parts are received by the mouth only in passing. But as to the second reason, namely that that act is a begun act and of itself tending to a new species of lust, it does not exceed the bounds of probability; and the same St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 466. at the end, more probably denies this peculiar species of sin. Cf. here n. 119.

146. Does a man sin mortally by beginning copulation in the preposterous vessel, so that afterward he may consummate it in the due vessel?

Resp. "Navarre, etc., deny, provided the danger of pollution is absent, because otherwise, as they say, all touches even venereal would not be illicit among married persons. But Sanchez, etc., commonly and more truly affirm. The reason is that coitus of this kind itself, even without semination, just as copulation itself in the natural vessel of another woman is true fornication although semination is not present." L. 916.

147. Note. 1. "Sanchez condemns as guilty of mortal sin the man who in the act of copulation would insert a finger into the preposterous vessel of his wife, because, as he says, in this act there is affection toward sodomy. But I judge that such an affection can indeed be found in the act, but, speaking of itself, I do not recognize this affection as implanted in such an act. Moreover, I say that spouses exercising such a foul act are always to be gravely rebuked." L. 935.

2. But is it mortal for a man to rub the male parts around the preposterous vessel of his wife? Sanchez and Bossius with Filliucci and Perez deny, because to touch the mouth of the preposterous vessel is not ordered to sodomitical copulation. Pontius, etc., affirm, and also Tamburini, "who testifies that from some codices the opinion of Thomas Sanchez was deleted; indeed Moya asserts that Sanchez himself retracted himself in the Antwerp edition of 1614. The reason is that at least such a touch cannot morally be done without sodomitical affection." L. 916.

148. When a man cannot coit with a virgin, is the wife then bound to suffer the cutting of the virginal enclosure by fingers or by another instrument, if there is need?

Resp. "Pontius, Palaus, Ledesma, Hurtado, and Leander apud Escobar deny. The reason is that that defect is not of the woman but of the man; therefore she herself is not bound to use a remedy so that she may render herself apt, but it is enough that she hand over her body to be opened in the mode instituted by nature, not however in an extraordinary mode. But Sanchez, etc., more probably affirm. The reason is that such an opening, on the one hand, can well be done without shame either by the husband or by the girl herself; on the other hand, the trouble which she would have to suffer in such opening does not seem great, nor extraordinary, indeed it is ordinary for all; hence since the woman has already handed over to the man the right to copulation, she is bound to use this means so that she may render herself apt for him who because of his own weakness otherwise cannot coit." L. lib. VI. n. 1100.; Debreyne, 2. p. ch. 1. Sect. 2.

149. When spouses cannot have copulation of itself apt for generation, impotence is had; and if it precedes marriage and is perpetual, whether absolute and toward all, or respective and toward one or only some, it dirimently impedes marriage. The reason is that a contract cannot be valid when the thing promised will never be able to be furnished, according to the rule of law: one unable to pay is also unable to promise. It is said, if it precedes marriage and is perpetual; for it will be otherwise if impotence, even perpetual, supervenes after marriage has been validly contracted, since marriage once validly contracted is indissoluble; or if it indeed precedes marriage but is temporary, for it is not of the nature of marriage that perfect copulation can always be had, but that it can be had at some time. Yet except the impotence of impubescent age, which, as is clear, is temporary; for by ecclesiastical law it dirimently impedes marriage. By the name of puberty is designated the age at which a man and woman become apt for generation. Puberty in males is in the fourteenth year of age, but in females in the twelfth year. Sporer 525. and following.; Milne Edwards, t. 9. pp. 85-89. 100. 104. 105.

150. Note. Four cases of impotence are listed in men. The first is if they lack both testicles, or have both crushed, because they are incapable of prolific semen. The second is the perfect absence of the penis, so that not even the little extremity of the male member remains, which could at least bring semen into the exterior genital parts of the woman. The third is imperforation of the penis, or a perforation of it which reaches no interior cavity, so that human semen cannot be emitted outside. The fourth is frigidity, or such weakness of the male member, whether it arise from disease, or from a natural aversion of the other spouse, or even from malefice, that by no art and remedy can he experience erection, nor can he penetrate the feminine vessel, nor can he pour forth semen. Excessive heat also is customarily listed by the older theologians, by which the man pours forth semen so prematurely that he cannot wait for conjugal copulation itself; this indeed can very rarely constitute a true diriment impediment. For if, approaching the first time, he cannot do this, it is very difficult that, attempting copulation a second and third time, he would be unable to complete the act.

But three cases chiefly of perpetual impotence in women are listed: first, the absence of both ovaries; second, the absence of the uterus and vagina; third, perfect obliteration of the uterus and vagina. But generally that impotence is judged perpetual which cannot be removed without a miracle, or sin, or danger to life; hence although such impotence is removed, the marriage nevertheless was null and therefore must be repeated. Debreyne, l. c. Sect. 1.; Milne Edwards, t. 8. p. 383.; t. 9. p. 21., etc.; Sanchez, de Matr. l. 7. D. 92. n. 1. 7.; Reiffenstuel, L. 4. Decret. Tit. 15. n. 3.

There are several modern authors who hold that perfect absence of the uterus and ovaries, as well as occlusion of the vagina, does not constitute the impediment of impotence in a woman. They rely chiefly on the fact that marriage is also for the remedy of concupiscence. Certainly for the remedy of concupiscence, but nature first already presupposes marriage, which is principally and essentially for generation. For in what other thing is that remedy to be sought, except in marriage? Is it to be sought otherwise than by the conjugal act? Therefore marriage is presupposed, and consequently the natural power for marriage, which by its nature is instituted for generation.

Nor truly does it avail to say that power for coiting suffices and not also power for generating offspring; for this must be proved. Coitus is not the end of marriage, but the natural means to its essential end, namely generation. And if impotence for generation were on the part of the woman, then equality would be lacking in the contract of marriage; for the man would hand over that power, but the woman in turn would not be able to hand it over. Eminent Cardinal Gasparri, in his Tr. de Matr., Paris, 1891., vol. 1. p. 119. num. 205., explaining the definition of marriage, excellently says: "The companionship of life signifies in the first place a mutual right, with relative obligation, over the body of the other in order to generate and educate offspring, or THE RIGHT OF COITING, as they say.... Therefore marriage brings to each party an exclusive and perpetual right, with relative obligation, over the body of the other in order to generate and educate offspring." And if marriage is valid with a woman impotent for generation, why then is marriage not also valid with a man impotent for generation, with a eunuch, with a castrated man? For these could use marriage well, not indeed for generation, but for the remedy of concupiscence, for taking pleasure. But it is objected: they cannot take the greatest and full pleasure from marriage. But is pleasure the end of marriage? And if they cannot take full pleasure, nevertheless they take as much as they can take, and this fully suffices for them as a remedy of concupiscence, if, for there to be marriage, it suffices, as they say, that it be for restraining, or rather satisfying, concupiscence. Castration, or the removal of both testicles, brings perpetual inability for generation, but by no means inability for copulation, nor does it carry with it the absence of venereal sense.

Lastly, there are indeed several modern authors who oppose the common opinion of the ancient doctors, but there are also several modern doctors who still hold it and support it by reasons.

R. P. Lehmkuhl, in his very recent Compendium Theol. Mor., year 1907, num. 1019., defines marriage as: "The individual association of male and female, BY WHICH THEY ARE MUTUALLY COMPLETED for constituting by right ONE PRINCIPLE OF GENERATION." And num. 1052 he says that impotence "renders one incapable of consummated copulation, or copulation of itself apt for generating.... Sterility is distinguished from impotence; it supposes the possibility of copulation, but offspring is not generated because, whether on the part of the male semen or on the part of the woman, something stands in the way so that the male semen may not fecundate THE MATERNAL EGG." And num. 1054 he says: "Whether she who lacks both ovaries or even the uterus is judged impotent is disputed. The Holy Office, indeed, having been asked whether a woman rendered sterile by the defect of both excised ovaries can and lawfully may be permitted to enter marriage, on February 3, 1887, responded: Having considered the matter maturely and for a long time, that the marriage of the woman in the case should not be impeded. It answered the same on July 30, 1890, concerning excised ovaries and uterus. But in those cases there was no certainty about complete excision, nor about absolute impossibility of conceiving."

1. Marina, after marriage had been entered, was able to complete intercourse the first time not without grave difficulty. For it could not be completed otherwise than by exciting herself, in the very approach of the husband, even to seminal emission, namely before intercourse was in reality completed. The same difficulty always persevered because of narrowness of the organ, whence unless she does that, conjugal intercourse is impossible for her, or not possible without grave pain. She often explained the matter to her confessors. Some told her that it is permitted to her to excite herself thus even to seminal emission, immediately before the intercourse itself, just as it would be permitted to excite herself in the same way immediately after intercourse. But others said that it is by no means permitted thus to excite herself immediately before the intercourse itself, and added that the marriage, in the case, is null on account of impotence, since intercourse is not possible except by a means altogether illicit.

Q. What as to the case?

R. That a marriage of this sort was null on account of the impotence of the woman can indeed in no way be admitted. For in fact intercourse was completed, as appears from the case; and accordingly this marriage cannot be null from impotence, which impotence is for coition simply, and not for coition easily or with difficulty, with pain or without pain. And that impotence which is present in the case, whatever it is, can rightly be removed, and in fact is removed, without bodily danger and by a remedy otherwise licit, as will soon be explained. For nullity by reason of impotence in the case could not reasonably have been affirmed otherwise by those confessors, except insofar as they thought that that manner of congress was illicit, and accordingly that the impotence in the case is not removed except by an illicit means.

But as to the discord of the confessors concerning that excitation immediately before intercourse, perhaps they would be brought to concord if some explained their mind rightly to others. For if that immediately before is taken in a certain gross way and broad meaning, so that namely the woman, before the coition itself, indeed before the very approach of the husband, excites herself even to perfect seminal emission or pollution, this indeed appears altogether illicit. For that act, in reality, as a whole and entire thing, is in itself fully perfect independently of intercourse, and accordingly truly has the nature of pollution. And if afterward intercourse in fact follows, as far as concerns the very nature of such an act, this following intercourse is not related per se to that prior excitation as its natural perfection and natural complement, but that intercourse is related merely per accidens. But in such a case it is not really had that that excitation is done immediately before the intercourse itself, since in reality other actions intervene between this and that, and accordingly that immediately before is taken in a broad and gross way.

But if that immediately before the intercourse itself is taken properly and strictly, so that the aforesaid excitation has place in the very approach of the husband to the wife, and not before it - which approach alone is that which can truly and properly be understood immediately before the intercourse itself - then the grave illicitness of that excitation does not appear, so that it cannot be permitted without a grave and proportionate cause. The brief and urgent reason seems to be that that excitation is then related to the intercourse itself not at all per accidens, but on the contrary per se, and is related only to the intercourse, since it is in reality the beginning and commencement of the intercourse itself. And only this beginning and commencement of intercourse immediately precedes the intercourse itself, not another. The same assertion is confirmed from the authority of theologians. For there is truly no one who denies the illicitness of an excitation of this sort on the part of the wife in the intercourse itself now begun.

For 1. although theologians commonly do not teach this explicitly, because they do not treat this question, supposing that the woman is always of a colder nature, nevertheless they seem at least to intimate this implicitly, when they permit the wife before the act "to prepare herself for intercourse by touches." St. Alphonsus, n. 919. Indeed, such preparation by its nature progresses even to seminal emission, which can be confirmed from the very comparison which the Holy Doctor makes in l. c., which otherwise would prove nothing at all: "just as the wife can prepare herself for intercourse by touches, so also she can complete the act of intercourse," namely after the husband has withdrawn himself. And the same is also evinced from the other reason which the Holy Doctor adds: namely, that the wife can, after the husband has withdrawn himself, immediately excite herself by touches to seminal emission, because that seminal emission of the woman contributes much to generation. Now, from physiology and the opinion of physicians, that excitation contributes still more both to the marital act and to generation itself, if it is done immediately beforehand, namely in the very approach of the husband and in the commencement of intercourse. Pont., de Matr., l. 10, c. 11, n. 5; Giribaldi, tr. 10, de Sacr. Matr., c. 19, d. 7, n. 41, 47.

2. The principle commonly admitted by theologians is: "It is not necessary that each spouse have seminal emission at the same time." Sanchez, de Matr., l. 9, d. 17, n. 9. The husband can have emission first and then the wife; the wife can have emission first and then the husband, in the conjugal act. Cf. St. Alph., l. 6, n. 918, 919. Hence it is commonly deduced that immediately after the conjugal act also the wife can have emission, because that emission of the wife is had, the emission of the husband being supposed, as the complement of the conjugal act. Now from this it also follows, by logical deduction, that immediately before, in the very approach of the husband, the wife can have emission, since then the commencement of intercourse is had, which, the intercourse having been carried out, is completed and perfected by the emission of the husband. But attending to physiological doctrines concerning this matter, that improper emission of the woman pertains rather to the proximate and immediate preparation and disposition of the conjugal act and its commencement than to its complement. Moreover, it is more related to intercourse, and is more a preparation and commencement of intercourse, if it is done immediately before, while namely the husband is in that which completes coition and is already at the mouth of the woman's vagina, than if it is done immediately after, namely, as theologians commonly say, after the husband has withdrawn himself; for intercourse then is no longer had in any way, and nevertheless the emission of the woman is regarded by theologians as the complement of intercourse.

3. Besides, the conjugal act consists in this: that by marital congress the husband and wife become one flesh through the mingling of seeds. This indeed does not prevent the woman who did not have seminal emission in the marital congress, after that congress has now ceased, from having emission immediately afterward, because the mingling of seeds is still had by force of the same marital congress. But the same is verified altogether, and much more, if immediately before that congress, the woman, preparing and disposing herself proximately for it, namely in its very beginning and commencement, has emission; for, the congress itself immediately following after from this proximate preparation and beginning of the congress, the mingling of seeds is now had by force of the same conjugal congress.

It is added that, according to the opinion now commonly admitted, it is permitted to the husband to institute imperfect intercourse, that is, only to begin intercourse, and by this beginning of intercourse, from some reasonable and sufficient cause, also to pour out seed at the external surface of the female organ, or at the mouth of the vagina. Cf. Ballerini, note to n. 855; Fr. Gury, vol. 2, p. 830 seq.; D'Annib., p. 3, a. 431, 3rd ed. Therefore a fortiori the woman can, without doing anything repugnant to nature, excite herself even to seminal emission in the beginning of the same intercourse. Sometimes indeed natural intercourse on the part of the woman is possible in no other way, nor can it be done in another way without grave pain and inconvenience to the woman; for the fibers are then naturally relaxed and dilated.

4. The same follows from another commonly admitted principle, that in order that there be mortal sin between spouses, something must be done against the good of marriage. But that act immediately before intercourse, in the very commencement of intercourse, according to the teachings of physiology, harms human generation in no way; indeed it is commonly regarded by physiologists as useful, and very useful, both to the conjugal act itself and to the generation of offspring itself. From the aforesaid principle theologians gather that, the crime of voluntary pollution outside the vessel and of sodomy being set aside, scarcely anything else can be condemned with certainty as grave fault in spouses. It is not a question here, as is clear, of sodomy, nor can there be question of pollution outside the vessel, since female emission naturally and commonly is not done outside the vessel, unless from purpose and from lasciviousness the woman procures in herself that outpouring of humor outside the vessel, and this is not the present case. Scav., 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 1, n. 778. Nor indeed can there be question of pollution, simply such, for this is an outpouring of seed without congress with another, so that a futile outpouring of seed is had against the order of nature. In the case at issue, the beginning of intercourse is had, and accordingly it cannot be said that that without congress with another is verified; and much more it is not verified in this case than in the other already indicated, in that aforesaid complement of intercourse. But most certainly a futile outpouring of seed is not had, since, with intercourse soon perfected, the mingling of seeds is had, the conjugal act being completed on each side. Cf. Verricelli, de Apost. Miss., tit. 18, q. 303 seqq.; Quaest. Mor. leg., tr. 4, q. 27, s. 7; Mendo, Statera, etc., d. 5, q. 18, at the end.

And from these things which precede, that also is clear which was declared by the Holy Office on 24 March 1897, namely that artificial fecundation of the woman is not licit. From which illicitness those things also which precede are in turn confirmed.

2. Candidus, a confessor, although he has a prudent suspicion that spouses use marriage onanistically, always omits interrogating those same spouses, who do not accuse themselves of that sin. For first, he considers all as constituted in good faith. Besides, he himself acts thus lest he offend the spouses.

3. Pius, a confessor, asks: 1. Whether a woman can be absolved who indeed would suffer the husband if he acted rightly in conjugal intercourse, but vehemently desires that the husband withdraw himself, because that woman fears to have offspring. 2. Whether a woman can be absolved who, in conjugal intercourse, could by her blandishments obtain from the husband that he not withdraw himself, and does not do it, because that intercourse displeases her.

4. Bertha has a husband whom she has known by constant experience to be an onanist. In vain she has tried every means to draw him back from so unspeakable a crime. Indeed, most grave, or at least grave, evils now probably threaten her, so that she must either incur these evils, or flee from the house of her husband, unless she permits at least sometimes the abuse of marriage.

5. Flavia has an onanist husband, whom she can in no way resist. After the withdrawal of the husband, since she herself is greatly aroused, she is accustomed still to excite herself by touches so that she herself may at length complete the act. Since she was doubtful concerning this matter, she questioned Doctor C. C., who responded to her that this is licit to her, since what of itself is licit to her cannot be made illicit to her by the sin of the husband alone.

Q. 1. What concerning onanism? 2. What as to the various cases?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. V. 2, n. 1066, 1067. - To the second. The practice of Candidus cannot be approved, in always omitting to interrogate spouses, even when the abuse of marriage is prudently established. But it is altogether false that all spouses of this sort, acting badly, are in good faith. And for omitting the interrogation which otherwise must be made, the fact that the aforesaid spouses may be offended is not a sufficient reason. Sacred Penitentiary, 21 May 1851; 10 March 1886; Enchir. Moral. 1058. But the interrogation, when it ought to be made, must be made discreetly and prudently. Let the aforesaid confessor recall to mind that adage: holy things must be treated holily. And lest he exceed in interrogations, let him also weigh the words of St. Alphonsus, who in Praxis Confessariorum, § 4, n. 41, says: "But concerning the sins of spouses, with respect to the conjugal debt, ordinarily speaking, the confessor is neither held nor is it fitting to interrogate except wives, whether they have rendered it, in the more modest way in which he can. Let him be silent about the others, unless he has been questioned." Sacred Penitentiary, 8 June 1842.

To each question of Pius one must respond negatively. Sacred Penitentiary, 27 May 1847. For in the first case that woman desires a thing intrinsically evil, since the thing is contrary to the natural right of marriage. Sacred Penitentiary, 21 May 1851. But in the other case, the woman is consenting in the abuse of marriage on the part of the husband.

As regards Bertha, "since in the proposed case the woman indeed on her own part does nothing against nature, and gives work to a licit thing, but the whole disorder of the act proceeds from the malice of the husband, who, instead of consummating, withdraws himself and pours out outside the vessel; and therefore, if the woman after due admonitions accomplishes nothing, but the husband insists, threatening beatings or death or other most grave evils, she herself will be able, as approved theologians teach, to conduct herself permissively without sin, since in these circumstances of things she simply permits the sin of her husband, and that from a grave cause which excuses her; because charity, by which she is held to impede it, does not oblige with so great an inconvenience." Sacred Penitentiary, 1 Feb. 1832. - Gury, Comp., vol. 2, n. 927 seqq.; Scav., 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 3, n. 921, 922.

As to Flavia, the response of Doctor C. C. cannot be approved. For, given the withdrawal of the onanist husband, that act now has the true character of pollution. Hence in circumstances of this sort that act is not licit to her of itself, nor is it in any way made illicit to her by the sin of the husband. Wherefore, although the husband were not an onanist and withdrew himself from a reasonable cause, because, for example, he could not consummate the act, nevertheless the wife, thus aroused, could not for this reason then complete the act herself by her own touches. St. Alph., l. 6, n. 918, 919; I. M. 810, 811, 813.

6. Moevia, fearing to have several children, is accustomed immediately after the conjugal act to wash herself with cold water. But at the same time fearing lest this be a sin, she questions four confessors. The first responds that this is altogether illicit. The other asserts that it is simply licit. The third affirms that it is indeed illicit if it is done immediately after marital congress, or a little afterward, but by no means if it is done at least after three or four days. The fourth says that it is illicit if it is done with cold water, but by no means if it is done with hot water. Hence Moevia, after so many diverse resolutions, approaches a fifth confessor, that she may know whether she can continue in that practice, candidly asserting that she in reality has had no further child after she began to apply that washing.

Q. What as to the case?

R. First, there can be no doubt concerning the grave sin of Moevia in the aforesaid practice, from the depraved intention which she has of impeding generation, even prescinding from the very nature and force of that washing. It appears sufficiently and more than sufficiently that Moevia persists in it from the fear by which she is affected of having several children; consequently she applies it to impede conception.

But what must be thought concerning the aforesaid practice, sufficiently common? If it is considered in itself and the depraved intention is absent, since by prescription of a physician it is applied on account of infirmity, namely on account of a flux of humor which women not rarely experience.

From the opinion of physicians and physiologists, cold water either kills the germ, or certainly diminishes its fecundative power, which needs a certain determined degree of heat. For the fecundating activity of the spermatozoa is preserved by heat exceeding 30 degrees; but when the heat decreases below 20 degrees, although it is still preserved, nevertheless its energy is less. Hence washings or interior irrigations made with cold water are illicit of themselves, because they either impede generation or at least contain a sufficiently proximate danger of generation to be impeded.

Likewise, if the water, although sufficiently warm, nevertheless is not simple water but medicated water, then the case must be examined in particular; for there are certain drugs which have the same force of killing the germ or impeding generation, but others which are altogether innocuous.

Moreover, if the washing is done not only immediately, but even a little after the conjugal act, the seed is wasted and generation is impeded. It is necessary that at least a half hour, or at most three quarters, or even a whole hour have elapsed, lest generation be impeded. If besides the washing or irrigation is done not only in the vagina but also in the womb, so that water is sent by some greater pressure into the womb itself and penetrates it, the aforesaid washing and irrigation is altogether illicit, since either the germ is carried away by it or, if conception has already been made, abortion is procured. Wherefore the washing must be done only with light pressure of water, lest it pass beyond the vagina and seed be carried away from the womb or the fetus be expelled; and because, if seed still remained in the vagina, the more easily is the seed then carried away from the vagina, the greater will be the pressure of the water by which it is introduced within. But in the beginning of pregnancy it is at least prudent to abstain from washings or irrigations of this sort, since some danger of abortion can be present in them.

Hence, if due precautions are applied, both lest seed be ejected, and lest conception be impeded, and also lest abortion be procured, the aforesaid washing does not seem illicit, so that the wife must abstain from it under grave obligation, although otherwise it is altogether necessary for her on account of the infirmity which she suffers, of a flux of acrid and harmful humor. But if she could abstain from it, or at least defer it longer after the conjugal act and wait an entire day, or two or three days, it would certainly be better. Nor indeed does there appear, at least ordinarily, so urgent a reason why it is not deferred thus. Cf. Debreyne, Essai sur la Theol. Mor., p. 3, c. 1; Legrand du Saulle, Médecine Légale, Paris, 1886, pp. 265, 266, etc.

Those things which precede can be confirmed by the doctrine and authority of St. Alphonsus as to other cases very practical in this matter. 1. "Spouses indeed can from a grave cause do something from which, per accidens, an outpouring of seed follows; nevertheless they sin if in the use of marriage, or after the use, they do something by which conception is impeded or the seed conceived is rejected. The reason of the former is that generation is not impeded, not even indirectly, but it is only permitted not to take place, which is licit from a reasonable cause. The reason of the latter is that they act against the faith and principal end of marriage. Hence poverty threatening or danger from childbirth does not excuse such persons." Lig. 954.

2. Hence it is grave if a woman in the use of marriage diverts her mind to other things in order to impede conception. Lig. 918, 954. Likewise a wife will sin mortally if immediately after intercourse she urinates, or rises, or does something else, with the intention that she expel the received seed, because she frustrates the end for which seed is instituted by nature.... But it was said if the woman does this immediately and with the intention of expelling the seed; for if she did this from some necessity, for example, to avoid danger of death or the scandal of others, all say that she does not sin, just as they also agree that there is no need that the wife, after intercourse, remain long unmoved and supine, because in a short time the womb draws the seed and is closed most tightly." Lig. 954, 918.

"It seems to me indeed," says Capellmann, "to be preferable that this sin be removed from the midst by this reason: that to a woman accusing this in confession it should be answered that that manner of acting in no way helps the woman's depraved counsel. For it is certain that seed which has now penetrated into the female vessel does not flow out so easily. The walls of the vagina, after the withdrawal of the husband, are immediately composed hermetically, and therefore on account of the capillary sucking force of the touching walls it cannot happen that the seed flows out." Medicina Pastoralis, 11th ed., Aachen, 1896, p. 139.

3. Speaking of the natural position, the Holy Doctor adds these things at the end: "But Sanchez, Pontius, Palaus, and Bossius say, with Perez, Hurtado, and Aversa, that it is not mortal if, on account of a variation of position, only part of the seed falls out, the rest being retained within the vessel, sufficient for generation; which Sanchez and Bossius say sometimes happens; indeed Palaus and Pontius say that it happens almost always, and Pontius testifies that physicians assert this. But the Salamanticenses call this opinion too lax, because, as they say, to waste human seed without reasonable cause cannot be excused from mortal sin. Moreover, the Salamanticenses themselves, and Sanchez and Sporer with Aversa, say that the confessor is not held to interrogate a spouse accusing himself of this whether seed was poured out or not, because rarely, as they say, does it happen that seed is poured out; and thus I also have heard several times from those who accused themselves to me in confession of having had intercourse in an inverted manner. But those who have intercourse standing, or sitting, or with the woman above, I think to be in greater danger of pouring out the seed. But by this I do not dare to condemn the opinion of Sanchez, Pontius, Palaus, and others, as above; for they could respond to the Salamanticenses that to waste seed without a just cause, or, as the Salamanticenses ought better to have said, to permit that seed be wasted, is never licit when the seed is poured out outside the vessel of the wife, but not when it is sent within and, per accidens and not from the act itself, is wasted; because then the womb, as the aforesaid authors say, already draws what is sufficient for generation and expels the rest as superfluous." Lig. 917.

The same Capellmann, l. c., p. 151, says: "Every position, even if unnatural in intercourse,... of itself does not exceed venial fault, provided that the conjugal act can be sufficiently completed... that is, provided that introduction into the vessel and emission of seed into the vessel can take place. Infusion into the vagina is plainly sufficient. From anatomical causes direct infusion into the womb will very rarely have place; descent

(according to the law of gravity) will never happen. Reception of seed into the womb is effected partly by motions of the muscles and of the ciliated epithelium of the mucous membrane, and partly certainly by motions which are present in the spermatozoa themselves. Wherefore, in order that seed be introduced into the womb, position in intercourse is of no importance. Partial loss of seed after infusion into the vessel can indeed happen in some positions, nevertheless not so that conception is impeded by it. For it is established that the least amount of seed suffices for generation." And St. Alphonsus also says in l. c.: "Change of position does not impede generation, since the seed of the man is not received into the womb of the woman by infusion or descent, but by attraction, while the womb of itself naturally draws the virile seed."

4. "One taking or giving a potion, or effecting anything else by which conception of offspring is impeded and the spouse becomes sterile, sins mortally, whatever end this is done for, for instance, because the wife is accustomed to give birth with danger of death. The reason is that by deliberate work the seed is impeded from its natural end of generation, and it is against nature. Thus Cajetan, in 2. 2, q. 154, a. 1, ad 2; Sanchez, de Matr., l. 9, d. 20, n. 2. And it is established from C. Aliquando, 32, q. 2. V. Lig., l. 6, n. 954." Scav., 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 3, n. 839.

Hence consequently it must be said that it is altogether illicit to wet the mouth of the womb with alum, by whose force it is tightened and closed, enough to impede the ascent of seed into the womb, by which the ovule may be fecundated.

Is the use of marriage licit and due? R. Affirmatively. And this is of faith from 1 Cor. 7:3: Let the husband render the debt to the wife; and likewise the wife to the husband. The reason is clear from the very nature of the contract of marriage, which the Apostle himself then expresses in the cited place. Due, i.e., mutually due, if it is at least tacitly asked, because one is not bound per se necessarily to use one's own right, but only sometimes per accidens, e.g., for averting a danger of incontinence threatening the spouse. Due, and therefore after the two-month period, and if the spouse has not lost the right of asking through adultery or through incest. L. 900, 938; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 44, aa. 5, 6.

Resolutions: Spouses are bound to cohabitation, and one cannot be absent for a longer time without the consent of the other or without necessity; for this obligation follows from the very obligation of rendering the debt. But just causes for going away for a long time are the public good, the family to be supported or protected, harm from enemies to be avoided, etc. Then the husband who must remain elsewhere for a long time must take his wife there, if he conveniently can, so that she may cohabit with him. C. Pervenit, de Conv. lepros.; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 64, a. 6, ad 1; Quodl. 4, a. 11. Cf. vol. 1, n. 675.

A spouse sins gravely by denying the debt whenever there is danger of incontinence or grave annoyance on the other side. Likewise if he or she denies it to the other seriously asking. But otherwise if the spouse kindly remits it, or asks lukewarmly, or immoderately, e.g., after the third or fourth time in the same night; nor if one defers it for a short time, namely until night, or if from night he defers it to morning time, the danger of incontinence always being excluded. Likewise a spouse sins by doing something by which generation is per se impeded.

Likewise a man or woman sins gravely if he or she renders himself or herself impotent, even by means otherwise licit, against the will of the spouse. St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 64, a. 1, ad 3; a. 6, ad 4. Spouses can indeed do something from a grave cause from which the emission of seed follows per accidens; nevertheless they sin if in the use of marriage they do something by which per se either seed is poured out outside the vessel, or, once received, is rejected. Hence, perfect copulation being excluded, artificial fecundation is illicit. Holy Office, March 24, 1897. Artificial fecundation, namely by which art is substituted for nature, not by which nature is merely aided by art.

Art is indeed substituted for nature if the man is first polluted, and then the seed collected from this is introduced into the vagina by some instrument. But nature is only aided if copulation is first performed in the natural manner, and then, either by fingers or by a little tube, the seed already introduced into the vagina is driven further up to the opening of the uterus, for more certainly obtaining fecundation. "It is certain that it is illicit to have copulation for pleasure alone, as is clear from proposition 9 condemned by Innocent XI.... Yet it is common among all that this is not mortal, but nevertheless a venial sin.... But there will be no sin if the spouse principally intends the procreation of offspring and uses pleasure, intending it moderately, so that he may excite himself to copulation; just as likewise one does not sin who intends moderate delight in eating, for providing suitable nourishment for the body." L. 912, 938, 940, 942, 954. Finally, the use of marriage is licit as a remedy of concupiscence, for avoiding incontinence. Sanchez, book 9, disp. 11; E.M.

"Is it lawful for spouses to copulate if because of old age or another disposition it generally happens that the seed is poured out outside the vessel? Bossius, etc., probably affirm, provided that there is probable hope of inseminating within the vessel; because whenever such hope is present, they have a right to copulation, and if the seed is poured out, this happens per accidens." L. 954.

Nor indeed is the use of marriage illicit for them because of old age; for although then in act it is not in the office of nature, nevertheless that act is still apt per se for it, and certainly is not against it. Hence it is lawful even for old persons to contract marriage. For zoosperms, on which in men the power of generating depends, and ova, on which in women the same power of generating depends, are first produced at the time of puberty and endure in men through the whole of life and in women until advanced age, nor can any time be defined at which that power is wholly extinguished, although it is diminished by old age. That generative power is diminished in men about the sixtieth year of age, in women about the fortieth to fiftieth year, at which age the menses ordinarily have an end. Diminished; for the absence of menses because of age is not an argument of impotence. For in women menstruation and ovulation are not always joined together: the former can cease and nevertheless the latter can endure; and pregnancy can also be had without menstruation. And when menstruation ceases, it is not therefore altogether extinguished, for after some longer or shorter interruption it can continue even in extreme old age. Moreover, the release of an ovum, since by its nature it is internal and hidden, is always presumed per se. Dominic Benetti, Opus Medico-Morale, Canon Eleventh, Annotations, n. 3; Francis Topai, Importanza dell'utero, Rome, 1900, pp. 44-45; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 58, a. 1, ad 3.

Likewise copulation is licit if the woman cannot retain the seed. The reason is that copulation then is still per se apt for generation and sufficient for generation; and that emission of seed is only per accidens and by no means impedes generation. For whatever the quantity of seed emitted from the vagina, the vaginal mucosa always retains a quantity of seed most sufficient for generation. "Then, when ejaculation has been performed and the man has withdrawn, ordinarily the seed once poured into the vagina is no longer emitted, since then the vaginal walls adhere to each other in such a way that they touch one another, from which there is great difficulty of exit. Indeed, even if some part is emitted outside because of special conditions of the vagina, that which remains adhering to the mucosa and folds of the vagina is always far more abundant than the necessity of fecundation requires." Antonelli, vol. 2, p. 189, n. 381.

From these things it follows that a woman does not sin gravely if, after the act of copulation, she rises, walks, works, etc.; since, once copulation has been performed, the vaginal walls immediately adhere to each other and close the vagina, so that ordinarily nothing of the seed is emitted. Therefore there can be sin only because of a depraved intention of impeding generation. Antonelli, l.c., p. 220, n. 479.

Is the use of marriage licit for the sterile? R. Affirmatively, both because no positive law is present prohibiting it, and because the sterile are per se fit for perfecting the conjugal act. But if no generation follows from it, this is per accidens and from nature, altogether independent of that act duly perfected, insofar as it is from the spouses. Besides generation there are also other honorable ends of the conjugal act. Hence the use of marriage is also licit at that time and on those days on which generation is more difficult. Cf. 1077; E.M.

"Is a man ever bound to ask? Speaking per se, he is not bound to ask; but he is bound per accidens, namely if the wife tacitly demands, for instance if she shows some indication by which she signifies a tacit petition; because in women, also because of innate modesty, such signs are held as a true petition. Thus commonly... from St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 64, a. 5, ad 2. Conversely Sanchez rightly says, etc., from the same St. Thomas, IV Sent., d. 22, q. un., a. 3, ad 2, that a woman is not bound to render to the man unless he expressly asks; for since men are not ashamed to demand expressly, wives can well presume that men who do not ask expressly do not wish to oblige them to asking." L. 928. This indeed holds likewise, speaking per se and ordinarily. L. ibid.; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 64, a. 5, ad 2; n. 6, ad 3.

"Is a wife ever bound to ask the debt? It is certain, first, that ordinarily she is not bound..., because this is notably immodest for women. It is certain, second, in danger of incontinence, that when the other spouse is in danger of incontinence, both husband and wife are bound to ask in order to free the other from the danger.... Third, however, doubt arises whether the wife is then bound to ask from charity or from justice? The first opinion... says that she is bound from justice. The reason..., then it is rather rendering than asking of the debt.... And St. Thomas seems to adhere to this opinion, Suppl., q. 49, a. 5, ad 1.... The second opinion, which seems more probable..., says that she is bound only from charity. The reason is that where there is no express or tacit petition of the other spouse, there is no obligation of justice for rendering.... Therefore this kind of petition is not called absolutely rendering by St. Thomas, but a certain rendering of the debt.... From this opinion it is inferred that the spouse, since he or she is not bound from justice, but only from charity, in that case to asking, is not bound to ask with great inconvenience; hence the wife is probably then excused from asking if in this she would have to undergo great shame." L. 929. Cf. St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 64, a. 5, ad 1; a. 6, ad 3.

"If the man withdraws after his insemination but before the insemination of the woman, can she immediately excite herself by touches so that she may inseminate? The author of additions to Wigandt, etc., deny it. The reason is that the seed of the woman is not necessary for generation; likewise because that emission of the woman, as separate, does not become one flesh with the man. But more commonly Wigandt, Lessius, etc., affirm. The reason is both because the insemination of the woman pertains to completing the conjugal act, which consists in the insemination of each spouse; hence just as a wife can prepare herself by touches for copulation, so also she can perfect the act of copulation... and because, as many think, the insemination of the woman is necessary, or at least greatly contributes to generation, for nothing is done fruitlessly by nature. But all concede that wives who are of colder nature can excite themselves by touches before copulation, so that they may inseminate in the marital congress immediately to be had." D. 919.

And indeed nothing in this matter is had against nature, if one considers what has already been noted elsewhere: that the female seed properly is in the ovum, which almost every month descends from one or the other ovary into the uterus without any heat of lust. When the mingling of the male seed and the ovum has been made, the man and woman become one flesh, and that is had which is required and suffices for generation. Another seed in the woman, improperly so called, which is situated in that humor which sometimes also comes forth externally, is indeed useful for rendering the conjugal act easier, useful also for generation itself, but not necessary. Hence women who are cold in the very act of copulation can very well conceive and frequently become mothers. Therefore, just as, if this improper insemination simply does not have place, nothing is done against nature, so also if it does not occur at the same time, in the act of copulation, together with the insemination of the man. "It is not necessary," says Sanchez, book 9, disp. 17, n. 9, "that each spouse inseminate at the same time."

Many women, says Antonelli, sometimes do not undergo the aforesaid distillation or secretion of humor or vulvo-vaginal mucus in copulation. But although this secretion is not necessary for generation, nevertheless it is very useful for it; for through it not only does coitus become easier, but also, since it is of alkaline nature, it is able to change the acidic action of the vaginal secretion, which for this reason could even kill the spermatozoa. But since it indicates that perfect pleasure has been attained, it is clear that it truly is the complement of copulation, since pleasure of this kind is ordered by nature to generative copulation.

Nevertheless, since its defect by no means impedes generation, a woman is excused at least from every grave sin if she withdraws from inseminating, that is, from the aforesaid distillation or secretion, when the man has already inseminated. For fecundation can altogether be effected without such insemination or emission of mucus. Nor indeed are spouses bound to coire in the more apt way, but it suffices that generation not be impeded by them. Consequently, neither does the man sin gravely if he withdraws from copulation when he has already inseminated, not waiting for the insemination of the woman. Indeed, ordinarily at least it is not even venial; for, when ejaculation has been performed, the member is almost immediately relaxed, wherefore it is impossible to prolong copulation longer. Antonelli, vol. 2, p. 217, nn. 471, 472; p. 219, n. 477; p. 220, n. 478. Cf. here the following number.

"Do spouses sin mortally if, once copulation has begun, they restrain insemination? If both spouses consent in this, and there is no danger of inseminating outside the vessel, this, speaking per se, is not mortal; for that penetration of the female vessel is then reckoned like touching of the shameful parts, which is permitted between spouses, or at least is not mortal, when danger of pollution is excluded. Thus commonly.... If both consent, for if one withdraws without the consent of the other, he certainly sins gravely.... Speaking per se, for Sanchez wisely notes that this is ordinarily mortal, because ordinarily there is danger from such withdrawal of pouring out seed, unless the spouses have experienced the opposite; in which case, however, I think they can in no way be excused at least from venial sin.... But if the woman has already inseminated, or is in probable danger of inseminating, the man indeed cannot deliberately withdraw from insemination without grave fault, because then he is the cause that the seed of the wife is wasted.... But if the man has already inseminated, doubt arises whether the woman sins mortally if she withdraws from inseminating. The first opinion affirms... The reason is because, as they say, the seed of the woman also concurs actively for generation..., at least according to all the seed of the woman greatly contributes to the formation of the offspring, since at least for this it was instituted by nature. The second, more common opinion denies... These rely on the contrary foundation, namely that the seed of the woman is not necessary for generation.... Nor does it stand in the way... that the seed of the woman contributes to the perfection of the offspring; for they answer that spouses are not bound to the more suitable mode of generating, but it is enough if they do not obstruct generation." L. 918, 954.

Although the Holy Doctor says that this second opinion is more common and more probable, nevertheless he judges the first to be sufficiently probable, and therefore to be held in practice for avoiding harm to the offspring. And immediately the Holy Doctor adds that it cannot practically be probable that a woman in the act of coitus may divert her mind to other things, lest she be excited to insemination. And at n. 954 he says that this is more truly mortal. But since that insemination of the woman, concerning which the question is properly made here, namely the pouring out of interior humor, is in no way essential to generation, and it is certain that generation is not therefore impeded, it does not seem that in practice the first opinion must necessarily be held. Therefore the sin is rather from the intention of impeding generation than from the thing itself, as also happens in other things which, although they do not impede generation, nevertheless if they are done with this depraved intention, sin will certainly be present. E.M. "But something must be noted concerning the manner of quieting lust through the beginning and breaking off of copulation, by which some Theologians judge that it can licitly be quieted. We say at once that the end of quieting lust cannot be had except through copulation with emission of seed into the vessel, namely one which is apt for generation on the part of each; for the quieting of concupiscence is necessarily had only in this way, while the introduction of the penis and breaking off of copulation before ejaculation in no way diminishes, much less extinguishes, but very greatly increases and inflames the heat of lust. Therefore the breaking off of copulation cannot serve for restraining lust, since, on the contrary, the ardor of concupiscence is vehemently increased by it." Antonelli, vol. 2, p. 222, n. 483.

"Does the man sin mortally by beginning copulation in the improper vessel, so that afterwards he may consummate it in the due vessel? Commonly and more truly they affirm.... The reason is that coitus of this kind, even without insemination, is true sodomy, although not consummated; just as copulation itself in the natural vessel of another woman is true fornication, although insemination is not present." L. 916. The same Holy Doctor, ibid., affirms the same concerning simple touching of the male organs with the same improper vessel, "because at least such touching cannot morally be done without sodomitic affection."

Is it lawful in the conjugal act to think of another person and to take delight in that person? "Sanchez and Sporer excuse from mortal sin the spouse who would excite himself to copulation by taking delight in the beauty of another person, but without shameful affection; yet they rightly say that this is very dangerous and not to be permitted. Just as I think it also is not to be permitted to excite oneself to coitus by looking at images of the different sex, especially if they were sacred, which La Croix and Sporer rightly say is mortal because of grave irreverence. But is it lawful for a husband to take delight in the thought of another's copulation, namely had by others, so that he may excite himself to coitus with his wife? On the one hand it seems it must be denied, since the object in which he delights is per se shameful. On the other, such a spouse does not seem to be condemned.... But that... he, the husband, take delight in a thought of copulation between himself and another woman, I say is altogether to be rejected, since such delight is concerning an object intrinsically evil and altogether forbidden to the spouse himself." L. 913, 914.

"Is it lawful to ask with danger to health, namely if one or the other spouse labors under leprosy, venereal disease, phthisis, or another contagious disease? Speaking per se, it is not lawful, since no one is master of his life or health. Nevertheless Busembaum, etc., probably say that if the disease were long-lasting and not proximately tending to death, namely one that is not accustomed shortly and easily to bring death..., then it will not be illicit for the healthy one to ask, if there is a just cause..., because otherwise it would be very burdensome to abstain for so long from the use of marriage, which could scarcely be without danger of incontinence. Nevertheless it must be noted that a spouse infected with venereal disease, or syphilis, or a similar contagious disease, will not be able to ask from the other who is unaware, unless he manifests his defect to that person, and by manifesting it the other can meet the disease with remedies. Indeed, he will not even be able to render unless the healthy one has been informed.... But otherwise he is not bound to manifest it, because he is not bound with such great detriment to his reputation to furnish the conjugal debt. For in all contracts a most grave inconvenience in payment excuses from rendering the debt." L. 909, 910, 950. "This is the natural order, that something first be perfected in itself, and afterwards communicate to another from its perfection; and this also is the order of charity, which perfects nature. And therefore since the wife has power over the husband only as regards the generative power, but not as regards those things which are ordered to the preservation of the individual, the husband is bound to render the debt to the wife in those things which regard the generation of offspring, yet with the safety of the person first preserved." St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 64, a. 1. C. Quoniam, de Coniug. lepros.

The danger is most grave of transmitting syphilis from a syphilitic spouse to the other spouse and to the offspring through copulation. But the effects of syphilis are horrible, and it is also a frequent cause of abortion. Since through medical care ordinarily after some time, if the disease is rather light, it can be removed, copulation during this time is not to be permitted. Antonelli, vol. 2, p. 203, nn. 423, 430. But as regards having copulation in phthisis, it must be noted that grave danger of infection is present through kisses, and, as it seems, sometimes also through copulation, although through this it is not proximate. But since the phthisical are often troubled by great concupiscence, and grave harm does not come to them from moderate use of copulation, it seems that this can be permitted to them. Antonelli, l.c., n. 433. As regards other non-contagious diseases, one must see whether from copulation the disease is aggravated and brings danger of death or not. In diseases joined with fever, and especially in acute and inflammatory diseases, such as peritonitis, pneumonia, pleurisy, pericarditis, meningitis, cerebral hyperemia, and in cardiac defects and in several similar things, copulation will always bring grave harm, and also sometimes sudden death can follow during or after copulation. Antonelli, l.c., nn. 434, 436. Copulation immediately after a meal does not become free from danger until at least two or three hours have passed from the meal. Antonelli, l.c., n. 439.

There is danger of most grave evils and of the death of the mother and fetus in extra-uterine pregnancy, since this constitutes a true anomaly and derogation of the laws of physiology. Cf. Joseph Antonelli, Opusc. de Conc. impot. et steril., Rome, 1900, chap. 5, n. 104 ff.

Resolutions: "It is common that the wife is not bound to render the debt if she has experienced that she cannot give birth without probable danger of death, because payment of the debt does not oblige with such detriment." L. 953. Nor is a spouse bound to render if he or she can reasonably fear harm or grave danger to health, because spouses are not judged to have bound themselves to rendering the debt with such inconvenience. St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 64, a. 6, ad 4. The conjugal act in time of illness, at least generally, is not illicit even under light sin, because often no harm comes from it to the spouses; but the labor which accompanies the act, at least commonly speaking, can hardly influence the illness. Nevertheless, because of notable weakness of body, those laboring under strong fever or another grave disease are excused from rendering the debt. The wife is not excused from rendering the debt because of the ordinary inconveniences of birth, pregnancy, or nursing, nor even because of pains that are grave but brief in time, nor because of long-lasting but moderate pains, e.g., of the head for several months after birth, nor because of health somewhat weakened; because all these are annexed to the matrimonial condition. It is otherwise, however, if danger of life or of grave disease were truly to be feared according to the judgment of a truly prudent physician. L. 952.

"Can and must a spouse render when harm to the offspring to be born is feared? Commonly and more truly they affirm with St. Thomas, IV Sent., d. 32, q. un., a. 1, ad 4.... The reason assigned by St. Thomas is: A wife is bound to render the debt to a leprous husband, and although the offspring would be begotten infirm, nevertheless it is better for it thus to be than not to be at all." L. 951. What if the mother has experienced giving birth to dead children? In this case Laymann says that the wife can well render, indeed also ask, because that death of the fetus happens per accidens. Nevertheless Bossius and others hold that she can neither render nor ask, because from the death of the offspring the mother is exposed to great danger of life. Therefore, that danger excluded, it does not appear per se illicit to render and ask, although the spouse could for this reason be excused from rendering. And if danger of incontinence were present, as in fact it is, they almost commonly agree that then it is lawful to render and ask, and St. Alphonsus himself seems altogether to agree. L. 952, 953.

"Is it a just cause for denying the debt if more children are born than the spouses can support? The first opinion denies.... The reason is both because the procreation of offspring pertains to the principal end of marriage... and because it would expose the other to danger of incontinence.... But the second opinion affirms.... The reason is both because the multitude of future offspring would yield to the harm of the children already begotten, and because in all debts great difficulty excuses from payment." L. 941. The first opinion pleases the Holy Doctor more because of the danger of incontinence, which in reality will scarcely be absent.

Is it lawful to render to one asking illicitly with mortal sin? R. Negatively, if the fault holds itself on the part of the act, e.g., if the other asks in a sacred or public place. For the act itself is then illicit both for the one asking and for the one rendering. Affirmatively, if the fault holds itself only on the part of the person, e.g., if the person asks from a depraved end, because the act remains honorable in itself, and the other does not therefore lose the right to the act. Therefore, speaking per se, the spouse both can and must then render. Speaking per se; for if one can easily impede the other's sin, from charity one is bound to do this, or at least must admonish the other, if nevertheless one can do this without grave inconvenience, which they say is present for the most part. But if the spouse has lost the right through incest, then the other spouse can indeed render per se, but is not bound. L. 944-946; book 2, n. 61; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 64, a. 6.

With mortal sin. But with venial sin, if the act is venially illicit on the part of the act itself, the other is not bound to render to the one asking, because the other does not have a right to it, since it is per se illicit. Nevertheless the other can render when there is a just cause, "since any just cause excuses from venial sin" in this case. L. 946.

In the case of impotence supervening after marriage has been validly contracted, copulation by which a proximate danger of pollution is had consequently becomes illicit, since copulation then is not by reason of generation, and therefore cannot be had by reason of quieting concupiscence. For marriage is not ordered as a remedy of concupiscence except insofar as the union by which satisfaction is made to concupiscence is, from the nature of the thing, ordered to the more principal end of generation, such as is not the copulation of eunuchs.

The aforesaid impotence can be both on the part of the man and on the part of the woman. In impotence of this kind neither can ask nor render the debt by exercising copulation. Nevertheless spouses can in the case of the aforesaid impotence exercise touches, embraces, and kisses, yet apart from proximate danger of pollution, or consent in the case; without, however, pollution being able to impede the aforesaid acts if it follows only per accidens.

There is no lack of authors who permit the aforesaid spouses to exercise copulation, because, they say, they have a right to it. But this is the difficulty: for they indeed have a right to copulation which is according to nature; not to copulation from which pollution is had against nature.

"Is it lawful for a wife to render the debt or ask it from her husband who wishes to seminate outside the vessel after copulation has begun? The first opinion affirms..., because when the woman renders or asks, she gives her effort to a licit thing, nor should she herself be deprived of her right because of the malice of her husband. The second opinion says that the wife can neither ask nor render unless there is a grave cause which excuses her in permitting the sin of the man and in cooperating with the material element of that sin; otherwise she is bound from charity, when she can without grave inconvenience, to impede the sin of her husband. But I think a distinction must be made.

If there is question of rendering the debt, I say the wife probably can and is bound to deny the debt if she can do so without grave inconvenience, because one who will abuse the thing due to him does not have a right to vindicate the thing for himself. But it seems more probable that the wife not only can render, but is also bound. The reason is that when the fault stands on the part of the person asking, since that person has a right to copulation, the other cannot without injustice deny the debt if she cannot turn him away from such fault by admonishing him; and then it is clear that the one rendering does not even materially cooperate with the semination outside the vessel, but only with the copulation begun, which per se is altogether licit for both. But if there is question of asking the debt, I say that the wife cannot ask unless there is a just and grave cause. For then she is truly bound from charity to impede the sin of her husband. But she will have a just cause of asking if she herself were in danger of incontinence, or if otherwise she would have to be deprived of her right of asking more than once or twice, with a perpetual scruple whether then to contain herself would be a grave inconvenience to her, or not." L. 947. Cf. book 2, n. 53, par. Si vero; Sacred Penitentiary, November 16, 1816; February 1, 1823; June 8, 1842; E.M. "The sin of a married man with his own wife is not according to undue matter, but according to other circumstances, which do not constitute the species of the moral act." St. Thomas, II-II, q. 154, a. 1, ad 4. Therefore besides mutual scandal there remains the species of sin against nature, in whatever way after perfect copulation generation is impeded. Ferreres, 922, IV. This practice as regards the health of spouses is also fertile in very many grave evils. Antonelli, vol. 2, p. 351, n. 587.

Resolutions: The sin of the man in the preceding case is commonly called Onanism. It takes its name from Onan, second son of the Patriarch Judah, who after his brother Her had died was compelled according to custom to marry his widow Tamar, so that he might raise up seed to his brother; but entering to the wife of his brother, he poured the seed onto the earth, lest children be born in the name of his brother. And therefore the Lord struck him because he did a detestable thing. Gen. 38:9, 10. Voluntary Onanism is always a mortal sin, as being against nature; and therefore it can never be licit for spouses.

The wife can be excused from sin if for a grave cause she renders the debt to an onanist husband, provided that interiorly she does not consent to his sin, and exteriorly shows her repugnance by serious admonitions or other signs of displeasure. The wife does not sin by giving internal consent to pleasure when she can permit the conjugal act to an onanist husband, provided that she does not give assent to the sin of the man. The reason is that since she by no means sins by permitting an act of this kind, neither does she sin by admitting the pleasure coming from it, although she foreknows that the man will not perfect the copulation; for that act is in itself honorable and licit for the woman, and it is not through her that it is not perfected in the due manner.

But if the woman in that act has not inseminated, as is commonly said by the ancient theologians, she cannot after copulation excite herself to insemination, namely if the man withdraws without having performed insemination in the due vessel. For that act on the part of the woman is ordered by nature only to generative copulation. Therefore in the case it would be true pollution on the part of the woman, as it is on the part of the man. Likewise the man cannot excite himself by touches to insemination outside the due vessel, if the woman has already inseminated and has withdrawn from copulation without having waited for the man's insemination. The reason is the same, because such an act would be manifest pollution on the part of the man. L. 919.

Hence likewise it must consequently be said with the same St. Alphonsus, l.c., that the man cannot withdraw from copulation before he inseminates, if in it the wife has already inseminated or is in probable danger of inseminating. The reason is that otherwise that act of the woman would not attain the end intended by nature. "Vaginal washings, which women use for preserving the cleanliness of the genitals, are not to be done unless at least twelve hours after copulation, because otherwise the seed is lost with the emission of the washing employed, or life is killed and then lost, according to the nature of the washing." Antonelli, vol. 2, p. 186, n. 378. But, as far as time is concerned, a shorter time also suffices so that generation is not actually impeded.

"Can a spouse prohibited from asking by reason of a vow, or of affinity, or of spiritual kinship contracted after marriage, ever licitly demand the debt? The doctors commonly admit this if danger of incontinence is present in the other spouse. Indeed they say that then he is bound to ask, because this obligation arises from the institution itself of marriage. Likewise St. Thomas, IV Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, q. 2, ad 4, etc., also commonly admit that an impeded spouse can ask if the other asks interpretatively, namely when the woman, as St. Thomas says, is modest, and the man senses her will concerning the rendering of the debt. For then the impeded spouse can offer himself, because then it is rather rendering than asking." L. 930. Nevertheless as regards a spouse who, apart from necessity, baptized his own offspring, the opinion which denies that he is prohibited from asking the debt is sufficiently probable, and several grave doctors hold it, as the same Holy Doctor says, 150. But as regards a vow, it can be invalidated directly or indirectly by the spouse; indeed after the marriage has been made, without the consent of the spouse whose liberty of asking is restricted, it is judged illicit.

"But is it lawful for an impeded spouse to ask if he himself is in danger of incontinence? Viguerius, etc., affirms, especially if he were impeded by reason of affinity or spiritual kinship, and a dispensation could not conveniently be had, and there would be danger in delay, because ecclesiastical law does not oblige in so great a danger. But Sanchez, etc., deny, because danger of incontinence is a just cause of dispensing, but not of coeundum. But the first opinion with respect to an impediment imposed by the Church does not seem improbable to me, if truly a dispensation cannot be obtained shortly, and there is great danger in delay." L. 930. Concerning spiritual kinship, cf. here 1068.

"Is it lawful for an excommunicated spouse, although vitandus, to ask the debt, and to ask from one excommunicated, although vitandus? That it is lawful for a spouse to ask from an excommunicated person is certain from C. Quoniam multos 103, causa 11, q. 3. But is it also lawful for the excommunicated person to ask?... Commonly and more truly they affirm.... The reason is that ecclesiastical law does not oblige with so great a danger, in which the excommunicated person would indeed be if he could not be separated from the other spouse, as in fact he cannot, and could not ask." L. 931; C. Inter alia, de Sent. exc.

"Is a spouse bound to render the debt to one insane or drunk? Busembaum, etc., most commonly and more probably deny. The reason is that although such persons retain dominion, nevertheless they are incapable of the use of dominion.... But although there is no obligation of rendering to an insane or drunk spouse, nevertheless it is lawful to render to him or her, as they commonly say, since the use of marriage is per se licit, and the offspring can be educated by the spouse of sound mind, provided the danger of scandal or abortion is absent. Hence it is not lawful to coire with a furiously insane wife, unless it is established that she is sterile." L. 948.

It must be added that those conceived in drunkenness are very easily born inclined to mental alienations, to insanity and scrofula; and alcohol can infect even the ovum itself and the seed. To this is added that the offspring can easily be born dull and deaf-mute. Therefore a spouse is not bound to render to a drunken spouse. Antonelli, vol. 2, p. 205, n. 438.

"Whether and how do spouses sin by coeundum in an unnatural position? The natural position is that the woman be beneath and the man above; for this mode is more apt for the pouring out of the male seed and its reception in the female vessel for procreating offspring. But an unnatural position is if coitus is done otherwise, namely sitting, standing, from the side, or improperly after the manner of animals, or if the man is beneath and the woman above.... Commonly they say that all these modes do not exceed venial fault. The reason is that although some disorder is present... change of position does not impede generation, since the seed of the man is not received into the womb of the woman through infusion or descent, but by attraction, while the womb naturally attracts the male seed to itself." L. 917; St. Thomas, IV Sent., d. 31, at the end, in the exposition of the text. And, as the same St. Alphonsus and St. Thomas have in the places cited, this also is done without any sin if it is done from a just cause; and, on the contrary, it is a grave sin if from experience it were established that, with the natural position changed, the woman retained none of the seed. Cf. 1053.

Change of position is not grave. The reason is that in change of position the end of generation is obtained. For the fecundation of the ovum one spermatozoon alone suffices. But in the ejaculation of seed many thousands are emitted. Therefore when some of the seed penetrates into the vagina, by the proper motion of the spermatozoa these proceed as far as the uterus, the tubes, and the ovaries; all the more because their vitality lasts for several days, and if they meet the ovum, fecundation follows. Moreover, once ejaculation has been completed, and when the man has withdrawn, ordinarily the seed once poured into the vagina is no longer emitted, since then the vaginal walls adhere to each other in such a way that they touch one another, from which there is great difficulty of exit. Antonelli, vol. 2, p. 189, n. 381.

Note: The prudent confessor must beware lest he ask questions about the various modes of sexual congress which are not only useless, but also full of scandal. Hence, if the penitent introduces a doubt about these things, it will be enough for the confessor to know whether complete pollution was made outside the due vessel. If he introduces a doubt, or even if the penitent supplies an occasion of doubting; for no one fails to see that questions of this kind, in so slippery a matter, are never to be asked unless manifest necessity is present. L. 917.

"Is it lawful for spouses to coire during pregnancy? It is common that this is not mortal unless danger of abortion is present... St. Thomas, IV Sent., d. 31, at the end, in the exposition of the text.... Commonly such danger is not present.... And therefore spouses are not to be troubled with importunate questions.... But whether, apart from danger of abortion, it is a venial fault? St. Antoninus, etc., affirm. Sanchez, etc., deny, because nowhere is it held to be forbidden per se.... In order that coitus be licit in marriage, it suffices that the act per se be suitable for generation; but that generation itself does not occur holds itself per accidens. For the rest, the opinion which Pontius, etc., hold pleases me, namely that coitus with a pregnant woman cannot be excused from venial fault unless there is danger of incontinence or another honorable cause." L. 924. Therefore there is question at least of an uncertain obligation. But an honorable cause can scarcely ever be absent. Moreover, conception does not always coincide with copulation, but often happens after several hours, or days, or even after a week. Hence it cannot be determined from which copulation conception followed. Nor indeed do women themselves, especially in the first days, know their state of pregnancy. Therefore for this reason also they cannot then be prohibited from the use of marriage. But to prevent abortion it would suffice not to repeat copulation several times at the same time, and not to perform it too vehemently and with force. Antonelli, vol. 2, p. 193, n. 394.

Pregnancy is the natural and physiological development of the fetus which occurs when the fecundated ovum descends into the uterus and there settles; pregnancy is then called uterine. But any pregnancy which occurs outside the uterus constitutes a true anomaly and irregularity of physiological pregnancy, which, since it is outside the usual order and the physiological laws, is always the cause of very grave evils for the life of the mother and the fetus. Every pregnancy which has place outside the uterus, wherever the fetus develops, is called extra-uterine, and such fetuses are called extra-uterine or ectopic.

The whole time during which the fetus remains in the uterus is called pregnancy, and it ordinarily lasts for the space of nine months, or about 280 days. The fetus in the uterus is covered by several membranes and lies immersed in a certain whitish fluid, the amniotic fluid. In birth it is expelled from the uterus by contractions of the muscles of the uterus, which rupture the membranes enveloping the fetus, whereby the amniotic fluid begins to flow. The membranes of the fetus after birth are called the afterbirth.

A probable sign of pregnancy is the suppression of menstruation, when before this the woman had regular menstruation. Yet it must be noted that menstruation can cease also from other causes, and, even during pregnancy, can appear once or twice. To this are added changes in the genitals, and partly the size of the abdomen and uterus, which moreover can grow from other causes, a greater secretion of the vagina, and swelling of the breasts, which can also secrete milk.

Extra-uterine pregnancies for the most part end before the time because of the rupture of the membranes enveloping the fetus. Sometimes the fetus continues to complete development, but, as is clear, it cannot be born. In either case the life of the mother is placed in great danger. Extra-uterine pregnancy presupposes the uterus; for the uterus is the necessary way for the passage of sperm. Therefore when the uterus is absent, whether from birth or through a surgical operation, ectopic pregnancy is impossible. Antonelli, vol. 1, p. 142 ff.

"Is it illicit to coire during the period of purification after birth? There are three opinions. The first says that it is mortal from the final chapter of Dist. 5. The second opinion says there is no sin.... Because, as they say, uncleanness of this kind is only material, not moral. The third opinion, more probable and more common,... says that it is venial, but not per se mortal. It is venial because such coitus contains some indecency. Hence, unless an honorable cause excuses, namely danger of incontinence, or of discord, or another similar cause, it cannot be excused from every fault. But it is not mortal, speaking per se, because such indecency does not seem so great that it induces mortal fault.... Per se, for sometimes it could be mortal if from intercourse grave illness or a notable aggravation of illness were imminent."

L. 926. But the disposition of the cited final chapter has either fallen into desuetude, or concerns fittingness, not precept. But even light fault is only an opinion. Yet this must be noted: that in the first two weeks it can very gravely harm the woman. But in the other two following weeks the danger of so grave a harm is diminished. Generally, therefore, only after six weeks is the woman bound to render, when all danger then ceases. Therefore account must be taken in this matter of probable harm. After this time has passed, the puerperal period has its end, and menstruations again appear, which indicate that the woman is now fit for a new pregnancy. Menstruations, however, appear much later if the woman herself nurses her infant. Antonelli, vol. 2, p. 195, nn. 399, 400, 401.

"Is it lawful to ask the debt during nursing? Most commonly they affirm.... The reason is that no law prohibiting it exists." L. 911. Nor indeed is there any danger that the milk will be infected and corrupted.

Once nursing has begun, unless something impedes, it lasts for eighteen or twenty-four months. The secretion of milk suspends congestion of the uterus, or menstruation. If nursing is not done by the mother when she is able to nurse, not a few inconveniences follow, even grave ones for the mother and infant. For the breasts, since they cannot secrete the milk already prepared, exercise great action upon the uterus, which then acquires an easy disposition for contracting grave diseases. Yet there can be several physiological causes which impede the mother from nursing, e.g., great weakness on her part and various morbid affections, concerning which a physician must be consulted. Antonelli, vol. 1, p. 2, On the Fifth Precept, chap. 7.

During the time of nursing menstruation is suspended, and therefore it must be concluded that the time of nursing is less apt for a new fecundation. Yet this can still be had, and sometimes is had, and then the milk gradually diminishes until it ceases altogether. Antonelli, vol. 1, pp. 144-145; vol. 2, p. 196, n. 403.

"Is it lawful for spouses to coire during menstruation? During an extraordinary flow it is certain that it is lawful both to render and to ask... from St. Thomas, IV Sent., d. 32, q. un., a. 2, q. 2.... But during the time of the natural flow there are three opinions. The first condemns it as mortal, and this is held by the same St. Thomas, l.c., q. 3, ad 1.... The second opinion says that it lacks all fault.... The reason is that today this is prohibited by no law.... Although there is then an easy danger of frustrating the seed, nevertheless in order to make coitus honorable it is not required that generation follow from it, but it suffices that that coitus per se be apt for generation, granted that per accidens the seed is scattered, as happens in access to a pregnant or sterile woman.... The third opinion, most common and more probable, says that coitus during menstruation is not mortal, but is not excused from venial fault. That it is not mortal is proved by the reason adduced for the second opinion. But that it is venial is proved because such intercourse... involves a certain shamefulness and disorder, since... coitus then is less fitting for the end of generation. But Navarre, Paludanus, etc., agree that there is no sin in coiring at such a time if some cause is present which makes that shamefulness honorable, namely for avoiding discord, or incontinence, in oneself or in the other, or other similar things.... But in the case in which no cause is present, can and must a menstruating wife render the debt if the husband, once admonished, refuses to desist? Paludanus, etc., affirm. But more probably it must be denied.... The reason is that since the fault, even venial, holds itself on the part of the act, more probably the spouse is not bound, nor can she licitly render the debt." L. 925.

But practically, when the husband asks, scarcely, or not even scarcely, is a cause absent for the wife by which she may render. And St. Thomas himself, Suppl., q. 44, a. 4, says: "If the husband does not desist from asking, the wife must render the debt to the one asking." But the reason adduced by the Holy Doctor for the third opinion is opposed to the opinions of more recent physiological science, since during menstruation the woman is per se more apt for generation.

For the monthly flow of this kind is nothing other than a flow of blood, which flows more abundantly to the uterus when the release of some mature ovum from the ovary occurs. With the aforesaid flow, the organs become erect, the small veins of the uterus are distended, and more or less abundant blood drips forth and goes out through the genitals. Hence the aforesaid flow is a sign of ovulation; but its absence is a sign neither of impotence nor of sterility. For many women conceive without such a flow; and after it has ceased, even after a long time, it again appears. During a flow of this kind there is only danger of some local irritation for the woman, which can be lighter or graver according as that flow is more or less lasting and morbid. Regularly it lasts for two or three days. It begins from puberty, and around the forty-fifth to fiftieth year of age it usually ceases.

And in this matter it is now established as a principle that a woman can be fecundated at any time which intervenes from one menstruation to another, and sometimes cannot be fecundated in the times which are commonly held more apt for fecundation, such as the time which precedes or follows ovulation and the release of ova, and therefore menstruation. For the matter is not certain. And there are many causes which can change the time of maturation and release of ova, among which is coitus itself and the excitation of the genitals. Antonelli, Pastoral Medicine, ed. 2, part 1, chap. 15, nn. 219, 224. "Copulation during menstruation can bring many inconveniences to the health of the woman, and especially grave hemorrhages." Antonelli, vol. 2, pp. 190-191, nn. 387, 388. And if there is question of an extraordinary flow, it can be greatly feared that copulation will very much aggravate the disease. Hence, speaking per se, to perform copulation can be light or grave from this head. Antonelli, l.c., p. 191, n. 390.

"Is the conjugal act illicit on feast days, fast days, or Rogation days? It is common that rendering the debt is not then forbidden, with St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 64, a. 9.... But is it forbidden to ask? The first opinion affirms, and this is held by St. Thomas, l.c., a. 7, etc. Yet this is under venial fault, as St. Thomas says there, a. 8, with others, not under mortal fault, as some improbably hold.... But the second, more common opinion denies that it is illicit.... The reason is that this is held to be forbidden by no law." L. 923. Hence it is also deduced that there is no reason why use of this kind should be prohibited during Advent or Lent. Cf. 603.

"Are shameful touches and looks mortal between spouses on account of pleasure alone, without order to copulation? The common and truer opinion denies it.... The reason is that the conjugal state, just as it makes copulation honorable, so also makes touches and looks of this kind honorable. (Otherwise it would be exposed to very many dangers and scruples.) But just as pleasure sought in copulation does not exceed venial fault, so also in these touches and looks." L. 933. In truth, since incomplete acts of this kind are of themselves referable to the complete and perfect act, since this is licit for spouses, the former cannot per se be illicit for the same persons. L. 932, 933. A fortiori, acts of this kind are per se free from fault, whether they are less honorable or simply dishonorable, if they are immediately referred to copulation. For then they are a certain preparation for and beginning of copulation. Therefore, apart from the crime of voluntary pollution outside the vessel or of sodomy, nothing is done against the good of marriage. But the light fault which can be present in acts of this kind is easily excused by ends intrinsic to marriage itself or other extrinsic ends, e.g., because they are suitable for fostering affection or for calming concupiscence.

What if spouses foresee that pollution will follow from these shameful acts in themselves or in the other? The resolution depends on the intrinsic nature of the act, on the manner in which it is exercised, on the cause, and on the other circumstances. For there is question of the voluntary in its cause; therefore if the act is such, or at least is exercised in such a way, that per se and proximately it influences pollution, and no just cause is present, there is certainly grave sin. But otherwise, if the act is such, and is exercised in such a way, with due caution applied for preventing it, that pollution, if it follows, follows only per accidens, and there is a just cause.

Hence St. Alphonsus, after relating three opinions concerning the proposed question, says: "I think it more probable that it must be said that shameful acts between spouses with danger of pollution, both in the one asking and in the one rendering, are mortal; unless they are had so that the spouses excite themselves to copulation to follow proximately, because since they have a right to copulation, they also have a right to such acts, although pollution per accidens should precede copulation. But I also judge modest acts to be mortal if they are done with danger of pollution in oneself or in the other, in the case in which they are had for pleasure alone, or even for a slight cause; otherwise if for a grave cause, for instance if sometimes there is an urgent cause of showing signs of affection, for fostering love, or so that a spouse may avert suspicion from the other that he himself is inclined toward another person. Sanchez, etc., probably say that in the one rendering, even immodest touches, unless they are such that they seem to be pollution begun, are licit, although danger of pollution is present in either one, because then the one rendering applies himself to a licit thing to which he is bound by reason of the right of the one asking, who although he sins, nevertheless does not lose the right, since the fault holds itself on the part of the person." L. 934; Sanchez, book 9, disp. 45. Indeed St. Alphonsus himself, book 3, n. 484, says: "The common and more probable opinion teaches that pollution is not mortal unless it proceeds from a cause per se mortal in the genus of lust." And in book 3, n. 483, he says: "Yet exception is made if the aforesaid actions (gravely influencing pollution) are placed from a cause necessary, useful, or fitting for soul or body; for then pollutions proceeding from them, even foreseen, are not sins, provided that consent, or danger of it, is absent."

"Is it always mortal if a man places his private parts in the mouth of his wife? Sanchez, Bossius, and Perez deny it, provided danger of pollution is absent. But Sporer, Tamburini, Diana, and Fagundez more truly affirm it; both because in this act... there is proximate danger of pollution, and because this per se seems to be a new species of lust against nature, called by some irrumation. For whenever another vessel is sought by a man besides the natural vessel instituted for copulation, there seems to be a new species of lust." L. 935.

"Are the shameful touches which a spouse has with himself or herself, the other being absent, and apart from danger of pollution, mortal? The first opinion denies it.... The reason is that touches of this kind are made honorable by the conjugal state itself, since by their nature they are ordered to copulation; and therefore, apart from danger of pollution, they cannot be gravely illicit in a spouse, although he could not consummate copulation at present. But the second opinion, more probable, and altogether to be recommended in practice, affirms it.... The reason is both because a spouse does not have a right per se over his own body, but only per accidens, namely only so that he can dispose himself for copulation..., and because touches of the private parts, when they are done lingeringly and with commotion of the spirits, per se tend to pollution and are proximately connected with its danger." L. 936. And from the very reason of the second opinion, the first opinion rather certainly appears more probable.

"Is morose delectation in a spouse concerning copulation had or to be had, which nevertheless could not be had at present, mortal? The first opinion affirms it.... The reason is that such delectation is, as it were, pollution begun.... But the second, more common opinion... says that such delectation is not mortal if danger of pollution is absent, but only venial. It is venial because it lacks the due end, since it cannot be ordered to present copulation. But it is not mortal because delectation takes its goodness or malice from the object, and since copulation is licit for married persons, delight in it cannot be gravely illicit. And St. Thomas expressly favors this in De Malo, q. 15, a. 2, ad 17.... And Sporer admits this, even if venereal delectation is had, arising from commotion of the spirits. Finally the third opinion... distinguishes and says that if the delectation is without commotion of the spirits it will not be mortal; otherwise, if with commotion and titillation of the parts." L. 937.

It is indeed a grave sin if that delectation is proximately joined with danger of pollution; otherwise, however, if the danger of pollution is not proximately joined with that delectation. But this proximate danger of pollution, speaking per se, is not had according to the Holy Doctor from any commotion whatsoever of the spirits and alteration of the parts, but from a vehement and graver commotion of the spirits. But St. Thomas, in the place cited by St. Alphonsus, says: "Delectations in goodness and malice follow the pleasurable operations; and therefore, just as carnal union is not a mortal sin for one married, but is a mortal sin for one not married, a similar difference also exists concerning delectation and consent in delectation. For consent in delectation cannot be a graver sin than consent in the act, as is clear through Augustine."

But in truth this argument proves not only that consent in delectation (for this is what morose delectation means) is not mortal, but that it is not even a venial sin. Namely, it cannot be illicit to take delight in a licit thing, that is, to take delight with rational delectation; and similarly neither desire concerning future copulation nor approval concerning past copulation is per se illicit, because approval and desire of a licit thing cannot be illicit. L., book 5, nn. 23, 24, 25.

Therefore for spouses all those things are illicit which have the nature of pollution, or which by their nature contain its proximate danger. Hence several cases can be resolved which can occur from an abnormal state of the spouses. Sanchez, book 7, disp. 102, n. 6 ff.

To n. 958.

Truly marital intercourse is not imperfect intercourse, such as is had by penetration of the virile member within the vessel of the woman with the outpouring of male seed, while the woman is impotent for generation; rather, perfect intercourse is that which is completed by the commingling of seeds, namely of the male seed and of the female. For without this commingling of seeds the proximate principle of generation is not had; since a principle of this kind is not had except by the male seed and the ovule, and by the commingling of both, so that the former can fecundate the latter. For indeed, as marriage from its intrinsic end is for generation, so also marital and perfect intercourse is for generation as for its intrinsic end.

"In the generation of man," says St. Thomas, Quodlibet 5, a. 8, "as also of the other animals, the father's seed is the active principle, while the matter supplied by the mother is as the passive principle, from which the human body is formed." And Quodlibet 8, a. 5 ad 3: "For the conception of a human body two things concur: namely the matter from which the conceived thing is formed, and again the formative power which forms the conceived thing... The conceived matter is prepared by the generative power of the mother, but the formative power is in the father's seed." Moreover, according to St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 44, a. 1, marriage is the conjunction of man and wife for one generation and education of offspring and for one domestic life. Therefore marital and perfect intercourse cannot be that which is not of itself simply generative, but generative only on the part of the man and not also on the part of the woman, and accordingly unsuitable for generation. "I wish to procreate children, and for that reason I took a husband." C. Accepisti 1, de Frigidis. She therefore who is impotent for procreating children is also impotent for taking a husband. Certainly she "will never be able to be a mother or a wife." C. Fraternitatis 4, same title; as if it were said: she cannot be a mother, therefore neither can she be a wife. Hence the same St. Thomas, Catena Aurea on Matthew, c. 19, v. 15: "God created man as male and female on account of the necessity of generating children... And this is what is said: For this reason a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cling to his wife." And on the Epistle to the Ephesians, c. 5, lect. 10: "And because a man in respect to father and mother is inferior, not superior, therefore toward his wife, of whom he is the superior, and toward his children he is naturally more affected than toward his parents, and also because the wife is joined to him for the act of generation." And Contra Gentiles, book 3, c. 122: "Thus therefore the emission of seed ought to be ordered so that both suitable generation and the education of the begotten can follow. From this it is evident that every emission of seed in such a mode that generation, according to itself, cannot follow is contrary to the good of man; and if this is done deliberately, it must be a sin."

If marital and perfect intercourse is perfect only in the notion of intercourse, marriage will be had also among eunuchs, who can complete intercourse in the notion of intercourse; marriage will be consummated even if the man does not emit seed in that intercourse. The outpouring of seed is altogether extraneous to intercourse in the notion of intercourse, and does not in the least pertain to its completion. It pertains to intercourse generative of itself; and this cannot be of itself simply generative, or suitable for generation, unless it is such at the same time on the part of the man and on the part of the woman. As intercourse of an impotent man is not suitable for generation, so neither is intercourse of an impotent woman suitable for generation. Operation follows being.

Perfect intercourse is the intercourse of a man emitting seed in the due vessel of the woman, and accordingly of one not otherwise impotent for generation. For the due vessel of marital intercourse is not the mere vagina, but is the vessel apt for generation; Salmanticenses, de Matrimonio, tract. 9, c. 4, punct. 1, n. 2. The vagina is not the place in which the male seed ought to come to rest by the institution of nature, as in its natural terminus, but is only the way and channel through which that seed ought to arrive at the uterus and fecundate the ovule. Hence in intercourse there is naturally produced a movement of the muscles and of the ciliated epithelium of the mucous membrane, and at the same time there occurs a movement of descent of the uterus, which contracts spasmodically to draw in the seed; when this is completed, the seed then arrives at the ovule to be fecundated. Hence it is evident that, when the uterus and ovaries have been removed, there is not only a subsequent obstacle to generation, but an antecedent defect of the essential power of generation, and consequently a concomitant impotence for generating; since then intercourse remains substantially incomplete and imperfect, by the very fact that that union of the organs of the man and woman cannot be terminated in union, because of the aforesaid essential defect of the elements essentially required for generation, the male seed and the female ovule.

Nor is it of avail to say that that intercourse is certainly suitable for quieting concupiscence, even if it is not suitable for generation, and that marriage can still be licitly and validly contracted for quieting concupiscence, with the impotence of the woman for generating standing. For by what act will concupiscence be licitly quieted? Certainly not by intercourse of any kind whatsoever, but by marital intercourse. And what is this? That in which the man alone emits seed, while the woman's impotence for generating exists? But this is that which must be proved. Hence a clear begging of the principle is evident. For then it is already supposed that the marriage is valid, notwithstanding that impotence for generating.

Noldin (De Sacramentis, n. 577) calls carnal intercourse that which is "of itself apt for the generation of offspring."

Sanchez (De matrimonio, book VII, disp. 92, n. 28): "The contract of marriage consists essentially in the mutual obligation to perfect intercourse, of its own nature apt for the generation of offspring."

Santi (book IV, title 15, n. 1): "Perfect intercourse is that which... of itself is capable of operating toward generation."

Wernz (book IV, title 13, n. 342): "That intercourse is called perfect which of itself is apt for generating offspring, although by accident it does not in fact produce the generation of offspring, for example in women already pregnant or in men or women who are sterile, for example because of advanced age."

It is called apt of its own nature, or capable of itself, because it is not required that generation actually follow. Wherefore impotence, which is "the incapacity of a man or woman for perfect intercourse or for generating offspring" (Wernz, loc. cit.), is not to be confused with sterility, "because in sterility it is only by accident that generation does not follow, whereas in impotence it is per se or from an intrinsic defect of nature; in the former, generation does not follow because of some obstacle coming from without which impedes it, as from deficiency of heat or its excess; but in impotence for intercourse, generation does not follow from defect of those things which nature itself requires as necessary means to this end" (S. R. Rota, in one Platien., Nullity of Marriage, coram Mori).

And these things indeed are said as regards speculative doctrine. For, practically speaking, marriage will certainly not be impeded, both because practically it is not established concerning the absolute and perfect impotence of the woman, and because the question has not yet been settled.

It must be said, says the Angelic Doctor, that frigidity impedes marriage more and more frequently than heat, because "it removes not only the commingling of seeds, but also the vigor of the members, by which conjunction is made"; 4 Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 2 ad 2.

Viva, De Matrimonio, q. 5, a. 10, n. 5, says: "Here they are called impotent who cannot have such intercourse, from which one flesh is made from two through the commingling of the seed of each, from which one flesh can issue."

Sylvius on the Supplement, q. 58, a. 1, question 1, says: "The impotence which invalidates marriage is impotence of carnal intercourse, that is, of that intercourse in which the seeds of man and woman are commingled... Of the notion of marriage is the handing over of power for carnal intercourse; but this intercourse cannot be made unless the seeds, or the things which are in place of seeds, can be commingled."

Pichler, Summa Iurisprudentiae, book 4, title 1, n. 75, says that marriage is "consummated" when it has been contracted not by consent alone, but also "completed and perfected by carnal intercourse, and that perfect, ... or of itself sufficient for the generation of offspring and making it so that the spouses through the commingling of seeds become one flesh."

Billuart, Summa S. Thomae, new edition, Paris, 1895, vol. 10, p. 161, says that marriage "is consummated when it is completed by marital carnal intercourse and commingling of seeds; because then the spouses become one flesh... I said, and commingling of seeds; because neither by mere penetration of the vessel without emission of seed, nor by the seed of the man alone without the seed of the woman, is marriage consummated in the forum of conscience, although it is presumed consummated in the external forum; because without the commingling of seeds apt for generation they do not become one flesh inchoatively, which inchoation is completed by offspring, in whose one flesh they are completely united."

Zacchias, Quaestiones Medico-Legales, Consil. 72, n. 11, says: "It is certain that spouses become one flesh, which is of the essence of marriage, not by penetration of the vessels, but by the commingling of seeds poured out on the part of each." And in the cited work, book 9, title 3, q. VII, nn. 2-3: "In the consummation of marriage potency for generating is required, because through generation, which follows from the mixture of the seed of each into one, husband and wife become one flesh... For what is that, that husband and wife become one flesh? Is it the simple conjunction of both through the members of generation? By no means: for this conjunction is fruitless unless generation can follow from it, or the separated seeds of each are not mingled for conceiving a fetus... Therefore where from coitus there is no hope of generation because the seeds of the spouses do not concur together, nor are united... husband and wife cannot become one flesh, and thus they cannot consummate marriage."

If theologians certainly were not lacking, indeed if there were many among the ancients, who required only male seed for the marital act, this was because they followed the opinion of Aristotle, who required only male seed for generation, without anything having to be supplied in it by the woman. Wherefore those theologians were never content precisely with the coitus itself in which the man alone had poured out seed, except because they believed that coitus by itself sufficient for generation; this sufficiency they themselves exclude under the other opinion of Galen and Hippocrates, which requires a twofold essential element, one on the part of the man, the other on the part of the woman, and which many also of the ancients, and those most learned, embraced.

And so, for example, De Iustis, who adheres to that Aristotelian opinion, De dispensatione matrimonii, book 2, c. 7, n. 10 ff., speaks in this way: "Only through perfect and consummated intercourse do man and woman become one flesh." Therefore, in order that affinity be contracted, "there is required the outpouring of true male seed in the vessel, which is sufficient for the generation of offspring... I said that the outpouring of male seed is required of necessity, because it is most probable that female seed is not required for generation; whence, although the woman does not emit seed, but only the man, affinity is contracted; nevertheless conversely it is not contracted if the woman alone emits seed and not the man." Therefore, if the contrary is most probable and certain, as it is at present, namely that female seed, or the ovule, is required for generation, neither according to De Iustis will intercourse be perfect, nor will there be consummation of marriage, nor will there be affinity.

906. • Hear St. Ligorius as he approaches this question, On Matrimony, no. 900: It irks me to have a longer discourse on this matter, which bears such great foulness before it that it disturbs chaste minds by its very name alone. But would that this matter were not frequent in the hearing of confessions, so that it would not be altogether necessary for the Confessor to be instructed by a full treatment, but it would suffice for him to be instructed by a compendium! Let the chaste reader therefore pardon me if I speak of it at length here and descend to particular cases which exhibit a more repulsive baseness....

The conjugal debt is said to be that common action of spouses which is necessary for generation and which has been ordained by the supreme Provider of all things for the propagation of human society. This action consists in carnal intercourse, by which a man and a woman are made as though one body and one flesh.

An act of this kind is called a debt by the Apostle; for it is that which the spouses mutually owe to one another.

We must treat: 1. of the liceity of the conjugal act; 2. of the obligation of the same; 3. of the sins of spouses.

15. St. Paul sets forth the Christian doctrine on the conjugal debt thus²: "Let the husband render the debt to the wife, and likewise also the wife to the husband. The woman does not have power over her own body, but the husband; and likewise also the husband does not have power over his own body, but the woman. Do not defraud one another, except perhaps by consent for a time, that you may be free for prayer; and return again to the same thing, lest Satan tempt you because of your incontinence." - Therefore we shall speak 1° on the liceity; 2° on the obligation of the conjugal debt.

¹ St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 49 and 64; Billuart, disp. IV, art. 2-4; Sanchez, book IX; Lacroix, n. 287-400; St. Alphonsus, n. 900-954; Lehmkuhl, n. 833-850; Ball. P., n. 385-416, ed. 3; Aertnys, n. 480-515; Genicot, n. 543-554; Noldin, De Sexto, n. 60-94; Capellmann, p. 136-161; Eschbach, p. 105-120.

² I Cor. VII, 3-5.

55. 1° Spouses from justice are held of themselves under grave obligation to render the debt mutually to one another, whenever one party asks seriously and legitimately, whether expressly or tacitly.

It is proved: For by force of the matrimonial contract a strict right over the body of the other is acquired in order to acts of themselves apt for generation; but to the strict right of one there responds a strict obligation on the part of the other; and since there is question of a grave matter, namely of the generation of offspring, of avoiding incontinence, and of preserving peace between spouses, such an obligation is of itself grave. - Hence deservedly St. Paul says¹: "Let the husband render the debt to the wife, and likewise also the wife to the husband."

¹ I Cor., VII, 3.

56. It is explained: (A) This obligation is grave of itself, but by accident can be light from various circumstances; if the debt is denied only rarely, e.g., if to one asking often it is denied only once in a month; if it is deferred for a brief time; if the other asks only weakly, not insistently, and easily acquiesces to the one denying; provided nevertheless that in these circumstances danger of pollution is absent. - But in practice wives who make themselves difficult and morose in rendering the debt sin mortally, since thus they expose their husbands to danger of incontinence and adultery. Men also sin gravely who, whether for avoiding offspring or from malevolence, rarely know their wives, even if these do not ask expressly, but only interpretatively. Indeed, even once to deny the debt to one asking seriously and legitimately, when this brings danger of incontinence or grave trouble to the other, is not free from mortal fault.

57. Hence also it is not licit for spouses to render themselves incapable of copula by excessive labors, vigils, austerities, or a fortiori by pollutions, adulteries, or other illicit acts. - Nor is it licit for one, without necessity or the consent of the other, to be absent for a notable time: for this is equivalent to denial of the debt.

Certain women, already burdened with offspring or of more advanced age, sometimes think that by denying the debt they do not sin gravely; if this is not done often, and the man is not exposed to danger of sinning, nor any fruit is hoped for from admonition, they can be left in good faith; but they must be admonished not by acting thus to expose the man to danger of incontinence.

Spouses are excused from rendering the debt within the first two months from the celebrated nuptials, certainly indeed if they are thinking of entering religion; probably even if they do not have this in mind. But that privilege ceases, even within the two months, as soon as the marriage has been consummated. Besides, most do not use that privilege because they are ignorant of it.

58. (B) In order that someone be held to render the debt, the other must ask legitimately; for if this one has lost the right of exacting the debt, the obligation of rendering ceases. Now either spouse loses the right of exacting:

(a) Through formal, certain, consummated, not permitted, and not condoned adultery; for then the innocent spouse has the right of departing from the adulterer.

(b) Through affinity or some other impediment contracted after the nuptials by force of which it is prohibited to ask the debt; for then the other party can indeed, but strictly is not held to, render the debt¹, although often it is better to furnish it, for avoiding incontinence. - Nevertheless a woman oppressed by a blood-relative of the husband does not lose the right of asking, because a penalty is not incurred without fault. - Moreover, when the lost right has been restored by dispensation, the obligation of rendering the debt revives on the other side, unless it was lost through adultery: for then it is not restored unless the condonation of the innocent party accedes.

¹ Yet some think that she is held, because the other party, although acting illicitly, preserves his right in relation to the consort: but in practice, since the obligation is doubtful, it cannot be urged.

(c) Through the loss of reason; namely if one of the spouses becomes insane or drunk, the other is not held to render the debt; for one who lacks the use of reason does not ask in a reasonable and human mode. Nevertheless it is licit in this case to render the debt, especially if the insane or drunk person is in danger of incontinence; indeed, according to some, this is truly prescribed, if the danger is proximate; but since this obligation is not established, it must not be urged. - But when the insane or drunk person has recovered the use of reason, he or she can now enjoy his or her right.

59. (d) By asking the debt in an illicit mode, e.g., in an onanistic or sodomitical mode, or in such circumstances in which scandal can be furnished; for no one can exact an illicit act. - Nevertheless if the act is illicit not in itself, or in the mode in which it is performed, but by reason of the one asking, because, e.g., he or she is bound by a vow of chastity, or acts for pleasure alone, many with Sanchez say more probably that the other spouse can and ought to render the debt; for although the one asking acts illicitly, he or she has not lost the right over the body of the other. Hence in practice it is more advisable in this case to render the debt.

60. (e) By asking the debt in an immoderate mode, so that from it the other spouse prudently fears grave harm to self or to offspring. Here there is question of harm or inconvenience which is not annexed to the matrimonial condition. Therefore the ordinary inconveniences of pregnancy or childbirth do not excuse from rendering the debt, nor some debilitation of health, nor moderate pains even long-lasting, such as headaches, etc., because all these are annexed to marriage itself.

But grave danger of life or health excuses, which from the judgment of a prudent physician is to be feared; thus in the case of contagious disease or not, when grave harm threatens, as was said above, n. 28: likewise if the woman cannot give birth without danger of death, but not if in a first childbirth she suffered danger or extraordinary pains (for in a first childbirth the labors are greater than in the following ones). Hence also if the man asks the debt too often, e.g., twice or three times on the same night, there is no obligation of rendering, since copula repeated so often harms both, and commonly even more the man than the wife. Besides, spouses of weak or infirm constitution cannot, without grave harm, exercise copula daily; hence let them consult a prudent physician concerning this matter and follow his counsel.

Likewise grave harm threatening offspring already conceived excuses, e.g., danger of abortion. If there is question of offspring to be conceived, the fear that it may be born infirm or dead, or live in poverty, does not excuse; for it is better for it to labor under these infirmities, or even to die infected with original sin, than not to be.

If the man culpably has no care for the offspring, and the burden of feeding herself and the offspring falls upon the wife, she is not held to render the debt to him, even if he were living in danger of incontinence, unless at last he comes to his senses and promises to have care for the family; for she is not held to be as a servant addicted to the mere will of the man.

But if, without fault of the man, the wife and numerous offspring labor under the greatest poverty, and no other children can be fed, according to some, danger of incontinence being excluded, the debt can be denied. But such danger will hardly be absent; hence rather trust must be placed in Divine Providence, which, while it imparts fecundity, is also wont to provide food. Nevertheless to these spouses it can be discreetly advised that they come together only in the time of agenesis (above n. 64).

61. (C) In order that someone be held to render the debt, it is not necessary that the other party ask explicitly; it suffices that he or she implicitly or interpretatively signify his or her will. For often wives, because of innate modesty, do not dare to ask expressly, but express their desire by interpretative signs; if the husband notices these, he is held to render the debt.

62. 2° Neither spouse of himself or herself is held to ask the debt; but by accident, from charity, each can be held, but especially the man. - The reason for the former is that no one is held to use his or her own right. The reason for the latter is that the man can judge that the consort is exposed to danger of incontinence and, because of modesty, does not dare to ask: then charity demands that he himself ask the debt, lest she fall into sin; likewise, in certain circumstances, this is necessary for fostering mutual love, or for averting jealousy and disagreements.

The Divine natural law imposes both negative and positive duties.

The negative duties oblige one to refuse to any person but the lawful partner the intercourse which is permitted in wedlock, and consequently to exclude voluntary thoughts and desires for other persons; also to refuse even to the lawful partner whatever is forbidden in wedlock itself.

It is to be understood in the sense in which approved authorities explain it in treatises of moral theology. Even St. Augustine distinguished between such a use of marriage as a high spiritual point of view rendered altogether virtuous;

a use which is less to be commended, considering its motive, but permissible especially to the party who condescends to the weakness of the other; and finally such a use as is gravely sinful, or in the very manner of its exercise strictly abusive, which admits of no formal cooperation;¹ although material cooperation may in certain cases be allowed.²

¹ By formal cooperation one partakes in the bad intention of the principal actor; this community of intention is excluded in purely material cooperation. In the latter, one, for other reasons, either performs an act in itself good or indifferent, or abstains from some act, where the act or the abstention, as the case may be, was in fact helpful to the guilty party. MDe bono conjugali, chapter 6, number 6; Latin Patrology. 40. 377.

² De bono conjugali, c. 6, n. 6; PL, 40, 377.

Not in the least. It is simply a question of understanding them rightly and applying them prudently.

Because the marriage contract is not of a purely private nature; it has from God its laws which are unchangeable by the parties to the marriage. Thus the Holy See condemned the assertion that the consent of the other party could reduce the guilt of adultery to that of simple fornication.¹ Moreover, these laws of God sanction an order of mutual relations which is for the good of the parties. The partner who violates that order does an injury to the other party, which is manifestly contrary to conjugal fidelity, since that demands mutual helpfulness.

¹ Innocent XI (September 24, 1665) Prop. 50, Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1200.

Exactly so. As was said above, in number 17, Catholic tradition so interprets the words which Our Lord quotes with confirming approval from Adam: “They shall be two [not more than two] in one flesh.”

Yes; thanks to this severity the relations between husband and wife bear the fresh and delicious imprint of chastity. That mutual familiar intercourse between the spouses themselves, if the blessing of conjugal faith is to shine with becoming splendor, must be distinguished by chastity in such wise that husband and wife must bear themselves in all things in conformity with the law of God and of nature, and endeavor always to follow the will of their most wise and holy Creator with the greatest reverence towards the work of God.¹

¹ P. 28.

Usefulness. The necessity of this chapter is too manifest to be demonstrated. But day by day there increase in number cases concerning lawful and unlawful things between spouses, and concerning the material cooperation of spouses in the sins of the other.

I. On Mutual Acts

Principle. Imperfect venereal acts of themselves contain a certain beginning and preparation of the perfect act, or they are added to this as complements. These beginnings or complements participate in the moral character of the perfect use. Wherefore to those to whom the complete use of marriage is permitted, the incomplete use is of itself honest.

Again, however, since spouses are not obliged to exercise the perfect conjugal act, imperfect acts, even when the complement is lacking, keep their honesty. And as they dispose toward the perfect act and generation, so also they assist, or can assist, the secondary ends of marriage: mutual concord, indeed also the good of calming concupiscence.

Applications. These acts, according to themselves, even without a present relation to the complete act, are truly honest from the object, so that their delight also can be taken honestly. - With attention to the end, those acts are fully to be approved which are assumed so that the conjugal act may be exercised more easily and more perfectly; those also are honest which are employed for testifying love or for giving concupiscence sufficient satisfaction by which the fault of incontinence may more easily be avoided. Nor are spouses to be reproved who wish to draw from these acts moderate solaces and joys, which pertain to the virtue of eutrapelia. - With attention to the mode, the best counsel is that spouses, in their intimate conversation, should strive sweetly to compose personal dignity with tender affection, and should not wish to be delighted by base arts. Yet excluding affection for an unnatural act, or excessive danger of pollution, there is no mode which is forbidden to them under grave sin, or which cannot become honest on account of the end of marriage. - With attention to that efficacy, acts lightly influencing of themselves toward pollution, or which are joined with merely possible pollution, are never to be omitted under grave guilt on account of subsequent pollution: for this will always be accidental, and to be attributed to another non-voluntary cause, for example the excessive warmth of the spouse. These acts are chaste significations of love (kisses, embraces, tender words), and even less chaste ones done in passing, or those which the very experience of the spouses demonstrates to be ineffective for inducing pollution of themselves (in ordinary circumstances). Nor then, on account of imminent pollution, are spouses forced to exercise the conjugal act, provided the danger of consent to pollution is removed. - Acts gravely influencing, or joined with probable pollution, cannot be exercised except in circumstances where, pollution urging, they can and will complete the conjugal act, or unless they are excused by a grave cause: for then either pollution is avoided or, on account of a proportionate cause, it is permitted¹. These acts are, of themselves, impure venereal acts. - Finally, acts so lustful that of themselves they end in pollution as in a proximate term, or which are joined with morally certain pollution, are forbidden under grave sin to the spouses themselves unless in those circumstances where they can and will exercise conjugal copulation. Otherwise, they betray a depraved intention of lust, nor of themselves are they necessary or so useful for the honest ends of signifying love, etc. How pitiable is the wife of a man whom love itself does not suffice to turn away from exacting filthy arts!

N.B. - 1. Acts gravely influencing are not lawful beyond what a grave cause demands for them. Wherefore when they notice that pollution is proximately present, spouses must cease from those acts or interrupt them. Concerning this imminent excitement, one is to be warned by the other, if it can conveniently be done. Unless a grave reason does not permit delay, or unless copulation itself must be avoided for a grave cause, the acts are to be exercised in that place where, by the perfect use of marriage, the spouses can forestall pollution. The graver the danger of pollution has been, the graver the cause required that the acts be exercised elsewhere. Yet take this without anxiety, without troublesome comparisons. It is enough that the matters seem proportionate to a moral view.

2. On account of the very custom of marriage it happens that some acts, for definite persons, do not have that character of begun pollution which they are to be thought to have of themselves or for the most part. Thus there are spouses who know from experience that pollution is not imminent to them because they cease from begun copulation. Therefore, although other spouses generally cannot try that without grave guilt, these, after the circumstances have been prudently weighed, will be able for a grave cause to do it without grave guilt, or even, with attention to the cause and the rarity of pollution, without guilt, although sometimes pollutions happen.

3. Fault is more easily absent when copulation is prohibited by physical necessity than when only the will, even reasonable, of not having children stands in the way. Indeed, unless a truly grave cause underlies that will, such spouses, if pollution otherwise is imminent, must complete the copulation thus begun.

II. On Imperfect Acts Which Are Not Mutual

¹ Grave causes are judged to be the necessity of fostering mutual love which is growing weak; averting suspicion of infidelity or of propensity toward another person; cutting off the beginning of adulterous lust; compensating for the perfect use of marriage when the spouses cannot exercise it, or, for a just cause, do not wish to increase offspring by number; finally, the very petition of the other party made insistently, or so made that denial would be borne with difficulty.

1. Imperfect venereal acts, exercised by a spouse upon his own body, the other being absent, if they induce grave danger of pollution of themselves and for that agent, are for that reason prohibited under grave guilt.

When the spouse with whom the other wishes to have intercourse is present, if they are referred formally to copulation, they will be wholly honest, because of themselves they contain the utility of preparing the perfect act, which is honest and laudable.

2. Excluding grave danger of pollution, solitary imperfect acts, exercised while the spouse is absent, contain of themselves this inordination, that a spouse separately seeks for himself a pleasure which belongs to a common work. Yet that inordination is not indicated as grave by approved authors. There are indeed some who respond more severely, and St. Alphonsus himself, l. 6, n. 936, thinks that severity more probable and to be advised in practice. Yet the more severe opinion is refuted by its very consequences; for they gravely reprehend even the carnal [thing] concerning copulation had with one's wife. This would be full of scruples and dangerous for morals.

Concerning this question, Bucceroni writes these things in his special work De sexto et nono praecepto, art. IX.

"These acts, if they are venial, are venial only on account of the extrinsic disorder of the agent. Wherefore... we say that even these acts exercised by one spouse only, entirely apart from the other, speaking of themselves, or from their intrinsic nature, probably contain not even venial fault. And the reason is: 1. because if these acts are intrinsically culpable, since the matter here is always grave, either they are gravely culpable or in no way; 2. because mutual touch of spouse with spouse is probably licit outside consummated copulation for this reason, that that touch from its intrinsic nature is ordered to copulation. Wherefore, just as it is lawful for spouses in consummated copulation, so it is lawful also in copulation only begun, which is contained in those acts. But any pleasurable touch of a married person of itself is referred to copulation, which is now licit to him. Therefore the light fault which can be present in these acts can also easily be excused by an honest end, because, for example, they are suitable for calming concupiscence, and for avoiding another grave sin."

— Lustful looking, readings, and conversations are gravely culpable in themselves for spouses only when either they foster adulterous desires or they induce grave danger of pollution; and the prohibition of reading books professedly obscene can be understood more benignly for spouses. Yet equally as celibates they must beware of books which pervert the intellect or inculcate false notions concerning moral matters.

132. - Most men alienated from the faith do not defend honorable morals in the matter of chastity in such a way as to exclude every exception from the rules which in themselves they approve and establish. Wherefore, if at any time conception is prohibited by health, if at any time the wife will be unable to bring forth a living fetus without danger, they will permit, or even advise, artificial sterility, indeed abortion or embryotomy, resting openly or tacitly upon these principles: that necessity is immune from law; that all things are to be weighed not by an absolute but by a relative rationale; and that accordingly, in individual actions, one must consider what prevails and what is to be preferred.

133. - They can be answered thus, in brief but efficacious words. Moral uprightness has either an absolute command or one subordinated to this condition: unless great difficulty excuses transgression. An absolute obligation suffers no exception; but a conditional one will consequently be tempered by exceptions in every kind of uprightness. For no reason can be alleged why it would lose its force only in the subject of chastity and when offspring is at issue. What, therefore, if the physical state of the body, or a prolonged separation, should prohibit even imperfect conjugal intercourse? Will they dispense the healthy spouse from the obligation of fidelity? What, moreover, if the gravest harm threatens unless a theft is committed? Very few indeed will admit this, and rightly and deservedly so, on account of the absolute dictate of conscience. But this dictate is general and ought to prevail in every moral matter. Indeed, do they not celebrate as the fruit of the most atrocious war which raged for more than four years the fact that the rationale of right is acknowledged to be absolutely inviolable and can no longer be passed over on account of an alleged excuse of necessity? Will not all confess that there are duties, for example of devotion to the fatherland, on account of which life itself is to be held of no account? Can they, therefore, without absurdity deny such force and efficacy to moral duties that, in order to observe them, less than life itself - a certain delight and pleasure of life - must sometimes be subordinated?

"What kind of philosophy is this," the pagan writer Cornelius Tacitus was already vigorously exclaiming, "which would not bring about the destruction of moral gravity, but would be content with a mediocrity of vices?" ¹.

¹ Annals, 14, 38.

But they deny that there is anything absolute for man, since he himself is wholly relative.

Yet, if man is constituted by an essential relation to God, and if all the things of this world are contingent and subject to relative considerations, nevertheless God is absolute, and by His authority He confirms and sanctions the absolute precepts of the moral order.

Yet we freely admit this: when faith in God has been lost and the hope of a future life has been cast aside, those accidental contrarieties between the honorable and the pleasurable lack a sufficient explanation, and the commands of absolute uprightness cannot be perceived well. But for us they assume the excellent form of divine worship and obedience by which we humbly acknowledge the dominion of God.

Nevertheless, all sensible men feel that nothing is more worthy of man than that, besides the impediments which he is forced to obey physically, so that he must confess, "I am unable," he should equally revere the moral impediments on account of which, without any exception, in private and public life, he says, "I cannot."

But the more vehement the venereal appetite is accustomed to be, the more the firmness of a purpose of this kind honors a man and renders him strong and capable of accomplishing great things.

What of the fact that difficulties concerning the begetting of offspring most often flow from the imprudent levity with which marriages are entered, while consideration of vocation or aptitude is neglected? Shall we say that it is lawful for a man to redeem his fault at the expense of uprightness? On the contrary, will it not be obtained by moral vigor, as a thing greatly to be desired, that marriages be celebrated more circumspectly, with greater happiness for the spouses and for their stock, between persons who are well suited?

Therefore let this be settled and deliberate for us: pleasure, perfect copulation, and solicitude concerning the offspring, if any is born from it, are so joined by nature that it is never lawful to tear these apart in the mind and to admit one while repudiating the others.

134. - But at the same time, to the best of our abilities, we shall procure that parents deter from matrimony a daughter unequal to the burdens of conjugal life, and that they nourish their offspring physically and morally from tender years in such a way that it may become of itself fully capable of matrimony.

It is also to be desired that young men be less solicitous concerning the dowry of a bride than concerning her physical and moral suitability.

For this is among the desires of nature: that those insufficiently suited abstain from matrimony and aspire by another road toward a holy fecundity of good works.

223. - That is perfect intercourse by which both spouses, from the carnal union of both, with the seed of the husband within the wife's vagina, are said to become one flesh.

This act, between spouses, is morally good from its object. It therefore remains to inquire what it requires from the end and what, besides, from the circumstances.

224. - We consider here the proximate end of the agent. Now, with attention to the end:

1. Intercourse is honorably requested for the generation of offspring; for testifying love; and for calming concupiscence.

For nature itself has placed these utilities in conjugal intercourse; nor, by the separate pursuit of one end, is the other or the third impeded per se. "Because, although intercourse is not had for the sake of propagating offspring, nevertheless the propagation of offspring is not obstructed for the sake of this lust, either by an evil wish or by an evil deed": thus St. Augustine ¹ confirms this doctrine, relying upon the very passage of the Apostle: "Defraud not one another, except perhaps by consent, for a time, that you may give yourselves to prayer; and return together again, lest Satan tempt you because of your incontinence" ².

¹ De nuptiis et concupiscentia, chapter 15, no. 17 (M. 44, 423).

² 1 Corinthians 7:5.

2. Intercourse is honorably rendered to the spouse requesting it whenever no grave harm, whether one's own, that of the other spouse, or that of offspring already conceived, stands in the way.

For one who complies with the requesting spouse observes the right acquired by that spouse in an honorable matter.

a) One's own harm can nevertheless stand in the way, for example, on account of a disease with which the rendering spouse is affected or of which he must fear certain contagion to himself.

Nevertheless, if a grave reason for assenting is added, for example, lest the requesting spouse sin formally, especially lest he become an adulterer, or lest domestic peace be banished, the rendering spouse can permit this evil to himself on account of a proportionate cause of this kind, provided death itself does not seem to threaten from intercourse. For then intercourse is excused only on account of a most grave and most urgent necessity, such as can arise from serious threats of death or infamy.

b) The harm of the other spouse can also stand in the way, who, for example, on account of a cardiac disease is prohibited by a physician from every use of marriage. For from charity and piety, one spouse ought to meet the grave harm of the other. This obligation, however, does not subsist with grave inconvenience, for the harm of one who wills it can more easily be disregarded than one's own harm. But if death threatens the other spouse who requests, the other cannot cooperate in that rash outpouring of life which the spouse requesting intercourse contemplates, unless excused by a most grave inconvenience ³.

³ Cf. Lehmkuhl, II, 1083.

c) The harm of offspring already conceived can also stand in the way. This harm must be guarded against more absolutely: for the offspring has an inviolable right, concerning which no other person can dispose, lest harm be inflicted upon it; and the parents are bound by a grave duty of piety to guard against these harms. Therefore, in order that a spouse, by rendering the debt, may cooperate materially in this harm, the harm must at least be truly grave. Nor will the rationale of preventing the sin of the other be sufficient.

But if it is a question of offspring to be conceived, which is foreseen to be born either dead or infected with disease, some hold the use of marriage not for that reason unlawful, since it is better for the offspring to be or to have been than not to have been ⁴; others concede the use of marriage, at least in the danger of incontinence ⁵.

⁴ Cf. Sanchez, De matrimonio, book 9, disputation 21, nos. 24 and 25; Génicot, II, 544.

⁵ Thus Lehmkuhl, II, 1064, 3.

Unless we were prohibited by a consideration of a different order, we would rather assent to the former. For the patrons of the other opinion also concede that it is better for the offspring to be born infirm than not to be born, and they consequently require the condition of the danger of incontinence less consistently. But the essential subordination of spouses to the species, or the primary end of marriage, not only forbids them to generate contrary to the order which the good of the species demands, but also imposes upon them the positive duty of bringing it about that birth occur in that manner which the good of the species demands, and consequently that a living and healthy fetus be brought forth. Yet, because the duty is positive, it admits excuse from a proportionate reason; and such a reason is had more easily here because fertilization after intercourse is uncertain and because no harm is inflicted upon the offspring perhaps to be conceived. And the harm of incontinence is also social. Wherefore intercourse is excused by the danger of incontinence.

225. - Hence the following cases are resolved:

1. If a physician declares that a new conception will certainly be fatal to the wife, the wife ought to decline intercourse. But if death does not threaten so closely, the wife can place herself in the danger for a grave cause. For, since conception itself is doubtful, the danger seems neither certain nor proximate. (Cf. Lehmkuhl, II, 1082.)

On these matters, however, one must approach a physician who is at once expert and God-fearing. For there are not lacking those who, because of slight indications, inconsiderately prohibit persons who are little continent from the honorable use of marriage. Wherefore Génicot ⁶ judges that it is very rarely established that there is such a danger from a future birth on account of which there is a grave obligation to abstain from the use of marriage.

⁶ Vol. 2, no. 544, 5.

2. For those suffering from consumption, intercourse is harmful to themselves rather than to the other party, though not always gravely so. Therefore, spouses of this kind are not bound per se by a grave obligation of abstaining; but excuse from a moderate obligation is easily at hand. Wherefore, while nevertheless observing the diseased condition and the counsels of the physician, moderation alone in use is to be preached to them. This will be very opportune, since they are accustomed to be ardent.

3. That, for a grave cause, the infected party should request intercourse by which venereal disease seems likely to be introduced, after the other has been admonished and consents, can be tolerated ⁷. But the other party is certainly permitted to admit that intercourse on account of a cause of this kind, for example, if otherwise prolonged abstinence would be imposed with danger of the husband's incontinence.

⁷ Génicot, II, 544; Lehmkuhl, II, 1083, V, 2.

4. Necessity or common utility of having, for example, one who may succeed to a kingdom can make intercourse, although it be gravely dangerous, not only morally good but also obligatory ⁸.

⁸ Cf. Sanchez, De matrimonio, book 9, disputation 24, no. 11.

5. Unless they are excused by a grave cause, such as the danger of incontinence, spouses cannot use marriage when they foresee a certain necessity of applying a remedy or treatment from which abortion, although not intended, will certainly or probably follow if the intercourse has been fruitful.

6. Furthermore, intercourses harmful to either party, or which give no hope of living offspring, are prudently to be dissuaded, just as they are condemned by the common opinion of men. Prudently, I say, that is, with the cause for using marriage also considered. But above all we shall turn away from intercourse those who thence incur common reproach, such as those who, infected with syphilitic disease, have not recovered sufficiently to be judged harmless by an upright and expert physician. The use of an antiseptic ointment can sometimes be permitted here, at least if the probability of conception is not removed by its use.

226. - You will ask whether one who has requested intercourse for pleasure alone sins.

Concerning this matter there is this statement of St. Thomas: "It is disordered and vicious if anyone uses food and venereal things for pleasure alone" ⁹. And among the propositions condemned by a decree of the Holy Office on 2 March 1679 by Innocent XI, at least as scandalous and pernicious in practice, there is found this one, no. 9: "The work of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is entirely free from all guilt and venial defect."

⁹ Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 83.

The question, however, is easily answered in this manner. One who explicitly thinks of nothing except pleasure either positively excludes or does not exclude a further or different end. If he has positively excluded a further or different end, he sins, because he repudiates an honorable good, or refuses to act honorably; for man was created for an honorable end.

But if he has not excluded a different end, he will not sin except through an immoderate desire, by which he wishes to be delighted contrary to some duty, or through immoderate use. For it is honorable in this life to admit permitted pleasures moderately. Therefore, while he explicitly seeks moderate pleasure alone, he tacitly approves and intends that moral goodness. Wherefore one who acts thus will also be conscious of an honorable action, unless he has been deceived by the dicta of the rigorists.

To use other words: one who wishes pleasure only moderately wills it insofar as it is suitable to man, and consequently refers it tacitly to the utility which pleasure is seen to have in the present life.

Although, therefore, we profess that it is unlawful for you to use marriage, even moderately, for pleasure alone, we shall bring no scruple of sin to those who seek pleasure in the moderate use of marriage, as though they had acted for pleasure alone. Indeed, we shall tear scruples of this kind from the soul, lest Catholics appear fearful, but rather that they may strive toward better things with a nobler affection.

Up to this point we have spoken of lust outside marriage; it remains to speak of chastity and lust in the matrimonial state. In this state the conjugal act, or carnal copulation per se apt for generation, is licit if it is done on account of the due end and with due circumstances; indeed it is an act of the virtue itself of chastity. Hence we shall speak:

1. concerning the essence and end of conjugal copulation,

2. concerning the circumstances of conjugal copulation,

3. concerning accessory acts connected with conjugal copulation,

4. concerning excess in the use of marriage,

5. concerning the conjugal debt and concerning defect in the use of marriage.

I. Conjugal copulation is that which per se is apt for generation; for this three things are required: intromission into the female genital canal, effusion of semen within the female genital canal, retention of semen by the woman, so namely that it can be drawn into the uterus.¹ Hence he sins gravely who knowingly and willingly does not preserve one of these three things or voluntarily exposes himself to the proximate danger of this.

¹ The hypothesis which some have posited concerning a woman who would not be able to retain semen seems in no way to be attended to; for naturally it cannot happen that she reject all the semen once received.

Hence:

a. Although conception absolutely can occur without intromission, by pouring out semen at the mouth of the female genital canal, because it is not impossible for sperm to enter by its own vital motion and by the attraction of the uterus, nevertheless, because this is altogether rare and per accidens, it does not suffice for copulation such as nature instituted, nor is it an honorable mode of perfecting copulation even if it is done for a good end, for example to avoid the contagion of disease; rather, it is gravely illicit. For then in reality no copulation is present, but only two simultaneous pollutions.

b. Yet to effect slight intromission into the female genital canal suffices, although one acting thus can sin by affection, at least venially, if without proportionate cause he acts in this way, of which certainly the sole fear of procreating offspring is not one, as if someone wishes in this way to avoid conception or render it notably more difficult, and wishes to avoid the mode more apt for generation;² mortally, if he thinks and intends that generation is thus totally impeded.

² This at minimum must be concluded from the response of the Holy Office, November 23-December 1, 1922, approving the decree of the bishops of the Netherlands. The question concerned copulation, as they say, half-completed, which was considered by several confessors as an apt remedy to be proposed to onanists. Now the bishops of the Netherlands condemned that practice of confessors who advised or permitted inveterate onanists half-completed copulation so that they would no longer sin gravely; moreover, this was gravely scandalous and rather was apt to prepare the way to onanism. The bishops, however, sought the approval of the Holy Office, which gave the following response:

A proportionate cause, for example, is if the woman, recently from childbirth or infirm in the sexual parts, cannot suffer perfect coitus.

c. Nevertheless it would not suffice to effect slight intromission at the external pudendum and deposit semen between the lips, because thus it would be deposited only at the mouth, in no way in the female genital canal itself; and thus it would not be copulation.

d. Since intromission into the female genital canal is an essential condition altogether required, therefore he who certainly could not effect intromission and perfect the act in the due mode is in reality impotent. But if impotence is doubtful, a married person could attempt copulation in this way as long as there is some hope of intromission and of arriving at perfect copulation; otherwise, if there is no hope, because the mere possibility of generation does not suffice, but a probable possibility of copulation is required.

II. Every carnal copulation of itself apt for generation is also per se licit, provided it is instituted on account of a right end; hence it is necessary that on the part of the one acting the end be conformed to the end of the work.

But the one proper and principal end from the nature of the work is the generation of offspring, to which two secondary ends are joined, but merely subordinated in such a way that they are true means by which the principal end is more securely obtained: the enjoyment of pleasure or the calming of concupiscence, and mutual solace, or mutual love to be fostered and preserved.

Hence spouses can seek copulation either on account of the principal end, or also on account of a secondary end, but insofar as of itself it is subordinated to and serves the principal end.

Indeed copulation can also be exacted by either spouse, and indeed from justice, so that per se and generally the partner is bound to render it; wherefore it is called the conjugal debt, concerning which the Apostle speaks, I Cor. VII, 3-5. Hence for rendering copulation, the legitimate end is to render to the partner what is owed to him or her from justice; yet this end always supposes the primary end of the act itself or work, namely the generation of offspring.

III. Corollaries. From this the following conclusions follow:

1. He who exercises copulation sins if he positively excludes the primary end, and indeed gravely if he intends to impede it, or employs means for this.

2. Therefore he who, in perfecting copulation, intends only or chiefly a secondary end, for example pleasure, in such a way that the principal end is positively excluded or postponed, sins venially; for it is an inversion of order, namely the inordinate use of a licit thing. Compare proposition 9 condemned by Innocent XI.³

³ "The work of marriage exercised on account of pleasure alone is altogether without all fault and venial defect." Compare Saint Thomas, Supplement, q. 49, a. 5 and 6.

3. Yet he who explicitly intends a secondary end, for example the calming of concupiscence, and only abstracts from the primary end, acts licitly, because he implicitly intends the principal end toward which, from its nature, the act tends, which, the whole of what it is, exists only for generation.

4. Likewise he who intends to avoid incontinence in himself or in the consort: for he acts directly from a motive of virtue for preserving continence. On the contrary, he who seeks pleasure alone acts directly from love of pleasure. Nor does it stand in the way that the danger of incontinence implies defect of virtue and therefore sin: this defect is evil, but rather is presupposed to the copulation; yet, this defect standing, to provide an apt remedy to it by conjugal copulation rightly exercised is not evil but good.

5. Nor does he sin who, on account of poverty, infirm health, or another honorable end, by an inefficacious desire only wishes that offspring not be conceived, provided he uses no illegitimate means for impeding generation, nor positively excludes it in the act, and the act posited is apt for generation.

6. But he sins, and indeed mortally, who with an adulterous mind approaches his own spouse, thinking of another person as present, or desiring to have copulation with that person; not, however, he who, without depraved affection, while thinking of another person, adorns his own wife with the beauty of another so that he may excite himself to the conjugal act, although this is dangerous. In a similar mode one must speak for the wife thinking of another man or of his qualities or vigor.

7. The use of marriage is licit also for the sterile and the old, even if sterility is certain, provided they can perfect the act or have hope of perfecting it, because the act by its nature is ordered to generation, and if generation does not follow, this happens per accidens. Hence the Church blesses their marriages.

8. Likewise the conjugal act is licit even if it is foreseen that from fertilization the woman will suffer abortion or will bring forth dead offspring into the light, because such an effect occurs per accidens and can be permitted on account of some honorable end of the act itself.

I. The use of marriage, whether consummated or begun, licit of itself, can per accidens be illicit by reason of circumstances, and indeed not only on the part of the end; but also on the part of the person, by reason of impotence, as has already been said, or of vow, or of marriage doubtfully valid; from the circumstance of mode, by reason of position; from the circumstance of place, by reason of scandal; from the circumstance of time, by reason of danger or harm.

II. From the circumstance of the person, the use of marriage is illicit:

1. From impotence:

a. The man who certainly cannot effect intromission, or does not have semen, or cannot emit it, or cannot deposit it in the female genital canal, cannot exercise copulation, nor can the wife with such a man.

b. If impotence is doubtful, they can attempt copulation, if there is hope of perfecting it.

c. But if impotence is altogether certain but temporal, they are bound to abstain during this time.

2. From vow:

a. The spouse who has made a vow of chastity is prohibited under grave sin, from religion, from seeking the debt; nevertheless he or she can and must render it to the one who has the right and justly exacts, because one person is not deprived of right because of the deed of another. Nevertheless such a spouse could also seek, if he or she were to notice that the partner is placed in danger of incontinence and does not dare to seek, which can happen especially in the wife because of shame; for thus the spouse is rather rendering to one tacitly seeking than seeking.

b. If each has vowed separately, even with the partner knowing and approving, neither can seek, because they have freely deprived themselves of the use of the debt; but if in fact one seeks, the other is bound to render from justice, because the right of seeking always remains. The one seeking does indeed seek illicitly, but seeks with right, and therefore sins against religion, not against chastity.

c. But if each has vowed together by mutual consent and by the same pact, each is prohibited both from rendering and from seeking, because by the pact each intends freely to renounce mutually his or her right of seeking, as to exercise.¹

¹ The wife can indirectly irritate the vow of the husband, insofar as it is contrary to her rights; the husband can irritate the vow of the wife, perhaps even directly. But not if they vowed by mutual pact, because then they renounced this right of irritation.

3. From doubt concerning the validity of marriage:

a. Doubt concerning the validity of marriage, if it is on each side, simply prohibits use until due inquiry has been made.

b. If doubt remains after due inquiry, use is licit, because in doubt one must stand for the validity of marriage.

c. If only one doubts, during the doubt that one is prohibited from seeking, but is bound to render, because he or she cannot expose himself or herself to the danger of injuring justice, nor is the other deprived of his or her right because of the doubt of the partner; if doubt remains after due inquiry, he or she can seek and render.²

² Thus it is certain if the marriage was entered in good faith. But whether one who in bad faith contracted marriage in doubt can seek the debt, and especially if the marriage is doubtful because of the impediment of ligamen, or the bond of a prior marriage perhaps enduring, which would be in possession, can be disputed. Practically, however, there are authors who think this licit, because they hold it probable, even in the last case, that the principle of can. 1014 can be applied: "in doubt one must stand for the validity of marriage until the contrary is proved."

690. Principle. The conjugal act is licit, and indeed meritorious, whenever it accords with the good of offspring and the good of fidelity.

The individual parts of this very fruitful principle are to be explained and demonstrated. Certain ancient heretics denied the liceity of the conjugal act (for example, Saturninus, Marcion, the Manichaeans, and the Encratites), but several texts of Sacred Scripture manifestly prove not only its liceity, but also its obligation. Thus St. Paul writes: "Let the husband render the debt to his wife; and the wife also in like manner to the husband. The wife hath not power of her own body, but the husband; and in like manner the husband also hath not power of his own body, but the wife."³⁸⁰ - In the Old Testament, after their creation, God commanded the first parents: "Increase and multiply."³⁸¹ But according to the present order of things, the conjugal act is the sole means of propagating the human race. Therefore, if God wills the propagation of the human race, He also wills the conjugal act, which consequently is licit in itself. Nor is it required that each and every conjugal act serve directly and immediately for the propagation of the human race; for the whole economy of human propagation greatly excels the propagation of brute animals. Indeed, animals of the female sex are not accustomed to have the instinct, or even the power, of generating except during a brief and determinate time of each year; among them conception is very often completed by a single intercourse; and after that intercourse has been effected, the animals abhor another carnal union. It is altogether otherwise in the human race. Human physiology demonstrates that human conception can occur at any time of the year and commonly is not completed except by repeated conjugal acts. These things clearly demonstrate that the Creator permits spouses carnal intercourse even if human conception cannot follow here and now, for example, during pregnancy. Moreover, the unions of animals are transient, mutable, promiscuous, and produce no spiritual good; on the contrary, the marital union of human beings is stable; there is no promiscuity; spouses are not separated except by death.

But the principal end both of the whole conjugal life in general and of the conjugal act in particular is the spiritual good of the spouses.

Since these things are so, a general rule can be established: The conjugal act is licit when it serves the spiritual good of the spouses, even though conception or generation is neither directly and immediately had nor even intended. Not only supernatural virtues, but also marital love and affection conduce to the spiritual good of the spouses. For if spouses are united by true and constant love, their whole life also becomes happy; each willingly bears the burdens of the other, and almost all the praises which St. Paul attributes to charity can be proclaimed of such marital love, when he says: "Charity is patient, is kind; charity envieth not, dealeth not perversely, is not puffed up, is not ambitious, seeketh not her own, is not provoked to anger, thinketh no evil ... beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things."³⁸²

³⁸⁰ 1 Cor. 7:3 f.

³⁸¹ Gen. 1:28.

³⁸² 1 Cor. 13:4 ff.

691. Practical conclusions immediately follow from the rule established above:

1. The conjugal act is licit during the time of nursing, both because the danger of infecting the milk and thus harming the child already born is not present (according to the common opinion of modern physicians), and because no law prohibits it. During the time of nursing a new conception is rather rare; but if it nevertheless occurs, then the mother's milk is customarily much diminished, so that the child already born must be nourished in an artificial manner; this is indeed some inconvenience, since such artificial nourishment is not as good as mother's milk. Nevertheless, this inconvenience is not so great that spouses are bound to observe complete continence throughout the whole time of nursing.³⁸³

2. The conjugal act is licit during pregnancy, provided that no grave danger is thereby brought upon the conceived fetus or the mother. For although a new conception is then impossible, nevertheless intercourse can serve to foster honorable marital love and to allay the impulses of the flesh. For it would be a most grave burden if spouses were bound to observe continence throughout the whole time of pregnancy. Per accidens, intercourse had at this time can be illicit, namely, if grave danger of abortion or illness arises from it.³⁸⁴

3. The conjugal act is licit between sterile spouses; with a wife whose ovaries have been excised, or even whose uterus has been removed;³⁸⁵ with a husband who was castrated after matrimony.³⁸⁶ The reason is the same. Certainly, the proximate end of intercourse in all these cases not only is not attained, but is even impossible; nevertheless, because the carnal act is completed in the ordinary manner and is frustrated of its proximate end only because of a physical impediment which does not depend upon the will of the spouses, it is licit.

4. The conjugal act is licit on Sundays and feast days or on the day of Communion, if it is performed for a reasonable cause. Certainly, it is most fitting that spouses not come together on days of Communion and during the short interval between confession and Communion, especially if they do not approach the sacraments of penance and the Eucharist so often. For such abstinence, being so rare and of such brief duration, cannot be hard; and therefore let the wife ask the husband to be willing then to abstain from the conjugal act. Nevertheless, if the husband bears this with difficulty, let the woman acquiesce in the desire of the husband. Especially let pious women who are accustomed to approach the sacred Synaxis several times each week show themselves ready to please the husband, lest he become indignant at such frequent reception of the sacraments.

³⁸³ Cf. Scavini, Theol. mor. univ., IV, n. 573.

³⁸⁴ Cf. St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor., l. 6, n. 924), who favors the opinion that intercourse with a pregnant woman cannot be excused from venial fault unless there is danger of incontinence or another honorable cause. This honorable cause, however, is easily present. Certain Holy Fathers spoke more severely about intercourse during pregnancy, for example, St. Augustine and St. Jerome. Cf. Eschbach, Disp. physiol.-theol., 2nd ed., 110.

³⁸⁵ Holy Office, February 3, 1887, and July 30, 1890. Cf. also Noldin, De sexto praec., n. 61.

³⁸⁶ Cf. Sanchez, De matrim. sacr., l. 7, disp. 102, n. 7.

692. 5. The conjugal act is illicit because of pleasure alone, such that pleasure is its sole and ultimate end. Hence Innocent XI condemned proposition 9: "The act of matrimony exercised because of pleasure alone is entirely free from every fault and venial defect."³⁸⁷ Ballerini,³⁸⁸ however, deservedly notes that the words "because of pleasure alone" are to be understood with the exclusion of another honorable end; for it is certainly lawful to seek ordered pleasure, since God Himself joined pleasure to the conjugal act so that this act, so necessary for the conservation of the human race, might be made more desirable; but it is not lawful to seek pleasure as one's proper end. The older authors disputed at length concerning the liceity of conjugal intercourse exercised because of pleasure alone, or for preserving one's own health, or for avoiding temptations of fornication. All these disputes are of little practical utility. For in practice spouses are not to be disturbed if they exercise the conjugal act in an ordinary and honorable manner without actually thinking about some particular end. The reason is that the conjugal act performed in a natural manner fosters marital love, while marital love redounds to the good of offspring; and all teach that the conjugal act is licit because of the good of offspring. St. Thomas also seems to be understood in this sense when he teaches: "In only two ways do spouses come together without any sin, namely, for the sake of procreating offspring and of rendering the debt; otherwise there is always at least venial sin there."³⁸⁹

6. The conjugal act is illicit if one's own health, or that of the other spouse or the offspring, is thereby gravely and proximately endangered. Therefore spouses are not permitted to come together, for example, if one of them suffers from a grave contagious disease and especially from venereal disease,³⁹⁰ or if danger of abortion threatens the conceived offspring from intercourse. Small injuries to health or light bodily inconveniences, however, neither render the conjugal act illicit nor dispense from rendering the conjugal debt. - Authors customarily ask here whether the conjugal act is licit during menstruation and puerperal cleansing, because in these circumstances intercourse not rarely becomes harmful. The only true response to this question is this: Particular cases are to be considered; if grave harm truly arises for certain spouses in these circumstances, either for themselves or for offspring to be born, intercourse is illicit; otherwise it is not.

During menstruation it certainly is not fitting to exercise intercourse, but the opinion of the ancient authors who thought that during menstruation none were conceived except "those damaged in their members, the blind, the lame, and lepers" is not true.³⁹¹ The ceremonial or judicial law of the Old Testament prohibited intercourse during menstruation under penalty of death,³⁹² but this law no longer binds. In the Old Testament this law was wise both for fostering chastity, for avoiding superstition, and for guarding against grave diseases which, because of special circumstances among the Jews of that time, could easily arise from such intercourse.³⁹³

Modern physicians are accustomed to judge more severely concerning intercourse had during puerperal cleansing. Thus, for example, Capellmann³⁹⁴ says: "I consider intercourse in the first two weeks after childbirth altogether prohibited, since it is most apt to bring the gravest harm upon the woman. Indeed, during the following four weeks I do not think it licit without doubt. But since the danger at this time is no longer so great, let theologians determine what causes suffice to compensate for this danger of grave harm which may be brought upon the woman."

7. The conjugal act is illicit when it is completed in an onanistic manner. This is evident, because it is directly contrary to the good of offspring, whose generation is impeded; it is also contrary to the good of fidelity, according to which one spouse gives the other a right over his or her body, but only in order to generation. The discussion will return to the onanism of spouses below, n. 699.

8. The conjugal act is illicit if it does not occur in a secret manner and place. The reason is that scandal and most grave temptations are then caused to others. Hence parents sin gravely who come together immodestly, so that the children can perceive something.

9. The conjugal act is illicit if during it a spouse thinks as though he or she were joined with another person. For such a thought is spiritual adultery. The Angelic Doctor³⁹⁵ writes aptly concerning this matter: "If pleasure is sought beyond the honorableness of matrimony, so that someone does not attend in the spouse to the fact that she is a spouse, but only that she is a woman, being prepared to do the same thing with her if she were not his spouse, it is a mortal sin; and therefore such a one is called a too ardent lover of his wife, because that ardor is carried outside the goods of matrimony."

³⁸⁷ Denz., n. 1159.

³⁸⁸ In the notes to Gury, II, 908.

³⁸⁹ Suppl., q. 49, a. 5. William Peraldus, O.P., a contemporary of St. Thomas, writes concerning this matter: "The [carnal] act can be exercised without any fault and even meritoriously in three cases: 1. when it is for the sake of receiving offspring and educating it for the worship of God.... 2. when the debt is rendered to one asking.... 3. when someone demands that act so that he may guard his spouse lest the spouse fall into the sin [of incontinence]" (Summa virtut. et vitior., I, De temperantia, c. 17, Venice ed. 1571, p. 569).

³⁹⁰ Cf. above, n. 692. What is taught "concerning the matrimony of lepers" (cc. 1, 2, X 4, 8) does not oppose this doctrine, because the ancients thought that proximate danger of contagion did not arise from intercourse with a leper. Cf. St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 64, a. 1, ad 4; Billuart, De matr., diss. 4, a. 4, § 1.

³⁹¹ Thus thought, for example, St. Jerome (In Is., c. 65).

³⁹² "He that shall copulate with a woman in her menstrual flow, and shall uncover her nakedness, and she shall open the fountain of her blood, both shall be put to death out of the midst of their people" (Lev. 20:18).

³⁹³ D. Haller explains well the reason for the Mosaic law (in Eschbach, Disp. physiol.-theol., 2nd ed., 106, disp. 1, c. 8, a. 1).

³⁹⁴ Pastoralmedizin, 18th ed., p. 316. The same physician says: "In my eyes, intercourse, at least in the first weeks, appears as true brutality toward the puerperal woman."

³⁹⁵ Suppl., q. 49, a. 6.

693. Corollary. On acts accessory to marital intercourse. Not only is the conjugal act itself licit, but so also are all accessory acts, whether mutual or solitary, which are either necessary or useful for completing the conjugal act. The reason is obvious; for if the end is licit, all honorable means not prohibited from another source are also licit, so that this end may be obtained. Certainly spouses are to be exhorted to exercise the conjugal act with great modesty, and especially the woman is with all her strength to take care for her modesty and honor; but a mortal sin is never committed by spouses in this matter unless there occurs either pollution of either party, foreseen and culpably willed, or at least the proximate danger of pollution. Absolutely all other lustful acts had between spouses are at most venial sins and often lack every fault. Hence the confessor acts badly if he torments spouses concerning this matter with inopportune questions and renders confession hateful to them. It is much better to leave spouses in good faith or to admonish them only generally to preserve modesty.

What the RIGHTS and DUTIES of spouses are, we set forth summarily in the Treatise on the fourth Precept (n. 703 and 704). - It remains that here we treat specifically of the conjugal debt and of cohabitation.

2092. The conjugal act is customarily named by theologians the conjugal debt, both because spouses mutually owe this act to themselves, and especially because the Apostle thus called it, saying (1 Cor. 7:3): Let the husband render the debt to the wife: and likewise the wife to the husband.

This having been noted beforehand, so that all things which pertain to this matter may be weighed, we shall treat: 1. of the liceity of the conjugal act; 2. of the obligation of the conjugal act; 3. of various delicts in the conjugal act, or of the sins of spouses.

N.B. Before we approach the unpleasant matter, it helps to remit the reader to those things which were said in n. 762, where ST. ALPHONSUS warns students not to read these things except with due cautions, and then only when the proximate necessity of hearing confessions has persuaded the reading.

2093. That the conjugal act is of itself licit and honorable is already established from the things said concerning the honorableness of matrimony (cf. n. 1967). But that such an act, from every part, be licit and legitimate, it ought to be clothed with certain conditions, which refer both to the persons using matrimony, and to the end and circumstances of the act itself.

For the liceity of the conjugal act there is required on the part of the persons a true right, and this unimpeded.

It is said 1. a true right, that is, a right which arises from valid matrimony; otherwise the conjugal act would be true fornication. Whence: if matrimony is certainly null, it is never licit for the party knowing this either to seek or to render the debt to the other who is ignorant.⁹ - It is said 2. an unimpeded right; for spouses can be deprived of conjugal right on account of certain prohibiting impediments, which either preceded matrimony or followed after. The principal ones concerning which we must treat here are FOUR, namely: 1. Doubt concerning the value of matrimony; 2. Impotence of body; 3. Simple vow of chastity; 4. Affinity contracted after matrimony was entered. Concerning these, therefore, the following are established.¹⁰

2094. Principles. I. A spouse DOUBTING concerning the value of his matrimony CAN and OUGHT to RENDER the debt to a coparty seeking in good faith; but he CANNOT SEEK it, unless he prudently has put aside his doubt after due diligence has been made. The reason of the first is that if, after the first two-month period, or after consummation of the matrimony, he refused to obey the coparty seeking in good faith, he would commit himself to grave danger of violating that one's right. Whence, as long as from valid reasons it has not been established with moral certitude concerning the nullity of the matrimony, the certain possession of the coparty presses. - The reason of the second is that in the one doubting the right of possession is suspended until the truth has been diligently investigated, as was seen in n. 46; but with doubt persevering after diligence has been made, possession remains for the value of the matrimony, and therefore for the use of it.¹¹

St. Alphonsus with others, against many, admits these same things as sufficiently probable, even if the matrimony had been contracted in bad faith or in doubt; because although the one doubting cannot put aside doubt by title of possession, since he began to possess in bad faith, nevertheless he can put it aside from another principle, namely from the principle that in doubt one must stand for the value of matrimony, in favor of which, in the forum both internal and external, judgment must always be made, by reason of the common good of society.¹²

Yet two cases are to be excepted, in which doubt cannot be put aside from the aforesaid principles, namely: - 1. If someone prudently doubts concerning the death of a prior spouse; for then the prior matrimony possesses, until it is established as morally certain concerning its dissolution; meanwhile, however, the debt must be rendered to the coparty seeking in good faith, as we said above.¹³ - 2. If it is established concerning an impediment of ecclesiastical law, and it is not established concerning a dispensation having been obtained; for then likewise the impediment possesses. But otherwise, if it is established concerning the dispensation and there is doubt concerning its value; because one must stand for the value of the act¹⁴ (cf. n. 1810).

IT IS ASKED. What in the case of a matrimony contracted in GOOD FAITH, if it is PROBABLY invalid, no probability standing for the value?

Resp. It is controverted. The first opinion DENIES the right of seeking the debt; because possession indeed suffragates for one doubting, but not for one opining for the nullity of matrimony. - The second opinion, sufficiently probable, AFFIRMS; because possession confers a certain right of seeking, until it is established concerning the nullity of matrimony. It is confirmed from cap. Laudabilem, de frigid. et malef.; for if, after two years, spouses have not yet been able to consummate, it is surely most probable that the matrimony is invalid; and nevertheless they can attempt intercourse until the end of the third year, certainly for no other reason, except because the nullity of matrimony is not yet certain (cf. n. 45).¹⁵

2095. II. Certain impotence SUPERVENING upon matrimony renders the use of it illicit, insofar as danger of pollution underlies.¹⁶ The reason is that the pouring out of seed is not licit except in an act of itself apt for generation. Authors commonly agree.

It is said 1. certain impotence; for if it is doubtful, it is licit to try intercourse for so long as there is probable hope of completing it as nature requires (cf. n. 2011, Resp. 2).

It is said 2. insofar as danger of pollution underlies; because short of such danger, the conjugal act is licit, no otherwise than touches, concerning which below n. 2110.

Whence spouses are not to be prohibited from the use of matrimony if, on account of old age or another cause, it generally happens that the seed is poured out outside the vessel, "provided there is probable hope of emitting seed within the vessel; because whenever such hope is present, they have a right to intercourse, and if seed is poured out, this happens by accident."¹⁷

2096. III. He who VOWED chastity after matrimony CANNOT SEEK the debt; nevertheless he is BOUND to RENDER it to one seeking. The reason of the first is sufficiently clear from the obligation of the vow. - The reason of the second is that a vow cannot prejudice the right of the other spouse.¹

But if the spouse not only permitted the coparty's vow, but consented to it, intending to yield his right, now neither is permitted the seeking or rendering of the debt. But if "they have vowed mutually, not intending to yield their right, the one is still bound to render to the other seeking," as is commonly taught. And the reason is that the seeking is still just, and on the part of the act honorable, although on the part of the one seeking illicit; and because thus to one seeking there can never be denied a thing which is owed to him from justice² (cf. n. 216 and 519). But if the vow preceded matrimony, recall the things said in n. 1992, Hence 2.

IT IS ASKED. Whether a spouse bound by a vow can ever seek the debt?

Resp. HE CAN, indeed HE OUGHT, in a twofold case: - 1. If the other is in danger of incontinence; because then the obligation arises from the very end of matrimony, which commands that one assist the other. - 2. If the other seeks tacitly, for instance when a wife does not dare to seek because of modesty, and the husband perceives intercourse to be desired by her; because then the seeking is really a rendering. Thus commonly³ (cf. n. 1992).

2097. IV. A spouse who, during matrimony, contracted AFFINITY with his consort, namely by perpetrating complete and formal incest with a blood relative of the consort, male or female, in the first or second degree, is deprived of the right of seeking the debt until he has obtained a legitimate dispensation. - Recall the things said in n. 2031, q. 3.

Note. Concerning adultery, insofar as it deprives of the right of seeking the debt, see n. 2031, question 3.

That the conjugal act be licit and honorable, it must be exercised FOR AN HONORABLE END. This is clear from the things said concerning the honorableness of human acts (cf. n. 306 and 307). - Whence,

2098. I. It is licit to exercise the conjugal act for VARIOUS ENDS which COHONESTATE matrimony, namely: - 1. For generating offspring; because this is the end intended by the very Author of matrimony. Nor, however, must the generation of offspring necessarily be intended, provided it is not positively impeded; indeed it is licit for spouses with a simple affection to wish that offspring not be born, for instance because of the difficulty of nourishing it. - 2. For rendering the debt; because this rendering is an act of justice emanating from the institution itself of matrimony. - 3. For avoiding incontinence in oneself or in the coparty; because after the fall of the first parents, matrimony was also ordained as a remedy of concupiscence. - Indeed, if it is a question of avoiding the coparty's incontinence, the act is not only licit, but also obligatory by precept of charity. - And these are the PRIMARY ends.

Moreover, it is licitly exercised for any honorable end whatever, e.g. for fostering conjugal love, for the health of the body; because nothing prevents a means licit in itself, and useful for that end, from being applied to an honorable end.⁴

2099. II. It is not licit to exercise the conjugal act FOR PLEASURE ALONE. This is clear from the ninth proposition condemned by Innocent XI: "The work of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is entirely without any fault or venial defect." The reason for the condemnation is given because it is a certain perversion of order to intend delight as an end, which nature intends as a means. But there is only VENIAL fault, because the inordinate use of a thing licit in itself is not grave, unless someone rests in it as in an ultimate end (cf. n. 342, q. 3).

It was said: for pleasure alone, i.e. any other end whatever being excluded; because unless such an exclusion is made, the act, apprehended as licit and duly exercised, is referred virtually and by its nature to its proper intrinsic ends. Wherefore it is also without any fault, although the appetite of delight impels one to it (cf. n. 1966).

Here also in passing we note that a spouse sins gravely who exercises marital intercourse with an adulterous affection toward another person, whom he imagines or wishes to be present to himself⁵ (cf. n. 356).

From these things you will resolve: - 1. The conjugal act is licit, although because of sterility there is no hope of offspring; for this happens by accident, and the other ends of matrimony cohonestate the act.

2. Spouses who assume the pleasure of intercourse as a remedy of concupiscence, or for avoiding incontinence, act rather from love of virtue than from love of pleasure, since they intend to preserve continence and avoid sin. But those who desire pleasure for its own sake are led by love, not of virtue, but of pleasure, which is not honorable.⁶

3. In practice, as regards the use of matrimony for delight alone, spouses are customarily in good faith, nor usually can fruit be hoped for from admonition. Whence it is more advisable that the confessor leave them in their good faith.⁷

2100. The due circumstances of the conjugal act look especially to its manner, place, and time.

I. The natural manner or position in the use of matrimony is that the woman be beneath and the man above, since it is more apt for pouring out and receiving seed; whence, of itself it is unlawful to change this position, since such a change is an inversion of the order of nature. Yet authors commonly say with St. Thomas that it is not of itself mortal if the act is exercised in an improper position, either standing, or sitting, or from behind after the manner of beasts, or with the man beneath, provided it always takes place in the natural vessel. For a change of position ordinarily does not impede generation, since the male seed is of itself naturally drawn into the woman's matrix. - And therefore there will be no sin if the natural manner is changed on account of some just cause, e.g. of danger of abortion, scandal, or difficulty.⁸

We said 1. that of itself it is not mortal; for the Angelic Doctor teaches that by accident one can sin gravely in this, if it is done from depraved concupiscence, e.g. from an affection of bestiality or sodomy.⁹ 2. Provided it always takes place in the natural vessel; otherwise the order of nature would be essentially violated, and the end of matrimony would be entirely frustrated (cf. n. 2112).

You will ask whether it is mortal to change position if, because of this, some part of the seed is lost? Doctors more commonly deny it; because if seed is poured into the vessel, a partial loss of it after infusion, which can occur in some positions, happens by chance, nor does it forestall conception. For it is clear that a small amount of seed suffices for generation. - On the contrary, if it were established by experience that the woman retains none of the seed because of the natural position having been changed, then it would be mortal; but this very rarely happens. And therefore the confessor ought not to ask about this danger.¹⁰

2101. II. The place suitable for the conjugal act cannot be, as natural modesty itself dictates, except secret. In a public place or before others, and especially before children, the conjugal act would be a most grave scandal. But if it were done in a sacred place, apart from the case of necessity, according to the more probable and more common opinion it would be a grave and sacrilegious irreverence (cf. n. 788).¹¹

Note. Spouses are to be admonished not to allow children capable of reason, or already capable of some malice, to lie down with them in bed or in the bedroom.¹² But if on account of poverty they are compelled to this, let them at least take care lest the children perceive anything.

2102. III. TIME, of itself, is an indifferent circumstance; nevertheless sometimes, by reason of other adjuncts, it can render the conjugal act lightly or gravely illicit. Thus more commonly with St. Bonaventure. - The reason of the first is that no law can be assigned by which an act of this kind is ever prohibited, and the prescriptions of the ancient Mosaic law have been entirely abrogated by the New Law. Whence if the canons and the holy Fathers seem to prohibit the use of marriage on feast days or in times of penance, the prohibition is to be understood as of counsel, not of precept. Concerning the days of Communion, see n. 1561, 2. - The reason of the second is had from the natural law, because the use of conjugal right can be suspended or impeded on account of the concurrence of another predominant right, e.g. on account of danger of abortion or harm to health, especially in the time of menstruation, pregnancy, purification after birth, lactation, and sickness. - Whence YOU WILL RESOLVE:

1. In the time of menstrual flow conjugal intercourse is forbidden, under venial fault, as the most common and more probable opinion holds; both because it involves a certain indecency, and because, as physicians testify, it can harm the genital parts of the woman and thence, if she conceives, afterward bring on some danger of abortion; and because it is a certain intemperance not to await the suitable time which will shortly be present. In the time of an extraordinary flow of blood, which proceeds from disease and is long-lasting or perpetual, intercourse can then become illicit when it is established by experience that the flow is increased after intercourse; if this happens, intercourse will ordinarily harm somewhat, yet rarely gravely. If it will be only lightly harmful, intercourse will become licit, because otherwise the husband would have to abstain perpetually, which would bring him both grave inconvenience and ordinarily grave danger of incontinence; these two things certainly prevail over a slight harm to the wife.¹³

2. In the time of pregnancy, intercourse, the danger of abortion being excluded, is more commonly judged licit; because it is prohibited by no law, and it would be a most grave burden if spouses were held to contain themselves for so long a time. - Nevertheless, the opinion of those who judge that intercourse with a pregnant woman, speaking of itself, is not without venial fault, is more pleasing to St. Alphonsus; because the seed is frustrated of its end; yet by accident it is cohonestated when an honorable cause accedes, e.g. danger of incontinence, or another cause; and since this is hardly ever absent, in practice this opinion nearly coincides with the former.¹⁴

The danger of abortion will be so much the less, the farther intercourse is distant from the day of conception. Whence it can exist only within the first months of pregnancy, and in this time only then when intercourse is performed either more often or more impetuously; wherefore moderation as to number and manner is to be recommended to spouses. - Moreover, on account of the danger of abortion, intercourse can by no means be forbidden; both because no one knows anything concerning beginning pregnancy, at least nothing certain; and because abortions much more often proceed from a morbid disposition than from a direct cause.¹⁵

3. In the time of purgation, according to the more common and more probable opinion, intercourse is illicit; both because of indecency and because of danger of harm for the wife. - If slight harm is feared, there will be venial fault; if grave, mortal fault. A new conception is not to be feared except after about six weeks, namely when the uterus is restored and menstruation recurs.¹⁶ Moreover, according to the opinion of St. Alphonsus,¹⁷ who consulted a very skilled physician, grave harm can prudently be feared within two days after birth; and, according to more recent physicians, still longer, for one or perhaps two weeks, namely while the puerperal flow, or the woman's great weakness or sickness, persists.

4. In the time of lactation, it is most commonly affirmed that intercourse is licit; because although milk for the most part, when a new pregnancy begins, is soon diluted and shortly ceases, offspring can be nursed in another way, lest spouses be compelled to abstain for so long with so great difficulty. To this there accedes that a woman commonly does not conceive in the time of lactation.¹⁸

5. In the time of sickness, the conjugal act is illicit when notable harm to health can prudently be feared from it. Therefore, A DISTINCTION MUST BE MADE between contagious and non-contagious diseases.

1. In the contagious disease of one spouse, if it is a venereal disease or syphilis, intercourse is gravely illicit, on account of the horrendous consequences which it brings with it for the coparty and for offspring. The infected party is not bound to manifest this disease to the coparty, on account of infamy, provided that, while he remains silent, he neither seeks nor renders the debt. Yet see n. 2108, 2.

In other diseases, intercourse is likewise prohibited if they are apt to bring death shortly; but otherwise, if they are chronic or longer-lasting, because the danger of incontinence, which for so long a time can scarcely be absent, seems to prevail. Moreover, the infected party is bound to manifest the disease to the coparty.

It must be admonished in this place that phthisis is not a contagious disease, but hereditary; but it would be better for offspring to be infirm than not to be at all. - On the contrary, the flow of seed which in men is called gonorrhea is for the most part a certain species of syphilis, and therefore contagious, as physicians testify. - Leucorrhea, or white flow, from which pregnant women often suffer, does not forbid intercourse, since it is not harmful.

2. In a non-contagious disease, intercourse is very harmful in a disease that greatly debilitates, joined with fever and the greatest pain. In a slight disease, intercourse is not harmful; nevertheless diseases of the genitals are excepted, which in a woman can be aggravated by intercourse and afterward be healed with difficulty.

Note. After a bath, bloodletting, lunch, or dinner, intercourse is not customarily notably dangerous, as present-day physicians testify.¹⁹

Two things are to be weighed here: 1. what the obligation is for spouses, whether of rendering or of seeking the debt; 2. what causes excuse from such an obligation.

2103. Principles. I. EACH spouse is held from justice, and under grave obligation, to RENDER the debt to the other spouse reasonably and seriously seeking. - This is clear from the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:3): "Let the husband render the debt to the wife; and likewise the wife to the husband." The reason is that by force of the matrimonial contract "the woman does not have power over her own body, but the man. And likewise the man does not have power over his own body, but the woman" (ibid.). And therefore they cannot deny to each other the use of marriage without injustice, which is, of itself, a mortal sin; because it is a denial grave from its nature, at least if it is done more often, or obstinately.¹

We said 1. to one seeking reasonably; for if the one seeking is not master of himself, as a madman or one perfectly drunk, because he does not seek in a human manner; or if he seeks unjustly, immoderately, at an unseasonable time, and whenever generally a legitimate cause of denying intervenes, the obligation ceases, at least that of justice; although then there can still be an obligation of charity, namely for avoiding in the one seeking a danger of incontinence, anger, blasphemy, etc., as will be explained below (n. 2104, 2).

We said 2. to one seeking seriously; for if a spouse seeks weakly, or easily yields to the prayers of the one denying, according to the common opinion it is not mortal, unless the one seeking is placed in danger of incontinence; indeed, not even venial, if some cause of denying is given. Yet it makes no difference whether he seeks expressly or tacitly; for it suffices if by certain signs he manifests that he desires that act, although because of modesty he does not dare to demand it.²

2104. II. NEITHER spouse is held PER SE, or from justice, TO SEEK the debt; but indeed PER ACCIDENS, from charity or another virtue, he can be obliged to this.³ - 1. He is not held from justice, because no one is held to use his own right. This, more probably, St. Alphonsus also admits, although the coparty is in formal danger of incontinence; because if no express or tacit seeking occurs, no obligation of justice to render is present. A spouse indeed obliged himself not to break faith, but not to impede the other from breaking faith. - 2. He can be obliged PER ACCIDENS, namely from charity or from another virtue, gravely or lightly, according as this or that virtue urges. But authors commonly teach that there is a grave obligation of seeking from charity, when this is judged necessary for avoiding incontinence in either spouse, or for fostering mutual love. They admit the same if the generation of offspring is very necessary for the public good or for the peace of the family.⁴

Spouses can MAKE AN AGREEMENT not to use matrimony, and then neither can be compelled to render the debt; but this agreement, which is rarely expedient, can be rescinded by mutual consent. Indeed, when danger of incontinence supervenes, it must be remitted from charity, at least for a time, so that incontinence may be avoided.

2105. From the things said you will resolve:⁵ - 1. A wife sins mortally if she obstinately denies even for one time only, while the husband seeks seriously and insistently.

2. Likewise, if in rendering she shows great delay, with danger or even with the intention of deterring the husband from seeking; if she does not grant the debt except when compelled; if she harshly and insultingly reproaches the husband for his requests. Thus commonly.

3. Those worst husbands gravely offend who, whether from avarice so that they may avoid offspring, or from malevolence, or from love conceived toward others, never or almost never know their own wives, although they ought to presume well that the wives bear this most unwillingly.⁶

4. Denial of the debt is EXCUSED from grave fault on account of smallness of matter, if it occurs rarely, e.g. once in a month to one seeking often, short of danger of incontinence or grave dissension; likewise, if the rendering is delayed somewhat, for instance from day to night, from night to morning.⁷

2106. In one spouse the OBLIGATION of rendering the debt CEASES when the RIGHT of demanding ceases in the other. For these are correlatives.

Now the right of demanding BEGINS after the two-month period from the celebration of matrimony, or after the first rendering of the debt, as was said (n. 1981 and 2087); and it CEASES entirely through legitimate causes of divorce, especially through adultery, as will be said below (n. 2124, 1). - It can also cease on account of very many other causes, both on the part of the one seeking and on the part of the one rendering; which causes now come to be explained.

2107. I. On the part of the ONE SEEKING, first of all the ILLEGALITY of the seeking itself can stand in the way; in this matter, St. Alphonsus teaches that a distinction must be made thus:

1. If the illegality holds on the part of the act and is grave, for instance because one seeks in a sacred or public place, or with proximate danger of abortion or death, the other cannot render without grave fault; since an act grave evil in itself can never be cohonestated by any cause, nor therefore can it be demanded. - But if the illegality is light, because it is sought, for example, in an unnatural position, or in the time of menstruation or puerperium, it is licit to render with a just cause which cohonestates the act, e.g. lest the indignation of the consort be incurred. Indeed, if the one seeking has a just cause of seeking thus, the other is bound to render. But every reasonable cause being absent, he is not bound to render, indeed he cannot do so short of venial fault.

2. If the illegality holds on the part of the one seeking alone, e.g. because he has a vow of chastity, or because he seeks for a depraved end, according to the more common and more probable opinion the coparty is bound to render, nevertheless with an admonition first given, if fruit is hoped for, that the one seeking desist.⁸ If the husband is an onanist, see n. 2118, q. 2.

2108. II. On the part of the ONE RENDERING, there is held to be a just cause of denying the debt IF GRAVE HARM or DANGER would threaten from it.⁹ - The reason is sought from the order of justice and charity, from which spouses are not judged to have obliged themselves to render the debt with grave harm. If grave and proximate danger of life is present for either spouse, neither can seek or render; because no one is master of his own life, or of the life of another.

Hence: 1. A wife is exempted from rendering the debt who, by her own experience or by the judgment of experts, has learned that she cannot bring forth offspring without grave danger to life. Yet, for avoiding her own or her spouse's incontinence, or for avoiding dissensions, she could expose herself to a danger that is only probable and remote; because although a human being is not master of his own life, nevertheless he can expose it on account of charity.¹⁰

2. A healthy spouse is exempted if the coparty suffers from a contagious disease, e.g. plague, venereal disease, and danger of infection threatens. - Yet, for a just cause, he can undergo a danger that is not entirely proximate from a motive of charity, namely by applying preservative means.¹¹

3. A spouse who is feverish, or affected by another grave disease, is exempted, namely on account of notable debilitation of the body; likewise a wife, if she suffers from beginning cancer of the uterus, so that after the conjugal act she is subjected to a copious outpouring of blood; or if she undergoes intercourse with very acute pain which is repeated each time.¹² - But she is not exempted on account of labors and pains, even unusual ones, of pregnancy, birth, lactation, education, etc.¹³

2109. IT IS ASKED. Whether harm which is feared for OFFSPRING exempts from the obligation of the conjugal debt?

Resp. Distinguish. 1. If harm is feared for offspring already conceived, e.g. if it is established that in a particular case by intercourse there is harm to its life or formation, or danger of abortion is induced, spouses do not have a right to intercourse¹⁴ (cf. n. 2102).

2. But if it is a question of offspring to be conceived, the debt must be rendered, although it is to be feared lest offspring be born infirm; since it is better for it to be thus, than not to be at all. But if the wife has already experienced that she brings forth dead children, authors more commonly hold that, danger of incontinence in herself or in the coparty being excluded, she cannot render the debt, chiefly on account of this reason, that she herself undergoes danger of life from the death of the fetus in the uterus.¹⁵ - If it is established concerning this danger, the aforesaid opinion will indeed urge; but because rarely is it established concerning it, and spouses would be placed in great danger of incontinence if on account of this cause they had to abstain perpetually from the use of matrimony, hardly, or not even hardly, is the debt to be denied on account of the aforesaid reason.¹⁶

3. If, finally, an excessive multiplicity of offspring is feared, this of itself seems a sufficient reason for denying the debt, provided that in neither spouse there is danger of incontinence. But since such danger is scarcely ever absent, it is clear that a spouse is not easily excused from rendering the debt on account of the multiplicity of offspring.¹⁷

Besides those things which have already been said concerning those who INJUSTLY seek or deny the conjugal act, it remains that we speak of the same act insofar as it is opposed to CHASTITY. - Hence we shall treat: 1. of the sins of spouses generally; 2. specifically of onanism.

2110. Acts which can be exercised in conjugal commerce are distinguished as of THREE kinds: namely some are according to, others besides, others against the end of marriage.¹⁸ Hence a threefold rule:

I. Whatever is ACCORDING TO the end of marriage, or whatever is necessary or useful either for exercising the conjugal act or for fostering mutual love, is licit for spouses. - The reason is, "because for him for whom the end is licit, the means are also licit; and for him for whom the consummation is licit, the beginning is also licit."¹⁹

Hence: 1. Modest touches, kisses, and embraces for fostering mutual love are without fault, although sometimes unforeseen pollution would follow; because this would be by accident, and a just cause is present for applying blandishments of this kind. - But they are gravely culpable "if they are done with danger of pollution in oneself or in the other, in a case in which they are had for pleasure alone, or even for a light cause; otherwise if for a grave cause, for instance if sometimes there is an urgent cause of showing signs of affection for fostering mutual love; or so that a spouse may avert from the other the suspicion that he is inclined toward another person,"²⁰ provided danger of consent is absent.

2. Touches, kisses, embraces, sights, foul conversations, and all immodest acts are without fault if, danger of pollution being excluded, they are referred to intercourse to be consummated here and now. This also is true, although pollution now and then inculpably precedes intercourse.²¹ - Yet spouses ought according to their strength to beware of an effect of this kind, not lingering too long in the aforesaid acts.²²

2111. II. Whatever is BESIDES the end of marriage, or whatever is not of itself necessary or useful for the conjugal act, is customarily a venial fault, from which, nevertheless, an honorable end can excuse. Thus commonly according to the truer opinion. And the reason is that just as the conjugal state cohonestates intercourse, so also it cohonestates immodest acts which do not induce danger of pollution. "For otherwise, since there is so great a companionship between spouses, and they often cannot have intercourse, they would be exposed to continual dangers if such acts were gravely illicit for them. But just as delight sought in intercourse does not exceed venial fault, so also in these touches and sights."²³

Hence: 1. Spouses do indeed sin, but only venially, if for the sake of pleasure and with proximate danger of pollution excluded, they permit to themselves foul acts or sights without order to intercourse. "And this, even if intercourse were then forbidden to them on account of disease, or were impossible on account of impotence which had supervened, as Sanchez and others say; because, since intercourse is licit between spouses, touches between them cannot be gravely illicit. But otherwise one must say if a spouse were bound by a vow of chastity; because such a vow excludes every venereal pleasure voluntarily taken. Thus commonly." - But one impeded from intercourse on account of affinity contracted, although of himself he is not bound under grave obligation to abstain from touches and sights of this kind, since the penal law prohibiting intercourse is not to be extended to touches, nevertheless "in practice, ordinarily he ought to abstain from touches of this kind, especially foul ones, on account of the proximate danger either of pollution, or of seeking intercourse by seeking against the prohibition."²⁴

2. "It is licit, as the truly probable opinion holds, for spouses to take delight, even carnally, concerning intercourse had or future, whenever danger of pollution is absent. The reason is that the matrimonial state itself renders all these things licit; otherwise the matrimonial state would be liable to too many scruples."²⁵ - But indeed, "if delight is had not only with commotion of the spirits, but also with titillation or venereal pleasure, I think it cannot be excused from mortal fault, because such delight is proximately joined with the danger of pollution."²⁶

2112. III. Whatever is AGAINST the end of marriage, or whatever is opposed to the generation of offspring, namely by inducing of itself, outside natural congress, an outpouring of seed, is gravely illicit; indeed, according to the more probable opinion, it has the malice of a double adultery¹ (cf. n. 782, 2). - The reason of the first is that the outpouring of seed is not licit except in order to generation, and therefore matrimony gives spouses no faculty except for an outpouring of seed which can of itself serve generation.² - The reason of the second is that voluntary pollution by a married person violates the right of the coparty; whence it has annexed to itself the malice of adultery, just as pollution by one bound by a vow of chastity has the malice of sacrilege. Since, therefore, in the conjugal act which is done against the end of marriage, each sinner is married, it follows that the aforesaid malice is superadded to the pollution of each.³

Hence: 1. Sodomy between married persons has the guilt of greater malice than between unmarried persons, far from losing anything of its atrocity on account of the matrimonial state.⁴ This also holds concerning a sin not consummated, for instance if the husband were to begin intercourse in the unnatural vessel, with the intention of completing it in the natural vessel; or if he were to rub the private parts around the unnatural vessel of the wife;⁵ or if he were to introduce them into her mouth⁶ (which obscenity is called irrumation); because in these there is either the beginning of sodomy, or an affection toward it, or another sin against nature.

2. Foul touches are gravely illicit which are had without order to the conjugal act, with proximate danger of pollution.⁷ But if acts of this kind are by their nature a kind of disposition toward intercourse, they can be excused in the one rendering, on account of the grave inconvenience otherwise to be undergone by him, as we shall say below concerning onanism, provided they are not such that of themselves they induce an entirely proximate danger of pollution, and therefore seem to be as it were the beginning of it, e.g. lingering handling of the private parts.⁸ For since direct pollution is always illicit, its proximate danger can never be permitted, unless those causes are given and those conditions are observed which sufficiently excuse indirectly voluntary pollution (cf. n. 796).

3. The man sins gravely if, deliberately, he restrains emission, when the wife has already emitted seed or is in probable danger of emitting; because he is the cause why the seed of the wife, the end of generation being frustrated, is wasted. - But otherwise, if he were to interrupt intercourse from a grave cause, for instance to avoid scandal, although with danger of pollution.⁹

4. If the man has already emitted seed, it becomes doubtful whether the WOMAN sins mortally if she withdraws herself from emitting seed, or whether the MAN sins mortally by not awaiting the emission of the wife. The more common and today much more probable opinion denies this; and the reason is that today it has been discovered that in the woman there is not given a true emission of seed which is necessary for generation. The matter which the woman necessarily supplies to generation is the ovum. If the woman has a mature and released ovum, she is apt for fecundation, although she is not moved in the act of intercourse. Certainly, the secretion of humor which theologians call emission, and the concomitant movement of the organ, contribute something to fecundation;¹⁰ but spouses are not held to come together in the more apt manner, and it is enough if they do not impede generation.

Nevertheless, the contrary practice is earnestly to be advised, both because the aforesaid emission of the woman pertains to the complement of intercourse, and lest conjugal love grow cold. - But if either one were so to behave as to impede generation, on the part of intention there would be mortal fault.¹¹

5. It is ordinarily a mortal sin if both spouses, intercourse having begun, restrain emission; and the reason is that although, speaking speculatively, such congress, danger of pollution being excluded, is not gravely illicit, and is reputed like a touch of the private parts, nevertheless practically the danger of pollution can scarcely be absent in both spouses, which would be required. - Except if the spouses have experienced the opposite; yet in that case they would not be excused from venial fault.¹²

6. A wife sins mortally who, immediately after the conjugal act, rises or does something with the intention of expelling the received seed. For such an act, although it is done in vain, nevertheless by reason of the perverse intention has the malice of abortion.¹³

2113. IT IS ASKED. Whether foul touches WITH ONESELF are ever licit for a spouse?

Resp. 1. They are licit if they are ordered to intercourse to be had immediately, as all confess. Indeed, they are licit, more probably, for a WOMAN immediately after intercourse in which the man alone emitted seed, so that she may thus procure her own emission; because although this is not absolutely necessary for generation, nevertheless it can contribute to it and pertains to completing the conjugal act.¹⁴ But before intercourse this is never licit, nor after onanistic congress, because in that case the end of nature would be entirely frustrated.

Resp. 2. The aforesaid necessity or utility being excluded, they are not licit; indeed, according to the more probable opinion, and one wholly to be advised, they are, just as for other unmarried persons, gravely illicit if they are had for pleasure. The reason is both that a spouse does not have a right in his own body of itself, but only by accident, namely in order to intercourse; and that touches of the private parts, when they are done lingeringly and with commotion of the spirits, of themselves tend to pollution and are connected proximately with its danger.¹⁵

2114. Onanism is intercourse begun or completed with an outpouring of male seed outside the vessel (n. 801).

Intercourse is begun when the man indeed penetrates the natural vessel, but as soon as he notices that the outpouring of seed is proximate, withdraws himself; or also when the woman withdraws herself before the man's emission. - Intercourse is completed, namely in the natural vessel, but with greater malice, when the man uses a certain thin covering or instrument to impede the seminal substance from arriving at a place apt for generation.

Moreover, there has been invented a wicked manner of destroying conception immediately after intercourse, namely by means of a certain injection into the uterus. This injection, as is clear, has the guilt of homicide, just as the procuring of abortion.¹⁶

2115. Principles. I. Onanism between spouses is an act against nature, and therefore gravely illicit.¹⁷ - This is clear both from Scripture, which (Gen. 38:10) calls this act a detestable thing, and from reason, which dictates that onanism is true pollution directly defrauding matrimony of its end, and also from the decision of the Church, which, by a Decree of the Holy Office on 21 May 1851, defined that this use of matrimony is prohibited by natural law, and taught that this is elicited from proposition 49 condemned by Innocent XI, which sounds thus: "Mollities is not prohibited by the law of nature."¹⁸

Hence: 1. Onanism can be cohonestated by no cause, whether of poverty, lest offspring to be nourished be multiplied, or of avoiding infirmity, or of warding off danger of death in childbirth. Yet on account of a cause of this kind it can be perpetrated with good faith; and when this exists, it belongs to the prudent confessor to judge whether admonition is expedient or not.

2. Not only the man exercising onanism, but also the wife formally cooperating with or consenting to him sins mortally, and both are unworthy of absolution unless they sincerely grieve concerning the sin and promise amendment. - The wife formally cooperates if by complaints concerning the pains or dangers of childbirth, concerning more numerous offspring, etc., she supplies to her husband an impulse toward onanism, namely foreseeing this effect or even intending it.¹⁹

2116. II. Onanism can be PERMITTED by the wife if a JUST cause suffragates for her rendering the debt to an onanistic husband. - The reason is that she then cooperates with the husband's sin only materially, by an act honorable in itself, which it is licit to furnish under certain conditions and with a just cause acceding.

The CONDITIONS are the following:

1. That the wife not consent to the husband's sin, and that she always be ready to impede it efficaciously, if she could (cf. n. 518, 519). - We say to the sin; for nothing prevents her from consenting to the carnal delight arising from intercourse, or even to a simple complacency concerning not having offspring, according to the things said in n. 2098.

2. That she not cease prudently to admonish the husband concerning the obligation of desisting from this foulness. Thus the S. Penitentiary, 13 Nov. 1816. For she is held to such admonition both from charity toward the husband, namely that he may recover his senses, and from charity toward herself, namely that she may decline every danger of consent. It was said prudently; for admonitions ought not to be continual, nor unseasonable, but opportune, namely when hope of amendment shines forth, and no grave evil is to be feared, for instance the husband's adultery, indignation, or great dissension.

3. That she permit the inordinate act only from a just and reasonable cause. And to this pertain the words of the Major Penitentiary in the cited Response: "Approved and chastened moral theologians agree in this, that it is licit for a wife to render the debt, if from its denial she is to be treated badly by her husband, and can fear grave inconvenience to herself from it; for, they say, in this case the wife is not judged formally to cooperate with the sin of her husband, but only to permit it from a just and reasonable cause."²⁰ In practice, denial of the debt can scarcely be separated from danger of grave inconvenience.

2117. Therefore, when the aforesaid conditions concur, the WIFE can licitly RENDER the debt, provided the act is rightly begun, and she, as regards the interruption, has herself entirely passively. But if the husband is known to be about to commit onanism by means of an instrument, the wife cannot, by having herself passively, permit the act; but she is bound, not otherwise than a virgin to whom force is brought, firmly to resist according to her strength. The reason is that in such a case intercourse on the part of the act itself, already from the beginning, is entirely illicit and against nature.²¹

2118. Questions. QUESTION 1. Whether a wife can also SEEK the debt from an onanistic husband?

Resp. Affirmatively, but only from a grave cause. It is said only from a grave cause, because she is held from charity not to give the husband an occasion of sinning. - Now a grave cause would be danger of incontinence, a long deprivation of the right of seeking, with perpetual scruple whether the cause of seeking is just or not; wherefore she is not held to abstain except for a few times²² (cf. 2098).

QUESTION 2. Whether the husband commits onanism if he indeed penetrates the wife's vessel, but only slightly, and pours out all the seed at the entrance of the vagina?

Resp. Distinguish. 1. In the work, negatively, because that act indeed renders fecundation less easy, but does not impede it; therefore intercourse so exercised is apt for generation. Yet except if it were done in such a way that all the seed flows away and is lost. - 2. In the mind, subdistinguish: affirmatively, if he intends to impede generation in this way, then from a depraved intention he sins mortally against nature; otherwise, it must be denied. Moreover, if he behaves thus because he wishes to avoid a manner more apt for generation, so that offspring may be less certain, he does not seem to be guilty of lethal fault; because he is not held to choose the more certain manner for conceiving offspring, nor is the desire of lacking offspring a mortal sin. Finally, if he has a legitimate cause of behaving thus, because, e.g., the wife on account of recent birth or infirmity in the private parts does not endure more perfect coition, he sins in no way.²³

QUESTION 3. What is to be judged concerning spouses who, for avoiding more numerous offspring, come together only at that time when fecundation can occur with difficulty?

Preliminary note. It is clear from very many testimonies of physicians that the conception of offspring occurs easily about the time in which the woman is in menstruation, namely three or four days before, and about fifteen days after; but with difficulty at another time, called agenesis, if the flow of blood is certain and constant every month.²⁴ Now then,

Resp. Of themselves, they are not to be accused of sin; for they use their right, since the work of marriage is not prescribed at the time when the probability of conception is greater, nor is it prohibited at the time when the probability is less or none. But whether by accident fault enters, is to be judged from the end and from the other circumstances. To the point is the following response, which, after various doubts had been proposed concerning this manner of acting, the S. PENITENTIARY, on 16 June 1880, judged should be given: "The S. Penitentiary, having diligently weighed the things proposed, responds: Spouses using matrimony in the aforesaid manner are not to be disturbed, and the confessor can cautiously, however, insinuate the opinion in question to those spouses whom he has attempted in vain to draw away in another way from the detestable crime of onanism."²⁵

QUESTION 4. But what concerning ARTIFICIAL fecundation, e.g. between sterile spouses?

Resp. Fecundation of this kind, which is done with seed obtained from the husband's pollution, is intrinsically evil, and therefore wholly illicit.²⁶

2119. Admonition. Concerning the office of the confessor in QUESTIONING about the sins of spouses, besides the things said in n. 1804 sqq., let the following be noted:

1. Concerning those things which look to the use of matrimony, the confessor should question only those whom, on account of a just cause, he suspects to be guilty of lethal fault. And he should do this in the most modest manner he can, by inquiring, e.g. from wives, whether "they have always been obedient in those things which look to the conjugal state." - If from a general question of this kind he detects something of culpability, yet does not sufficiently know the nature of the sin, let him come so cautiously to particular questions that he gives the penitent an occasion rather of opening his conscience than seems to investigate it more curiously. - But concerning venial things let him introduce no discussion of his own accord, because, since they are not necessarily to be subjected to the keys, there is no reason why investigations should be instituted in so slippery a matter. Nevertheless, when questioned, let him respond, so that he can thus provide for the peace of consciences.¹

2. The confessor ought sometimes to question concerning Onanism, namely when there is prudent fear that the penitent is guilty of this sin. The reason is that he is held, from the office of judge, to supply the defect of the penitent, as the common opinion teaches.² And hence it is why the S. C. INQUIS., on 21 May 1851, declared the opposite opinion, namely that spouses are never to be questioned concerning this matter, "false, too lax, and dangerous in practice." This declaration especially looks to those regions in which the devastating plague of onanism spreads widely; for many take an occasion for persevering in the worst practice from the fact that the confessor, when the circumstances suggest it, does not question. - At least generally, let him inquire whether there is anything concerning the sanctity of matrimony which gnaws at the conscience.³

But to the Question: Whether those confessors satisfy their duty who, when a penitent accuses the sin of onanism, "keep deep silence, and when the confession of sins has been finished, excite him to contrition with general words, and to him asserting that he detests every lethal sin, impart holy absolution" ... the S. PENITENTIARY, on 14 Dec. 1876, responded Negatively.⁴

It seems useful to add also the following document:

"Most Blessed Father - Bishop N. N., reverently presenting himself at the feet of Your Holiness, proposes to Your Beatitude certain doubts to be elucidated, which for a long time have brought grave anxiety of mind and conscience to pastors of souls and confessors.

"As is known to Your Holiness, the unspeakable crime of Onan is being spread more widely day by day in several regions of France, and it is driving deeper roots; so that hardly any Province remains immune from this pest, and the cultivators themselves of social science publicly complain concerning this deadly disease. Nearly everywhere families are seen to become rarer, not indeed from the infrequency of marriages, but from their voluntary infertility. The matter has now come to this, that whereas before many spouses wished to avoid only excessive offspring, now very many dare, by wicked counsel, to exclude every or almost every reception of children. Hence also, at least in great part, comes that lamentable diminution of ministers of the Church by which the dioceses labor more and more.

"Indeed, the deplorable calamity moves pastors of souls, which is derived into society itself from this depraved use of matrimony; but the most grave offense brought against God and the most present danger of souls moves them more sharply, and at the same time affects them with immense sadness. And this sadness of theirs is also increased from the fact that there is not one manner of acting among all confessors in caring for this wound; nor can the desired uniformity be hoped for from the Responses and Declarations of the Holy See which have thus far come forth.

"The knot of the difficulty turns on the necessity of questioning and admonishing penitents. - Indeed all confessors and writers of moral theology acknowledge the very great gravity of this sin; all likewise confess that the greatest prudence and modesty must be applied by the confessor in questioning, and that it is better that the material integrity of confession be deficient than that scandal should come to the penitent from an indiscreet question, or the honor of the sacred ministry be offended. But confessors disagree on this point: whether the questioning itself is necessary or not, even though expressed in chaste and modest words.

"For some confessors have persuaded themselves that among so many faithful who indulge the detestable practice of Onan, at least some are found who are in good faith. - Therefore, lest they disturb these rare penitents from good faith, they think it more advisable to question no one concerning this sin, unless perhaps the penitent himself begins to accuse himself, and the questioning only renders the confession easier. The same confessors judge that the penitent ought not to be admonished concerning the gravity of this sin, because perhaps he thinks the matter is not so grave. And in that opinion they are also confirmed by this reason, that most spouses, openly admonished concerning the malice of onanism, are foreseen to be about to desert the sacraments, and thus incur a greater danger of damnation.

"Other confessors think that silence is not licit for ministers of the divine law, to whom by office it belongs to teach the faithful their proper duties, when they see the precepts of nature itself generally violated. For then, to use the words of Benedict XIV in his Bull Apostolica Constitutio, 'the penitent either is ignorant of crimes which nevertheless he ought to know, or is placed in those circumstances which, if the confessor dissembles, confirm the sinner in a depraved work, not without the scandal of others; since someone thinks those things are licit for himself which he observes to be practiced with impunity by those who frequent the Sacraments of the Church.' - Hence the aforesaid confessors judge that a discreet question must be asked concerning Onanism as often as there is a founded suspicion that the penitent is addicted to this crime; they judge that the common good demands that a penitent who is only probably in good faith be admonished in open, but discreet, words; finally they judge that then only must one abstain from questioning and admonishing, unless the common good demands the contrary, when from the present circumstances of the matter it seems morally certain that the penitent is in good faith, and that the admonition will be fruitless.

"From the Responses hitherto given by the Holy See, various rules are indeed supplied, by which several doubts already pertaining to this matter are clear.

"Thus from the Response of the S. Penitentiary of 14 December 1876, given to the Rector of a Parish in the diocese of Angers, it is clear that it is not licit to favor the error of penitents, which by many is called good faith, nor to create such good faith.

"It is also clear that those confessors do not satisfy their duty who, when a penitent merely accuses Onanism, keep deep silence, and when the confession of sins has been finished, excite him to contrition with general words, and to him asserting that he detests every lethal sin, impart holy absolution."

"It is clear, moreover, that those confessors are free from every reprehension who, keeping themselves within the limits laid down by the Roman Ritual and approved authors, as regards questions sometimes to be asked of spouses concerning the use of matrimony, 'do not omit to reprehend any penitent whatever, whether of his own accord or from a question prudently asked, confessing onanism, not otherwise than concerning other grave sins, as much as his good seems to demand; nor do they absolve him, unless by sufficient signs he shows that he grieves concerning the past and has the purpose of no longer acting onanistically.'

"But since from the prior Responses of the Apostolic Holy See not all doubts concerning this matter are solved, and meanwhile action is taken diversely by different confessors with Onanists, not without grave detriment of souls and great sorrow of pastors; hence the aforesaid Orator reverently and confidently approaches Your Holiness, having the words of eternal life, earnestly beseeching that Your Beatitude deign kindly to give a Response to the following doubts, namely:

"I. When there is a founded suspicion that a penitent who is entirely silent concerning ONANISM is addicted to this crime, is it licit for the confessor to abstain from prudent and discreet QUESTIONING, because he foresees that several will be driven from good faith and many will desert the Sacraments? Or rather is the confessor not bound prudently and discreetly to question?

"II. Whether a confessor who, either from spontaneous confession or from prudent questioning, knows that a penitent is an Onanist, is bound to ADMONISH him concerning the gravity of this sin, equally as concerning other mortal sins, and, as the Roman Ritual says, to reprehend him with paternal charity, and to impart absolution to him then only when it is established by sufficient signs that the same one grieves concerning the past and has the purpose of no longer acting onanistically?

"The Sacred Penitentiary, considering that the unspeakable vice of which there is question in the case has widely prevailed, judged that to the proposed doubts response must be made, as it responds:

"To I. Regularly, negatively to the first part; affirmatively to the second.

"To II. Affirmatively, according to the doctrines of approved Authors.

"Given at Rome in the S. Penitentiary, on 10 March 1886.

"Card. Monaco, Major Penitentiary.

"Hip. Can. Palombi, Secretary of the S. P."

Spouses, on account of the undivided manner of life by which they are bound to each other in turn, and on account of the mutual help which one ought to furnish to the other, are held to cohabit together, unless a legitimate cause of separation has freed them from this obligation. - Whence there is a new argument, the treatment of which we shall dispatch in few words.

2120. Principles. I. "It is certain that spouses ARE HELD, from an obligation of justice, TO COHABIT in the same house, at table and bed."¹ - This is clear both from reason, namely from the nature of marriage, and from the words of the Lord: "A man shall leave father and mother, and shall cling to his wife" (Matt. 19:5).

Hence it is inferred: 1. "Neither spouse can depart elsewhere, against the will of the other, for a long time, unless just causes are present, namely on account of the public good, or for nourishing or protecting the family, or for avoiding harm from enemies."

2. "If the husband had to remain elsewhere for a long time, he would be bound, if he conveniently can, to bring his wife there, so that she may cohabit with him."

3. The wife is held, more probably, to follow the husband into exile; because she is held to suffer his misfortune. Similarly the husband is held to accompany the wife, if necessity compels her to change domicile.²

1640. - Hear St. Alphonsus, approaching this question:¹ "It grieves me to have a longer discourse on this matter, which carries before itself such foulness that it disturbs chaste minds by its very name alone. But would that this matter were not frequent in receiving Confessions, so that it would not be altogether necessary for the confessor to be instructed by a full treatment, but it would suffice for him to be instructed by a compendium! Let the chaste reader therefore pardon me if I speak of it here at length, and descend to particular cases which exhibit a more deformed turpitude." ...

The conjugal debt is called that common action of the spouses which is necessary for generation, and which has been ordained by the supreme Provider of all things for propagating human society. But this action is situated in carnal copula, by which a man and a woman are made, as it were, one body and one flesh.

An act of this kind is called a debt by the Apostle; for it is that which spouses owe mutually to themselves.

It must be treated: 1° concerning the liceity of the conjugal act; 2° concerning its obligation; 3° concerning the sins of spouses.

1641. Principles. - I. The conjugal act among legitimate spouses is, per se, honorable and licit: for it is the means established and ordained by the very Founder of nature for the legitimate propagation of the human race.

II. The ends which render an act of this kind honorable are: 1° the generation of offspring, which is numbered among the principal ends of Matrimony; 2° satisfaction of the obligation toward the other spouse; 3° the calming of concupiscence, and thence the avoidance of incontinence both in oneself and in the consort; 4° the desire of fostering or conciliating honorable love, of disclosing or promoting conjugal affection, etc. - Thus commonly with St. Alphonsus,¹ Sanchez, and others against some few, who do not admit the last two ends.

1642. Resolves. - 1° The use of marriage is illicit if it is done for pleasure alone, that is, either by expressly excluding the other ends, or by intending none of them, not even virtually. This is clear from the 9th proposition condemned by Innocent XI (p. XV). Yet per se it would be only a venial sin, just as it is venial to take food for delight alone. But the use of marriage is immune from this fault if the satisfaction of pleasure is intended as a remedy of concupiscence, whether expressly or implicitly.² Cf. n. 1548. q. 6°, Things to be Noted Beforehand, and n. 29. 31. q. 4°.

2° The use of Matrimony with an adulterous mind is gravely illicit, as if someone, approaching his own wife, represents another to himself. - St. Alphonsus,³ and others commonly.

3° The use of Matrimony is licit for the sterile, both because no law to the opposite can be shown, and because the sterile are per se suitable for completing the conjugal act; but if no generation follows, this occurs altogether per accidens; and besides generation there are other honorable ends co-honestating conjugal intercourse.

4° Also for the elderly, whose seed is no longer prolific, or for whom it is for the most part poured outside the vessel, the use of marriage is licit, provided they are able sufficiently to complete copula, or have a hope, not empty, of completing it. For the same reasons favor the elderly which we have adduced concerning the sterile. Moreover this is confirmed from the practice of the Church, which blesses the Matrimonies of the elderly.⁴

The principal circumstances regard person, position, and time.

1643. - A fourfold circumstance, or impediment annexed to the person, can stand in the way of petitioning the debt, namely: 1° a vow of chastity (n. 1568-1571); 2° affinity from incest (n. 1589. III.; n. 1590. 6a. 7a. 8a; n. 1144. II. 2°); 3° spiritual cognation (n. 1585. 6°); 4° impotence, which also forbids rendering (n. 1618. III.; n. 1619).

Note. - 1° According to the more common and more probable sentence, a spouse bound by a vow, or by the impediment of affinity or spiritual cognation, can ask the debt, indeed is bound to ask it, when he or she notices that the consort, not daring to ask, is placed in danger of incontinence. He or she can also ask as often as the other asks interpretatively, for example, when the woman is held back by modesty, and the man perceives, as St. Thomas says, her will of asking; because then it is rather to render than to ask.¹

2° Yet a spouse impeded by the bond cannot exact the debt, not even for avoiding incontinence; for the danger of incontinence is indeed a cause for obtaining a dispensation or suspension of a vow, but not for asking the debt. - Thus Sanchez, and others. Except, not improbably, if there is question of impediments imposed by the Church, and a dispensation cannot be obtained shortly, and great danger of incontinence is in the delay.²

1644. - First Rule. That position is altogether licit which nature herself teaches, namely that the woman be beneath and the man above. - Thus St. Thomas, and others commonly. The reason is that other positions are somewhat opposed to the order of nature, and consequently bring in some violation of order.

Second Rule. No position, however unnatural, is per se gravely illicit, provided the conjugal act can be sufficiently completed; the reason is that any inversion whatever of position, provided union can be completed, does not impede generation.³

Third Rule. Any unnatural position, a just cause acceding, is free from all fault; but sometimes an unnatural position is easier, or even the only possible one; and indeed some greater facility or necessity can remove an inordinateness of this kind, which per se is slight.¹

1645. Resolves. - 1° Spouses who invert the position do not sin in the least because of danger of abortion in the time of pregnancy; because of the fatness or curvature of the man; because of excessive weariness of the woman; or even because of frigidity, when they are more aroused by an unnatural position, etc.

2° A position which alone is possible, whatever it finally is, is in no way condemned, although a not moderate loss of seed follows; because that part of the seed is not necessary for generation, and is lost per accidens, while the spouses are unwilling.

These circumstances chiefly regard the time of pregnancy, lactation, menses, sickness, Feast days, and Sacred Communion.

1646. - 1° At no time is the conjugal act, per se, forbidden under grave sin, because no law is found by which the work of marriage is ever prohibited by reason of time. I said: per se; because perhaps sometimes, by reason of circumstances, a proximate danger of abortion or of health could be induced. But this is very rare, and cannot easily be foreseen in some cases.

2° Indeed, according to very many Theologians, the conjugal act is never forbidden even lightly by reason of time; the reason is that no law can be assigned by which it is ever prohibited even under light sin. Yet to St. Alphonsus² the opinion is more pleasing which does not excuse from venial fault if copula is had in the time of pregnancy, unless danger of incontinence is present, or another honorable cause, which otherwise can scarcely ever be absent.

3° The more common sentence teaches that coitus had at the time of menses is not excused from venial sin because of the indecency which it seems to bear before itself, unless some co-honestating cause is present, namely for avoiding disagreements, or for forestalling incontinence, etc.³ - But a prudent confessor will abstain from every interrogation in this matter, since there is nothing that must necessarily be declared by the penitent. The same, by parity of reason, they commonly hold concerning copula had by spouses at the time of purgation, or on the days following birth. Yet this could be mortal per accidens, namely if from it grave illness or notable aggravation of illness were imminent for the wife.¹

4° The act of marriage is not illicit during the time of lactation, because there is no prohibiting law, nor, experience being witness, any danger, at least proximate, of infecting the milk. Hence there is no reason why spouses should be held to abstain from the use of Matrimony for so long a time with continual danger of sinning. Thus most commonly, says St. Alphonsus.²

5° The conjugal act in time of sickness, at least for the most part, is illicit neither under grave nor under light sin, because no harm from it happens to the brain for spouses; and the labor which accompanies the act cannot, at least commonly speaking, influence sickness very much.

But generally and wisely as regards all things which precede, the anonymous annotator of Gury³ warns: "Theological opinions concerning the liceity of the conjugal act, as regards circumstances, rest on a twofold principle, of which the first regards law or the dictate of natural law, the other regards fact. That, namely, in the use of marriage it is not lawful to place an impediment to generation, or to bring grave harm to oneself, or to the consort, or to offspring, these are so many principles of natural law, to which Theologians deservedly adhere firmly; but whether such a circumstance ordinarily produces grave evils of this kind, this is a question of another order, and is to be resolved only from arguments of physiology and medicine. Wherefore the diverse sentences of Theologians concerning controversies of this kind, not certainly defined, are to be held as hypothetical conclusions."

6° According to the more common sentence, it is not illicit on Sundays and Feast days, even the more solemn ones; both because no law is opposed, and also because marital intercourse does not remove spouses from observing the Feasts of the Church. Most of the Holy Fathers who are objected on the opposite side seem to speak of counsel rather than of precept. Hence you will also deduce that there is no reason why a use of this kind should be prohibited in the time of Advent or Lent. - Thus commonly.⁴ See p. XCI. C). 2°.

7° Finally, per se, it is not prohibited on the day of Sacred Communion, although spouses approach it from piety only, provided they act from an honorable end. - Thus commonly St. Alphonsus,¹ Lugo, Sanchez, and others, who teach that it is of mere counsel to abstain from copula on the day of Communion, whether before or after Communion, provided it is not had immediately after Communion has been received, nor from the mere cause of pleasure. Cf. n. 1311. 2°.

1647. Principles. - I. There is an obligation of justice, per se grave,¹ of rendering the debt to the other spouse seriously and reasonably asking it. The reason is that from the very nature of the matrimonial contract the spouses mutually transfer to themselves the power of their bodies in order to the conjugal use. This is also deduced from the words of the Apostle: Let the husband render the debt to the wife; and likewise the wife to the husband; the woman does not have power of her own body, but the man; and likewise the man does not have power of his own body, but the woman.²

II. No obligation, per se, urges of asking the conjugal debt. The reason is that neither spouse is bound to use his or her right, and each can remit it. Yet per accidens there can be an obligation of asking from charity or another virtue, especially in the man, for example, if he judges that the consort is placed in danger of incontinence because of modesty in asking, or if the asking is necessary for fostering or restoring conjugal love, etc. - See St. Alphonsus.³

III. The obligation in one spouse of rendering the debt ceases when the right of exacting it ceases in the other: and the right is destroyed chiefly in the following cases, namely:

1° If one of the spouses has committed adultery, provided the conditions enumerated in n. 1552. III. 3° are present. Yet in this case the asking will not be illicit, as it is in the cases of which n. 1643 treats.

2° If the one asking lacks the use of reason, because his or her asking is not human. Yet it is licitly rendered, unless there is danger of scandal, abortion, or another grave harm; indeed it must be rendered if danger of incontinence, even material, urges in the insane or drunken person (yet with a greater evil excluded), or if the spouse is not perfectly insane or drunk.¹

3° If the one rendering can reasonably fear grave harm or danger to health, because spouses are not judged to have obligated themselves to render the debt with so great an inconvenience. Hold the same if evils of this kind are to be feared for offspring already conceived, and also universally, if for the one asking.²

4° If the one asking, because of incest committed with blood relatives of the other in the first or second degree, or for another cause, has lost the right of asking.

5° If it is asked too frequently (n. 1648. 3°).

6° If the other has given sufficient cause for divorce, namely as long as that cause continues to exist (n. 1552. III.).

7° Within the first two months after Matrimony has been celebrated (n. 1551. 2°).

8° If the other asks illicitly; yet in this case it must be distinguished in the following manner. For the illicitness either holds itself on the part of the one rendering alone, or on the part of the one asking alone, or on the part of the act, so that it affects the one asking and the one rendering.

For the first case (for example, if the one asking exacts the act on this condition, that the one rendering impede conception), let this be the rule: he or she is neither bound to render, nor is it licit with one's own sin, even venial, since no obligation or liceity toward sin can exist.³ It is otherwise, as is clear, if what must be called a sin per se is rendered licit by adjunct circumstances, as can happen in an unnatural position, etc.⁴

In the second case there is an obligation of rendering, if there is question only of venial sin, for example, if the act is asked for pleasure alone; for it will scarcely be able to be demonstrated that there is a right of denying some grave debt of justice because the one enjoying that right will use it with slight malice. - But if it is asked with mortal sin (for example, with an adulterous mind, or by one who is bound by a vow of chastity, or by an onanist), that act is licitly rendered, or rather merely permitted, if a grave cause is present (n. 1653. III.) and the proximate danger of consent in the work, insofar as it is evil, does not urge (n. 1654. 2°; 1655. q. 8°). - Indeed St. Alphonsus says that rendering in these circumstances is more probably simply owed, if the one asking has not been deprived of his or her right, for example, through incest.⁵

In the third case, however, one must distinguish. - It is licit to render, if the act is not so intrinsically evil that illicitness can never be taken away by particular circumstances, and if such circumstances are in fact present (n. 1648. 6°. 8°). Otherwise it is not licit; for it would be participation in the illicit act itself.¹

Note. - If warning, or asking that the one exacting desist from sin, is foreseen to be profitable and can be done without grave inconvenience (which will be present for the most part), it must be premised by the consort before the permission, especially if there is question of mortal sin (n. 1654. 3°. 4°). - But if there is question of one impeded from asking, for example, by a vow, it will be safer if the consort forestalls the impeded person by his or her own asking, or adds his or her own asking to the asking of the impeded person already made. Yet the wife, by reason of modesty, will rarely be bound to this.²

1648. Resolves. - 1° Spouses are bound to cohabitation, nor can one be absent for a longer time without the consent of the other, or without necessity; for this obligation follows from the very obligation of rendering the debt. But just causes of going away for a long time are the public good, the support or protection of the family, harm from enemies to be avoided, etc. And a man who must remain elsewhere for a long time ought to lead his wife there, if he conveniently can, so that she may cohabit with him. As regards civil law, see what has been said in n. 445. 2°. 3°.³

Regularly, however, a wife is bound to follow her husband when he changes domicile, even without a just cause (not, however, if he changes it from a base cause); and this: a) notwithstanding a contrary custom, which might exist somewhere; for a custom of this kind, as opposed to the divine law by force of which the man is the head of the wife,⁴ would be intrinsically evil (n. 184. 3°); b) even if the man goes away into a distant region (from which, however, he is not about to return shortly). - Except if either 1) by following the man she would be exposed to danger of life, chastity, grave detriment, or - for example, because the place to which the husband withdraws for a long time is destitute of every religious succor - of salvation; or 2) she would lack nourishment; or 3) there is question of a husband made a wanderer after Matrimony, or, without the wife's knowing it, already a wanderer before it; or 4) by an antenuptial pact it was agreed not to change domicile, which pact nevertheless has an included condition: unless a new grave cause should supervene.⁵

2° A spouse denying the debt sins gravely whenever there is danger of incontinence or grave vexation in the other party. Likewise if he or she denies it to the other seriously asking. But it is otherwise if the consort benevolently remits it, or asks remissly. Yet remiss asking must be altogether distinguished from interpretative or virtual asking, which is had by signs indicating a serious will of asking, and from which the obligation of rendering the debt arises. This is verified especially in a woman, who is most especially subject to modesty, and from shame does not ask expressly what she anxiously asks.

3° One denying does not sin when the other asks immoderately, for example, after the third or fourth time in the same night; nor if he or she delays it for a short time, namely until night, or if from night he or she delays it until morning time, yet always with the danger of incontinence excluded.¹

4° Wives are to be reproved who deny the debt to their husbands without sufficient cause, even if they ask remissly; or who do not concede it except when forced, and who harshly and contumeliously reproach the man for his requests.

5° A wife is not excused from rendering the debt because of the ordinary inconveniences of childbirth, pregnancy, or nursing; - nor even because of pains which are grave but brief in time; - nor because of pains which are long-lasting but moderate, for example, of the head for several months after childbirth; - nor because of health somewhat weakened; because all these things are annexed to the matrimonial condition. It would be otherwise, however, if danger of life or of a most grave disease, from the judgment of a truly prudent physician, had to be feared.²

6° There is no obligation of rendering the debt to another laboring under a contagious disease grave in itself, such as plague, venereal disease, or something similar. Likewise, because of notable bodily debility, those laboring under a strong fever or another grave disease are excused from rendering the debt. Probably, however, notwithstanding grave danger to health, a spouse can render the debt, in order to free the consort from probable danger of incontinence [for it is licit even to expose life for an excellent work of charity (n. 279. 461)], or for another grave cause (for example, for fostering mutual love), provided the disease is long-lasting and is not accustomed shortly and easily to bring death; in these cases it is also licit to ask. Yet the one asking or rendering, with a contagious and grave disease, must manifest this circumstance to the party unaware of it. But the consort is not bound to manifest to the consort an infamous disease, e.g., a venereal one, provided he or she abstains both from asking and from rendering; nor is he or she bound to render in the case in which he or she is unwilling to manifest a disease of this kind; for the conjugal debt does not oblige with loss of reputation.¹

7° Whether a spouse is excused from rendering the debt because of fear of more numerous offspring than he or she can support, if danger of incontinence is absent in the other, is disputed. But since this danger can scarcely be absent, St. Alphonsus is more pleased by the negative opinion.²

8° As regards the obligation of abstaining from the conjugal act because of harm which perhaps could befall offspring already conceived or born, the probability and gravity of the harm on the one side, and the difficulty of lacking the conjugal right on the other side, must be weighed. It is not established that the use of marriage is prohibited because of harm of no great moment, which befalls offspring and cannot be guarded against, if long abstinence is very difficult.³

The conjugal act would indeed be illicit if from it a proximate danger of death for offspring already conceived would arise, for example, because of abortion proximately to be feared (n. 1646. 1°); for circumstances will scarcely ever concur which render it licit to permit abortion (n. 474. II.). Besides, dangers of this kind must not be imagined: hence the liceity of this act is not to be called into doubt unless in a concrete case there is at least prudent fear.

But if there is question of offspring to be conceived, authors oblige to the rendering of the debt, although it is to be feared that the offspring may be born weak, since for him or her it is better "thus to be, than not to be at all."⁴

Finally, the sentence (certainly the more common one) asserting that a wife who has experienced that she bears children dead cannot render the debt unless there is danger of incontinence seems scarcely probable in the concrete, unless this is established with certainty, for example, from the judgment of an expert physician. For how often will it be licit to experience this? Has not healthy offspring often come forth after unhappy births? etc. Add the danger of incontinence, which will especially be present if, because of this cause, one had to abstain perpetually from the use of marriage.¹

1649. - Sins can be perpetrated between spouses by reason of the conjugal act either by excess, that is, by placing acts useless for generation, or by defect, by not completing the essential act, or by staining the bed with the crime of onanism. (Cf. also n. 1641. II. 1°. 2°. Besides, modesty and often the reason of avoiding scandal [n. 432. 5°] require the most secret place.)

Hence there is a twofold paragraph.

Acts which, besides copula, but on its occasion or pretext, can be exercised by spouses are distinguished into three kinds. 1° Some are harmful to generation, such as sodomy and pollution, and are against nature. 2° Others are useful, such as touches exciting nature and fostering love. 3° Others are neither harmful nor useful, and are called besides nature.

1650. Principles. - I. Whatever is necessary for completing the conjugal act, or useful for exercising it more easily, more quickly, or more perfectly, is altogether licit for spouses. The reason is that he who has a right to a thing also has a right to the necessary or useful means, and means not prohibited from another source; and for those for whom the principal thing is licit, the accessory also is licit, and the means ordered to it.

II. Whatever in the conjugal act is an obstacle to generation, or per se induces pollution outside the natural conjunction, is gravely illicit. The reason is that voluntary effusion of seed is not licit except in order to generation; and therefore Matrimony does not give spouses faculty except for an effusion of seed which can per se serve generation. But otherwise, if men could enjoy pleasure itself without the consequent burden of offspring to be nourished and educated, the generation of children would easily be postponed, indeed would be avoided by set purpose, and thus society itself would incline toward destruction.¹

III. Whatever indeed is not an obstacle, yet per se is less necessary or less useful for the act of generating, cannot be turned to fault except light fault; yet from this other ends intrinsic to acts of this kind excuse, namely that conjugal affection may be preserved and fostered, or at least that concupiscence may be calmed. See n. 1641. II.

1651. Resolves. - 1° Modest touches and looks between spouses, with danger of pollution in oneself and in the other excluded, are free from every fault, although sometimes involuntary pollution may follow per accidens. But they are venial if they are done for pleasure alone; and mortal if they are done with the aforesaid danger and for pleasure alone or for a light cause. It is otherwise if they are done for a grave cause, say if there is an urgent cause of showing affection for fostering mutual love, or for removing a depraved suspicion from the other.¹

2° Touches and looks which are less honorable are also free from fault per se, if they are referred immediately to copula. Indeed the same must be held even if they were simply dishonorable, because since they have a right to copula, they also have a right to acts per se necessary or useful for copula. But if the acts by which a spouse disposes himself or herself for the conjugal act are such that they easily provoke pollution per se, they can be culpable, if diligence is lacking for avoiding pollution outside intercourse, or if such an act is such that the proximate danger of pollution cannot be guarded against by any diligence, say if the man inserts the shameful parts into the mouth of the wife. Hold the same if in preliminaries of this kind to copula there is present a sodomitic intention.² But if, due diligence having been employed, pollution follows beyond intention, there will be no fault.

3° Spouses do not sin gravely by touches, even immodest ones, although had for pleasure alone and without intention of copula, yet with danger of pollution, even involuntary, and the crime of sodomy excluded. But the one rendering seems always to be excused, although there is danger of pollution in either one (unless the touches are such that pollution seems to have been begun), since then the fault holds itself on the part of the person. - Thus commonly.³ But light fault, which can be present in acts of this kind, is easily excused because of ends intrinsic to Matrimony itself, or other extrinsic ones, for example, because they are suitable for fostering affection or for calming concupiscence.

But what if spouses, after copula has been begun, restrain semination? St. Alphonsus responds:¹ "If both spouses consent in this, and there is no danger of seminating outside the vessel, that, speaking per se, is not mortal; for that penetration of the female vessel is then reputed after the manner of a touch of the shameful parts, which is permitted between spouses, or at least is not mortal, with danger of pollution excluded. St. Antoninus, etc. I said: 1) if both consent; for if one withdraws without the consent of the other, he certainly sins gravely, as all the aforesaid authors say. I said: 2) speaking per se; for Sanchez wisely warns with Veracruz that this ordinarily is mortal, because ordinarily there is danger from such withdrawal of pouring out seed, unless the spouses have experienced the opposite; in which case nevertheless I think that they can in no way be excused from venial sin, whatever Sanchez may say with others."

Likewise what if the husband wishes directly either to pollute the woman, or to pollute himself around the body of the woman without matrimonial copula, as happens too often in practice? - Berardi responds² (yet with a certain trembling, as he admits, because he has not found Theologians teaching his opinion in a clear and firm manner): "If the woman can in no way avoid these touches if she sleeps with her own husband, so that to avoid them she would have to leave the bedchamber altogether, provoking the greatest discord and procuring for herself and her children very grave detriments; I would think that she is not held to undergo such and so great inconveniences, and can limit herself to resistance morally possible for her, provided that by positive acts she never accommodates herself to the shameful touches of the man, but only permits them because of the aforesaid grave causes, bearing herself passively. For then the woman on her part does nothing evil, and simply sleeps in her bed with her own husband. The whole malice is on the part of the husband himself, whose illicit touches indeed the woman ought to impede, if she could; but not if very grave inconveniences stand in the way of her impeding them."

Leaving the matter to the wiser, I cannot fail to observe that it is certainly not licit for the woman to bear herself passively if, unless she positively resists, she is in proximate danger of consent (cf. n. 20).

4° A wife does not sin gravely, indeed, according to the more common and more probable sentence, not even lightly, if by touches she excites herself to semination immediately after copula, in which the man alone has seminated; 1° because semination of the woman pertains to completing the conjugal act, so that the spouses may properly be one flesh; and, just as the wife can prepare herself for copula by touches, so also she can perfect it; 2° because, if women after such irritation were held to restrain the natural motions, they would be continually exposed to great danger of sinning gravely.¹

5° Touches with oneself from venereal delight, the other spouse being absent, cannot be excused from grave sin. The reason is both because a spouse does not have the right of using his or her own body in order to fulfilling pleasure with oneself, but only in order to copula, and because touches of the shameful parts, when they are done lingeringly and with movement of the spirits, tend per se to pollution and are proximately connected with its danger. And St. Alphonsus² calls this opinion the more probable and altogether to be urged in practice, no broad judgment concerning the probability of the opposite sentence being made.

6° Morose delectation concerning copula had, or remotely to be had, with danger of pollution excluded (which nevertheless will be proximately present if titillation of the parts is joined with movement of the spirits), although according to the common sentence it is only venial, nevertheless is to be dissuaded. 1) It is some sin; because in this pleasure, not referred to proximate copula, an inordinateness is found, since an honorable end is lacking and the genital spirits are moved in vain, at least inchoatively. 2) It does not exceed venial sin; because, since copula is per se licit for spouses, it cannot be gravely illicit to be delighted concerning it. Nor, however, is simple thought concerning these things to be had or already had illicit.³ Indeed neither is desire concerning future copula, nor (except in a widower or widow) joy concerning past copula, per se illicit; because desire or joy concerning a licit thing cannot be illicit.

1652. - Onanism consists in this, that the man, after copula has been begun, withdraws himself before semination and pours out the seed outside, in order to impede generation. Everyone sees per se that this is to indulge lust and at the same time to be unwilling to assume the burdens of Matrimony.

It takes its name from Onan, the second son of the patriarch Judah, who after the death of his brother Her, according to custom, was compelled to take his widow Thamar, so that he might raise up seed for his brother; but going in to the wife of his brother, he poured out the seed upon the ground, lest children should be born in the name of his brother. And therefore the Lord struck him, because he did a detestable thing.¹

1653. Things to Be Established. - I say I. Voluntary onanism is always a mortal sin, as being against nature; and therefore it can never be licit for spouses. The reason is 1° because it plainly fights against the primary end of Matrimony, and per se tends toward the extinction of society, and consequently subverts the natural order; 2° because it was strictly prohibited by the supreme Legislator and Author of nature, as is drawn out from the text of Genesis just related; 3° moreover, this is established from the 49th proposition condemned by Innocent XI, which sounds thus: Mollities is not prohibited by natural law. ... Hence thus: Onanism is true and properly so-called mollities, or pollution outside the licit use of Matrimony; therefore. This is confirmed by several Decisions of the Sacred Penitentiary and of the Holy Office to be referred to below. - I said: voluntary; because the sin of Onanism is not present if in the conjugal act seed can indeed be received by the woman, but cannot be retained, or if, after the work of marriage has been begun, seed is poured out because of necessity, for example because others come upon them and the work of marriage must be interrupted.²

I say II. An onanist man can never be excused from grave sin, and therefore is never to be absolved unless he sincerely grieves over his sin and proposes to avoid it for the future. The reason is clear from what has been said.

I say III. A wife can be excused from sin if, for a grave cause, she renders the debt to an onanist husband, provided that interiorly she does not assent to his sin, and exteriorly shows her repugnance by serious admonitions or other signs of displeasure. The reason is 1° because she is occupied with a licit thing and uses her own right, of which she cannot be deprived because of the malice of the man; nor does she properly cooperate in the sin of another, since she bears herself only passively, and the intrinsically evil action consists only in the act of the man then withdrawing against the order of nature; 2° because she is not bound by charity to impede the sin of her husband with grave inconvenience to herself; 3° because it is clear from the responses by which the Sacred Penitentiary declared that a woman of this kind is not to be disquieted. - See the Decisions to be referred to below, n. 1658. ad 1um. 1659.

I said: if for a grave cause; and among grave causes Bouvier enumerates a reasonable fear of death, of grave cruelties, quarrels or blows (measuring gravity according to the condition of the person), divorce, infamy or grave scandal; likewise fear lest the husband should keep a concubine or commit adultery, or lest he should utter blasphemies against Religion, injuries against the confessor, or scandalous words before children or servants.

1654. Resolves. - 1° A woman sins gravely who induces the man to abuse Matrimony, even indirectly or tacitly, for example by complaining about the number of offspring, the labors of childbirth or the education of children, or by repeatedly saying that she will die in the next childbirth, etc. A fortiori she sins gravely if, the husband being unwilling, she withdraws herself from copula begun before semination.

2° Likewise, a woman sins gravely by interiorly consenting to the detestable action of the man, even if exteriorly she shows repugnance. For sin is always to be held in hatred. Yet distinguish consent in the very action of the man from joy over the effect thence following, or over immunity from the inconveniences and dangers which accompany generation. Yet that joy is not without danger (see what was said in n. 232). Especially, however, the woman must beware of the manifestation of joy of this kind, lest the onanist man take an occasion from it for sinning in this way.

3° The wife is held, at least ordinarily, to warn an onanist man concerning the obligation of acting rightly, and to turn him away, as much as is in her, from a perverse manner of acting. Nor does it suffice that she has warned him once; but she ought sometimes to repeat admonitions, unless she is certain that a new admonition will profit nothing. Yet even then she ought in some manner to make known her repugnance, lest she seem willingly to consent to the sin of the husband. - Thus commonly, and thus responded the Sacred Penitentiary when interrogated, n. 1659. IV.

4° It will also be the office of the wife to move the husband by caresses, various signs of love, prayers, and exhortations to completing the act rightly, or to abstaining from it altogether. Experience establishes that very many onanist men, thus enticed by their wives, have returned themselves to better fruit.

1655. Questions. - Query 1° In what manner should a confessor conduct himself with spouses confessing, asking, or wholly silent concerning the use of Matrimony?

Resp. See n. 1425. 2). 3). 4); 1657. Resp. Ad 3um; 1658. § Ad 2um autem.

Query 2° Can a wife ask the debt from an onanist man?

Resp. Affirmatively, more probably, from a just cause; because she has a right to copula, and is excused from the sin of cooperation. - But "she will have a just cause of asking, if she herself should be in danger of incontinence, or if otherwise she would have to be deprived of her right of asking more than once or twice, with a perpetual scruple whether it is a sufficiently grave inconvenience to her or not, then to contain herself." Thus St. Alphonsus.¹ So also declared the Major Penitentiary Card. di Pietro in the admonition to the aforesaid responses of the Sacred Penitentiary, although he adds that the Sacred Penitentiary refused to give a decision concerning this matter.

Query 3° Does the wife sin by furnishing internal consent to pleasure, when she can permit the conjugal act to an onanist man?

Resp. Negatively, provided that she does not furnish assent to the sin of the man. The reason is that, since she does not sin in the least by permitting an act of this kind, neither does she sin by admitting the pleasure coming from it, although she foreknows that the man will not perfect copula; for that act is in itself honorable and licit for the woman, and it does not stand through her that it is not perfected in the due mode.

Query 4° Do spouses sin gravely who, in order to avoid offspring, have copula only at that time in which conception is not accustomed to have place, e.g., in that space of time which runs from about a fortnight after menses up to the next term of these?

Resp. The following doubts were proposed to the Sacred Penitentiary concerning this matter, which, from the French idiom into Latin to the letter, as much as I could, I have translated.

I. 1° Can this manner of acting be excused from mortal sin? - 2° Is it prohibited at least under venial sin by reason of the intention of not conceiving?

II. Is it lawful for a confessor to counsel this manner of acting: 1° to a wife who, although she detests and reproves the onanism of her husband, nevertheless tries in vain to turn him away from it? 2° To both spouses, who, lest they be burdened by a numerous family, voluntarily give themselves to onanism?

III. 1° Can this manner of acting be counseled without danger, by which the diminution of the family is caused more certainly than by onanism, since the very reason of honesty reproves this latter? - 2° Is that danger compensated, if thus mortal sin is avoided and the conscience of very many wives is pacified, who otherwise, whether by fault of the husband or by fear lest they conceive, will be alienated from the Sacraments?

To these doubts "the Sacred Penitentiary, the things set forth having been diligently weighed, responds: Spouses using Matrimony in the aforesaid manner are not to be disquieted, and the confessor can, cautiously however, insinuate the sentence of which there is question to those spouses whom he has vainly attempted to draw away from the detestable crime of onanism by another reason." Rome, in the Sacred Penitentiary, June 16, 1880.

A. Card. Bilio, P. M.
Hip. Can. Palombi, S. P. Secretarius.
L. + S.

Yet note that the spouses of whom there is question in the Query can be in a bad state: a) because of the danger of incontinence, which within the fortnight that immediately follows the menses can be present for at least one of the spouses, and which will more easily be present for those inclined toward venery, especially if they do not greatly abhor sin; b) because of the danger of refusing the debt in the case in which the consort should ask it within that fortnight, and this danger will be the greater the more solicitous the party from whom it is asked is to avoid offspring.¹

Query 5° In what manner must one proceed with a wife who is placed in a proximate occasion of sin because of a man abusing Matrimony in any way?

To be noted beforehand. - The case would be if, the husband exacting it, she herself directly pollutes him with her hands, or if she herself is accustomed truly to consent to onanism, sodomy, her own pollution, etc.

Berardi responds:¹ "In this case the confessor will employ every zeal, that he may turn away the miserable woman from such horrible sins. Women ordinarily are accustomed to have the greatest affection for sins of this kind, and very difficultly are they accustomed to be induced to elicit a firm purpose of ceasing from them, because, by committing the aforesaid sins, on the one hand they satisfy pleasures both their own and the husband's, and on the other hand they free themselves from numerous offspring and from the inconveniences of gestation, childbirth, lactation, etc. Hence it is necessary that the confessor have ready an efficacious admonition and very grave words, that he may deter them from so great a crime.

"But if the admonitions of the confessor produce no or little amendment, it will not rarely be useful to threaten delay of absolution, and even in fact to defer the same."

Query 6° Can the wife of whom there is question in the case be obliged to make a divorce, so that she may be freed from this occasion of sinning with her own husband?

The same Berardi responds,² distinguishing: "If the woman in the use of Matrimony commits mortal sins, without the husband tempting her to committing these same sins, then she has no right of making a divorce, and therefore she must use other means for removing the danger of sinning in this occasion, which must be judged as altogether necessary. But if the husband himself compels her, or tempts her to committing the same sins, then Canonists and Theologians very commonly teach that the woman has the right of making a divorce; whence they argue that she even ought to make the same divorce if, because of cohabitation, she is placed in grave danger of sinning. See St. Alphonsus,³ Sanchez,⁴ the Salmanticenses, etc. But this conclusion must be understood with a grain of salt: namely, inasmuch as the woman indeed ought to make a divorce if she can without grave difficulty; but not if she would have to undergo grave harms and grave difficulties; because then there would be question of a necessary occasion, as Hurtado⁵ and St. Alphonsus note."⁶

1656. - I Consultation. "The Bishop N. most humbly supplicates for the solution of this doubt: 1° whether a woman can be absolved who indeed would suffer the husband, if he acted rightly in conjugal copula, but vehemently desires that the man withdraw himself because that woman fears to have offspring. 2° Whether a woman can be absolved who in conjugal copula could by her caresses obtain from the man that he would not withdraw himself, and does not do it; because that copula displeases her."

Response. - "The Sacred Penitentiary, having weighed the doubts proposed by the Venerable Father in Christ, Bishop N., responded: Negatively. Given at Rome, in the Sacred Penitentiary, on the 27th day of May, 1847."

1657. - II Consultation. "It is asked of the Apostolic See with what theological note the three following propositions are worthy, namely: 1° for honest reasons it is licit for spouses to use Matrimony in that manner in which Onan used it. 2° It is probable that that use of Matrimony is not prohibited by natural law. 3° It is never expedient to interrogate spouses of either sex concerning this matter, even if it is prudently feared lest the spouses, whether the man or the wife, abuse Matrimony."

Response. - "Sacred Congregation of the Inquisition, on the 21st day of May, 1851. To the 1st. That the proposition is scandalous, erroneous, and contrary to the natural right of Matrimony. - To the 2nd. That the proposition is scandalous, erroneous, and otherwise implicitly condemned by Innocent XI in the 49th proposition" (p. XVII). - "To the 3rd. That the proposition, as it lies, is false, too lax, and dangerous in practice."

1658. - III Consultation. Petition of the Most Illustrious Lord Bouvier, Bishop of Le Mans, concerning the manner of acting of confessors with spouses, relatively to Onanism.

"Most Blessed Father, the Bishop of Le Mans in France, prostrate at the feet of Your Holiness with the greatest reverence, most humbly represents the things which follow.

"Nearly all younger spouses do not wish to have a more numerous offspring, and yet morally they cannot abstain from the conjugal act.

"Being interrogated by the confessor concerning the manner in which they use the rights of Matrimony, more commonly they are accustomed to be gravely offended; and, when admonished, they neither abstain from the conjugal act, nor can they be determined toward the excessive multiplication of offspring.

"Then, murmuring against confessors, they forsake the Sacraments of Penance and the Eucharist; they give a bad example to children, servants, and other faithful of Christ; a lamentable detriment to Religion arises thence.

"The number of those who approach the Sacred Tribunal of Penance in many places decreases from year to year, especially on account of this cause, as most pastors more conspicuous in piety, knowledge, and experience confess.

"How then did confessors formerly act? many say. No more children were commonly born then than today from individual Matrimonies, spouses were not more chaste, and nevertheless they did not fail in the precepts of annual Confession and Paschal Communion.

"All readily admit that infidelity toward the consort, and the attempt at abortion, is a very great sin. But scarcely, and indeed not even scarcely, can they be persuaded that they are held under mortal sin either to preserve perfect chastity in Matrimony, or to incur the danger of generating innumerable offspring.

"The aforesaid Bishop of Le Mans, foreseeing that immense evils will thence come, and troubled with anxiety, solicitously asks of Your Beatitude:

"1° Whether spouses who use Matrimony in such a manner that they guard against conception exercise an act per se morally evil?

"2° If the act is to be held as morally evil, whether spouses not accusing themselves of it can be considered as constituted in that good faith which excuses them from grave fault?

"3° Whether the manner of acting of confessors is to be approved who, lest they offend married persons, do not interrogate them concerning the manner in which they use the rights of Matrimony?"

Response. - "The Sacred Penitentiary, having maturely weighed the proposed questions, to the 1st responds: Since the whole disorder of the act proceeds from the malice of the man, who, instead of consummating, withdraws himself and pours out outside the vessel; therefore, if the woman, after due admonitions, profits nothing, but the man insists, threatening blows or death, she herself, as approved Theologians teach, can simply permit it without sin, and this from a grave cause which excuses her; since charity, by which she is held to impede that, does not oblige with so great an inconvenience.

"But to the 2nd and 3rd it responds: That the aforesaid confessor recall to mind that adage, holy things are to be treated in a holy manner; and also weigh the words of St. Alphonsus de Ligorio, a learned man and most experienced in these matters, who in the Praxis Confessariorum § 4. n. 41 says: 'But concerning the sins of spouses with respect to the conjugal debt, ordinarily speaking, the confessor is not held, nor is it becoming, to interrogate, except wives, whether they have rendered it, in the more modest manner in which he can. ... Concerning other things let him be silent, unless he has been interrogated.' Nor should he omit to consult other approved authors. Given at Rome by the Sacred Penitentiary on the 8th day of June, 1842."

1659. - IV Consultation. Question. "Bertha has a man, whom by constant experience she knows to be an onanist. In vain has she attempted every means to draw him back from so nefarious a crime. Indeed very grave or at least grave evils now probably threaten her, so that she must either incur these evils or flee from the house of the husband, unless she permits at least sometimes the abuse of Matrimony, etc."

Response. - "Since in the proposed case the woman on her part indeed does nothing against nature, and gives work to a licit thing, but the whole disorder of the act proceeds from the malice of the man, who, instead of consummating, withdraws himself and pours out outside the vessel; and therefore, if the woman, after due admonitions, profits nothing, but the man insists, threatening blows or death or other very grave evils, she herself (as approved Theologians teach) can bear herself permissively without sin; since in these circumstances of things she simply permits the sin of her husband, and this from a grave cause which excuses her; because charity, by which she is held to impede that, does not oblige with so great an inconvenience. Given at Rome in the Sacred Penitentiary on the 1st day of February, 1823."

V. Response of the Major Penitentiary. "Approved and exact moral Theologians agree in this, that ... it is lawful for a wife to render the debt, if from her denial she would be badly treated by her husband, and could fear grave inconvenience to herself thence; for, they say, in this case the wife is not judged formally to cooperate in the sin of her husband, but only to permit it from a just and reasonable cause. Yet let the Orator admonish a wife of this kind, that she not cease prudently to warn her husband, so that he desist from this turpitude.

"Michael, Card. di Pietro,
Major Penitentiary.

"Given at Rome in the Sacred Penitentiary, on the 19th day of November, 1816.

"There exist also other responses of the Sacred Penitentiary, which are wholly consonant with the preceding; Gousset reports these in the work, Justification de Saint Liguori."¹

I. For asking a dispensation in a public impediment, concerning which, according to the faculties (p. LXX. sq.), the Bishop can dispense.

"Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Lord."

"John N." (the family name is put) "and Anna N. ... of the parish (mission) N. ... of this diocese N." ... (if the persons about to marry belong to different dioceses, this is more correctly² expressed, and indeed immediately after the family name of each. Moreover, the dispensation is more conveniently petitioned through the pastor of the bride, if the impediment is common to both contracting parties, as, e.g., the impediment of kinship) "being blood-relatives in the fourth degree equally in the transverse line, as appears from the appended chart" (see an example of this, n. 1583. q. 2°. p. 252) "they desire to enter Matrimony with each other" (the impediment of blood-relationship is set forth here; but, as is clear, in this place that very impediment by which the persons about to marry are bound is to be set forth), "and therefore they suppliantly beg from Your Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Lordship the dispensation necessary for themselves. - The reasons are" ... (Here are set forth the causes which exist for obtaining the dispensation, e.g. 1° the age of the girl, who, having now completed 25 years, probably would not find another man whom she could conveniently marry; 2° e.g. danger of heresy, since the Orators live in a place mixed with non-Catholics, etc.). There follow, if any are present, the circumstances which must necessarily be expressed.

"With the greatest reverence and devotion with which it is proper, I remain,

"Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Lord,

"Of Your Most Illustrious Lordship,

"Most submissive,

"N. N.,

"Pastor or Missionary Priest.

"Baltimore, day ... Dec. 1874."

Note. - On the back of the sheet, or below the text of the supplicatory petition, let the chart of blood-relationship or affinity be put.

II. For asking a dispensation in an occult impediment, concerning which, according to the faculties or by law, the Bishop can dispense, and whose dispensation can be asked from him without danger of injuring the seal.

"Most Illustrious," etc., as above I.

"Titius and Caja, while the first spouse of Titius was still living, knew each other carnally, and gave faith mutually to each other concerning Matrimony to be contracted between themselves if the wife of Titius should die before him; she now being dead, however, neither of the Orators having plotted against her death, they desire to contract Matrimony between themselves. But since the impediment of crime arising from adultery and promise is occult, and unless Matrimony is contracted between them there threatens danger of scandals or of perseverance in sin, therefore, to avoid these things, and for the quiet of their conscience, they most humbly supplicate that Your Most Illustrious Lordship may deign most graciously to impart to them the grace of dispensation."

"With the greatest," etc., as I.

III. For asking a dispensation from the Bishop, after Matrimony has already been contracted in good faith with an impediment in itself public, and concerning which, by force of the faculties, the Bishop can dispense.

"Most Illustrious," etc.

"It is humbly set forth to Your Most Illustrious Lordship on the part of the devout Orators John N. ... and Anna N. (see above I.) of the parish (mission) ... of this diocese" ... (see above I.), "that they, otherwise ignorant that some impediment existed between them by which they could not be joined matrimonially to each other, contracted Matrimony between themselves by words of the present, public proclamations having been made in their parochial church, and no impediment having been detected or denounced, and solemnized it in the face of the Church, and consummated it by carnal copula. But afterward it came to their knowledge that they (as appears from the appended chart), proceeding in the third and fourth degrees of blood-relationship from a common stock, are joined to each other, on account of which they abstained from carnal copula" (or "and nevertheless persevered in the same carnal copula"). "But since the aforesaid Orators cannot remain in this Matrimony of this kind without dispensation, and, if separation were made between them, grave scandals could thence arise, they supplicate that, the pardon of ecclesiastical law being most graciously given to them, they may be able to enter Matrimony in the face of the Church, and afterward live in it freely and licitly."

"With the greatest," etc., as above.

IV. For asking a dispensation from the Bishop, after Matrimony has already been contracted in bad faith with a public impediment.

"Most Illustrious," etc.

"It is humbly set forth to Your Most Illustrious Lordship, in the name of the Orators John N. and Anna N., of the parish N. of this diocese N., that they, otherwise knowing that they (as appears from the appended chart), in the second degree of blood-relationship proceeding equally from a common stock, are joined to each other, petitioned a dispensation from Your Most Illustrious Lordship" (or "from the Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Lord N.") "for validly contracting Matrimony between themselves, the said impediment notwithstanding; but, having suffered refusal, blinded by mad passion and circumvented by diabolical fraud, they contracted an incestuous Matrimony before the civil magistrate" (or "a heretical preacher") "and consummated it, from which already three children have in the meantime been received by them. But now, from the superabundant mercy of God, greatly fearing concerning the danger of eternal salvation, they have been moved with great sorrow on account of their past life. But since, if separation were made between them, grave scandals would thence arise, and also great harm would come forth for their children; yet in Matrimony they cannot remain without dispensation, they supplicate that Your Most Illustrious Lordship may deign to dispense with them, so that, in the face of the Church, but with public denunciations omitted, they may contract Matrimony with one another, consent having been renewed, and may remain in it freely and licitly; this motive also being added on the part of the undersigned, that unless the dispensation is granted, it is greatly to be feared lest the Orators be entirely perverted in the Faith, and fall away from it, together with the children received, since they live among non-Catholics and infidels."

"With the greatest," etc.

V. For asking a dispensation from the Bishop in an occult impediment, and indeed with sanation of the Matrimony in the root.

"Most Illustrious," etc.

"Sempronia, of the diocese N. N., ignorant of the impediment, in the face of the Church and with denunciations having preceded, contracted Matrimony in good faith with a man by whose brother" (or "son") "she had previously been known carnally. Wherefore, since they cannot be separated without scandal, and danger of incontinence or of grave defamation is present, the putative husband being plainly ignorant of the impediment, and therefore the matrimonial consent cannot be renewed without grave danger of quarrels, hence she humbly supplicates for a speedy remedy of dispensation concerning an impediment of this kind, entirely occult, and indeed in the root of the Matrimony, so that, without renewal of consent, the Matrimony can be healed."

"With the greatest," etc.

VI. For asking a dispensation in a public impediment concerning which the Bishop cannot dispense.

Let Formula I be taken; but:

1° In place of: "Most Illustrious," etc., let this be written: "Most Blessed Father."

2° In place of: "from the Most Illustrious," etc., write: "from Your Holiness."

3° In place of: "With the greatest," etc., write:

"If Your Holiness deigns benignly to grant this grace to the Orators, they will render the greatest thanks for it with the greatest reverence and devotion with which it is proper,"

"To Your Holiness,

"Most submissive,

"N. N., etc.

"Given at N. N."

Note. - 1° If they are poor, after the reasons have been set forth it is said: "They are poor and miserable, and live only from their labor and industry." See n. 1627.

2° Let the supplication prepared by the Pastor of the Orators be sent to the Bishop; but the Bishop, or in his place the Vicar General, sends it to Rome fortified with testimony, seal, and episcopal handwriting.

3° If a dispensation is to be asked from the Holy See in a Matrimony contracted with a public impediment, whether in good or in bad faith, let Formula III or IV be taken, with the things changed which must be changed according to those things which were changed in this Formula VI.

VII. For asking a dispensation from the Sacred Penitentiary in Matrimony to be contracted.

"Most Eminent Prince."

"It is most humbly set forth to Your Eminence, on the part of the Orators Titius and Caja, that they intend to contract Matrimony, but that Titius, a married man, carnally knew Caja by perfect copula while his own wife Sempronia was still living, and they gave faith mutually to each other concerning Matrimony to be contracted between themselves if Sempronia, the wife of Titius, should die before him; and she indeed died before him by poison administered by Titius. But since from the premises the impediment of crime has arisen, and thence they can contract Matrimony neither licitly nor validly, the Orators supplicate for the grace of dispensation concerning this impediment of crime, so that they may publicly contract Matrimony between themselves, and afterward remain in it licitly and freely, and the offspring may be decreed legitimate. The impediment is altogether occult, and the danger of perseverance in sin is pressing, indeed also of grave scandal, if they cannot be joined in lawful Matrimony. Wherefore, for the quiet of their conscience, grieving greatly over the premises, they humbly supplicate Your Eminence, that concerning these things you may deign to provide by Apostolic authority with an opportune remedy.

"Kissing the purple, with the greatest," etc., as I.

"May Your Eminence deign to direct the response to New York (n. 173 Third Street, New York, U.S. of America) to me, the undersigned."

On the outside let him form the inscription thus: "To the Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lord, Lord N., Cardinal of the Holy Roman Church, Major Penitentiary" (from our Provinces: "Prefect of the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide"), "Rome."

VIII. For asking a dispensation from the Sacred Penitentiary in Matrimony already contracted.

"Most Eminent Prince."

"Titius, a married man, carnally knew Caja by perfect copula while his own wife Sempronia was still living, and they gave faith mutually to each other concerning Matrimony to be contracted between themselves if Sempronia, the wife of Titius, should die before him; and, after Sempronia had died before him by poison administered by Titius, aware" (or "ignorant" [or "Titius aware" or "ignorant" or "Caja aware" or "ignorant"]) "of the impediment, in the face of the Church, with proclamations having preceded" (or "having been dispensed") "they contracted Matrimony" (or "with no proclamations having preceded, before the civil Magistrate," or "a heretical preacher") "and consummated it by carnal copula." (If each party or one or the other party still perseveres in good faith, let this be expressed; likewise whether each party or one or the other party, aware of the impediment, now abstains from copula, or nevertheless has persevered in the same.) "Wherefore, since the impediment is altogether occult, and separation cannot be made without scandal, I most humbly ask Your Eminence that you benignly indulge dispensation for them, inasmuch as they may be able to contract validly.

"Kissing the purple," etc., as Form VII.

Note. - The formulae by which the Bishop grants dispensations, Prelates will find in Heiss, de Matrim. p. 406 sq.

1. Formula of supplication for dispensation concerning the banns.

"Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Lord."

"It is humbly set forth that" (the names and surnames of the Orators are written, as above Form I., if the cause is honest or public; fictitious names, if the cause is occult and dishonorable; then the cause itself or causes). "Wherefore the Orators, whom, after diligent inquiry, I have found bound by no impediment, earnestly ask that a dispensation be granted to them concerning two (three) proclamations.

"Commending the prayers I remain," etc.

2. Formula of supplication for dispensation concerning the impediment of mixed religion.

"Most Illustrious," etc.

"Constantia N., Catholic, my parishioner, desires to enter Matrimony with Frederick N. from N., attached to the sect ..." (or "a baptized non-Catholic").

"The non-Catholic party before me, as appears from the declaration annexed to this supplication, promised under the faith of an oath that all infants of either sex to be born from that Matrimony are to be baptized and educated in the Catholic Faith, and that to them, equally as to the consort, the exercise of the Catholic Religion will be entirely free. Moreover, the Catholic party promised that she would take care according to her strength that, as much as is in her, the man be converted to the true Faith. Wherefore she most humbly supplicates Your Most Illustrious Lordship that you deign to grant to her by Apostolic authority a dispensation concerning that impediment. The causes are" (the cause or causes are set forth, e.g. vain attempts that the Oratrix renounce such a Matrimony; founded hope of the conversion of the non-Catholic party, etc.).

S. Th., Suppl., q. 41, a. 3-4; II-II, q. 153, a. 2; c. Gent., III, 122 and 126.

937. The conjugal debt (le devoir conjugal; de huwelijksplicht) is the proper act of conjugal life, namely, carnal copula of itself apt for generation, to which spouses have a right and which they must mutually render to one another, since in this essentially consists the undivided custom of conjugal life. Hence it constitutes the primary office between them, just as the primary end of matrimony is the procreation of offspring, and therefore by the Apostle it is called, as it were by excellence, the conjugal debt: Let the husband render the debt to the wife; and likewise also the wife to the husband (I Cor. VII, 3). Therefore in this spouses are equal by right; hence can. 1111: "to each spouse from the very beginning of matrimony there belongs an equal right and office in regard to the acts proper to conjugal life."

Therefore the conjugal act, per se apt for the generation of offspring, not only is licit if it is done for the due end and with the due circumstances, as was proved above (n. 763), but then it is also an act of the very virtue of chastity, such as befits the conjugal state; and therefore, given the required conditions, it is also meritorious.

Hence S. Thomas, II-II, q. 153, a. 2:

"Sin in human acts is that which is contrary to the order of reason; but the order of reason has this, that it order each thing suitably to its end; and therefore it is not a sin if through reason a man uses certain things for the end for which they are, in a suitable mode and order, provided that end is something truly good. But just as it is a good that the bodily nature of one individual be preserved, so also it is a certain excellent good that the nature of the human species be preserved. But just as the use of foods is ordered to the preservation of the life of one man, so also the use of venereal things is ordered to the preservation of the whole human race; whence Augustine says: What food is to the safety of a man, this intercourse is to the safety of the race. And therefore, just as the use of foods can be without every sin, if it is done in the due mode and order according as it befits the safety of the body, so also the use of venereal things can be without every sin, if it is done in the due mode and order, according as it is fitting for the end of human generation."

We shall speak:

1° of the liceity of conjugal copula,

2° of the circumstances of conjugal copula,

3° of acts connected with conjugal copula,

4° of excess in the use of marriage,

5° of defect in the use of marriage.

S. Th., Suppl., q. 49, a. 4-6.

938. Principle I. That copula is licit for spouses which of itself is apt for generation; for this three things are required: penetration of the vagina, effusion of seed within the vagina, retention of the seed by the woman, namely, so that it can be drawn into the uterus. Therefore he sins gravely who knowingly and willingly does not observe one of these three, or who voluntarily exposes himself to the proximate danger of this.

Conjugal copula which of itself is apt for generation is that by which, from the very mode in which the act is exercised, the conception and generation of offspring can be had per se and from the nature of the thing, even if from elsewhere or per accidens there is an impediment, as from sterility, old age, pregnancy, and other causes. For this threefold condition is required:

1° that the husband penetrate the woman's vagina with the virile member;

2° that he pour forth seed in the vagina and deposit it there;

3° that the woman receive the virile seed in the vagina.

Hence: a) Although conception can occur absolutely without penetration, by pouring forth seed at the opening of the vagina, because it is not impossible for the sperm to enter by its own vital motion and by the attraction of the uterus, nevertheless, because this is altogether rare and per accidens, it does not suffice for copula such as nature instituted it, nor is it an honorable mode of completing copula, even if it is done for a good end, for example to avoid the contagion of disease, but it is gravely illicit; for then in reality there is no copula, but only two simultaneous pollutions.

b) Nevertheless to penetrate the vagina a little suffices, although one acting thus can sin in affection, at least venially, if he acts thus without a proportionate cause. Certainly the mere fear of procreating offspring is not such a cause, as if someone wished thus to avoid conception or render it notably more difficult, and wished to avoid the mode more apt for generation; mortally, if he thinks and intends that thus generation is totally impeded.

A proportionate cause, for example, is if a woman, recently after childbirth or infirm in the genital parts, cannot endure perfect intercourse.

c) Nevertheless it would not suffice to penetrate the vulva a little and deposit the seed between the lips, because thus it would be deposited only at the opening, not at all in the vagina itself; and thus there would be no copula.

d) A fortiori, artificial insemination properly so called does not suffice for copula, by which seed, emitted outside the natural act of copula, is introduced by a certain art into the vagina or uterus; this is always gravely illicit.

1° Thus artificial insemination outside matrimony, by which a woman is fecundated with the seed of any man whatsoever, obtained and introduced by art. For by natural and divine law offspring can have origin only from matrimonial conjunction.

1. This is the question of copula, as they say, "dimidiate," which by several confessors was considered as a fitting remedy to be proposed to onanists. Now the bishops of the Netherlands condemned that practice of confessors who were advising or permitting inveterate onanists to use dimidiate copula lest they sin gravely any more; which, moreover, was gravely scandalous, and rather was by nature suited to prepare the way to onanism. The bishops asked the approbation of the Holy Office, which, Nov. 23-Dec. 1, 1922, gave the following response:

1° it cannot be tolerated that confessors of their own accord teach the practice of dimidiate copula and advise it indiscriminately to all penitents who fear lest more numerous offspring be born;

2° the confessor is to be reproved who, after all remedies have been tried in vain for turning away from this evil a penitent abusing matrimony, teaches him to exercise dimidiate copula for preventing mortal sins;

3° likewise the confessor is to be reproved who, in the said circumstances, advises dimidiate copula to a penitent to whom it is otherwise known, or, when the penitent asks whether this mode is licit, answers simply that it is licit without any restriction or explanation.

Concerning these things Fr. Damen observes, Th. M., II, n. 896, "the reason for the first response is that it is licit for no one, and much less for a confessor, to advise sin, whether mortal or even venial. The reason for the second response is that such a mode of acting involves scandal, since dimidiate copula easily paves the way to worse things, and thus in fact, as to the diminution of offspring, produces the same effect as neo-Malthusianism, and therefore cannot be advised as a lesser evil. The reason for the third response is that the advice is scandalous and the response of the confessor would be false, since it would declare licit that which is illicit."

But copula is not dimidiate if seed is deposited at the orifice or between the lips, because thus there is no copula, not even dimidiate; but if, at the entrance of the vagina and penetrating it, even a little, seed is poured forth.

2° Thus also insemination by which seed would be taken from any man whatsoever for fecundating the wife of another (hetero-insemination), for the same reason.

3° Thus finally artificial insemination in matrimony, by which the wife is fecundated with the seed of her own husband, yet not through an act of coitus of itself apt for generation. This has place if, by an artificial process, seed is transmitted to the internal organs of the woman, seed which is had from voluntary or involuntary pollution, or which is deposited at the mouth of the vagina, or which is extracted from the organs of the man, or which is collected from interrupted copula or from condomated copula. In all these cases the natural mode of procuring generation through copula is lacking, nor is there an action of itself tending to generation.

Indeed, in the case there is not one but in reality a twofold action of man: the first by which the seed is expelled or extracted, which of itself in no way tends to generation, but on the contrary is an impediment of generation, inasmuch as it pours forth seed outside copula and for this reason is gravely evil; the other, artificial, by which the seed afterward is introduced into the vagina or uterus of the woman. And although thus seed is now employed for fecundating the wife, nevertheless the action by which it is expelled or extracted from the testicles, as far as it is of itself, from its nature and from the mode in which it is done, emits seed in such a way that generation naturally is impeded, even if per accidens, from another consequent action, this defect is met so that the seed may contribute to generation in an artificial mode. Nevertheless this is insufficient for restoring rectitude in the prior action.

e) Since penetration of the vagina is an essential condition altogether required, therefore he who certainly cannot penetrate and complete the act in the due mode is in reality impotent. But if the impotence is doubtful, a married person could thus attempt copula as long as there is some hope of penetrating and arriving at perfect copula; otherwise, if there is no hope, because the mere possibility of generation does not suffice, but the probable possibility of copula is required.

1. From artificial insemination properly so called, which is always illicit, there differs artificial insemination improperly so called, by which, namely, after copula has been duly performed and the seed deposited in the vagina or at the entrance of the vagina, the seed is gathered again and transferred more deeply toward the uterus in an artificial mode. But if for this it is necessary to take up the seed in a syringe and also to draw the syringe out of the vagina by reason, for example, of asepsis, from this it probably would not be illicit. For thus the work of man duly furnished remains safe, and only a defect in the work of nature is corrected. - For the whole question of artificial insemination, confer: Allocution of Pope Pius XII to Catholic physicians, September 29, 1949.

939. Principle II. Every conjugal copula of itself apt for generation is per se licit, provided it is instituted for a right end; hence it is necessary that the end on the part of the agent be conformed to the end of the work. - Now the one proper and principal end from the nature of the work is the generation of offspring, to which two secondary ends are joined, but merely subordinately, so that they are true means by which the principal end is more securely obtained: the enjoyment of delight or the calming of concupiscence, and mutual solace or mutual love to be fostered and preserved (n. 769). As Pius XI says in the encyclical Casti Connubii: "Nor are those spouses to be said to act against the order of nature who use their right in a right and natural manner, even if, on account of natural causes, whether of time or of certain defects, new life cannot arise thence. For there are had, both in matrimony itself and in the use of conjugal right, also secondary ends, such as mutual help, mutual love to be fostered, and the calming of concupiscence; these spouses are by no means forbidden to intend, provided always that the intrinsic nature of that act remains safe, and therefore its due ordination to the primary end."

Hence: 1° Spouses can seek conjugal copula, whether for the principal end, or also for a secondary end, but insofar as it is subordinated to the principal end and serves it.

2° Indeed copula can even be demanded by either spouse, and this from justice, so that per se and generally the other party is bound to render it; wherefore it is called the conjugal debt, of which the Apostle speaks, I Cor. VII, 3-5. Hence, for rendering copula, a legitimate end is to render to the other party what is owed to that party from justice; which end, nevertheless, always supposes the primary end of the act or work itself, namely, the generation of offspring.

3° Consequently the Scholastics teach that the conjugal act is legitimated by the goods of matrimony, because through the good of offspring there is had the intention of the due end, through the good of fidelity there is had the due matter insofar as a man approaches his own and not another; and by these the act recedes from two extremes: from pollution or vice against nature and from fornication, holding the mean between the two, and thus it is constituted in the nature of moral virtue, which consists in a mean (q. 49, a. 2).

4° Likewise they teach that in only two modes can spouses come together altogether rightly and honorably so that they are totally excused from sin, namely, for the sake of generating offspring, which regards the first good, namely offspring, and for the sake of rendering the debt, which pertains to the other good, namely fidelity (q. 49, a. 5). To these two ends are reduced the fostering of conjugal love and the remedy of concupiscence, which implicitly tend to the good of offspring and the good of fidelity; for one who would yield to depraved concupiscence and commit a sin of the flesh would break matrimonial fidelity and could harm the good of offspring to be born, and one who would not foster the necessary love would expose these goods to danger.

From this the conclusions follow:

The conjugal debt is called that common action of spouses which is necessary for generation, and which has been ordained by the supreme Provider of all things for propagating human society. But this action is situated in carnal intercourse, by which man and woman are made as it were one body and one flesh. An act of this kind is called by the Apostle a debt, for it is that which spouses mutually owe to each other. Concerning this act, however much it is disagreeable, one must here speak briefly and chastely for the practice of confessors. - Cf. S. Alphonsus, n. 900.

I say. The conjugal act, had between legitimate spouses, is of itself honorable and licit. The reason is that an act of this kind is the means established and ordained by the very Founder of nature for the legitimate propagation of the human race. - I said of itself, because it can become illicit by reason of the end and of circumstances. And first it would become gravely illicit by reason of the end, if either a gravely depraved end were positively intended, or all ends rendering this act honorable were positively excluded, which are 1°. generation of offspring; 2°. satisfaction of the obligation toward the other spouse; 3°. avoidance of incontinence both in oneself and in the co-party; 4°. the desire of fostering or conciliating honorable love, of manifesting or promoting conjugal affection, etc. - By reason also of circumstances, especially of position and time, the conjugal act otherwise licit could be gravely vitiated. On account of position indeed, if it were unnatural in such a way that the spouses could not come together and the semen were poured out outside the vessel; but on account of time, if the conjugal act were placed at that time when proximate danger of abortion or of death of the co-party was present. - Cf. S. Alphonsus, nn. 881 and seq.

You Will Resolve. 1°. The use of marriage is illicit if it is done on account of pleasure alone, that is, by not intending the other ends even virtually or implicitly. This is clear from prop. 9 condemned by Innocent XI, which sounds thus: "The work of marriage, exercised on account of pleasure alone, is wholly free from all fault and venial defect." Nevertheless of itself, if it were done, it would be only a venial sin, just as it is venial to take food on account of delight alone. But the use of marriage is immune from this fault if it is made as a remedy of concupiscence, or on account of another honorable end, whether expressly or implicitly, even if otherwise delight or pleasure is intended. - Cf. S. Alphonsus, n. 912. - Baller. note (b), p. 881.

2°. The use of marriage is licit for sterile persons, both because no law in the opposite can be shown, and because sterile persons of themselves are suitable for completing the conjugal act; but if no generation follows, that happens wholly by accident; and other honorable ends besides generation are present, rendering conjugal intercourse honorable. Besides, scarcely is there given a case of sterility certainly known.

3°. To old men, whose semen is no longer prolific, the use of marriage is licit, provided they can sufficiently complete intercourse, or have a non-empty hope of completing it. For the same reasons favor old men which we adduced concerning sterile persons. It is confirmed besides from the practice of the Church, which blesses the Marriages of old men. - Cf. S. Alphonsus, n. 954.

4°. The wholly licit position is that which nature itself teaches, namely that the woman be lying beneath, and the man lying above. But any other position diverse from the aforesaid, provided the conjugal act can be sufficiently completed, does not exceed venial sin, and with a just cause acceding, lacks all fault. Wherefore spouses by no means sin who invert the position on account of danger of abortion during the time of pregnancy, on account of the corpulence or curvature of the man, on account of excessive weariness of the woman, or also on account of frigidity, when they are more aroused by an unnatural position, etc. Indeed the position which alone is possible, whatever finally it may be, is in no way condemned, although a not small loss of semen follows; because that part of the semen is not necessary for generation, and by accident, against the will of the spouses, is lost. - Cf. S. Alphonsus, n. 917.

5°. According to not a few theologians, the conjugal act is never forbidden, not even lightly, by reason of time; the reason is that no law can be assigned by which it is ever prohibited even under light fault. Nevertheless to S. Alphonsus the opinion is more pleasing which does not excuse from venial fault if intercourse is made during the time of pregnancy, unless there is danger of incontinence or another honorable cause, which otherwise can often be present. Besides, the more common opinion teaches that coition had during the time of menstruation is not excused from venial fault on account of the indecency which it seems to bear before itself, unless there is some cause rendering it honorable, namely for avoiding quarrels or preventing incontinence, etc. - Cf. S. Alphonsus, nn. 924 and seq.

6°. According to the more common opinion it is not illicit on Sundays and Feasts, even more solemn ones; both because no law is opposed, and also because marital intercourse does not remove spouses from observing the Feasts of the Church. Most of the Holy Fathers who are objected in the opposite seem to speak of counsel rather than of precept. Hence you will also deduce that there is no reason why use of this kind should be prohibited during the time of Advent or Lent. Cf. S. Alphonsus, n. 923.

7°. The S. Office on 24 March 1897 declared artificial fecundation of a woman to be illicit.¹

8°. A Marriage once validly entered is not invalidated by the fact that the man, even before it is consummated, has become impotent; hence there enters also the condition or circumstance which, had it existed before, he could not have entered. But after marriage has been entered, to such a man, says D'Annibale, vol. 3, n. 470, note 13, rights are established on both sides. C. 25, Can. 32, 7. And therefore for those who after contracted marriage have been made eunuchs, to coit is not illicit. - Tolet. L. 7, 1, 6, 4. Sanch. 7, 192, 6.

9°. It is licit for a woman who cannot retain semen to use marriage, because now perfect intercourse within the vessel is had; but if the semen is not retained, this is by accident, nor does it in any way impede the use of marriage; indeed also in that case the woman cannot be obliged to apply extraordinary means or means harmful to her bodily health.

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1116, n. 66.

The marital debt is the duty to have intercourse with one’s spouse upon request, usually said with respect to such an act as a means to prevent the strain of the concupiscible passions from becoming psychologically painful or even from growing into a nearly uncontrollable urge to sin, whether through self-abuse or infidelity of some other sort.¹⁹ Each spouse owes this debt to the other, at least in proportion with the seriousness and reasonableness of the request, as a fundamental part of married life.²⁰ This debt is better characterized as a “legal debt” rather than a “moral debt,” meaning it is owed in strict justice rather than merely according to a kind of fittingness. It is not simply “the appropriate thing to do,” like signs of respect toward superiors we are not subject to, it is the strictly necessary thing to do under terms of commutative justice between spouses.²¹ According to St. Thomas, the payment of the debt is even more formally significant as to the good of fidelity (bonum fidei) than the duty to refrain from adultery.²² In other words, it is a worse sin to deny one’s spouse his or her rights (understood correctly) which were positively promised (“I will”) than it is to commit adultery, which was merely negatively promised (“I will not”). She owes him, and he owes her, in virtue of their marriage, unless the most serious problems obtain.²³ (Adultery implicitly renounces this right.)²⁴ The relaxation of “concupiscence” (here meaning “sexual desire,” especially when occurring unwillingly,) is one of the classical motives for marriage,²⁵ with direct Scriptural foundations in 1 Corinthians 7, verses 2 and 9, annexed to the good of fidelity, the bonum fidei, as a secondary good or end of marriage and its act.²⁶ St. Paul’s explanation of the marital debt conveniently falls in between these same verses (3-5). ¹⁹ Sometimes “marital debt” or a similar phrase will be used simply to indicate conjugal relations. ²⁰ The ability to pay the marital debt is so important that those who are perpetually impotent are unable to marry for the reason that they cannot pay it if requested, failing to fulfill a basic part of what it means to be married. See Canon 1084, §1 in the CIC (1983); see also St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Suppl., q. 58, a. 1. (Hereafter cited as ST.) Note that the debt may not be extracted by force. ²¹ See ST, I-II, q. 80; q. 102, a. 2, ad. 2. ²² ST, Suppl., q. 49, a. 2, ad. 3: “Just as the marriage promise means that neither party is to have intercourse with a third party, so does it require that they should mutually pay the marriage debt. The latter is indeed the chief of the two, since it follows from the power which each receives over the other.” (All translations are from the Second and Revised Edition [Blackfriars: Westminster, UK, 1920]. Online edition transcribed for New Advent by Kevin Knight, 2017.) In the exchange of consent at a wedding, one promises (implicitly) both not to have relations with anyone else and to be available to the other – and not simply based on one’s own feelings about having relations at a given time. ²³ In the young St. Thomas’ Commentary on the Sentences, we find a protracted casuistic examination on the use of marriage, including the following case: suppose a man contracts leprosy, a contagious and hideous skin disease which can even kill. The leprous man requests his wife to sleep with him. Is she bound to acquiesce? The answer given is a resounding, “yes,” though he clarifies that she is not bound to live in the same house with him, lest she contract the disease by prolonged exposure. See ST, Suppl., q. 64, a. 1, ad. 4. (The content of the Supplementum is essentially identical to the Commentary on the Sentences; I use the Supplementum references for the convenience of the reader.) In the Response to the Third Objection in the same Question, we are told, however, that the request for the debt is excessive in various ways and therefore unnecessary (or even immoral) to pay, such as being asked for repeatedly or in a case where it would be physically harmful. ²⁴ See Canon 1152 (CIC, 1983); cf. ST Supp., q. 62 – St. Thomas is here using the ecclesiastical jurisprudence and law of his time and place. Note in Article 3 his explicit reference to the fact that the Church could compel a spouse to pay the debt by the sentence of an ecclesiastical court. (Contracting a spiritual relationship with one’s spouse also has implications for the marital debt in the ecclesiastical law of St. Thomas’s world. See ST Supp., q. 56, a. 1.) ²⁵ See ST Suppl., q. 54, a. 5; Interestingly, the fact of the usefulness of marriage for concupiscence as a natural motive for marriage seemingly implies that those who fully reach the acquired virtue of chastity while unmarried in fact ought to presume themselves to be in possession of the charism to live in celibacy unless otherwise evident. ²⁶ The three “goods” (“blessings”) of Matrimony are children, fidelity (or faith), and sacrament. See ST Supp., q. 49.

Now concerning the matters about which you wrote. It is well for a man not to touch a woman. But because of the temptation to immorality, each man should have his own wife and each woman her own husband. The husband should give to his wife her conjugal rights, and likewise the wife to her husband. For the wife does not rule over her own body, but the husband does; likewise the husband does not rule over his own body, but the wife does. Do not refuse one another except perhaps by agreement for a season, that you may devote yourselves to prayer; but then come together again, lest Satan tempt you through lack of self-control. I say this by way of concession, not of command. I wish that all were as I myself am. But each has his own special gift from God, one of one kind and one of another. To the unmarried and the widows I say that it is well for them to remain single as I do. But if they cannot exercise self-control, they should marry. For it is better to marry than to be aflame with passion.^{27 27} 1 Corinthians 7:1-9 (NSRVCE).

The use of the marital debt protects the uniqueness of the couple’s union: the availability of sexual goods from one’s spouse removes or at least diminishes the felt desire to seek such goods elsewhere. The “one flesh union” of marriage is a major renunciation of the control over oneself as a sexual being; one is giving that control in large part to one’s spouse.^{28 28} Another major source for this discussion is St. Thomas’ Commentary on 1 Corinthians (§320-329). Yet another is found in the De Malo q. 15 a. 2, where St. Thomas urges against “unnecessary” uses of marriage due to such acts being venial sins. The doctrine presented in the De Malo is largely a reiteration of what is presented in the Commentary on the Sentences.

If the marital debt is a category belonging to commutative justice, among the spouses as equals, rather than to domestic justice which is distributive from husband to wife, then it appears that it cannot be a sin in and of itself to request the marital debt, including to avoid sin, which is a good end.²⁹ This is because one cannot sin in asking for what one is truly owed. However, the Commentary on the Sentences does directly imply that requesting the debt to relieve concupiscence is venial sin, in line with the doctrine of St. Augustine, but it does not explain very deeply why this is the case.³⁰ In Article 8 of Question 64 we read on whether it is a mortal sin to ask for the debt at a holy time. The Answer: “To ask for the debt on a feast day is not a circumstance drawing a sin into another species; wherefore it cannot aggravate infinitely. Consequently a wife or husband does not sin mortally by asking for the debt on a feast day. It is however a more grievous sin to ask for the sake of mere pleasure, than through fear of the weakness of the flesh.”³¹ Given the lack of an explanation, including elsewhere in the Question, we are left wondering why making use of marriage at least to avoid sin is itself imputable as sin.³² The best direct response to this comes much earlier, in Question 49, Article 5, in the Reply to the Second Objection: ²⁹ See ST II-II, q. 57, a. 4. ³⁰ For some examples, see St. Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence, Book I, ch. 16, and On the Good of Marriage, §6 and §11. ³¹ ST Suppl., q. 64, a. 8, resp. Note that St. Thomas distinguishes between the request being “for mere pleasure” and being “for relief of concupiscence to avoid sin.” Evidently, these are not quite exactly the same thing to him, a distinction with relevance for the deeper discussion which this book takes on later. ³² Article 7 of Question 64 also seems to imply the opposite by specifying that it is not lawful to ask for the debt on holy days when one must be specially given over to prayer; were it never lawful, the more appropriate formulation of the Article’s thesis would be whether it is mortal sin rather than whether it is “lawful,” which we are given in the following Article (8), which then proceeds to presume sin in the asking of the debt by arguing circumstance cannot aggravate the sin into grievous guilt as it does not draw the act into a new species. Evidently, for St. Thomas, that a request for the debt is “lawful” in this sense does not mean free of moral guilt but rather that it exercises a binding claim over the other such that it would be immoral to refuse – “legal” debt.

If a man intends by the marriage act to prevent fornication in his wife, it is no sin, because this is a kind of payment of the debt that comes under the good of “faith.” But if he intends to avoid fornication in himself, then there is a certain superfluity, and accordingly there is a venial sin, nor was the sacrament instituted for that purpose, except by indulgence, which regards venial sins.^{33 33} ST Suppl. q. 49, a. 5, ad. 2.

The Question does not address the issue of the possibility of concupiscence hindering the ability to pray or do good deeds by a kind of distraction. In the so-called Catechism of St. Thomas, (specifically the sermons constituting the Commentary on the Ten Commandments,) written in the last period of the saint’s life, we will see a similar treatment of the matter which provides a very succinct formula for the evaluation of the motives for the use of marriage.

A natural reading of 1 Corinthians 7:6, the verse regarding allowing the use of marriage for the removal of temptation by concession or permission (συγγνώμην) rather than by command (ἐπιταγήν) is that the Apostle is saying that he is not imposing an obligation on married persons to use their rights to conjugal acts in order to remove temptation; rather, he is merely allowing them to do so, indicating that it is not necessarily sinful in itself. In fact, this helps to make more sense of the following verse in which the Apostle explains that he wishes all were continent like himself, not needing such assistance but rather disciplining oneself through total continence; this regards a higher pursuit of perfection, rather than merely avoiding sin. Were St. Paul speaking of venial sin in the use of marriage to remove temptation “by concession,” it seems he would have contrasted this with the use of marriage to procreate rather than with perfect continence and celibacy.

Of course, Christ Himself counsels celibacy. The apostles decline from the Lord’s words forbidding divorce and remarriage and thus lead themselves to the conclusion – “It is better not to marry.” (Matthew 19:10) Their selfish motives for desiring celibacy are the upshot of their selfish motives for marriage, yet they are valid motives nevertheless – it is easier to absent oneself from such trouble as might lead to the desire for divorce and then be unable to do so in view of marrying again. The propensity for a spouse to misuse their rights to conjugal acts, in favor of children or not, is in fact a similar reason why it is better to avoid marriage. One must realize that marriage is a true renunciation of self – a risking of one’s whole life.

It must be noted that the fundamental concern of St. Augustine and St. Thomas – and essentially the entire body of classical authors, ancient, medieval, and baroque, even up to the 1900’s – is about the suspension of the act of reason by which we know, love, and serve God. Because of its intense pleasure, the sexual act inhibits the reason’s proper functioning, like drunkenness. This is why there is a need to excuse the marriage act.^{34 34} See ibid., a. 1.

We return to a central question: what would St. Thomas say about NFP? Several distinctions must be made before providing an answer, after which we will consider the recent magisterial literature and then find a solution for how to reconcile St. Thomas with common teaching. We look now at the text of The Catechism of St. Thomas Aquinas on the use of sex within marriage.

Moreover, it must be known that the Commandment, “Thou shalt not commit adultery,” not only forbids adultery but also every form of immodesty and impurity. There are some who say that intercourse between married persons is not devoid of sin. But this is heretical, for the Apostle says: “Let marriage be honorable in all and the bed undefiled.” (Hebrews 13:4) Not only is it devoid of sin, but for those in the state of grace it is meritorious for eternal life. Sometimes, however, it may be a venial sin, sometimes a mortal sin. When it is had with the intention of bringing forth offspring, it is an act of virtue. When it is had with the intent of rendering mutual comfort, it is an act of justice. When it is a cause of exciting lust, although within the limits of marriage, it is a venial sin; and when it goes beyond these limits, so as to intend intercourse with another if possible, it would be a mortal sin.^{58 58} The Catechetical Instructions of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 80; trans. Collins, Joseph (1939), made available online by The Catholic Primer, 2004. Cf. ST Suppl., q. 49, a. 4; see also Commentary on 1 Corinthians, §328-329, which reiterates largely the same doctrine.

There are these four categories of the use of the marriage bed: virtue, justice, venial sin, and mortal sin.

First there is “virtue,” which is dependent upon direct or “actual” or at least “virtual” procreative intention willed in an act of intercourse.⁵⁹ The generosity of the spouses towards the possibility of receiving children and thus building up the community and raising souls to love and serve God is thereby manifested, making it “virtuous.” ⁵⁹ I take here Fr. John Hardon, SJ’s definition of “virtual intention,” aware that there could be other ways to define the term. “An intention that was once made and continues to influence the act now being done. But it is not present to the person’s consciousness at the moment of performing the act. This kind of intention is sufficient for a human act to be voluntary and therefore morally responsible.” See “Virtual Intention,” John Hardon’s Modern Catholic Dictionary (Eternal Life), https://www.catholicculture.org/culture/library/dictionary/index.cfm?id=37121. To interrupt or stop a virtual intention towards children in one’s use of marriage would require some positive mental act or desire for such interruption, even if only vaguely.

Second, and most interestingly for us, there is “justice,” which is the case of the marital debt. The text here does not give a detailed explanation of the marital debt the way the Commentary on the Sentences does. A plain reading of the text, however, in particular due to the word “mutual” in the phrase “rendering mutual comfort,” implies that the request to have one’s concupiscence calmed is just insofar as it requests what is rightfully one’s own, which is the spouse’s body in marital union. It could be imagined here that such union is the due means of the preservation of oneself from the possibility of illicit sexual activity or even merely from annoying distraction from the normal pursuit of rational and social goods; to give this to one’s spouse is righteous, for the preservation of one’s spouse from sin and assisting him or her in pursuit of holiness is one of the main purposes of the sacrament of Matrimony. The one who renders the comfort is also comforted him or herself, thus contributing to the overall psychological health and friendship of the spouses. However, this is a deliberate eisegesis – it is quite clearly at odds with St. Thomas’s intention. If he was disagreeing with his previous teaching on this point, we would expect him to be clear about it.

Third there is “venial sin,” which is mere pleasure seeking (contradistinguished from the need to pay or receive the debt and also from the intention towards procreation), and fourth there is “mortal sin.” These two cases are explained in the Commentary on the Sentences in the following way:

[If] pleasure be sought in such a way as to exclude the honesty of marriage, so that, to wit, it is not as a wife but as a woman that a man treats his wife, and that he is ready to use her in the same way if she were not his wife, it is a mortal sin; wherefore such a man is said to be too ardent a lover of his wife, because his ardor carries him away from the goods of marriage. If, however, he seek pleasure within the bounds of marriage, so that it would not be sought in another than his wife, it is a venial sin.^{60 60} ST Suppl., q. 49, a. 4.

The case of venial sin in relation to the case of “justice” is what is most interesting for us in our inquiry. The meaning of “seeking pleasure” seems to indicate the use of sex to “recreate” within the bounds of marriage, and this must also in fact imply an absence of an actual or virtual procreative intention, or else it would be in the category of “virtue.” In fact, “sexual recreation” is the very same “excitement of lust” which is spoken of in the Catechism text quoted above, and it is treated in the Commentary on the Sentences as a movement based on sexual appetite as opposed to a movement of reason which would entail virtue.⁶¹ This sort of sexual activity is an unnecessary and therefore demeritorious momentary inhibiting of the powers of reason and a movement toward the creation of a habit of such activity, together with the onset of a general dulling of the spiritual senses over time.⁶² Thus it is not eutrapelia either, which merely relaxes the mind through recreation but does not make one lose the power of reasoning altogether as does sexual union.⁶³ Any social goods which such recreational sexual activity can produce in the couple can and should be pursued by other means – and St. Thomas was certainly not unaware of the social or psychological benefits of conjugal activity, which point functions as the anchor for the contrary argument today, insofar as an argument is even made.^{64 61} Ibid. ⁶² See ST II-II q. 153, a. 2, ad. 1; a. 5. ⁶³ ST II-II q. 168 a. 2 resp. ⁶⁴ See SCG III ch. 123, 6: “Furthermore, the greater that friendship is, the more solid and long-lasting will it be. Now, there seems to be the greatest friendship between husband and wife, for they are united not only in the act of fleshly union, which produces a certain gentle association even among beasts, but also in the partnership of the whole range of domestic activity. Consequently, as an indication of this, man must even ‘leave his father and mother’ for the sake of his wife, as is said in Genesis (2:24). Therefore, it is fitting for matrimony to be completely indissoluble.” St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, ed. Joseph Kenny; trans. Vernon Bourke; (Hanover House: New York, 1955-1957).

It is clear that for St. Thomas it is always a venial sin to request the debt, unless this be for the sake of procreation, and the spouse is morally obliged to pay the debt, even if the spouse does not presently wish to have children. St. Thomas would say that the one requesting the debt outside of this purpose would be owed its payment by strict or legal debt, and that this is simply a bad use of what one is owed by justice. Only the gravest sort of reason would allow for a spouse to withhold the payment of the debt; the analogy which comes to mind is the example St. Thomas gives of the rebel who wishes to claim his deposited sword, which return may be refused him.^{65 65} ST II-II, q. 120, a. 1; the treatment of the “bottom line” regarding cases of requesting and refusing the marital debt goes beyond the scope of this book. St. Thomas does treat the issue at some length in the Commentary on the Sentences.

While interiorly coherent reasoning, one is still left with the sense that this treatment simultaneously overstates the claim a spouse has on the other’s body (viz., to use it for one’s sin), and underappreciates the utility of the use of marriage in easing concupiscence insofar as marriage and its act exist secondarily for this end. Yet we should not easily stray from the teaching of St. Thomas, and indeed we see that some have clearly gone too far.

Some contemporary authorities, such as those seeking to popularize and promote the teachings of St. John Paul II on human sexuality, might even go so far as to imply that the marital act is a spiritual act or experience, which is utterly foreign to the thought of St. Thomas and to the general moral-ascetical-mystical tradition.⁶⁶ On the contrary, it is noted by Pius XII that the use of mutual abstinence in marriage is helpful for freeing oneself for prayer in a way that is superior to the habitual use of marriage.⁶⁷ Thus we can certainly understand the conclusion of St. Thomas that the desire to use pleasure in the marital act (and to use the marital act itself) is legitimate only when annexed to the payment of the marital debt or to an intention to conceive children by the sexual act, especially given that this is rooted so deeply in the teaching of St. Augustine.⁶⁸ Besides, the more one enjoys an act chosen under the impulse of reason as opposed to passion, the more virtuous that act will be, as one is desiring it with his whole self, rather than forcing a part of himself by a kind of violence.^{69 66} ST II-II, q. 186, a. 4: “The religious state requires the removal of whatever hinders man from devoting himself entirely to God’s service. Now the use of sexual union hinders the mind from giving itself wholly to the service of God, and this for two reasons. First, on account of its vehement delectation, which by frequent repetition increases concupiscence, as also the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii, 12): and hence it is that the use of venery withdraws the mind from that perfect intentness on tending to God. Augustine expresses this when he says (Solil. i, 10): ‘I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its height as the fondling of women, and those bodily contacts which belong to the married state.’” (The second reason is related to the preoccupation of caring for one’s household, which arises from marriage and offspring.) See also ST Suppl., q. 41, a. 3, ad. 3. ⁶⁷ Pope Pius XII, Sacra Virginitas (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1954) §38: “Or rather does not the Apostle Paul admit [1 Cor. 7:5] that they have the right of abstaining for a time from the use of marriage, so that they may be more free for prayer, precisely because such abstinence gives greater freedom to the soul which wishes to give itself over to spiritual thoughts and prayer to God?” ⁶⁸ Following on the analogy with communication, an analogy with digestion could also be made, namely, that to eat only for pleasure without any bodily benefit foreseen, i.e., intentional overeating, would also be sin. See ST II-II q. 148, and SCG III ch. 127, 1. However, the digestive faculty is not structured entirely the same way as the sexual faculty, and this analogy faces the similar problems which are explored in Chapter Three with regards to solam voluptatem. ⁶⁹ ST I-II, q. 24, a. 3, ad. 1.

The exegesis of St. Thomas is simple enough, but the major question which remains for us is this: can the request for the marital debt be licit without at least a virtual intention towards having children?

If we follow the line given in the Commentary on the Sentences, the answer is clearly “no” – an actual or at least a virtual intention is required in favor of children, the bonum prolis, in every sexual act initiated on the part of both spouses, or else there is sin, including making the request for the marital debt (but not in fulfilling the duty of paying it). This is also essentially the doctrine St. Thomas gives in the Commentary on 1 Corinthians. This line would certainly exclude NFP used in favor of preventing conception.

However, for the recent magisterial literature the answer very much seems to be “yes,” even though it does not ever address the “request for the debt” as such; if mapped onto the doctrine of the Catechism of St. Thomas we would probably want to say “yes” because it is still a matter of justice, namely, asking for what one is due.⁷⁰ We can see a pathway through to accepting the liceity of NFP as a recourse to infertile periods while still substantially saving the teaching of St. Thomas, though the doctrine we find in the Commentary on the Sentences and earlier literature on the request for the marital debt being necessarily sinful absent a virtual or actual procreative intention would need to be abandoned. (I have already made a brief argument that the strength of St. Thomas’ argument – which is a summary of all the arguments of earlier authorities, especially St. Augustine – is less than what we would expect, including in terms of Biblical exegesis – commutative justice renders what is due. The claim that it is due by “concession” or is necessarily a sinful “superfluity” is simply not as robust a case as St. Thomas normally makes.⁷¹) ⁷⁰ It is perhaps worth noting that St. Thomas never addresses the issue of the marital debt in the Summa Contra Gentiles or other writings in the way that he does in the Commentary on the Sentences. He does address it at some length in the Commentary on 1 Corinthians. ⁷¹ Those tempted to take the pure Thomistic line here are urged to be cautious, not only for the problem stated with the intrinsic weight, but also due to the extrinsic weight of the tradition after St. Thomas, including St. Alphonsus (who makes a similar exegesis on 1 Corinthians 7:6-7 as myself in De Matrimonio, §882,) and several popes, as we will see. One obscure but helpful manual which gives an argument against the Augustinian-Thomistic line is Reiner Sasserath, Cursus Theologiae Moralis, vol. 4, p. 491 (1771). He argues that, since marriage was instituted partly to help one avoid fornication, to hold that requesting the debt is immoral would actually be counterproductive – it would be a “laqueus animarum,” a “snare of souls.” He does, however, uphold a sensible reading of Innocent XI’s condemnation (which we will read momentarily), arguing that pleasure is ordered to procreation and that therefore inverting this order, while remaining an act licit in itself, involves a perverse will, thus rendering the act a venial sin. Sasserath does, however, against St. Alphonsus, think that health alone is a sufficient motive for the marital act.

However, this still does not necessarily mean that the marital act, in the context of NFP used to avoid pregnancy, does not require any special justification of its own. This remains yet to be seen, and I will argue that when intentionally avoiding pregnancy the marital act does indeed require a special motivation to avoid venial sin.

I. Spouses sin mortally if they contract feignedly; if with some impediment, whether diriment or impedient, known to them, they celebrate the sacred nuptials. Besides they sin if with a conscience of mortal sin they approach this sacrament. For this is a sacrament of the living. Therefore they perpetrate a sacrilege who, defiled with mortal sin, approach it.

II. They sin also more or less who after the manner of pagans profane the sacred solemnity of the nuptials with excessive and immodest luxury and with satanic and immoderate pomps. Several ritual books prescribe the sacred nuptial blessing. But are the sacred rites of the Church to be exercised amid the revived spectres of the heathen? Run through the histories, whether ancient or recent, the morals and customs of the pagans; inquire whether a more profane luxury, whether more immoderate pomps, whether more dissolute dances, more obscene songs, more intemperate banquets, more shameless capering stalked abroad at the time of nuptials among pagans, unbelievers, and heretics, or among not a few Catholics, who venerate the sacred nuptials as a great sacrament portending the union of Christ with the Church, and who by a solemn rite in Baptism renounced the pomps of the world. Who would not feel himself moved, while he sees prestiges of the pagans so profane conciliated with the more sacred rites?

III. QUESTION I. How great is the obligation of spouses to paying the conjugal office? ANSWER. Matrimony being celebrated, several burdens follow thence, of which the first regards the spouses themselves, and is set in their mutual conjunction. Neither of the spouses is absolutely bound to ask, but to render each is bound. A husband is bound to render to a wife asking even tacitly by signs, and a wife to a husband. For by force of the matrimonial contract they are gravely bound to this reciprocal payment; and those who infringe it gravely offend.

IV. QUESTION II. What causes excuse from rendering the conjugal office? ANSWER. Several. 1. Danger of life, or of grave infirmity; a slight inconvenience nevertheless does not suffice. Wives often sustain slight inconveniences, nor on that account are they free from paying this. There is need nevertheless of the confessor's prudence, because a general rule cannot be prescribed. 2. If the one asking be infected with the French disease, or with leprosy, if from intercourse a grave danger of one's own infection threaten: for if the danger of catching leprosy be absent, the debt is to be paid. 3. If the other spouse asking be an adulterer. 4. Too frequent asking excuses from rendering the debt.

V. The multiplication of offspring is not a just cause of denying the debt. A woman who has experienced that she bears her own sons dead does not on that account sin by rendering the debt to one asking; and if she be obnoxious to a danger of incontinence, she can even ask, trusting in the divine providence, which will not cease to succour those who exercise matrimony holily.

VI. A spouse sins who by unlawful means renders himself unfit for paying the debt; as if he pollute himself, or approach other women, beyond these crimes he perpetrates an injustice against the innocent spouse. Nay, neither can they lawfully by excessive voluntary austerity so extenuate themselves as to become unfit for rendering the debt. But this happens most rarely. From moderate exercises of piety nevertheless, and from fasts prescribed by the Church, a spouse ought not to abstain, that he may become more robust and vigorous for rendering the debt. Nay, in the time of fasts spouses ought to observe continence, although they be not rigorously bound.

VII. A secretly adulterous spouse can ask without sin, not as a thing owed out of justice, but to be granted out of benevolence: because he is not bound to undergo a penalty before the judge's sentence. An innocent spouse can ask the debt from the other spouse who on account of an impediment of affinity contracted from fornication perpetrated after the matrimony has lost the right of asking. If he lawfully asks, by a stronger right he can render. A spouse bound by a vow of chastity cannot render to the other asking, if this one had no right of asking; on the contrary if the right be present, he is bound to render. When a spouse asks unlawfully, because he is bound by a vow of chastity, then the other can render, if the partner cannot be turned away, because the vow does not take away the right of asking arisen from a lawful matrimony, but only effects that he asks unlawfully. Nor hence does it follow that the one rendering becomes a partaker of the other's sin. For a spouse rendering gives his labour to a lawful thing, not to the other's sin, just as one who from grave and pressing necessity seeks a loan from a usurer.

VIII. QUESTION III. How from an impediment of affinity or of spiritual kinship are spouses hindered from asking the debt? ANSWER. Two impediments besides a vow are wont to supervene upon matrimony. One from affinity contracted on account of fornication with the blood-relations of a spouse; the other from spiritual kinship, as if one spouse should outside the case of necessity raise from the sacred font, or hold at confirmation, a son common to both; in which case he would sin gravely, and would be deprived of the right of asking the debt. But he who commits incest in the first or second degree with a blood-relation of the other spouse is deprived of the right of asking, but is bound to render, as I have said. Authors dispute concerning a spouse consenting to, or affording counsel for, the perpetrating of incest, whether then each be deprived of the right of asking; and the arguments for either opinion are such as to make the matter doubtful. For the asking of the debt is granted to the innocent only. One consenting to the other's incest is guilty. Therefore for the security of conscience a dispensation is to be sought. A spouse who should sin with a blood-relation of his own, not of his spouse, would perpetrate a graver crime, but would not lose the right of asking the debt, because he would not contract affinity. On the contrary, if both spouses perpetrated incest with a blood-relation of the other, both would be deprived of the right of asking and of rendering; and therefore they would have to be separated until they obtained a dispensation. A wife compelled by fear from a blood-relation of her husband to incest, unless such compulsion were such as to excuse from sin — which scarcely, and hardly even so, happens — would be deprived of the right of asking the debt. If a spouse sin with a blood-relation of the other and labour under an ignorance of fact, namely that she is a blood-relation of the spouse, authors commonly teach that he is not deprived of the right of asking the debt; but if he knows her to be a blood-relation, although he be ignorant of the penalty of the privation of the right of asking the debt, he is nevertheless deprived of the right of asking.

IX. QUESTION IV. Can he who is certain that the matrimony is void render the debt to a spouse asking, ignorant that the matrimony is void, that he may avoid infamy or grave loss? ANSWER. The common opinion teaches that a spouse certainly knowing an impediment annulling the matrimony can in no way render, even if a danger of death threaten, or he be compelled by censures. The reason is evident, because in this case the copulation would be fornicating; therefore it is in no way to be committed for any evil whatsoever, whether death or infamy. The things which are objected are of no moment. An ecclesiastical judge, from invincible ignorance judging the matrimony valid, compels by censures to the observing of the matrimony, and therefore does not dispense. If the judge dispense, when he can, every question ceases.

X. QUESTION V. Whether a confessor certainly knowing a matrimony to be null is bound to admonish a penitent spouse believing by invincible ignorance that it is valid? ANSWER. If the woman labour under invincible ignorance, all confess that she is to be admonished. Similarly if the ignorance of right and of fact be invincible, and the confessor foresee that his admonition will profit, all confess that he ought to admonish the penitent. On the contrary, if the confessor foresee that his admonition will not profit, then the confessor would bear himself most imprudently if he admonished, say the Salmanticenses with very many.

XI. Above, in Vol. II, I have already routed these opinions, which are to me false. In few words I now touch upon the matter. All are bound by divine right to know the truths which pertain to their own state, and to inquire into them and learn them, as all theologians teach with St. Thomas. The truth concerning diriment impediments of matrimony is one whose knowledge greatly pertains to married persons. Therefore married persons violate this divine mandate of inquiring into the truth pertaining to their own state, as often as they are affected with such a disposition that they either neglect or refuse to know it. Married persons labouring under an invincible ignorance of right and of fact concerning such an impediment diriment of matrimony are foreseen to be in this disposition, that they will not expel this ignorance and learn the truth. Therefore they are violators and contemners of the divine mandate of inquiring into the truth. Therefore their ignorance is vincible, since it can be overcome by them through the means of the confessor's admonition. If the ignorance be vincible, therefore according to all the penitents are to be admonished. Is there a chink open for escape? Why does the confessor keep silence? Because he foresees that the truth will not be received by the penitent spouse if he manifest it. This is the whole reason for silence. You are deceived. There are infamies, scandals, death, or other most grave evils about to arise, which prescribe silence. You are inept. These absurdities do not impose silence, if the ignorance be vincible, as all confess. And yet in our case the ignorance, which was otherwise invincible, becomes vincible at that very moment at which the spouses are foreseen as not about to receive the knowledge of the truth to be manifested by the confessor. External evils which are feared can in no way make the confessor's silence honourable. Therefore the penitents are indisposed for this sacrament.

XII. Adversaries reply that such penitents are disposed, just as are those who are not so affected in mind as to abstain from sins if they were to be tortured by a slow fire; and yet it would be imprudence to propose such things to them, and to adduce a test of their weakness. A most inept example. I should repute a confessor most imprudent who should propose like hypotheses of the most atrocious torments of tyrants. But why? Because here and now the precept of undergoing martyrdom does not urge. And that I may stab adversaries with their own point: imagine a fire prepared, and a tyrant before his tribunal, sitting and decreeing death for this Christian, who is ignorant of all these things. Is he not to be admonished of the imminent punishment, if he confess? Is he not to be animated and raised up for undergoing the slow fire? Is silence to be kept? Then only would a confessor be imprudent when, no occasion of martyrdom occurring, there were no cause for testing the penitent's weakness. In our case the precept of not fornicating in a null matrimony urges. And divine grace is present, by which the precept can be observed. Adversaries teach that God imparts his grace even to the blinded and the hardened. And now do they despair of the grace of illumination, by which they may embrace the truth, being granted to their own penitents who are just and receive the sacraments? They inveigh, and deservedly, against Jansenius, that light is lacking to the just, that grace is lacking, by which the precepts possible to them stand; and they themselves frequently assert divine precepts impossible by reason of invincible ignorance, and deny that grace is present by which they become possible even to those frequenting the sacraments. For if grace be present by which the ignorance can be overcome, it is vincible, not invincible.

XIII. The testimonies of Innocent III and of St. Augustine I have with a full pen made plain in Vol. II of the Apparatus, dissertation 1, chapter 4, to be ineptly obtruded by adversaries, as also the precept of fraternal correction. See also above, Vol. I, Book 2, dissertation 1, chapter 2, no. 21. The opinion of the Salmanticenses, of Sánchez, and of others, who teach that a confessor ought not to admonish spouses of an impediment either before or after matrimony, if he foresee that it will profit nothing, is to me evidently false. Grave theologians teach that penitents are to be admonished, and by opportune means the matrimony deferred. Most rarely do circumstances occur in which matrimony cannot be deferred. If nevertheless circumstances should urge, they suggest either that the privilege of two months be used, or that a vow of chastity be elicited, until a dispensation be obtained either from the bishop or from the Pope.

XIV. I am unwilling to produce the matter further. Only some absurdities I shall here indicate in passing which follow upon the adversaries' opinion. 1. A confessor would not be bound to admonish penitents invincibly ignorant that gain exacted beyond the principal as owed out of benevolence is to be restored. 2. Similarly he ought not to admonish a knightly man provoked to a duel, in good faith thinking that it must be accepted lest his honour be clouded and he incur the mark of cowardice. 3. That those are not to be admonished who in good faith believe the killing of a calumniator lawful, when no other mode occurs of escaping infamy. 4. That those are to be left in their ignorance who in good faith believe that a judge can judge according to a less probable opinion, and can accept money when litigants have on their side opinions equally probable. 5. That those are not to be enlightened who invincibly believe it lawful to retain a concubine exceedingly useful for delight. 6. Girls who certainly reckon that the abortion of an unanimated foetus can be procured without sin for the avoiding of infamy. 7. Very many who hold it for certain that a proximate occasion exceedingly convenient is not to be forsaken are to be left in the darkness of ignorance.

XV. That these and six hundred other like things can be invincibly ignored adversaries will not deny, if the kindly casuists themselves who maintained these and other things in good faith invincibly ignored them. Silence therefore is to be kept, and dissimulation used, when a confessor foresees penitents so addicted to vices of this kind that his admonition will profit nothing. Nor is it to the purpose that it be objected that ignorance of impediments is of fact. For the rest, that readers may have it discovered how far the lax manner of opining extends itself, besides those things which have been said in the preceding book, let them hear what follows.

XVI. Fr. George Gobat, tract 7, no. 315, writes here: “What shall a confessor do if he see a penitent obnoxious from invincible ignorance, for example, to softness, from whose gravity, being taught it, he will scarcely abstain on account of a depraved habit? By these words the question was proposed of this vice, when it could be of several. But I answered from writings in the place cited, chapter 37, no. 61, that if, the circumstances of that penitent being duly considered, it be altogether judged that the admonition will profit nothing at all, but that, the grave crime being known by him to be committed, he will nevertheless perpetrate it no more rarely than he did when ignorant of so great a baseness, THE MANIFESTATION OF THE TRUTH IS TO BE DISSEMBLED BEFORE GOD.”

XVII. Not even the knowledge of crimes against nature themselves is a confessor bound to manifest to the ignorant, but the manifestation of the truth is to be dissembled. While we propose comments so unheard-of to be detested, some cry out that we burden the casuists. But they ought at some time at last to be ashamed to object these things. Are these not of public right? Can they not be pernicious to the unskilled? Fr. Gobat adds that he reckons there is scarcely a confessor so sagacious that he can prudently judge of anyone that his admonition will not profit toward the diminution of sins against nature.

XVIII. But forthwith in the same place, no. 317, Fr. Gobat subjoins: “And indeed more than once I have learned that there are those who inculpably are ignorant of the mortal malice of this outrage. Therefore, practically speaking, the question is not so much of him alone who will scarcely omit, or scarcely abstain, as those letters speak — that is, who sometimes, though most rarely, will abstain — as, alas for the grief, confessors groan that they have found several of this most foul and at the same time most fetid bran. Concerning this also I reckon that the opinion of St. Augustine is to be understood. For morally that admonition does not so much profit as it hinders, which would prevent only six, eight, or ten formally mortal sins, but will cause two hundred, three hundred likewise mortal.”

XIX. The opinion of St. Augustine saying, If I knew that it would not profit thee, I would not admonish thee, I would not terrify thee, those men abuse with too good a faith who transcribe it out of other books without having read it in the fount. Consult Vol. II of the Apparatus, dissertation 1, chapter 4, where I have transcribed the whole sermon out of Augustine, not out of the casuists. The holy Doctor addresses a dying man, and raises and animates him to hope. And the cited casuists do not hesitate to wrest this opinion of so great a Doctor to this, that confessors ought by silence to dissemble the very horrid crimes against nature. If you admonish penitents, says Fr. Gobat with others, you will obtain that they abstain from eight or ten formal pollutions. Meanwhile they will perpetrate two hundred and three hundred formal outrages. Therefore silence is to be permitted, that materially they may wallow in the mire of lust, because by their pollutions, whose malice they invincibly ignored, they will enter the gates of Paradise. These are the little flowers of the new kindliness.

XX. QUESTION VI. Whether, if one of the spouses prudently doubt whether the contracted matrimony be valid, he can ask the debt or render it? ANSWER. He ought forthwith diligently to inquire into the truth. If he shall have been negligent, he will offend according to the quality of the negligence. If, diligence being employed, a prudent doubt persist, he is bound to render to the spouse not doubting; but he cannot ask, as Innocent III openly teaches, chapter Inquisitionibus on sentences of excommunication. Wherefore I reject as false the opinion of those who teach that this man can ask, even if the doubt persist after diligence employed in each. He who lightly doubts ought to shake off the doubt by the judgment of a prudent man.

XXI. QUESTION VII. How are null marriages to be reintegrated? ANSWER. A matrimony can be void either from a defect of consent, or on account of an impediment occult or public, or because the presence of the parish priest and of witnesses was lacking. That a matrimony null from any of these heads may grow valid, all those things are to be supplied which the laws of the Church prescribe. If the presence of the parish priest and of witnesses was lacking, the matrimony is to be reintegrated before the parish priest and witnesses. If consent was lacking, it is to be renewed. If it was void on account of an impediment, a dispensation is to be sought.

XXII. To a spouse affirming that consent was lacking to him no credence is to be had, as is had in chapter Per tuas on proofs. He who contracted feignedly is bound out of justice to apply true consent, because to each his own right is to be preserved. But to a spouse sincerely contracting the other contracting party's consent is by right owed not only in the very celebration of the contract, but also after the contract celebrated, and for the whole time of life: because the innocent party contracted in perpetuity.

XXIII. QUESTION VIII. When a matrimony is void on account of some diriment impediment, is it required that each spouse be made certain? ANSWER. If the impediment be known to each, there is no question. Straits press on every side when one party alone is conscious and guilty of the impediment, which cannot be manifested to the innocent spouse without danger of infamy — as if a wife had had copulation with her husband's brother, or conversely. It is agreed among all that first a dispensation is to be obtained by the conscious party, and that meanwhile abstinence is to be kept from asking the debt. The things which follow make the highest trouble.

XXIV. The pontifical letters of dispensation contain this clause: the other party being ignorant, the former being first made certain of the nullity of the prior consent. The reason urges. For a null contract cannot be reintegrated, unless it be anew made valid. But how can it be made valid unless each party consent again? But each party cannot consent again, unless it be established to each that the matrimony first contracted was null.

XXV. That theologians might cut this Gordian knot, various things have been devised. Very many teach that the innocent spouse is to be admonished generally and confusedly concerning a void matrimony. The matter would be easy, if this generic manifestation elicited a new consent, and begot no suspicion in the innocent spouse. For what if the innocent spouse suffer scandal, and be led into a suspicion that the other spouse has in fact perpetrated an outrage? Then other theologians teach that the impediment is in no way to be indicated when such things are feared; but that it suffices that, a dispensation being obtained, the guilty party draw the other into consent by enticements and blandishments in this manner: With such love do I follow thee, that if there were no matrimony between us, I should now wish to marry thee! Nay, now I take thee as mine. Dost thou do this on thy part? If she reply I do, or by a like word betray consent, the business is reckoned done. Can this be hoped for from a simple spouse of good faith?

XXVI. But what is to be said if this cannot be hoped for from a spouse being awakened — nay, if the answer be feared which Fr. Sporer reports at no. 459: I must already have thee. But if I had thee not, I should wish all the devils to have thee? Therefore others teach that the innocent spouse is not necessarily to be admonished, but that it is enough that the guilty spouse renew consent, copulation being had with marital affection: for the other by rendering consents. To the said clause the party being made certain they answer that it is to be understood as when this can conveniently be observed. If it consisted in this, all things would most easily be dissolved. I suggest that, according to the diversity of circumstances, bishops are to be consulted. For they are the pastors. If the Pontiffs, the aforesaid clause being added, that the innocent party be made certain, impart a dispensation, by what authority do some erect a tribunal above the pontifical dispensations themselves, by extending them beyond the clauses which restrict them? In these straits therefore consult either the bishops or the Roman See.

XXVII. QUESTION IX. Ought a matrimony void on account of an occult diriment impediment, or void from a defect of consent, to be reintegrated before the parish priest and witnesses? ANSWER. All affirm it, because a null matrimony was also clandestine. Similarly when a diriment impediment is public, and has been or is to be brought to the contentious forum, the matrimony is to be reintegrated before the parish priest and witnesses. Concerning an occult impediment which cannot be proved by witnesses, theologians dispute whether consent is to be renewed before the parish priest and witnesses.

XXVIII. The affirmative opinion most grave theologians defend — Pontius and Basil, Book 3, chapter 6, Paul Comitolus, Book 1, question 110, where he reports the answer of Clement VIII so affirming, who dispensed that in a like case the spouses should contract secretly between themselves, consent being renewed, with the legitimation of the offspring. The opposite opinion is defended by Sánchez, Bonacina, Castropalao, and very many others. I answer in few words that in these cases bishops or the Roman Pontiff are to be consulted.

I. QUESTION I. How can spouses sin against the end of matrimony? ANSWER. They sin: 1. If they be mingled for the sake of pleasure alone. Formerly some taught the opposite, whose opinion Innocent XI condemned: The work of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is utterly free from all fault and venial defect. Brutes, not men endowed with reason, operate for the sake of pleasure alone.

II. QUESTION II. What is the end on account of which the conjugal act is lawful and meritorious? ANSWER. It is the procreation of offspring, or the rendering of the debt. Some teach that the conjugal act is lawful and good when exercised for the recovering or confirming of bodily health. The Doctors of the Church openly teach the opposite. Let it suffice to allege one, St. Thomas, who in the Suppl., q. 49, art. 5, reply 4, has this: Although to intend the preservation of health be not of itself evil, nevertheless this intention is made evil if health be intended from something which is not of itself ordained to this; as if a man should seek from the sacrament of Baptism only bodily health; and similarly also in the case proposed in the act of matrimony. The same teach Augustine, Jerome, and all the Doctors of the Church. The reason is clear. Matrimony was not instituted for the recovering or preserving of the health of the body. Therefore he abuses matrimony who exercises it as a means by which he may seek bodily health. Spouses also vitiate the conjugal office if they act too shamelessly and intemperately, says St. Augustine, Book On the Good of Marriage, chapter 16.

III. QUESTION III. Are those free from venial fault who use matrimony against their own incontinence and against other graver outrages? ANSWER. Fr. Claude La Croix, Book 6, part 3, no. 291, candidly confesses that Sts. Augustine, Bonaventure, Thomas, and Gregory the Great, reported in chapter Nervi, distinction 13, teach that the conjugal act exercised for the avoiding of one's own incontinence is a venial sin; but he subjoins: Very many other theologians and jurists, with Durandus, Cajetan, Medina, Navarrus, Almain, Gaspar, Layman, Coninck, Rebello, Hurtado, Henríquez, Pontius, Mastrius, Aversa, say most probably that there will be no sin. Behold in what place the first lights of the Catholic Church are held by very many Probabilists.

IV. But we, this new manner of opining being dismissed, bring into the midst the doctrine of the holy Fathers. St. Augustine, expounding the words of St. Paul, 1 Corinthians 7, Return together again, lest Satan tempt you for your incontinency; but I speak this by indulgence, not by commandment, teaches these things in the Enchiridion, chapter 78: It could be thought to be no sin to be mingled with a spouse, not for the sake of procreating children, which is the good of nuptials, but even of carnal pleasure, so that fornication or adultery or any other uncleanness — a deadly evil which it is base even to speak of — be avoided by an infirmity which can be dragged along by Satan tempting. It could therefore, as I have said, be thought to be no sin, had he not added: But I say this according to pardon, not according to command. Who now would deny it to be a sin, when apostolic authority is granted as pardon to those doing it?

V. St. Thomas in the Suppl., q. 49, art. 5, reply 7, confirms the doctrine of Augustine, Gregory, and all the other Fathers with these words: But if a man intend by the act of matrimony to avoid fornication in his spouse, it is not any sin, because this is a certain rendering of the debt which pertains to the good of fidelity. But if he intend to avoid fornication in himself, then there is there a certain superfluity; and according to this it is a venial sin: nor for this was matrimony instituted, save according to indulgence, which is of venial sins. This same doctrine St. Thomas repeats on 1 Corinthians 7, lecture 1, where he says: It is to be considered that the conjugal act is sometimes meritorious and without all fault, mortal or venial; for instance when it is ordained to the good of offspring to be procreated or educated for the worship of God, for thus it is an act of religion; or when it is done for the cause of rendering the debt, for thus it is an act of justice. But every act of virtue is meritorious, if it be with charity. Sometimes indeed it is with venial fault, namely when someone is excited to the matrimonial act from concupiscence, which nevertheless stands within the limits of matrimony, namely that he be content with his wife alone. Sometimes indeed it is a mortal fault, namely when concupiscence is borne beyond the limits of matrimony, namely when someone approaches his wife as willingly, or more willingly, as he would approach another. In the first way therefore the act of matrimony does not require indulgence; in the second way it has indulgence, inasmuch as one who trusts in concupiscence toward his wife is not guilty of mortal sin; in the third way it has no indulgence at all. Like things teach Gregory, Anselm, Bonaventure, and the rest of the Fathers, and among the more recent the graver theologians commonly.

VI. Let parish priests and confessors nevertheless be prudent in admonishing and instructing spouses in the holy end of matrimony, of procreating and educating offspring for the worship of God. Let them inculcate this end and no other: of capturing carnal pleasure, of saturating concupiscence. Let them most cautiously and most chastely remember. For since that office is scarcely wont to be exercised without pleasure and concupiscence, if they should wish to look into such things more subtly than is fitting, they will offend ears and expose themselves to danger.

VII. QUESTION IV. Do spouses sin who exercise the matrimonial act on days of fasting and on the day on which they have received the Eucharist? ANSWER. Very many deny it; but the Fathers and Councils affirm it. It pleases me to transcribe a few things from cause 33, question 4, chapter 3, where these things are had concerning the time of fasts: Brethren, you ought not only to abstain from all uncleanness, but also most studiously to contain yourselves from your own wives. Let no one on the days of fasts be joined to his own wife. Again there, chapter 4, it is subjoined concerning feast days: If a wife is taken for the cause of procreating children, much time seems to be granted for that use; and since the feast days themselves show that on these times one ought to cease from the reason of conception, and to keep it more purely according to the law. Again there, chapter 1, it is inculcated out of St. Augustine: It is sometimes lawful for a Christian to come together with his wife, sometimes indeed it is not lawful. For on account of the procession of prayer it is sometimes not lawful to come together; nay, even from lawful things one must abstain, that what is sought may more easily be obtained. Whence the Apostle says that one must abstain by consent for a time, that one may be free for prayer. Read there several things.

VIII. La Croix, Book 6, part 3, no. 311, says: “That of itself, speaking, it is lawful to have the use of matrimony on the day of communion, has been said in Book 6,” and so forth. To the canons and the holy Fathers he answers with Sánchez, Coninck, Aversa, and others, that they suggest a counsel.

IX. That it may be always more evidently discovered by confessors how far the doctrine of very many casuists differs from the doctrine of the holy canons and of the Fathers, I transcribe a few things out of many. In cause 33, chapter 4, these things are had: If the loaves of proposition could not be eaten by those who had touched their own wives, how much more can that bread which came down from Heaven not be violated and touched by those who a little before have clung to conjugal embraces? Not that we condemn nuptials (for this we do not say), but because at that time in which we are about to eat the flesh of the Lamb, we ought not to be free for the works of the flesh. If Christians ought to approach the Eucharist fasting from all food, how much more must they needs be fasting from the conjugal office? Concerning feast days, in the same place, chapter 2, these things are prescribed out of St. Augustine: As often as either the day of the Lord's Nativity or the other festivities draw near, as I have frequently admonished, for several days before we ought to abstain not only from the company of unbelieving concubines, but even from our own wives. Frequently then did the Fathers of the Church admonish spouses.

X. After the sacred canons and the Fathers of the Church, St. Thomas in the Suppl., q. 64, art. 5, assigns the reason: Just as certain places are sacred because they are deputed to sacred things, so certain times are sacred for the same reason. But in a sacred place it is not lawful to ask the debt. Therefore neither in a sacred time. What to these things say the Probabilists? The Angelic in the same place dissolves all the sophisms which can be opposed.

XI. But that those may be touched with some shame who on feast days and on the very day of sacred communion defend the conjugal office lawful, it pleases me to transcribe what the Catechism of the Council of Trent, which excels six hundred casuists, prescribes, part 2, chapter 8, § 34. This is the title of the cited paragraph: That spouses must sometimes abstain from the conjugal office. Then these things are had: But since all good things are to be obtained from God by holy prayers, this is another thing which it behoves to teach the faithful, that they abstain sometimes from the office of matrimony for the cause of praying and beseeching God: and above all let them know that this is to be observed by them for at least three days before they receive the sacred Eucharist, and more often when the solemn fasts of Lent are celebrated, as OUR fathers rightly and holily PRESCRIBED. For thus it will come about that they themselves feel the goods of matrimony increased daily with a greater accumulation of divine grace; and, spreading the studies of piety, they not only pass this life tranquilly and placidly, but also lean upon the true and stable hope, which confoundeth not, of obtaining eternal life by God's benignity.

XII. QUESTION V. Whether the conjugal office be vicious by reason of a place either public or sacred? ANSWER. If copulation be exercised in the presence of others, it is a mortal sin, no one denying it, on account of the scandal. Touches themselves between spouses in the presence of others are vicious. The conjugal office in a sacred place, urgent necessity being taken away, is sacrilegious. In the time of the menstrual flux the conjugal office is unlawful. For in Leviticus 20 these things are prescribed by God: He that lieth with a woman in her flowers … both shall be destroyed out of the midst of their people. Again chapter 18: Thou shalt not approach to a woman having her flowers. The testimonies of Augustine, Jerome, and the other Fathers I pass over.

I presuppose that the use of marriage for the sake of offspring is lawful. Likewise, to avoid the danger of incontinence, as D. Bonaventure teaches in 4 d. 31, art. 2. The reason for the first is that this is the first end of the institution of marriage. The institution, moreover, is from God, as is said in Genesis 1 and 8, Matthew 19, John 2.

The other, however, is conceded in 1 Cor. 7: Again return together into the same, lest Satan tempt you because of your incontinence. So teach Rebello, 2 part. de oblig. iust. lib. 3 de imped. matrim. quaest. 19; Cajetan, sum. verb. usus matrimonii; Soto, 4 d. 32, art. 4; Fagundez, lib. 6, cap. 3; Diana, p. 2, Tract. 4, resol. 115, with others; or at most it is venial, as D. Bonaventure asserts, quaest. 2, with others cited by Sanchez, Tom. 3 de matrim. lib. 9, d. 11. One may also licitly use marriage for health's sake. So Rebello, sect. 1; Cajetan, tom. 1, opusc. tract. 12, quaest. 3; Henriquez, lib. 11 de matrim. cap. 17, num. 7; and others cited in Diana, resol. 218.

I presuppose also that the union of spouses from mere delight is venial. So D. Bonaventure, quaest. 3, from D. Augustine, lib. 1 de nupt. cap. 15, and de bono coniug. cap. 6 and 7; Rebello, loc. cit.; Fagundez, num. 5; Cajetan, verb. usus matrimonii; and this the Saintly Doctor calls a disordination with respect to the final cause. The reason is that marriage makes honorable the union, yet it still retains some disordination. Many, however, with Diana, p. 2, Tract. 4, resol. 116, excuse it even from venial sin.

The Saintly Doctor adds there, and in the Speculum animae, cap. 3, whom others follow: if from such concupiscence one is carried toward the spouse with a meretricious affection, so that he would wish, even if she were not his wife, or in the act should imagine another, it is mortal, and he is held to declare the condition of her whom he imagines, whether she is sacred, or married, or betrothed, or a virgin. But of these we must treat in the Tractate on Marriage.

The Saintly Doctor adds in the Speculum animae that a disordination of manner, of time, etc. may accompany the conjugal act.

With respect to manner, it is certain that it is a most grave sin if one defiles one's wife Sodomitically, as D. Bonaventure notes.

D. Bonaventure here; D. Thomas, quaest. 154, art. 11; either between the thighs, or in any other way by spilling the seed outside the natural vessel, as D. Bonaventure says and as is commonly held, with Sanchez, lib. 9 de debito coniugali, d. 17. The reason is that it is opposed not only to the general but to the special order of nature, as the Saintly Doctor argues in Compend. Theol. verit. lib. 3, cap. 21, and with him Fagundez, lib. 6, cap. 3, num. 17. Understand, however, that this is so if it is done advertently, as Fagundez notes, num. 20.

They ask, however, whether a man who begins the conjugal act Sodomitically with his wife, in order to complete it in the proper vessel, sins mortally.

The first opinion is that it is not mortal, provided the danger of pollution is absent. So Navarrus, lib. 5 consil. tit. de paen. et remiss. num. 7; Ovando, 4 d. 31, quaest. unic.; Angelus, V. debitum 25; Zerola, in praxi paen. cap. 12, quaest. 25; Graffius, tom. 1, lib. 5 de adulterio, conf. 3; Gambacurta, de casibus reser. casu 2; Zancharda, in direct. part. 1, Tract. de matrimonio, cap. 4, § 10.

But that it is not lawful teaches Bonacina, de matrimonio, quaest. 4, punct. 11, num. 12; Sanchez, lib. 9, d. 17; Rodriguez, sum. tom. 3, cap. 88; Basil Pontius, de matrimonio, lib. 10, cap. 11 — whom Diana reports, p. p. Tract. 17, resol. 37. I add Fagundez, in 6 praec. lib. 6, cap. 3, num. 18, who calls it an absurdity to concede this. And I subscribe: for that act is not ordered by nature to that vessel, but is initiatory of an execrable abomination, and is accordingly reduced to it. If, however, he inserts his fingers into the woman's vessel, or his member into her mouth, they deny that it is a mortal sin — Sanchez, de matrim. tom. 3, lib. 9, d. 17, num. 5; Diana, loc. cit.; but Fagundez, loc. cit. num. 19, says it is mortal, as also to rub the member about the unnatural vessel. Diana, part. 3, Tract. 4, resol. 204, condemns this with Pontius, and deservedly, for they can have no order, but are brutish.

They ask further: when the man is sowing and withdrawing his member, may the wife, gravely aroused, excite herself with touches.

They say it is lawful: Sanchez, num. 12; Fagundez, num. 21; and very many others cited in Diana, p. p. tract. 17, resol. 38 — who nevertheless, with Rodriguez, summ. part. 3, cap. 88, condemns such an act.

To me the prior opinion seems more probable. The reason is that it is the consummation of the conjugal union, ordered to generation. For the seed of the woman, though not necessary, nevertheless according to many contributes greatly to generation, as Sanchez proves, num. 8.

As for variation of position — for instance, if the woman is on top — it is more probably not deadly; for the womb of the woman has a power of attracting and retaining the man's seed, as the stomach has for food. So Sanchez, lib. 9 de matrim. d. 16; Navarrus, man. cap. 16, num. 42; Rodriguez, tom. 1, sum. cap. 143; Fagundez, in 6 praec. lib. 6, cap. 3; Diana, p. p. Tract. de circumstantia aggravante, resol. 35; and others cited by these. The same they say if the union is had unnaturally, or sitting, or from the side — provided, however, there is no danger of spilling seed outside the proper vessel.

But if in an extraordinary manner of union he emits some quantity of seed outside the vessel, and, weary of children, at the end of the act pours out all the seed outside the vessel.

It is answered that the effusion of all the seed outside is deadly, nor can the wife, knowing this, render the debt — whatever Basil Pontius may say, de matrim. lib. 19, cap. 11, as reported by Diana, p. p. Tract. 15, resol. 54.

Thus as often as the husband wishes to exercise the act mortally, the wife is not bound, nor can she render it, as Sanchez notes, lib. 9, d. 16, num. 8; but when it is venial, it is probable that she is bound to render it. So Sanchez, loc. cit.; Peter Soto, de matrim. lect. 16; Cajetan, 2. 2, quaest. 154, art. 1; Fagundez, num. 27; Henriquez, lib. 11, cap. 16, num. 6, in gloss. litt. O; Diana, p. p. Tract. de circumstantia aggravante, resol. 35; and others with D. Bonaventure, in 4, d. 32, dub. 4.

But whether to approach a menstruating woman is deadly.

The first opinion is that it is mortal, and of old it was punished by the penalty of death, Leviticus 18, as S. Bonaventure notes, loc. cit., where he observes that the penalty enjoined was upon the husband asking, or even upon the wife, if she herself be the one asking; yet he must render to the one asking, if he cannot otherwise, because he is bound to render his due to his husband.

He concludes, however, from what has been said, art. 3, quaest. 1, that if the time of the menses is, according to nature, customarily once a month, he ought not to ask, because he has a time to attend to generation, so that offspring may be born without danger of monstrosity or of elephantiasis, as D. Jerome admonishes, cited by the Saintly Doctor.

But if he violently renders, the wife is excused; if, however, he knowingly asks, and renders willingly, he sins; for at that time the man has no power over the body of the woman. But if it is a continuous disease, all concede with the Saintly Doctor that it is lawful to ask; otherwise they would be compelled to be long without their right, nor would a monstrous offspring then be born; even if there were danger of this, it would be better that she be, than not to be. So Navarrus, man. cap. 16, num. 32, and others cited by Fagundez, num. 18.

Some, however, say that to ask during the ordinary time of the menses is only venial. Fagundez says this is the common opinion, num. 29. But these things I shall defer to the Tractate on Marriage. So it is said likewise of the sin of one who approaches a pregnant woman, with danger of abortion.

There remains to be considered whether, on account of sacred time, unions are illicit.

First, when the most holy Eucharist is to be received: it is commonly asserted to be venial, as in Sanchez, lib. 9 de matrimonio, d. 13; Fagundez, cap. 4, num. 51, with D. Bonaventure, in speculo animae, cap. 5.

But others say it is not even venial; Fagundez reports them, loc. cit.

On the more solemn principal feasts, the Saintly Doctor judges it venial, loc. cit.; but in compend. Theol. verit. lib. 3, cap. 21 he teaches that it is a sin if it is done from a mere impulse of lust.

In the Confessional, cap. 2, particula 14, he reports the words of Alexander of Hales, who says that the conjugal act is deadly in five ways from mere impetuousness. The first is the cause of satisfying lust through meretricious blandishments; the second, when it is done against the natural use; the third, when it is at a prohibited time; the fourth, in a prohibited place; the fifth, when one approaches a menstruating woman. But in the other passages adduced, and there also before these words, he understands these circumstances of place and time to be mortal if the impulse of lust is grave, preferring delight to God.

For the rest, he judges it not mortal, as I have reported; and it is the common opinion with respect to time; with respect to place, however, I have said enough when the sacrilege was treated.

There are also certain preliminaries to the act. And indeed they ask: whether spouses sin mortally by touching one another and kissing the privy parts for the sake of mere pleasure.

Many assert so. So Paludanus, 4 d. 31, quaest. 3, art. 2; Sylvester, V. debit. coniug. quaest. 7; Rodriguez, tom. 1, cap. 129. But I shall say with Diana, 3 part. tract. 4, resol. 125: woe, woe to the married, if this opinion were true. Therefore he upholds the contrary opinion with Zancharda, de Sacram. matrimonio, cap. 41; Sylvius, 2. 2, quaest. 154, art. 4, concl. 61; Filliucius, tomo 2, tract. 30, cap. 10, num. 195. Diana adds that these men are to be gravely rebuked. Fagundez subscribes, in 6 praec. lib. VI, cap. 3, num. 37, who says they are venial — yet with this condition, that there be no danger of pollution; for then those acts would be deadly.

Caia, the wife of Caius and of infirm health, heard from a physician that at her next delivery the next offspring would very probably be death to her. Hence she was placed in distress, for she does not wish to deny the debt to her husband, but if she grants it, she will bring death upon herself. Therefore she goes to a physician of certainly not the best reputation and buys a medicine by which, taken once each month, she will be rendered safe, as the physician says, from the danger of future offspring. An outcome happy from her point of view proves the physician’s knowledge, but nevertheless also casts scruples into Caia as to whether it is lawful to take such a medicine, and she approaches her confessor to resolve them. Hence it is asked:

1. How are the direct and indirect killing of a human being distinguished? And is it lawful to kill an innocent person?

2. In a case in which either the mother or the fetus or both are certainly going to perish, is it ever lawful to procure abortion? Even of an inanimate fetus?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. How is direct distinguished from indirect homicide, and is it ever allowable to kill the innocent? Homicide is direct when it is intended, and it may be intended either explicitly or implicitly. It is intended explicitly when the homicide wishes to cause death; it is intended implicitly when an action is intentionally put which can not but cause death. Thus one would directly cause death who kept another under water for some time, though his primary intention might have been not to kill him, but to prevent him from calling out. On the other hand, homicide is indirect when it is not intended, though it is foreseen that it will follow from some act which is put for another purpose. It is never allowed to kill the innocent directly; it is allowed to do so indirectly, for a great and proportionate cause.

2. In a case where either the mother or the fetus, or both, must necessarily perish, is it allowable to procure abortion at least, if the fetus has as yet no soul?

Following the common opinion, we may put aside, as antiquated, the hypothesis of a living fetus not yet informed by a human soul. The human soul is infused into the fetus at the moment of conception, according to the common opinion. The answer, then, to the question proposed will be that it is never allowed to procure abortion of the immature fetus directly, since it is never allowed to kill the innocent directly. If the fetus, though not quite mature, may probably be saved, as it may be after about the seventh month or even earlier, by artificial means, it will be lawful to bring it to the birth for a reason grave in proportion to the danger incurred. Indirect abortion, like indirect killing of the innocent, is allowable for a sufficiently grave reason.

3. The case. Caia did wrong in taking medicine to prevent having another child. If the medicine acted so as to prevent conception, she sinned mortally; for as St. Alphonsus teaches (III, no. 394): “It is never lawful for a mother, on account of any danger whatsoever, to take a potion to impede conception.” If the medicine acted on the fetus after conception, Caia was guilty of infanticide. Her confessor should tell her that she is justified in refusing her husband, supposing the danger to life to be real, but that she may also allow him marital rights and commit herself to God’s providence. The latter course may be adopted with greater security than the advice of some doctors would lead one to suppose.¹

1 See Génicot, Theol. Mor., vol. ii, nn. 551, 553.

Caius, a confessor, asks what he must do in the following case. Titia, the wife of Titius, whom Caius knew well as parishioners, approached confession. After the confession was completed, Titia asked whether marital intercourse was lawful without the husband duly completing the act. When Caius denied it, Titia replied that her husband affirmed it, and indeed often acted thus on a physician’s advice because of the weak powers of his wife, who was less capable of bearing and nursing a child. Caius was then silent, but the difficulty increased when Titius soon approached confession and nevertheless said not a word about the matter badly conducted with his wife. Hence it is asked:

1. Is it established that onanism is a sin, and what kind?

2. What advice must be given to wives anxious about onanism committed by their husbands?

3. Must penitents established in good faith be warned about things badly done by them?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. Is it certain that onanism is a sin and what sort?

From the way in which Holy Scripture mentions it (Gen. xxxviii. 9), from the teaching of the Church, and because it is a gross perversion of nature, it is certain that onanism is a grave sin.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. ii, 363.

2. What advice is to be given to wives anxious about onanism committed by their husbands?

They are to be admonished to do what lies in their power so that their husbands complete the act in the proper manner, and if they do not succeed, let them not approve the manner, and let them lawfully cooperate only materially in the sins of their husbands.²

2 Ibid., 363.

3. Are penitents to be admonished who in good faith do what is wrong?

They must be admonished if what they do is a cause of public scandal, or if their good faith is not perfect and they are doubtful about the matter. They must be admonished also if in all likelihood they would obey the admonition. If the admonition would be productive of more harm than good it should not be given.³

3 Ibid., 223.

4. To the case. Although good faith regarding the licitness of onanism is not altogether impossible even among Catholics, yet it can scarcely endure for a long time. For bishops and priests, and even upright laymen, are accustomed to condemn that crime in clear words and writings. When therefore Titius comes to confess, yet he says nothing about onanism, Caius should interrogate him with general words whether he has anything that torments his conscience, or something similar. If Titius denies it, it seems that Caius may be able to acquiesce and grant absolution. For the penitent is to be believed whether speaking for himself or against himself. Nor is Caius permitted to reveal what he heard from Titia’s confession. But if Titia again makes mention of the matter brings it up, Caius must say openly that the matter is altogether unlawful, Titia should do what she can to correct the husband, and if nothing succeeds, she may be able to offer material cooperation to the act which she is unable to hinder. As for the dangers to health or even life, which physicians sometimes exaggerate let Titia entrust herself to God.¹

1 Bucceroni, TheoL Moral., vol. ii, n. 824; Génicot, vol. ii, n. 551.

A married woman learns that her husband is suffering from syphilis. Must and can she continue to live with him as his wife? He declares solemnly that he has not contracted the disease by any fault of his own.

In consequence of the immorality prevalent in large towns, cases of this kind frequently occur, and may have very disastrous results, so that a detailed discussion of the subject seems necessary.

If the husband has contracted this loathsome disease through actual adultery, he has lost all right to the debitum conjugale and consequently the wife may refuse to live with him. This is the doctrine taught by all writers on moral theology and canon law; they base their opinion upon Matth. v, 31, 32, and xix, 9.

In dealing with the case before us, we are not concerned with the details of the adultery, nor with the question whether sodomitic and bestial intercourse have the same effect, and therefore we may set aside these matters.

The man declares that he has contracted syphilis by no fault of his own. Is this statement credible? Physicians are now agreed in believing that people may possibly, though not probably, become infected with syphilis in an innocent manner. Dr. Surbled writes as follows: " The infection can be conveyed directly through the mouth, the breast, or any other part of the body where the mucous membrane is exposed; but there are many indirect ways of becoming infected; for instance, by drinking out of a glass or smoking a pipe used by a sufferer from syphilis, or by wearing his clothes. Midwives are by their occupation exposed to the danger of catching this disease, and so are medical men.... However, it is only in exceptional cases that syphilis is caught in any of these ways, and they do not suffice to overthrow the general theory that " syphilis is a serious disease, brought on by immorality, and, as a rule, only those who voluntarily lead a vicious life display its unpleasant and shameful symptoms." (La morale dans ses rapports avec la medecine, II. 92, 93, ed. 10.) Other physicians write in a very similar way.

We may assume therefore that the husband's assertion is hardly credible, unless he can bring forward some proof of his innocence. If he adheres to his statement, his wife ought not to refuse him the debitum conjugale on the ground that he has probably committed adultery, because his undoubted right to the debitum can not be contested on the ground of what is only a probability. It is true that when a question arises of the loss of the debitum conjugale in a case of adultery, only a moral certainty as to the facts of the case is required, but it can hardly be said to exist here.

There are, moreover, other reasons besides adultery which release any one from the debitum; we may sum them up shortly, and say that the debitum need not be granted if it would result in any considerable injury to mind or body. The moralists teach that a separation from bed and board is allowed where otherwise there would be great danger of sin.

With regard to bodily injuries Berardi writes: "The debt may habitually and reciprocally be refused: (1) If the wife would undergo danger of death in childbirth, so that if she became pregnant again, in the judgment of physicians she would certainly or probably die. (2) If the wife suffered from incipient cancer of the uterus, so that after intercourse she would be subjected to a copious discharge of blood. (3) If she underwent intercourse with very acute pain that recurred each time. (4) If the husband suffered from venereal disease so that he had ulcers or discharges on his genital organs; for then not only the wife herself but also the offspring would be infected in a pitiable manner, with great danger that abortion would follow and baptism itself could not be administered.... (5) If the husband or wife had an organic defect of the heart; for then intercourse is always very harmful and can even produce death suddenly and in the act itself. (6) If husband or wife suffered from pulmonary consumption to such a degree that, continually feverish, they were approaching the final stage of the disease and were already spitting blood" (Praxis Confessar., I. 1042).

Capellmann-Bergmann writes very decidedly on the subject of syphilis: " Syphilis is so serious, disgusting and shameful a disease, that in my opinion the copula ought always to be forbidden, if only one of the conjuges suffers from it. In this disease the danger of the healthy person being infected at the copula is very great, as long as any external symptoms exist. Even when syphilis is latent in the husband, and there are no external symptoms of it, the wife may be infected as soon as impregnation occurs. For the infected person to demand the copula would be a horrible outrage upon the healthy partner, on whose part it would be in my opinion madness, rather than charity, to incur so great a risk of being infected with such a disease. I cannot even regard a periculum incontinentiae as a causa honestas in this matter. I may be thought to speak too strongly, but whoever has seen the awful consequences of this disease will agree with me. I think that there is not a single medical man who would not share my opinion. The consequences to the offspring resulting from such a copula are most disastrous. The children are almost always syphilitic, like their parents, even when in the parents the disease is latent. Abortion and premature births are of common occurrence, and children carried to the full time often die most miserably before they are more than a few months old. Thousands of children are thus called upon to expiate the sins of their fathers, and often die without baptism." (Pastoralmed., 192, ed. 14.)

From the purely medical point of view there may be full justification for these statements, but moral theology requires us to recognize certain distinctions and limitations, which may be summed up as follows:

(1) If one conjux shows symptoms of syphilis, a trustworthy physician must be consulted, and asked to decide whether the syphilis is hereditary or acquired. If the former, the patient is of course not to blame, but the confessor ought, if not actually to insist upon, yet at least urgently to recommend, continence, because hereditary syphilis may be communicated to the offspring of a marriage, although it is not directly infectious.

(2) If syphilis has been acquired after marriage, inquiries must be made to ascertain whether it has been contracted in an innocent or guilty manner. If the latter, the innocent partner has the right to refuse copula carnalis. The same right exists also in the former case, but for another reason. St. Thomas has laid down the principle: Vir tenetur uxori debitum reddere in his quae ad generationem spectant, salva tamen prius personae (propriae) incolumitate (Suppl. qu. 34, art. 1), i.e., if to grant the debitum would involve serious danger to one's own health, it may be refused. Periculum incontinentiae and any quarrels that might resuit from the refusal are not enough to force the innocent partner to grant the debitum conjugale, as they only amount to a necessitas gravis, and no one is bound in such a case to assist his neighbor cum maximo proprio incommodo.

The decretal of Alexander III. (c. 2 X. IV. 8), which is sometimes quoted on the subject, need not be understood to impose such an obligation. It contains the words: But if it should happen that the husband or wife becomes leprous and the sick party demands the carnal debt from the healthy party, what is demanded must be rendered by the general precept of the Apostle; no exception to that precept is found in this case, but at the time when it was issued copula cum leproso was not considered likely to cause the disease in a healthy person. Many medieval writers pointed out this fact when commenting on the decretal. (Cf. S. Thomas, l. c. ad IV, Sanchez, de matrim., lib. IX. disp. 24, n. 17, Cajetan, Victoria, Soto, Ledesma, etc.). Therefore it may be laid down as a general rule that the healthy partner is not bound to grant the debitum conjugale. Certain limits may be assigned to the right to refuse it. There is still a good deal of obscurity with regard to the therapeutics of syphilis; and the disease, after apparently being cured, sometimes breaks out again, but still medical men as a rule believe that the danger of infection ceases after a definite period. Professor E. Lesser (Klin. Wochenschr., No. 23, 1902) says: "The danger of infection is connected with the secondary period, and does not continue more than five years." Consequently the innocent partner is perhaps bound to grant the debitum conjugale, if the other has shown no symptoms of syphilis for a considerable time.

(3) The innocent partner must refuse the debitum if to grant it would cause unjust injury to a third person, and especially to their own children. It frequently happens that there are children requiring education, or aged parents needing support, or that mother and child would both perish if she became pregnant as a result of granting it. In these and similar cases the innocent partner would not be justified in risking infection, as thus an absolute wrong would be inflicted upon others. In my opinion it would objectively be grievously sinful for the mother of little children to grant the copula to a syphilitic husband, as she would expose her children to the danger of becoming orphans, and should she again be pregnant, the child would certainly also suffer from syphilis, and would probably die before its birth, and so be deprived of baptism. It would be absolutely cruel for a mother to treat her children thus. The case is different if from conjugal intercourse the only sufferer is the innocent partner. Under certain circumstances copula might not only be allowed in this case, but might even be very meritorious. For instance, if a good wife has reason to hope that by her self-sacrifice in granting the copula to her disgusting and syphilitic husband she may preserve him from worse evils, or even bring about real amendment of life, it would be a meritorious work to allow conjugal intercourse, and not madness, as Capellmann calls it in the passage quoted above. Her husband is in necessitate gravi spirituali and it is permissible, and even meritorious, to save one's neighbor from such a state, even at the risk of one's own life.

It is, for instance, highly meritorious if a missionary ministers to lepers, although he incurs great danger of infection.

Of course a woman granting the copula under such circumstances would take all possible care, in accordance with medical advice, so as to avoid infection, since it is a duty incumbent upon every man to protect his own health as far as he can.

Several eminent theologians, such as Sanchez, Petrus, Soto and others, teach that in such cases the copula is permissible and meritorious. Cajetan, however, says: If a healthy husband or wife disregards the danger of personal infection from contagion out of love for the spouse, that person is not only excused from sin but, if acting from charity, merits. We see daily in our times (it does not say much for the morality of that period!) spouses not abandoning each other with respect to bed and dwelling because of so great and contagious an evil as the disease commonly called the French disease. (Com. in II. II. qu. 154, art. 1, n. 14.) This malum gallicum was nothing but syphilis.

In practise a confessor ought to be very cautious when such a case comes under his notice, and he ought to express no decided opinion without knowing that of a trustworthy physician.— Dr. Prümmer, OP.

THE recently issued Report of the British National Birth-rate Commission on the declining birth-rate contains much that is of great interest to Catholics, and especially to the clergy. It is very plain-spoken indeed on certain sexual matters which have suffered somewhat in the past from a conspiracy of silence. Just now the pendulum seems to be swinging in the opposite direction, and excess of plain speaking threatens to produce greater evils than ever silence produced. Very difficult and delicate problems connected with sex morality are being openly discussed in the daily and weekly press, and the public are invited to form their own opinions on the questions raised. The writers know well on which side popular sentiment is likely to be found, and naturally they adopt a tone and maintain views which will be acceptable to the majority of their readers. The questions certainly are of the greatest importance, and should be treated somewhere. That is my reason for offering this contribution to the Ecclesiastical Review, which addresses itself to an exclusive circle—that is, to priests, whose influence in matters of this kind is likely to be effective for good.

The above-mentioned Report corroborates what was well known already, that the birth-rate of England and Wales has declined by about one-third during the last forty years. It is still declining, and in all probability we have not touched bottom yet by any means. Some authorities profess to find matter for satisfaction in this fact. Dr. Havelock Ellis has publicly reproved the " panic-stricken fanatics " who preach to the people that the birth-rate is falling and the nation is decaying. The first witness examined by the Commission was Dr. C. V. Drysdale, the Secretary of the Malthusian League. Dr. Drysdale took the opportunity to say something about the Malthusian League, which he represented, and of which he is the Secretary. He told the Commission that the League has carried on a propaganda in favour of family restriction ever since the Bradlaugh and Besant trial in 1876; the time at which the birth-rate began to decline in England and Wales. The central principle of the Neo-Malthusian movement is the doctrine of Malthus, that unrestricted reproduction inevitably leads to pressure upon subsistence, with its consequences — poverty, starvation, prostitution, disease, and war. At first, English Neo-Malthusians confined their operations to expositions of the economic, moral, and eugenic aspects of the population question. Until 1913 they refused to give information concerning preventive devices. In that year, however, says Dr. Drysdale, "following upon recent authoritative medical pronouncements, in favour of such devices, the League has instituted a practical propaganda, with special precautions against abuse." He gives a descriptive definition of Neo-Malthusianism which embodies the principles to which the League has constantly adhered:

" Neo-Malthusianism is an ethical doctrine based on the principle of Malthus, that poverty, disease, and premature death can only be eliminated by control of reproduction, combined with a recognition of the evils inseparable from prolonged abstention from marriage. It, therefore, advocates nearly universal early marriage, together with a selective limitation of offspring to those children to whom the parents can give a satisfactory heredity and environment, so that they may become desirable members of the community. It further maintains that a universal knowledge of hygienic contraceptive devices among adult men and women would in all probability automatically lead to such a selection through enlightened self-interest, and thus to the elimination of destitution and all the more serious social evils, and to the elevation of the race."

Open-air campaigns have been held to disseminate these views in the large towns, and a pamphlet is being distributed gratuitously describing the most hygienic methods of limiting families. The ordinary layman can hardly be expected to form a sound judgment on these important questions when they are proposed to him in that guise. It makes one thank God devoutly for the guidance which the Church gives us, and it makes us realize the necessity of that guidance.

I do not wish to suggest that the Neo-Malthusian League is alone responsible for the decline in the birth-rate. It is clear from the Report that direct procuring of abortion, and venereal diseases, such as gonorrhoea and syphilis, are largely responsible as well. The Neo-Malthusians deplore these causes, as all sensible men must do. Nor are they alone in their advocacy of such preventive devices as they consider harmless. The Report acknowledges that "among conscientious and high-minded laymen and women in the Anglican Church there are many who openly justify the use of preventives," and this attitude has become far more common during the last few years (page 64). The Report further adds:

" We regret that we are unable to present a definite pronouncement as to the physical consequences of the use of these devices. The printed evidence which follows does not enable a dogmatic statement to be made as to these; and in view of the fact that medical investigation on this subject is difficult and in large measure has only recently been made, it is not surprising that no definite medical conclusion can be drawn" (page 57).

Twenty-four of the Commissioners signed an Addition to the Report which, among other things, acknowledges that there are some questions " which deserve more thorough and general consideration than we have been able to give to them." Among these is the following: " Is any mode of restriction except voluntary abstinence from marital relations moral and religious?" There seems to be a general consensus of opinion that there is one other lawful mode of restriction besides voluntary abstinence from marital relations. Married couples may, if they like, limit intercourse to the inter-menstrual periods, when conception is less likely to take place. The Anglican Bishop of Southwark, in his evidence given before the Commission, expressed the opinion that this practice is unlawful. He failed, however, to substantiate his view, and it is opposed to the Memorandum drawn up by a Committee of Anglican Bishops and endorsed by a majority of their number. Medical authorities are not agreed as to whether the practice is likely to be effectual in preventing conception, but there seems to be no valid reason against it from the point of view of moral theology. I do not propose to discuss this question further. Catholic moral theology clearly condemns the use of all anti-conceptional methods by married people who use their marital rights. There is a more heinous malice in the voluntary procuring of abortion after conception than in the use of anti-conceptive devices. Some anti-conceptive devices are more injurious than others. But there are none that are not immoral and wrong, according to the teaching of Catholic moral theology. Can this be shown by reasons that will appeal to the ordinary man or woman of sound common sense? That is what I want to show in this paper.

I have already referred to the article contributed to an English weekly newspaper by Dr. Havelock Ellis. He is of considerable standing in the world of science, and so his views are of interest to us. He maintains that small families and a falling birth-rate are not only not evil, but that they are a positive good. They represent an evolutionary rise in nature and a higher stage in civilization. It is the lower forms of animals that are most prolific and the higher forms that are less so. Vast quantities of lower forms of life are born, but natural selection, by its rough methods, takes care that only the fittest should survive. In the higher forms of animal life quality takes the place of quantity. The elephant has far fewer offspring than the herring, but it more than makes up for the difference by greater parental care. This evolutionary process becomes conscious and deliberate in man without ceasing to be natural. We will here give his own words:

" It is, then, that we have what may properly be termed Birth Control. That is to say, that a process which had before been working steadily through the ages, attaining every new forward step with waste and pain, is henceforth carried out voluntarily in the light of the high human qualities of reason and foresight and self-restraint."

This statement seems to be in direct opposition to fact. The natural process kills off the unfit in the struggle for life, and so only the fittest survive. A couple who use preventive devices use an unnatural process without the means of knowing what the result is to be. Of the possible children that they might have had, the two or three that are born may very possibly be the weakest and the least gifted by nature. At any rate the parents can exert no choice as to the quality. They can indeed limit the quantity by restrictive devices, but if we follow the teaching of experience the two or three children are as likely as not to be spoiled by over-indulgence and by having all the hardships of life removed out of their path. The best and the strongest characters, as a rule, are developed in the bosom of large families, which preclude pampering and necessitate a certain simplicity of life. It is a mere abuse of language to speak of the use of preventives as the employment of reason, foresight, and self-restraint. It is irrational, blind, and the absence of all restraint.

It is difficult to understand how Dr. Havelock Ellis could possibly maintain that a falling birth-rate is not an evil but a positive good. A people living in simple conditions of life without rivals or powerful neighbours to fear might perhaps be satisfied if the birth-rate and death-rate more or less balanced. There would be no great cause for alarm if such a balance of births and deaths were the effect of natural causes. But those are not the conditions of the problem before us. There is a keen rivalry among the great nations of the world, and the declining birth-rate among the chief European nations is largely due to preventive devices. The process has been going on in France for something like two centuries, and France furnishes our great object-lesson of its effect on national welfare. In the seventeenth century France was the acknowledged leader among the nations of Europe. At that time her population was 38 per cent, of the total population of the chief European nations. At the end of the eighteenth century it had fallen to 27 per cent. In 1815 it was 20 per cent.; in 1880 it was 13 per cent., and now it is about 11 per cent. Instead of being the most populous nation of Europe, France now takes the sixth or seventh place. It is patent to everyone what this has meant in the Great War. Man for man, the Frenchman believes himself superior to the German, but the forty millions of France are no match in arms against the sixty-five millions of Germany. Quantity of population undoubtedly is a factor of great influence on national welfare, and a declining birth-rate can only be viewed with alarm by a true and far-sighted patriot.

Moral turpitude cannot be gauged by the physically evil effects which follow from it, and can be verified. An evil desire to commit adultery does not entail the physical and verifiable evils that follow from actual adultery. And yet "Whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her hath already committed adultery with her in his heart.” The moral turpitude of an evil desire is the same in kind as that of the evil act itself. The ancient Romans used emetics after one dinner in order to be able to enjoy the pleasures of a second and third on the same day. The physically evil effects of the practice were perhaps not very serious if it was not indulged in too frequently. There are few that would not allow that such an action is disgusting, unnatural, and inordinate. It is immoral and wrong apart from any physically evil effects that it may have. If it were indulged in very frequently it would lead to a permanent derangement in the action of the stomach. These principles are applicable in a special degree to sexual excesses. In the natural use of marriage a legitimate outlet is provided for the strongest of the instincts and appetites of mankind. A sense of satisfaction follows upon the use of marital rights. There may be intemperance in such use, and intemperance will be the cause of physical evil, more or less serious. But the temperate use is accompanied with satisfaction, and after a time leads to a gradual weakening of the sexual appetite. This is not true of the abuse of the sexual appetite. Let us take a well-known example which has been studied by theologians and by medical men for centuries. A solitary act or two of self-abuse may not have any serious physical evil as its consequence. But if constantly repeated, it destroys health of body and of mind. It is generally accompanied by some physical pleasure, but it does not give complete satisfaction. This leads to a constant temptation to repeat the act, repetition leads to a strengthening of the habit and the craving for indulgence, and the yielding to this leads to a gradual weakening of self-control, and to the ruin of health of mind and body. This is the rational argument by which theologians defend and illustrate their teaching concerning the deadly malice of one sin of self-abuse.

When preventive devices are used in sexual intercourse there is self-abuse and abuse of the other party as well. The act is satisfying for neither of them except for the moment; an appetite is created, not satisfied, and the natural consequences of self-abuse follow for both to a greater or less extent. There are not the same facilities for over-indulgence, and so the evil effects of the practice are not so rapid and conspicuous, but in a measure they are there. This is fully borne out by the first-hand experience of several of the medical witnesses examined by the Commission. Thus Dr. Amand Routh said:

"I have no doubt that prevention of maternity by artificial methods invariably produces physical, mental, and, I think, moral, harm to those who resort to it—to one, or probably to both.... I am sure it does harm to both, if they both agree to it. The act is incomplete; it is not a spontaneous act; and if the act ceases before the proper crisis, as it were, the nervous system suffers enormously if the habit is continued for long. And the result often is that there is a great deal of congestion produced in the woman, at all events. I know nothing about the physical results in the case of the man, but in the woman the result is that the pelvic organs become congested and catarrhal, the womb becomes enlarged, and the result is that later on, when the parents are perhaps better off and want a child, they are not able to have one " (page 247).

The Chairman, the Very Rev. Dean Inge, put a question to the witness on this subject. He asked: " You say in your lecture, ' Every method of artificial prevention of conception is harmful in both its physical and moral effect.' That is, of course, by no means universally admitted, is it? It is a matter of very great importance to this Commission." Dr. Routh answered:

"Well, personally, I believe that every artificial method does do physical harm, with the only exception that supposing the husband uses letters, for instance, I do not think the harm is very much to the wife, except that she misses the stimulating effect of the semen itself. And there is not the least doubt that that has a very powerful effect; it is absorbed to a certain extent, and seems to stimulate and even to nourish the woman in a way which we do not at present understand." " I think," pursued Dr. Inge, " it will be generally admitted, as far as I can make out, that withdrawal is mischievous; but we have been told that the use of these other things which you mention is harmless to both sexes. That is what I want to get at." Dr. Routh replied:

"Well, I am sure that people who use letters suffer from it in time. It is not the same thing. It is difficult to explain how it does act, but I am only speaking of practical experience with one's patients who have adopted these methods. To begin with, supposing that both the man and the woman are very much averse to having a child. It is not a normally conducted physiological act at all; it is an act accompanied more or less by fear the whole time, and the nervous system cannot stand being, thus, in anything rather than the passive attitude of affection which ought to exist."

Asked if that effect was not mental rather than physical, the witness replied: " It is mental, but it has a physical effect. You cannot have the nervous system in this state of dread without a physical effect."

A further question was put: "You would agree, I take it, that there is a difference of opinion among experienced gynecologists on this point, as to the deleterious physical effects of the use of these artificial means?" To which Dr. Routh replied: " I thought everybody considered they were more or less harmful" (page 254). Another witness of experience, Dr. Mary Scharlieb, was asked: " Are you of opinion that injury does result from the use of these preventives?”

To which she replied: " No physical injury. In the majority of cases they cannot do physical harm to anyone. From the use by the wife of a douche or a quinine pessary, or from the use by the husband of a sheath, I do not see that any physical injury results, but I am sure there are recondite effects upon the nervous system."

To the question: " Having regard to hysteria and allied diseases, would you not agree that although physical injury may not be present, yet nevertheless serious injury does arise?" The witness replied, "Certainly" (page 271).

When, therefore, the Commissioners express regret in their Report that they are unable to present a definite pronouncement as to the physical consequences of the use of preventive devices, we may presume that they use the word " physical " in a restricted sense as distinguished from nervous and mental evils. Catholic writers on Pastoral Theology have long insisted on the grievous harm done to body and mind by the use of preventive devices. An increase of fornication, too, is said to take place when the fear of offspring is removed by the use of preventive methods.

Clement of Alexandria lived at a time of great moral depravity, and Alexandria was probably as bad as any other city of the Roman Empire. He was acquainted with all the learning of his time, and especially was he a keen student of human nature. In an interesting passage he tells us that defilement of the marriage bed leads to loss of mutual respect and of conjugal love. I will finish my article by a translation of a few sentences:

" It is not shameful for us to mention for the instruction of our hearers the parts in which the conception of the fœtus takes place and which God was not ashamed to make.... Now, marriage is the desire for the procreation of children, not the inordinate effusion of seed, which is contrary to precept and against right reason. The whole of our life will proceed according to nature if, from the beginning, we curb our appetites and do not destroy by wicked and malicious devices the race of mankind which is born of divine providence. For those women who, to conceal fornication, use destructive drugs, which lead to utter ruin, lose all humanity, together with the fœtus.... If uprightness should be practised, much more should uprightness be shown toward your wife by avoiding intercourse which is not upright; and let there be trustworthy evidence coming from your home that you deal chastely with your neighbours. For nothing can be deemed upright by her with whom uprightness in those vehement pleasures is not proved by irrefragable evidence, as it were. The love which rushes headlong toward intercourse lasts but a short time and grows old with the body; sometimes it grows old even before the body, since lust becomes torpid when whorish lusts have vitiated the temperance of marriage. For the hearts of lovers are winged, and the impulses of love are often extinguished in repentance, and love often turns to hate when satiety has felt reproof."*

* Pædagogus, ii. 10.

ABOUT a dozen years ago the National Council of Public Morals with official recognition established the National Birth-Rate Commission. Since then the Commission has issued several Reports, and a Special Commission was appointed to study the ethical side of the question. This Special Commission has now issued its Report under the title of The Ethics of Birth Control. This Report professes to adopt the Christian standpoint with regard to human life and its responsibilities. But for all that it is not able to announce any definite conclusions as to the morality or immorality of birth control. The subject, it says, needs much further investigation from the medical, economic, and religious point of view. In the meantime, no one can escape the personal responsibility of forming his own judgement on the question.

Four members of the Special Commission declared it to be their opinion that the use of contraceptives is a frustration of God’s design in Nature and cannot be justified in any circumstances, but this opinion was rejected by the majority of the Special Commission, and in a leading article on the subject, The Times newspaper endorsed the rejection. In support of this rejection it is said that civilization itself has been the story of man’s control over Nature, and that rigid application of the principle advocated by the four members would entail the condemnation of all medical treatment. Medicine tries to arrest natural processes; it is an interference with Nature, an action against Nature.

Nevertheless, the principle adopted by the four members is a fundamental principle of Christian ethics, and if it is properly understood it does not involve the absurd consequences attributed to it. I will try briefly to show this.

Everybody knows that the reign of law is universal. We live in an ordered world. The physical and animal world are governed by necessary laws. The same causes are always followed by the same effects, and nothing else is possible. According to Christian teaching, the whole world inferior to man was created for man’s use and benefit. In the beginning the Creator told man to rule and subdue the earth and everything that it contains. Man can subdue and control the physical world by learning to understand its laws, and in doing this for his own benefit he not only does nothing morally wrong, but he is fulfilling the intention of his Creator. When the doctor, then, destroys the germs of tubercular disease, he not only does nothing morally wrong, he performs an action which in the highest degree is a moral action. He acts against Nature, contrary to Nature, in that he interferes with a natural process which threatens human life, but it is morally right for him to do that.

The reign of law extends to the sphere of human conduct. Certain actions are in accordance with moral law, others are contrary to it. Those actions which are in accordance with moral law are called right, ordinate, lawful; those that are contrary to it are called wrong, inordinate, unlawful. By considering an action in itself and in all its circumstances we can generally see quite clearly whether it is in accordance with moral law and right, or whether, on the contrary, it is against the moral law and wrong. It is clearly right for children to love, respect, and obey their parents, to render to every man what is his due, to wish well to all men, to practise temperance. It is clearly wrong for children to show disrespect to parents, to do unjust injury to others, to show hatred to one’s fellow-man, to give way to intemperance in eating and drinking. We can discern the rule or law of temperance by considering the object of eating and drinking, the purpose which those actions should serve. Eating and drinking are for the sake of supporting life. The body derives heat and energy from food and drink, and bodily waste is repaired thereby. The end of eating and drinking indicates the rule which ought to govern those actions. We should eat and drink what supports life. We should abstain from what injures or destroys life. We should eat and drink that quantity which is suitable for the end in view. If we eat or drink more or less than what conduces to our support we infringe the law of temperance, we act against the moral law, we are bound to preserve our life and to take the necessary means to do so.

We are bound to do what is right and abstain from what is wrong because our Creator and Lord wishes and commands it. He is the Author of the moral law, and because he is good and holy he cannot possibly be indifferent as to whether it is observed or not by his rational creatures. Man is not only a rational creature, he is also endowed with moral freedom. He can recognize the moral law, but, unlike the lower creation, he is not necessitated to obey it. He has the physical power of obeying it if he chooses to do so, but he has also the physical power to refuse obedience to it if he chooses. He can violate the law of temperance if he likes, but he will do so at his peril and to his ruin. What has been said about eating and drinking may be applied to the procreation of children. The means to that end are laid down by Nature and by the Author of Nature. In making use of the means the end furnishes the rule, and it must always be kept in sight so that nothing contrary to it may be done. If we forget the rule of temperance and follow appetite and pleasure in eating and drinking, we are sure to go astray. We shall eat and drink too much, we shall act inordinately, and we shall frustrate God’s design in Nature. Not less evidently and surely will they who use contraceptives act inordinately, violate the moral law, and frustrate God’s design in Nature. We heartily agree, then, with the four members of the Special Commission. They defended a great and important principle of the moral law.