Question Three. On the Obligation of the Conjugal Act.

87. Declaration. Of itself it belongs to the man to ask, and to the wife to render the debt: for to women, on account of their innate modesty, asking is ordinarily very troublesome; but men, on account of modesty, are ordinarily not kept from asking. Wherefore the wife is not bound to render the debt unless the husband asks: for if he does not ask, the wife can presume that the husband does not demand the debt. But accidentally even the woman is bound to ask: for if the husband is in danger of incontinence, she is bound from charity to free him from danger; but since charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience, she is not bound to ask if she cannot do so without grave inconvenience, e.g. great shamefacedness.

From express asking, which is done by words or equivalent signs, interpretative asking must be distinguished, which is gathered from certain indications. Thus if a wife existing in danger of incontinence wishes to use marriage, but because of shamefacedness does not dare to ask expressly, she is said to ask interpretatively, and the husband, noticing these things, is bound himself to ask, or rather to render the debt to one asking interpretatively.

88. Principles. 1. There exists no obligation of asking the conjugal debt except sometimes accidentally from charity: for there exists for individual spouses no obligation of using marriage, but they have only a right to that use; but no one is bound to use his own right.

Accidentally, however, there can be an obligation of asking, especially in the man: a. if he judges that the other party is placed in danger of incontinence and because of shamefacedness does not ask: for each one is bound from charity to impede the sin of another if he can conveniently do so; b. if the use of marriage is necessary for fostering love or for averting dissensions.

Although the use of marriage is ordinarily to be advised to spouses, especially to those who can nourish offspring and suitably educate them, nevertheless by mutual consent it is also licit for them to abstain from the use of marriage, provided there is no danger of incontinence. And indeed, if they abstain from a motive of virtue, with danger of incontinence excluded, this is to be praised; if it is done from another reasonable motive, and there is no danger of sin, it is at least to be permitted.

2. There exists an obligation of justice, of itself grave, of rendering the debt whenever the other spouse expressly or tacitly asks seriously.

a. For by the matrimonial contract the spouses mutually transfer to each other the right and power over the body in order to the conjugal act; but to the right of asking there corresponds in the other the obligation of rendering the debt. The Apostle expressly teaches the same: let the husband render the debt to the wife, and the wife likewise to the husband.¹ Moreover, one who denies the debt often exposes the other party to danger of grave sins.

Wherefore it is not licit voluntarily to render oneself impotent, e.g. by excessive labors, vigils, austerities, etc.: for the spouse has a right to the conjugal act; therefore one who renders himself impotent makes himself unable to pay the debt. Nor is it licit, without necessity or the consent of the other party, to be absent for a notable time: for an absence of this kind would be equivalent to denial of the debt.

b. The object of the mutual contract is of itself a thing of grave moment: for it concerns the generation of offspring, the avoidance of incontinence, and the signifying of conjugal love for preserving peace; therefore to render the debt is of itself a grave obligation of justice when the other asks seriously, namely in such a way that, when asked, he would not wish to yield. Nevertheless denial of the debt can be a light sin in a twofold case: a. from smallness of matter, if it is done only rarely, if, e.g., it is denied once in a month to one asking often, or if it is not denied altogether, but is only deferred for a short time, e.g. until the night; yet with danger of incontinence excluded; b. if the other asks not seriously but only weakly, so that he is judged benevolently to remit the debt.

a. Therefore of itself a spouse sins gravely who denies the debt to the other asking seriously, even only one time, especially if in the other party there is danger of incontinence or grave trouble; and indeed not only against justice, because he denies what is owed, but also against charity, because he exposes the other party to danger of grave sins.

b. Men also sin gravely who, whether from avarice, lest they have to nourish offspring, or from malevolence, never or almost never know their own wives, although they ought to presume that the wives bear this with the greatest difficulty.

c. Women, especially those who are already of more advanced age and burdened with numerous offspring, sometimes think that by denying the debt they do not sin gravely unless it is done almost always or unless the husband is placed in danger of sinning. But if the confessor discovers this, let him beware lest he fruitlessly take good faith away from them.

d. For the rest, women must be seriously and gravely admonished not to show themselves difficult and peevish to their husbands if the husbands demand intercourse, or other things which are licit for spouses, from them, lest namely they expose them to the danger of leaving their own wives and approaching other women.

3. A spouse is bound to render the debt to one asking seriously, even if from this he fears light harm or inconvenience: for light harm or inconvenience in no way excuses from a grave obligation, which moreover is one of justice.

Although a light inconvenience, e.g. a bad odor which the wife emits from her mouth and nostrils, does not excuse from asking or rendering the debt, nevertheless an inconvenience truly grave excuses even from this obligation, as from others, as will be said in what follows, n. 91 ff.

4. Within the first two months, by a special concession of law, spouses are not bound to render the debt.² This privilege is indeed conceded to spouses by law for deliberating about entrance into religion; nevertheless they can probably use it even if they do not wish to enter religion. But once the debt has been rendered, the privilege ceases. Spouses, however, are not accustomed to use this privilege, both because they are ignorant of it and because, even if they know it, they do not wish to use it, and indeed deservedly, on account of the danger of sinning.³

a. Although many authors deny this privilege to those who do not think about entrance into religion, nevertheless, since St. Alphonsus (n. 958) affirms it, a spouse who wished to use it could not be compelled to render the debt.

b. This privilege refers only to a religion in which solemn vows are emitted, since marriage is dissolved only by solemn vows.

c. The two-month period begins from the day of the contracted marriage (others think from the day which the ecclesiastical judge determines), and when this period has elapsed the privilege ceases.

d. A spouse who contracts marriage with the intention of entering religion, without the other party being forewarned, sins because he deceives the other party.

e. The obligation of rendering the debt, which presses from the time of the contracted marriage, is suspended by force of this privilege. But if the bride enters religion, the husband, in order that he may be able to enter another marriage, must wait until, after the novitiate has been completed, or rather after the three-year period has been completed, she emits the profession of simple vows, by which the bond of marriage is dissolved.

¹ 1 Cor. 7, 3.

² Council of Trent, sess. 24, canon 6. C. Ex publico 7. De convers. coniug. (III. 32).

³ Cf. De sacramentis n. 522.

89. When the right of asking is lost. The cases in which the right of asking is lost are chiefly the following:

1. If one of the spouses has committed adultery, and a fortiori if he has committed incest. The right of departing from an adulterous spouse is conceded to the innocent party, whether it is the man or the woman, from the very nature of the matrimonial contract: for fidelity is not owed to one breaking fidelity. In order that the right of asking be judged lost, it is required that the adultery be formal, certain, not committed by both, and not explicitly or implicitly condoned: for if it has been committed by both, there is compensation, and if the innocent party asks the debt or freely renders it to one asking, the injury is judged implicitly condoned.

A husband who, without his wife's knowledge, has committed adultery can ask: for by adultery he is not deprived of the use of marriage as by incest; moreover he does not lose the right of asking by the adultery itself, but when the innocent party, after the adultery has been known, deprives him of his right by denying the debt for a long time (n. 100), nor is he bound to manifest his crime to the other party.

2. If the one asking lacks the use of reason, as if he is insane or drunk, because the asking of one who lacks the use of reason is not a human act; moreover by marriage there has not been contracted an obligation except to the conjugal act to be performed in a human manner. But it is licit for the party in possession of reason to render the debt to an insane or drunk person, especially if he is in danger of incontinence. But if the insanity is not perfect, of itself there exists in the other party an obligation of rendering.

Whether a spouse is bound to render the debt to one perfectly drunk or insane if the one asking is in danger of committing pollution, there is not one opinion of authors. Many affirm it, because the spouse is bound from charity to impede the sin of the other, even if it is only material.¹ Their opinion is to some extent confirmed by the judgment of those physiologists who assert that harm is not to be feared for offspring from intercourse had at the time of drunkenness: for if offspring of a drunken spouse is born infirm or dull, this does not arise from intercourse had at the time of drunkenness, but from the organic constitution of the drunken person, altered by frequent drunkenness.² Some, however, deny this obligation, because a spouse is excused from the precept of charity by a just cause; but a just cause is a founded fear lest offspring arisen from intercourse of this kind contract not only grave defects of body, but also depraved habits of soul.³ Practically, therefore, a spouse cannot be obliged to render the debt to one perfectly drunk, even if the one asking is placed in danger of incontinence.

¹ St. Alphonsus n. 984. Sanchez l. 9, disp. 23, n. 11.

² Olfers, Pastoralmedicin^2, p. 70, to whom however others are opposed, judging that from intercourse with a drunk person there arises danger lest offspring be born infirm.

³ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri VI, n. 407 ff.

90. Whether the wife is bound to render the debt to one asking illicitly. If the conjugal act is illicit on account of some circumstance which is had on the part of the person asking, the wife not only can, but also must render; but if the act is illicit either in itself or on account of a circumstance which is referred to the conjugal act, she is not bound and cannot render.

a. He asks illicitly to whom the conjugal act is illicit; but the conjugal act can be illicit on account of a circumstance which is in the one asking himself, as if he asks from a depraved end, for taking pleasure alone, or if the one asking is bound by a vow of chastity; moreover the conjugal act can be illicit in itself, as if an onanistic or sodomitic act is asked; finally the conjugal act can be illicit because of some circumstance which is on the part of the act, as if it is asked in a public or sacred place.

b. Now there are some who with Pontius answer the proposed question, with no distinction made, that it is not licit to render the debt to one asking illicitly: for he asks formal cooperation with sin, with the single case excepted in which the one asking, if he wished, could also actually have intercourse licitly, as if he asks for pleasure alone; but it is never licit formally to cooperate with sin.¹

c. But others, making the distinction which is set forth above, with Sanchez teach that the wife can and must render the debt if the conjugal act is illicit on account of a circumstance which is in the one asking: for the conjugal act on the wife's part is licit, and because the husband, on account of that circumstance which renders the act illicit, has not lost the right of asking, the act is also owed from justice. And Sanchez indeed illustrates this doctrine by these examples: if someone demanded coins deposited with another in order to fornicate, the latter would have to return the coins; and if one having a credit with another vows that he will not exact the credit and nevertheless exacts it, the other can and must render the debt.²

¹ Cf. Pontius l. 10, c. 3, n. 3.

² Sanchez l. 9, disp. 6, n. 7. Cf. St. Alphonsus n. 944. 947.

91. When the obligation of rendering ceases. A spouse is not bound to render the debt if from this he ought justly to fear grave harm, which is not of itself annexed to marriage, for himself or for conceived offspring: for those entering marriage are not judged to bind themselves to the conjugal act with so great an inconvenience. The cases in which for this reason a spouse is not bound to render are chiefly the following:

1. If the asking is immoderate: for intercourse performed immoderately exhausts strength and harms health. Asking can be immoderate absolutely, if it is asked more than once in one night, or relatively by reason of illness or weakness of body, according to the judgment of prudent men.

a. How often spouses can perform the conjugal act without detriment to health cannot be determined by a general rule: for it depends on the physical constitution of the spouses themselves and on other circumstances. According to medical authors, the use of marriage which occurs twice in a week does no harm, and if spouses are vigorous and of firm constitution, they can use it even three or four times, excepting times in which nature itself advises that they abstain from the conjugal act, as at the time of menstrual flow, pregnancy, etc. But spouses who are weak and of infirm constitution, especially men who are occupied for a long time and seriously with mental labors, can exercise the conjugal act without detriment only once in a week. If in a concrete case doubt arises about this matter, it will be helpful to consult a physician.¹

b. Therefore a wife does not sin by denying the debt to a man for whom intercourse had once on any night is not sufficient, so that he asks even during the day or more often in the same night, unless this occurs in an extraordinary case, e.g. in danger of incontinence.

2. If grave danger of life or health is to be feared according to the judgment of a prudent physician.

a. Therefore there is no obligation of rendering the debt to one who labors under a contagious disease, nor to one who labors under a strong fever or another grave disease. If, e.g., a wife labors under an organic disease of the heart, intercourse can bring sudden death, and therefore she is not bound to render the debt; if the husband labors under the same disease, he cannot ask, and the wife is not bound to render to him asking; if nevertheless because of danger of incontinence he asked, the wife could render the debt, unless sudden death were certain.

b. Likewise a woman is not bound to render the debt who has experienced that she cannot give birth without danger of death; nevertheless a woman is not excused from rendering the debt who underwent danger of death in the first childbirth or suffered extraordinary pains, because experience establishes that women experience greater difficulties in the first childbirth than in those following.

c. If from the judgment of a skilled and prudent physician it were established that the one rendering would be exposed to a grave disease or to death itself, he would not be bound to render; nevertheless in these circumstances it would be licit to render if the danger is not altogether certain and proximate, because always to abstain would be most difficult.

d. If a woman rendering the debt is exposed to danger of grave and long-lasting infirmity, which would bring only a slow death, she is not bound to render: for she is not bound to this with danger of death, even if only of a slow one.

3. Inconveniences which are internal to the condition of marriage do not excuse from rendering the debt: for those entering marriage are judged by that very fact to wish to undergo these inconveniences. Inconveniences of this kind are held to be: a. ordinary inconveniences of pregnancy and of nourishment; the ordinary difficulty of childbirth; b. some weakening of health; c. pains which are indeed grave but not long-lasting, or long-lasting but moderate, such as headaches for several months after childbirth.

¹ Cf. S. Ribbing, Die sexuelle Hygiene, p. 58 f.

92. 1. If spouses already gifted with numerous offspring are so poor that they cannot nourish further offspring, with danger of incontinence of each party excluded, they are probably excused from rendering the debt on account of the grave harm which is to be feared for the wife and for the offspring already born.

Although spouses already gifted with numerous offspring can abstain from the use of marriage, nevertheless if danger of falling into grave temptations is imminent, it is rather to be advised to them that, committing themselves to divine providence, they use marriage, supported by this hope, that God who gives fecundity will also give nourishment.

2. A husband who, having no care of the family, leaves the burden of nourishing the offspring to the wife, loses the right of asking; wherefore the debt can be denied to him without sin. And this indeed can be done even when the husband is placed in danger of incontinence: for the wife cannot be obliged to rescue the husband from this danger with so great an inconvenience.¹

Whether and what kind of harm to offspring excuses from rendering the debt. Universally it can be said: if for the offspring it is better thus to exist than not to exist at all, harm to offspring, at least when danger of incontinence exists, does not excuse from rendering the debt. Wherefore fear does not excuse, lest offspring be born infirm, nor fear lest it have to live in need and want; indeed not even a fear founded on experience lest offspring be brought forth by abortion or be born dead, because it is better for it to exist in original sin than not to exist at all. Nevertheless, if offspring is already conceived, it is not licit for spouses to perform intercourse or any other action whatsoever which may harm its life or formation.

In all these cases the wife not only can licitly render, but also, for avoiding the danger of incontinence, which scarcely is not always present or must be presumed in one or the other party, she is even bound to render if the husband asks seriously, especially because these harms occur accidentally, and therefore do not certainly happen.

¹ Lehmkuhl, II, n. 853.