Article I. On the End

I. The intrinsic ends of conjugal intercourse, namely, of the work itself, are: the principal end is the procreation of offspring; the secondary ends are the quieting of appetite or concupiscence, both in oneself and in the partner, the signification of conjugal love, and the increase of this love (cf. can. 1013, § 1). Finally, many other ends can be intended by the one acting, as for example the procuring of health, etc. (St. Alphonsus VI, 882, 883).

II. Intercourse, if it is performed, can be performed only for an honorable end. Nevertheless any honorable end suffices, and it is enough that the honorable end be virtually intended. I said:

1. Intercourse can be performed only for an honorable end. For every human act, in order to be good, must be done only for that end which befits the nature of man, that is, rational nature. But it befits rational nature to act for an honorable end, and not for another (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2; St. Alphonsus V, XLIV).

Corollary I. It is unlawful to have intercourse for pleasure alone, as is clear from what has been said and from proposition 9 condemned by Innocent XI, which said: "The work of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is entirely free from fault and venial defect" (St. Alphonsus VI, 912). Nevertheless one who performs intercourse for pleasure alone sins only venially, since the disordered use of a thing lawful in itself, such as intercourse, does not contain grave disorder, since the defect does not fall upon the substance of the act. Make exception if someone actually or virtually had pleasure as his ultimate end (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Corollary II. It is unlawful to have intercourse also for pleasure, by resting also in it as such, because pleasure as such is not an honorable end. Yet to someone this will seem lawful, insofar as the honorable act and its pleasurableness constitute one thing.

Corollary III. It is lawful to have intercourse for pleasure insofar as, from the intention of the Author of nature, it entices to an act ordered in itself, that is, to conjugal intercourse; likewise insofar as it conduces to the well-being and operation of the body or soul. The reason is that pleasure considered as such has the character of an honorable end (St. Alphonsus VI, 912; cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 34, a. 1; II-II, q. 141, a. 6, ad 2; II-II, q. 168, a. 2; Contra Gentiles, book 3, c. 9, n. 1).

2. Any honorable end suffices, whether of the work or another intended by the agent, whether conceived specifically or in a vague way. The reason is that the ends of the work themselves do not fall under precept; this being laid down, it is free to the agent to set before himself another honorable end (St. Alphonsus VI, 927, compared with 882 and 883).¹ Many, however, judge, as we shall note presently, that the end of the work itself is at least implicitly intended by the very fact that it is not positively excluded.

Corollary. Spouses do not sin who, in intercourse had for an honorable end, desire that conception not follow, provided the act placed is of itself apt for the primary end, or the procreation of offspring (St. Alphonsus VI, 831, 927).

3. It is enough that an honorable end be virtually intended, or that intercourse be virtually referred to an honorable end; this follows from the fact that, in view of the nature of such a relation, intercourse is truly referred by it to an honorable end; and this suffices (St. Alphonsus V, XLIV).

It is disputed whether one who performs intercourse, and does not positively exclude the honorable end of the work, for example procreation, by that very fact intends an honorable end, at least implicitly. Most more recent authors affirm this, but it seems that it must be denied. For what is distinguished from the work is not implicitly intended by the very fact that the work is performed. But the end of the work, for example procreation, is distinguished from the work itself as effect from cause; hence, in order that it be intended, a new act of the will is required. But the controversy is less practical, because one who places in due manner and order an act which by its nature is ordered to an honorable end, and does not positively exclude that end, commonly positively includes that end, although perhaps only confusedly and weakly.

¹ St. Thomas teaches thus: "In two ways alone spouses come together without any sin, namely, for the sake of procreating offspring, and for rendering the debt; otherwise there is always sin there, at least venial" (Supplement, q. 49, a. 5). And again: "But if someone through the act of marriage intends to avoid fornication in his spouse, there is no sin, because this is a certain rendering of the debt, which pertains to the good of fidelity; but if he intends to avoid fornication in himself, thus there is some superfluity there; and according to this there is venial sin there; nor was marriage instituted for this except according to indulgence, which concerns venial sins" (loc. cit., ad 2). Finally: "It must be said that although to intend the preservation of health is not evil in itself, nevertheless this intention becomes evil if health is intended from something which of itself is not ordered to this; as if someone were to seek only bodily health from the sacrament of baptism; and similarly also in the proposed case, in the act of marriage" (loc. cit., ad 4).