Voluntariety and Free Choice

All human acts are voluntary. The voluntary and involuntary are treated so that the diverse modes may be known according to which the will tends into its object, or according to which acts proceed from the will, because this knowledge contributes much to determining the imputability of human acts and its grades.

42. What the voluntary is. The voluntary is called that which proceeds from the will, as an effect from its cause, with previous knowledge of the intellect. Therefore two things belong to the nature of the voluntary: a. that the act proceed from the will as from its cause; b. that it be placed with the knowledge of the intellect going before.

a. Something can proceed from the will positively, or through its positive influence, or negatively, or through omission of influence.

Something can proceed positively from the will in three ways: immediately, mediately, and effectively. The elicited acts themselves of the will proceed immediately; acts commanded by the will and elicited by other powers proceed mediately; the effects of these acts proceed effectively. Thus in the throwing of a stone by which a man is wounded, the intention of doing so proceeds immediately from the will, the throwing mediately, and the wound inflicted by the stone effectively.

Omissions and their effects are said to proceed negatively from the will. If someone does not extinguish a fire set to a house, the omission of extinguishing and the effect of the house burning are said to proceed negatively from the will.

Therefore four things are said to be voluntary to us: a. elicited acts of the will; b. acts commanded by the will; c. external effects of our actions; d. omissions and their effects.

b. The voluntary differs: a. from the willed: for that is called willed which is the object of the will, even if it does not depend upon the will; but only that object is called voluntary which depends upon the will; b. from the spontaneous, which proceeds from a power with sensitive knowledge; for which reason acts of the insane, of infants, and even of brutes can be called spontaneous, but cannot be called voluntary; c. from the free or from a human act: for the voluntary abstracts from whether the act proceeds from the will freely or necessarily, but a human act is a free act.

For him who kills his enemy, both the purpose of killing and the death of the enemy are voluntary; but for him who desires the death of one killed, but does not bring it about, the desire of death is voluntary, while the death is willed. The farmer's desire for rain is voluntary; the rain is willed. But for God the rain is willed and voluntary. Therefore everything voluntary is willed, but not conversely is everything willed voluntary.

43. On the divisions of the voluntary.¹ 1. The voluntary is necessary or free, according as the act of the will is so borne into the object that the will cannot abstain from it, or so that the will can, at its pleasure, place the act or not place it.

Therefore the voluntary and the free properly differ from each other in such a way that the free is a species of the voluntary. For the voluntary generically is an act which proceeds from the will with knowledge of the intellect. But an act of this sort can proceed either in such a way that man has dominion over it, or the power also of abstaining from it, which is the free; or in such a way that he does not have dominion over it, which is the necessary. Nevertheless, in moral matters voluntary and free are used promiscuously, because in man as wayfarer there are no deliberate acts of the will which are plainly necessary.

2. The voluntary is perfect and imperfect by reason of advertence. The former is done with full advertence of the mind and therefore also with full consent of the will; the latter is done with half-full advertence of the mind and therefore also with imperfect consent of the will. The imperfect voluntary is found, for example, in acts of one half asleep, in acts which are done in great disturbance of soul.

The voluntary is not called imperfect because the will embraces the object reluctantly and only with some repugnance; this is the voluntary in a qualified sense, which belongs to the perfect voluntary. Rather it is called imperfect because the will does not fully determine itself to willing the object, for example sin. For the determination by which the will determines itself to willing the object, as to the grade of perfection, depends upon knowledge more or less unimpeded, to such a degree that without full or unimpeded knowledge there cannot be a full and perfect tendency of the will into the object, such as is required for a perfectly human act.

Therefore, for example, a man who, stirred by great anger, in a quarrel with his adversary breaks forth into blasphemies or says insults to him, does not sin gravely, because the blasphemies and insults are either first-first movements on account of the defect of advertence, or are light sins, because on account of the defect of full advertence they are not perfectly voluntary, unless perhaps the blasphemies, on account of a neglected habit of blaspheming, are grave sins.

3. The voluntary is voluntary simply and voluntary in a qualified sense. The former is that which is done with the full inclination of the will without any repugnance at all; the latter is that which is done with full inclination of the will indeed, but at the same time with some repugnance of it. For example, the martyr who offers himself to death wills death simply, that is, he would not wish not to die; and the martyr who is dragged to death wills death in a qualified sense, that is, he would wish not to die.

a. In this division two diverse acts are considered and compared with each other, one of which is done without repugnance, while the other is done with repugnance. Voluntary simply is also called pure voluntary, and voluntary in a qualified sense is called mixed voluntary, because in the same act of the will an inclination is joined with repugnance.

b. The mixed voluntary, or voluntary in a qualified sense, contains in the same act an inclination or consent of the will joined with some repugnance toward that very thing into which the consent is borne, for example the migration of one who is sent into exile. Therefore the mixed voluntary is usually called voluntary simply and involuntary in a qualified sense: voluntary simply, because the will in fact wills the thing and consents to it; involuntary in a qualified sense, because the will would choose the contrary if this were possible. For example, in one who hands over a purse to a robber, handing over the purse is voluntary simply, because he absolutely wills the handing over of the purse, but it is involuntary in a qualified sense, because he would not hand it over unless moved by fear. Likewise the unjust action of one who lends at usury is voluntary simply, because he wills it absolutely, but involuntary in a qualified sense, because he knows that it is unjust.

c. Those things which are done from fear, for example denial of the faith from fear of death, are voluntary simply and involuntary in a qualified sense. A mixed voluntary of this sort is relatively imperfect on the part of consent if it is compared with the pure voluntary, but not of itself on the part of knowledge; therefore the mixed voluntary of itself constitutes a perfectly human act.

4. The voluntary is express and tacit. The former is present when elicited consent is manifested outwardly by words or other signs, as if a superior by stated words or a nod grants or denies something. The latter is present when elicited consent is not manifested outwardly, but is only gathered to be present from some fact or from the omission of a fact, as if a superior, knowing something to be done against the law, does not prohibit it; he is considered to consent tacitly or to give permission. Hence the axiom has prevailed: he who is silent seems to consent.

a. From tacit voluntary there must be distinguished presumed voluntary, which is had when in fact no act or consent of the will is present, but because of the fittingness of the matter it is supposed to be present; for if the matter were proposed, without doubt consent would in fact be present. For example, if someone says to a young man entering a tavern, from the presumed consent of the father: your father wishes you to return home. Sometimes even the tacit voluntary is called presumed, because its existence must be gathered or presumed from external signs and circumstances.

b. Concerning the saying, "he who is silent seems to consent," these things must be noted. Silence of itself signifies neither consent nor dissent; therefore in a particular case one or the other must be gathered from the circumstances. The following rules, however, are established so that the consent or dissent of one who is silent can be presumed from the circumstances according to prudent estimation:

a. One who is silent is considered to consent in favorable matters, namely where it concerns his favor and advantage, but not in odious matters, where it concerns his burden and prejudice. Hence one who is silent when another promises him something is considered to consent; but if someone asks that something be given to him by another and that other is silent, he is not considered to consent.

b. One who is silent is considered to consent even in odious matters if, not wishing to consent, he ought and could contradict; but he is not considered to consent if he is not bound to contradict or cannot. Now he is said not to be able when he cannot without harm or great inconvenience. One who takes a thing while the owner is present and not contradicting does not commit theft, because the owner is considered to consent, unless he is silent from fear or for another reason. And if a prince or superior knows that something is being done against order and does not contradict, he is considered to consent if he could easily contradict or impede it, but not if he could not easily impede it.

5. The voluntary is in itself and in another, or in the cause, which by others is called direct and indirect voluntary, by reason of the mode in which something is intended. The first is what the will immediately intends in itself; thus, for him who deliberately kills his enemy, the death of the enemy is voluntary in itself. The other is that which is not itself intended, but whose cause is intended, and which therefore is foreseen as going to follow from something which is intended in itself and immediately as from a cause; thus to one writing evil books, the sins of the readers, which he foresees but does not intend, are voluntary in the cause.²

a. In order that something be called voluntary in itself, it is not necessary that it be desired for its own sake or as an end, but it can also be desired for the sake of another thing or as a means. Thus for a shipmaster the throwing overboard of goods is voluntary in itself, although he does not will it for its own sake, but as a means for saving the life of those sailing.³ Likewise not only the cause but also the effect together with the cause can be voluntary in itself, provided the will also wills this in itself, as in one who wills, together with medicine, also the effect of health.

b. Something can be voluntary in the cause in two ways: either because by a positive action the cause is posited from which the effect is foreseen as going to follow, and this indeed is called voluntary in a positive cause; or because by omitting an action, the cause is not removed or not impeded, although it can be impeded, and this is called voluntary in a negative cause. Let the death of innocent men in a military commander who fires cannon into a fortress, and the burning of a house in one who does not extinguish a fire set by another, serve as examples.

c. Cause here in a broader sense signifies everything in which another thing is contained, whether as an effect in a cause, or as a part in a whole, or as connected with the other, so that the will cannot desire one without being considered to desire also the other.

d. Therefore the voluntary in the cause is generally an effect which is not intended but which follows apart from intention from a cause which is voluntary in itself and is intended.

6. The voluntary is actual, virtual, habitual, by reason of the influence which the act of the will exercises upon the work, or upon the effect. Since this voluntary agrees in reality with actual, virtual, and habitual intention, it is better to set forth this division under that respect. Intention is the act or tendency of the will toward some end to be obtained through apt means.

a. Actual intention is that which exists here and now, influences the work, and is adverted to reflexively when the work is placed. Thus one who here and now wills to confer baptism and in fact confers it has actual intention in conferring baptism.

It can be twofold: explicit, if the will intends what is apprehended clearly and distinctly, as if someone intends to confer the sacrament of baptism; or implicit, if that which the will intends is in some way contained in that which is explicitly known and intended, as if one baptizing intends to do what he saw the pastor doing. The former has actual explicit intention in conferring baptism; the latter actual implicit intention.

b. Virtual intention is that which, elicited previously, continues here and now, influences the work, but is not adverted to when the work is placed. Thus one who confers baptism which he had previously proposed to confer, but now, when he confers it, no longer thinks of this proposal, has virtual intention in conferring baptism.

The influence of virtual intention is discerned from this example. If someone goes walking after setting for himself the end of the walk, he does not think of the end at each step, but the intention of the end latently continues and brings it about that each step is suitably disposed to the end. This intention is called virtual from the force or virtue by which the act or intention of the will influences the action. What that force is which flows from an act of the will previously elicited into the action now to be placed, and brings it about that the action is virtually voluntary, is explained by authors in diverse ways;⁴ but all agree in this rule to be assigned for practice, by whose aid it can be judged how long a previously elicited intention continues and influences the action: namely, a previously elicited intention influences the action as long as the agent, although he does not think about the intention, nevertheless, if asked what or why he is acting, without a new act of the will and without reflection, from the mere remembrance of the prior intention, immediately says: I am doing this, or, I am doing this for that.⁵

c. Habitual intention is that which, elicited previously, no longer exists nor influences when the work is placed. Thus one who elicited the intention of offering tomorrow's sacrifice of the Mass for a deceased friend, and thinking no more about this intention celebrates tomorrow, applies the Mass from habitual intention.

a. In order that an action proceed from intention as from its cause, the intention must be actual or virtual; habitual intention does not suffice, since this no longer perseveres when the action is placed, nor influences it.

b. Nothing prevents someone from having several intentions at once, or intending several objects at once, whether these are ordered to one another, as if someone wills medicine and through it health, or are not ordered to one another, as if someone undertakes a pious pilgrimage to venerate a saint and to visit a friend.

¹ Ballerini-Palmieri I, n. 15-32. St. Thomas I-II, q. 6. Suarez, De voluntario et involuntario, disp. 10. Frins I, n. 77 ff.

² Others, who follow more exactly the way of speaking of St. Thomas, distinguish direct and indirect voluntary from voluntary in itself and in the cause, and define it so that it agrees with positive and negative voluntary. Cf. St. Thomas I-II, q. 6, a. 3; q. 77, a. 7.

³ Lehmkuhl I, n. 4.

⁴ On this matter Walsch n. 70 ff. and especially Frins I, n. 51-56 can be consulted.

⁵ Cf. Sporer-Bierbaum III, tr. 7, n. 107 ff.

44. On the involuntary. The involuntary is called that which does not proceed from the will. And since two things are required for the voluntary, consent of the will and knowledge of the intellect, it can happen in two ways that some action is involuntary to the agent: either because he is forced by an external force against the inclination of the will to place the action, as if someone is violently dragged to the shrine of an idol; or because he places the action ignorantly, as if someone kills a man thinking him to be a beast.

a. The involuntary is distinguished into negatively or privatively involuntary and positively involuntary. The former is had when no act exists in the will toward some object; the latter is had when there exists in the will toward some object an act of aversion or unwillingness.

The privatively involuntary is also called the non-voluntary. There are some who distinguish between involuntary and non-voluntary: they call involuntary what someone does while ignorant, which he would not have done if he had known, and therefore against the will; they call non-voluntary what someone indeed does while ignorant, but which he would have done even if he had known, and therefore without the will. The former is done from error, the latter with error. Thus if someone, wishing to kill a beast, kills the goat of his enemy, whom he has long intended to harm, the killing of the goat is indeed not involuntary, but nevertheless non-voluntary.

b. There is perfect and imperfect involuntary. The former is had when the will fully and, as far as lies in it, efficaciously rejects something; the latter is had when the will rejects something weakly and remissly, only with some hesitation. A temptation against faith, charity, or chastity which is entirely rejected without hesitation is perfectly involuntary; but one which is rejected with some hesitation and negligence is imperfectly involuntary.

Human acts, the subject-matter of moral theology, are also called voluntary acts to distinguish them from such actions as are produced under external compulsion. For voluntary acts are the effect of an internal principle, the will (voluntas). The term, however, is ordinarily used not of all actions which are produced by an internal principle, for some of these are specially denominated spontaneous or reflex actions. These latter are the immediate result of sense excitation without the intervention of consciousness. Thus the eyelid closes to protect the threatened organ, and the hand rises involuntarily to drive off a troublesome fly. Voluntary in the strict sense is used only of actions produced by the will with rational knowledge of, and inclination towards, the object. Voluntary actions are produced with consciousness and deliberation. Thus, practically and in the concrete, voluntary actions are identical with human acts, though their connotation is different. For human acts connote freedom, as we have seen, while an act may be voluntary and yet not free. The beatific vision by which the blessed see God face to face, and are thereby thrilled with ineffable delight, is a voluntary act; it proceeds from the will with full and clear knowledge of God, but it is not free; the blessed cannot avert their gaze from the Infinite Beauty which enraptures every fibre of their being. However, all voluntary acts of man are in this life free, and so, for the purposes of moral theology, human acts and voluntary acts are interchangeable terms.

An act may be voluntary in various ways:

(a) An act is perfectly voluntary if it proceeds from the will with full knowledge and deliberation; if the knowledge and deliberation are not full, the act is imperfectly voluntary.

(b) Simply or absolutely voluntary is distinguished from voluntary under a certain respect, or secundum quid. More commonly an action which under the circumstances is willed, but which would not be willed if the circumstances were different, is said to be simply or absolutely voluntary; while inasmuch as the same action would not be willed if the circumstances were different, it may also be said to be only voluntary under a certain respect. Thus, to take the well-worn example, when the merchant is willing in a storm that his goods should be thrown overboard to save the ship, the action is simply voluntary; he would not will it unless the ship were in danger, so that it is also voluntary only under a certain respect.

(c) An action is said to be voluntary in itself when it is in itself and by itself the object of the will; if it is merely the effect of something else which is willed, it is then called voluntary in something else, or voluntary in the cause.

Frequently directly and indirectly voluntary are used in the same sense as voluntary in itself and voluntary in the cause.

All voluntary action is imputed to the agent for praise or blame, merit or demerit; for the action is free, as we have seen, and proceeds from a positive inclination of the will. This inclination of the will is an important element in voluntary actions; the absence of it prevents the sin of man being imputed to God as voluntary, and the same principle sometimes justifies us in performing an action which is right in itself, though some of its effects are evil. But this is an important point and requires fuller treatment.

First of all then, let us see what is required before an evil effect of my action can justly be imputed to me and make me morally guilty.

(a) The evil effect must in some measure be foreseen, otherwise it will be involuntary and not imputable. And so no moral blame attaches to a man who, thinking that he is drinking water, swallows poison. (b) The agent must be able to prevent the evil effect, for we are only responsible for what is under our control. The engine-driver of an express train is not responsible for the death of a person who suddenly throws himself under the wheels of the engine.

(c) There must be an obligation not to perform the action by reason of the evil effect which would follow from it. If the evil effect follows merely by accident, it does not render an otherwise lawful action unlawful, and I am not bound to abstain from it on account of the mere possibility of the evil effect following from it. Thus, if a hundred people indulge in hunting or motoring for a considerable time, some one of them is morally certain to meet with an accident endangering lite or limb. But this does not make hunting or motoring morally wrong. Though I am conscious that the accident may happen to me, I may nevertheless hunt or use the motorcar as usual. If I kill myself or someone else, it will be merely by accident, for it is presumed that I use reasonable care to avoid mishap.

On the other hand, a superior, whose commands I am bound to obey, may have used his authority to forbid an action on account of the possible evil effect which may follow therefrom. In that case I must abstain from the action by reason of the command of my superior, though otherwise I should be free. And so if a father, for special reasons, forbids his son to go to the theatre, the son should obey, as long as he is subject to parental authority. Again, even though there may be no positive command of a superior, in cases where no good would come from the action, and where the only effects would be evil, I am bound to abstain from the action, which in that case itself becomes evil. Similarly, where the evil effects are largely in excess of the good, right reason tells me that I must abstain from the action. But there are many actions which are forbidden by no lawful authority, which have both good and evil effects, while it is not clear that the latter largely outweigh the former. Am I bound to abstain from such actions, or when am I bound to abstain from them ?

In order to provide a general rule of conduct in such circumstances, divines have formulated what is known as the principle of a double effect. That principle may be enunciated as follows: It is lawful to perform an action which produces two effects, one good, the other bad, provided that (1) the action, viewed in itself, is good, or at least indifferent; (2) the agent does not intend the evil effect, but only the good; (3) the good effect is produced as immediately as—that is, not by means of— the bad; and (4) there is a sufficiently weighty reason for permitting the evil effect.

This rule will furnish us with a guide in case of doubt whether we are bound to abstain from any given action because of some evil effect which will follow from it. We shall be at liberty to perform the action in question provided that four conditions are realized. In the first place, the action itself, apart from the evil effect, must not be bad. If it is bad in itself, there can be no question about its lawfulness. Further, the agent must not intend the evil effect, though he foresees that it will follow. If he intends it, the evil effect becomes voluntary in itself and imputable to the agent. Then, the good effect must not be the result of the bad, for we must not do evil that good may come; the end does not justify the means.1 Lastly, there must be such a proportion between the good and bad effects that right reason tells me that I am not forbidden to forego the good effect of the action on account of the bad being inextricably bound up with it.

The question as to whether a general is justified in ordering his army to take a stronghold by assault in war will serve to illustrate the principle and its use. In the first place, the assault must be justified by itself, apart from the cost in human life. The assault will be justified in itself if the war is just and the stronghold belongs to the enemy; it will not be justified if the war is one of unjust aggression, or if the general has been expressly ordered by his Government not to take the place. Moreover, the general must not directly intend the necessary loss of life among the innocent non-belligerents.

He foresees and deplores it; he is said in the technical language of theology to permit the evil effect, not to intend it. The slaughter of innocent non-belligerents must not be the means chosen to capture the stronghold; evil may not be done that good may come. Finally, the capture of the place must be a matter of sufficient importance in the war to warrant the shedding of innocent blood in the bombardment, and the other evils necessarily entailed in an assault. The question as to when the good result is sufficient to outweigh the evil is largely a matter of sound judgement after a careful examination of all the circumstances. If the successful storming of the place would only add to the personal reputation of the general without bringing the end of the war any the nearer, the assault would be a crime; if it would compel the enemy to sue for peace, it would usually be justified. This principle is of great importance in Moral Theology; it has in its support the common consent of divines, and is expressly used by St Thomas.”

If I am not justified, according to the foregoing principle, in performing an action which causes some evil effect, that evil effect is imputable to me though I did not intend it in itself; it is not indeed voluntary in itself, but it is voluntary in its cause, and I am bound to avoid evil even though only voluntary in its cause.

When, however, evil is not voluntary in itself, but only voluntary in its cause, a question arises concerning the degree of moral guilt which is contracted when such a cause of evil is posited unwarrantably. The case arises especially when grave evil is the result of an action which in itself is only venially sinful, as when grave harm is the result of slight negligence. Of course, great evil arising from grave negligence is seriously sinful even though only voluntary in the cause; and so a doctor who through grave negligence kills his patient is guilty of a great sin, though he did not intend the homicide.

But supposing that in passing through a gate in the country I leave it open, owing to slight negligence, and in consequence a neighbour’s crop is seriously damaged by his cows getting among the corn; do I commit a grave sin in that case¹ Of course, if owing to the circumstances I clearly foresaw that the damage was certain to follow and I could easily have closed the gate if I chose, I certainly sin grievously in not closing it; the negligence is then grave. But our case supposes circumstances to be such that the negligence is only slight, partly on account of the uncertainty of harm following, partly because I had frequently seen the gate standing open, and for other reasons. Will the neglect to close the gate after me in such circumstances be grievously sinful on account of the serious harm to my neighbour which was the consequence² ‘The answer must be ‘“‘ No.”’ For the harm did not follow necessarily and exclusively from my neglect; my action was not the immediate and necessary cause of the damage done to the crop; other agents intervened; my action was only slightly responsible for what followed. Inasmuch, then, as the malice of the cause is only slight, and this alone is voluntary in itself, the evil effect which is only voluntary in the cause will be imputed only as a venial sin.

¹ Rom. iii 8.

² Summa, 2-2, q. 64, a. 7.

'Theologians dispute about the question whether such a sin of omission as is committed by not closing the gate after me, with resulting loss to my neighbour, can be committed without a special act, by simply neglecting to put the act which was of obligation.

The question is not a very practical one; it will be sufficient to say in reply that physically a man who adverts to the obligation of doing something may hold himself neutral, and so sin by omission without doing anything; practically, however, in such cases, a positive determination is formed not to perform the duty, or at least to perform something else which is foreseen to be an obstacle to the performance of the duty.¹

¹ Suarez, tract. 5, d. 3, sec. 2, n. 6.

The question sometimes arises at what time a sin of omission or a sin which is voluntary only in the cause is committed. When a man gets drunk on the Saturday evening and foresees that in consequence he will not be able to attend Mass on the following day, is the sin of omitting to hear Mass committed on the Saturday night, when he voluntarily posits the cause of his not hearing Mass on the following day, or on the Sunday, when Mass is not heard as is of obligation? Inasmuch as a formal sin is a human act, it would seem that we must say with St Alphonsus¹ that the sin is committed when the cause of the omission or of the evil is voluntarily posited, otherwise we should have to say that a man may commit sin without knowing it, or while he is asleep. ‘10.

¹ Theol. Mor. lib. 5,

I. Notion of the voluntary. The voluntary is that which proceeds in any way whatsoever from the will, whether it is the actuation of the will itself, as the willing of drunkenness; or the actuation of another faculty from the command of the will, as drunkenness committed. Moreover, an effect following from an action or omission is usually called voluntary when it could and ought to have been foreseen, as pollution following from drunkenness and foreseen.

Since the will is a rational appetite, it cannot act except from a prior cognition of reason or intellect. Besides, for the sake of completeness and clarity, note:

1. The voluntary differs:

a) From the willed, insofar as the willed extends more widely than the voluntary. For the willed is the object of the will, or that toward which the will is borne, whether it depends on the will and is voluntary, or does not depend on it, as, for example, excellent weather, which is willed by farmers but is nevertheless not voluntary.

b) From the violent, which is from a principle extrinsic to the will, while the will resists or at least contributes nothing, as motion inflicted on someone by an external cause.

c) From the spontaneous, which proceeds from the sensitive appetite, from sensitive cognition, as the anger of a beast.

d) From the natural, which proceeds from an intrinsic principle without cognition, as a vegetative act (cf. St. Alphonsus, V, nn. VI-VIII).

2. Since the voluntary, as we have said, requires prior knowledge, it extends only to things known. Hence, in order that "some action be called wholly voluntary, it is necessary that it be known according to all its parts and circumstances. If any one of these is unknown, the action is not called voluntary with respect to that unknown circumstance. Thus, one who approaches a woman whom he does not know to be married does not commit the sin of adultery, but of simple fornication, since he is involuntary with respect to the circumstance of marriage, which he does not know" (St. Alphonsus, V, VIII).

3. The involuntary is opposed to the voluntary. It is taken in two senses, negatively and positively. Taken negatively, it is the same as the merely non-voluntary, or signifies that which the will neither positively wills nor positively does not will. Taken positively, that is called involuntary which the will by a positive act does not will or turns away from (St. Alphonsus, V, XIII).

II. Division of the voluntary. The voluntary is distinguished:

1. Into elicited and commanded (n. 17).

2. Into perfect and imperfect, according as cognition and deliberation, and therefore the consent of the will, are sufficiently perfect or only half-full. Imperfectly voluntary are the acts of one half-mad, half-asleep, half-drunk, or otherwise distracted (St. Alphonsus, V, 3).

3. Into pure and mixed, or voluntary in a qualified sense, according as the will chooses something without, or with, some rational or deliberate repugnance. Thus the throwing overboard of merchandise, lest a ship sink, is voluntary in a qualified sense. From what has been said, it is plain that the voluntary in a qualified sense can be perfectly voluntary (St. Alphonsus, V, IX).¹

4. Into express and tacit, according as it is signified by words or equivalent signs, or can only be gathered from some act or omission.

5. Into explicit and implicit, according as something is willed distinctly or according to its proper concept, or is contained in another thing explicitly willed, as if one about to baptize says or at least confusedly thinks: I wish to do what Christ instituted, or what the Church intends in these things.

6. Into actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative, as was said concerning intention (n. 14), and as is usefully applied to the voluntary. The actual is that which depends on the will actually influencing, or that which is elicited or commanded by the will under attention of mind. The virtual is that which depends on a will that has been had and is influencing only virtually, or that which is done by force of a past act, as if a priest wills to celebrate Mass and by force of that will celebrates, without attending to the things which he performs.² The habitual is that which depends on a will that has been had and not retracted, but nevertheless is not virtually influencing, although, since it has not been retracted, it morally perseveres. Thus the reception of Extreme Unction is habitually voluntary for a dying person deprived of the senses, who previously wished to receive that sacrament and did not retract that will. The interpretative is taken in different senses. Some, by the name of interpretative voluntary, understand the implicit voluntary; thus according to some, one who has willed or wills the means of salvation has implicitly willed or wills Baptism. Others call that interpretatively voluntary which the will neither actually wills nor has willed, but nevertheless would will if it thought about it (St. Alphonsus, VI, 15).

7. Into the directly voluntary, or voluntary in itself, and the indirectly voluntary, or voluntary in another, or in the cause. The direct is that which is intended in itself, whether as an end or for its own sake, or as a means. Hence, if someone makes himself drunk in order to suffer pollution, both the drunkenness and the pollution are directly voluntary: the former is intended as a means, the latter as an end. As is plain from the example given, even an effect can be directly voluntary. The indirectly voluntary is usually said to be that which is not intended in itself, yet is foreseen as going to follow from another thing, whether from an action or from an omission, and is permitted when someone can and ought to avoid the action or omission so that the effect may be avoided. Thus if someone makes himself drunk, with pollution foreseen but not intended, the pollution is indirectly voluntary (St. Alphonsus, V, IX, 3). Others call what follows from an action that should be avoided voluntary in the cause, and what arises from an omission that should be avoided indirectly voluntary (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 6, a. 3; q. 77, a. 7).

Objection. What is foreseen as going to follow from an action cannot be said to be permitted.

Response. I deny the assertion, because nothing prevents the will from being borne toward the cause, for example toward horseback riding, but not toward the effect, for example toward the pollution going to follow (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 77, a. 7). It is rightly said, however, that what follows from an action is not merely permitted, because someone at least in some way cooperates toward it. But this must also be said of that which follows from an omission, if the omission, for example neglect of a precept, exercises a moral influence, for example, on the sin of one's neighbor.

¹ Others, however, take the said words in another sense.

² There are some who explain the virtual voluntary in another way, so that it is nothing other than the actual unconscious. Thus, for example, Lugo (De sacramentis in genere, disputation 8, section 5, and De poenitentia, disputation 7, number 40) teaches that that by which the will previously conceived perseveres in the virtual will is "the very act of the will, now confused and imperceptible, which almost escapes our attention and of which we cannot give an account." We freely concede indeed that the intention which is called virtual is often in fact such as Lugo describes it, namely properly actual, but unconsciously. Yet psychological consciousness seems to testify that there is also another merely virtual volition, which does not in fact include an act, but is merely the effect of that action previously willed.

Two Kinds of Voluntary Acts.—Having discussed human or voluntary acts in general, we shall now indicate in particular the acts that are of this kind. There are two classes of voluntary acts: (a) those elicited by the will; (b) those commanded by the will.

Acts Elicited by the Will.—The first class of acts under the control of the will are those that are performed by the will itself—i.e., that are begun and completed in that power of the soul.

There are three acts of the will that are directed to the end the will has in view, viz., wish, intention and fruition. Wish is the love or inclination of the will towards the end without any reference to the means by which it is to be obtained: this is the first act of the will. Intention is the direction of the will to the gaining of the end through certain means. Fruition is the enjoyment of the end after it has been gained: this is the last act of the will.

There are three acts of the will that are directed to the means and that follow after intention, viz., consent, election, and use. Consent follows upon the counsel of the intellect, and is an act of the will agreeing to several means as suitable for the intended end. Election follows after a practical judgment of the intellect about the means consented to, and is an act of the will which chooses one of the means in preference to the others, as being most suitable for gaining the intended end. Use is the act by which the will directs and moves the other powers to employ the particular means that has been chosen.

Acts Commanded by the Will.—The second class of acts that are under the control of the will are those that proceed, not from the will itself, but from the other powers under the direction of the will.

Acts commanded by the will are of various kinds: (a) intellectual acts, such as judgment, reasoning, etc., performed under the direction of the will, (b) sensible acts such as sight, hearing, imagination, the passions of love, hate, etc.; (c) external corporal acts, such as walking, writing, etc. None of the foregoing acts need be commanded by the will, as they may be indeliberate (see 23).

The following kinds of acts are not subject to the control of the will: (a) intellectual acts, such as the assent of the reason to self-evident truths, as regards the specification of the act; (b) sensible acts, such as the passions considered as arising from bodily dispositions before they are adverted to; (c) acts of the vegetative life, such as digestion and growth; (d) bodily movements, such as the circulation of the blood and the beating of the heart.

What are human acts? - An act in created things is the determination of some potency or faculty. Hence human acts are acts of human faculties. But human acts are considered in moral theology in the genus of morals, or insofar as they are moral acts. Hence here "moral acts and human acts are the same." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3. But "the genus of morals begins where dominion of the will is first found." S. Th. 2. D. 24. q. 3. a. 2. Therefore human acts are, in general, acts of man by which man himself orders himself to an end suitable to him. Therefore human acts can be considered either in relation to the man who is ordered to the end by them, or in relation to the end to which he is ordered by their help. We shall speak step by step of human acts considered in both respects. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2; E. M. n. 4.

What is the division of the treatment of human acts in relation to man? - Human acts, considered in relation to man, can be inspected in two ways: 1. Insofar as they proceed from human faculties, which is to consider them in their intrinsic nature. For an act in general, in created things, as was just said, is nothing other than the determination of some faculty from being able to be to being. And therefore they are called acts, not actions. For an act is so called by reason of its intrinsic principle; an action, when it comes forth outwardly, from which also the effect differs if it follows, for the action is the object of the act. 2. Insofar as they fall short of this proper nature of theirs because of impediments, which do not allow the human faculties to act rightly.

We shall speak first of the intrinsic nature of the human act; then of its impediments. E. M.

What is the intrinsic nature of the human act? - Usage has obtained that a distinction be made between an act of man and a human act. An act of man is called one which proceeds from man without advertence and deliberation, or without deliberation only. But human acts are called those which proceed, not in any way whatever, but with advertence and deliberation. Nor indeed was that distinction made without reason. For "of the actions which are done by man, those alone are properly called human which are proper to man insofar as he is man" (namely adequately, both as to the substance of the work and as to the mode of operating). "But man differs from other irrational creatures in this, that he is master of his acts.... But man is master of his acts through reason and will; hence free choice is said to be the faculty of will and reason. Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from deliberate will. But if any other actions befit man, they can indeed be called actions of man, but not properly human actions, since they are not of man insofar as he is man." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 1.

Moreover, a human act can be elicited or commanded, according as it is performed by the will alone, or also by another potency; merely internal or external, or mixed, according as it is performed by a power of the soul alone, or also by another faculty of the body; natural or supernatural, according as it is brought about by the powers of nature alone, or also by the powers of grace; good, bad, indifferent, and meritorious or demeritorious from its relation and order to the rule of morality, to reward or punishment; valid or invalid, according as it has all the things required for its effect, or not.

Now, since a human act is an act proceeding from deliberate will, and therefore voluntary and free, so that we may know its nature more deeply, it is necessary briefly to explain 1. the nature of the voluntary, 2. the nature of the free, 3. finally, in how many ways any act can proceed from a deliberate will. And this is done in the following questions. E. M. n. 6, 69, 71, 72, 74, 89.

What is the voluntary; how many acceptions of the voluntary are there? - R. To the first: The voluntary, so called from the will, is that which proceeds from or is caused by the will, which is the rational appetite. Therefore the voluntary is nothing except either an act of the will or the effect of that act. Therefore the voluntary differs from the willed, which designates only the object of the act of the will. Since the voluntary proceeds from the will, which is a principle intrinsic to the agent, it agrees with any natural motion, but differs from the violent; for the former proceeds from an intrinsic principle, the latter from an extrinsic principle.

R. To the second: The voluntary can be taken in three ways: 1. more broadly, for the spontaneous; 2. more strictly, for the voluntary precisely as such, namely insofar as it differs from the spontaneous and from the free, or at least abstracts from the free; 3. most strictly, for the free. The spontaneous is that which proceeds from the sensitive appetite from a prior sensitive cognition of the object toward which the appetite tends. "The reason is that, just as the appetite of nature follows from the natural form, so the elicited appetite follows from the apprehended form, the act representing the object." Suarez, on 1. 2, tr. 2, d. 6, s. 4. Therefore the spontaneous belongs both to men and to brute animals.

The voluntary properly is that which proceeds from the spiritual appetite, or will, with prior rational cognition of the object or end. Finally, the free is that which proceeds from the will determining itself to an act, with the power of eliciting that very act, or not eliciting it, or of eliciting another. Therefore the free essentially includes the notion of the voluntary; and the voluntary also essentially includes the notion of the free, if indeed the voluntary is taken according to the proper meaning of the word, but adequately, both as to the substance of the act and as to the mode of operation proper to the will. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1, 2; q. 8. a. 1; q. 26. a. 1; 2. D. 25. q. 1. a. 1; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 1, 3, 6; L. 1. 5. n. 6.

You will resolve: The voluntary cannot be had without prior cognition. Nothing is willed unless first known. Nevertheless a clear and distinct knowledge of the thing is not always necessary; for obscure and confused knowledge is sufficient. And thus an adult is validly baptized, even though he does not yet have all Christian obligations fully examined. Moreover, the voluntary cannot exist except concerning a determinate thing. For the will is moved only to the good; but the good has the notion of an end. "Since the good is what all things seek, and this has the notion of an end, it is manifest that the good imports the notion of an end." S. Th. 1. p. q. 5. a. 4. But an end is nothing except something certain and determinate. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2. And therefore he who wills to contract betrothal with either one of two women does not contract; and the priest who wills to consecrate any one host out of several hosts does not consecrate. Sanchez, l. 1, d. 26, s. 1; Rubr. Miss. de Defect., title 7, n. 1; L. 1. 3. n. 203, 224.

Finally, the voluntary cannot exist concerning an impossible thing. For "the will is a certain rational appetite; but every appetite is only of the good. The reason for this is that appetite is nothing other than a certain inclination into something. But nothing is inclined except into something similar and suitable." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 8. a. 1. Yet it is by no means required that the voluntary be only concerning a true and real good. "For the will to tend into something, it is not required that it be good in the truth of the thing, but that it be apprehended under the notion of good; and on account of this the Philosopher says: the end is a good, or an apparent good." S. Th. 1. c.

Can the voluntary at least exist concerning a thing impossible, not in fact, but in law? - Concerning a thing impossible as to the fact itself, the voluntary cannot exist, as is clear from what was said in n. 9, if one uses reason rightly. Hence no one can seriously will to touch with his hand the empty space outside the world.

Concerning a thing impossible only as to law, there is a question: for example, contracting marriage with one who has a diriment impediment, consecrating water, baptizing with wine, etc. But it seems that this must be affirmed; since the will is borne into the fact itself, and it is not necessarily borne at the same time into the law, or into the fact only dependently upon the law. And thus one who contracts marriage with a diriment impediment unknown to him, and one who even attempts marriage before a civil magistrate, truly wills, as far as he is concerned, to contract marriage. Hence it is that the Church afterward sometimes dispenses in the root, namely without a renewed consent, and validates the marriage. And indeed C. Ex sponsalibus, sole chapter, de Spons. et Matr. in the Sixth, says: "From pure and certain betrothals, even if they are null by reason of consanguinity, affinity, frigidity, religion, or any other reason whatever, provided they are not null from defect of consent, there arises ... the impediment of public honesty of justice." Therefore true consent with a diriment impediment is openly supposed. Cf. vol. 2, n. 1033; Sanchez, de Matr., l. 2, d. 33.

What is the free, and how many kinds are there? - The free adds to the voluntary only a relation to the potency eliciting the voluntary act and having the power to suspend it, or to elicit another act, different only in species, or even opposed. In the first case it is called liberty of exercise or of contradiction. In the second case, liberty of specification. In the third case, liberty of contrariety.

Therefore the free certainly requires in the potency or faculty an intrinsic dominion of the act, and accordingly immunity not only from extrinsic coercion, but also from intrinsic necessity; but it by no means requires immunity also from weakness, namely from concupiscence and the other miseries of human life, which, as extrinsic, and neither coercing nor necessitating, cannot change the intrinsic manner of acting of the human will. "The free is that which is the cause of itself." S. Th. C. G. l. 2, c. 48. And this liberty is altogether necessary for meriting or demeriting.

This liberty of which we are speaking is physical liberty. But moral liberty involves in its concept the absence not only of physical necessity of acting, but also of moral obligation by force of a law commanding or prohibiting. S. Th. 1. p. q. 83; 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2; E. M. n. 10, 11.

There is indeed no doubt that various interior dispositions of the soul and body of man, and also exterior conditions of man, can influence human acts. Hence moral statistics collects the moral facts of men, in various conditions of persons, in order to investigate their causes, whether internal or external. And it especially dwells upon enumerating criminal facts. But criminal anthropology insists upon investigating the causes of crimes, some of which are internal, various diseases, neurasthenia, epilepsy, etc., others external, education, the company of associates, the reading of books and newspapers, etc. Psychopathology or Psychiatry considers the influence of various diseases upon various crimes. But from all these exterior and interior causes, although the voluntary and the free can be diminished, as will later be seen in the impediments of human acts, nevertheless liberty is by no means taken away, unless madness entirely perverts the use of reason. For from these there can indeed be inadvertence, inconsideration, ignorance, the excitation of concupiscence and of the passions, a contracted habit, and imaginations clinging to the mind, and certain fixed judgments; by all of these an inclination to acting can indeed be had, greater or lesser, but in no way an intrinsic necessity of acting. If the intellective faculty is not injured, through whatever bodily disturbance, the liberty of the will always remains.

In human acts is the free truly found not only from coercion, but also from necessity? - R. Affirmatively. It is a truth of faith, which is most openly clear from Scripture and Tradition; notably from Trent, sess. 6, c. 4-6. The reason is that "if some good is proposed to the will which has the complete notion of good, as the ultimate end, on account of which all things are sought, it cannot not will to be happy, or will to be miserable. But in those things which are ordered to the ultimate end, nothing is found so evil that it does not have some good mixed in, nor anything so good that it suffices in all respects; hence, however much the good or the evil is shown, it can always adhere and flee into the contrary by reason of the other thing which is in it; from which it is taken, if it is evil simply, as an apparent good; and if it is good simply, as an apparent evil; and hence it is that in all things which fall under election the will remains free, having determination in this alone, that it naturally seeks happiness, and not determinately in this or in that." S. Th. 2. D. 25. q. 1. a. 2.

Hence, as is clear, that power toward opposites, by which the act of the will is placed by the will itself, presupposes in its exercise the objective indifference of the judgment of the intellect, which consists in this: that the intellect proposes to the will in the object various notions of suitability or unsuitability, of good or evil. Therefore liberty is concerned with particular goods to be sought. But as regards the seeking of happiness in general, the human will is not free as to the specification of the act, because it cannot will the opposite; but it is free as to the exercise of the act, because someone can not wish then to think about beatitude. S. Th. de Malo, q. 6, sole article.

From the liberty by which human acts are performed, they are said to be imputable to the agent, namely the honesty or baseness of the act redounds to the agent himself, as to its author. Eccl. 15:11 ff.; Trent, sess. 6, c. 4-6; St. Augustine, Enchir., c. 105; S. Th. 1. 2, Prologue, q. 10. a. 2; q. 13. a. 6; 2. D. 25. q. 1. a. 1; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 2; Wurzburg, de Act. hum., c. 2; E. M. n. 10, 11.

"It follows that, when a grave temptation has arisen, and after the sensitive appetite, concupiscible, venereal, or irascible, is vehemently excited by phantasy or from elsewhere, then, I say, acts of a threefold kind can be given in the will. 1. Those which precede the use of reason, and are elicited by the one tempted in that instant or time in which the intellect does not yet propose to the will motives deterring it, but only motives enticing it toward that object into which the appetite is borne. And these acts of the will are called first-first motions. 2. Those which follow upon some use of reason, and are elicited by the one tempted in that instant in which the intellect proposes the deterring motives only obscurely, but the enticing motives toward illicit love or toward hatred so vividly that the will is moved only weakly and imperfectly by the deterring motives.

And these acts of the will are called second-first motions. 3. Finally, those which follow upon the perfect use of reason, and are elicited by the will in that instant in which the intellect has proposed to the will, sufficiently clearly and intensely, deterring motives or the unsuitability and moral malice, by which the will could freely be deterred if it seriously wished. And these acts of the will are called deliberate acts. "Acts of the first kind are not free, and consequently they are not formally sinful. But acts of the second kind are imperfectly free, and only venially sinful. But acts of the third kind are perfectly free, and consequently, if there is gravity of matter, they are mortally sinful." Struggl, Theol. Mor., tr. 1, q. 1, a. 1, v. 10; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 10. a. 3.

In how many ways does the voluntary proceed from the will? Since the voluntary presupposes the apprehension of the intellect, includes an act of the will and the exercise of liberty, and extends itself also to some extrinsic act, or extrinsic action, hence the voluntary is from the will in many ways, and from this arise various divisions of the voluntary, which we shall now explain.

What is the voluntary elicitedly and commandingly? - The first is had when the whole act is performed by the will and in the will, without the aid of another faculty, whether interior and spiritual, or exterior and bodily; such are volitions and nolitions.

The second is had when the act indeed depends upon the very command of the will, but nevertheless is performed by another faculty of the agent; whether interior, as are the intellect, phantasy, memory; or exterior, as are the members of the body and the organs of the senses, as to walk or to speak. But an act can be at the same time elicited and commanded; for the will can command itself in its own acts. And in this way one virtue, for example charity, commands the acts of other virtues, when the will from the motive of one virtue elicits the act of another virtue, for example, from love of God it has mercy on the poor. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 1 ad 2; q. 17. a. 5; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 10, s. 1, 2.

What is the division of acts elicited by the will? - The division is twofold, according as these acts consist in the pursuit of good, or in flight from evil; and according as they are concerned with the end or with the means.

What are the acts of the will which consist in the pursuit of good and in flight from evil? - These acts of the will can be distinguished according as the passions of the sensitive appetite, to which they correspond, are distinguished. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 22. Now the passions are: love, to which hatred is opposed; desire or concupiscence, to which flight or abomination is opposed; delight, to which sadness is opposed; hope, to which despair is opposed; daring, to which fear is opposed; finally anger, which has no opposite.

S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23. The first three are passions of the concupiscible; the four latter are passions of the irascible. Love is the simple complacency of good, which proceeds from the connaturality and coaptation of the one appetizing with regard to the thing suitable to him. Dilection adds to love a preceding election; charity adds to love a certain perfection, insofar as that which is loved is esteemed of great price. One love is of friendship, another of concupiscence. For to love is to will good to someone. Toward that good which someone wills to someone there is love of concupiscence. Toward that to which someone wills good there is love of friendship. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 26.

Hatred is the simple displeasure and detestation of evil, which arises from a certain dissonance of the appetite toward that which is apprehended as repugnant and harmful. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 29. One hatred is of abomination, another of enmity. The former is the detestation of some evil of a person; the latter is also the detestation of the person himself, to whom one wills evil. Concupiscence or desire is the movement of the appetite into an absent good. Flight or abomination is the detestation of an absent evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 30.

Delight is a certain repose of the appetite from the presence of a delighting good. Sadness is a certain pain from the presence of evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 31, 35. Hope is the movement of the appetite into a future good, arduous, possible to obtain, and according to this possibility or impossibility hope differs from despair. Hence it is that hope imports a certain approach to an arduous good; despair, on the contrary, imports withdrawal from it. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 40. a. 1, 4. "Fear flees future harm because of its victory over the one fearing; but daring attacks imminent danger because of its victory over the danger itself." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 45. a. 1. For fear "does not regard evil absolutely, but with a certain difficulty or arduousness, so that it can scarcely be resisted." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 41. a. 2 ad 3. "According to the opposition of good and evil, fear is contrary to hope; according to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, daring is contrary to fear, but despair to hope." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 45. a. 1 ad 3.

Anger is the appetite of vengeance, as possible to itself. It seeks evil itself under the notion of vindictive justice. Hence it regards one object according to the notion of good, namely the vengeance which it seeks, and another according to the notion of evil, namely the harmful man, against whom it wills to be avenged through the infliction of punishment. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 46. a. 2, 6. It has no contrary either according to approach and withdrawal, or according to the opposition of good and evil. For it is a movement toward attacking the injurious evil already lying upon one. Hence neither can there be a movement toward fleeing evil; nor can there be a movement toward good: for when this has been obtained, there is repose and joy of the appetite. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23. a. 3.

What are the acts of the will which are concerned with the end and with the means? "Every action of the will is concerned either with the end, or with the means, which can happen in two ways, either by appetizing or by executing. From this arises a twofold order of acts of the will and of the practical intellect, which governs the will in morals. The first contains all those acts which are necessary up to the final election of the means, which are will, intention, counsel, consent, election. The first two are concerned with the end; the latter with the means, in the order in which they have been numbered. But once the election has been established, the will proceeds to free execution, and thus there is the second order, in which only two acts are numbered: command and use. To these acts fruition is added, which is not an operation ordered to seeking or attaining the end; but, rather, once the end has been obtained, it follows upon it." Suarez, tr. 2, d. 6, at the beginning.

What is will? - Will, or simple volition, is the first act of the will, which is as it were the first inclination of the will toward the proposed object, as toward something lovable of itself, without any order to another. From this it is clear that this act is concerned with the end; for only the end is lovable of itself. But it does not include a tendency into the end, standing only in love and complacency for that good, and therefore it is simple volition, or love and complacency, still inefficacious. Suarez, tr. 2, d. 6, s. 1; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 8. a. 1, 2.

What is intention? - Intention is a free or perfectly voluntary tendency into a good, so that we may attain it. Therefore intention is a tendency of the will into some end to be obtained through due means. It is a purpose and desire toward the thing loved, and of itself is an efficacious desire. For purpose is had when someone determines with himself to do something. But desire, in its general signification, signifies any appetition whatever of obtaining a good which someone lacks; and it extends not only to the appetition of an efficacious will, but also to imperfect volitions, or velleities, even of impossible things. Intention, either virtually or expressly, is also an appetition of the means in common. The reason is that intention is the efficacious will of obtaining the end. But to will the end, absolutely as something to be attained as such, is virtually to will to execute all the means necessary to the end. Moreover someone can explicitly elicit this act: I will to employ all the means necessary for the end; this act is intention, because it precedes every consultation about the means and every election, and is the principle of counsel and election. In common, not in particular; for by this reason it is distinguished from election. Suarez, tr. 2, s. 2; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 8. a. 2; q. 12.

Can someone intend several things at the same time; and if several incompatible things are intended, which intention prevails? - R. To the first: Affirmatively. For either those things are ordered to one another, or they are not. "If indeed they have been ordered to one another, it is manifest that man can intend many things at the same time. For there is intention not only of the ultimate end, but also of an intermediate end: but someone simultaneously intends both the proximate and the ultimate end, as the making of medicine and health. But if two things not ordered to one another are taken, thus also man can intend several things at the same time, which is clear from the fact that man chooses one thing before another, because it is better than the other. But among the other conditions by which something is better than another, one is that it is useful for several things. Hence something can be chosen before another from the fact that it is useful for several things, and thus manifestly man intends several things at the same time." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 12. a. 3.

R. To the second: If those wills are simultaneous, the predominant one prevails, namely the one which would be chosen if the impossibility were known. If neither is more powerful, neither prevails, and accordingly neither is valid. If among contrary wills one succeeds another, the later prevails over the former; for it is predominant in the order of time and actuality. Except if the former is more powerful, or has revoked, at least virtually, every subsequent will; for then the former will, provided it is not expressly revoked, is certainly predominant. Lugo, de Sacr., d. 8, n. 121, 123; L. 1. 6. n. 24.

You will resolve: If one person asked you for a Mass in thanksgiving, another for someone gravely sick, it must be held to have been applied for the latter, whether he asked for it first or later.

If you have established with yourself: Whatever vow I may emit hereafter without the permission of my confessor, I do not wish it to be valid; and afterward you have vowed something without consulting your confessor, it is not valid, provided that will is not retracted expressly or virtually, namely if, mindful of the first vow, you were to emit the second, for example in shipwreck, in fire, etc.

If someone contracted marriage, intending it to be soluble, with such a mind that if he knew it to be indissoluble he would not contract, the marriage is null; for indissolubility is an essential property of Christian marriage. But he would contract validly if merely through error he thought marriage to be soluble, because private error does not take away from him the intention of contracting in the way in which he ought. L. 1. 3. n. 179, 210, 700; l. 6. n. 24; Elbel 130.

What is election? - Election is an act of the will by which the will is borne into a particular means as a means, or as a useful good; namely, it is the efficacious volition of some particular thing which is loved on account of another.

Therefore election proceeds from the efficacious intention of the end, and its object is the useful good as such and possible for us; and it contains at least virtually the volition of the end itself.

Likewise election retains its intrinsic nature, although it does not happen to take place among several things, when that means is only one. For an act is specified by its proper object, and the same object of election remains, namely the means to the end, whether it is the only means or whether it is compared with others. Election is after the manner of desire, because it is concerning the means as to be executed, and precedes execution; and therefore it is concerning an absent thing.

Moreover election is the purpose of the will; since purpose is an act of the will by which someone determines that he will do something. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 13; Suarez, d. 8, s. 1, 2.

What is consent? - Consent can be attributed to any free act of the will conforming itself, or consenting, to the judgment of the intellect, that is, accepting the good proposed by the intellect; in this way sin is said to be perfected by consent, and thus it is not a special act, and is concerned not only with the means, but also with the end. But insofar as it is a special act, it is concerned with the means, and is not an act specifically distinct from election, but only by reason, from diverse respects. "For insofar as the will wills what the intellect judges to be useful, it is called consent; but insofar as it prefers that either to other useful means, or certainly to other useless things not conducing to the end, it is called election." Suarez, tr. 2, d. 8, s. 2. But also in reality consent can be distinguished from election, namely when consent is inefficacious. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 15.

What is counsel? - Counsel properly is an act of the intellect including two things: the inquiry and discovery of the means, and the discerning judgment concerning the means more apt for attaining the end. Therefore counsel involves not one act of the intellect, but several. For that inquiry does not take place without discourse and consideration of several things. But counsel sometimes signifies only inquiry, sometimes only judgment, even though it does not proceed from discourse, and sometimes it embraces both. Counsel in this last sense indeed frequently precedes election, but not always. For when election takes place among many things, which happens more often, all those things must be found, proposed, discussed, and judged by the intellect. But where there is question of very small matters, or of things determined of themselves, or known of themselves, then there is no formal counsel. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 14; q. 9. a. 4; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 8, s. 5.

What is use? - Use is one thing active, another passive. The first is an act elicited by the will, by which the will moves the other powers to operating. The second is the act of the executing power proceeding from active use.

Use properly concerns the means, for use signifies a certain movement of the will toward really obtaining the thing willed, or the end. Use is really distinguished from election, since counsel and election concerning the means according to itself first take place before there is treatment of execution. But it is by no means really distinguished from election when the intellect suddenly determines the means and all the circumstances, and the will in the same instant in which it chooses the means also chooses the circumstance of actual execution; for from the force of such election there follows the action of the executing power. Therefore use is the will executing the chosen means for attaining the end. Use and election are not acts specifically distinct from one another, because they tend into the object under the same notion of good, namely as it is useful for attaining the end. But election of itself is concerned with the means in the order of intention, as future and as an effect of the end. Active use is concerned with the same means in the order of execution, as present and as the efficient cause of the end had in reality. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 16; Suarez, d. 9, s. 1, 2.

What is command? - The command which is treated here is the command by which someone commands himself, not that by which he commands others, and it is the absolute will intimated to oneself for doing or omitting something. Man can command himself in two ways: 1. as it were in the exercised act, while he moves himself to doing something; 2. in the signified act, by expressly eliciting the act of command: do this. Command of this kind is partly an act of the will, and partly an act of the intellect; because to command is to move to acting, but "the first mover among the powers of the soul to the exercise of an act is the will." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 17. a. 1. But to command is not to move in any way whatever, but to move as if by imposing a law; and it is the intellect that imposes law on the will, since it judges concerning things to be done. Now here it is asked, what is this act of intellect and will which adequately constitutes command?

As regards the act of the intellect, note: 1. Before will and intention there precedes a practical judgment of the intellect, by which someone judges not only that the thing is good in itself, but also that it is suitable for him, and that it is expedient to love it. This judgment contains some notion of command. "For one commanding orders him whom he commands to doing something, by intimating or announcing." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 17. a. 1.

2. Before election and consent there likewise precedes a practical judgment, whether it is by way of formal counsel or not, proposing the means apt for the end as something electable; and a judgment of this kind contains the notion of command more, since it moves more by announcing and intimating.

3. After that election which in time precedes active use, another judgment precedes, more practical, distinct in this from the judgment which precedes election, that it more immediately touches the work and all the determinate circumstances necessary for the execution of the work. The reason is that before every act of the will there must precede a judgment of the intellect consonant with it, by which it is directed and illuminated; but active use is an act of the will, which adds something to the election already made. Therefore. This judgment still more participates in the notion of command; for it moves the will more vehemently by announcing and intimating, not so much by its own power as by the power of the election already made. For it is altogether ordered to the execution of the work and inclines more to overcoming the difficulty of the work, which at the time of execution always appears greater than in consultation and abstract election.

4. Besides these practical judgments, there is found in us another judgment, which we experience when it speaks thus internally with us: do this; and it explicitly expresses the efficacious act of the will to be elicited for executing the work. This judgment is that which explicitly constitutes command. This judgment is not of itself necessary for the work; nevertheless it is a useful act, so that the will itself and the whole man may be moved more, or so that he may more quickly undertake the execution, or so that he may persevere more constantly in it; because while man thus commands himself, he as it were reflects above himself and becomes superior to himself; and because, as external speech with regard to others has the power of moving and inciting the mind, so internal speech has this power with regard to oneself.

As regards the act of the will, it must be noted: 1. that this command, if it is efficacious and true, supposes an absolute will; for if it takes place without any will, it is fictitious and not true; but if the will which precedes is inefficacious, the command itself also will be inefficacious. And the reason is that the whole efficacy of moving is from the will. Therefore a will of this kind completes the notion of that command.

2. The act of the will preceding the act of reason, which is command, is election, by virtue of which reason moves. Therefore command is the practical judgment itself, whether direct or reflex, which, from election already made, by announcing and intimating what is to be done, moves to execution; and then the will begins to use by executing the command of reason. Hence it is manifest that command is prior to use.

3. Nevertheless active use itself of the will has some notion of command, and is often called command. For the will commands the other potencies, even the intellect. Indeed, the will commands even itself. For the will commands all voluntary acts, and one act of the will is commanded by another act of the same will. And the reason is that to command belongs to one having dominion; but it is the will which, as it were, has dominion over all human actions.

S. Th. 1. 2. q. 17; q. 71. a. 6 ad 2; 2. 2. q. 4. a. 2 ad 2; Quodl. 9. a. 12; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 9, s. 3.

What is fruition? - Fruition, as regards the name, is to take fruit from a thing. As regards the thing itself, it is a certain repose of the will, sweetness, joy, delight, once the presence of the desired object and its possession have been posited.

Joy is said more of a rational good, delight of a sensitive good, fruition of both; and it is rather restricted to one's own good, while joy is also said of another's good, as of a friend. Moral theologians commonly distinguish joy from delight by time, teaching that joy is of a past thing, delight of a present thing. Therefore the object of fruition properly is the good under the notion of a delightable good. But both the end and the means can be an object of joy, although the reason for rejoicing, or the formal object, is always the end. The first reason is that joy arises from the attainment of a delightable good. But the means itself is a certain delightable good. And thus we experience that we are delighted when we obtain suitable means. The second reason is that every loved good is an end or by reason of the end. Therefore every good which delights is an end or by reason of the end. Moreover a twofold joy or fruition is distinguished, perfect and imperfect. "For since it concerns an attained end, if the end has been perfectly obtained, fruition is perfect; if it has been obtained in a certain hope, from this some fruition can arise, but imperfect, because that is already some kind of attainment; and this seems to be that fruition of which Paul speaks: rejoicing in hope." Suarez, tr. 2, d. 7, s. 2. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 11, 31; 2. 2. q. 28.

What is the perfect and imperfect voluntary; the absolute voluntary and velleity; the voluntary simply and according to a certain respect? - These various divisions can be taken and explained in various senses, according as there is considered in the voluntary either precisely the notion of the voluntary, or the notion of the free, or the various object to which it is referred, according to its various state. We shall briefly explain them in the following paragraphs, according to the various acceptions which they have.

By reason of the voluntary, or of the inclination of the will, one voluntary is such simply, or perfect; another is such according to a certain respect, or imperfect. The first is that which proceeds from the will with the full inclination of the same will, without any repugnance. In this way the most perfect voluntary is the love of God toward Himself and the love of the Blessed toward God, which proceed from the most perfect cognition of the object.

The second is that which proceeds indeed from the consenting will, but not without some repugnance of the same rational will, so that there is indeed volition actually, but mixed with a conditioned nolition of the object. Thus a sailor, when the danger of shipwreck presses, actually wills and deliberately wills to throw away the merchandise, which nevertheless he would also, by deliberate will, wish to preserve if shipwreck were not imminent; hence, not without the deliberate repugnance of the will, but an inefficacious repugnance, he absolutely consents to throw them away. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6 ad 3; a. 7 ad 2; Suppl. q. 47. a. 1; L. 1. 5. n. 21.

By reason of the free, according to the varying degree of deliberation, one voluntary is perfect, and it is that which proceeds from the will with perfect cognition and full deliberation; another is imperfect, and that is what proceeds from the will with imperfect cognition and half-full deliberation. Such are the actions of a man half-drunk, half-asleep. Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 3, 4; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 2. The voluntary that is perfect in this way can well be imperfect in the preceding way, as is clear from the example given of throwing merchandise into the sea in shipwreck.

By reason of deliberation, simply, one voluntary is absolute and simply; another is according to a certain respect, which is also called velleity. And thus, when the temptation of sin stands in the will, yet someone deliberately resists the sin, the will as nature, or according to a certain respect, wills the sin; but nevertheless the same will, as the will of reason, absolutely and simply detests the sin. Aptly S. Th. 3. p. q. 21. a. 4, where he also gives the reason for this division: "The will simply of man is the will of reason. For we will absolutely what we will according to deliberate reason. But that which we will according to the movement of sensuality, or even according to the movement of simple will, which is considered as nature, we do not will simply, but according to a certain respect, namely if nothing else stands in the way, which is found by the deliberation of reason. Hence such a will should rather be called velleity than absolute will; because, namely, man would will this if something else did not stand in the way."

By reason of the object, likewise one voluntary is absolute and simply; another is velleity and according to a certain respect, according as the object to which the will tends is considered absolutely, as it really is, according to all its circumstances, or only as it is in itself, with abstraction made from the circumstances.

To the point, the Angelic Doctor, 1. p. q. 19. a. 6 ad 1: "Each thing, according as it is good, is thus willed by God. But something can be, in the first consideration of itself, according as it is considered absolutely, good or evil, which nevertheless, as it is considered with something added, which is the consequent consideration of it, has itself contrariwise. Thus for a man to live is good and for a man to be killed is evil, according to absolute consideration; but if there is added concerning some man that he is a murderer, or living to the danger of the multitude, then it is good for him to be killed, and evil for him to live. Hence it can be said that a just judge antecedently wills every man to live, but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. Similarly God antecedently wills every man to be saved, but consequently wills certain ones to be damned, according to the demand of His justice. And nevertheless that which we will antecedently, we do not will simply, but according to a certain respect, because the will is compared to things according as they are in themselves, and in themselves they are in particular. Hence we will something simply according as we will it with all particular circumstances considered, which is to will consequently. Hence it can be said that a just judge simply wills the murderer to be hanged, but according to a certain respect he would will him to live, namely insofar as he is a man. Hence it can rather be called velleity than absolute will. And thus it is clear that whatever God wills simply, happens; although that which He wills antecedently does not happen."

And thus also that throwing away of merchandise of which above in n. 30, under various respects, is voluntary according to a certain respect, and at the same time voluntary simply. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 142. a. 3; 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6.

By reason of its perfection, finally, one voluntary is absolute, efficacious, perfect, or complete; another is the voluntary which again is called velleity, of simple complacency, or imperfect and incomplete. The first is that which extends itself all the way to the attainment of the thing, by efficaciously willing the thing and the means to it. The other is that which does not proceed all the way to the attainment of the thing, but stops in simple complacency for it. When there is a twofold contrary will concerning the same object, that one is absolute and efficacious which explicitly or implicitly contains the revocation of the other, because one is absolute, the other as if conditioned; for example, someone truly wills to contract marriage, but nevertheless would not wish to receive the sacrament; he truly contracts marriage and receives the sacrament. De Lugo, de Sacr. in genere, d. 8, s. 8, n. 120 ff.

Thus the Angelic Doctor assigns the reason for this division, 1. 2. q. 13. a. 5 ad 1: "It must be said that the will is intermediate between the intellect and exterior operation. For the intellect proposes its object to the will, and the will itself causes exterior operation. Thus therefore the principle of the movement of the will is considered on the part of the intellect, which apprehends something as good in universal. But the termination or perfection of the act of the will is attended to according to order to operation, through which someone tends to the attainment of the thing: for the movement of the will is from the soul to the thing; and therefore the perfection of the act of the will is attended to according to this, that something is good for someone to do. But this is possible. And therefore the will is not complete except concerning the possible, which is good for the one willing. But incomplete will is concerning the impossible, which according to some is called velleity: because, namely, someone would will it if it were possible."

A sick man hoping for health wills health with a complete will; for he has an absolute and efficacious will of health, at the same time willing the means inducing health. A sick man despairing of health, whence he neglects to employ the means necessary for recovering it, wills health with an incomplete will; for he has only simple complacency, or velleity, of health, since he does not at the same time will the means inducing health. Complete and incomplete will, therefore, is not to be taken as if incomplete will were an undeliberated willing, or not capable of merit and demerit, or as if incomplete will were a half-deliberated willing. For someone can deliberately and with full deliberation will to expel God from His kingdom, if he could, and similar things, where it is clear that sin and grave sin are found. But the completion and incompletion of the will is to be taken according to the order of the will to operation, namely according to the movement of the will toward the thing. Hence from the fact that the movement of the will is toward the thing to be attained, disposed, etc., by means of exterior operation, it is not perfect, with the perfection apt by nature to be found in the genus of movement of the will, unless it is terminated at a good that can be done, although it is perfect as regards consent, deliberation, and other things of this kind. And thus a sinner, even a great sinner, who wills to be converted to God, and therefore wills to do penance, has a complete will.

The Angelic Doctor, q. 20. 2. a. 4, says: "If we speak of the goodness of the exterior act which it has according to the matter and due circumstances, then it is compared to the will as term and end, and in this way it adds to the goodness or malice of the will, because every inclination or movement is perfected in this, that it attains the end or reaches the term. Hence the will is not perfect unless it is such that, when opportunity is given, it acts. But if possibility is lacking, while the will exists perfected so that it would act if it could, the defect of perfection which is from the exterior act is simply involuntary."

Therefore the will can be called and can be complete in two ways. In one way, according to that relation by which the willed thing is in the will. In another way, according to that by which the will tends into the real attainment of the thing willed. According to the first way, the perfection of the will is signified by this, that it wills perfectly; but according to the second, by this, that it has perfectly, or attains and possesses the thing willed. Hence the will prepared to act if it could is a perfect will, because it wills perfectly, and this pertains to the perfection of the first relation; and it is imperfect simply, because it does not arrive at this, that it really has, attains, and possesses that which it wills, and which it is apt by nature to have. For every movement falling short of the term is imperfect by privation, which consists in the attainment of the term. And since the first perfection is of another account from the second, and the whole latitude of the first is compared to the second as the imperfect to the perfect, it follows that however much the interior act of the will may grow, and however intense it may be, alone it will never arrive at this, that it be perfect simply, without exterior attainment. On account of this the Savior said, John 15:13: Greater love no one has than that someone lay down his life for his friends; He said lay down, not wish to lay down. Cajetan, on 1. 2. q. 13. a. 5; q. 20, a. 4.

What is the direct and indirect voluntary; voluntary in itself and in the cause; positive and negative? - The voluntary, by reason of the act of the will by which it proceeds from the will, is one thing direct, another indirect. The direct is from the will acting. The indirect is from the will not acting, not prohibiting, namely which ought and can prohibit. For "not always is that which follows upon a defect of action reduced, as into a cause, into the agent from the fact that he does not act, but only then when he can and ought to act. For if the helmsman could not direct the ship, or the governance of the ship had not been entrusted to him, the sinking of the ship, which would happen through the absence of the helmsman, would not be imputed to him. Therefore, since the will, by willing and acting, can impede this which is not to will and not to act, and sometimes ought to, this which is not to will and not to act is imputed to it as existing from it." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 3; 2. 2. q. 69. a. 7; 3. p. q. 47. a. 1. Namely, it must be what one ought and can prohibit, so that one is in fault. And thus no one would say that every good which you do not do is voluntary to you, even indirectly, and consequently imputable, although absolutely you can do it, but are not bound to do it; and much less every evil which you are not bound in any way to impede.

If nevertheless someone knowingly posits an act incompatible with another act, which is omitted, for performing which there is no obligation, since that omission is free, it is indirectly voluntary, although not imputable to fault; for example, if you wish to study without wishing not to go to visit a church, when there is no obligation; and, on the contrary, it is imputable to merit, as if you wish to pray and therefore omit recreation, without saying, I wish to omit it. Cf. Commentary de Act. hum., Fourth, n. 9. Cf. here the following paragraph and n. 35.

The voluntary, by reason of the object which immediately terminates the act of the will, is one thing voluntary in itself, another voluntary in the cause. The first is had when someone immediately wills something in itself; the second, when someone wills the cause from which some effect is going to follow, even if he foresees this effect; for then he does not will it in itself, but in another, namely in its cause. Foresees, that is, merely foresees; for if besides this he wills it, that effect will already be directly and in itself willed and voluntary, and not merely in the cause. From this it follows that that effect will no longer be willed and voluntary as an effect; nor likewise will its cause be willed and voluntary as a cause; but then the effect, with respect to the will, will have the notion of an end, and the cause the notion of a means. For that which someone wills on account of itself has the notion of an end; what someone wills on account of another has the notion of a means. Nor indeed is it valid to object that if the effect is merely foreseen, and the will is not borne into it by its own act, then that effect is outside the intention, and in no way can it be voluntary, not even in the cause. For because the will, by not willing the cause, can impede the effect, and sometimes ought to impede it if it is evil, the effect is imputed to it; consequently, since it is not willed in itself, it will be willed in the cause. S. Th. q. 6. a. 3; q. 71. a. 5.

And thus evil works committed against one's neighbor in drunkenness are voluntary in the cause for him who was voluntarily made drunk, foreseeing those evils from previous experience, although he neither willed nor intended those same evils. If someone writing a bad book foresees many spiritual evils from it, although he does not intend them, they are imputed to him, and they are voluntary to him not in themselves, but in the cause. But if the effect is good, and someone who posits the cause foresees it, he is already judged implicitly to will it, and he does not lack his merit, since the good is the object of the will, not evil. If you give your goods to a monastery, foreseeing the spiritual goods thence to come, you certainly do not lack merit. Therefore there is a distinction between good and evil; for good, at least in some way, we ought to intend; evil, on the contrary, cannot be intended, but ought to be avoided. Suarez, d. 1, s. 4.

Several theologians altogether distinguish the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause from the direct and indirect voluntary. And thus Suarez says, "The voluntary in itself is sufficiently clear; for then something is said to be voluntary in itself when it is willed in itself, so that the will is immediately concerned with it, either by a proper act, if it is voluntary direct, or through the lack of an act, if it is indirectly voluntary." D. 1, s. 4. Likewise S. Th. q. 77. a. 7: "Two things seem to have to be considered. First, that something can be voluntary either according to itself, as when the will is borne directly into it, or according to its cause, when the will is borne into the cause and not into the effect; as is clear in him who voluntarily becomes drunk. For from this, what he commits through drunkenness is imputed to him as quasi-voluntary. Secondly, it must be considered that something is called voluntary directly or indirectly. Directly indeed is that into which the will is borne; but indirect is that which the will could have prohibited, but does not prohibit."

But others call the voluntary in itself and in the cause the direct and indirect voluntary, and express this by another division, namely of the positive and negative voluntary. Gury, Ballerini, n. 5. Now, with a comparison established between both divisions, the voluntary in itself and in the cause, and the direct and indirect voluntary, and insisting upon the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor, it must be said that the direct voluntary includes under itself both the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause. For the direct voluntary is said by the Angelic Doctor to be "that which proceeds from the will as from an agent," q. 6. a. 3 ad 1. But both the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause proceed from the will insofar as it is acting and willing.

But the indirect voluntary can be reduced both to the voluntary in itself and to the voluntary in the cause. The indirect voluntary is said by the same Holy Doctor to be "that which is from the will as from a non-agent," l. c. But both the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause include the acting and willing will. Therefore the indirectly voluntary is neither properly voluntary in itself, nor likewise properly voluntary in the cause. Nevertheless it can be reduced to both; for the indirectly voluntary is said either only of the interior act of the will, or also of the exterior act. If the first, since not willing is immediately from the will, it can be called voluntary in itself. If the second, since externally not acting is as it were the external object completing that not willing, just as the former is in some way voluntary in itself, so also is the latter, since one complete non-act is as it were constituted from both the lack of an interior and exterior act; for example, not willing to hear Mass, and not hearing Mass in fact, just as one complete act is constituted from the internal and external act of willing to hear Mass and of hearing Mass.

Now, as from the positing of an act, as from a cause, some effect can follow, so from the omission of an act another act can follow, which, although it is not properly the effect of that omission, just as that omission is not properly the cause of the following act, since not acting cannot properly be a cause, nevertheless it can be considered as an effect. And thus it can be called voluntary in the cause; for example, the death of those sailing, indirectly voluntary, is, in the sense stated, voluntary in the cause for the pilot of the ship who desists from steering.

What is required so that an evil effect which follows, voluntary only in the cause or indirectly, be imputable to the will as fault? - The following conditions are required: 1. That he who posits or omits the cause advert, at least confusedly, that such an effect will follow from that cause; because nothing is willed unless in some way it is known beforehand.

2. That the agent be able to impede such a cause; because there is no obligation to impossibilities.

3. That the agent be bound, by reason of that effect, to remove or omit that cause; because the effect following outside the intention is not imputed to one pursuing his own right. For then the agent in reality does not will the effect, but wills the permission of the effect. L. 1. 5. n. 15; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 3; q. 21. a. 2; C. I. 1151 f.; C. G. 1182 f.; C. H. 1092 ff.

When is someone bound to remove the cause, by reason of an evil effect that will follow? - 1. He is bound when it of itself, directly and primarily, produces nothing except an evil effect. For then the cause is evil in itself. It is said, of itself, directly and primarily, produces nothing except an evil effect, because one would not therefore be bound to remove the cause if the evil effect followed merely accidentally; for then the cause would not therefore be evil in itself. Nor would he be bound if the cause of itself, directly and primarily, produces a good effect, and only through this as a medium an evil effect follows; for a cause according to moral estimation is judged from its effect of itself, directly, and primarily, and accordingly it is then simply honorable in itself. Therefore then one would not will the evil, but would will the good, and would only permit the evil. Likewise one would not therefore be bound to remove the cause because it equally, directly and primarily, as if in a parallel manner, influences a good and an evil effect. For then the cause in itself, according to moral estimation, is indifferent, and honorable, insofar as it is subject to the honorable intention of the agent; for the evil effect is not intended, but permitted. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 20. a. 5; q. 73. a. 8; 2. 2. q. 64. a. 7.

2. Someone is likewise bound to remove the cause by reason of an evil effect that will follow, when, although the cause is honorable or indifferent in itself, nevertheless someone is bound to impede the effect from justice, or from charity, or from a precept that presses to be fulfilled; for example, if someone wished to play for the sake of recreation while the last Mass on Sunday will soon be celebrated, so that consequently he omits it from distraction. "For he who is bound to the law must necessarily be bound to procure the ordinary means, and the means proximately necessary from the very nature of the thing, for observing the law..... Ordinary, I say; for human laws do not compel to extraordinary and excessively difficult things." Ithur., case 32, n. 4. Hence "the reason can be given, that by reason of the precept that cause and the effects following from it, although physically they are connected only accidentally, and one is not the cause of the other, nevertheless morally are judged to have the notion of one unsuitable object, or one to be avoided by the will, and therefore the will of one is judged the virtual will of the other." Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 4, n. 9.

3. Finally, someone is bound to remove the cause by reason of an evil effect that will follow, when, although the cause is honorable or indifferent in itself, nevertheless there is no proportionate necessity, utility, or fittingness on the part of the agent. For then an honorable end of the one operating is lacking; for evil is to be avoided, and it can be permitted when there is a rational and just cause. Besides, to will such a cause then often shows an evil affection directly toward that evil effect that will follow; or at least there is often a proximate danger of such evil affection. But a greater or lesser reason is required for positing the cause according as it is a cause of itself, or from its own nature influencing such an effect, or an accidental cause, namely one which does not influence such an effect from its intrinsic nature, but from some extrinsic condition of things. Likewise the greater reason is required for acting in such a case, the more proximately the cause touches the evil effect, the more probable the evil effect is, the less right one has to the action considered in itself, and the graver the effect itself is, if one is bound by office to impede the evil. For if a proportionately grave reason is not had, natural honesty itself obliges us to omit that cause. L. 1. 1. n. 152; l. 5. n. 14; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 64. a. 7.

Is the effect which follows, gravely evil, voluntary only indirectly or in the cause, always imputable as grave fault, so that someone contracts the grave malice proper to that effect, if he illicitly posits the cause without any sufficient reason? - R. 1. Affirmatively, if that cause of itself, or from its intrinsic nature, gravely influences the effect. The reason is that if the cause of itself gravely influences the effect, the grave malice from the effect redounds into the cause. Therefore someone contracts the grave malice proper to the effect itself by willing its cause without any sufficient reason. Moreover, at least practically speaking, one who wills the cause, of itself gravely influencing an effect gravely evil, without any sufficient reason, in reality directly wills the grave malice of that effect, and does not merely permit it; since the cause and effect are inseparably connected with one another, so far as concerns the very nature of the thing, and no other honorable reason is present for positing the cause on account of another honorable effect, as is supposed.

R. 2. Negatively, if that cause of itself influences that effect only lightly. The reason is that, since the cause of itself has only a light influence upon that gravely evil effect, a cause of this kind is not of itself sufficient for the positing of the effect, and accordingly, so far as concerns the nature of the thing, they are not inseparably connected with one another. Therefore it is not the case that because someone wills the cause, he also wills the effect, but he wills only the permission of the effect, if perhaps it follows. Accordingly he does not contract the grave malice proper to the effect. But since the malice of the effect redounds into the cause by reason of the influence which the latter has upon the effect, where the influence is light there is only light malice; and consequently, with the direct intention of the gravely evil effect always excluded, someone willing a cause that influences such an effect only lightly, although he will not sin gravely, nevertheless will sin lightly. And this is the proper reason why, although there is no smallness of matter in venereal matters, nevertheless there is such in those acts of mere sensuality, as are looks, from a cause of mere curiosity, at less honorable things, with the intention of the venereal thing itself again excluded, as the very common opinion of theologians holds.

R. 3. Again negatively, if the cause in no way of itself influences that evil effect, but the effect follows merely accidentally, or from extrinsic circumstances. The reason is that since the effect follows only accidentally, there is no connection, so far as concerns the nature of the thing, between the cause and the effect. Therefore it is not the case that because someone wills the cause, he also wills the effect, but he wills only the permission of the effect, if perhaps it follows. But since the malice of the effect in no way redounds into the cause, for the effect does not follow from that cause of itself, but merely accidentally, someone willing the cause, with every intention of the evil effect excluded, contracts none of its malice, neither grave nor light, although perhaps otherwise he also sins gravely. And thus, if someone foresees pollution from some excess of drink or food, without willing and intending it, he will sin lightly, or perhaps even gravely, by reason of that excess, but by no means will he sin by reason of the pollution, since this effect is not willed, but happens outside and against the intention, and the cause is outside the genus of lust. Nor indeed is someone bound to remove all causes influencing only accidentally into some evil effect, by reason only of that evil effect itself. For in actions only this one thing must be attended to: whether they are the cause of this effect, or not. For if they do not have the force of a cause, it is ridiculous that they must be avoided on account of an effect of this kind. And in no way is someone bound to abstain from positing such a cause, if a reasonable motive is present for positing a cause of this kind.

Cf. 40. 1, 4; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 4, 5; Sanchez, l. 9, d. 45, n. 14 ff.; L. 1. 3. n. 484; Salm., tr. 26, c. 7, n. 41; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 154. a. 5; 3. p. q. 30. a. 7; d'Annibale, 4th ed., p. 1, n. 157, note 15.

When is an effect willed in the cause imputed? - It is imputed, speaking of itself, first when someone has posited the cause, or from the time when he could and ought to have impeded it, if he noticed it after the cause had been posited. "The reason is that the free volition, or non-impeding, of an evil effect is formally evil, but not the physical existence of the effect; and accordingly formal sin is committed when there is such a perverse volition or nolition.... Thus therefore, he who, for example, has offered poison to another ... does not sin when the death of the other follows ... but when he freely posited the cause of this effect." Struggl, q. 1, a. 3, n. 32. Speaking of itself; for if someone can impede an effect of this kind right up to its execution, and does not impede it, or is pleased in its futurition or existence, he continues in his mind the sin whose cause he previously posited freely and culpably. Consequently someone must then confess the effect as if it were the external act and object, the complement of the sin. But it would be otherwise if, after the cause had been posited, before the effect follows, he retracts the will, or confesses the sin committed. L. 1. 5. n. 10; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79. a. 3 ad 3.

Note: Since the cause, as such, participates in the specific malice of the effect, but not in a different malice, it suffices in confession to accuse only the malice of the effect; or if the cause has in itself another special malice, it suffices to state each separately. And thus, if because of play you omitted Mass, it suffices to accuse this omission; if because of theft you likewise omitted Mass, you can then accuse separately the theft and the omission of Mass. L. 1. 5. n. 9; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 15, n. 479.

You will resolve: 1. "If the cause of pollution is one gravely influencing it, and the man does not abstain from positing that cause or action, it is clear that the pollution is imputed as sin, even if it was not intended, provided it was at least confusedly foreseen. But causes of this kind are without doubt all those which of themselves are grave faults in the genus of lust, namely touches or sights of the shameful parts of another's or one's own body with base and deliberate delight; the sight of human intercourse; and morose thoughts about venereal matters. Therefore all pollutions arising from these causes are certainly mortal. Thus S. Th. a. 2. q. 154. a. 5, and others commonly. And then that base act which is the cause of pollution has a special malice against nature, as Sanchez says, de Matr., l. 9, c. 45, n. 23, and all agree." L. 1. 3. n. 482. A special malice, namely of the effect or pollution, which is a sin against nature, besides the proper malice which consists in delight excited from a base object. Gravely influencing; therefore, if the cause, whether by reason of itself or by reason of the disposition of the subject, does not gravely influence, grave fault is absent by reason of the pollution perhaps going to follow, since then it follows outside the intention and accidentally. Of themselves are grave faults: "the common and more probable opinion teaches that pollution is not mortal (namely in the cause), unless it comes from a cause of itself mortal in the genus of lust.... The reason is that, since pollution is not willed except in the cause, it will be evil in that degree in which the cause itself is evil." L. 1. 3. n. 484. In the genus of lust, whence "it is inferred that the pollution which happens outside the intention from causes illicit even mortally in another genus than lust is not mortal, as from drunkenness, or from eating too immoderately or on a forbidden day." L. 1. 3. n. 484, 477; Salm., Theol. Schol., tr. 13, d. 10, n. 274; Theol. Mor., tr. 26, c. 7, n. 41.

2. "If someone, about to do some necessary or lawful and honorable thing, foresees that pollution will naturally follow, and this applies much more to distillation, which nevertheless he in no way wills or intends, then, provided the danger of consent to the delight is absent, he is not bound to abstain from such an action; because the effect following accidentally and outside the intention is not imputed to one pursuing his right. Hence, notwithstanding pollution, it is lawful to hear the confessions of women, to study cases of conscience, to touch oneself from necessity, cautiously and from necessity to kiss women, to embrace according to the custom of the country, if otherwise one would have to be regarded as uncivil." L. 1. 3. n. 481. "It is lawful for someone who suffers a great itching in the private parts to drive it away by touch, even if pollution follows." L. 1. 3. n. 483. The reason is that these acts either of themselves influence only lightly, or although they of themselves gravely influence, nevertheless, since they are not done from a base cause of concupiscence and delight, but from an honorable, necessary, useful, suitable cause, they no longer have the same force and influence upon the effect, which is gravely increased by that evil propensity of the will, and on the contrary is greatly diminished by the will turned elsewhere and resisting as far as it can. Hence the evil effect, if it follows, is attributed rather to natural constitution, or to weakness of nature, than to the aforesaid acts as cause. Besides, with the aforesaid honorable end standing, someone is not bound to abstain from the cause in order to impede the evil effect. For when a cause has two effects, one good, the other evil, it can be posited from the intention of the good effect alone, by behaving permissively toward the evil. Therefore that evil effect, in the case, truly follows accidentally and outside the intention. L. 1. 3. n. 483; l. 5. n. 14; S. Th. 3. p. q. 80. a. 7.

3. "It is inferred that the pollution which arises from a not prolonged conversation with a girl, or from a slight glance, or from curious reading venially base, is only venial; because, as has been said, since those causes influence lightly, the subsequent pollution proceeds rather from a natural cause than from them." L. 1. 3. n. 484. But if someone has a just cause, he sins in nothing. L. 1. 5. n. 29. A just cause is "any reasonable cause of necessity, utility, or fittingness." L. 1. 3. n. 484; l. 5. n. 29.

4. A fortiori grave fault is absent in those actions which influence remotely and accidentally, since they are outside the genus of lust. Therefore, although pollution or an evil commotion is foreseen as going to follow, it is lawful to ride horseback, not only for the sake of necessity and utility, but also for recreation; to recline in some position in order to rest more comfortably; moderately to take hot foods or drink; to lead honorable dances, etc. L. 1. 3. n. 483. Grave fault is absent; for whether light fault is present in the positing of such causes without a just reason, on account of the effect going to follow, is disputed. Holzmann and others deny it, "because, as they say, the pollution arises rather from the weakness of nature than from that cause, which concurs to pollution only accidentally and remotely. But Sanchez, Lessius, and others more probably affirm it..., because without a rational cause to permit pollution always seems something unbecoming and disordered." L. 1. 3. n. 484; Sanchez, de Matr., l. 9, d. 45; Sporer, de Matr., n. 644 ff.; Lessius, l. 4, c. 3, d. 14, n. 97-103.

What is the actual, virtual, habitual, interpretative voluntary? - The voluntary, by reason of the very act of the will and its efficacy, is one thing actual or formal, another virtual, another habitual, another interpretative. Actual voluntary is given when someone actually wills something, with actual attention on the part of the intellect, whether he wills explicitly, that is, clearly and in particular, or implicitly, that is, confusedly, by a universal or quasi-universal will, which extends also to this object.

The virtual voluntary is threefold. First, the virtual voluntary is that which perseveres in some power of itself, and it is given when the explicit and clear will itself, or intention of the end, no longer exists, but only volitions of the means explicitly and clearly exist, which volitions of the end itself, in a more remiss degree, with more remiss attention, accompany. Thus when a priest wills to celebrate Mass and then puts on the sacred vestments, approaches the altar, and performs the other customary things, without any longer having that clear actual will to consecrate, the consecration will be virtually voluntary if, while he performs all things voluntarily, there is always present to him, confusedly and weakly, some attention and will to consecrate. Or at least then acts of the cogitative or estimative power remain, which are first generated when the mind proposes its object to the will, and which acts then go on to influence all subsequent acts. When the mind apprehends that object, its apprehension is at the same time generated in the cogitative or estimative power, which pertains to sensitive cognition, and moves the sensitive appetite and the exterior members to motion.

The virtual voluntary, secondly, is that which perseveres in the exterior work itself, commanded by a prior act of the will, or in the voluntary execution of the means, which someone voluntarily employs by the force or virtue and impulse of the prior intention of the end, even though as regards the end not even remiss attention and volition any longer exists. Thus the pilgrimage undertaken by a traveler to the sanctuary of the Blessed Virgin will be virtually voluntary, even though on the journey he no longer attends to it, indeed thinks of entirely different things.

The virtual voluntary, thirdly, is that which perseveres in some moral effect of its own; thus, for example, a contract entered into by a procurator will be virtually voluntary to the principal agent, who gave him the faculty of acting in his name. In a moral effect, so that a merely physical effect may be excluded, into which perhaps that prior act of the will influenced as it is a physical act; for example, if, having had the will to consecrate, afterward while sleeping you consecrate in a dream, the consecration is null. For that prior act of the will does not influence this effect as it is a human or moral act, but merely as it is a certain physical action. S. Th. 3. p. q. 64. a. 8 ad 3; Lugo, de Sacr. in gen., d. 8, s. 5, n. 87; de Fid., d. 1, n. 98; de Poenit., d. 24, s. 4; Laymann, l. 1, c. 2, c. 3, n. 4.

The habitual voluntary is that which was, but is neither in itself, not even weakly, with no attention to it persevering on the part of the intellect, nor in an exterior commanded work, or in the execution of the means, nor in any positive moral effect, but is, morally speaking, in a merely negative effect, insofar as the prior will has not been retracted. Hence a will of this kind suffices for certain moral effects. Thus, if an adult invalidly baptized were rebaptized while he sleeps, the baptism is valid. Thus also "for contracting," says St. Alphonsus, l. 3, n. 769, "an interpretative or conditional will does not suffice, cf. below n. 773, but an actual or virtual will is required, or at least one had and not retracted, according to what is to be said, l. 6, n. 324." Habitual voluntary is sometimes called virtual voluntary, which in truth is a certain habitual voluntary, insofar as it is distinguished from actual. S. Th. 3. p. q. 64. a. 8 ad 3; Laymann, l. c.

Interpretative voluntary is an act of the will which neither is, nor was, because cognition of the object is not present and was not present, but would be if cognition of this kind were had. Just as actual and virtual voluntary is a true cause of the act which is posited by the force of an actual or past volition, so habitual and interpretative voluntary is not a cause of the act. Habitual makes it that the act is positively according to the will, for example, the reception of a sacrament by a dying person deprived of his senses, who while healthy had resolved to receive the sacrament in danger of death. Interpretative makes it that the act at least is not judged to be against the will. Its foundation is the disposition and inclination of the soul, on account of the suitability of the thing. And these concern the voluntary considered in itself. Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 4, n. 4.

1. Human acts considered relatively to man can be looked at in two ways: first, according as they proceed from human faculties, which is to consider them in their intrinsic nature; for an act, generally in created things, is nothing other than the determination of some faculty from potency to act. secondly, according as they fall short from this nature proper to them, on account of accidental impediments which do not allow the human faculties to act rightly. Therefore first we set out to speak of the intrinsic nature of a human act; but afterward we shall speak of those accidental impediments.

2. Moreover usage has prevailed, and not without reason, that a distinction should be made between an act of man and a human act. Since man is a substantive name, and directly signifies a supposit or person, an act of man is taken merely materially for any act whatever proceeding from a man, or from a human supposit and person: for actions belong to supposits. But since human is an adjective name, and directly denotes a form, a human act is an act proceeding from man not in just any way, but according to the form or nature proper to him, namely with advertence of the intellect and deliberate will. “Of actions,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 1., “which are done by man, those alone are properly called human which are proper to man insofar as he is man (namely adequately, and as to the substance of the work, and as to the mode of operating). But man differs from other irrational creatures in this, that he is master of his acts. Hence those actions alone are called properly human of which man is master. But man is master of his acts through reason and will: hence free choice also is said to be the faculty of will and reason. Therefore those actions are called properly human which proceed from deliberate will. But if any other actions belong to man, they can indeed be called actions of man, but not properly human actions, since they are not of man insofar as he is man.” And in the same place, a. 3: “Acts are called human insofar as they proceed from a deliberating will.” Therefore, since a human act is an act proceeding from deliberate will, in order that we may know its intrinsic nature more deeply, it is necessary to explain briefly: 1. the nature of the voluntary; 2. the nature of the free; 3. finally, in how many ways any act whatever can proceed from deliberate will. Hence in this first Commentary on human acts we have proposed first to explain the nature of the voluntary.

3. Moreover, before we proceed further, it must be noted that human acts are called acts rather than actions, because this name action is accustomed to designate more the exterior operation, although it is also used for an interior act; while, on the contrary, the name act is used rather for an interior act, or for an act considered in its intrinsic principle, than for an exterior operation, namely for an act considered with respect to its exterior object or extrinsic effect; although it is also taken for an exterior action, as when one says: an act of religious profession, an act of matrimony, an act of contract, etc. But a human act, as is clear from the very determination of the adjective added to it, properly designates an act according as it proceeds from its intrinsic principles and is considered according to them; which from what has been said is now sufficiently drawn out.

Moreover, since a human act proceeds from the will and from the free will, and in it alone, as in its proper subject, morality is found, concerning which there will be discussion hereafter, human acts are also called voluntary acts, free acts, moral acts, and one name is used for another indiscriminately, as may be seen in the Angelic Doctor in 1. 2. And thus q. 18. a. 5: “some acts are called human or moral, according as they are from reason.” And q. 1. a. 3: “moral acts and human acts are the same.” And q. 20. a. 6. ad 2: “it must be said that action and passion pertain to the genus of morals, insofar as they have the nature of the voluntary. And therefore according as by a diverse will they are called voluntary, according to this they are two morally, and there can be good on one side, and evil on the other.”

4. If a human act is an act proceeding from deliberate will, it is essentially a voluntary act. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 71. a. 6. For the voluntary, cognition is essentially prerequired: nothing is willed unless foreknown. This prior cognition is, in a human act, the prerequired condition; but voluntariness is properly the form constitutive of it. - From defect of the aforesaid condition, the acts of infants, of the insane, of those sleeping, of the intoxicated, are not human acts, but acts of man. Hence, if someone in a state of insanity, sleep, or intoxication baptizes, consecrates, contracts, or is present at Mass, recites the canonical hours, these acts are of no moral value and have no moral effect, because they are not human acts. And this holds even if someone, while still master of himself before he falls into that state, foresees it, indeed wills and intends it. For when, being master of himself, he wills and intends to do it, nevertheless he does not do it; but when, no longer master of himself, he does it, he does not will to do it by a human act; and since those things are of the moral order and of moral value, they can be done only by a human act. In sleep the imagination prevails, or at least “the intellect does not prevail; whence man follows the imaginative apprehension as if true.” St. Thomas, On Dreams, sect. 6. Namely, “the use of reason is indeed more or less impeded in sleeping; nevertheless it is always impeded as to something, so that one cannot have an altogether free judgment.” St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 154. a. 2. ad 2. - Cf. Lugo, On the Sacraments, D. 8. n. 106; Suarez, On Religion, tr. 6, On Vow, l. 1. c. 10; Sanchez, On Matrimony, l. 1. D. 8. n. 20; Laymann, l. 4. tr. 4, On Vow, c. 1. n. 4.

5. But if the prior cognition of the intellect is not indeed lacking, but is not perfect, the act, so far under this head, is human insofar as it is directed and ordered by that prior cognition. Therefore, one who is ignorant of what he does materially, or as to the fact, or is ignorant of what he does formally, that is, as to the morality of his action, because namely he is ignorant of the law, sins in no way; for example, if someone on a day of abstinence is ignorant that he is eating meat, or, eating it, is ignorant of the law of abstinence. - But it is not required that someone have perfect cognition of the thing, that namely, that the thing be known in itself and in the individual, or with every certainty; for it is sufficient that it be apprehended at least confusedly, and with doubt. For, with prior cognition of the thing standing, although confused, now the will is borne into it, whatever it may be; with doubt of thing and thing standing, the will is borne into each. And thus an adult is validly baptized, although he has not yet fully explored all the obligations of a Christian, and afterward he is bound by them. One receiving the subdiaconate, at least confusedly, apprehends and consequently wills all the obligations annexed to that state; wherefore, although he is ignorant of the chastity to be preserved which is annexed to it, nevertheless he is bound to it. A hunter striking a beast, concerning which he doubts whether it is a man, in truth wills both: to kill the beast and the man.

6. From defect of voluntariness or of deliberate will, the first intuition of evident truth and the first love of good in common, or of happiness, are not human acts. Beatitude itself, since it is not an act of deliberate will, but a necessary act, although it is a perfect act of the intellect and of the will, nevertheless is not a human act; and by the Angelic Doctor himself in 1. 2. it is not considered as a human act, but as the end of human acts. And thus in the prologue to q. 6 St. Thomas says: “Therefore, because it is necessary to arrive at beatitude through certain acts, it is consequently necessary to consider human acts, that we may know by which acts one may arrive at beatitude, or the way of beatitude may be impeded.” Therefore to the question which is commonly discussed, whether beatitude is a human act, one must answer that it is not a human act, but the term and end of all human acts. Cf. Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 1. D. 2. S. 2.

7. From defect of both elements, intellective cognition and deliberate will, those sudden passions of desire, fear, and anger, which are stirred up in the sensitive appetite, are not human acts, but acts of man. The same must be said of those actions which man does from a certain natural instinct, thinking nothing about them, as when someone moves a foot or hand while intent on other things, or strokes his beard, etc. “It must be said,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 1. ad 3, “that actions of this sort are not properly human, because they do not proceed from deliberation of reason, which is the proper principle of human acts; and therefore they have, as it were, an imagined end, but not an end pre-established by reason.”

8. These things having been established, the question is at once resolved concerning that cognition prerequired for a human act: namely, whether merely sensitive cognition suffices for a human act, the apprehension of a thing through sensitive imagination. - Since a human act, as has already been said, is an essentially voluntary act, the proposed question falls back into another more general question.

Since the will is borne toward an apprehended good, it is asked: whether it can be borne toward an object apprehended by sensitive cognition alone, or through phantasy and imagination alone, and not at the same time through the intellect.

It must be denied altogether; and the reason is that, as the natural appetite follows the natural form, and the sensitive appetite follows sensitive cognition, so the spiritual appetite follows spiritual cognition. Therefore spiritual cognition alone is its foundation, and is consonant with it, so that it may be moved into act. Moreover, the cognoscitive power moving the will, which is an intrinsically inorganic and spiritual faculty, illuminates and directs it. But this cannot belong to a sensitive power of an inferior order, which is an intrinsically organic faculty. Aptly Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter Libertas, 20 June 1888: “The will is in no way moved unless cognition of the mind has shone before it like a certain torch: namely, the good desired by the will is necessarily a good insofar as it is known by reason.”

And St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 19. a. 3: “It must be said that... the goodness of the will properly depends upon the object. But the object of the will is proposed to it through reason. For the understood good is the object of the will proportioned to it. But the sensible or imaginary good is not proportioned to the will, but to the sensitive appetite; because the will can tend toward universal good, which reason apprehends. But the sensitive appetite tends only toward a particular good, which the sensitive power apprehends. And therefore the goodness of the will depends on reason in the way in which it depends on the object... The appetite of the will cannot be concerning the good unless it is first apprehended by reason.” And Cajetan, on q. 10. a. 3: “If sense alone could move the will, then man could will without the use of reason, and consequently could sin and do well, which is not intelligible; for it implies the existence of an act of free choice without the use of reason.” For liberty is founded in reason. Wherefore a human act, both insofar as it is an act proceeding from the will and insofar as it is proceeding from deliberate will, altogether requires prior cognition of reason. Cf. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2. ad 3; Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2; D. 6. S. 4. 5; Lessius on q. 9. a. 1. D. 4. a. 2.

9. And thus much concerning the first element of the human act. The remaining matters which must be treated concerning it will more conveniently be explained presently when the discussion is about the other element, or about voluntariness. This element includes two things: the voluntary and the free. We pause now in explaining the voluntary. The voluntary, so called from the will, is that which proceeds or is caused by the will. “Voluntary,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 2. ad 1, “is said denominatively from the will... which names the rational appetite.” And in the same place, a. 3: “The voluntary is said to be that which is from the will,” namely, as the same Holy Doctor explains in the same article, that which proceeds from the will. Wherefore the voluntary is nothing except either an act of the will or the effect of that act. And thus, q. 20. a. 2. ad 3, the Angelic Doctor says, “it must be said that voluntary is said not only of an act of the will, but also of exterior acts, according as they proceed from will and reason, and therefore there can be a difference of good and evil concerning both.” Just as some motion is from the sole instinct and impulse of nature, so some act is elicited from the vital appetite and arises from prior cognition. Just as the former motion has its proper name and is called natural, so also this act has its proper name and is called voluntary. And therefore this name is never attributed to those things which happen without cognition, and it is not used except to signify those things which are done by one's own will alone, without any exterior impeller. Thus 1 Peter 5:2: Not for the sake of base gain, but voluntarily; and sometimes those things which are done without obligation are also called voluntary, and those things which are done with a ready mind are especially called voluntary. Wherefore by this name voluntary is signified that motion which arises from one's own intrinsic appetite eliciting the act, with prior cognition. For since in every motion there is both to act and to act on account of an end, and since the end, the first cause of all things, does not exercise its causality except by means of cognition of it, the voluntary consequently will be that whose principle is simply intrinsic with cognition of the end. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1; Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 1. S. 1. n. 10.

10. The voluntary differs from the willed. For the willed neither proceeds from the will, nor consequently is it an act of the will or the effect of that act; but it designates only the object of the act of the will. Suaresius gives the example, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 1. S. 1. n. 2, “of a death effected by another,” while I indeed desire it, consent to it, and rejoice in it, but “do not cooperate.” That depraved desire, consent, and joy are voluntary, because they proceed from the will; but that death of the enemy, effected by another, with me in no way cooperating, is not voluntary for me, but only willed; for it does not proceed from my will, or depend upon it in any way, but is only the object of the act of my will. If, on the contrary, either I myself were to inflict that death, or at least were to cooperate so that it would be inflicted by another, then it would proceed from my will, and for me it would be at once voluntary and willed. Yet the willed object is not altogether excluded from the voluntary, insofar as the voluntary, that is, the very act of the will, is terminated at that object, and the will embraces that object by its act, and the act itself, according as it exists in the concrete, concerning such an object, proceeds from the will. But although not everything willed is also voluntary, nevertheless the voluntary is always in some way willed. For nothing can proceed from the will unless in some way it is the object of the will. Suaresius, l. c. S. 1.

11. Since the voluntary proceeds from the will, which is a principle intrinsic to the agent, the voluntary agrees with any natural motion whatever, but differs from the violent. For the former proceeds from an intrinsic principle, the latter from an extrinsic principle. “But this,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1. c. and ad 3, “the name voluntary imports, that the motion and act be from one's own inclination..... Yet it is commonly of the nature of natural and voluntary motion that they are from an intrinsic principle.” And in the same place, a. 4:

“The act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination proceeding from an interior cognoscitive principle, just as the natural appetite is a certain inclination from an interior principle and without cognition. But what is coerced or violent is from an exterior principle.” And thus in 1 Peter, loc. cit., it is said: “Feed the flock which is among you: overseeing not by constraint, but spontaneously according to God, neither for the sake of base gain, but voluntarily.”

12. The voluntary can be taken in three ways: first, in an improper sense, for the spontaneous; secondly, in a proper and strict sense, for the free; thirdly, in a proper and enlarged sense, for any act whatever of the will. The spontaneous, according as it is distinguished from the voluntary properly so called, is said to be that which proceeds from the sensitive appetite from a prior sensitive cognition of the object into which the appetite tends. For as the appetite of nature follows from the natural form, so the vital appetite, elicited, follows from the apprehended form, actually representing the object. The form apprehended intellectually is followed by the rational appetite or will; the form apprehended sensibly is followed by the animal, or sensitive, appetite, common to brute and man. That which proceeds from the sensitive appetite indeed proceeds necessarily, but flows forth of its own accord, and therefore it is called necessary and spontaneous. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2., q. 8. a. 1., q. 30. a. 1.; Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 6. S. 4. The voluntary, taken in a proper and strict sense, for the free, is that which proceeds from the will determining itself to act, with the active power of the same will of eliciting or not eliciting the act, of eliciting this act or another act. Wherefore the free essentially includes the notion of the simply voluntary. Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 1. S. 3. 6.; Lessius on q. 6. St. Thomas a. 1., on q. 9. a. 1. D. 4. The voluntary, taken in a proper and enlarged sense, for any act whatever of the will, is generally that which proceeds from the spiritual or rational appetite, namely from the will, with prior intellective cognition of the object.

13. St. Thomas in 1. 2. seems to acknowledge no other voluntary than in the first and second sense, which voluntary he calls according to an imperfect and perfect notion. Hence the Angelic Doctor requires three things for the perfectly and properly voluntary. The first is that it be from an intrinsic principle, from an intrinsic inclination; for the will, whence voluntary, like every appetite, is nothing but a certain inclination intrinsic to the agent. “Appetite is nothing other than a certain inclination of the one appetizing toward something.” 1. 2. q. 8. a. 1. The second is that not only the motion itself of the will be from within, but also the motion of the will unto the end, since “it is necessary that all agents act on account of an end”; 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2.; and therefore prior cognition of the end is required. The third, finally, is that the very application of the faculty to act be from within, namely that the faculty itself move itself to the end and not be moved by another. Therefore, according to the Angelic Doctor, the voluntary is then had perfectly or properly, when from within the will there is motion, motion unto the end, determination of motion unto the end. And this last thing, according to the Angelic Doctor, is to move oneself, which in no way is to be confused, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, with motion simply from an intrinsic principle.

14. It is worth the effort to bring forward the very words of the Holy Doctor, so that it may be clear whether the interpretation set forth of his doctrine is genuine. “Of those things which are moved by an intrinsic principle, some move themselves, but some do not. For since every agent, or moved thing, whether it acts or is moved, acts or is moved on account of an end, those are moved perfectly by an intrinsic principle in which there is some intrinsic principle, not only so that they are moved, but so that they are moved unto an end. But for something to be done on account of an end, some cognition of the end is required. Therefore whatever thus acts, or is moved by an intrinsic principle, which has some knowledge of the end, has in itself the principle of its act, not only so that it acts, but also so that it acts on account of an end. But that which has no knowledge of the end, although there is in it a principle of action or motion, nevertheless the principle of that which is to act or to be moved on account of an end is not in it, but in another, by whom the principle of its motion unto the end is impressed upon it. Hence things of this kind are not said to move themselves, but to be moved by others. But those things which have knowledge of the end are said to move themselves, because in them there is a principle not only so that they act, but also so that they act on account of an end. And therefore, since each is from an intrinsic principle, namely that they act, and that they act on account of an end, the motions and acts of these are called voluntary. But this the name voluntary imports, that the motion and act be from one's own inclination. And from this it is that the voluntary is said to be, according to the definition of Aristotle and Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene, not only that whose principle is within, but with the addition of knowledge. Hence, since man most of all knows the end of his work and moves himself, in his acts the voluntary is found most of all.” 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1. And then a. 2: “As has been said, for the notion of the voluntary it is required that the principle of the act be within, with some cognition of the end. But cognition of the end is twofold, namely perfect and imperfect. Perfect cognition of the end indeed is when not only the thing which is the end is apprehended, but also the notion of the end is known, and the proportion of that which is ordered to the end itself. And such cognition of the end belongs to rational nature alone. But imperfect cognition of the end is that which consists in the apprehension of the end alone, without this, that the notion of the end and the proportion of the act to the end be known. And such cognition of the end is found in brute animals through sense and natural estimation. Therefore perfect cognition of the end is followed by the voluntary according to the perfect notion, according as, once the end has been apprehended, someone can, deliberating concerning the end and concerning those things which are to the end, be moved unto the end, or not be moved. But imperfect cognition of the end is followed by the voluntary according to the imperfect notion; according as, namely, one apprehending the end does not deliberate, but suddenly is moved into it. Hence to rational nato rational nature belongs the voluntary according to the perfect notion, but according to the imperfect notion it belongs also to brutes... Will names the rational appetite; and therefore it cannot be in those things which lack reason. But voluntary is said denominatively from will, and can be extended to those things in which there is some participation of will according to some agreement with will. And in this way voluntary is attributed to brute animals, insofar namely as through some cognition they are moved unto an end... It must be said that from this it happens that man is master of his act: that he has deliberation concerning his acts. For from the fact that deliberating reason is related to opposites, the will is able toward either. But according to this, the voluntary is not in brute animals, as has been said.” And a. 3. §. Sed contra: “That of which we are masters is said to be voluntary.” And likewise q. 21. a. 2, the Holy Doctor affirms that in all voluntary acts there is present in the will dominion over its act.

15. But when it is said by the Angelic Doctor that the voluntary according to the perfect notion requires that the notion of the end be foreknown, the sense is not that it is necessary to know what an end is; but the sense is that the thing which is the end is known as an end, that is, as a term to be obtained through other things, so that the proportion of these as means to that thing is foreknown. Thus, for example, a woman about to prepare a banquet foreknows the banquet as the term of her preparation. This preparation must be directed to that. Wherefore, by reasoning from the banquet, she is moved to the preparation of these meats, of this wine, at this hour, in this place, as things corresponding to the obtaining of that banquet, and therefore she foreknows the proportion of these things, and therefore chooses and prepares these foods before others, these drinks before others.

16. But properly and strictly such a voluntary is so not only materially, because the voluntary is narrowed to the free, but also formally, since then the act, as has also been said, is from an intrinsic principle simply, not only insofar as the will simply acts and acts on account of an end, but also insofar as from itself it is determined to acting on account of an end, since it can be toward either, as St. Thomas says; or, as the same Angelic Doctor says, it itself is what moves itself unto the end. Since, on the contrary, toward an act of which it itself is not mistress, the will is as it were applied, determined, moved unto the end from elsewhere, namely by the very instinct of nature, by God himself conferring nature, by whom the principle of its motion unto the end is impressed, as the Holy Doctor says. Hence the former act, strictly and properly speaking, is voluntary; the latter should rather be called of the will. The former is from the power of the will, namely from the will which can be toward either; the latter is only from the natural inclination of the will. Since that former free act is in reality not concerning the end, namely concerning the necessary end which we necessarily will, by the natural instinct itself, but concerning the means to be chosen for the end; hence St. Thomas constantly narrows the voluntary to the free choice of means.

17. “Since each is from an intrinsic principle, namely that they act, and that they act on account of an end, the motions and acts of these are called voluntary.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1. To act on account of an end, as is clear of itself, is not the act itself by which we desire the end, but is the act by which we choose and assume the means, or something as a means to the end. And then, l. c.: “Hence since he most of all knows the end and moves himself (namely unto the end), in his acts the voluntary is found most of all.” The tendency and motion unto the end is contained in the choice of means. And l. c. a. 2: “Perfect cognition of the end is followed by the voluntary according to the perfect notion, according as, namely, with the end apprehended, someone can, deliberating concerning the end and concerning those things which are to the end, be moved unto the end or not be moved.” And q. 10. a. 1, the Holy Doctor sets the voluntary against the natural in the very acts of the will, so that some are voluntary or free, others natural from the very intrinsic necessity of nature. And as the will is founded, as in its principle, in nature itself, that is, in the very substantial nature of man, so the voluntary act is founded in the natural act of the will, as in its principle, namely in the act by which man wills good in common or the ultimate end. For the free act of the will, or voluntary act, is concerning a determinate good, and that which is an end; but the natural act is concerning good in common and the ultimate end. But in every volition the volition of good in common and the volition of the ultimate end is included, as the principle is included in the conclusion. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 6., Cajetan on this place; St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 1., Cajetan on this place.

18. Hence, if by the name voluntary is understood that which is from the will, acting of itself, or moving itself and applying itself to act, that which is from the rational appetite as author and master, which comes under the name voluntary strictly and properly, without doubt the free is altogether of the notion of the voluntary. But if by the name voluntary is understood merely an act of the will, namely an act elicited by the will, or an act elicited by the will according to its own propensity and inclination, the free is not of the notion of the voluntary. For first, the imperfect voluntary from imperfection of cognition is not rarely necessary, as may be seen in sudden motions. Secondly, beatific love is a perfect voluntary, for it is from perfect cognition of the object, and from the will loving God perfectly known by the whole inclination of its proper nature, and it is necessary. Thirdly, “Naturally man wills not only the object of the will, but also other things which belong to other powers, as cognition of the true, which belongs to the intellect; and being and living, and other things of this kind, which regard natural consistency, all of which are comprehended under the object of the will, as certain particular goods.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 1. “It must be said that the ultimate end moves the will of necessity, because it is the perfect good, and similarly those things which are ordered to this end, without which the end cannot be had, such as being, and living, and things of this kind.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 2. ad 3. And these things man wills even by a perfect act of the will. - Therefore man naturally wills three things: first, good in common; secondly, beatitude, or happiness; thirdly, everything fitting to the one willing according to his nature. Suarez, in 1.2. tr. 2. D. 1. S. 3.

19. Now then, as in exterior things the natural is found in two ways, namely always or frequently, so also in natural motions of the will the natural is found in both ways. For toward certain objects, namely toward the first and the second, the will is so naturally determined that it cannot in any way will the opposite. But toward certain things it is so naturally inclined that it can by accident will the opposite, and such is that third object. For that which naturally befits man, such as being and living and other things of this kind, can be considered in two ways. First, these things can be looked at as certain particular goods according to themselves, and thus they can, although rarely, be rejected by the will because they have annexed the defect of some good which is desired, as may be seen in those who kill themselves. Secondly, they can be considered as they are necessarily connected with beatitude or happiness, and thus, so far as is on their part, they cannot be rejected by the will. Wherefore, if they are known sufficiently and in due manner by the intellect and proposed to the will, the will necessarily wills them and cannot not-will them. Cajetan on q. 10. a. 1. 2.; Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 1. § 3.

20. From what has been said, the distinction between the voluntary and the permitted is clear. The voluntary is that which is from an intrinsic principle, namely from the will, which by its affection, its propensity, its inclination, is borne into it, and therefore truly wills it, and by its volition contributes, as much as it can, that it be. “This the name voluntary imports, that the motion and act be from one's own inclination.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1. “The act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination proceeding from an interior cognoscitive principle, just as the natural appetite is a certain inclination from an interior principle and without cognition.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. And thus the good which is in the world is voluntary to God, for God truly wills it and by his will contributes that it be. The routing of enemies in the siege of a fortress is voluntary to the leader of the army, for he truly wills it and by his will contributes that the defeated yield to the victors. The permitted is that which someone, although he does not will it, since it is contrary to his proper propensity and inclination, and consequently he positively contributes nothing by his will that it be, nevertheless does not will to impede, although absolutely he can, since from elsewhere he is not bound to do this. Wherefore sin is not voluntary to God, but only permitted by God, since certainly it is against the natural propensity of God and his proper inclination; nor does God positively contribute anything by his will that it be, but he only does not impede it, although he can do this, on account of most wise causes. Likewise, “it must be said that human law is said to permit some things, not as approving them, but because it is not able to direct them.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 93. a. 3. ad 3. The death of innocents, in the assault upon a city, is not voluntary to the leader of the army, since it is outside his intention and affection, and consequently he himself can positively contribute nothing by his will toward it; but it is permitted by him, since, on account of sufficient and rational causes, he does not impede it, although absolutely he could, for he could desist from that assault upon the city. But sin is voluntary to man, and not only permitted by him. “It must be said that that into which the will tends by sinning, although it is evil and contrary to rational nature according to the truth of the thing, nevertheless is apprehended as a good and as fitting to nature, insofar as it is fitting to man according to some delight of sense, or according to some corrupted habit.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. ad 3. And in this way the will is inclined and borne into it by its affection, and wills it: “when the will is moved by the appetible according to its own inclination, the motion is voluntary.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. ad 2.

21. Further, from what has been said, what the involuntary is is clear. The involuntary is opposed to the voluntary. Therefore the involuntary can be taken in three ways. First and properly for the involuntary, according as it is distinguished from the non-voluntary, or for the involuntary contrarily. Such an involuntary “is said through this, that the will is contrary to that which is done, whence sadness follows upon the involuntary.” St. Thomas, De Malo, q. 3. a. 8. Wherefore the involuntary contrarily is that which in a voluntary act is against the positive affection of the will. Secondly, the involuntary is taken for the non-voluntary. “The non-voluntary is said through the mere removal of the act of the will.” St. Thomas, l. c. Moreover, the removal of the act of the will can be understood in two ways: first negatively, for a mere negation of the voluntary. Of this kind are all acts which are neither elicited nor commanded by the will. Secondly privatively, insofar as an otherwise voluntary act lacks under some respect some condition required for a voluntary act, and thus that voluntary act is at the same time called an involuntary or non-voluntary act. Therefore the involuntary privatively is that which, in a voluntary act, is not from voluntary consent, insofar as some condition of the voluntary is lacking, namely due cognition on the part of the intellect and deliberation on the part of the will, and yet there is not in the will a contrary affection. Hence, says St. Thomas, l. c., sadness follows upon the involuntary, which nevertheless does not always follow upon the non-voluntary. For sometimes it happens that someone approaching one not his own, whom he believes to be his own, although he does not actually will to approach one not his own, because he does not know her to be not his own, nevertheless wills habitually and would will actually if he knew; whence when he afterward perceives that she was not his own, he is not saddened but rejoices, unless he has changed his will.” But if he neither wills habitually, nor would will actually if he knew, it would not be held merely non-voluntary, but involuntary. And from this example it appears how the involuntary and the non-voluntary privatively are verified only in a voluntary act, while for the non-voluntary merely negatively no act of the will is prerequired.

22. If in the involuntary that contrary affection of the will is of itself efficacious for impeding the contrary motion, so far as is on the part of the one operating, and the thing is so displeasing to the will that it wills it in no way, the involuntary simply is had. But if that affection is a simple affection, of itself not efficacious for impeding the contrary act, or if the thing is not so altogether displeasing to the will, and the will wills it at least in some way, then the involuntary in a certain respect is had. Hence an indication can be taken concerning consent or dissent of the will with respect to temptations to be repelled; concerning perfect or imperfect resistance of the will to the same; so that although perhaps mortal sin is excluded, nevertheless some defect, negligence, and venial sin are not excluded. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6. ad 3., a. 7. ad 2.

23. Since the voluntary is had by an act of the will, various questions are raised here concerning the object of this act, concerning the will itself passing from potency to act, concerning the very act of the will required for the voluntary. And first, with respect to the object, it is asked: whether the will is concerned only with good. - The answer must be affirmative. The reason: the will is the rational appetite. But every appetite is only of the good, because appetite is nothing other than a certain inclination of the one appetizing into something. “But nothing is inclined except into something similar and fitting. Since therefore every thing, insofar as it is a being and a substance, is a certain good, it is necessary that every inclination be into good.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 8. a. 1. But since each power extends itself to those things in which the notion of its object can be found in any way whatsoever, and since the notion of good is found not only in the end, but also in those things which are to the end, the will extends itself to all these things, St. Thomas, ib. a. 2. But since the will tends into apprehended good, “for the will to tend into something, it is not required that it be good in the truth of the thing, but that it be apprehended under the notion of good.” St. Thomas, ib. a. 1. Therefore the will can indeed be concerned with evil as material object, but by no means as formal object. But since the same power is of opposites, yet not bearing itself in the same way to each, the will is related both to good and to evil: to good by desiring it, but to evil by fleeing it. Hence, since whatever the will wills or does, it wills or does because it is good or on account of good, good and end are convertible, and the object of the will is said to be good and end. St. Thomas, ib. ad 1., q. 1. a. 2. ad 3. - Cf. Becanus, On Beatitude and Human Acts, C. 2. q. 7.; Lessius in l. c. St. Thomas.

24. Moreover, the good into which the will tends must not only be apprehended, but also determinate and possible. - First, the voluntary cannot be except concerning a determinate thing. For the will is moved only into good; but good has the notion of an end. “Since good is what all things desire, and this has the notion of an end, it is manifest that good imports the notion of an end.” St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 5. a. 4. But an end is only something certain and determinate. And therefore he who wills to contract betrothal with either of two does not contract, and the priest who wills to consecrate any one host out of several hosts does not consecrate. Sanchez, On Matrimony, l. 1. D. 26. S. 1., Rubr. Miss. De Defectibus, § VII. n. 1. - Furthermore, the voluntary cannot be concerning an impossible thing. For “the will is a certain rational appetite; but every appetite is only of the good. The reason for this is that appetite is nothing other than a certain inclination into something. But nothing is inclined except into something similar and fitting.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 8. a. 1. - Although, however, the object of the will must be a possible good, it is not nevertheless necessary that this good also be existing, because, since it moves the will only metaphorically through cognition, it is enough that it be apprehended by the mind and represented in the imagination. For it does not move the will except insofar as it is judged by the intellect to be fitting or good.

25. Having been established that the voluntary must be concerning a possible good, can the voluntary at least be concerning a thing impossible not in fact, but in law? - Concerning a thing impossible as to the fact itself, the voluntary cannot be, as is clear from what has been said, cf. n. 24, if someone uses reason rightly. Hence no one can seriously will to touch with his hand a vacuum space outside the world. The question is concerning a thing impossible only as to law, for example, to contract marriage with one having a diriment impediment, to consecrate water, to baptize with wine, etc. But it seems that the answer must be affirmative, since the will is borne into the fact itself, and need not necessarily be borne at the same time into the law, or into the fact only dependently upon the law. And thus one who contracts marriage with a diriment impediment unknown, and one who even attempts marriage before a civil magistrate, truly wills, so far as in him lies, to contract marriage. Hence it is that the Church afterward sometimes dispenses in the root, namely without consent being renewed, and validates the marriage, Sanchez, On Matrimony, l. 2. D. 33. And indeed in C. Ex sponsalibus, un., de Spons. in 6., it is said: “from pure and certain betrothals, even if they are null by reason of consanguinity, affinity, frigidity, religion, or any other reason, provided they are not null from defect of consent, there arises ... the impediment of justice of public honesty.” Therefore true consent with a diriment impediment is openly supposed.

26. From the object of the will we proceed to the very faculty of the will, as passing from potency to act.

Hence the first question arises: whether the will is moved by the intellect? - The will is by no means moved by the intellect with respect to the exercise of the act. The reason is that the will is an inclination into the good of the whole supposit, while the other faculties are inclinations into some particular good of the supposit. But the inclination into the good of the whole ought to move and incite the particular inclinations, because particular goods ought to be referred to the good of the whole, and not conversely; just as a cause which regards the universal end moves causes which regard particular ends. Therefore “it belongs to the will to move the other powers by reason of the end, which is the object of the will.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 3. Since the first final principle pertains to the will, it itself is the first mover in man. St. Thomas, 1.2. q. 9. a. 1., q. 11. a. 1. ad 2. Cf. Cajetan on 1. 2. q. 9. a. 1.; Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 6. S. 7. But the intellect moves the will with respect to the specification of the act. For the intellect is what proposes the object to the will. “But the object moves by determining the act after the manner of a formal principle, from which action is specified in natural things.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 1. After the manner of a formal principle, because it is not an intrinsic formal principle but an extrinsic one, nevertheless not separated, as an idea or exemplar, but conjoined.

27. Another question follows: whether the will is moved by the sensitive appetite? - The answer must be negative with respect to the exercise of the act, on account of the same reason brought forward in the preceding number. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 1. But sense moves the will not directly and immediately, but indirectly and mediately, by inducing a disposition in the willing subject with respect to the specification of the act. For “that which is apprehended under the notion of good and fitting moves the will by mode of object. But that something appears good and fitting happens from two things, namely from the condition of that which is proposed, and of him to whom it is proposed. For fitting is said according to relation, whence it depends on each of the extremes. And thence it is that taste disposed in diverse ways does not receive something in the same way as fitting and as not fitting. Whence the Philosopher says in 3 Ethics, cap. 5. a med. to. 5., As each one is, such does the end seem to him. But it is manifest that according to passion of the sensitive appetite man is changed to some disposition, whence according as man is in some passion something seems fitting to him which does not seem so to him existing outside the passion: as to the angry man something seems good which does not seem so to the quiet man; and in this way, on the part of the object, the sensitive appetite moves the will.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 2. Nor indeed does it stand in the way that the mover is not moved by that which it moves, so that there would be reciprocal motion. But the will moves the sensitive appetite, insofar as it obeys reason. For St. Thomas answers, l. c. ad 3: “It must be said that reason, in which the will is, moves by its command the irascible and concupiscible, not indeed by despotic principality, as a slave is moved by his master, but by royal or political principality, as free men are ruled by a governor, who nevertheless can move contrariwise. Whence both the irascible and the concupiscible can move the will in the contrary direction. And thus nothing prevents the will from sometimes being moved by them.” Cf. St. Thomas, l. c. a. 5.; Suarez, tr. 2. D. 6. S. 6. 7.; Cajetan on q. 9. a. 2.

28. Aptly St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 1: “It must be said that something needs to be moved by another insofar as it is in potency to several things. For that which is in potency must be reduced into act through something which is in act, and this is to move. But some power of the soul is found to be in potency to diverse things in two ways: in one way as to acting or not acting; in another way as to acting this or that; as sight sometimes sees actually and sometimes does not see, and sometimes sees white and sometimes sees black. Therefore it needs a mover as to two things, namely as to the exercise or use of the act, and as to the determination of the act; of which the first is on the part of the subject, which sometimes is found acting, sometimes not acting; but the other is on the part of the object, according as the act is specified. But the motion of the subject itself is from some agent. And since every agent acts on account of an end, as was shown above q. 1. a. 2., the principle of this motion is from the end. And thence it is that the art to which the end belongs moves by its command the art to which that which is to the end belongs, as the art of steering commands the art of shipbuilding.... But good in common, which has the notion of an end, is the object of the will. And therefore on this part the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts. For we use other powers when we will. For the ends and perfections of all the other powers are comprehended under the object of the will, as certain particular goods. But always the art or power to which the universal end belongs moves to acting the art or power to which the particular end belongs, comprehended under that universal: as the leader of an army, who intends the common good, namely the order of the whole army, moves by his command some one of the tribunes, who intends the order of one battle-line.” Therefore according to the Angelic Doctor the will is not moved with respect to the exercise of the act either by the intellect or by sense. But on the contrary, it itself is what moves the other faculties with respect to the exercise of the act. Hence the same Holy Doctor, l. c. ad 3, says still more clearly: “It must be said that the will moves the intellect as to the exercise of the act, because even the true itself, which is the perfection of the intellect, is contained under universal good, as a certain particular good.”

29. Since the will, as has been said, is moved in some way by the inferior appetite, another question thence arises: whether the will is moved of necessity by the inferior appetite. - It must be said that either reason is totally bound by the passion of the sensitive appetite, or reason is not totally absorbed by passion, but there remains, as to something, the free judgment of reason. If the first is verified, then there is not any motion of reason, and consequently neither of the will. If the second has place, according as the free judgment of reason remains as to something, consequently something of the motion of the will remains. “Therefore insofar as reason remains free and not subject to passion, so far the motion of the will which remains does not tend of necessity to that to which passion inclines. And thus either the motion of the will is not in man, but passion alone dominates; or if there is a motion of the will, it does not follow passion of necessity.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 3. Wherefore, although the will cannot make it that motions of concupiscence do not arise, nevertheless it can not will to desire, or not consent to concupiscence. For although reason is clouded over by passion, nevertheless something of reason remains free. And according to this someone can either repel the passion totally, or at least contain himself lest he follow the passion. Sometimes indeed the sensitive part is totally subjected to reason, as happens in the virtuous and in the saints. Sometimes, conversely, reason is totally absorbed by passion, as happens in those who through vehement anger or concupiscence become furious or insane; concerning such persons the same account holds as concerning brute animals, which of necessity follow the impulse of passion. But we will and operate many things apart from passion of the sensitive appetite, through the choice alone of the rational appetite, as is clear in those things in which reason resists passion. St. Thomas, l. c. ad 1. 2. 3.

30. Since the will is moved neither by the intellect nor by sense to the exercise or use of the act, it is now asked: whether the will moves itself to act. - With respect to the specification of the act, the will is moved by the object, as is already clear from what has been said in n. 26. With respect to the exercise of the act, the will moves itself in the volition of means. For to move oneself is to reduce oneself, to apply oneself, to determine oneself from potency to act, by ordering oneself to the end. But the will, with respect to the volition of means unto the end, because it is free and has dominion over the act, is itself that which determines itself to act and orders itself to the end. Therefore. On the contrary, by an exterior principle, which is the cause of the will itself, it is moved with respect to the exercise of the act in the first volition of the end. For in this volition the will is not itself that which determines itself to act and orders itself to the end, but it is determined by the natural instinct itself of the will, received from an exterior principle, namely from God. Hence the principle of voluntary motions is something naturally willed, which is good in common, the ultimate end itself, and universally all those things which befit the one willing according to his nature. But the will does not always will these various objects actually, although it always has the aforesaid natural instinct, “but only when it is in some determinate disposition,” by which the aforesaid natural power is then stirred up to act. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 1. c. ad 1. 2.

31. That according to St. Thomas the will moves itself with respect to the exercise of the act in the volition of means is affirmed most clearly in 1. 2. q. 9. a. 3, where the Angelic Doctor treats this question expressly: whether the will moves itself. In the paragraph Sed contra, he says: “because the will is mistress of its act, and in it there is to will and not to will; which would not be if it did not have in its power to move itself to willing. Therefore it moves itself.” And then he responds: “It must be said that.... it belongs to the will to move the other powers by reason of the end, which is the object of the will. But... in this way the end is related in appetible things as a principle in intelligible things. But it is manifest that the intellect, through the fact that it knows a principle, reduces itself from potency into act as to the knowledge of conclusions. And in this way it moves itself. And similarly the will, through the fact that it wills the end, moves itself to willing those things which are to the end,” passing from act to act. And ad 1: “It must be said that the will does not move and is not moved according to the same thing. Whence neither according to the same thing is it in act and in potency; but insofar as it actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potency into act with respect to those things which are to the end, namely so that it actually wills them.” The same is clear from 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2: “It must be said that it is necessary that all agents act on account of an end. For among causes ordered to one another, if the first is removed, it is necessary that the others be removed. But the first among all causes is the final cause. The reason for this is that matter does not obtain form except according as it is moved by an agent. For nothing reduces itself from potency into act. But the agent does not move except from intention of the end. For if an agent were not determined to some effect, it would not act this more than that. Therefore, in order that it produce a determinate effect, it is necessary that it be determined to something certain, which has the notion of an end. But this determination, as in rational nature it comes about through the rational appetite, which is called will, so in other things it comes about through natural inclination, which is called natural appetite.” St. Thomas then adds the things which have already been reported in n. 1, and in c. ad 1. 2 he says that man is moving himself to the end; that those things which have reason move themselves to the end, because they have dominion over their acts; that it is proper to rational nature that it tend to the end as acting itself, or leading itself to the end; that man through himself acts on account of an end; that man orders into the end and acts himself into the end. This discussion indeed is about the volition of means. St. Thomas treats the question: whether to act on account of an end is proper to rational nature. Now to act on account of an end is to will and assume something as a means proportioned to attaining the end. And it is the same thing to move oneself to the end, to tend into the end, to act or lead oneself to the end, to order into the end; and, as the same Holy Doctor has it, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 3. ad 3, to be moved by itself according to the notion of the end; for he says that the will is moved by itself as to the exercise of the act, according to the notion of the end. And in the same place, when the second difficulty has been proposed: “A movable thing is moved at the presence of the mover. But the will is always present to itself. If therefore it moved itself, it would always be moved, which is clearly false,” he responds: “To the second it must be said that the power of the will is always actually present to itself; but the act of the will by which it wills the end sometimes is not always in the will itself. But in this way it moves itself. Whence it does not follow that it always moves itself;” since one actually willing the end moves himself to the means to be willed.

32. As regards the volition of the end, in 1. 2. q. 9. a. 4 the Holy Doctor asks whether the will is moved by some exterior principle; and he responds by distinguishing motion as to specification and as to exercise, saying: “It must be said that according as the will is moved by the object, it is manifest that it can be moved by something exterior. But in that way in which it is moved, as to the exercise of the act, it is necessary to posit that the will is moved by some exterior principle. For everything which is sometimes an agent in act and sometimes in potency needs to be moved by some mover. But it is manifest that the will begins to will something when previously it did not will this. Therefore it is necessary that it be moved by something to willing. And indeed, as was said in the preceding article, it moves itself insofar as through the fact that it wills the end it reduces itself to willing those things which are to the end. But it cannot do this except by means of counsel. For when someone wills to be healed, he begins to think how he might attain this; and through such thought he arrives at this, that he can be healed through a physician, and this he wills; but because he did not always actually will health, it is necessary that he began to will to be healed from some mover; (that is, some principle was the cause for him why he began to will). And if indeed it moved itself to willing, it would have been necessary that it do this by means of counsel from some presupposed will, but one must not proceed to infinity. Whence it is necessary to posit that, into the first motion of the will, the will comes forth from the instinct of some exterior mover.” But this exterior mover, as is held from article 6, is God.

33. In order that these things may be made clear, it must be noted that for the will to move itself can be taken in two ways: first, according as it merely signifies that it passes from potency of volition to the act of willing, the active power of the will being sufficient for this in its own order, namely in the order of a second cause, without another mover being required as though supplying a defect of the active faculty of the will in that order of a second cause. And in this sense, whether the discussion is about the volition of means or about the volition of the end, “it is certain,” says Cajetan in l. c., “that for willing the will with the object suffices.” Whether the will wills the end or wills the means, it always wills, and the active power of the will is always the same; nor is a greater active power required for willing one thing than for willing another. Whence it is also clear that if in this sense, according to the Angelic Doctor, the will moves itself in the volition of means, the will also moves itself in the volition of the end. Therefore, besides this ordinary and evident sense, there is another peculiar and more intimate sense. For the will to move itself can signify not only that the will wills, but that the will acts, and reduces and applies itself to acting; and to will is not the same as to act, to move; nor does that which suffices for willing suffice for acting, for moving. For willing, as has been said, the will and the object suffice; but for acting something else is required, for the end also is required; for to act is to act on account of an end. “It is necessary that all agents act on account of an end.” Indeed the appetite of the end is prerequired, either in time or by nature. “The first among all causes is the final cause... An agent does not move except from intention of the end.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2. For moving oneself, that is, for determining oneself to act, the end is likewise prerequired, namely the appetite of the end. And the reason is clear, because an agent, by moving itself, that is, by reducing itself from the potency of acting to the act of acting, reduces itself from that potency to a certain act, to a determinate act, and this can be only from intention of the end. St. Thomas, ib. Whence it is also that in this sense the will moves itself only when it proceeds from one act into another, from intention of the end to the choice of means. And in this sense St. Thomas takes that expression, the will moves itself, and upon this, that the agent acts on account of an end, and upon motion, which is the act of the movable by the mover, he builds his whole doctrine. Cajetan on q. 9. a. 4.

34. And this truly signifies that the will moves itself, for, as is clear, it does not signify that the will simply wills, but signifies the will acting from itself, namely the causative force or causality of the will applying itself to acting; and for this the will with the object does not suffice, but the will is required as pre-willing the end by nature or in time, as has already been said. Wherefore that moving itself or acting from itself does not import in this sense, as in the former, the exclusion of another mover, as though furnishing powers for acting, but it excludes only the application to acting from intention of the end made by an exterior mover: the will itself, mistress of its act, from the prior intention of the end applies itself to acting, or to willing the means. The will, through the fact that it wills the end, moves itself to willing those things which are to the end... Insofar as it actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potency into act with respect to those things which are to the end, so that, namely, it actually wills them... The will is moved by itself according to the notion of the end. St. Thomas, l. c. Whence it is more than sufficiently clear that St. Thomas derives from the prior volition of the end the fact that the will acts from itself, or moves itself. This indeed is not verified in the first volition of the end; and the reason brought forward by the Holy Doctor is now well understood, why, although the will moves itself in the volition of means, nevertheless it does not move itself also in the very volition of the end, namely in the first volition of the end, because if indeed it moved itself to willing the end, it would have been necessary that it do this by means of counsel, namely from a prevolition or intention of the end, for this is to act from counsel, just as to know by means of syllogism and from principles is the same; and consequently from some presupposed will of the end, which would be to proceed to infinity. Wherefore it is necessary that, into the first motion of the will concerning the end, the will comes forth from the instinct of some exterior mover, namely God, that is, from the very instinct of the will's proper nature tending to good, given indeed by an exterior principle, not received from the object, but from God, the cause effecting and creating the will with its proper nature. Wherefore in the first volition of the end, it is not the will itself which moves itself, acts from itself, as mistress of the act ordering, acting, leading, directing itself into the end; but the will in this volition is moved and acted, ordered and directed by an exterior mover, namely by God. Aptly Cajetan in l. c.: “And this act (of volition of the end) is said to be from an exterior agent... because to this act the will does not concur as acting on account of an end, but as tending to the end from the direction of the superior agent ordering it in this. And for this reason this act, although it is willing, and of the will, and from the will as eliciting the act, nevertheless is not voluntary, because it is not from the will as applying itself to willing, but natural; because the giver of nature applies it by means of an inclination given for willing. For it is necessary, as is said in the text, that there be an infinite process in voluntary things unless one arrives at one non-voluntary but natural act of the will, in which there is a stopping point.” Cf. Contra Gentiles, l. 2. c. 48., l. 3. c. 88. 89.; Cajetan on 1. 2. q. 9. a. 4.

1. Arnulfus, an upright man, but of a petulant disposition, when, first, he had met his enemy, and had been provoked and attacked by him not only with words but also with blows, burns with the desire of killing him, and, having seized a dagger, rushes upon him. But, the impulse of anger having been restrained, he flees from the enemy. Afterwards, however, having become master of himself, he fears lest he has committed a mortal fault, and therefore, no delay having intervened, he throws himself at the feet of the confessor, about to accuse the sin.

2. The same man, although he had made serious efforts to destroy the evil habit of blaspheming, in a quarrel had with a certain adversary breaks out into blasphemies, and therefore again seeks a confessor to wash away this stain of conscience.

3. On another occasion, knowing that he was accustomed to quarrel in drunkenness, he carefully attends lest in drinking he exceed the limits of sobriety. But behold, urged by his companions to drink beyond custom, he is overtaken by drunkenness before he has adverted to its danger, and, being furious, mixes in quarrels with others. But having returned to himself he strives to do penance, and again has recourse to the confessor.

Q. 1. What is the voluntary? 2. Has Arnulfus sinned in that threefold case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 6-8. To the second, Arnulfus does not seem to have sinned, at least gravely, in any of the three proposed cases. For the perfectly voluntary was lacking. Not in the first, for he is said, and appears, truly to be an upright man, and an upright man does not so easily resolve deliberately to kill a man. He is said, moreover, to be prone to anger, and that his enemy met him; whence, from his presence, he could at once be moved to anger. Likewise it is said that he was provoked and attacked with words and blows, and so he could be much moved to anger, so that he lacked at least full and perfect knowledge of the malice and deliberation of mind. Finally it is said that, the impulse of anger having been restrained, having become master of himself, he feared lest perhaps he had sinned, and at once went to the confessor to expiate the guilt of soul, if perhaps he had incurred it; and this indeed shows that Arnulfus acted at least without full deliberation of mind.

Not in the second; for, if he had sinned gravely, in the case this would have been only on account of the neglected habit of blaspheming. But he had made serious efforts to root it out. For since he is prone to anger, he is easily to be judged to have acted from a first-first movement.

Not in the third, since he carefully attended lest in drinking he exceed the limits of sobriety, and then, not adverting to the danger of drunkenness, he was seized by drunkenness. - G. 1.

2. Elpidius, habitually given to drinking and of a quarrelsome disposition, furious in drunkenness, after having had a dispute with Titius, resolved to seek vengeance from him; yet he put off the purpose to another time. Afterwards he went to a nearby tavern, that he might calm his anger in wine; but behold, when at night he was leaving the tavern perfectly drunk, by an unfortunate chance he came upon Titius himself, and beat him so gravely that for many weeks he was forced to abstain from his accustomed work and suffered great damage.

Q. 1. What is the free? 2. Are the damages inflicted by Titius in drunkenness imputable to him, and therefore is he held to repair them?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 10-12. To the second: "Affirmatively. The reason is that the damages are truly voluntary and sufficiently foreseen in the cause itself, at least confusedly. For Elpidius willed to inflict damage on Titius, and drank with the danger of drunkenness, since he was habitually given to drinking. Moreover he is judged to have foreseen, at least implicitly, that in the state of drunkenness he would inflict damages; since he could not be ignorant that in wine he became furious and could harm someone. Therefore Elpidius is excused neither from grave sin against justice, nor from the obligation of repairing the damages." Thus G. 3.

But that resolution is not without difficulty. For Elpidius entered the nearby tavern, not in order then to carry out his evil purpose, but, on the contrary, to calm his anger; and so it does not appear that even confusedly Elpidius then foresaw damage to be inflicted on Titius. Nor is it valid to say that he is judged to have foreseen, at least implicitly, that in the state of drunkenness he would inflict damages. For if in fact, in the case, he did not foresee it, this general presumption must yield to the truth. And the presumption in the case is rather the contrary; since, stirred by anger, he entered the tavern to calm his anger; whence Elpidius rather seems, for that time, to have willed to abstain from every vengeance and from inflicting damage. But when Elpidius gravely beat Titius, Elpidius was already perfectly drunk, and so then the voluntary, the free, and sin were entirely lacking. - I. M. 288.

3. • Three principles of human acts are numbered: 1. cognition, 2. will, 3. liberty. For these are constitutive of them, and therefore required for any act properly human, as is clear from the definition of a human act.

The will necessarily supposes previous cognition; for nothing can be the object of the will unless it has first been apprehended by means of the intellect. Hence the axiom: Nothing willed unless foreknown. But liberty supposes both. For liberty is the faculty of choosing, or of determining oneself to some act; but election cannot be made unless the will moves itself toward this or that foreknown part.

4. • DEFINITION. The voluntary, or a voluntary act, is called that which proceeds from the will with intellectual cognition of the end. The reason of this definition is clear from what has just been said, or from the necessity of previous cognition, so that the will can determine itself to an act.

Hence it differs 1. from the willed ¹, which can be the object of the will even when inefficacious, and therefore without being the effect of the same will; thus rain poured upon dry land, as regards the farmer, will be called willed, but not voluntary; 2. from the spontaneous, which is done with merely sensitive and material cognition, and therefore imperfect, and is commonly also attributed to brutes.

¹ The willed, namely, is not said of an act of the will, but of the object into which the will tends; and this can happen, although the object does not depend on the will as an effect on its cause. I said, can happen; for what we call willed can also proceed from and depend on the will, so that it is both willed and voluntary. Thus, for example, while you move foot or hand, this motion will be called both willed and voluntary to you. Wherefore it hardly appears why the editor of the most recent French edition (Anicii 1873) requires for the notion of the willed that it not proceed from or depend on the will, since nothing is more contrary to the very frequent usage of Theologians.

5. • DIVISION. The voluntary is manifold, namely:

1. Perfect, or imperfect. The former is that which is done with full cognition and full consent of the will. But the latter is that which proceeds from somewhat obscure cognition or imperfect consent ².

² Understand: where full deliberation is not present; in which matter there can be many degrees.

2. Voluntary simply, or in a certain respect. The former is that which is done from full deliberation and inclination of the will. But the latter is that which is done with consent of the will, but with some repugnance, or some inclination of the will toward the opposite ³.

³ More commonly the Doctors employ this partition only with those acts in which there is something of the voluntary and at the same time of the involuntary; namely, when the affection of the will tends to two things which it cannot have at the same time, and therefore, concerning one, rises efficaciously and embraces it; toward the other, inefficaciously, and therefore leaves this. Concerning one there is will, concerning the other velleity; toward one the will is borne absolutely, but toward the other conditionally, namely if the former is not to be lost; and thence comes the appellation of absolute or simple will, and of will in a certain respect, namely according to some regard or inefficacious complacency.

3. Direct, or indirect ⁴. The former is that which is intended in itself, or per se, that is, that which is the immediate object of the will ⁵, as theft perpetrated by a thief, or killing intended by a malevolent murderer. The latter is called that which is not willed in itself, but in another directly willed, either as effect in cause, or as something connected with it, for example drunkenness in excessive drinking, or homicide from the rash throwing of a stone.

⁴ Others, with St. Thomas (I-II, q. 6, art. 3), understand by the name of direct and indirect voluntary that which the Author soon designates by the expressions positive and negative voluntary. But the things handed down here express another partition of the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in cause.

⁵ The immediate object of the will can also be an effect very remote, provided that it too is intended in itself. But you will call voluntary in cause that which is not indeed intended in itself, yet is foreseen to follow.

4. Positive, or negative. The former is said to be that which is from the will itself really acting, or that which requires a positive action, for instance reading. The latter is that which proceeds from the omission of an act depending on the will. Such is the omission of Mass in him who, adverting to the instant celebration of it, nevertheless continues to devote himself to study at home ⁶.

⁶ More briefly and clearly you will say that it is called positive when the will elicits an act; negative, when the will elicits no act, but remains suspended. This distinction is employed when it is asked whether omission can be given without any act of the will. See Suarez on I-II, Treatise V, Disputation 3, Section 2.

5. Express, or tacit. It is called express if it is manifested by words or signs; but tacit if it is known to be present from some fact or even omission. Thus the sins of subjects are voluntary and imputable to a Superior if he does not oppose them, when otherwise he can and ought to do it ⁷. Hence rule 43 of law: He who is silent seems to consent ⁸.

⁷ In that example you have 1. tacit voluntary, as is clear; 2. voluntary in cause (the Author calls it indirect), insofar as the sins are judged effects of correction omitted by the Superior; and 3. negative voluntary (others with St. Thomas call it indirect), insofar as the effect comes from omission.

⁸ For rightly understanding the axiom, He who is silent seems to consent, these rules can help. I. Someone is judged to consent in favorable matters. II. Likewise one silent where otherwise there intervenes some obligation or necessity of contradicting, and an available faculty for doing it; to this also pertains that saying: Knowledge and patience in those things which are of slight prejudice works consent. III. One silent, if anything is decreed unjustly or less rightly, where deliberation is made by common counsel and vote. IV. Likewise, one asked several things, who is silent concerning one thing while he refuses the rest. V. Add cases from the disposition of law, for example of a son silent in betrothals contracted for him by a parent.

6. Actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative. It is called actual if it proceeds from the will actually influencing, as for example contrition in him who here and now elicits an act of penance. It is virtual if it comes by force of an act previously posited and continuing morally to influence the agent, as absolution imparted by a distracted confessor. It is called habitual if indeed it was once had, and not retracted, but now neither directly nor reflexively influences the will or the act. It is named interpretative if it has been had neither physically nor morally, but can prudently be presumed, and would be had if it were thought about, or could be thought about. Thus a sick man deprived of his senses, if he has lived in a Christian manner, is judged to wish to receive extreme Unction ⁹.

⁹ The interpretative voluntary differs from the tacit because in the former there is no consent, in the latter true consent is present. But each is customarily called presumed voluntary, because it is presumed to be present in its own manner.

6. You Will Resolve. - 1. In the same act there can be direct voluntary, or voluntary in itself, indirect voluntary, or voluntary in cause, and involuntary ¹⁰. Example: Titius, seeking Caius his enemy unto death, attacks him, with danger also of injuring his companion, whom he sees associated with him; but with the bullet, besides both, he also strikes Sempronius, whom he neither saw nor could have suspected to be present there. Caius is struck from the direct voluntary of Titius; the companion from the voluntary in cause; and Sempronius apart from every voluntary.

¹⁰ It is clear from the context that involuntary is not here said of what is against the will. Others call it not voluntary rather than involuntary. Otherwise this would have to be said not apart from, but against, the will.

2. Where there is no advertence to a precept, there is no voluntary in relation to it, and therefore no voluntary transgression of the precept, and therefore no sin. - St. Lig., no. 8.

3. Where there is half-full advertence of the mind, you have an act only half-voluntary, which even in violation of a grave precept does not exceed venial sin; thus it happens in those half-asleep, or distracted to other things. Hold the same concerning imperfect consent of the will. - St. Lig., ibid.

4. Some act can be voluntary under one respect, not however under another, according as it is known in one way or another: thus he who kills someone, being ignorant that he is a Priest, commits homicide, but not sacrilege. - St. Lig., ibid.

5. He who violates a grave precept, induced by human fear or threats of companions, posits an act simply voluntary, and indeed gravely sinful in grave matter ¹¹, because he acts with full determination of the will, although he acts unwillingly, and would more gladly not have done this; nevertheless an act of this kind is also involuntary in a certain respect, and therefore becomes less culpable. - St. Lig., no. 21.

¹¹ Too hastily is this resolution placed here, which supposes that known point which will have to be discussed below concerning fear. Therefore, so that the resolution may be true, it must be supposed that the fear 1. did not greatly disturb the use of reason, and 2. does not excuse from observing the precept. For, as will be said below, fear of grave evil not only excuses from an ecclesiastical precept, for example of hearing Mass, but also from a positive divine precept, for example of confessing integrally, indeed even from natural divine law, for example of preserving a secret.

6. Not only actual voluntary, but also merely virtual voluntary influences the morality or validity of an act sufficiently in such a way that it is good or evil, valid or invalid; but otherwise one must speak concerning the habitual and interpretative, as becomes manifest from their definition.

7. Omission can be voluntary ¹², just as a positive act of the will; nevertheless, unless a precept is included, it cannot be imputable unto fault. Thus one omitting Mass on a weekday does not sin. St. Lig., no. 11.

¹² Indeed, even the omission itself, if it is truly voluntary, that is, free, according to the truer doctrine cannot be understood without some act of the will. For it is necessary that the will determine itself to it, and choose it before the opposite. But a determination or election of this kind says a positive act of the will. And the equivocation on which the opposite opinion rests, namely that it admits that free omission happens without any act of the will, you will easily detect from St. Thomas (I-II, q. 71, art. 5).

Since in the other species of the voluntary no special difficulty occurs, we shall say only:

7. Preliminary Notes. - The indirect voluntary, or voluntary in cause, as has been said, is not intended in itself, but is discerned as about to follow from another thing directly willed, as an effect from a cause. Nevertheless it is a true object of the will, although indirect; for he who wills the cause also wills the effect following from it, if he foresees this effect. Hence the saying: He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the thing caused. Thus when someone sins before others, the scandal coming from his sin is imputed to him by reason of indirect voluntary.

But cause is distinguished manifoldly, namely:

1. Physical, or moral. The former is that which produces the effect by acting physically, as fire produces burning, the sun light. The latter is that which effectively moves another free cause to acting. Thus one commanding a homicide is a moral cause of the killing.

2. Immediate, or mediate. The former is that which produces an effect with no other cause intervening, for example if someone pierces the breast of another, he will be the immediate cause of his death. The latter, which does not produce the effect unless another cause is interposed. Hence moral cause is always a mediate cause.

3. Proximate, or remote. That is called proximate which has a necessary or ordinary connection with the effect. But remote is that which, although it is able to produce the effect, nevertheless does not have great force, and does not influence it notably; or it is that from which the effect for the most part does not come.

4. Cause per se, or per accidens. The former is that which by its nature tends and is ordered to producing the effect. Thus excessive drink is a cause per se of drunkenness. But the latter is that which, although it is not ordered by its nature to some effect, nevertheless sometimes, some circumstance intervening, can produce it. Thus homicide can follow from drunkenness. For the most part this last division falls back into the preceding one.

8. Principles. - I. Principle. A threefold condition is required so that an effect can be imputed to the agent, or to the one positing the cause, namely:

1. That the agent has foreseen the effect, at least in confusion. The reason is that an effect in no way foreseen can in no way be voluntary; for nothing is willed unless it has been foreknown. Hence drunkenness is not voluntary, nor to be imputed to him who becomes drunk from a little wine, whose force he did not know. Therefore, as some have contended, it is not sufficient for fault that the evil effect could or ought to have been foreseen; for the supposition must be denied, namely, that the effect can be foreseen if in fact it is not foreseen, at least in confusion; for the first idea of some thing is not in the power of man.

2. That the agent could have not posited the cause, or could have removed it once posited; for otherwise, liberty being lacking, the voluntary necessarily is lacking. Moreover an obligation cannot be given when this cannot be fulfilled. Hence the axiom: No one is held to the impossible. Hence also Augustine, On Free Choice, book III, ch. 18: For who sins in that which can in no way be guarded against?

3. That the agent, lest such an effect follow, is held not to posit the cause, or to remove it once posited. For if there is not given an obligation of avoiding the cause, the effect following from it cannot be imputed, because the agent uses his own right, and holds himself only permissively as regards the effect. Hence inordinate motions are not imputed to a physician or surgeon in the exercise of his art as if voluntary; because these are not bound to omit their art for the purpose of guarding against this effect, but on the contrary have a just reason for exercising it, as will be declared more from the following principle. - St. Thomas, I-II, q. 20, art. 5.

9. • II. Principle. It is lawful to posit a good or indifferent cause from which immediately follows a twofold effect, one good and the other evil, if there is present a proportionately grave cause, and the end of the agent is upright, namely, he does not intend the depraved effect. - St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64, art. 7.

The reason of this principle is that if this were not lawful, the agent would sin either from the intention of the depraved effect, or from the positing of the cause, or from the foreseeing of the evil effect. But none of these can be said.

For 1. this is not illicit by reason of the end, since it is supposed upright; 2. nor by reason of the apposition of the cause, since it is supposed good, or at least indifferent, or even if it is evil, nevertheless it is not evil on account of that effect about to follow; 3. nor from foreseeing the depraved effect, for in the hypothesis this is not intended, but merely permitted; and for permitting it there is present a proportionately grave and just cause.

But four conditions which are enunciated in this principle are altogether required, namely: 1. that the end of the agent be upright; 2. that the cause be good, or at least indifferent; 3. that the good effect be immediate; and 4. that there be present a grave reason for positing the cause, and that the agent not be held from justice, or from office, or from charity to omit it.

Therefore 1. a good end is required, that is, the agent ought not to intend the evil effect, because otherwise the evil effect would be voluntary in itself. For this reason neither ought he in any way to take complacency for himself concerning the depraved effect.

2. A good cause is required, or at least an indifferent one, namely, that the act be opposed to no law ¹. The reason is evident. For if the cause were evil in itself, it would introduce guilt per se.

¹ This statement extends more broadly than is proper. And indeed, he who unjustly kills a man posits a cause, on account of which creditors suffer harm, evil, indeed most evil; nor nevertheless is he therefore held to restitution, unless he intended that harm, according to the common opinion of the Doctors. Therefore the guilt to be considered here is not that which inheres in the cause in itself on account of opposition to any law whatever, but that which arises from the obligation of guarding against that effect.

3. It is required that the good effect follow at least equally immediately from the cause. The reason is that if the cause directly and immediately has a depraved effect, and the good effect comes only by means of that depraved effect, then good is sought from evil: but it is never lawful to perpetrate evil, however slight, for procuring any good whatsoever; for according to the very common axiom drawn from the Apostle, Rom. 3:8: Evil things must never be done that good things may come. Thus it is not lawful for you to lie, even to save the life of a man.

4. It is required that there be present a proportionately grave reason for positing the cause; because natural equity obliges us to avoid evils and to guard against harms to our neighbor, when we can do this without proportionately grave harm ².

² Here, however, one must not weigh only the harm or inconvenience of the agent at that time, but also and much more the common inconvenience of all, if this were generally required.

Now in these cases, the greater the reason required for acting, the more nearly the cause touches the evil effect, the more probable the evil effect is, and the less right one has to the action considered in itself.

10. You Will Resolve. - 1. An evil effect which follows per accidens from a voluntary cause is not imputable unto fault, unless there is present an accidental circumstance from which the effect necessarily to be guarded against is foreseen: for example, to sell weapons per se is no evil; although it is evil to sell them to someone mad. The reason of the former part is that the evil effect, if perhaps it follows, unless it is intended, is not properly voluntary, since it is not contained in the cause through a necessary connection, nor is the cause ordered to an effect of this kind. Therefore the one positing the cause does not effectively influence the effect; and therefore the effect is not imputable. - Reuter, no. 15. - The reason of the other part is that you are held both from charity and from justice to avert harm which you can easily foresee from weapons handed over to a madman.

2. Blasphemies, impurities, quarrels, or injustices which are done in drunkenness are voluntary when they can be foreseen; but they are sufficiently foreseen from a custom of perpetrating such things in this state, and therefore they are voluntary in cause, and imputable unto sin.

78. That an act may be truly and in all respects free, cognition or advertence of mind ought to precede the election of the will; and the agent ought to advert to two things: the act itself as moral, and the various elements which can affect its morality: and the more perfect the cognition, the freer the act is, because the will elicits the act more freely the more lucidly the motives of acting are proposed to it.

1. The agent ought to be conscious of the action itself which he elicits, that this may be free; for since a free act is in the power of the one operating, the agent ought to be so disposed that he can posit or not posit the act, continue or interrupt it; but he cannot do this unless he is conscious that he is acting and performing such an act. Nor does it suffice that he advert to the material act itself, but it is required that he perceive its morality.

79. (a) By reason of the subject itself, advertence is full or semi-full: full, when nothing on the part of the intellect impedes the eliciting of the act of adverting, with that perfection which prudent persons are accustomed to employ in matters of some moment, for example, when someone, awake, in possession of himself, neither disturbed nor distracted, attends to a matter; - semi-full, or rather non-full, when something impedes the mind so that the act of adverting is not perfect, for example, when someone thinks about some matter while not yet fully aroused from sleep, or not fully in possession of himself, or distracted by other matters.

According to diverse advertence of mind, three kinds of acts are usually distinguished: first-first movements, or indeliberate ones, which precede all advertence, for example, the natural movement of aversion, anger, revenge when they are excited before they are adverted to; second-first movements, or semi-deliberate ones, of which we are conscious only imperfectly, because we are not fully awake, or are distracted in some way; second movements, or deliberate ones, which are elicited with full advertence, namely by one who is altogether in possession of himself and fully attends to the matter.

80. (b) By reason of the object, advertence is distinct, when the morality of the object is clearly perceived; confused, when it is apprehended only obscurely. Thus one who throws a stone from a window, foreseeing that from it a passing enemy will be wounded, distinctly adverts to the malice of this action; but if he does this, indeed suspecting that perhaps someone passing by can be wounded, but not knowing whether someone in fact is passing, he adverts only confusedly to the wounding of the neighbor. - This distinction indeed is of the greatest moment, since an effect only confusedly foreseen is much less imputable to the agent than one which is clearly perceived.¹

¹ Which Vieux Moraliste lucidly sets forth, apud Ami du Clerge, t. XX, 1898, p. 1025-30.

81. 2. That the agent may freely will all the circumstances of the act, he ought to advert to them; for since nothing is willed unless previously known, if in some object there are several moral elements which the agent does not perceive, he does not freely will the same. Thus if someone kills his father, thinking him to be a man hostile to himself, he is indeed guilty of homicide, but not of parricide, because, on account of darkness or another cause, he did not advert that this man was his father; if he kills him while hunting, thinking that what he saw was a wild animal, he is guilty neither of parricide nor of homicide.

82. 1. By reason of deliberation and adherence, volition, like cognition itself, is called perfect or imperfect, according as it is done with full or semi-full advertence, and at the same time with full or semi-full consent. Therefore in the voluntary, or free, there can be several degrees, according as cognition or volition is more or less perfect. Certain ones think that the perfection of volition depends on cognition alone; but others, whom we follow, judge that there are degrees in consent itself. For sometimes no consent is given, although advertence is full, as in the case of abulia, below, n. 128. Sometimes consent is semi-full, although advertence is full, as in the case of a habit already retracted, n. 125. At other times the will consents only reluctantly, under the influence of fear: thus a Christian who, from fear of death, externally denies the faith; or an official who, in order to preserve an office, reluctantly acts against conscience. In this case, if advertence is full, volition does not cease to be free, and indeed sufficiently full for committing mortal sin: for then the agent deliberately prefers a temporal and transitory good to a spiritual and eternal good, which is commanded under grave obligation. This is illustrated by a comparison: a merchant who, when a storm has arisen, throws his merchandise into the sea to save his life, does this indeed reluctantly, but nevertheless freely and efficaciously, because he places life before riches; thus one who consents to sin from fear acts freely, although reluctantly. - But at other times consent is given with the whole soul, with the whole heart. Therefore there are various degrees in consent itself.

83. 2. By reason of manifestation, volition is express, when it is distinctly declared externally by words or other signs; tacit, when consent is indeed elicited, but is not distinctly manifested, and is gathered to be present only from some fact or omission of fact: thus, if a superior, knowing that something is being done against the law, does not prohibit it when he easily can, he seems to consent. - From this was born the axiom: he who is silent seems to consent; it must be noted, however, that silence alone of itself does not signify consent, but that its sense is to be defined from the adjuncts, according to the rules which will be handed down in the whole course of the work.

From the voluntary or tacit consent there must carefully be distinguished the presumed voluntary, which someone in fact did not elicit, but would have elicited, if the matter had been proposed to him; for example, if in a particular case a positive law cannot be observed without grave inconvenience, the dispensation of the legislator can be presumed.

84. 3. By reason of the mode in which it is expressed, volition is positive, when it is terminated to some act; negative, when it consists in some omission; for example, a father who adverts that his son is stealing another's good, and does not impede it, negatively wills to cooperate in this theft. But this omission is truly free and imputable when someone can and is bound to act.

Here it can be noted that a voluntary omission can happen in manifold ways. If it is a question, for example, of hearing Mass: (a) someone can expressly say: I do not wish to hear Mass; (b) or choose an action incompatible with hearing Mass, for example, hunting; (c) or positively determine himself to elicit no act, whether of volition or nolition; (d) or behave altogether passively, as happens to those who are found in a state of indifference or abulia, as they say. In the first three ways, the omission is free; in the fourth, it is controverted: for abulia is a psychological disease, which often was voluntary in the cause, but greatly diminishes and sometimes removes liberty.

Other divisions of the voluntary or free, direct and indirect; actual, virtual, and habitual, will more opportunely be declared below.

Not all human actions are ethically free. There are various degrees of self-determination corresponding to the measure of knowledge with which a man acts.¹

¹ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 59, art. 3: "Some things do not act from any judgment, but as if acted upon and moved by others, just as an arrow is moved toward its end by the archer. Other things act by a certain judgment, but not a free one, as do irrational animals. For a sheep flees a wolf by a certain judgment by which it considers the wolf harmful to itself; but this judgment is not free in the sheep, but implanted by nature. Only that which has intellect can act by free judgment, insofar as it knows the universal character of the good, from which it can judge this or that to be good. Hence wherever there is intellect, there is free choice."

A spontaneous or reflex action is one produced by the will without due knowledge. A spontaneous act, as such, is not ethical. "Nihil volitum nisi praecognitum." To the category of spontaneous actions belong the primary perceptions of the external and internal senses, the first stirrings of the imagination and the memory, as well as all acts performed in the state of sleep or disease, under external compulsion or in ignorance.

2. VOLUNTARY AND FREE ACTS. —An act is voluntary and free (voluntarium et liberum) if it is performed by the will with knowledge and deliberation. ² For an act to be voluntary and free, therefore, two conditions must cooperate: a) The act itself must be produced by an internal principle, i. e., the will; b) The person acting must have some knowledge of the end towards which his act tends.

² "Actus procedens a principio intrinseco seu a voluntate cum cognitione finis." —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, art. 1.

Acts performed under external compulsion, therefore, or without knowledge of their purpose, cannot be called free.

In order that an act be entirely free, it must, moreover, be perceived by the agent in all its I parts and circumstances. When even one circumstance is unknown to the agent, the act is not free with regard to this circumstance. For instance, if a man appropriates to himself an object, not knowing that it belongs to another, he is not a thief; or if he knowingly possesses himself of the property of another without being aware of the fact that it is devoted to a sacred purpose, he is not guilty of sacrilege.

There are different degrees of voluntariness, according to the measure of reflection accompanying an act. (1) An act is positively voluntary (voluntarium positivum) if it is directly intended; negatively (voluntarium negativum) if it involves an inexcusable or culpable omission.³

³ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 71, art. 5, ad 2: "Not willing itself can be called voluntary, insofar as it is within man's power to will and not to will."

(2) An act is perfectly voluntary (voluntarium perfectum) if it proceeds from the will with full knowledge and deliberation; it is imperfectly voluntary (voluntarium imperfectum) if the knowledge and deliberation are not full.

(3) An act is immediately voluntary (voluntarium elicitum) if it is produced directly by the will; it is mediately voluntary (voluntarium imperatum) if it is dictated by the will and performed by some other faculty of mind or body.

(4) An act is expressly voluntary (voluntarium expressum) if the consent of the will is manifested by word or sign; it is tacitly voluntary (voluntarium taciturn) if the consent of the will can be deduced from some act or omission. Thus a superior wills expressly what his spoken or written command enjoins; he wills tacitly what he permits, though he be able and in duty bound to prevent it.

(5) Something is said to be willed directly or in itself (voluntarium directum s. in se) when it is in and by itself the object of the will, e. g., a premeditated crime. It is willed indirectly or in the cause (voluntarium indirectum s. in causa) when it is merely the effect of something else which is directly willed. For anything to be willed in the cause, therefore, the effects of that cause must be foreseen but not intended, for if they were intended, the action would be willed in itself or directly. A drunkard, e. g., directly wills the gratification of his appetite for strong drink; indirectly he also wills to ruin his health and squander his money, because he foresees these inevitable effects in the cause.

READINGS. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6. —V. Frins, S.J., De Actibus Humanis, Vol. I, Freiburg 1897, pp. 85 sqq. —M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 34 sqq. —Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 22 sq. —Sabetti-Barrett, S.J., Compendium Theologiae Moralis, 22nd ed., New York 1915, pp. 11 sqq. —A. Sweens, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, 2nd ed., Haaren 1910, pp. 34 sqq. —A. Vermeersch, S.J., Theologia Moralis, Vol. I, Bruges 1922, pp. 57 sqq.

Usefulness. In moral theology one must frequently recur to the divisions of the voluntary, especially in questions on imputation, on sins, on chastity and the opposed vices, on laws, and on the sacraments. It is of the greatest importance to possess a distinct notion of intention, election, and permission; and accurately to separate the virtual, habitual, and interpretative voluntary, or that presumed for the future. The conditions of liberty must be known, so that the impediments of the human act may be better understood.

Since this article is somewhat broader and at the same time very necessary for practice, for the sake of clarity we divide it into three paragraphs, namely: on the quiddity and division of the voluntary and involuntary; on the indirect voluntary; on the enemies of the voluntary.

52. Elements of a Human Act. - In a human act we can distinguish essential being, or the elements which constitute it, and accidental being, which is added to it once already constituted; likewise the subjective element, or the very activity of the agent, and the objective element, or the object (that is, the end or good) considered totally with all things that pertain to it.

1. The whole subjective element is essential; for it three things are required:

a) Deliberate reason, that is, the previous knowledge of the intellect proposing the good, because nothing is willed unless it is foreknown, and indeed deliberate knowledge, without which man would not be master of his act;

b) The tendency of the will toward the good proposed by reason;

c) The freedom of this tendency, for otherwise the will would not choose nor act in the mode proper to men.

Concerning deliberate knowledge nothing special must be said, because the will supposes knowledge, and freedom supposes deliberation; hence it suffices to explain the other two elements. Therefore the essence of the human act is that it be voluntary and free.

2. The objective element, however, is twofold:

a) one essential, namely, the object itself, or the end or good to which the agent tends;

b) another accidental, namely, the circumstances which are added to the object and affect it.

Concerning all these things we must now speak specifically.

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 1 and 2.

53. The voluntary, from Aristotle, Ethics III, chapter 1, is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end. It is said:

1. That which, that is, anything whatever, whether an act, or the omission of the act itself, or an effect proceeding from either;

2. Which proceeds, namely, in any way whatever, whether immediately or mediately, whether directly or indirectly: for he who places the cause, or omits it when he ought to place it, wills and causes the effect which he foresees will follow from it;

3. From an intrinsic principle, that is, from the proper power and inclination of that which operates;

4. With knowledge of the end or good: since the principle of acting is twofold, efficient and final, that properly proceeds from within which has an intrinsic efficient and final principle, so that it is not only moved but moves itself into the end. Hence for the voluntary it is required not only that it be from its own efficient principle by natural inclination, but also from some previous knowledge of the end by intentional inclination, by which the being acts for the sake of a known good. Hence for something to be totally voluntary, it must be known according to all circumstances; but if one is unknown, according to this it will not be voluntary, as if someone kills a man, not knowing that he is a cleric, he is guilty of homicide, not sacrilege.

Therefore the voluntary differs:

a) from the natural, whose efficient principle is within, but not the final, such as the motion of the heart, of vegetative life, which are done without knowledge of the end;

b) from the violent, whose principle is from without, with the subject resisting, as if someone is dragged by external force against his will;

c) from the simply willed: for this is an intentional object, but not a real effect of the will proceeding from it as from a cause, that into which the will tends affectively, but which does not proceed from it effectively, that which it wills but does not cause; thus rain is willed by the farmer but not voluntary, likewise the natural death of an enemy at which someone rejoices: indeed every voluntary is in some way willed, but not conversely;

1. Although the simply willed does not proceed from the will, the very volition proceeds from it and consequently is voluntary and sufficient for the notion of sin; but since that volition is not the cause of the willed thing, it does not suffice on this part to induce an obligation, for example, of restitution.

d) from the permissive, which is neither voluntary, or proceeding from the will, nor willed as its object, but only is not impeded by him who can but ought not: thus for just reasons and for a greater good, God or a governor do not impede sins which nevertheless displease them and are not done by them.

54. Division of the Voluntary According to Knowledge of the End. - Since the voluntary proceeds from knowledge of the end, hence according to the diverse knowledge of the end, the voluntary is diverse:

1. Knowledge of the end is material, or improperly so called, when that which is the end is known but not as end; but knowledge is formal, or properly so called, when the thing which is the end is known as end, that is, the very reason and dignity of the end and the proportion of that which is ordered to the end, or the proportion of means to end. Hence the voluntary is divided into the properly so called or perfect, which proceeds from formal knowledge of the end and is found only in the higher appetite of man; and the improperly so called or imperfect, which proceeds from material knowledge of the end and is also found in the sensitive appetite alone, and even in beasts: this is also called spontaneous.

2. Formal knowledge can be deliberate and indeliberate; hence the necessary voluntary is distinguished, which proceeds from judgment and will determined to one thing; and the free, which comes about from indifferent judgment with the power of the will to the opposite. The free is not always more voluntary, for the intentional inclination of the will toward beatitude is greater than toward other things, and yet it is necessary.

3. Deliberate knowledge can be more or less perfect; hence the perfectly free voluntary is distinguished, which comes about with full deliberation, such as prudent persons are accustomed to use in matters of some importance, and with full consent; this is required for mortal sin. And the imperfectly free voluntary is distinguished, which comes about with some deliberation and some consent, as is found in the half-asleep, the half-drunk, the distracted, and those laboring under vehement passion; this suffices for venial sin. Hence theologians are accustomed to distinguish: first-first movements, which precede all deliberation (and are not properly voluntary or human acts); second-first movements, which come about after some deliberation and before perfect deliberation; and second movements, or deliberate movements, which proceed from perfect deliberation.

55. Division of the Voluntary According to the Intention of the Will. - The voluntary is from the proper intentional inclination of the appetite; hence according to the diverse intention of the will from which it proceeds, the voluntary is diverse. For something can proceed:

1. From an actual intention had here and now, whether explicit, as when a priest baptizing says, I will to baptize, or implicit, contained actually in another, as when he wills to go to the baptistery and perform all things according to custom;

2. From a virtual intention, had previously but here and now still influencing and persevering in force, as when a distracted priest baptizes from the intention had at the beginning;

3. From a habitual intention, had previously and not retracted, but in no way remaining in force and influencing the present act: as when a catechumen desiring to be baptized, deprived of the senses, is voluntarily baptized.

1. Namely, the effect of the will once had endures, which is the condition or necessary disposition of the present effect caused by another.

The first is actually willed, the second virtually, the third only habitually.

2. We say: willed. There is no virtual or habitual voluntary; every voluntary proceeds and therefore is actual, but it proceeds from a virtual or habitual intention.

For a human act, habitual intention is not sufficient (nor, a fortiori, interpretative intention): for this does not flow into the act, nor therefore make it proceed from deliberation of reason and the influence of freedom and be done in a human mode; but at least virtual intention is necessary. For this three things are required: a) that the agent act in a human mode, for otherwise he would not act from intention; b) that the first intention has not been retracted; and c) that it remain active in some effect of itself, so that one effect flows from another and all from the first.

In the case in which contrary or incompossible intentions are present, the predominant remains and influences or obtains the effect. Of simultaneous intentions, the predominant is that which, according to the present disposition, would be chosen if the incompossibility were known; but if they are equal, none persists, because they destroy one another. Of two successive intentions, the later will prevail if someone formed it remembering the prior, because then the prior was knowingly revoked; also for the most part if he was forgetful of the prior, unless the prior was made in such a way that he wills at least virtually to exclude the subsequent one.

56. Division of the Voluntary by Reason of Principle. - The voluntary is from an intrinsic principle, and therefore by reason of the diverse principle it is distinguished into elicited, which proceeds immediately from the will itself and is consummated in it (to will, to consent, to choose), and commanded, which from the motion and command of the will proceeds immediately from another power, whether internal (for example, voluntarily to think or to be angry), or external (for example, voluntarily to walk).

Therefore by reason of terminus it is internal or external, according as it is consummated in an interior rational or sensitive power, or in the senses or members, or even in exterior effects. Hence the elicited and internal voluntary, and the commanded and external voluntary, are not one and the same.

57. Division of the Voluntary by Reason of Manifestation. - Both the voluntary and the willed are manifested in diverse ways, and thus it is divided into 1) expressed, which is manifested by words or signs; 2) tacit, which is manifested by silence, or rather is known certainly from the circumstances of silence according to rule 43 of law: He who is silent seems to consent; 3) presumed, which from certain reasons, as from the inclination or disposition of mind, is prudently conjectured to be present now, or is gathered conjecturally by reasonable indications: for presumption is a probable conjecture of an uncertain thing. Examples are: a religious who buys a book with consent received from the superior; or with the superior present and silent; or with the superior absent, whom he cannot approach, when he wholly needs the book.

Not everyone who is silent consents, for in rule 44 it is said: He who is silent does not confess, but neither indeed does he seem to deny. Therefore silence not per se but only according to various circumstances prudently to be considered signifies consent or dissent. Hence the one silent is judged to consent a) in favorable matters when there is question of a benefit or favor, such as a donation or gratuitous promise, but not if there is question of a burden, inconvenience, or prejudice; b) also in prejudicial matters, if someone can without great inconvenience and at the same time ought to contradict, e.g., if he is questioned by a judge, or a superior if he observes a transgressed rule and is silent, or if several come together to deliberate about a common opinion: for then the silent are judged per se to support those consenting; c) in comparison: if several things have been proposed and someone denies all and is silent about one, he is judged to affirm it; if he affirms all and is silent about one, he is judged to deny it; d) if it has been so determined in law, which nevertheless has force only in the external forum, provided the contrary is not proved.

58. Observation. - From all the aforesaid things there is distinguished both the merely interpretative voluntary and the merely interpretative willed: so called from an intention in no way had, but which only would be had. But this in no way is, but only would be, willed or voluntary; namely, in fact it is not intended by the will nor does it proceed from it, but it would be intended or would proceed if something were known, for example, a priest would will to celebrate Mass for his father if he knew him to be dead, and a bishop, if it were requested from him, would grant jurisdiction. It differs from the presumed willed, because this indicates that which, according to prudent estimation, exists or existed; but the former indicates that which, the condition being supposed, would exist.

St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 6-21; St. Alphonsus, V, 1-5; ed. G., II, p. 685 ff.; Suarez, in 1.2, tr. 2; Billuart, de act. hum. Diss. 4; Frins, de act. hum. I and II; Bouquillon, Theol. mor. fund., ed. 3, n. 318 ff.

IMPUTATION is a judgment by which an act is attributed to someone as to its true author and master; so that the agent is held to render an account concerning the act itself and its natural effect, for example, concerning damage inflicted on someone. Imputability is the very quality of the action, by force of which such a judgment is made (Muller, Theol. mor., I, § 90).

Imputability is founded on the dominion which belongs to man over his own acts: therefore those acts are imputable which it is within the power of man to place or not place; and hence all and only human acts must be called imputable, both those which each one places personally and those in whose placing he actively cooperates, as we shall say below (n. 517). Moreover, dominion over human acts is had from this, that they proceed from free will; wherefore, as principles of imputability, THE VOLUNTARY and THE FREE are rightly assigned. Each of these can be more or less perfect, and can be lessened or even taken away by various impediments: in which case, imputability is lessened in the same degree, or even taken away.

Therefore we must discuss: 1. concerning the principles of imputability; 2. concerning the impediments of the same.

271. DEFINITION. The voluntary can be defined thus: an act proceeding from an intrinsic principle, or from the will, with knowledge of the end (V, n. VII).

An act of the will necessarily presupposes knowledge of the end in the agent; for nothing can be an object of the will unless it was first apprehended by help of the intellect; and the more perfect or nobler the knowledge of the intellect has been, the more perfect the will will be. Hence the axioms: Nothing willed, unless foreknown; Nothing in the will, unless it was first in the intellect. But end here is taken in a broad sense, for the term of the will in the concrete, namely for the object with all its circumstances. Therefore, to constitute the notion of the voluntary, two things are required: 1. some knowledge of the end, on the part of the intellect; 2. consent, on the part of the will (St. Thom., 1.2, q. 6, a. 1).

From this definition it is clear that the voluntary differs from the spontaneous, from the willed, and from the free.

1. The SPONTANEOUS, in the broad sense, says absence of any external influence whatever, and is: that which happens with no precept, fear, deceit, etc., compelling. In the strict sense, it says only absence of coercion, and is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle; whether with full and formal knowledge of the end, as every voluntary act; or with imperfect and material knowledge, as, for example, an indeliberate motion by which someone strives to repel pain, and thus it differs from the voluntary. From this it is clear that the spontaneous extends more broadly than the voluntary; for every voluntary is spontaneous, but not vice versa (Porpora, tr. II, n. 9).

2. The WILLED is said of the object toward which the will tends, yet without necessarily proceeding from the influence of the will itself. The willed is compared to the will as object to faculty; the voluntary as effect to its cause. Thus, for example, rain poured out upon dry earth, as regards the farmer, will be called willed, but not voluntary (Konings, Theol. mor., n. 4).

3. The free consists in this, that the will proceeds to acting with no necessity compelling. The merely voluntary abstracts from whether the act is placed with indifference or with determination to one. The free is a species of the voluntary.

272. DIVISION. The voluntary is divided in many ways by theologians:

1. By reason of the mode by which it proceeds, it is free or necessary. Free is that which is done by a will which operates with indifference toward willing and not willing; such is the love of man as wayfarer toward God. Necessary is that which proceeds from a will determined to one, as is the love of the Blessed in the homeland. "The notion of the voluntary is found more perfectly in necessary human acts than in free ones. The reason is, because the greater the love is, the greater is the voluntary, that is, the greater is the inclination of the will and the greater the knowledge of the intellect. Such is the necessary love of God toward Himself, or the love of the Blessed, by which they are borne with their whole effort into God" (V, n. IX).

In the schools, THE VOLUNTARY is regularly taken for the free voluntary, since all acts by which man as wayfarer tends to his end proceed in reality from free will.

2. By reason of perfection, it is perfect or imperfect. Perfect voluntary is said of that which is done from full knowledge of the thing and from full consent of the will, as if someone, perfectly knowing and willing, eats meat on a forbidden day. Imperfect voluntary, which is also called semi-voluntary, is that which is done with imperfect knowledge or advertence; as happens in those half-asleep, or distracted to other things (St. Thom., 1.2, q. 6, a. 6).

From the fact that someone performs such a work only with difficulty, do not conclude by the fact itself that imperfect voluntary is present, as is clear from the example of apostates whom the Church has always condemned. The whole reason of perfect or imperfect voluntary must be taken from the degree of advertence (Lehmkuhl, I, n. 85).

3. By reason of the whole complex, it is voluntary simply, or in a certain respect. Voluntary simply is said of that which, all things having been weighed, proceeds from the will, although the object, under some respect, is displeasing.

Voluntary in a certain respect is said of that to which, when only certain circumstances are attended to, the will bears itself, but which finally, all things considered, it repudiates. It is called, as is clear, voluntary improperly; for it is nothing other than a simple velleity. The known example of this thing is that of the merchant throwing goods into the sea from fear of shipwreck: their throwing is voluntary simply; but preservation is voluntary in a certain respect.

Others explain the matter otherwise: Voluntary simply, or pure, is said of that which proceeds from the full inclination of the will toward the object, without any repugnance; voluntary in a certain respect, or mixed, that which indeed proceeds from the consent of the will, but with repugnance (cf. V, n. IX and XIII).

4. By reason of correlative knowledge, it is explicit or implicit.

Explicit is said of that which happens from formal and distinct knowledge of the thing willed; for example, if the minister of the Church says: I will to confect this sacrament.

Implicit is said of that which happens from more general and confused knowledge; for example, if one about to confect a sacrament says: I will to perform this rite which the Church holds as sacred (VI, 22).

5. By reason of manifestation, it is express or tacit. Express is that which is manifested externally, by words or signs: for example, if a Bishop, asked that he concede jurisdiction for hearing confessions, responds: I concede, or nods by an inclination of the head. Tacit is that which is not declared externally, but is sufficiently and prudently gathered from some fact, or omission of a fact, when the circumstances have been considered. Thus a Bishop grants jurisdiction by fact, if he asks someone to receive confessions. Thus likewise the sins of subjects are voluntary and imputable to a Superior if he omits to oppose himself to them, when otherwise he can and ought to do this.

Hence the rule of right: "He who is silent seems to consent" (Reg. 43 in 6.). This rule holds in two cases, namely: a) when something favorable is proposed to one silent; b) when he who is silent is held to speak and can. Otherwise another rule holds: "He who is silent does not confess, but neither indeed does he seem to deny" (Reg. 44, ibid.).

6. By reason of its very actuation, it is actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative. a) Actual voluntary is that which here and now is elicited or commanded by the will with continuous attention of the mind. But this can happen either by an act signified, when by clear words or another sign the voluntary is, as it were, signed, for example, if the agent says: I will to do this; or by an act exercised, when without such a sign it is exhibited from the work itself; thus one genuflecting attentively performs an act of adoration. b) Virtual voluntary is that which is done by force or virtue of an act of the will not yet revoked, and continuing to influence morally. It was placed at the beginning of the work, but afterwards is absent. c) Habitual voluntary is that which indeed once was willed by actual volition for the future, and afterwards was never revoked, but now flows into the act neither directly nor indirectly, because the attention of the mind is altogether lacking. The habitual acts more by force of habit than by force of will. d) Interpretative voluntary, like the habitual, excludes a motion of the will here and now toward the end, but superadds the absence of a tendency toward the object even in the past. For it is that voluntary which indeed was never expressly willed, but would have been willed or is presumed it would be willed, if it were thought of, or could be thought of.¹

You have an EXAMPLE of actual voluntary in him who here and now, by mind alone, or by mind and mouth, says: I will to consecrate; of virtual in the same, if by force of this will he begins Mass and pronounces the words of consecration, but distracted in mind; of habitual in him who yesterday willed that the fruit of the Mass which he is about to celebrate today benefit Titius deceased, but today celebrates unmindful of yesterday's will; of interpretative, in the consent of a dying man, destitute of senses, who is judged to seek the sacraments.

Two things must be noted here: 1. In succession, implicit virtual, which proceeds from an implicit act, is confused by authors with interpretative. Therefore from the context one must judge in which sense it must be understood, whether truly for virtual implicit, or for strict interpretative. 2. Interpretative voluntary differs from tacit in that in the former no consent is present, but in the latter true consent is present. Yet each is accustomed to be called presumed voluntary; tacit is presumed concerning the present; interpretative is presumed conditionally, or concerning the future.

7. By reason of intention, it is direct or indirect. Direct voluntary is said of that which is willed in itself and immediately, as when someone steals something because he has the will of stealing; indirect, that which is willed not in itself, but in another, with which it is known, at least confusedly, to be connected; whether as an effect proceeding from some cause, for example, drunkenness from excessive drink; or as something connected with the cause, for example, sacrilege in the theft of a consecrated chalice (cf. n. 274). Now indeed:

An act of the will can have either a single or a multiple EFFECT. If the effect is single, it must be called directly voluntary, because the act was ordered to it. If it is multiple, sometimes any of them is directly voluntary, namely if the will tends directly toward each one, and seeks them in themselves; sometimes one is directly voluntary, the others only indirectly. Moreover, the directly voluntary is intended in itself, and has the nature of moving the will. The indirectly voluntary is not intended in itself, nor does it move the will, which reaches it only by reason of its connection with the directly voluntary act. Nevertheless it is a true object of the will, although indirect; for the will wills such an action as cause. But he who wills the cause also wills the effect which will follow from it, if he foresees this effect. Hence the saying: He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the caused.

Note. To the INDIRECT voluntary is referred that most intricate question: When is an evil effect, not intended in itself indeed, but proceeding from a voluntary cause, imputable unto fault to the one placing the cause? But this matter will be treated more fittingly in the article on the extension of morality (cf. n. 314 and 315). For the things which we are about to say concerning the sources of morality will contribute very much to the solution of this question. See n. 296 ff.

273. To the voluntary is opposed THE INVOLUNTARY, which happens either from an extrinsic principle against the propensity of the will, as happens to one acting from force or fear; or without knowledge of the intellect, which either is taken away or at least bound, as happens to one operating from ignorance or passion (V, n. XII).

Just as the voluntary, so also the involuntary is MULTIPLE. One is called involuntary privatively, or non-voluntary, when there is only lacking in someone the act of willing that which he could will. Another is called involuntary positively, or contrarily, when namely something not only is not willed, but also is positively not-willed and repugnant to the will.

Again, positive involuntary is TWOFOLD: one simply, which, when all the adjuncts are considered at once, so displeases the will that in no way, and for no reason, does it will it; another in a certain respect, which, although under some respect it displeases the will, nevertheless under another reason is more pleasing to it and is accepted (V, n. XIII).

Hence arises the mixed from voluntary and involuntary. For something is voluntary simply and involuntary in a certain respect, when someone definitively consents, although with some repugnance; and conversely, it is involuntary simply and voluntary in a certain respect, when someone denies consent, although the thing in some way pleases him. You have an example of the first in him who, from fear of shipwreck, throws goods into the sea; an example of the second in him who refuses great gain because he knows it to be unjust.

274. From these things you will gather: 1. In order that some action be called wholly voluntary, it is necessary that it be known according to all its parts and circumstances; if some one of these is unknown, the action is not called voluntary as regards that unknown circumstance. Thus he who approaches a woman whom he does not know to be married does not commit the sin of adultery, but of simple fornication, since he has himself involuntarily as regards the circumstance of matrimony which he does not know (V, n. VIII).

2. Where there is no advertence, there is no voluntary, and therefore no sin, as happens in the actions of those sleeping, which are simply involuntary. But where there is half-full advertence, there is the semi-voluntary, and only venial sin, as happens in those half-sleeping (cf. n. 336).

275. Things to be noted beforehand. Liberty, in general, is immunity from servitude and subjection: whence, as many as are the species of servitude, so many are the species of liberty.

But a fivefold liberty is customarily assigned: 1. LIBERTY OF SPONTANEITY, which consists in exemption from violence and from coercion. This is common to all living things; indeed by analogy it is transferred to inanimate things: thus water is said to flow spontaneously.

2. LIBERTY OF INDIFFERENCE, or of choice, which consists in exemption from necessity and natural inclination determining to one. This belongs to intellectual nature alone.

3. LIBERTY OF INDEPENDENCE, which consists in exemption from obligation to law and any Superior commanding. This absolutely belongs to God alone, who, subject to no one, alone is law and rule to Himself; but participatively and relatively, also to intellectual creatures, namely outside the ambit of those obligations by which each is bound, and then it is called moral liberty, or the power of acting licitly (cf. n. 279). See St. Alph., Diss. dell'Uso moder. (1765), c. 4, n. 11-16.

4. LIBERTY OF GRACE and Virtue, which consists in immunity from sin, and from habits inclining to evil. This belongs only to the good, in whom, the motions of cupidity having been extinguished or mitigated, and the yoke of sin having been shaken off, there is the tranquil kingdom and rule of will and reason, subject to God alone. The just man has all his affections right; whence, even if no law had been imposed upon him, as if connaturally and from his own inclination, he would observe those things which are of the law; concerning which the Apostle, speaking, said (1 Tim. 1:9): Law is not placed for the just, but for the unjust.

5. LIBERTY OF HAPPINESS, which consists in exemption from all misery and penalty. This belongs to those who have already entered into the joy of the Lord.

Only liberty of indifference, or of choice, refers to our matter; for this alone is the principle of imputability, and constitutes man master of his acts. As regards the other species of liberty, it suffices to note these things: Concerning liberty of spontaneity no peculiar treatment occurs, since it is included in liberty of choice, of which it is the foundation. Liberty of independence is circumscribed by laws, which determine the right use of choice. But the observance of laws leads to liberty of grace and virtue, which brings forth the liberty of glory (Billuart, Diss. 2).

276. DEFINITION. Liberty of choice is elective force, or the faculty by which the will is endowed, of choosing or not choosing, at pleasure. We call that act free which is done with no necessity compelling, or which can be omitted at pleasure.

DIVISION. "LIBERTY OF CHOICE, or liberty from necessity, is subdivided: into liberty of contradiction, by which someone can act or not act; into liberty of contrariety, by which he can act thus or act the opposite, for example, to love or to have hatred; and into liberty of disparity, by which he can do this or another thing, but not the opposite, for example, to write or to walk" (V, n. XXX).

To liberty is opposed NECESSITY, and it is the state of a thing which cannot have itself otherwise. One is called necessity of coercion, which is the same as violence; it arises from an extrinsic principle, and if it is absolute, it takes away the free and the voluntary, as will be said below (n. 282). Another is necessity of nature, or of natural inclination, which consists in a certain propensity implanted in the will by nature itself, toward something necessarily pursued or avoided. It is from an intrinsic principle determining to one, and takes away the free, but not the voluntary. Thus the Blessed necessarily love God, and man as wayfarer necessarily seeks good in general.

The things which regard the question of free choice are customarily treated at length in Dogmatic Institutions; wherefore we shall recall only the following principles. Cf. St. Alph., Op. dogm. (ed. Walt.), II, p. 220, 411, 463, 495.

277. PRINCIPLES. I. Man, even after the fall of Adam, enjoys free choice. It is of faith, from Trent, Sess. 6, can. 5: "If anyone shall have said that man's free choice, after Adam's sin, was lost and extinguished, or that it is a thing of title alone...: let him be anathema." See V, n. XXXII ff.

278. II. For meriting or demeriting, in the state of fallen nature, liberty from coercion does not suffice, but liberty from necessity, or of indifference, is required. It is similarly of faith, from the third proposition of Jansenius condemned as heretical: "For meriting or demeriting, in the state of fallen nature, there is not required in man liberty from necessity, but liberty from coercion suffices."

279. III. The power of sinning, which is in man as wayfarer, is not of the notion of liberty, but rather of its imperfection. And indeed truly, "if to be able to sin," says St. Anselm (de lib. Arb., c. 1), "were part of free choice, God and the Angels would not have free choice: which is absurd." The reason is evident: for since free choice is a quality of the will, it is ordered of itself to the good; but to be able to deflect from its own proper object is the defect or vice of any power whatever: therefore the faculty of sinning is a defect of liberty. Whence St. Thomas (de Verit., q. 22, a. 6): "To will evil is neither liberty nor part of liberty, although it is a certain sign of liberty, just as sickness, for example, is a sign of life." And St. Augustine (de Civ. Dei, l. 22, c. ult., n. 3): "Choice will be the more powerful, the more it will not be able to sin."

It is helpful here to add the things which St. Alphonsus (H. Ap., III, 11) writes concerning the root of liberty, briefly and learnedly in this way: "It must be noted that the root of liberty of indifference arises from the indifference of judgment, which is nothing other than deliberation concerning the good or evil which is considered in the action. This indifference of judgment does not now constitute liberty, but, as was said, is the root of liberty, so that afterwards the will can choose freely and indifferently what shall have pleased it."

280. From the things said you will gather: 1. Man's proclivity to evil never becomes a necessity of sinning; wherefore judges sin gravely against natural and civil right who absolve those guilty of great crimes, under the imaginary pretext that, in acting, they lacked liberty. See, however, the things to be said n. 291 and 292, note.

2. They speak absurdly who, under the pretext of liberty, maintain license of opining, writing, teaching, and operating all things at pleasure. These confuse the physical liberty of choice with moral liberty or independence. The former is natural to man; the latter by no means, unless, as was said, it is contained within the limits of the good and the licit (n. 275, 3.). See the work Verita della fede, P. II, c. 11; Confut. del libro dello spirito, n. 24.

To the point Pope Leo XIII (Encycl. Immortale Dei): "Nor can the Church approve that liberty," he says, "which begets disgust for the most holy laws of God and strips off due obedience to legitimate power. For it is more truly license than liberty; and most rightly by Augustine it is called liberty of perdition, by Peter the Apostle a veil of malice (1 Pet. 2:16): indeed, since it is beyond reason, it is true servitude: for he who commits sin is the slave of sin (John 8:34). On the contrary, that is genuine and desirable liberty which, if it is considered privately, does not allow man to serve errors and passions, most hideous masters; if publicly, it wisely presides over citizens, supplies widely the faculty of increasing advantages, and defends the republic from another's arbitrary power." A. S. S., vol. 18, p. 175.

Note. Certain things should be said here concerning the principles which concur for the production of a free act: namely concerning advertence and the consent of the will. But concerning these things below, n. 317, when the discourse will be concerning sins.

Everything impedes the imputability of human acts which is opposed to the principles of imputability itself, that is, to the voluntary and the free. But there is no reason why we should treat separately of the impediments of THE FREE; and the reason is, because, if we except internal necessity, which is opposed only to the free, the impediments of the voluntary and of the free are altogether the same. But the treatment of internal necessity is rightly and deservedly omitted, for the reason that man as wayfarer never experiences it in his peculiar acts. Therefore the discourse will be concerning only the impediments of THE VOLUNTARY, of which four are counted, opposed to the two constitutives of the voluntary, namely: violence and fear, which are opposed to the intrinsic principle, or the will; ignorance and concupiscence, which are opposed to knowledge (cf. n. 271).

These impediments proximately influence the internal act. But there are given also others which exercise a remote influence upon liberty and are: heredity, temperament, and certain pathological states.

Yet let it be noted that these impediments, which are called remote, obtain efficacy only through the mediation of the proximate ones, as Bessmer, S.J. rightly notes (Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, 1908, II, p. 258), and therefore can, indeed ought, rightly to be reduced to the four heads noted above, already introduced by Aristotle.

I. On the impediments which proximately influence the voluntary.

Cf. St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 6, a. 4-5; St. Alphonsus, V, n. XV; ed. G., II, p. 692; Salmant., de Vol., disp. V; Frins, de act. hum., n. 247-280.

281. DEFINITION. Violence is a motion proceeding from an extrinsic principle, while he who suffers the force resists (V, n. XV).

Violence cannot be inflicted on the will with respect to elicited acts; but it is inflicted with respect to commanded acts. God indeed, and He alone, can change the will; but He cannot coerce it. But extrinsic force can be inflicted not only on the body, but also on the inferior faculties of the soul. Cf. n. 559.

In order that force, coercion, be present, it is not necessarily required that the influence be caused by one compelling from without. The notion of violence first of all demands that something be done in us while the will resists; and therefore first-first acts, by analogy, are reduced to the impediment of violence. Any cause whatever, whether it is in man or is found from outside, can violently influence the acts of man.

DIVISION. Violence is either absolute, when he to whom it is inflicted resists in every way in which he can; or in a certain respect, when he does not resist according to his powers.

282. PRINCIPLES. I. Absolute violence takes away the voluntary. The reason is, because when the will of the one suffering resists the extrinsic agent according to its powers, the action of the agent is in no way willed by the one suffering; for it is against

every inclination of the will, and therefore simply involuntary; whence, those things which are done by force merit nothing of good or evil. Hence it is deduced that a woman who in every way resists the violence which is inflicted upon her against chastity does not sin, even if she suffers rape unwillingly (V, n. XVII; compare St. Thom., 1.2, q. 6, a. 5, ad 2).

283. II. Violence in a certain respect does not take away, but lessens the voluntary.¹ The reason is, because where the will does not resist as much as it can, there remains in part the notion of the voluntary; hence, according to the greater or lesser resistance of the will, the action will be more or less imputable. Whence girls are by no means excused from sin who, when lustful youths act more freely with them, do not oppose resistance in every way (V, n. XVIII).

284. IT IS ASKED. What resistance must be applied so that an act proceeding from violence not be imputable?

Resp. Since resistance is the reluctance of the will so that an act may not be imputable, it is clear, as regards commanded acts, that all that resistance must be applied which seems useful for impeding the act or its effects. "But to the impossible, or to the useless, no one is held." Thus martyrs, conducted by force to the temples of idols, did not sin, although they themselves walked. Nevertheless sometimes, or per accidens, even ineffective resistance must be applied for the sake of protestation; namely where tacit protestation, or protestation expressed by words alone, would not suffice for averting injury to religion, or for removing the danger of scandal. Similarly, a peculiar obligation of resisting urges in more dangerous matter, for example, when it is opposed to chastity; because defect of resistance induces danger of consent (cf. n. 374, 778). But if resistance is not only useless, but also consent will certainly not be present, then of yourself you are not held to resist, unless further attempts are feared.

St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 6, a. 6; St. Alphonsus, V, n. XX; ed. G., II, p. 693; VI, n. 1047 ff.; ed. G., IV, p. 193; Bain, Les emotions et la volonte, p. 147.

285. DEFINITION. Fear is trepidation of mind, on account of an evil present or future: namely an evil present either to the very person who fears, or to another who is closely joined to him by blood-relationship, affinity, marriage, or singular friendship (V, n. XX).

Fear can be present on account of an evil apprehended in the mind alone as present and imminent.

DIVISION. Fear is divided in many ways:

1. By reason of influence upon the act, it is antecedent or concomitant. Antecedent is that which moves one to acting, so that the action is said to proceed FROM fear. Concomitant is that which only accompanies the action, without influencing it in any way, so that the action is said to be done WITH fear.

Thus a traveler who gives a purse to a robber acts from antecedent fear; but the robber acts with concomitant fear, lest he be discovered.

2. By reason of object, fear is light or grave. Light fear, which is also called vain, is that by which a light evil is feared, or even a grave one, but from a light and improbable cause. Grave fear is said to be present if a grave evil is feared from a very probable cause.

But fear: a) is grave absolutely if an evil grave in itself is feared from a grave and truly probable cause, and cannot be escaped: this fear is said to fall upon a constant man, as being that by which even a firm man is deservedly struck. Commonly grave evils are judged to be death, mutilation, a foul wound, loss of liberty, status, reputation, chastity. b) It is grave respectively if the evil which is feared is indeed in itself and commonly light, yet grave with respect to the one fearing, because he is fearful, such as children, women, old men are (V, n. XX; VI, 1047; H. Ap., III, 16).

Reverential fear must be added, by which a son fears the offense of parents, a ward of a guardian, a wife of a husband, a subject of a Superior. But it can be grave if the fear is lest he who strikes fear be held offended for a long time or gravely (III, 717; VI, 1056; H. Ap., l. c.).

3. By reason of cause, fear is from within or from without. That is said to be from within which comes from an internal cause, such as disease, weakness of mind, etc.; or also, in a broader sense, that which comes from any natural cause whatever, for example, from shipwreck, fire, an attack of wild beasts, etc.; but that is said to be from without which comes from an external and free cause, or from man (VI, 1049).

4. By reason of the mode by which it is struck, fear is just or unjust, according as it is struck from a just cause, for example, of merited penalties, or from an unjust one, that is, through injury.

286. PRINCIPLES. I. Grave fear regularly does not take away, but lessens the voluntary. The reason for the first is, because through fear neither knowledge on the part of the intellect nor choice on the part of the will is taken away, which always enjoys the faculty of determining itself to the opposite. Hence those who denied the faith from fear of torments have always been held as apostates. The reason for the second is, because since fear has joined to it repugnance of the will, the action becomes involuntary in a certain respect: whence the voluntary is lessened, as is clear (V, n. XXI).

We have said regularly; for sometimes fear altogether takes away the voluntary, namely if it is so great that it takes away the use of reason; but this is per accidens, and fear, in such a case, takes on rather the nature of passion, concerning which it will be said n. 290.

II. Light fear neither takes away nor lessens the voluntary. Hence that saying of right: "Vain fear is not a just excuse."

Note. Fear sometimes excuses from law, or at least from penalty, as we saw in the treatise on Laws (n. 223); sometimes it stands against the value of an act, as we shall see below when we dispute concerning vows, oaths, contracts, and matrimony. For from the fact that fear does not take away the voluntary, it does not follow that all things are firm and valid which are done under the influence of fear (V, n. XXII).

St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 76; St. Alphonsus, V, n. XXVI; ed. G., II, p. 695; Ami du Clerge, 1898, p. 1153; Huber, Hemnisse der Willensfreiheit; Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, 1909, p. 253.

287. DEFINITION. Ignorance, in general, is lack of knowledge in a capable subject. One ignorance, which is called negative or nescience, is lack of knowledge otherwise not owed, for example, in a rustic who does not know canon law. Another, which is called privative, is lack of owed knowledge, for example, in a confessor who does not know the things which pertain to the administration of the sacrament of penance. Another, which is called positive, or of depraved disposition, or also of contrariety, or error, is assent given to the false as to the true, or dissent from the true as from the false, for example, in a heretic (H. Ap., III, 13).

To ignorance are referred both FORGETFULNESS, which is privation of remembrance of a thing formerly known; and INADVERTENCE, which is lack of actual knowledge and defect of consideration in acting. This, if it comes from a depraved habit or from passion, is called ignorance of evil choice.

Here we consider ignorance insofar as it is lack of owed knowledge, whether it has error annexed to it or not; whether it is habitual or merely actual, as inadvertence.

DIVISION. Multiple ignorance is distinguished (V, l. c.):

1. By reason of object, it is of right or of fact. Ignorance of right is had if someone does not know the law, or is ignorant that something has been prescribed or prohibited: for example, if he is ignorant that fasting must be observed on Ember Wednesdays. Ignorance of fact is had if someone is ignorant of the existence of a fact, or of its circumstances: for example, if he is ignorant that today is an Ember Wednesday (cf. n. 40, 4.).

2. By reason of the action which is done ignorantly, ignorance is causing the act or merely accompanying. It is called causing the act when in some way it influences the work, and is the reason why the act is placed, either simply, or clothed with such a circumstance. It is had in him who can say: if I had known, I would not have done it, or I would not have acted in such a mode: for example, a hunter killing a friend whom he believes to be a wild beast would by no means have killed him if he had known that he was a friend. Moreover, ignorance causes the act not of itself, because, since it is privation and not a being, it cannot of itself influence; but per accidens, namely insofar as it removes knowledge, which, if it were present, would impede the work.

Ignorance merely accompanying is said of that which in no way influences the act; because, if knowledge were present, the work would be placed equally, indeed perhaps more easily and promptly, for example, if someone, thinking he is killing a stag, kills his enemy, whom nevertheless he would have killed even if he had known him (H. Ap., XIX, n. 8).

3. By reason of subject, ignorance CAUSING THE ACT is invincible or vincible. Invincible is that which cannot be overcome, either because doubt concerning the opposite does not occur, in which case it is physically invincible; or because, when moral diligence has been done, it cannot be put aside, and in this case it is called morally invincible. This ignorance is also called antecedent, because it altogether precedes the consent of the will. But vincible is that which a man does not overcome when he can and ought. It is also called consequent, because it follows the determination of the will, insofar as ignorance itself is voluntary and proceeds from free will. As is clear, there is not given vincible ignorance unless the obligation of inquiring further is known, at least confusedly; for the first thought of things is not in man's power (cf. n. 20 and n. 218).

VINCIBLE or consequent ignorance is subdivided into affected and non-affected. Affected, or directly voluntary, is that by which someone industriously labors, or in which he desires to remain, willing namely to be ignorant of the precepts of the law: either so that he may have an excuse for sin already committed; or so that he may not be drawn back from sin to be committed, according to that (Ps. 35:4): He would not understand that he might do well. This ignorance is found in those who, deliberately, neither attend sacred sermons or instructions, nor seek counsel in doubts, lest they be deterred from an evil purpose. Non-affected ignorance, or indirectly voluntary, is either crass, or simply vincible. Crass ignorance is had in him who, although he does not affect to be ignorant, nevertheless neglects to learn those things which he can and ought to know. This is also called supine, because the thick and fat, and those who lie supine, are accustomed to be idle. But if the negligence is common or light, so that some diligence is applied, yet not sufficient, the ignorance is called simply vincible. This is more or less culpable according to the various measure of negligence and the gravity of the thing concerning which the matter is treated. See St. Alph., III, 269; ed. G., I, p. 549; VII, 48; ed. G., IV, p. 291.

288. PRINCIPLES. I. Concomitant ignorance makes neither the voluntary nor the involuntary positively; but it makes the non-voluntary or involuntary privatively. The reason for the first is, because such ignorance has itself per accidens to the work which is done, and influences nothing into it. The reason for the second is, because that which is unknown cannot be actually willed (V, n. XXVIII).

II. Antecedent or invincible ignorance altogether takes away the voluntary. For whatever proceeds from it is by no means voluntary, neither in itself as being unknown, nor in its cause, namely in ignorance, which is plainly involuntary. But the work is done against the inclination of the agent, if not actual, at least habitual and interpretative. Thus the Doctors commonly (V, n. XXVII). Cf. however n. 125.

III. Consequent or vincible ignorance does not take away the voluntary, but lessens it, yet sometimes increases it. IT DOES NOT TAKE AWAY; because it is voluntary, and therefore its effect is voluntary. But IT LESSENS: for that which is willed only indirectly and per accidens is less voluntary than that which is intended in itself and directly. Whence Doctors commonly say that ignorance excuses, if not from the whole, at least from so much. But IT INCREASES the voluntary, if it is affected, not indeed by reason of itself, since ignorance, as such, is always opposed to the voluntary; but by reason of its cause, which is greater aversion from the right and greater affection into the depraved. For, as St. Thomas (1.2, q. 76, a. 4) observes: "from intention toward sin it comes about that someone wills to undergo the damage of ignorance, on account of the liberty of sinning" (V, n. XXIX).

289. From these things you resolve: 1. Those who do not observe feasts and fasts from ignorance, because they are accustomed to be little solicitous concerning knowing them, are not excused from sin, because their negligence is vincible. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, n. 78, 3. But if, suspecting nothing concerning an occurring feast or fast, they omit the ordinary means of knowing for one or another week, they are excused from sin, because by such omission they did not fail in the required diligence, and therefore the ignorance is not vincible.

2. He who, noticing that the knowledge necessary for exercising an office is lacking to him, voluntarily performs the office, is held concerning the errors which he foresaw at least confusedly. But if the errors are grave, he remains in a habitual state of sin as long as he has not revoked his evil will, by not seizing the occasion of putting away ignorance. Cf. the things which will be said below n. 317.

3. If negligence in putting away ignorance is only venially culpable, the deed following from it, although grave in itself, will be imputable only unto venial fault. For acts of this kind are voluntary by reason of the cause.

Note. See many other things concerning ignorance in the treatises on Conscience, on Laws, on Sins, on Contracts...

St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 22-48; St. Alphonsus, V, n. XXIII; ed. G., II, p. 694; Frins, I, n. 295; Surbled, La Morale dans ses rapports avec la Medecine, III, p. 16; Descuret, La Medecine des Passions.

290. DEFINITION. Concupiscence, in the stricter sense, sounds the same as the tinder of sin, and is defined: A motion of the sensitive appetite rebelling against the spirit and tending toward the delectable good. But in the broader signification, insofar as it is considered here, it sounds the same as passion, and is defined: A motion of the sensitive appetite toward the delectable good, arisen from the imagination of good or evil, with some bodily transmutation (H. Ap., III, 15).

Passion of itself is indifferent: and it becomes good or evil according to the nature of the object which is sought according to or beyond the order of reason. But since passions conduce much to increasing the powers of the will, it will be worthwhile to use them rightly, to coerce their disordered impulses, and to order them to a good end.

DIVISION. Antecedent and consequent passion are distinguished.

1. Antecedent passion is said to be that which anticipates the consent of the will, and rises up from the apprehension alone of the object; as if someone, from the fortuitous sight of a base thing, is enticed to carnal delight; or on account of an injury received is moved to revenge. Of the motions of the passions, some are first-first: these arise in us without us, that is, without any consent of the will; others are called second-first, namely those which are produced with half-full advertence and half-full consent; lastly, others are second motions, or fully deliberate; these are excited with full advertence and with perfect consent.

2. Consequent passion is said to be that which arises from a previous act of the will; either by redundancy, because a vehement motion of the will overflows into the inferior appetite and moves passion, as is accustomed to happen in those who have the habit of some sin, for example, lust; or by direct excitation, because the will industriously moves the inferior appetite, by stopping, for example, the object before the eyes or the imagination, as if someone turns over in mind an injury received in order to provoke anger (V, n. XXIII, XXV).

Passions are generally numbered as eleven, of which six are in the concupiscible appetite: love and hatred, desire and flight, delight and sadness; but five in the irascible: hope and desperation, fear and daring, anger. Concerning these the Scholastics treat at length, and indeed usefully, because such treatment serves much both to the acquisition of virtues and to the governance of souls. See Schram, Inst. Theol. Myst., § 90.

291. PRINCIPLES. I. Concupiscence or antecedent passion, although it increases the inclination of the will, nevertheless lessens the free voluntary; indeed, if it is most vehement, it can entirely take it away. Thus commonly with St. Thomas (1.2, q. 6, a. 7, ad 3, and q. 10, a. 3).¹

It is said: 1. It increases the inclination of the will; for the more passion burns, the more vehemently the will breaks out into act.

2. It lessens the free voluntary, and therefore imputability. For it weakens the notion of the voluntary insofar as it obscures the mind and turns it away from consideration of the end, by impeding the intellect, enticed by the sensible object, from weighing the baseness of the act and the offense of God.

3. It can entirely take it away; which happens when passion is so vehement that it anticipates every judgment of reason and consent of the will; as is clear by the example of those who, on account of love or anger, become insane. Yet this happens comparatively rarely, especially as regards external acts; for regularly, as St. Thomas observes (1.2, q. 17, a. 9), members are not applied to work except through the consent of reason (V, n. XXIV, XXV). St. Alph., V, 3, says: "The intellect can be so seized by the delectability of the object offered that it adverts nothing of moral malice in it." Concerning this Berardi (I, n. 408) writes: Let Confessors note these things well, lest they cast some miserable souls into desperation.

Hence it is gathered: 1. First-first motions of concupiscence are not sins, but an occasion either of sins or of virtues. Second-first motions, in every illicit matter, are venial sins. Finally, second or deliberate motions, in a gravely illicit matter, are mortal sins, although their gravity, on account of the vehemence of passion, is somewhat lessened (cf. n. 322). See St. Alph., Op. dogm. (ed. Walter, II, p. 413).

2. Good passion, if it precedes the judgment of reason, so that man is moved more by passion than by reason to acting well, diminishes the goodness and praise of the act. You have an example in a father of a family who chastises his children more from anger than from the judgment of reason; in a merciful man who relieves the poor rather from compassion than from the impulse of reason and faith (St. Thom., de Malo, q. 3, a. 11).

II. Concupiscence or consequent passion sometimes increases the voluntary, sometimes is a sign of its magnitude. 1. It increases the voluntary if it proceeds from direct excitation; for then the motion of the will is more vehement, and the obscuration of reason, as being voluntary, does not take away in the effect the notion of the voluntary. 2. It is a sign of its magnitude if it arises from the redundancy of the aroused will into the inferior part: then it is compared to the will as effect to cause; but an effect demonstrates the cause. St. Thomas aptly to the matter (de Malo, as above): "and thus consequent passion adds to merit or demerit, because passion is a sign that the motion of the will is stronger; and in this way it is true that he who gives alms with greater compassion merits more, and he who commits sin with greater lust sins more." Cf. 1.2, q. 77, a. 6.

Note. As regards the question: Whether we are held to resist the motions of passion, see what will be said below, n. 322.

292. It is helpful here to add a few things concerning habit, which influences the voluntary in almost the same way as concupiscence.

DEFINITION. Habit is a firm disposition for acting, caused for the most part from repeated acts. It is said for the most part; for sometimes it happens that habit is generated even from one act, namely if the active thing, as St. Thomas speaks (1.2, q. 51, a. 3), was of great power, as when strong medicine immediately induces health. Cf. St. Thom., 1.2, q. 49-54; Suarez, Disp. metaph., disp. XLIV; Ami du Clerge, 1899, p. 529-593.

DIVISION. Since habit always supposes an act of the will, it cannot be divided into antecedent and consequent.

Habit is therefore either admitted by the will, or attacked by the will. It is admitted by the will if it is caused with advertence, that is, with foresight of its generation from the repetition of acts, or also if, although caused without advertence, it afterwards is no longer efficaciously extirpated. But it is attacked by the will if apt means are applied for putting away the habit.

PRINCIPLES. I. A habit admitted by the will sometimes increases, sometimes lessens, but never takes away the voluntary.

1. It increases the voluntary insofar as it gives greater alacrity to the will, without the attention of the mind being lessened in the agent. 2. It lessens the voluntary insofar as man, the slave of custom, is so drawn by it that tranquil consideration of mind is prevented or impeded. 3. It never takes away the voluntary, since man, from the fact that he does not will to cast off the habit, by that very fact has willed in the cause the effects flowing from the cause. See St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 49 ff.

II. A habit attacked by the will always lessens the voluntary, sometimes also takes it away.

1. It lessens the voluntary insofar as the powers of the will and the deliberation of reason are more or less impeded by the habit. 2. It takes away the voluntary in the case in which the habit so vehemently dominates the executive powers that it anticipates the judgment of reason, as is clear among those who are agitated by bile.

Therefore let the human will be constant in repressing habits; for custom is conquered by custom. Yet let it not neglect to apply the physical means prescribed by physicians, by which the powers of nature can increase.

II. On the impediments which remotely influence the voluntary.

293. Among men there are numbered some who not only have obtained a good soul (Wis. 8:19), but also, with God so ordering, obtain a bodily constitution more apt for the exercise of virtue (St. Thom., 1.2, q. 51, a. 1). But others are given who from the cradle are inclined to evil, are infected with the poison of depraved propensities, and direct heart and will upward with the greatest difficulty.

Among all these we can consider three things which most greatly influence the will: heredity, temperament, certain pathological states.

I. On heredity. No one can deny that certain qualities of body and propensities of soul are transmitted, as are: kleptomania, impulse to suicide, etc.; which nevertheless do not pass from parents to children in the same mode, nor according to a constant rule. Although the laws of transmission are explained most difficultly, as being since the whole matter furnishes almost nothing for investigation, nevertheless there is no doubt concerning the fact of transmission.

Heredity without doubt has influence upon liberty, because in reality, as is clear among the children of drunkards, a body more or less apt for operating is transmitted. Sometimes also natural propensities can overturn the judgment of the intellect, so that liberty ceases. But in no way is it lawful to affirm with Determinists that free choice is taken away by the law of heredity, because, with the case excluded in which the will is suddenly drawn under the influence of natural propensity, the mind can remain conscious of its imputability. Considered historically, our affirmation obtains great weight from the fact that it is discovered that children shining with great virtue have had origin from parents given to vice, while, conversely, God-fearing parents have begotten children given to every nefarious crime. And thus it is clear how empty is the argument taken from moral statistics (cf. Lehmk., I, 63), and at the same time how grave a wound they inflict upon society, whoever before judges excuse any guilty persons whatever, as if from the law of heredity they were not conscious of their crimes.²

II. On temperament. The complex of diverse propensities of body and soul, by which a special disposition is conferred on such a man, is called temperament. If those propensities become firm by efforts of the will, character is had.

Whatever may be the case concerning the diversity of opinions between the ancients and moderns, whether namely four or only two foundations of distinction among temperaments are present, it is certain that in all something dominates, which impresses a special mark on operation.

Temperament in no way takes away, but only lessens THE VOLUNTARY. The reason is, because from constitution there indeed arises an influence upon the will (St. Thom., Contra Gent., l. II, c. 63), but not such that the rational part as if necessarily follows the inferior propensities. Indeed, the rational part, through repeated acts, can so change natural inclinations that someone becomes as it were a new man, as is clear by the example of certain Saints who, choleric by nature, with grace favoring and the will striving, shone forth as a form of meekness.³

III. On pathological states. Especially in our times there are given various diseases by which either the will or the center of the nerves is affected; the will indeed, insofar as because of dullness of mind it appears as if impotent to will anything efficaciously; but the center of the nerves, insofar as the nerves are so exhausted or weakened that the agent, although remaining master of himself, labors under great inconstancy or is shaken and depressed by great passions.

1. WEAKNESS OF WILL is called aboulia. This so affects men otherwise robust that liberty is always lessened, sometimes also, but most rarely, taken away. It is necessary that friends furnish help to the miserable, so that they may again learn efficaciously to will or not to will.⁴

2. WEAKNESS OF THE NERVES brings with itself neurasthenia, if the disorder is sufficiently grave, or hysteria, if the disorder is graver. Sometimes also not constantly, but with some delay interposed, this disorder breaks into a man, and epileptic disease is had. But who can measure, who would dare to measure, the influence of the disease upon the free exercise of the will among those who are situated in this miserable condition? The voluntary is always indeed lessened, and sometimes altogether taken away. Let the sick flee to God, let them hope against hope, let them commit themselves plainly to be ruled by a prudent physician and by a long-suffering and patient confessor. But let the Confessor himself, although it is his part to judge all things rightly, know that in many things he ought to suspend judgment and commit the whole matter to the judgment of God.⁵

Note. A very useful question pertaining to this matter regards the hypnotic state, into which many cast themselves either for the sake of experiment or of recovering health. It is evident that liberty of the will is much affected through suggestions to be fulfilled afterwards, but from this do not conclude that the agent lacks all responsibility. Cf. what Tanquerey teaches, II, p. 76. Read what will be said below, n. 570, concerning hypnotism.

4. Definition. - The voluntary, properly so called, is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with cognition of the end, or of the object willed: from an intrinsic principle, which is common to every act proceeding from any potency of the soul whatever, for example from the vegetative potency, and is not proper to the voluntary alone; with cognition of the end, which belongs to the voluntary alone. Therefore an act is voluntary insofar as it is done with cognition of the end. Hence if some circumstance of the action is altogether unknown by the agent, the action in relation to that circumstance will not be voluntary, by that very fact that it is unknown. Thus, if someone strikes a man while ignorant that he is a priest, he will indeed be guilty of injustice, but not of sacrilege, since he was ignorant of that sacred quality of priest in the man struck.

From this definition it is clear that the voluntary differs from the coerced, from the spontaneous, from the willed, from the free, and from a human act: 1° from the coerced or violent, because that proceeds only from an extrinsic principle; 2° from the spontaneous, because although it proceeds from an intrinsic principle, nevertheless it does not proceed from that principle with cognition of the end. For a spontaneous act is of those who apprehend only the end (object), but not the reason of the end and its proportion to the act. Thus a dog, seeing bread, begins to move toward it, and an infant smiles upon its mother caressing it;¹ 3° from the willed; for willed is not said of an act of the will, but of the object into which the will tends, and this can happen although the object does not depend on the will as an effect from its own cause. Thus rain poured out upon dry land, with respect to the farmer, is called willed, but not voluntary. 4° from the free, because that proceeds from the will determining itself to acting, with the power of not acting. Therefore everything free is voluntary, but not conversely. Thus the Blessed in heaven love God voluntarily indeed, but not freely; say the same of man as wayfarer, who voluntarily indeed, yet necessarily,

pursues happiness. Nevertheless in the schools voluntary is regularly taken for free, since in the acts by which man as wayfarer tends to his end they are in fact not distinguished. The reason is from St. Thomas,¹ because the will "has determination in this alone," "that it naturally desires happiness, but not determinately in this or that"; 5° from a human act, which, although it agrees with the voluntary insofar as it proceeds from the same principle, namely from deliberate will, nevertheless differs from it, both because a human act, since it is an act, comprises only action or omission, while the voluntary also extends to their effects (n. 6); and because a human act, since it is human, is effected by man alone, but the voluntary by any being endowed with intellect and will; and because the human act (of the 2nd and 3rd kind, p. 1, note 1 at the bottom of the page), which is considered by Moralists, is free, while there is also necessary voluntary (n. 4 under 4°).²

5. Division. - The voluntary is manifold, namely:

1° Necessary or free, of which the one differs from the other as voluntary and free (n. 4 under 4°).

2° Perfect, which supposes that full cognition of the intellect by which the character of good and evil becomes known, and the full consent of the will, such as is in him who perfectly knowing and willing eats flesh on a forbidden day; or imperfect, or semi-voluntary, which proceeds from the will with that imperfect cognition by which the character of good and evil becomes known only somewhat obscurely, and in which there can be a manifold degree. But an imperfect or semi-voluntary act, even in the violation of a grave precept, does not exceed venial sin, as happens in those half-asleep or distracted by other things.

3° Voluntary simply, which proceeds from the full inclination of the will without any repugnance, as, for example, in a youth who, for the comfort of his mind, wishes a game, when he could choose for himself another kind of recreation, for example walking; or voluntary according to something, which indeed comes from the consent of the will, but with some repugnance, or with some inclination of the will toward the opposite. Therefore, if someone, induced by human fear or by threats of companions, violates a precept which obliges gravely and notwithstanding fear of any evil whatever, he places an act truly voluntary (unless the fear is of such a kind that it wholly disturbs reason), and indeed gravely sinful; for he acts with full determination of the will, although he acts reluctantly and would prefer not to act. Yet an act of this kind is also involuntary according to something, and therefore becomes less culpable.

4° Actual, virtual, habitual, interpretative. It is called actual if the will here and now, and immediately and directly, is borne toward the thing willed. Thus actually voluntary to me is, for example, this my response to the question proposed, or contrition while here and now I elicit an act of penance. Virtual is an act of the will physically indeed now past, but which morally perseveres in some thing which is done in a human manner, as in its effect, and therefore is its cause. Thus, for example, in a traveler who "desires to reach the wished-for goal of his course," the individual steps which he places toward it are themselves virtually voluntary, although he does not attend to the individual steps, indeed, while making the journey, he thinks about things altogether diverse. The reason is that those steps proceed from the act of the will by which the traveler at the beginning wished to undertake the journey to that goal. Resolve the same concerning absolution imparted by a distracted confessor. Habitual is an act of the will not retracted, but not persevering either in itself or in its effect, as the application of the fruit of a Mass to be celebrated long afterward, not revoked. Interpretative is that which has been had neither physically nor morally, but which can prudently be presumed would be had, if thought were taken of it, or could be taken. Thus the consent of an absent Superior, reasonably presumed by a religious, is interpretatively voluntary. Sometimes it gives honesty to an act, when there is question of lawfulness alone, as in the proposed example; often it does not give honesty, especially when there is question of the validity of an act, because then it is required that another's will either truly exist, or have existed and not been revoked. Thus you cannot absolve someone sacramentally if you trust that the Superior would consent to the jurisdiction if you asked, because jurisdiction actually had is required (Haine, Th. Mor. Elem., p. 4, q. 7).

The interpretative voluntary is sometimes taken in the sense of the indirect voluntary, and by St. Alphonsus (L. I. 170) is called virtual or interpretative advertence; improperly, however, as is clear from the Holy Doctor himself, L. V, 177, § Ratio 2 and § Dictum est; L. VI, 14; L. III, 313.

By the ancient scholastics under the name of the habitual voluntary there is sometimes understood that voluntary which is now called virtual; for example, by St. Thomas, p. 3, q. 64, a. 8 ad 3.

5° Express, which is manifested externally (by words or signs), for example if a Bishop, asked to grant jurisdiction to someone for hearing confessions, responds: I grant it, or assents by a nod of the head; or tacit, which is not declared externally, but is sufficiently gathered to be present from some fact, or from the omission of some fact. Thus the sins of subjects are voluntary and imputable to a superior if he omits to oppose himself to them when otherwise he can and ought to do this. Hence rule of law 43 in the Sixth: "He who is silent is seen to consent." Tacit is also called presumed, namely concerning the present.

6° Explicit or implicit, according as something is intended in terms, or in a proper and distinct concept - as if one about to baptize should say: I wish to baptize - or in a confused concept, or in some general thing willed, as if one about to baptize should say: I wish to do what Christ instituted or what the Church here does or intends.¹

7° Absolute or efficacious, and relative or inefficacious. This division supposes two volitions which cannot stand together. From this twofold contrary volition, that is called absolute and efficacious which explicitly or implicitly contains the revocation of the other; but that which is thus explicitly or implicitly revoked is called relative or inefficacious.² See n. 1219, Note, under 2°; n. 1319, q. 2°, and St. Alph., L. IV, 210; L. VI, 24.

8° Direct and indirect, concerning which in the following §.

9° Some add the voluntary by one's own will, which proceeds from the operator's own will, and the voluntary by another's will, which indeed proceeds from the will of another, yet is imputed to us on account of subordination or subjection, or the pact of a legitimate Superior or of the parties among themselves. Thus the sin of Adam was voluntary for us; thus, at least in the external forum, the will of the father is sometimes judged the will of the son who is under puberty, or even of a minor. See, for example, n. 1525, It is said, 3°.

Since no special difficulty occurs in the other species of the voluntary, we shall speak only:

6. The direct and indirect voluntary comes among theologians in a twofold sense. In one sense, indeed, according as something proceeds from the will directly, as from one acting (as to sink a ship by a war-cannon), or indirectly, as from one not acting, as the sinking of a ship from the helmsman, insofar as he ceases from steering.¹ The direct voluntary taken in this sense others call positive; the indirect, negative, according as acting denotes something positive, not acting something negative. Yet from this do not conclude that the voluntary consists in negation; for, as St. Thomas says,² "something is called voluntary not only because it falls under the act of the will, but because it falls under the power of the will. For thus even not willing itself is called voluntary, because to will and not to will are in the power of the will, and similarly to do and not to do."

But in another and more common sense, the direct voluntary (or, as others say, express³) is called that "which is willed in itself" (therefore it is also called voluntary in itself) "and immediately, as when someone steals something, because he has in himself the will of stealing";⁴ indirect is that "which is willed not in itself, but in another thing which is apprehended, at least confusedly,⁵ as the cause"

"of some effect." Hence it is also called voluntary in cause.¹ By others, for the same reason, it is also called implicit or virtual voluntary.²

Hence you will gather: a) An effect not only foreseen, but also intended, is directly voluntary.

b) What is intended in itself is directly voluntary, even in the case in which it is intended not for its own sake, or as an end, but only as a means; and therefore the killing of a fetus is directly voluntary, although it is intended only as a means of saving the life or reputation of the mother. "For voluntary is not only what we will for its own sake, as an end, but also what we will for another thing, as for an end."³

c) Sins voluntary in cause are imputed at that time at which their cause is voluntarily placed. Yet from this do not conclude that the evil effect itself, when in fact it follows (for example pollution in sleep arising from a voluntary cause), is not sinful, and therefore that it is sufficient to disclose in Confession the guilt of the cause itself. For, as the exterior act is the substantial complement of the interior act and each is morally one and the same act (n. 25), so, in the case, the effect is the substantial complement of the cause, and with it morally one and the same act. Wherefore, just as it is not sufficient to confess the interior act, so neither is it sufficient to confess the placing of the cause. Thus, as the truer opinion, St. Alph., L. V, n. 149, against others.

d) For the imputation of a sinful effect foreseen from a voluntary cause, it makes no difference whether the effect in fact follows or not; for, as was said under c), the effect is imputed when its cause is placed.

That the things to be said concerning the voluntary in cause may be rightly understood, it is useful to premise these things concerning cause. - The efficient cause, concerning which there is speech here, is that by which something is done. But this is:

1° Physical or moral. The former is that which, by acting physically, produces the effect, as fire produces a conflagration, the sun light. The latter is that which effectively moves another free cause to acting. Thus one commanding homicide is the moral cause of the killing.

2° Immediate or mediate. The former is that which produces the effect, no other cause intervening, for example, if someone pierces the breast of another, he will be the immediate cause of his death. The latter is that which does not produce the effect except another cause being interposed. Hence a moral cause is always a mediate cause.

3° Proximate or remote (in moral matters). A proximate cause has a necessary or ordinary connection with the effect; but a remote cause, although it is able to produce the effect, nevertheless does not have great force upon it, nor does it notably influence it; or it is that from which the effect does not frequently arise. Thus the drinking of wine for a drunkard will be a proximate cause, for a sober man a remote cause, of drunkenness.

4° A cause per se or per accidens. The former is that which from its own nature tends, or is ordered, to producing the effect. Thus excessive drink is a cause per se of drunkenness. But the latter is that which, although from its own nature it is not ordered to some effect, nevertheless sometimes, some circumstance being added, can produce it. Thus homicide can follow from drunkenness. For the most part this last division falls back into the preceding one.

7. - An evil effect following from the indirect voluntary, that is, from the direct volition of a cause, is imputed to the agent for fault, if he could and ought to have avoided the cause on account of such an effect. Hence these things flow:

Corollaries. - I. A threefold condition is required that an effect can be imputed to the agent, or to the one placing the cause, namely:

1° That the agent foresaw the effect, at least confusedly. The reason is that an effect in no way foreseen can in no way be voluntary; for nothing is willed unless it has first been known. Hence drunkenness is not voluntary, nor to be imputed to him who becomes drunk from a little wine, whose force he did not know. Therefore, as some have contended, it is not sufficient for fault that the evil effect could have been foreseen or ought to have been foreseen; for the supposition must be denied, namely that an effect can be foreseen if in fact it is not foreseen, at least confusedly; for the first idea of some thing is not in man's power. Hence also, not even indirectly, is the omission of acts voluntary concerning which a man in no way thinks, as, for example, the omission of Vespers in him who, wholly immersed in studies, does not notice the twelfth hour of the night approaching, before which he had determined to finish them. Nevertheless, voluntary in cause and imputable to sin are the blasphemies, impurities, quarrels, which are wont to be done by someone in drunkenness. For such things are sufficiently foreseen from the custom of doing such things in this state.

2° That the agent could have not placed the cause; for otherwise, liberty being lacking, the voluntary would necessarily be lacking. Besides, an obligation cannot be given when it cannot be fulfilled. Hence the axiom: No one is held to the impossible. Thus a priest who gives Communion to a hidden sinner publicly asking for it is not guilty of sacrilege; for he could not, in those circumstances, not place the cause of the sacrilege which this man will commit.

3° That there be present a law by force of which the agent is held not to place the cause, or to remove it once placed; for where there is no law, neither is there transgression. But no one is held not to place the cause, or to remove it once placed, if he has a right of placing it, founded in necessity, utility, or honesty; for from the rule of law: to one pursuing his own right an effect following beyond intention is not imputed. Hence inordinate motions are not voluntary, nor therefore imputable, to a physician or surgeon in the exercise of his art, or to a theologian in the study of Moral Theology, provided, namely, that the proximate danger of consent is absent or remote; because the former are not held to omit their art, nor the latter his study, in order to forestall this effect, but on the contrary they have a just reason for giving work to them. Thus also evil desires of the curious are in no way imputed to a woman honestly adorning herself.

8. II. - It is lawful to place a good or indifferent cause from which there immediately follows a twofold effect, one good, the other evil, if there is present a proportionately grave reason and the end of the agent is honest, namely if he does not intend the depraved effect.¹

The reason of this principle is that, if this were not lawful, the agent would sin either from the intention of the depraved effect, or from the placing of the cause, or from the foresight of the evil effect. But none of these can be said. Not the first; for the end is supposed honest. Not the second; for the cause is supposed good, or at least indifferent. Finally not the third; for in the hypothesis the depraved effect is not intended, but merely not avoided; and there is present a proportionately grave and just reason for not avoiding it.

Moreover, five conditions which are directly or indirectly enunciated in this principle are altogether required, namely: 1° that the end of the agent be honest, that is, not disordered; 2° that the cause which is placed, or once placed is not removed, be good or at least indifferent; 3° that the good effect be immediate; 4° that there be present a grave reason for placing the cause, or not removing it once placed, nor is the agent held by justice, or by office, or by charity to omit it, or to remove it once placed; and 5° that practically there be no prudent judgment that the agent will consent to the illicit effect.

Therefore, 1° a good end is required; that is, one placing the cause or not removing it once placed must not intend the evil effect,² because otherwise he would intend something disordered, and therefore would sin. Thus in the example just adduced of the physician, surgeon, student of theology, woman honestly adorning herself, it would be a sin if besides the honest end a dishonest one were sought by them. 2° It is required that the cause which is placed, or once placed is not removed, be good or at least indifferent; namely that the act not be opposed to some law from which here and now he is excused by no legitimate cause. The reason is evident. For if the cause were not of this kind, it would induce guilt per se. Hence a girl gravely sins who, pregnant from a crime, procures abortion in order to avoid infamy; for the cause is not indifferent, and besides the 3rd and 4th condition fail. 3° It is required that the good effect follow equally immediately from the cause. The reason is that, if the cause directly and immediately has a depraved effect, and only by means of that depraved effect the good effect exists, then good is sought from evil; but it is never lawful to perpetrate evil, however slight, for procuring any good whatever; for according to the commonly known axiom, drawn from the Apostle,³ evils are never to be done that goods may come. Thus it is not lawful for you to lie, even for saving the life of a man. 4° It is required that there be present a proportionately grave reason for placing the cause, nor is the agent held from another obligation to omit it; because the natural law obliges us to avoid evils and to forestall harms to the neighbor, when we can do this without proportionately grave harm.

When a reason is proportionately grave will be explained in n. 307, 308. 5° It is required that practically there be no prudent judgment that the agent will consent to the illicit effect when it is produced. For consent into sin is never not to be avoided. Suppose, for example, that from riding there is wont to follow pollution for someone, and that the one riding does not intend this (the evil effect), but honest recreation (the good effect). Nevertheless he knows by experience that, notwithstanding the purpose of not consenting and of employing the means for forestalling consent, frequently, because the means have not in fact been employed, or have not been employed seriously enough, he consents; on this man certainly the obligation rests of abstaining from riding.¹

Note. - a) That it may rightly be decided whether the cause of permissively bearing oneself toward an evil effect is proportioned, the advantages and disadvantages which will follow from the action are to be compared with one another; but not only those which will arise in this or that particular case, but also those which would exist for society considered universally, or for the human race, if either it were necessary to abstain from the action, or it were lawful to place it. Wherefore, if I offer a just wage to a worker, and he demands more than the just amount, I am by no means held to consent to it, although I foresee that he will therefore blaspheme; for from this there would exist for society, or for timorous men, this grave harm: that whatever they asked would have to be furnished to those scoundrels, in order to forestall their blasphemies, which otherwise would not only not be forestalled, but to which a more frequent occasion would also thereby be given. On the contrary fornication will never be lawful, because permission for it, if it were given in any event, would yield to the harm of the human race (n. 493, I, under 2°).²

b) If the effect is lightly evil, it can never be imputed unto grave fault; but if it is gravely evil, it will not therefore always be imputed unto grave fault. For, as I said in n. 7 under 3°, in order that an effect can be imputed to one placing a cause, it is required that there be present a law by force of which the agent is held to avoid the cause on account of such an effect, or insofar as it is the cause of such an effect. But the obligation of this law, and likewise the degree or quantity of the obligation, depends both on the causality which intervenes between the action and the effect - namely whether the action influences the effect per se, or only per accidens, and, if per se, whether proximately or remotely - and on the reason which one has for placing the cause of such an effect. - Therefore under grave fault a gravely sinful effect will be imputed if it follows per se and proximately from the action (pollution from an immodest touch); but the killing of an unjust aggressor will in no way be imputed to you if this is necessary for the defense of your life, since you have a just reason for placing a cause producing even per se and proximately the death of the aggressor. - Under grave fault also will be imputed an evil effect which tends to grave harm of the neighbor if either no reason for placing the cause is present (no good effect follows for you from the cause), or a reason is indeed present, but not proportioned to the harmful effect (the good effect to follow from the placing of the cause is so little that, considering the gravity of the harm that will occur to the neighbor, it is to be esteemed as nothing). A case, for example, would be if, by not placing some action from the placing of which you can abstain without any inconvenience, or at least without proportioned inconvenience, you would avoid a cause, although only remote, of so grave a harm (suppose the killing of a neighbor), that you are held under grave fault by charity to avoid that harm, even with this inconvenience. Besides this case, there is not given a grave obligation of avoiding an effect, although gravely evil, if that effect follows from an act as from a cause per se, but only remote. Wherefore, by force precisely of this principle, inordinate motions following from honest conversation (a remote cause), although useless, are excused from grave fault; but if the conversation is truly useful, those motions by themselves are free from every fault. Notice, however, that a cause remote of itself can, for someone, considering his special disposition, be proximate. Examples are had in n. 502, I, under 2°.

VIII. Lust voluntary in its cause, from which it is foreseen to follow, is sin to the extent that the cause, insofar as it influences it, is sin. Hence it is a sin grave by its genus, which admits lightness of matter.

It is proved: in venereal pleasure willed in the cause, the consent of the will is borne only toward the cause which provokes the pleasure; therefore it is evil only to the extent that the cause itself is evil. Hence the malice is to be determined from the influence on venereal pleasure; and besides this it must be seen whether perhaps there is a just and proportionate reason for placing the cause on account of a good effect and permitting the evil effect.

Now there are actions which cause a base motion per se, others per accidens, according as they are apt to cause it, or on the contrary are not apt to cause it although nevertheless they can cause it. Actions which by their nature are apt to excite venereal pleasure, and thus are ordered to generation, cause it per se, for example a base look, touch, or imagination. Moreover, of these actions some influence that effect proximately and notably, namely those from which the base effect always or almost always follows, for example a repeated touch on the obscene parts of another person;²³ others influence the base motion only remotely and lightly, from which therefore the evil effect rarely arises, for example a touch made in passing on the immodest parts of one's own body.²⁴ Their influence must also be considered relatively, because by its nature it depends somewhat on the varying inclination and disposition of the subject, as in childhood, youth, or old age, in affection or habit of mind, in a warm or cold bodily constitution; hence certain causes are more vehement with respect to one such person, which are light with respect to another, for example a continued look at a naked person of the same sex, or a continued touch of one's own body.

²³ Actions gravely exciting, according to Lehmkuhl, Theologia Moralis, I, n. 864, are: "a more vivid practical thought concerning venereal matters; touch exercised on the obscene parts of another person, unless perhaps it is done entirely in passing in a person of the same sex without depraved affection; a voluntarily continued look at a completely naked person of the other sex; indeed also the look of a man at the naked chest of a woman, or the look at an obscene picture, at least if it is continued after commotion has already arisen."

²⁴ Actions lightly exciting, according to Lehmkuhl, ibidem, are: "touch or look on the immodest parts of one's own body made in passing; a non-immodest and light touch of a woman made in passing; taking her hand; a light kiss from an honorable cause; vain conversation with a woman; a non-fixed look at the chest; a fortiori other lighter looks."

Actions which of themselves pertain in no way to generation and are outside the genus of immodesty cause a base motion per accidens, for example to eat or drink immoderately, to use a bath, to ride, to sit or lie in a certain position, to exercise sight or touch on honorable parts on account of merely sensible pleasure. Indeed there are persons who, from actions which in no way relate to the venereal matter, are vehemently excited by a hidden force. Among causes per accidens are counted those actions which remotely and lightly influence the base effect, even if sometimes they influence it gravely, because this proceeds not from their nature but from the intervention of another cause, for example from the subject's infirmity, custom, obsession, weakness, heredity, and so forth.²⁵

²⁵ From the preceding things those opinions can be reconciled which at first sight seem opposed, while some deny that the influence of the cause is to be determined from the disposition of the agent, while others on the contrary affirm it, or assert that it depends principally on the nature of the cause, secondarily on the disposition of the agent. Noldin says, for example, cited work, n. 35: "He who, on account of peculiar disposition and infirmity, suffers frequent pollutions from actions licit in themselves, which by their nature influence them only lightly, is not bound to abstain from those actions, provided consent to the pleasure is excluded: for in placing them he uses his own right." Namely, this is valid concerning causes per accidens, not concerning causes per se. On the contrary, Genicot, Theologia Moralis, I, n. 377: "For determining which causes influence gravely and which lightly, attention must principally be paid to the nature of the cause; secondarily to the disposition of the agent. Whether a cause by its nature influences gravely or lightly often appears easily enough to each one. But in many cases the matter is not so clear: in these especially one must attend to the condition from the disposition of the agent. For the influence of the same causes is very much diminished or increased according to age, constitution, force of imagination, education, degree of virtue, custom of hearing, seeing, handling base things, and so forth." Indeed Aertnijs, Theologia Moralis, I, n. 260, conformably to the doctrine of Saint Alphonsus: "He who, from inclination toward venereal things, has experienced frequent pollution from causes not indeed gravely immodest by their nature, nor on the other hand altogether light, but which in him more vehemently arouse pollution, is bound, when no reason is given for placing them, to abstain from them, and indeed under grave obligation: because with respect to such a person, on account of his inclination, causes of this sort excite not lightly but gravely." Namely, these things are valid concerning causes per se, not concerning causes per accidens.

With these things posited we say:

a. It is a mortal sin without sufficient reason to place a cause which per se proximately or gravely influences carnal motions or venereal pleasure, even if these by accident do not follow; for example very obscene reading, or a prolonged touch or look at an immodest part. One case is excepted: when someone from his own experience knows certainly that he is not gravely moved by an action of this sort.

Practically, however, for mortal sin two things are often required: first, that the cause influence grave motions, that is, vehement ones, or those sufficiently proximately disposing to pollution, or causing great pleasure; for since light and transitory motions are most frequent, to avoid the causes of all of these would be very troublesome, indeed morally impossible, and therefore not to be urged under grave obligation, because often there is present a reason excusing in some measure, not from the whole, namely, but from so much; secondly, moreover, that the cause influence those grave motions proximately or gravely. Therefore Saint Alphonsus rightly notes²⁶ that even pollution itself is not mortal unless it proceeds from a cause per se mortal in the genus of lust or immodesty. It must be mortal, because since pollution is not willed in itself but only in the cause, it will be evil to that degree to which the cause itself is evil, that is, to which the cause is evil insofar as it is a cause or insofar as it influences; but every and only a cause which of itself gravely influences motions prohibited under grave obligation, unless there is present a reason excusing from a good effect which compensates the evil, is mortal insofar as it is a cause. It must be in the genus of lust, because otherwise it would influence pollution not gravely but only lightly, for example drunkenness or immoderate eating of meat.

²⁶ Theologia Moralis, book III, treatise IV, n. 484.

b. It is a venial sin without a just cause to place an action influencing lightly or remotely or per accidens into even vehement motions and complete venereal pleasure, provided those things do not please and no proximate danger of consent is present. For a light influence on a grave thing is a light thing.²⁷ Such things are a conversation not prolonged with a girl, a look, a touch, reading that is not very base. A sufficient reason is any reasonable cause of necessity, utility, or fittingness.

²⁷ And so an act which would influence only lightly into grave commotion, indeed into pollution, would for this reason be only venially evil. And in this there is a great difference from lust voluntary in itself: for direct intention toward venereal pleasure, even a small one, manifests a disposition of soul very different from that which is found in him who does not seek, indeed does not will, that pleasure. The first per se incurs proximate danger of consenting to further pleasure on account of his own propensity; not so necessarily the other.

c. It is no sin to place from a just cause an action from which inordinate motions are foreseen to follow, even pollution, provided the proximate danger of consent is always absent. A just cause is, for a priest, to hear confessions and to study base matters; for a surgeon, to look at and touch immodest parts; likewise for one serving the infirm or in baths; for all, to kiss women according to the custom of the country, to touch oneself from necessity, to ride for the sake of recreation or utility, to perform gymnastic exercises, to lie down in a more comfortable position, while sitting to put leg over leg according to custom, and to take warm foods and drinks moderately.²⁸

²⁸ You will find the whole doctrine concerning lust voluntary in its cause expounded in Billuart, diss. 6, a. 12. P. Vermeersch proposes the matter otherwise and speaks of disguised lust, cited work, n. 374 and 388, in place of lust voluntary in its cause. Yet our mode seems clearer and more open, more conformable to principles and older. Moreover, although at first sight the distinguished theologian may seem to dissent, nevertheless in fact he teaches the same. "For observe," he says, "that the sin of imperfect lust is committed directly, not only when it is sought by express intention, but also when, without another immediate cause, acts are exercised which directly excite the flesh: for then you are judged to effect the venereal motion" (n. 374). Behold the principle; if now you want an example: "Kisses too frequently repeated, especially on the mouth or lips, too prolonged embraces, because they gravely move the flesh and have no cause among unmarried persons, are argued to be grave unless the carnal motion is positively repressed and, if pollution more strongly threatens, one ceases from these" (n. 401). Genicot-Salsmans has the right doctrine concerning lust voluntary in its cause as regards pollution voluntary in this way (Theologia Moralis, I, n. 401), but not as regards venereal motions, which are not proved to be grave, since in them, he says, there is no evident affection toward complete pleasure (n. 403). But this reason is null, for he who seeks incomplete pleasure by that very fact implicitly seeks complete pleasure, and he who wills the cause of pleasure implicitly wills the effect. Moreover this doctrine is new and is not found in the first editions made under the care of P. Genicot himself; it is not founded in tradition: the traditional doctrine holds that to place a cause per se gravely influencing grave motions is of itself a grave sin; nor is it sustained according to principles: for if something is in itself gravely evil, as venereal motions outside marriage are, it is also gravely evil perfectly to cause it, in the case at hand to place a cause per se gravely influencing such motions. Others state more practically: if the motions are grave and excited without just cause, there is great danger, and the sin is grave; on the contrary, if the motions are light, the danger is small and the sin light. But this is said according to presumptions, according to that which often or ordinarily occurs. For if the motions are grave, danger is not always and for all persons grave, nor is it grave to place a cause lightly influencing such motions. On the contrary, if the motions are only light, nevertheless sometimes grave danger can be present. And so it must be said in principle: to place a cause per se gravely influencing venereal motions is of itself a grave sin; to place a cause influencing lightly or per accidens is of itself a light sin.

II. From the doctrine concerning human acts we know that it is licit to place a cause which produces at the same time a good effect and an evil effect, if four conditions are present:

1. if the action in itself, that is, circumstances set aside, is not evil, but honorable or at least indifferent;

2. if the good effect follows from the cause at least as immediately as the evil one, or does not follow by means of the evil; otherwise it would be to work or effect good through evil, and therefore to will evil in some way as a means to good, although evils are not to be done that goods may come about;

3. if the evil effect is not intended, but only the good one; otherwise the evil effect would be voluntary in itself, or at least willed;

4. if there is a reason for placing the cause, and indeed a proportionately grave one, that is, so that the good procured exceeds or equals, and thus compensates for, the evil.

On the contrary, it is illicit if the action is evil in itself or has only an immediate evil effect, even if further from it there is procured, and intended by the agent, a much greater good effect. For although in judging the morality of the interior act of the will, it is necessary above all to regard the intention, nevertheless in judging the morality of the exterior act, one must consider not so much where it is ultimately terminated or what is intended by the agent, but first of all what is immediately done; and if that is evil, or if it immediately produces only an evil effect, even if further it tends or is ordered to some greatest good, it will always remain intrinsically evil.

As is gathered from the very definition of a human act, three things concur to constitute it, namely knowledge, volition, and liberty. Since discussion concerning knowledge will occur throughout the whole Treatise on Conscience, here only volition and liberty will be spoken of under the single word voluntary; not because voluntary and free are the same, but because in the acts by which man as wayfarer tends to his end, in reality they are never separated, and thence they are used promiscuously by the moral theologian. First, then, some notion will here be given of the voluntary in general, and then of the voluntary in species, or rather of the indirect voluntary, for this species of the voluntary is very necessary to know and liable to difficulties.

The voluntary, according to St. Thomas, is that "whose principle is in the one operating . . . yet in such a way that the one operating himself knows the individual circumstances which concur for the operation": or, it is an act proceeding from the will illumined by intellectual knowledge of the individual things, namely of the object, end, and circumstances. Cf. St. Thomas, 3 Ethic., lect. 4.

The voluntary is distinguished in many ways, namely:

1st. Perfect or imperfect. The former is that which is done with full knowledge and full consent of the will; but the latter is that which proceeds from somewhat obscure knowledge, or from imperfect consent.

2nd. Voluntary simply or in a certain respect. The former is sometimes defined as that which is done from full deliberation and inclination of the will; the latter, as that which is done with consent of the will, but with some repugnance, or some inclination of the will toward the opposite. But more often the Doctors understand and explain this division in a different way. For they call voluntary simply that which proceeds from the absolute and efficacious will of man, even if there is given, to the contrary, a certain conditioned nolleity, so that apart from this case it would not be done, as happens in a sailor who, when a storm is pressing, casts merchandise into the sea; then they call that voluntary simply and involuntary in a certain respect, or more briefly a mixed voluntary simply. But if there is present no mixture of the involuntary, because no actual conditioned nolleity is given, as happens in a sinner seriously penitent from fear of hell, then it is called a pure voluntary simply. But voluntary in a certain respect is called by the same Doctors that which is according to the conditioned and inefficacious will of man, although here and now a prevailing unwillingness is present; for example, a player would gladly prolong the game, unless the time of Mass were pressing. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 6, art. 6. - St. Alphonsus, nn. 9 and 21. - Voit, n. 4.

3rd. Direct or indirect. The former is that which is intended in itself, or through itself, that is, which in the order of intention is the immediate object of the will, although perhaps it is very remote in the order of execution; but the latter is called that which is not willed in itself but in another, or rather is foreseen as about to follow from another thing directly willed, as an effect from a cause, or as something connected with it; for example, drunkenness in excessive drinking, or homicide from the rash throwing of a stone. Hence the Doctors often express the same division by the name voluntary in itself and voluntary in cause; but they use the name direct and indirect voluntary with St. Thomas to designate the positive and negative voluntary. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 6, art. 3. - St. Alphonsus, n. 9.

4th. Positive or negative. The former is called that which is from the will really acting, or which requires a positive action, for instance reading; but the latter is that which proceeds from the omission of an act depending on the will; not insofar as no act is posited by the will which is the cause or occasion of the negative voluntary, but insofar as no positive act is required which is of its essential nature. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 71, art. 5; and q. 6, art. 3.

5th. Express or tacit. It is called express if it is manifested by words or signs; but tacit if from some fact, or omission, it is apprehended to be present.

6th. Actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative. That is called actual which proceeds from the will actually acting, as for example contrition in one who here and now elicits an act of penance. Virtual is an act of the will already posited, which nevertheless still so perseveres that here and now it exercises its power upon that which is being done, of which therefore it exists as the true cause. Such is the intention of a priest who, from an actual will of consecrating or absolving, begins Mass or enters the confessional, but a little afterward is so distracted that he no longer adverts to the words which he utters; nevertheless he truly consecrates and absolves by virtue of the intention which he had, and which morally perseveres and acts. Habitual is called that which indeed was actually emitted by the will, has not yet been revoked, but does not flow into the present action, because it has been interrupted either by sleep, or drunkenness, or a notable delay of time; whence it bespeaks pure concomitance, but not causality in relation to the action now to be posited. It is named interpretative if in no way it has been had, but can prudently be presumed, and would be had if it were thought about, or could be thought about. Thus a sick man deprived of his senses, if he has lived as a Christian, is judged to will to receive Extreme Unction.

*« Since through certain acts it is necessary to arrive at beatitude, human acts must consequently be considered, that we may know by what acts one arrives at beatitude, or impedes the way to beatitude. But, because operations and acts are concerned with singulars, therefore every practical science is perfected in particular consideration. Moral consideration therefore, since it treats of human acts, must first indeed be treated in the universal, secondly however in the particular.

» Concerning the universal consideration of human acts, the first thing occurring to be considered is about the human acts themselves, secondly about their principles. Now some human acts are proper to man, others are common to man and other animals. And since beatitude is the proper good of man, those acts stand more closely related to beatitude which are properly human, than acts which are common to man and other animals. First therefore must be considered the acts which are proper to man, secondly the acts which are common to man and animals, which are called the passions of the soul ¹ » ¹ The passions will be treated in the following treatise.

» Concerning the first two things occur to be considered: first, the condition of human acts; secondly, the distinction of those acts. But since those acts are properly called human which are voluntary, because the will is rational appetite, which is proper to man, we must consider acts insofar as they are voluntary. First therefore must be considered the voluntary and the involuntary in common; secondly, the acts which are voluntary as elicited by the will itself, as existing immediately of the will itself; thirdly, the acts which are voluntary as imperated by the will, which are of the will itself through mediating other powers. And because the acts of the will have certain circumstances by which they are judged, first must be considered the voluntary and involuntary, and consequently the circumstances of those acts in which the voluntary and involuntary are found ¹ »] ¹ Hic q. 6.

PRAENOTANDA

[That it may be clearly known of what acts there is question in the present treatise, certain distinctions must be established. Since man is rightly defined « a rational animal, » those acts alone which proceed from his nature perfectly, that is rationally, are to be imputed to him, as human and subject to the rules of morality. Hence

Acts done in man necessarily, such as respiration, are indeed natural; but, as pertaining only to animality, they are imperfect and not properly acts in the sense we understand here, that is, human.

There are acts which would of themselves be human if they were referred to a deliberated and free end, but which sometimes arise unforeseen without any deliberation and intention, such as laughter, which proceeds from a power proper to a rational being, but often not rationally. Such acts are not yet human, but are called acts of a man, as proceeding from a man in a mode not perfectly human.

A human act, in the theological sense, is therefore an operation proceeding from a man in a human manner, that is rationally or from deliberated will, consequently with knowledge of the end and freely. It truly pertains to man as defined above.

A human act proceeds from the will either immediately, without the aid of another faculty, and is elicited, because it is considered only in the will itself, by which immanent operation it elicits it: such are love and hate. If that act of the will does not rest in itself but commands another act, for this reason it is said to be imperating. But the act which proceeds from the will only mediately, that is determined by the command of the will and distinguished from its own act, such as meditation and walking, is imperated.

A human act is not to be considered only physically; but, since it tends to a known and chosen end, it is subject to rules which render the prosecution of the end legitimate or illegitimate, and from this heading it is constituted in moral being. Therefore a human act becomes moral from its relation to the rule of honesty or morals: if it is conformable to it, it is good, because « good is from an integral cause; » if it discord from it, it is evil, because « evil is from any defect whatsoever; » but if it is neither against nor alongside such a rule, the act is indifferent.]

DISSERTATION I

ON THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY

St. Thomas, q. 6.

I say 1°: The voluntary is rightly defined commonly thus: « That which proceeds from an intrinsic principle, with cognition of the end. »

The definition is explained. By intrinsic principle is understood any elicited appetite, rational as well as sensitive; but, because among elicited appetites the will is the more principal, from the principal appetite the voluntary is denominated. Therefore by the first particles the voluntary is distinguished from the violent, whose principle is outside; likewise from what is willed simply, which does not proceed from any influx of will, but is its object and term extrinsically denominated from volition; thus rain is willed by the farmer, but not voluntary to him. By the last particles it is distinguished from natural motion; because, although natural motion is from an intrinsic efficient principle, yet it is not from an intrinsic final principle, or it is not with cognition of the end, as appears in the motions of vegetative things and in the motion of heavy and light bodies toward the center: whence such things are not said to move themselves toward the end, but to be moved by another knowing, by whom there is impressed on them the principle of their motion toward the end. Likewise by these particles are excluded from the reason of voluntary the acts of intellect anticipating the act of will and not commanded by it; because, although they are from an intrinsic efficient principle, they do not suppose cognition of the end from which they are caused.

I say 2°: The voluntary is divided 1° into perfect and imperfect ¹. Perfect is that which proceeds from perfect cognition of the end; imperfect that which proceeds from imperfect cognition of the end. For since two things concur to the voluntary, namely the intrinsic principle and cognition of the end, the proper perfection of the voluntary by which it is distinguished from the natural cannot be sought from the intrinsic principle in which it agrees with the natural. Therefore from cognition of the end alone, by which it is distinguished from the natural. ¹ Here q. 6, a. 2, c. — 2. Ibid.

Hence it follows that the perfect voluntary belongs to rational nature alone, the imperfect to brutes ²; because perfect cognition is had when not only is apprehended the thing which is the end, but also is known the reason of the end and the proportion of means to end; and such cognition, since it is collative and discursive, belongs to intellectual nature alone. But imperfect cognition of the end is that which consists in the mere apprehension of the thing which is the end, without the knowledge of the reason and dignity of the end and the proportion of means to end. And such cognition of the end is found in brutes through sense and natural estimation. Therefore the imperfect voluntary agrees with brutes, the perfect with rational nature alone; yet not with all its acts, but only those which proceed with full cognition and advertence; whence sudden motions, motions of children, of the insane, of the half-asleep, are only imperfectly voluntary. ² Ibid.

2° The voluntary is divided into necessary and free. Free is that which proceeds from appetite with an indifferent judgment and power toward the opposite, as in man acting with full advertence concerning created goods. Necessary, that which proceeds from appetite with a judgment determined to one without power toward the opposite, as in brutes and human motions preceding the deliberation of reason.

3° The voluntary is divided into the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in cause. Voluntary in itself is whatever proceeds per se from the will expressly willing it, or every act which per se is intended, elicited, commanded, or positively admitted by the will; as, if you deliberately hate an enemy, you wish to kill, you command killing, you positively consent to one willing to kill. It is called also direct, express, and explicit voluntary.

Voluntary in cause is that which in itself is not immediately intended, elicited, or commanded by the will, but follows nevertheless from something willed per se and in itself, and therefore is reckoned willed in another as in its cause: thus quarrels are voluntary in cause for him who deliberately makes himself drunk, knowing that in drunkenness he quarrels freely everywhere, although elsewhere he detests quarrels. It is called also indirect, imperfect, and interpretative voluntary.

For this voluntary, the indirect one or that in cause, theologians commonly require three conditions. The first is that the effect was foreseen, or ought and could have been foreseen in a human way to follow from such cause; failing this, drunkenness is not indirectly voluntary for him who, ignorant of the force of wine and drinking to satiety, becomes drunk, as happened to Noë. Second, that it can. Third, that he ought to remove this cause and impede this effect; for if by no law am I bound to remove this cause, but on the contrary have just reason for positing it, there is no reason why what follows from it against my intention should be imputed to me, at least morally. Hence disordered motions are not imputed as voluntary to the confessor or surgeon, since these are not bound on that account to omit their ministry, but on the contrary have just cause for exercising it.

But when is anyone bound to omit or remove the cause from which an evil effect follows? A question difficult of solution on account of the diversity of cases occurring; for which are to be seen the things I say in the treatise de Jure et Justitia, dissert. VI, a. 12, in the premises, from which I repeat these few things.

That it may be discerned when the cause ought, or ought not, to be omitted or removed on account of the evil effect to follow from it, whether per se or per accidens, the evil effect must be compared with the good, and at the same time weighed how great is the influx of the cause into the evil effect: so that if the cause influences per se and proximately into the evil effect, and this outweighs the good effect, there is grave obligation of omitting or removing the cause; but none if the good effect outweighs, or at least equals, the evil. By what reason we said that just defense need not be omitted, from which proximately follows the death of the unjust invader, because the life of the innocent outweighs or at least equals the life of the noxious man; nor ought the damnation which the unjust invader incurs be attended to, because this does not follow from the just defense of invasion, but from the malice of the invader, to lay aside which lies in his own hand.

But if the cause influences remotely and lightly into the evil effect, and from it some good effect also follows, although it does not outweigh or equal the evil, there is no obligation of removing the cause, because less reason is required for positing a cause influencing only lightly and remotely into evil, than if it influenced gravely and proximately.

Hence you are not bound to abstain from honest and useful conversation on account of the motions arising from it. But if the cause influencing lightly and remotely be venially evil in itself, or from it no good effect follows, then there will be obligation of removing it, but light and only under venial sin, unless in this and the preceding case there be question of grave damage to a neighbor: because that obligation must be estimated according to the quantity of the influx of the cause; for since the effect is voluntary only in the cause, and is contained lightly and remotely in the cause, it is lightly voluntary in it, and consequently imputable to light fault, and further there is light obligation of removing the cause on account of that effect. Hence you are bound under venial sin to abstain from honest but useless conversation, or from curious reading from which you foresee disordered motions will follow, and this not only by reason of the cause itself, which already is venial in itself, but also by reason of the effect itself. I said, for these last two assertions, « unless the evil effect be grave damage to a neighbor; » for then there would be grave obligation of removing the cause, because charity commands us not only not to cause evil to our neighbor, but also, insofar as we conveniently can, to prevent it.

4° The voluntary is divided into positive and negative ¹. The author calls it direct and indirect. The positive or direct voluntary is that which proceeds from the will by real influx, as are all acts elicited or commanded by the will. The negative or indirect voluntary indeed does not proceed from the will by real influx, yet depends upon it, whence it is said to proceed from it negatively, as the omission of Mass in one who, adverting to its approaching celebration, applies himself to study, without saying actually and positively: « I do not will to hear it. » ¹ Ibid., a. 3, c.

[5° The voluntary is divided into express and tacit. The express voluntary is that which is declared distinctly by word or sign. The tacit voluntary is that which is not distinctly declared, but is gathered from some fact or omission, according to rule 43 of Law: « Who is silent seems to consent. » Truly in interpreting that voluntary one must proceed cautiously and discreetly, on account of this other rule of Law, which is 44: « He who is silent does not confess, but certainly neither does he seem to deny. » There must be added, therefore, that the former rule be rightly understood: « When he is bound to speak, and can. »]

These are the more common divisions of the voluntary; certain others will occur in what follows.

You will ask whether the perfect voluntary is the same as free.

I answer. negatively. For there is given a voluntary necessary from the perfection of cognition, which is perfectly, and more perfectly, voluntary than free, namely beatific love. For this proceeds from a maximally intrinsic principle, namely from the will loving God with whole heart, whole affection, and endeavor, and is accompanied by most perfect cognition, namely the clear vision of God most perfectly flowing into that love and equaling the whole universality of intellect and will.

You will say. The same argument can be made of that necessary love by which God loves himself and produces the Holy Spirit. For it would be absurd to imagine God loving himself with lesser inclination and more imperfect cognition than creatures, whom he loves freely.

Note 1°. The question is not of omission directly voluntary, namely when the one omitting in act wills positively to omit; for all confess that then, for the omission to be voluntary, no precept or obligation of positing the act omitted is required, because then the will is terminated directly and positively to it. But the question is of omission indirectly voluntary, namely when someone, being advertent, posits some act incompossible with the act omitted; e.g., someone, while the practical judgment dictates that Mass is presently to be celebrated and can be heard, chooses to remain at home, or to play, or to study, yet without saying: « I will to omit Mass. »

Note 2° that distinction must be made between culpable and voluntary omission; for it is certain that omission is not culpable without a precept of positing the act omitted.

I say 1°: For omission to be voluntary, there is not required a precept or obligation of positing the act omitted.

It is proved 1° by the fundamental reason. The voluntary is from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end. But, the precept of positing the act omitted being set aside, its omission is from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end. Therefore. — Proof of the minor: 1° We suppose the intellect to advert to what is omitted, otherwise it would be mere forgetfulness or negative omission. 2° This omission hangs upon the will, whether it be posited or not posited. 3° The will elicits advertently some act incompossible with the omitted act, whereby liberty is exercised in act, and from which the omission follows. Therefore, the precept being set aside, omission is from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end, and the omission is indirectly voluntary and thus elicited. What the adversaries oppose against this fundamental reason we shall say in the solution of the objections.

It is confirmed. He who omits freely omits voluntarily. But he who, intent upon study, omits Mass on a feria omits no less freely than on a feast day. Therefore.

It is proved 2° a posteriori. Many are the indirect voluntary omissions of acts not precepted; thus, e.g., he who, given to study or prayer, omits warming himself, or recreation, or some other convenience licit indeed but not precepted — not by direct volition of those omissions, but out of voluntary choice of study or prayer at that time, or on that occasion when he could licitly enjoy these conveniences; these, I say, are indirectly voluntary omissions, as no one, I think, will deny, since they are meritorious. Therefore it is plain that an indirect voluntary omission can exist without precept.

I say 2°: The effect consequent upon or concomitant with the omission is not voluntary without obligation of impeding it, unless perchance the omission be ordered as a means toward this effect.

It is proved 1° a priori. The effect following or accompanying the omission, the obligation of impeding it being set aside, proceeds neither physically nor morally from the will: not physically, because the will precisely omitting has no physical influx upon the existence of this effect, nor can omission, since it is a non-being, cause it physically; not morally, because there is no reason why an effect upon which the will has in no wise physical influx should be referred back to it as cause, unless because it could and ought to have impeded it. But by the very fact that it can and ought to impede such an effect, the effect begins to belong to it, and there is due to it the care of impeding it; whence omission of impeding is reckoned as volition of the effect, because no one is presumed unwilling to fulfill his debt, unless he wills the opposite the more. Therefore, the obligation of impeding the effect consequent upon the omission being set aside, that effect is not voluntary.

It is confirmed from the difference which exists between the omission itself and the effect following or accompanying it respectively with respect to the will. Omission per se immediately, no other cause intervening, depends upon the will; for the will can equally immediately nill as will. Whence, that the nolition, or omission of willing, be indirectly voluntary, it needs no other cause than only advertence and the suspension of influx after the vital manner, which is furnished by eliciting another act incompossible with the act omitted; for then the omission proceeds indirectly from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end. But the effect following, or accompanying, the omission is not per se immediately from the will, but mediately, through another cause intervening: thus, e.g., while I omit to part two quarrelers, the killing ensuing thence is caused neither by my will nor by my omission, but by the sword of the slayer; likewise, when a sailor omits to steer the ship, neither his will nor his omission submerges the ship, but the tempest. That therefore such an effect be referred back to the will as to its cause, and be called interpretatively voluntary, something must be assigned whereby it comes about that it belongs in some way to the will and has some connection with it; and nothing else can be assigned except a precept of impeding that effect, as I said in the first proof.

Certain more recent authors reject the principle of a double effect on the ground that it contains a begging of the question; for the first condition which the said principle establishes for the lawfulness of an action requires that the cause be good or at least indifferent; secondly, because it requires that the bad effect not be intended, although intention cannot change the nature of the external action and it is permissible to intend the killing of an unjust aggressor, to which example St. Thomas applies this principle; in this example the third condition also is lacking, namely, that the good effect not follow from the bad effect; finally, the fourth condition, namely, that there be a proportionate cause, is indeed true, but according to them it is useless in practice and incapable of application.¹ Hence it is asked:

1 Ita fere Dr. W. McDonald, The Principles of Moral Science, p. 149.

1. What is the principle of a double effect, and for what does it serve?

2. Is the said principle true?

3. What is to be said about the objections recited?

1. What is the principle of the double effect, and of what use is it?

The first part of this question may be answered in the words of Dr. McDonald’s own rendering of Lehmkuhl: “It is lawful to perform an action which produces two effects, one good, the other bad, provided (1) the action, viewed in itself, is good or at least indifferent; (2) the agent does not intend the evil effect, but only the good (it is well to add in some cases, and provided there is no danger of subsequent evil consent or intention); (3) the good effect is produced as immediately as — that is, not by means of — the bad; (4) and there is a sufficiently weighty reason for permitting the evil effect.”

The use of this principle often enables us to decide whether we are bound to abstain from some action because of its producing evil effects. If the action in question has nothing but evil effects, then of course it is itself wrong. But sometimes an action has both evil and good effects. Thus if I dig a well in my own land, I may obtain a supply of water, but this good effect may be accompanied by serious loss to my neighbor if my well dries up his water-supply. The question frequently arises whether or not the evil effect (in this example loss caused to my neighbor) makes the action (digging the well) wrong. The principle enunciated above lays down the conditions under which the action in question may be done, in spite of its producing evil effects.

2. Is the principle true?

Yes; it has the support of St. Thomas (I–II, question 64, article 7) and of most recent moralists. It may be proved also from the fact that when the conditions laid down are fulfilled, there is nothing wrong either in the object or in the circumstances of the action in question, and so it may be done, for we may do anything that has nothing wrong in it. The fact that the evil effect follows does not under the supposed conditions make the action wrong; we exercise our right, and regret that this can not be done without some evil consequences which we do not desire, but only permit.

3. What is to be said about the objections mentioned in the case?

The first condition laid down in the principle is that the action viewed in itself must not be bad; but, says the objection, is not this the whole question at issue? No, it is not; there is no begging of the question in the principle. The morality of digging the well when it causes damage to my neighbor is in question, and the principle requires that this action of digging the well apart from the evil effect of causing damage to my neighbor should not be wrong in itself. If without the leave of the owner I proceed to dig a well in the property of my neighbor, the action in itself would be wrong; its malice would be at once apparent, it does not fulfil the first condition. But I have a right to dig a well in my own property, and so the first condition is fulfilled in the given example.

The second objection is that the question of intention does not arise, inasmuch as the intention can not change the nature of the external act. It is true that the intention can not change the physical nature of the external act, but it can change its moral quality. If I dig the well in my property to spite my neighbor and to deprive him of his water-supply, I commit a sin against charity, though the uncharitable intention does not change the physical nature of the external action so as to cause it to be against justice. The question of intention is therefore of importance. We need not here enter into the disputed question as to whether in self-defence one may intend to kill an unjust aggressor, or whether the intention should be exclusively directed to self-defence.

The third objection is that in killing an unjust aggressor in self-defence, to which St. Thomas applies the principle of the double effect, the good effect (the preservation of one’s own life) follows from the evil effect (the killing of the aggressor). In reply it may be said that even if this be conceded, it would only follow that the principle is wrongly applied to this case; it would not follow that the principle is false or useless. But according to the mind of St. Thomas the killing of the aggressor does not follow from the act of self-defence, but both killing and self-defence follow immediately from the blow or wound inflicted. The distinction is subtle and not of great practical importance.

The fourth condition, that there should be a sufficiently weighty reason, is not useless nor incapable of being applied, as the last objection asserts. For charity requires that I should not seek a trivial advantage of my own at the cost of serious loss to my neighbor. If I can very well do without a new water-supply, I may not dig a well in my property which would ruin my neighbor by depriving him of the only water-supply available to carry on his business. On the contrary, if a new supply is as necessary for me as it is for him, charity does not require that I should forego my own advantage lest I should deprive my neighbor of an equal advantage. Charity does not bind with so serious an inconvenience.

Titus, a young man, confesses that he is accustomed rather often to suffer a seminal emission when he rides horseback. When asked by the confessor whether he has given consent to the depraved pleasure, he denies it; and when asked again whether he rides horseback in order to procure those motions, at first he absolutely denies it, and says that he rides rather because that exercise pleases him greatly. But afterward, correcting himself, he says that he is not certain; perhaps because of the said effect he chooses that mode of exercise somewhat more readily. The confessor, however, having heard these things, doubts whether he ought to forbid Titus horseback riding or not. Hence it is asked:

1. What is voluntary in itself and in its cause, and when is this imputed to the agent as fault?

2. Is an effect seriously bad, voluntary only in its cause, always a mortal sin?

3. What is to be said concerning the case?

1. What is meant by voluntary in itself and voluntary in its cause, and when is the latter imputed as sin to the agent?

That is voluntary in itself which is willed in itself and which is not merely foreseen to follow from something else which is willed in itself. On the other hand, that is voluntary in its cause which is not willed in itself although it is foreseen that it will follow from something that is willed in itself.

That which is voluntary in its cause is imputable to the agent if it was foreseen, if it could be avoided, and if there was an obligation to avoid putting the action precisely because it produced the effect in question.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 24.

2. Is a seriously bad effect which is only voluntary in the cause always imputable to the agent as a grave sin?

No; for no evil is imputable unless it is voluntary, and evil which is only voluntary in the cause, though it would be grave if it were willed in itself, will not necessarily be grave if it is only voluntary in its cause. For this cause may be only slightly wrong, or only slightly connected with the evil effect, and then the amount of voluntariness in the effect is only slight, and can not be more than a venial sin. If the evil only follows by accident from what is voluntary in itself, it can not be truly said to be voluntary at all, and unless there is some extrinsic reason, such as the necessity of avoiding injury to others or the necessity of obeying a lawful superior, it will not prevent a useful or otherwise licit action being performed lawfully.²

2 Ibid.

3. Concerning the case. The confessor neither ought nor is able to forbid horseback riding to Titus in this case. For although he rather often suffers a seminal emission from it, nevertheless he does not give consent to this bad effect, nor is the effect voluntary in itself or in its cause, because it does not follow of itself from horseback riding but only by accident. For horseback riding contains in itself nothing unlawful or lascivious in the genus of lust, nor by reason of harm to another is he bound specially to guard against such an effect. Hence it is lawful for Titus to ride horseback, and he should be advised to cast aside every thought and fear of that bad effect, for bad motions sometimes arise from that rather than from any honorable action.¹

1 Cf. St. Alphonsus, lib. iii, nn. 483, 484.

Titius, a Catholic, gets himself drunk not rarely; and since for that reason he rather frequently omits hearing Mass on Sunday, and indeed, while drunk, beats his wife, although, when his reason has been recovered, on hearing this he grieves greatly; and since his son, having seized the occasion of his father’s drunkenness, not only omits hearing the commanded Mass but spends the whole Sunday in revelries and games with dissolute companions, Titius, being about to confess, consequently doubts what and in what manner he is bound to confess. Hence it is asked:

1. What sort of sin is drunkenness, and in what does its malice consist?

2. Are the sins of children imputed to their parents?

3. What is to be said concerning the case?

1. What sort of a sin is drunkenness, and in what does its malice consist?

St. Paul enumerates¹ drunkenness among the sins which prevent those who commit them from entering the kingdom of God, and so it is a mortal sin. This should be understood of complete drunkenness, which deprives one of the use of reason, so that he does not know what he is doing and can not distinguish between right and wrong. Partial drunkenness is only a venial sin, unless by reason of scandal or harm done to health or fortune, or some similar extrinsic reason, it becomes a grievous sin.

1 Gal. v. 21.

The malice of drunkenness does not consist merely in voluntarily depriving oneself of reason, for we may do that for a good cause, as we do when we take chloroform. Its malice consists in depriving oneself of the faculty of reason without good cause by yielding to an inordinate appetite for intoxicating drink. Drunkenness not only deprives one of the use of reason but also of the capacity to recover it for a considerable time.

2. Are the sins of children imputable to their parents?

Yes, certainly. “Parents sin gravely if, insofar as it lies in them, they do not take care that their children be imbued with good morals . . . avoid the company of the wicked, observe the commandments of God and the Church, frequent the sacraments, and abstain from sins.”¹

1 Busembaum apud St. Alphonsus, lib. iii, n. 339.

3. Titius committed grave sin every time he got completely drunk so that he did not know what he was doing. We must suppose that he foresaw that he would not be able to hear Mass on the following Sunday when he got drunk, and so he is guilty of mortal sin on this account also. If he knew that he usually beat his wife when he got drunk, he committed sin also on this account, even though he was sorry afterward; his sorrow should have prevented him from getting drunk. If his son was of age to be corrected and compelled to go to Mass and avoid bad company, Titius was obliged to see to this, and he committed grave sin by neglecting his duty and by giving bad example to his son. The sin which he commits is against his obligation as a parent, and the sins of his son are imputable to him under this head; not that the father is guilty of the specific sins committed by his son on account of the father’s neglect. Titius, then, must confess these sins with the number of times that he has been guilty of them.

1. In a hilly country, two or three steps sometimes measure all the interval between the basins of two rivers, whose mouths are miles apart. In the crisis of an illness the merest trifle will turn the scale between death and recovery. In a nice point of law and intricate procedure, the lawyer is aware that scarcely more than the thickness of the paper on which he writes lies between the case going for his client or for the opposite party. To rail at these fine technicalities argues a lay mind, unprofessional and undiscerning. Hair-splitting, so far as it is a term of real reproach, means splitting the wrong hairs. The expert in any profession knows what things to divide and distinguish finely, and what things to take in the gross. Moral Science in many respects gives its demonstrations, and can give them, only "in the way of rough drawing," as Aristotle says. ([Greek: pachulos kai tupo], Ethics, I., iii., 4.) But there are lines of division exceeding fine and nice in natural morality no less than in positive law. The student must not take scandal at the fine lines and subtle distinctions that we shall be obliged to draw in marking off lawful from unlawful action touching human life.

2. It is never lawful directly to kill an innocent man. Understand innocent in the social and political sense, of a man who has not, by any human act (Ethics, c. i., n. 2, p. 1) of his own, done any harm to society so grievous as to compare with loss of life. To kill, or work any other effect, directly, is to bring about that death, or other effect, willing the same, either as an end desirable in itself, as when a man slays his enemy, whose death of its own sheer sake is to him a satisfaction and a joy, or as a means to an end, as Richard III. murdered his nephews to open his own way to the throne. We must then in no case compass the death of the innocent, either intending it as an end, or choosing it as a means. The assertion is proved by these considerations. To kill a man is to destroy the human nature within him: for, though the soul survives, he is man no more when he is dead. Now to destroy a thing is to subordinate that thing entirely to your self and your own purposes: for that individual thing can never serve any other purpose, once it is destroyed. The man that is killed is then subordinated to the slayer, wholly given up, and as we say, sacrificed, to the aims and purposes of him who slays him. But that ought not to be, for man is a person. Body and soul in him make one person, one personal nature, which human personality is destroyed in death. Now it is the property of a person to be what we may call autocentric, referring its own operations to itself as to a centre. Every person—and every intelligent nature is a person¹⁷—exists and acts primarily for himself. A thing is marked off from a person by the aptitude of being another's and for another. We may venture to designate it by the term heterocentric. A person therefore may destroy a thing, entirely consume and use it up for his own benefit. But he may not treat a person as a thing, and destroy that, either for any end of pleasure that he finds in destroying it, or in view of any gain or good, whereunto that destruction serves him as a means.

¹⁷ The exception apparent in the Incarnation is not relevant here.

3. In the above argumentation account has not been taken of God, to whom for His sovereign dominion all created personalities stand in the light of things, and may be destroyed at His pleasure. But account has been taken of the State, to which the individual is subordinate as a citizen, but not as a man and a person. It is permitted no more to the State than to the individual ever to destroy the innocent directly.

4. An effect is brought about indirectly, when it is neither intended as an end for its own sake, nor chosen as a means making towards an end, but attaches as a circumstance concomitant either to the end intended or to the means chosen. The case of a circumstance so attaching to the means chosen is the only case that we need consider here in speaking of indirect, concomitant, or incidental effects. The study of these incidents is of vast importance to the moralist. Most cases of practical difficulty to decide between right and wrong, arise out of them. They are best illustrated in the manner of killing. That one matter, well worked out, becomes a pattern for other matters in which they occur. (Ethics, c. iii., s. ii., p. 31.)

5. A man is killed indirectly, or incidentally, when he perishes in consequence of certain means employed towards a certain end, without his death being willed by the employer of those means, or in any way serving that agent to the furtherance of the end that he has in view. If a visitor to a quarry were standing on a piece of rock, which a quarryman had occasion to blast, and the man fired the train regardless of the visitor, the latter would be incidentally killed. Now incidental killing, even of the innocent, is not under all circumstances unlawful. Where the end in view is in the highest degree important, the means may be taken thereto, provided always that such an issue as the shedding of innocent blood be not itself the means discerned and elected as furthering the end: for no end however urgent can justify the employment of any evil means. (Ethics, c. iii., s. ii., nn. 3, 13, pp. 32, 36.) Suppose in the instance just given the quarryman saw that, unless that piece of rock where the visitor stood were blown up instantly, a catastrophe would happen elsewhere, which would be the death of many men, and there were no time to warn the visitor to clear off, who could blame him if he applied the explosive? The means of averting the catastrophe would be, not that visitor's death, but the blowing up of the rock. The presence or absence of the visitor, his death or escape, is all one to the end intended: it has no bearing thereon at all.

6. We must then distinguish between means and circumstances. The means help to the end, the circumstances of the means do not. When the end is of extreme urgency, circumstances may be disregarded: the means become morally divested of them. So I have seen an island in a river, a nucleus of rock with an environment of alluvial soil. While the stream was flowing placidly in its usual course, the island remained intact, both rock and earth. But when the water came rushing in a flood, which was as though the island itself had gone speeding up the river, the loose matter at its sides was carried away, and only the central rock remained. The ordinary flow of the river past the island, or the gentle motion of the island up-stream, keeping all its bulk, represents a man acting for an end to which reason attaches no great importance. He must then take a diligent review of all the circumstances that have any close connection with his action, to see if there is any that it would be wrong for him to will directly. And if there is, he must abstain from willing it even indirectly: that is, he must abstain from doing the action, which cannot be done without that objectionable circumstance attending it. On the other hand, the floating island being towed rapidly up-stream, with its loose sides falling away, portrays the condition of one acting for a purpose of imperative urgency: he considers the means to that end, and if they are good, he concentrates his will upon them and uses them, disregarding, or even deploring, but nowise willing or being responsible for, the evil concomitants which go with those means, but do not make for his end. Thus it is, that a circumstance which in ordinary cases goes to make the adoption of certain means reasonable or unreasonable, comes, in a case of great urgency, to weigh for nothing in the balance of reason, owing to the extreme and crying reasonableness of the end in view. Nor is this the end justifying the means, for that unhappy circumstance is never a means to the end. (Ethics, c. iii., s. ii., n. 8, p. 34.)

7. To illustrate by a diagram:

[Illustration:

C
( )
U
|
|
A—————————————————-E( )V
]

A, the agent, a bead on a wire, can move only on the line AE, that alone being the line of means to the end.

EV, reasonableness of end in view, attracting A.

UC, the amount of moral evil which the untoward circumstance would involve, if it were willed directly. This UC repels A, tending to jam it on the line AE, which is absolutely rigid.

AE, remoteness, difficulty, and uncertainty of the end in view.

AU, remoteness of untoward circumstance from means chosen, which A is just in the act of taking. Then, for lawful action, the reasonableness required in the end in view is represented by the variation—

[Illustration:
UC . AE
EV varies ———-
AU
]

We observe that when AU is zero, while UC . AE remains a finite quantity (representing an appreciable evil), then EV becomes infinite: that is to say, when the distance, difference, or distinction between the evil circumstance and the means comes down to nothing at all, and the evil thing actually is the very means taken, then an infinite urgency of end in view would be requisite to justify the using of that means: in other words, no end possible to man can ever justify an evil means.

Readings.—St. Thos., 2a 2æ, q.64, art. 6; Cardinal de Lugo, De Justitia et Jure, disp. 10, n. 125.

1. On the question, whether it is lawful for one man to kill another in self-defence, St. Thomas writes (2a 2æ, q. 64, art. 7):

"There is nothing to hinder one act having two effects, of which one only is within the intention [and election] of the doer, while the other is beside his intention [and election, that is, is neither intended as an end nor elected as a means]…. From the act therefore of one defending himself a twofold effect may follow, one the preservation of his own life, the other the killing of the aggressor. Now such an act, in so far as the preservation of the doer's own life is intended, has no taint of evil about it, seeing that it is natural to everything to preserve itself in being as much as it can. Nevertheless, an act coming of a good intention may be rendered unlawful, if it be not in proportion to the end in view. And therefore, if any one uses greater violence than is necessary for the defence of his life, it will be unlawful. But if he repels the violence in a moderate way, it will be a lawful defence: for according to the Civil and Canon Laws it is allowable to repel force by force with the moderation of a blameless defence. Nor is it necessary to salvation for a man to omit the act of moderate defence in order to avoid the killing of another; because man is more bound to take thought for his own life than for the life of his neighbour. But because to kill a man is not allowable except by act of public authority for the common good, it is unlawful for a man to intend [that is, elect and choose as a means] to kill another man in order to defend himself, unless he be one who has public authority, who intending [electing] to kill a man in order to his own defence, refers this to the public good."

2. The right then of self-defence even to the shedding of blood involves a mere exercise of indirect killing for a proportionably grave cause. The cause in question is the defence of your own life, or your friend's, or of some other good or possession that can weigh with life, as the honour and inviolability of your person, or a large sum of money. This must be in present danger of being taken away otherwise than in due course of justice. The danger must be present, and even imminent, not prospective. The right of self-defence even to the grievous harming of the aggressor, endures only while the danger from him is imminent, not when it is past, or the evil is already done. The right supposes no moral obliquity, no formal injustice on the part of the aggressor: he may be a madman making for you with a drawn sword. Nay further, not even material injustice—that is, the quality of an act which would be formally unjust, if only the agent knew what he was about—is required. All that is requisite is that your life, or something equivalent to life, be threatened, not in due course of law.

3. The essential idea of self-defence is that of stopping a trespasser, one who, however innocently, is going about to trench on that good which you have a right to maintain and reserve to yourself. It is then no act of authority that you perform, but the dealing of one private person with another. Indeed, the party stopped is hardly regarded as a person: no account is taken of his demerits: he is regarded simply as an abridger and diminisher of what you have a right to preserve intact. You stop a man as you stop a horse, only with more regard to the moderation of a blameless self-defence, not using more violence than is necessary here and now to preserve what you have to preserve.

4. The stopping, unfortunately, has often to be done in a hurry: there is no time to wait: for the next moment, unless you act promptly, it will be all too late, or all to no purpose, to act at all. Being done in a hurry, it has to be done in a rough-and-ready way, with such instruments as are to hand: you cannot afford to be nice about the means, carefully purifying them, and shaking off the dust of objectionable circumstances. Now to stop a man in mid career all on a sudden, to render him powerless where he was about to strike, motionless in the direction whither he was about to go, and that in an instant, is of common necessity a rude treatment, very dangerous to him who experiences it, and under some conceivable circumstances hopelessly fatal. Still the fatality—in plain words, the death of the aggressor—is not directly willed. It is neither intended as an end, nor chosen as a means to an end. It is not welcomed as an end and desirable consummation: on the contrary, it is put up with most reluctantly as coming from your act: for you, a private individual, have no right to will and effect the death of any man, however guilty, as will be proved hereafter. It is not chosen as a means: for, formally as his death, it is no means to your end, which was the averting of all present danger to your right. For that it was enough to stop the trespasser; and you chose the means as a stopping means, not as a killing means. True, in stopping him you killed him, but you did not kill him to stop him. You struck him to stop him: that your blow was a mortal blow, was a circumstance which you did not choose and could not help. All killing then in self-defence is indirect.

5. By this explanation, resting on St. Thomas—in opposition to Cardinal de Lugo (De Just. et Jure. 10, 149) and others, who allow killing in self-defence to be the actual means chosen, and therefore directly willed—we save four grand positions in Moral Science:

(a) The axiom, that it is never lawful directly to take the life of an innocent man. For the person who perishes by occasion of your defending yourself, may be innocent formally, and even materially also.

(b) Likewise the axiom, that it is never lawful for a private individual to kill any one whatever. We say, from a technical standpoint, that he does not kill but arrests the onset of the aggressor.

(c) We are in hearty accord with the positive law of all civilized countries, which views with extreme suspicion all deaths said to be done in self-defence, the law being jealous of the blood of its citizens, and reserving the shedding thereof to itself. We teach that only by process of law can a man ever be directly slain, his death made a means of, and the person, who strikes him, really willing and seeking, exactly speaking, to kill him.

(d) The initial error is revealed of a theory that we shall have to combat at length hereafter, the theory of Hobbes and Locke, that the power of the State is the mere agglomeration of the powers of the individuals who compose it. It appears by our explanation that the individual has no power strictly to take life in any case, or ever to kill directly, as the State does when it executes a criminal.

As a fifth point gained, we may mention the efficacious argument afforded, as will presently be shown, against the acceptance of a duel under any conceivable circumstances, a thesis otherwise not easy to establish by reason.

6. In view of the question of the origin of civil government, we must carefully collect the differences between self-defence and punishment. Death occasioned in self-defence is indirect: death inflicted as punishment is direct. Punishment is an act of authority, of distributive justice, which lies from ruler to subject (Ethics, c. v., s. ix., n. 4, p. 104): self-defence is of equal against equal. Punishment is medicinal to him who suffers it, or deterrent on behalf of the community, or retributive in the way of vengeance. (Ethics, c. ix., s. iii., n. 4.) Self-defence is not on behalf of the community, still less for the good of the aggressor, but for the good of him who practises it and for the preservation of his right: neither is it retributive and retrospective, as vengeance is, but simply prospective and preventive of a harm immediately imminent. Finally, the right to punish abides day and night: but the right of self-defence holds only while instant aggression is threatened.

7. These two diverse ideas of self-defence and vengeance were confounded by the Greeks under the one verb [Greek: amunesthai]. They are confounded by Mill, On Utility, in the fifth chapter where he speaks (p. 77) of the "instinct of self-defence," which nine lines below he converts into "the natural feeling of retaliation or vengeance." It is a common but a grave mistake, and the parent of much bad philosophy.

Reading.—St. Thos., 2a 2æ, q. 64, art. 7.

53. When I perform a free act — one which I am able to do or not to do, as I choose — the act is evidently imputable to me: if the thing is blameworthy, the blame belongs to me; if it is praiseworthy, I am entitled to the praise. Every human act, therefore, since it is a free act (No. 2), is imputable to him who performs it.

Proof 1. The Infinitely wise Creator cannot fail to employ the proper means to direct all things to their appointed ends; hence, He directs by necessary tendencies beings that are not endowed with free will. Over these tendencies such beings have no control: thus He directs matter by physical laws; brute animals by instincts. Free beings He must also direct in the manner proper to their nature, i. e., requiring them to attain their appointed end by the free choice of the means peculiarly adapted to this object. Now, to require this of us, is to impose the law of morality upon us, since we tend towards our appointed end by doing what is right, and we fail to tend towards our end by doing what is wrong. Moreover, if the imposition of this law is to be effectual, as in His Infinite wisdom He is bound to make it, God must hold us accountable for our moral conduct. (See Ment. Phil., Nos. 222, 225.)

Proof 2. It is shown in Critical Logic (Nos. 156-164), that the judgments made by the common sense of mankind are true. Now, one of these judgments is that we are responsible for our moral acts to a Supreme Ruler, for this is found in the minds of all men who have the full use of reason; nor can a man rid himself of this conviction, though he may eagerly desire to do so. Therefore, all men are accountable for their moral conduct, i. e., for their observance of the moral law, to God, who is the Supreme Ruler, as He is the Creator of all things.