§ 1. On the Voluntary

271. DEFINITION. The voluntary can be defined thus: an act proceeding from an intrinsic principle, or from the will, with knowledge of the end (V, n. VII).

An act of the will necessarily presupposes knowledge of the end in the agent; for nothing can be an object of the will unless it was first apprehended by help of the intellect; and the more perfect or nobler the knowledge of the intellect has been, the more perfect the will will be. Hence the axioms: Nothing willed, unless foreknown; Nothing in the will, unless it was first in the intellect. But end here is taken in a broad sense, for the term of the will in the concrete, namely for the object with all its circumstances. Therefore, to constitute the notion of the voluntary, two things are required: 1. some knowledge of the end, on the part of the intellect; 2. consent, on the part of the will (St. Thom., 1.2, q. 6, a. 1).

From this definition it is clear that the voluntary differs from the spontaneous, from the willed, and from the free.

1. The SPONTANEOUS, in the broad sense, says absence of any external influence whatever, and is: that which happens with no precept, fear, deceit, etc., compelling. In the strict sense, it says only absence of coercion, and is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle; whether with full and formal knowledge of the end, as every voluntary act; or with imperfect and material knowledge, as, for example, an indeliberate motion by which someone strives to repel pain, and thus it differs from the voluntary. From this it is clear that the spontaneous extends more broadly than the voluntary; for every voluntary is spontaneous, but not vice versa (Porpora, tr. II, n. 9).

2. The WILLED is said of the object toward which the will tends, yet without necessarily proceeding from the influence of the will itself. The willed is compared to the will as object to faculty; the voluntary as effect to its cause. Thus, for example, rain poured out upon dry earth, as regards the farmer, will be called willed, but not voluntary (Konings, Theol. mor., n. 4).

3. The free consists in this, that the will proceeds to acting with no necessity compelling. The merely voluntary abstracts from whether the act is placed with indifference or with determination to one. The free is a species of the voluntary.

272. DIVISION. The voluntary is divided in many ways by theologians:

1. By reason of the mode by which it proceeds, it is free or necessary. Free is that which is done by a will which operates with indifference toward willing and not willing; such is the love of man as wayfarer toward God. Necessary is that which proceeds from a will determined to one, as is the love of the Blessed in the homeland. "The notion of the voluntary is found more perfectly in necessary human acts than in free ones. The reason is, because the greater the love is, the greater is the voluntary, that is, the greater is the inclination of the will and the greater the knowledge of the intellect. Such is the necessary love of God toward Himself, or the love of the Blessed, by which they are borne with their whole effort into God" (V, n. IX).

In the schools, THE VOLUNTARY is regularly taken for the free voluntary, since all acts by which man as wayfarer tends to his end proceed in reality from free will.

2. By reason of perfection, it is perfect or imperfect. Perfect voluntary is said of that which is done from full knowledge of the thing and from full consent of the will, as if someone, perfectly knowing and willing, eats meat on a forbidden day. Imperfect voluntary, which is also called semi-voluntary, is that which is done with imperfect knowledge or advertence; as happens in those half-asleep, or distracted to other things (St. Thom., 1.2, q. 6, a. 6).

From the fact that someone performs such a work only with difficulty, do not conclude by the fact itself that imperfect voluntary is present, as is clear from the example of apostates whom the Church has always condemned. The whole reason of perfect or imperfect voluntary must be taken from the degree of advertence (Lehmkuhl, I, n. 85).

3. By reason of the whole complex, it is voluntary simply, or in a certain respect. Voluntary simply is said of that which, all things having been weighed, proceeds from the will, although the object, under some respect, is displeasing.

Voluntary in a certain respect is said of that to which, when only certain circumstances are attended to, the will bears itself, but which finally, all things considered, it repudiates. It is called, as is clear, voluntary improperly; for it is nothing other than a simple velleity. The known example of this thing is that of the merchant throwing goods into the sea from fear of shipwreck: their throwing is voluntary simply; but preservation is voluntary in a certain respect.

Others explain the matter otherwise: Voluntary simply, or pure, is said of that which proceeds from the full inclination of the will toward the object, without any repugnance; voluntary in a certain respect, or mixed, that which indeed proceeds from the consent of the will, but with repugnance (cf. V, n. IX and XIII).

4. By reason of correlative knowledge, it is explicit or implicit.

Explicit is said of that which happens from formal and distinct knowledge of the thing willed; for example, if the minister of the Church says: I will to confect this sacrament.

Implicit is said of that which happens from more general and confused knowledge; for example, if one about to confect a sacrament says: I will to perform this rite which the Church holds as sacred (VI, 22).

5. By reason of manifestation, it is express or tacit. Express is that which is manifested externally, by words or signs: for example, if a Bishop, asked that he concede jurisdiction for hearing confessions, responds: I concede, or nods by an inclination of the head. Tacit is that which is not declared externally, but is sufficiently and prudently gathered from some fact, or omission of a fact, when the circumstances have been considered. Thus a Bishop grants jurisdiction by fact, if he asks someone to receive confessions. Thus likewise the sins of subjects are voluntary and imputable to a Superior if he omits to oppose himself to them, when otherwise he can and ought to do this.

Hence the rule of right: "He who is silent seems to consent" (Reg. 43 in 6.). This rule holds in two cases, namely: a) when something favorable is proposed to one silent; b) when he who is silent is held to speak and can. Otherwise another rule holds: "He who is silent does not confess, but neither indeed does he seem to deny" (Reg. 44, ibid.).

6. By reason of its very actuation, it is actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative. a) Actual voluntary is that which here and now is elicited or commanded by the will with continuous attention of the mind. But this can happen either by an act signified, when by clear words or another sign the voluntary is, as it were, signed, for example, if the agent says: I will to do this; or by an act exercised, when without such a sign it is exhibited from the work itself; thus one genuflecting attentively performs an act of adoration. b) Virtual voluntary is that which is done by force or virtue of an act of the will not yet revoked, and continuing to influence morally. It was placed at the beginning of the work, but afterwards is absent. c) Habitual voluntary is that which indeed once was willed by actual volition for the future, and afterwards was never revoked, but now flows into the act neither directly nor indirectly, because the attention of the mind is altogether lacking. The habitual acts more by force of habit than by force of will. d) Interpretative voluntary, like the habitual, excludes a motion of the will here and now toward the end, but superadds the absence of a tendency toward the object even in the past. For it is that voluntary which indeed was never expressly willed, but would have been willed or is presumed it would be willed, if it were thought of, or could be thought of.¹

You have an EXAMPLE of actual voluntary in him who here and now, by mind alone, or by mind and mouth, says: I will to consecrate; of virtual in the same, if by force of this will he begins Mass and pronounces the words of consecration, but distracted in mind; of habitual in him who yesterday willed that the fruit of the Mass which he is about to celebrate today benefit Titius deceased, but today celebrates unmindful of yesterday's will; of interpretative, in the consent of a dying man, destitute of senses, who is judged to seek the sacraments.

Two things must be noted here: 1. In succession, implicit virtual, which proceeds from an implicit act, is confused by authors with interpretative. Therefore from the context one must judge in which sense it must be understood, whether truly for virtual implicit, or for strict interpretative. 2. Interpretative voluntary differs from tacit in that in the former no consent is present, but in the latter true consent is present. Yet each is accustomed to be called presumed voluntary; tacit is presumed concerning the present; interpretative is presumed conditionally, or concerning the future.

7. By reason of intention, it is direct or indirect. Direct voluntary is said of that which is willed in itself and immediately, as when someone steals something because he has the will of stealing; indirect, that which is willed not in itself, but in another, with which it is known, at least confusedly, to be connected; whether as an effect proceeding from some cause, for example, drunkenness from excessive drink; or as something connected with the cause, for example, sacrilege in the theft of a consecrated chalice (cf. n. 274). Now indeed:

An act of the will can have either a single or a multiple EFFECT. If the effect is single, it must be called directly voluntary, because the act was ordered to it. If it is multiple, sometimes any of them is directly voluntary, namely if the will tends directly toward each one, and seeks them in themselves; sometimes one is directly voluntary, the others only indirectly. Moreover, the directly voluntary is intended in itself, and has the nature of moving the will. The indirectly voluntary is not intended in itself, nor does it move the will, which reaches it only by reason of its connection with the directly voluntary act. Nevertheless it is a true object of the will, although indirect; for the will wills such an action as cause. But he who wills the cause also wills the effect which will follow from it, if he foresees this effect. Hence the saying: He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the caused.

Note. To the INDIRECT voluntary is referred that most intricate question: When is an evil effect, not intended in itself indeed, but proceeding from a voluntary cause, imputable unto fault to the one placing the cause? But this matter will be treated more fittingly in the article on the extension of morality (cf. n. 314 and 315). For the things which we are about to say concerning the sources of morality will contribute very much to the solution of this question. See n. 296 ff.

273. To the voluntary is opposed THE INVOLUNTARY, which happens either from an extrinsic principle against the propensity of the will, as happens to one acting from force or fear; or without knowledge of the intellect, which either is taken away or at least bound, as happens to one operating from ignorance or passion (V, n. XII).

Just as the voluntary, so also the involuntary is MULTIPLE. One is called involuntary privatively, or non-voluntary, when there is only lacking in someone the act of willing that which he could will. Another is called involuntary positively, or contrarily, when namely something not only is not willed, but also is positively not-willed and repugnant to the will.

Again, positive involuntary is TWOFOLD: one simply, which, when all the adjuncts are considered at once, so displeases the will that in no way, and for no reason, does it will it; another in a certain respect, which, although under some respect it displeases the will, nevertheless under another reason is more pleasing to it and is accepted (V, n. XIII).

Hence arises the mixed from voluntary and involuntary. For something is voluntary simply and involuntary in a certain respect, when someone definitively consents, although with some repugnance; and conversely, it is involuntary simply and voluntary in a certain respect, when someone denies consent, although the thing in some way pleases him. You have an example of the first in him who, from fear of shipwreck, throws goods into the sea; an example of the second in him who refuses great gain because he knows it to be unjust.

274. From these things you will gather: 1. In order that some action be called wholly voluntary, it is necessary that it be known according to all its parts and circumstances; if some one of these is unknown, the action is not called voluntary as regards that unknown circumstance. Thus he who approaches a woman whom he does not know to be married does not commit the sin of adultery, but of simple fornication, since he has himself involuntarily as regards the circumstance of matrimony which he does not know (V, n. VIII).

2. Where there is no advertence, there is no voluntary, and therefore no sin, as happens in the actions of those sleeping, which are simply involuntary. But where there is half-full advertence, there is the semi-voluntary, and only venial sin, as happens in those half-sleeping (cf. n. 336).