§ 4. On Concupiscence

St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 22-48; St. Alphonsus, V, n. XXIII; ed. G., II, p. 694; Frins, I, n. 295; Surbled, La Morale dans ses rapports avec la Medecine, III, p. 16; Descuret, La Medecine des Passions.

290. DEFINITION. Concupiscence, in the stricter sense, sounds the same as the tinder of sin, and is defined: A motion of the sensitive appetite rebelling against the spirit and tending toward the delectable good. But in the broader signification, insofar as it is considered here, it sounds the same as passion, and is defined: A motion of the sensitive appetite toward the delectable good, arisen from the imagination of good or evil, with some bodily transmutation (H. Ap., III, 15).

Passion of itself is indifferent: and it becomes good or evil according to the nature of the object which is sought according to or beyond the order of reason. But since passions conduce much to increasing the powers of the will, it will be worthwhile to use them rightly, to coerce their disordered impulses, and to order them to a good end.

DIVISION. Antecedent and consequent passion are distinguished.

1. Antecedent passion is said to be that which anticipates the consent of the will, and rises up from the apprehension alone of the object; as if someone, from the fortuitous sight of a base thing, is enticed to carnal delight; or on account of an injury received is moved to revenge. Of the motions of the passions, some are first-first: these arise in us without us, that is, without any consent of the will; others are called second-first, namely those which are produced with half-full advertence and half-full consent; lastly, others are second motions, or fully deliberate; these are excited with full advertence and with perfect consent.

2. Consequent passion is said to be that which arises from a previous act of the will; either by redundancy, because a vehement motion of the will overflows into the inferior appetite and moves passion, as is accustomed to happen in those who have the habit of some sin, for example, lust; or by direct excitation, because the will industriously moves the inferior appetite, by stopping, for example, the object before the eyes or the imagination, as if someone turns over in mind an injury received in order to provoke anger (V, n. XXIII, XXV).

Passions are generally numbered as eleven, of which six are in the concupiscible appetite: love and hatred, desire and flight, delight and sadness; but five in the irascible: hope and desperation, fear and daring, anger. Concerning these the Scholastics treat at length, and indeed usefully, because such treatment serves much both to the acquisition of virtues and to the governance of souls. See Schram, Inst. Theol. Myst., § 90.

291. PRINCIPLES. I. Concupiscence or antecedent passion, although it increases the inclination of the will, nevertheless lessens the free voluntary; indeed, if it is most vehement, it can entirely take it away. Thus commonly with St. Thomas (1.2, q. 6, a. 7, ad 3, and q. 10, a. 3).¹

It is said: 1. It increases the inclination of the will; for the more passion burns, the more vehemently the will breaks out into act.

2. It lessens the free voluntary, and therefore imputability. For it weakens the notion of the voluntary insofar as it obscures the mind and turns it away from consideration of the end, by impeding the intellect, enticed by the sensible object, from weighing the baseness of the act and the offense of God.

3. It can entirely take it away; which happens when passion is so vehement that it anticipates every judgment of reason and consent of the will; as is clear by the example of those who, on account of love or anger, become insane. Yet this happens comparatively rarely, especially as regards external acts; for regularly, as St. Thomas observes (1.2, q. 17, a. 9), members are not applied to work except through the consent of reason (V, n. XXIV, XXV). St. Alph., V, 3, says: "The intellect can be so seized by the delectability of the object offered that it adverts nothing of moral malice in it." Concerning this Berardi (I, n. 408) writes: Let Confessors note these things well, lest they cast some miserable souls into desperation.

Hence it is gathered: 1. First-first motions of concupiscence are not sins, but an occasion either of sins or of virtues. Second-first motions, in every illicit matter, are venial sins. Finally, second or deliberate motions, in a gravely illicit matter, are mortal sins, although their gravity, on account of the vehemence of passion, is somewhat lessened (cf. n. 322). See St. Alph., Op. dogm. (ed. Walter, II, p. 413).

2. Good passion, if it precedes the judgment of reason, so that man is moved more by passion than by reason to acting well, diminishes the goodness and praise of the act. You have an example in a father of a family who chastises his children more from anger than from the judgment of reason; in a merciful man who relieves the poor rather from compassion than from the impulse of reason and faith (St. Thom., de Malo, q. 3, a. 11).

II. Concupiscence or consequent passion sometimes increases the voluntary, sometimes is a sign of its magnitude. 1. It increases the voluntary if it proceeds from direct excitation; for then the motion of the will is more vehement, and the obscuration of reason, as being voluntary, does not take away in the effect the notion of the voluntary. 2. It is a sign of its magnitude if it arises from the redundancy of the aroused will into the inferior part: then it is compared to the will as effect to cause; but an effect demonstrates the cause. St. Thomas aptly to the matter (de Malo, as above): "and thus consequent passion adds to merit or demerit, because passion is a sign that the motion of the will is stronger; and in this way it is true that he who gives alms with greater compassion merits more, and he who commits sin with greater lust sins more." Cf. 1.2, q. 77, a. 6.

Note. As regards the question: Whether we are held to resist the motions of passion, see what will be said below, n. 322.

292. It is helpful here to add a few things concerning habit, which influences the voluntary in almost the same way as concupiscence.

DEFINITION. Habit is a firm disposition for acting, caused for the most part from repeated acts. It is said for the most part; for sometimes it happens that habit is generated even from one act, namely if the active thing, as St. Thomas speaks (1.2, q. 51, a. 3), was of great power, as when strong medicine immediately induces health. Cf. St. Thom., 1.2, q. 49-54; Suarez, Disp. metaph., disp. XLIV; Ami du Clerge, 1899, p. 529-593.

DIVISION. Since habit always supposes an act of the will, it cannot be divided into antecedent and consequent.

Habit is therefore either admitted by the will, or attacked by the will. It is admitted by the will if it is caused with advertence, that is, with foresight of its generation from the repetition of acts, or also if, although caused without advertence, it afterwards is no longer efficaciously extirpated. But it is attacked by the will if apt means are applied for putting away the habit.

PRINCIPLES. I. A habit admitted by the will sometimes increases, sometimes lessens, but never takes away the voluntary.

1. It increases the voluntary insofar as it gives greater alacrity to the will, without the attention of the mind being lessened in the agent. 2. It lessens the voluntary insofar as man, the slave of custom, is so drawn by it that tranquil consideration of mind is prevented or impeded. 3. It never takes away the voluntary, since man, from the fact that he does not will to cast off the habit, by that very fact has willed in the cause the effects flowing from the cause. See St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 49 ff.

II. A habit attacked by the will always lessens the voluntary, sometimes also takes it away.

1. It lessens the voluntary insofar as the powers of the will and the deliberation of reason are more or less impeded by the habit. 2. It takes away the voluntary in the case in which the habit so vehemently dominates the executive powers that it anticipates the judgment of reason, as is clear among those who are agitated by bile.

Therefore let the human will be constant in repressing habits; for custom is conquered by custom. Yet let it not neglect to apply the physical means prescribed by physicians, by which the powers of nature can increase.

II. On the impediments which remotely influence the voluntary.

293. Among men there are numbered some who not only have obtained a good soul (Wis. 8:19), but also, with God so ordering, obtain a bodily constitution more apt for the exercise of virtue (St. Thom., 1.2, q. 51, a. 1). But others are given who from the cradle are inclined to evil, are infected with the poison of depraved propensities, and direct heart and will upward with the greatest difficulty.

Among all these we can consider three things which most greatly influence the will: heredity, temperament, certain pathological states.

I. On heredity. No one can deny that certain qualities of body and propensities of soul are transmitted, as are: kleptomania, impulse to suicide, etc.; which nevertheless do not pass from parents to children in the same mode, nor according to a constant rule. Although the laws of transmission are explained most difficultly, as being since the whole matter furnishes almost nothing for investigation, nevertheless there is no doubt concerning the fact of transmission.

Heredity without doubt has influence upon liberty, because in reality, as is clear among the children of drunkards, a body more or less apt for operating is transmitted. Sometimes also natural propensities can overturn the judgment of the intellect, so that liberty ceases. But in no way is it lawful to affirm with Determinists that free choice is taken away by the law of heredity, because, with the case excluded in which the will is suddenly drawn under the influence of natural propensity, the mind can remain conscious of its imputability. Considered historically, our affirmation obtains great weight from the fact that it is discovered that children shining with great virtue have had origin from parents given to vice, while, conversely, God-fearing parents have begotten children given to every nefarious crime. And thus it is clear how empty is the argument taken from moral statistics (cf. Lehmk., I, 63), and at the same time how grave a wound they inflict upon society, whoever before judges excuse any guilty persons whatever, as if from the law of heredity they were not conscious of their crimes.²

II. On temperament. The complex of diverse propensities of body and soul, by which a special disposition is conferred on such a man, is called temperament. If those propensities become firm by efforts of the will, character is had.

Whatever may be the case concerning the diversity of opinions between the ancients and moderns, whether namely four or only two foundations of distinction among temperaments are present, it is certain that in all something dominates, which impresses a special mark on operation.

Temperament in no way takes away, but only lessens THE VOLUNTARY. The reason is, because from constitution there indeed arises an influence upon the will (St. Thom., Contra Gent., l. II, c. 63), but not such that the rational part as if necessarily follows the inferior propensities. Indeed, the rational part, through repeated acts, can so change natural inclinations that someone becomes as it were a new man, as is clear by the example of certain Saints who, choleric by nature, with grace favoring and the will striving, shone forth as a form of meekness.³

III. On pathological states. Especially in our times there are given various diseases by which either the will or the center of the nerves is affected; the will indeed, insofar as because of dullness of mind it appears as if impotent to will anything efficaciously; but the center of the nerves, insofar as the nerves are so exhausted or weakened that the agent, although remaining master of himself, labors under great inconstancy or is shaken and depressed by great passions.

1. WEAKNESS OF WILL is called aboulia. This so affects men otherwise robust that liberty is always lessened, sometimes also, but most rarely, taken away. It is necessary that friends furnish help to the miserable, so that they may again learn efficaciously to will or not to will.⁴

2. WEAKNESS OF THE NERVES brings with itself neurasthenia, if the disorder is sufficiently grave, or hysteria, if the disorder is graver. Sometimes also not constantly, but with some delay interposed, this disorder breaks into a man, and epileptic disease is had. But who can measure, who would dare to measure, the influence of the disease upon the free exercise of the will among those who are situated in this miserable condition? The voluntary is always indeed lessened, and sometimes altogether taken away. Let the sick flee to God, let them hope against hope, let them commit themselves plainly to be ruled by a prudent physician and by a long-suffering and patient confessor. But let the Confessor himself, although it is his part to judge all things rightly, know that in many things he ought to suspend judgment and commit the whole matter to the judgment of God.⁵

Note. A very useful question pertaining to this matter regards the hypnotic state, into which many cast themselves either for the sake of experiment or of recovering health. It is evident that liberty of the will is much affected through suggestions to be fulfilled afterwards, but from this do not conclude that the agent lacks all responsibility. Cf. what Tanquerey teaches, II, p. 76. Read what will be said below, n. 570, concerning hypnotism.