Section — Marc, Institutiones Morales
§ 1. On Violence
Cf. St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 6, a. 4-5; St. Alphonsus, V, n. XV; ed. G., II, p. 692; Salmant., de Vol., disp. V; Frins, de act. hum., n. 247-280.
- DEFINITION. Violence is a motion proceeding from an extrinsic principle, while he who suffers the force resists (V, n. XV).
Violence cannot be inflicted on the will with respect to elicited acts; but it is inflicted with respect to commanded acts. God indeed, and He alone, can change the will; but He cannot coerce it. But extrinsic force can be inflicted not only on the body, but also on the inferior faculties of the soul. Cf. n. 559.
In order that force, coercion, be present, it is not necessarily required that the influence be caused by one compelling from without. The notion of violence first of all demands that something be done in us while the will resists; and therefore first-first acts, by analogy, are reduced to the impediment of violence. Any cause whatever, whether it is in man or is found from outside, can violently influence the acts of man.
DIVISION. Violence is either absolute, when he to whom it is inflicted resists in every way in which he can; or in a certain respect, when he does not resist according to his powers.
- PRINCIPLES. I. Absolute violence takes away the voluntary. The reason is, because when the will of the one suffering resists the extrinsic agent according to its powers, the action of the agent is in no way willed by the one suffering; for it is against
every inclination of the will, and therefore simply involuntary; whence, those things which are done by force merit nothing of good or evil. Hence it is deduced that a woman who in every way resists the violence which is inflicted upon her against chastity does not sin, even if she suffers rape unwillingly (V, n. XVII; compare St. Thom., 1.2, q. 6, a. 5, ad 2).
- II. Violence in a certain respect does not take away, but lessens the voluntary.1 The reason is, because where the will does not resist as much as it can, there remains in part the notion of the voluntary; hence, according to the greater or lesser resistance of the will, the action will be more or less imputable. Whence girls are by no means excused from sin who, when lustful youths act more freely with them, do not oppose resistance in every way (V, n. XVIII).
(1) The words lessens the voluntary signify that grave or light sin is present, or in the same genus a sin less imputable, according as these impediments influence more or less the advertence of the intellect or the free exercise of the will. Cf. n. 289.
- IT IS ASKED. What resistance must be applied so that an act proceeding from violence not be imputable?
Resp. Since resistance is the reluctance of the will so that an act may not be imputable, it is clear, as regards commanded acts, that all that resistance must be applied which seems useful for impeding the act or its effects. "But to the impossible, or to the useless, no one is held." Thus martyrs, conducted by force to the temples of idols, did not sin, although they themselves walked. Nevertheless sometimes, or per accidens, even ineffective resistance must be applied for the sake of protestation; namely where tacit protestation, or protestation expressed by words alone, would not suffice for averting injury to religion, or for removing the danger of scandal. Similarly, a peculiar obligation of resisting urges in more dangerous matter, for example, when it is opposed to chastity; because defect of resistance induces danger of consent (cf. n. 374, 778). But if resistance is not only useless, but also consent will certainly not be present, then of yourself you are not held to resist, unless further attempts are feared.