Chapter I: On the Imputability of Human Acts

St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 6-21; St. Alphonsus, V, 1-5; ed. G., II, p. 685 ff.; Suarez, in 1.2, tr. 2; Billuart, de act. hum. Diss. 4; Frins, de act. hum. I and II; Bouquillon, Theol. mor. fund., ed. 3, n. 318 ff.

IMPUTATION is a judgment by which an act is attributed to someone as to its true author and master; so that the agent is held to render an account concerning the act itself and its natural effect, for example, concerning damage inflicted on someone. Imputability is the very quality of the action, by force of which such a judgment is made (Muller, Theol. mor., I, § 90).

Imputability is founded on the dominion which belongs to man over his own acts: therefore those acts are imputable which it is within the power of man to place or not place; and hence all and only human acts must be called imputable, both those which each one places personally and those in whose placing he actively cooperates, as we shall say below (n. 517). Moreover, dominion over human acts is had from this, that they proceed from free will; wherefore, as principles of imputability, THE VOLUNTARY and THE FREE are rightly assigned. Each of these can be more or less perfect, and can be lessened or even taken away by various impediments: in which case, imputability is lessened in the same degree, or even taken away.

Therefore we must discuss: 1. concerning the principles of imputability; 2. concerning the impediments of the same.