IV. On the Obligation of Law

What is the obligation of law? - By obligation of law is understood a certain moral necessity, arising from the law itself, of acting thus or otherwise, so that someone may act honorably, that is, without any fault and without incurring penalty. Arising from the law itself: for this is the nature of law and precept, and in this it intrinsically differs from counsel. Hence S. Th. 1. 2. q. 96. a. 4, speaking especially of human law, says: "It must be said that laws laid down humanly... if indeed they are just, have the force of obliging in the forum of conscience from eternal law, from which they are derived, according to that saying of Prov. 8:15: By me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things." 1 Pet. 2:13. 14; Rom. 13:1 seq.; Wirceburg. c. 4. a. 5. But it is not necessary that the legislator making the law and promulgating the law explicitly intend and explicitly declare the obligation of the law.

Does the obligation of law always urge, and under grave fault? - R. To the 1st: The obligation of an affirmative precept is always, but not for always; but that of a negative precept is always and for always. For an affirmative precept commands doing good; and although its force always remains, and the good commanded by the law must be done whenever the established time has arrived, nevertheless not every good must be done at every time, since it would be an unbearable burden for man always to act. But a negative precept commands declining from evil, which is to be avoided at every time, which indeed can be done. Established time: and therefore neither before nor after that can the law any longer be fulfilled. But within that time, if some impediment threatens by which afterward the law could no longer be fulfilled, it must certainly be fulfilled beforehand; for example, if on a feast day you cannot hear Mass at midday, you are bound to hear it before midday. But when the established time has elapsed, the law must still be fulfilled if the time was established only for urging the obligation, and not for ending it. L. 101; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 71. a. 5 ad 3, q. 76. a. 2 ad 5, 2. 2. q. 79. a. 3 ad 3.

R. To the 2nd: Law obliges under grave or under light fault according to the will of the legislator, if nevertheless the matter is capable. The reason is that the whole obligation depends on the will of the legislator, and proportion must be present between the obligation and its matter. Therefore the legislator can command under light fault in grave matter, but not conversely. L. 141. 143. - What matter is grave can be gathered from the very nature of the object, the end, and circumstances. - But what obligation is grave can be gathered: 1. From the very words of the law, if they have great force, as, We command in virtue of Holy Obedience, etc. 2. From the matter, if it is grave and it is not established to the contrary concerning the will of the one commanding. 3. From the gravity of the penalty. 4. From the interpretation of doctors or of custom. L. 144, l. 5. n. 56. Therefore when the thing is simply light, someone does not sin mortally, even if the superior commanded under mortal sin. L. 141 seq.; Struggl tr. 2. q. 2. n. 24, tr. 3. q. 2. n. 28. 29.

Does a law founded on presumption always oblige? - To presume is to opine; and presumption is a probable conjecture of an uncertain thing, that is, a judgment likely arisen from certain signs or indications. It is either of man or of law. The former is placed wholly in the estimation of a good man, and does not pertain here: for it is a private act. The latter is introduced by laws, and therefore without express law it is not to be admitted. For the law itself conjectures or orders one to conjecture. - Presumption of law is twofold: one of danger, the other of fact. Of danger, when the legislator, noticing from those things which frequently happen that something is not done or omitted without danger, forestalling dangers of this kind, forbids the former or commands the latter. Of fact, when, holding something as certain to have been done because it is commonly accustomed to be done so, from that supposed fact, as if it had really been done, he constitutes rights and obligations. This latter, if in law it receives contrary proof, is usually called of law; but if not, of law and by law. - On presumption of danger, for example, rests the law which forbids reading books of an unapproved edition, contracting marriages with non-Catholics; of fact, the law which holds that one was baptized who, born from Christian parents among Christians, grew up in Christian fashion, C. 3 at the end de Presb. non bapt. Of law, for example, that the man is the father whom marriage shows; of law and by law, for example, is that those who contracted marriage in a prohibited degree, denunciations having been disregarded, did not ignore the impediment. C. ult. de Cland. despons.; Trent sess. 24 de R. M. C. 5; Sanch. De Matr. l. 8. d. 25. n. 32; De Iustis l. 3. c. 16. n. 11. - C. 30 de Spons.

Thus a law which rests on presumption of danger always obliges, even if the danger ceases in the present matter. The reason is that the law does not cease as long as the end of the law has not ceased adequately. On the contrary, a law which rests on presumption of fact, if the fact does not really underlie it, does not oblige in the forum of conscience. Hence the axiom: Presumption yields to truth, whether it be only of law, or of law and by law. For although a presumption of law and a presumption of law and by law is taken for truth, it is not on that account truth itself. For this reason, notwithstanding a presumption of law and by law, a regular who, coerced by force, made profession, even after five years is not obligated by it; a debtor absolved by the sentence of a judge, even after this has passed into res judicata, remains a debtor. But as long as it does not appear manifestly that the presumption rests on a false fact, it is held as truth in each forum. - C. I. 1349 seq.; C. G. 1350 seq.; C. H. 1249 seq.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 88. a. 9; Schmalz. l. 2. t. 23. n. 1; L. 100. 150. 151; Ithur. Cas. 39. n. 25. 26, Cas. 53. n. 23; Wirceburg. c. 4. a. 5.

You will resolve: After sentence you are bound to compensate damage truly inflicted by your animal, although without your theological fault. You are not bound to compensate damage if the damage is falsely thought to exist, and you can compensate yourself. L. 100; C. I. 1154.

Does a law founded on fiction always oblige? - From presumption ...from presumption differs a fiction of law, which is the assumption of a falsehood, made by the law itself from a just cause in a possible case, bringing about an effect of law as though it were truth. Wherefore a fiction is held for the truth of the matter; and from it, just as in a true case, the law establishes rights and obligations. Therefore there can be no doubt that this law also obliges. But indeed: 1. A fiction has no place except in the cases expressed in the law. Thus the law feigns the testator and the heir to be one person, but not in all things; it feigns a sick canon to be present in choir, who indeed gains the daily distributions, but not those which belong to those alone who are present. For the law does not establish that. Likewise prescription takes place, not where the person is, but where payment of the debt is to be made, or where the thing is, according to the laws of that place. Troplong, della Prescrizione, c. 1, n. 38, 39, 40. 2. A fiction ought not to operate more in a fictive case than truth in a true case. And therefore, although the law feigns one who is still in the womb to have been born, when his advantage is at issue, nevertheless if afterward he does not come forth viable, the fiction confers nothing on him. Since fiction imitates truth, it must be concerned with a possible case. 3. It is not valid beyond what is expressed in the law. And therefore it receives a strict interpretation. For rights and obligations in the case are from the law alone. Schmalz., l. 2, t. 23, n. 3; Reiffenst., l. 1, t. 2, n. 185. And so, e.g., with respect to receiving orders, a son accidentally born somewhere, by a fiction of law, is considered to have been born in the domicile of his father; and he can receive orders from the Bishop of this place, not from the Bishop of that place in which he was truly born. A. S. S., vol. 28, p. 233.

To what does law oblige? - Every law first obliges to knowledge of itself, and afterward to observance of itself. For law cannot be observed unless it is known. Therefore, unless it commands an act in vain, it must also implicitly command knowledge of itself, and it commands this first; since, without it, observance of the law is altogether impossible. Therefore a law is violated not only by an act opposed to it, but also by voluntary ignorance of it. Hence vincible ignorance concerning some precept is a sin, and in a grave matter can be grave, if the negligence was notable. L. 148-151. - Secondly, it obliges to observance of itself, that is, to furnishing that which the law commands to be furnished; not something else, for it does not command that. But since one who is obliged to an end is also obliged to the means, observance of the law also obliges one to employ these means, as to avert the danger of transgressing it. Since Pontifical laws are promulgated in the Official Commentary, the obligation consequently is to procure the aforesaid Commentary for oneself in order to know those laws. Yet it does not oblige to means except ordinary ones; for law is established for cases that commonly occur, and not for rare ones.

Consequently law obliges that no one act in fraud of it. To act in fraud of the law is to embrace the words of the law and to strive against the will of the law; R. I. in 6. Therefore he acts against the law who does what the law prohibits, or omits what the law commands. But he acts in fraud of the law where that which the law did not wish to be done, though nevertheless it did not forbid it to be done, is done, or where that which the law wished to be done, though nevertheless it did not command it in express words, is omitted. L. 29, 30, ff. de Legib. Wherefore in order to act in fraud of the law it is necessary that the law at least implicitly command or prohibit that thing. Otherwise one uses his own right. Hence a nobleman acts in fraud of the law who, so as not to fast, occupies himself with servile works; but not at all by drinking wine, although it nourishes in some way, and so that he himself may not suffer hunger.

But as regards the observance itself of the law, it must be noted that what is minimal is reputed as nothing, e.g., if in the recitation of the office, in hearing Mass, some little thing is omitted, if a minor in contracting is slightly injured, etc.; except those things which are defined by nature, or by law, or by the will of man, since in these there is no place for moral estimation; for example, if a novice emits profession on the penultimate or last day of the sixteenth year of age, he emits no profession. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66, a. 6, ad 3.

Note: One sins against the law not only by action, namely by commission or omission, by doing or not doing those things which are prohibited or commanded by law, but also by simple desire, without execution of the thing, by simple morose delectation, or voluntary complacency, without desire, or, conversely, by voluntary sadness. Hence he also sins against the law who despises, censures, reproaches those things which are to be done or were to be done; which is the same as despising, censuring, reproaching the law which commands them; or, on the contrary, approves, praises, boasts of those things which are not to be done or were not to be done; whether he himself or another has transgressed the law. Moreover scandal can easily be present by reproach or boasting; since these easily furnish others with an incitement, or delight. Except if someone praises not the evil thing itself, but the new, clever, vigorous manner in which the thing was accomplished: for this is a certain natural good, provided nevertheless that the danger of delight in the evil thing and of scandal is absent. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 266, 273; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 186, a. 9, ad 3.

Formal contempt of law, by which someone expressly despises the law, or its author, as he is superior, refusing to be subject to his ordinance, is always, speaking in itself, mortal. For it is contempt of authority. Hence it is not grave: 1. If the thing itself commanded is despised, insofar as it is made little account of. 2. If the superior is despised, not as superior, but insofar as he is a contemptible individual person, because, for example, he is imprudent, base, idiotic, rude, unlearned. Nevertheless this would still be mortal, if such a judgment, which is thus formed about that person, were gravely rash, as is clear. 3. If the act by which the precept, or the superior, is despised is not perfect by reason of advertence and deliberation, as often happens. Hence Lessius, Sanchez, etc. say that mortal sin by reason of contempt rarely occurs. But material contempt, by which someone violates the law in order to indulge his passions, is mortal or venial according to the measure of the matter. L. 142; S. Th. l. c.

Does every law forbid one to expose oneself to an occasion of transgressing it? - A law which commands or prohibits something also implicitly commands one to avoid proximate occasions, and prohibits one from exposing oneself to proximate occasions of transgressing the law. The reason is that otherwise the law would already be altogether frustrated. For if it does not oblige to the means, neither does it oblige to the end. - Wherefore, one who seeks these occasions, or voluntarily exposes himself to them, or remains in them, with no excusing cause, sins against the law and the virtue with which the matter is concerned: against faith, chastity, piety, etc.; and besides he sins against charity toward himself by reason of the spiritual harm to himself which he voluntarily undergoes.

Now, in the present matter, an occasion is called whatever externally offers us danger of transgressing the law. Externally, because the very frailty of nature, interior passions, and intrinsic habits, although they bring danger with them, do not constitute an occasion at all. Danger extends more broadly than occasion, and is whatever can induce us to sin, whether it is from without or from within. Danger is much graver when the occasion is present or in being, than when absent or not in being, as if a woman is at home, or outside. Of transgressing the law, and thus of consenting to sin, and not of mere temptation. Moreover a proximate occasion is that in which a man placed there, for the most part, sins, whether this is verified with respect to all who are found in the same circumstances, from the nature itself of the thing, or is verified only with respect to such a person, given attention to his peculiar circumstances. But an occasion is remote if a man placed in it for the most part does not sin; and we are not bound to avoid this, since the thing would be impossible. Between proximate and remote occasion various degrees are given, as is clear. For the danger of sinning can be morally certain and probable, more or less probable. For the most part; and thus in the former there is moral certainty of sinning; in the latter no solid probability of sinning.

If the proximate occasion is simply necessary, that is, one which cannot be removed, one must make it remote, by employing suitable means: prayer, frequenting of the sacraments, custody of the senses, etc. But if it is morally necessary, i.e., one which cannot be taken away without grave detriment, it is not illicit to be engaged in it from a just and proportionate cause; provided nevertheless that consent to sin is not morally certainly foreseen. This can easily be removed by fortifying oneself with custody of the senses, prayers, pious works, and by trusting in the greater help of God. Thus the occasion becomes remote from proximate. Morally certainly; what if only probably? And if consent is probably foreseen, it is illicit; for sin must certainly be avoided, as eternal damnation must certainly be avoided. There are not lacking those who, in the case, do not acknowledge a grave obligation, because, with moral certainty of sinning removed, he does not choose sin. But this is nothing; for since the will then chooses at least probable formal sin, the will is at least equally disposed toward either, and thus evil and gravely sinful. L. 1. 5. n. 63; l. 6. n. 452-456.

Does law extend itself to past acts? R. Negatively as to guilt. For guilt and sin could not be had where there was no law. - R. Likewise negatively as to penalty. For penalty has no place where there is no sin; because it is for the vindication of sin.

R. Equally negatively as to the value of a past act. For an act which was valid cannot be made invalid for that same time, although it can be declared invalid for the future. - R. Negatively also as to the effects of that act, speaking in itself and commonly, and likewise as to the past time. The reason is that a great disturbance of society would follow from this. Speaking in itself and commonly, because in a particular case, in which this would not be harmful, but, on the contrary, very useful, the legislator can touch such effects, if they are subject to his power, as, e.g., when a dispensation is given for an invalid marriage on account of a diriment impediment, which is called a dispensation in the root. For the offspring is held legitimate and succeeds to the inheritance, just as if it had always been legitimate. And likewise as to that same past time: for there is no difficulty that the legislator, for a past act, and even for a past delict, can introduce, for the future time, a certain inability, e.g., for receiving orders, for contracting marriage, etc.; and this indeed will not be a penalty of sin, but a mere privation on account of the defect of a required condition. C. Cognoscentes 2; C. Quoniam ult. de Const.; Clem. Dispendiosam 2 de Iudiciis; Clem. Ex frequentibus 1 § ult. de Sent. exc.; L. 7 de Legib., 1 C.; C. I. Disp. etc. at the beginning of a. 2; C. H. 3; Suarez, de Legib., l. 3, c. 14.

Does law also forbid one to become for another the author of transgressing it? - If someone is the cause why another transgresses the law, he sins against the same law and virtue, e.g., against religion, justice, chastity, etc. The reason is that what someone does through another is considered to be done by himself. Wherefore, as the executor himself, so he who compels, he who commands, he who counsels transgression of the law, becomes guilty of the transgression of the law.

But if someone is only an occasion to another of transgressing the law, e.g., by his example, and directly intends this, he likewise sins against the same law and the same virtue; since every law also commands this, that no one should wish it to be violated either by himself or by another. Directly intends; for if he only foresees it, whether even then someone acts against the same law and virtue is disputed. Some affirm it, because in reality and in fact he induces another to transgress the law, and is the cause of this transgression, although a cause per accidens. Others more probably deny it, because, if someone is bound to abstain from his own work lest another sin, this pertains only to charity, and thus he indeed sins against charity, but not also against that law and virtue which that law touches. - Cf. 424.

Does law also forbid one to cooperate with another in the transgression of the same law? - The matter is evident, that if it is not licit to be a cause to another of transgressing the law, much more is it illicit to be a cooperator with another in the aforesaid transgression of the law. Cooperation is to work together, wherefore it has no place except in an exterior transgression only of the law, which consequently consists of the intention of sinning and the very work of sin.

To cooperate in both constitutes formal cooperation, and this is altogether illicit, just as it is illicit to will to act and to act against the law. To cooperate only in the exterior work furnishes merely material cooperation. If this is furnished by an evil work, it is evil, e.g., if someone cooperates with a thief by breaking open doors. If it is furnished by a good work, or at least by an indifferent one, it is licit, unless it is prohibited either by office or by charity. By office, e.g., of father, judge, minister of the sacraments, etc. By charity, namely, for impeding the sin of one's neighbor, if it can be done. For if the other, without the cooperation of another, is still going to complete the sin, there can be no obligation to abstain from that cooperation, since it truly has no influence on the sin of the other, and can scarcely be called cooperation. But with the debt of office and charity set aside, since someone, by that material cooperation, sins neither by intention nor by work, there is indeed no reason from which its malice can be perceived. Wherefore then it makes no difference whether it is remote or proximate. And, speaking more properly, it is permission rather than cooperation. And thus it is licit to contract marriage with one who is in the state of mortal sin, and it is licit for a spouse to render the debt to a spouse bound by a vow of chastity. - Cf. 419.

How is law to be observed, and how is satisfaction made for its obligation? To satisfy the obligation of human law it is required and sufficient: 1. To do the commanded work as to its substance, and to have the intention of doing it. 2. Simply to omit the prohibited work, and not to have a contrary will. And thus someone satisfies the precept of abstaining from servile works if in reality he abstains from them, although he thinks nothing about the precept. Proof of the first part. For a commanding law, in itself and generally, commands only the substance of the act, not also the mode; nevertheless it commands not just any act, but a human act. Proof of the second part. For a law prohibiting something intends nothing more than the omission of the work. Therefore it does not also require intention, as a commanding law does, except in the case in which it commands that something be given, e.g., tithes. For you have satisfied, even though you gave while not in possession of your mind, or another gave for you; since the law does not seem to command more than that external and real action. Yet he who, entirely unaware, omits that which is prohibited by law seems rather not to transgress the law than to observe it. And the same must be said if someone, entirely unaware, does that which the law commands to be done; e.g., if there is a precept in a monastery of observing silence through the whole day, and through the whole day you sleep. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 100, a. 9; Cajetan on this place; Struggl, q. 2, n. 13, 14; Suarez, de Leg., l. 2, c. 10, n. 11-14; l. 3, c. 29; La-Croix, l. 1, n. 115.

Not also the mode; for regularly legislators commanding an act do not also command that the end of the law be intended, because even without this intention of the end, and by the commanded act alone, that end is obtained. Yet natural law also obliges to the mode of virtue, namely, that one do good and for an honorable motive, or on account of the honorableness of that same good. And so human law commands that you render the debt; if you render it, although from an evil intention, you have fulfilled the law. But natural law commands that you render the debt by reason of justice to be preserved. A soldier fights in war against enemies and kills them, but from hatred and on account of private vengeance; he observes human law, but not divine and natural law, which commands this or that as something honorable to be done only by reason of its intrinsic honorableness.

The mode of an act according to St. Thomas, following Aristotle, is threefold: first, that someone act, fulfilling the precept from knowledge of the work; second, that someone act from the will and intention of the good on account of the very honorableness of the act; third, that someone operate firmly and immovably. The first and the second mode are commanded by the natural law, which simply commands good; and good is from an integral cause. Therefore it is not enough to will the good materially, but one must will and intend it. But by positive and human law the first mode is commanded; for even positive human law commands only a human act; laws are given only for human acts, not also for acts of man. Moreover the obligation of law is a certain moral necessity, to which consequently satisfaction cannot properly be made except by a moral fulfillment of the precept. By only material fulfillment of the thing commanded someone does not transgress the law; but it cannot properly be said to be fulfilled. For this formal fulfillment of the law, as is clear, knowledge, will, and freedom are altogether required. And that first mode enters into the very substance of the human act. The second mode, that someone act from the will and intention of the honorableness itself, is regularly not commanded by human law. For as St. Thomas says, 1. 2. q. 100, a. 9: "A precept of law has coercive force; therefore that falls directly under the precept of law to which the law coerces. But the coercion of law is through fear of punishment. For that properly falls under the precept of law for which the penalty of the law is inflicted. But with respect to establishing a penalty, divine law and human law stand differently. For the penalty of law is not inflicted except for those things about which the legislator has to judge; because law punishes from judgment. But man, who is the lawgiver of human law, does not have to judge except about exterior acts." But the third mode is commanded neither by divine law nor by human law. For that firmness pertains to habit; thus by neither law is that mode of virtue commanded which is the end of the precept, namely, to make one virtuous.

Wirceburg., c. 1, a. 7.

Resolves: You satisfy the obligation if you fulfill different precepts by different acts, yet at the same time, provided one precept does not impede another; as to hear Mass and to recite the office at the same time. But you do not satisfy the obligation if you fulfill different precepts by one act, since they fall upon different matter; otherwise, however, if they fall upon the same matter. And so, if you owe Caius one hundred from a loan, and one hundred from a purchase, you do not satisfy by rendering only one hundred, because these two obligations fall upon different matter. But if you owe the same Caius one hundred from theft, which you vow to restore, and to the restoration of which the confessor has obligated you, by rendering only one hundred you satisfy these three obligations, namely of justice, of vow, and of precept, since they regard the same matter; thus also a beneficed subdeacon, by one recitation of the canonical hours, satisfies the double burden of order and benefice, for they fall upon the same matter. - L. 100; Struggl, q. 2, n. 15.

You satisfy the obligation, although you do not have the intention of fulfilling the precept, or of acting from the motive of formal obedience; nor do you have the intention of fulfilling the end of the precept; nor do you act from the motive of charity, or in the state of grace, or you lack faith; unless the very end of the precept, or the act of charity, or the state of grace, or faith itself is commanded. The reason for all these is that law regularly commands only the work to be furnished. And, if at times the law also commands its extrinsic end, e.g., to celebrate Mass for the suffrage of the deceased, he who freely furnishes the thing for this reason, because it is commanded, at least implicitly intends that end also.

You satisfy also, although while intending and doing the commanded work you expressly at the same time intend not to satisfy, e.g., if you hear Mass intending not to satisfy the precept; although, if the Mass is the last one, or if it is not the last and you intend not to hear another, you sin against another precept, by which one is bound to be subject to the legislator. - Finally, you satisfy, although in fulfilling the precept you sin from an extrinsic circumstance, e.g., if while hearing Mass you are occupied with thoughts of vainglory or lust. From an extrinsic circumstance; for, since law commands only honorable things, if the very substance of the act is intrinsically evil, you by no means satisfy the law.

He does not satisfy the obligation who, altogether compelled, drunk, sleeping, fulfills the precept, or with the sole intention of doing something else; e.g., if you read the hours with the sole intention of learning, or go to Mass only so that you may wait for a friend, feed your eyes, converse with another. But if you fulfill the precept from fear, you satisfy; though you would not do it if fear were absent, and you then sin from that perverse will. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 89, a. 5; q. 100, a. 9, ad 2, 10; 2. 2. q. 10, a. 4; L. 162-165; Struggl, q. 2, n. 17; E. M.

Note: He does not satisfy who performs the work of a vow or oath while expressly intending not to satisfy; because it depends upon the will of the promiser that such an obligation remain. But the obligation of obeying law proceeds from the will of the legislator, and therefore is not extended beyond his intention, i.e., beyond the substance of the commanded work. While expressly intending; for even in those things which proceed from one's own will, the one acting would satisfy if he merely negatively did not have the intention of satisfying, for example because, forgetful of the obligation undertaken, provided nevertheless that he does not apply what he does to another thing. For each person, from a general prior intention, intends to satisfy a debt before satisfying those things which he has imposed upon himself by free will. And this holds also concerning sacramental satisfaction, namely if he does the work imposed by the confessor, yet not intending to fulfill the penance. L. 30, 163; l. 3, n. 700.

When does the obligation of law cease? Obligation can cease in three ways: either on the part of the subject, or on the part of the superior, or on the part of the law itself. On the part of the subject it can cease: 1. Simply, through exempting causes, which totally withdraw him from the dominion of the law, for example if someone betakes himself outside the place which the law affects. 2. In a qualified way, through impeding causes, which impede or excuse from its fulfillment a subject remaining under the law. These causes are reduced to invincible ignorance, to fear, and to impotence. Ignorance, if it is invincible, excuses; because no one sins except by a voluntary act, and this presupposes knowledge. But if it is vincible and culpable it does not excuse; such it is when you were able and bound to know or to learn, and it came to mind to doubt, and you did not take pains to understand. L. 168, 170 ff. Cf. here 50, 51. Fear, namely grave fear, often excuses, since from it the observance of the law passes into a grave inconvenience. And so fear of death, e.g., often excuses not only from a positive precept, both human and divine, but sometimes even from an affirmative natural precept. Hence one is not bound, with danger of life, to confess integrally, to preserve a deposit, to fulfill a vow, etc. L. 175. Cf. here 62, 63. Impotence, even moral impotence, excuses. For if the object of the law, considered in itself, is not so difficult and grave, but from particular circumstances becomes such, then there is no longer that obligation which the legislator intends to impose, since that object has been notably changed. And thus David ate the loaves of proposition, prohibited to laymen, when he was in danger of undergoing a grave evil. 1 Reg. 21; Matt. 12, 3, 4. But grave inconvenience and harm must be proportioned to the gravity of the law, so that it may legitimately excuse from it. Since no one is held to the impossible, after someone has become unable to fulfill the law, he is excused, although he sinned in positing the cause; e.g., if someone squandered his goods, and then cannot pay his debts. L. 176. Cf. here 64, 65, 66, 171.

On the part of the superior it can cease: 1. Through dispensation, which is the legitimate relaxation of the law in a particular case. 2. Through privilege, which is a constant and permanent favor granted by a superior against or beyond the common law.

On the part of the law itself the law can also cease. For "it happens many times that something, in the majority of cases, is useful to be observed for the common welfare, yet in some cases is very harmful. Therefore, because the legislator cannot look upon all singular cases, he proposes the law according to those things which happen in the majority of cases, directing his intention to common utility. Hence, if a case arises in which the observance of such a law is harmful to the common welfare, it is not to be observed... But nevertheless this must be observed: that if the observance of the law according to the words does not have a sudden danger which must be met at once, it does not belong to just anyone to interpret what is useful and what is useless to the city; but this belongs only to the Princes, who on account of cases of this sort have authority in the laws to dispense. But if there is a sudden danger, not permitting so much delay that recourse can be had to the superior, necessity itself has a dispensation annexed, because necessity is not subject to law." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 96, a. 6. Cf. here 179.

Is he who is unable for the whole held to the part? If the precept is such that it can or is accustomed conveniently to be divided, and in its part the reason, or end, of the precept is preserved, then he who cannot observe the whole must observe the part which he can. Hence he who cannot read all the hours must say those which he can, because they are divisible. But if the reason of the precept is not preserved in the part, nor can or is this conveniently accustomed to be done, then he who cannot do the whole, that is, so much as may morally be considered the complete precept, is not held to the part. Wherefore one obligated to visit the thresholds of the Apostles at Rome, knowing that he cannot arrive there, is not bound to begin the journey; because neither the end nor the reason of the precept is preserved. All these things are to be estimated: 1. from the intention of the legislator; 2. from the reason, end, and matter of the law; 3. from the judgment of prudent persons; 4. from common usage. L. 176, 177.

Note: If someone unable for the whole is doubtful whether he is able for the part, he is often excused from this also, "as, for example, in the sick, in whom scarcely, or hardly scarcely, can it be determined what they can do, how far they can, and no further. Hence, if while they cannot fulfill the whole law, they were held to the part, there would be place for very grave scruples, and there would be continual perplexity in determining the part to which they would be held. And therefore it is rightly presumed concerning the mind of an equitable legislator that he does not wish in similar cases to oblige to the part: so grave theologians." Billuart, de Leg., diss. 4, a. 7.

Does the obligation cease for which satisfaction has not been made at a determined time? - R. Affirmatively, if the determination of time was made to put an end to the obligation. And thus he who omitted hearing Mass on Sunday is not bound to hear it further on the other days of the week. - R. Negatively, if that determination was made to urge the obligation. Hence he who did not pay a debt on the day established by contract is still held to pay it. When the law is urging here and now, if an impediment is foreseen afterward, satisfaction must be made for it beforehand; and so, if someone could not recite vespers and compline in the evening, he is bound to recite them in the morning; for already in the morning the substance of that precept urges, whence also, even without an evening impediment, he could in the morning from some just cause recite those hours and satisfy the precept.

Is it licit to posit causes exempting from the law? - It is always licit to posit exempting causes, and more probably also directly and proximately. - Causes de-obligating from the law are said to be posited directly when the end of withdrawing himself from the obligation of the law moves the agent; indirectly, if another cause moves him, though an impediment to observing the law has been foreseen.

These causes are proximate or remote, according as the law urges shortly, or after a notable time. Now law, speaking in itself, does not make someone subject to itself, nor make him remain subject, but obliges him who is already subject and remains so to observe itself. Therefore, if by an action otherwise licit you withdraw yourself from its dominion, you use your own right, and do not act in fraud of the law. Speaking in itself, because the law can also command this, that you not go to, e.g., a free place, and escape its force, as in reserved cases, and in clandestinely contracting marriage against the Tridentine law. Clem. X, C. Superna, 21 June 1670; Urban VIII to the Archbishop of Cologne, 1627. Nevertheless after the decree Ne temere on betrothals and marriage, those who, in fraud of the law, betake themselves into a region from which the pastor or Ordinary, or another competent priest, is absent, in order to contract marriage, contract validly. S. C. de Sacram., 12 March 1910. L. 152, 157; Struggl, q. 3, n. 20; Elbel 370-372.

Is it licit to posit causes impeding the observance of law? It is not licit directly to posit impeding causes, whether proximate or remote. Indeed, it is not even licit indirectly to posit proximately impeding causes, unless there is a proportionate necessity. But it is licit, even without reason, indirectly to posit remotely impeding causes. Proof of the first part. For every law implicitly obliges that nothing be done deliberately so that the law may be eluded; or, what is the same, every law prohibits anyone from acting in fraud of that same law; otherwise the law would be almost void as to imposing obligation. L. 29, 30 de Legib.; L. 5 e. t. C.; L. 152; l. 3, n. 1045; S. Th. 4 D. 15, q. 3, a. 4, q. 1, ad 1; Sanch. Con., l. 5, c. 1, d. 7, n. 11. - Proof of the second part.

Because a law proximately urging proximately binds the will to employ the means, from the nature itself of the thing necessary and ordinary, lest the law itself be violated without sufficient reason, and therefore to not throw in impediments. Otherwise the act of the legislator, by which he intends to oblige subjects, is altogether frustrated. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 147, a. 4, ad 3. But the reason for the exception is that on the one side there is a sufficient reason for positing the impediment, and on the other side the non-observance of the law is outside the intention of the agent. - Proof of the third part.

Because neither divine positive law nor human law obliges generally with a very grave inconvenience. But it would be a too grave burden if each person, long before the obligation of the law, were constrained to abandon all works incompatible with that obligation, and to wait for the time of the obligation. This reason, by which the thesis is proved, can be the best norm for judging in doubt whether a cause is only remotely impeding, namely if its omission would bring a grave inconvenience. But here it must be noted generally that not always will the same inconvenience which is truly grave with respect to one precept be such also with respect to every precept, since the gravity of all precepts is not the same. Hence that grave inconvenience must be judged not only absolutely and in itself, but also respectively and in relation to the precept with which the matter is concerned. L. 152; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 152; Ithur., Cas. 32; Sanch. in Dec., l. 1, c. 15, n. 4; Suarez, de Pecc., d. 3, s. 4, n. 10.

Resolves: He sins who on a fast day undertakes labor, although honorable, in order to be excused from the fast; although he, after he is gravely wearied, even with that evil end, is no longer held to the fast. L. 1. 3. n. 1022. But he does not at all sin who on the day before a fast spends the day hunting, foreseeing that through weariness it will not be licit for him to fast. He sins who, without a just cause, on the same feast day or one or another hour before it, begins a journey, foreseeing that he will not be able to hear Mass. But he does not sin if he does this on the preceding day. Gur. Ball. 111; Del Vecchio 161. But St. Alphonsus does not admit this, l. 3, n. 301, denying "that someone can set out on Saturday to hunt in a distant wood, although on Sunday he cannot hear Mass there."

"An excommunicated or interdicted person does not sin by omitting Mass, and likewise an imprisoned person, even if they neglect absolution or liberty, because these persons are not obliged to remove remote impediments," or extrinsic ones. L. 1. 3. n. 825; l. 1, n. 152; l. 7, n. 161. "Otherwise, however, they speak with respect to annual Confession and Communion, since this is one of the divine precepts, with regard to which we are held to remove impediments." L. 161; l. 6, n. 299. Excommunication and interdict, with relation to Confession and Communion, are not extrinsic impediments, but intrinsic, and therefore care must be taken that they be removed. "Tamb. and Viva, however, think that those detained in prison are not held to seek liberty in order that they may communicate." L. 1. 6. n. 299; Ithur., Cas. 3, n. 7.