§ 2. Supplements to the Doctrine

I. COROLLARIES.

302. How each consent operates. Each consent integrates one cause, and their common offspring is an obligation, at least in one party, with the corresponding right in the other.

303. Obligation from a fictitious promise. He who promises fictitiously is never bound from the promise formally taken, since it is null; but that fiction, like every injurious and harmful action, obliges him to compensate the losses. And if the execution of the thing which he appeared to promise is the only reparation, the obligation of the promisor will be materially the same as that which a true promise would have produced. (Against Vasquez, On Marriage, disp. 6, chap. 2.)

304. The will not to bind oneself, not to stand by one's promises. The will not to bind oneself is also repugnant to the will to contract, since a contract implies an obligation assumed by the will.

Therefore, the contract is null if that will was absolute, or regarded the same object under the rationale under which it is promised. But if the will to contract prevails, the will not to admit one of the obligations which necessarily arise from the contract must be judged to proceed from error and to be overcome by the more efficacious and absolute will to contract.¹ Hence he who rejects some burden conjoined with marriage while he wills to contract marriage sometimes contracts validly and sometimes invalidly, as is explained in the proper tract.

¹ Again against Vasquez, work cited. Cf. C. de Lugo, work cited, disp. 22, nos. 38, 39; and On the Sacraments in General, disp. 8, no. 120.

On the contrary, the will not to execute the obligations of a contract does not corrupt its essence, although sometimes, when it has been externally manifested, it is an indication that the obligation was not seriously assumed. (C. de Lugo, work cited, no. 36.)

II. SCHOLIA.

305. The force of external consent. If external consent was present: a) In the external forum, internal consent is rightly presumed to have been present, or an obligation of consenting internally is imposed.

b) The other party ought not to believe the simple assertion of the other by which he says that he consented fictitiously. For why is the deceiver now worthy of greater faith than when he consented externally?

306. The required advertence. That advertence to the substance of the act is required which suffices for someone to sin mortally. And this is so even in light matter, because each person is reasonably presumed to be unwilling to be despoiled of his thing or his right except with full consent. Cf. C. de Lugo, disp. 23, no. 18 ff., especially no. 23.

307. Concerning a light obligation if the matter was grave. Although someone can be bound under a light obligation by a vow or law, even when the matter is grave of itself, this other peculiarity in a contract is commonly admitted by theologians: that an obligation proportioned to the matter is necessarily assumed. For by a contract a right is acquired by another. Now to violate another's right in grave matter is grave of itself. Therefore, if the parties absolutely do not will a grave obligation then to arise from the contract, they will have made no contract. Yet you should observe that, when a personal obligation is in question, the matter which is the object of the contract can be changed by this intention, but not likewise where a real right is involved. For example, he who transfers ownership of a horse by contract will necessarily be bound under grave obligation not to violate that right of ownership acquired by the other. But if they will to impede this by the agreement, they will have impeded the very acquisition of ownership. Similarly, the marriage of those who will themselves to be bound only under light obligation to preserve mutual fidelity will be null. But those who have mutually promised marriage under a light obligation will not indeed have made betrothal, but another analogous contract, whose object, by reason of the light obligation, will have been made light; just as a slight hope of obtaining a horse will not have been grave matter. Cf. C. de Lugo—against Sanchez—disp. 22, nos. 40-43.