Article I. Notions

493. Why we write about gratitude. We are induced by a twofold reason to discuss a few things concerning this virtue: both because the peculiar equality of so highly praised a habit is recognized not without utility, especially since the proper rationale of justice itself appears capable of being illustrated by comparison with a cognate matter; and because, after the opinion of the moderns who contended that duties are exchanged in agreements had been refuted, it was necessary to indicate what nobler recompense was congruous with the innate dignity of a human act.

494. What a benefit is. A benefit is an unowed and useful prestation, freely made to someone from an affection of benevolence.

Unowed: whence Seneca, bk. 3 of On Benefits, chap. 21: “As long as that which is customarily exacted from servants is furnished, it is service; when there is more than is necessary from a servant, it is a benefit.”

Useful: whence “one who assists another in sinning does not confer a benefit but rather harm.” St. Thomas, q. 107, art. 1, ad 1, who wisely adds: “And therefore thanksgiving is not owed to him, except perhaps on account of his good will, if he was deceived when he believed that he was assisting toward good and assisted toward sin.”

Freely made from benevolence, whence the name gratitude was given. “For it is gratia because it is given freely.” St. Thomas, q. 106, art. 2, corpus. “It matters greatly whether someone gives us a benefit for his own sake, or for ours, or for his own and ours.” Seneca, bk. 6, chap. 12, who deservedly warns in chap. 13 that gratitude is owed if someone should sometimes have wished to provide for himself and for me. “If he considered both, I am ungrateful, not merely unjust, unless I rejoice that what benefited me also profited him.”

Sometimes benefit designates more broadly whatever has been usefully furnished, although its repayment is owed from commutative justice or pertains to that improper rationale of friendship which is called useful and does not require a love of benevolence, but some communion of cause and advantage. St. Thomas, II–II, q. 106, art. 5, corpus.

Nor is the name benefit transferred to this genus undeservedly. For one who is conscious that he devotes useful labor to another, although bound by a promise, is to be presumed to be moved somewhat by benevolence also. Therefore, we judged it equitable that some mutual gratitude be returned by workers and masters from the faithful prestation of those things which are embraced in the letting and hiring of labors.

495. Concerning material and formal ingratitude. He is materially ungrateful who, forgetful or careless of a benefit, is not moved by reason of it to discharge gratitude or to abstain from pursuits which oppose the beneficent man. He is formally ungrateful, however, who does not wish to appear obligated by the benefit and therefore contemns the benefit or the mind of the benefactor, for example, by an unfavorable interpretation of the benefit. Cf. Lessius, place cited, nos. 15, 17.