Article — Vermeersch, Questions on Justice
Article I. First Exposition of the Controversy
55. The function of distributive justice. To that special right by which the goods of the community pertain mediately to its members (cf. 8), there must correspond in the community—that is, in those who represent it—a care distinct from the procuring of the common good, by which they strive to make the citizens participate in the common advantages, not in just any manner, but so that from the common goods his own may be rendered to each one: his own, I say, according to that peculiar rationale by which the things belonging to the community are referred to the parts of the community. And this care is entrusted to distributive justice.
56. To whom this province belongs. Moreover, this care of distributing common things belongs properly to those who act for the community, who are placed over the administration of the commonwealth—in a word, who hold the supreme powers of government. Nevertheless, they can delegate this function to others, which can be done in a twofold manner. For sometimes the delegate properly sustains the person of the distributor. We have examples in royal ministers to whom each year, among the expenditures foreseen (the budget) and approved by the legislator, certain sums are committed to be expended for a definite end, yet in such a way that the entire administration of the affair belongs to them. The ministers are then bound toward the commonwealth by an obligation of commutative justice to apply that money to the proposed end—for example, to fostering the arts and sciences; but the manner in which they do this through prizes, etc., is left to their judgment, so that cultivators of the arts can demand something from them only under the title of distributive justice.
Not infrequently, however, the very manner of making the distribution is so defined by those who govern that, once the definition has been made, only its execution is entrusted to the officials; while the members whose interest is involved can each claim for himself his proportionate part from commutative justice. This obtains in the judicial forum. No one doubts that a judge has violated commutative justice toward a party whose cause he has either simply refused to hear or has delayed excessively in hearing. What is the reason for this? Because it indeed belongs to the law or the Prince to provide from distributive justice that access to the forum be open to every citizen; but once the forum has been constituted, every citizen has a strict right to bring his cause before the competent tribunal.
57. Object of the disputation. After we have shown the specific difference between distributive justice and the other species of justice, we can now describe its formal rationale with a light pen. But two other, more difficult questions remain which are not without their own importance. One concerns the material object of this justice; the other, the rules of just distribution.
58. Various opinions concerning the nature and matter of this justice. We shall take occasion from the former question to review what the most eminent doctors have thought concerning this justice.
St. Thomas seems to have remained doubtful concerning the nature of distributive justice and its distinction from commutative justice. Cf. I–II, q. 60, art. 3, ad 3. Later, however, in II–II, q. 61, he establishes it as justice in the proper sense, distinct from commutative justice because of a diverse rationale of debt: “For that which is common and that which is proper are owed to someone in different manners.” But concerning the object about which this justice is concerned, St. Thomas teaches that it is occupied principally with the distribution of goods,1 although the distribution of burdens is not entirely foreign to it. Cf. In V Ethicorum, ch. 5, and II–II, q. 61, art. 3. Finally, this virtue takes its mean, not according to the equality of thing to thing, which pertains to commutative justice, but according to the proportion of things to persons. Cf. the same, art. 2. This last point pleases all who write about this justice.
1 Cf. II–II, q. 61, art. 1.
For Molina, distributive justice concerns surplus goods to be distributed. Cf. treat. 1, disp. 12, nos. 3 and 8.
Lessius assigns to it the province of distributing common things, offices, and common burdens. Cf. ch. 1, no. 20 ff.
Cardinal de Lugo indeed admits that this justice is concerned with goods and common burdens to be distributed,2 but excludes from it election to offices.3 According to him, this virtue is improperly called justice and “regards the moral goodness of distribution with the proportion owed among subjects” (disp. 1, nos. 50, 61).
2 Cf. disp. 1, no. 43.
3 Cf. disp. 34, no. 19. In this matter he thinks to refute Sánchez, who in the work Consilia Moralia, bk. 2, ch. 1, doubt 36, treats extensively of the obligation of observing distributive justice in the conferral of offices and public functions.
More recent authors agree sufficiently that it is justice less properly so called, which is concerned with common goods and burdens to be distributed, so that offices themselves are generally judged to be comprehended among the goods to be distributed. Cf. Carrière, De Iustitia et Iure, no. 7; and especially Most Illustrious D. Waffelaert, who, from no. 404 onward, treats at length of the conferral of offices. R. P. Van Gestel, op. cit., pp. 14, 16, thought that he would answer more according to the mind of St. Thomas if he assigned to distributive justice only the equitable division of goods and public honors.
59. Opinions concerning the rules of just distribution. If you attend to it for a moment, the question concerning the rules to be observed by the distributor appears to be composed of two parts. For in order to distribute rightly, it is first necessary to know what title, quality, or condition is to be considered in the citizens; and then, according to the measure in which he possesses the title, each one is to obtain a greater or lesser part.
This becomes manifest from any example. Suppose, for example, that it is a question of the office of notary which you wish to confer upon Titius. It was first necessary to define in general who could compete for such an office, and then from among those who satisfy the conditions Titius must be chosen by you. Similarly, when subsidies from the treasury are assigned to mutual-aid societies, these two things had to be deliberated: why you grant subsidies to these societies rather than to others, and how much is to be expended for this end; and how you are to divide the sum equally among those societies.
Moreover, the latter part admits of a sufficiently easy solution: with respect to the title which is to be considered, the citizens are to be treated equally, “so that, if there are two of whom one has merits as four and the other as eight, the latter exceeds the former twofold in the distribution.”4
4 Cardinal de Lugo, disp. 1, no. 45.
Concerning the former part, however, St. Thomas, II–II, q. 61, art. 2, has these few words: “In distributive justice, something is given to a private person insofar as that which belongs to the whole is owed to the part. This is indeed greater in proportion as the part itself has greater principality in the whole. And therefore, in distributive justice, so much more of the common goods is given to someone as that person has greater principality in the community. This principality is considered according to virtue in an aristocratic community, according to wealth in an oligarchy, according to liberty in a democracy, and otherwise in other communities.”
But those who, after St. Thomas, were eminent among the Scholastics do not seem to have touched upon this principal and more difficult part.
From more recent controversies, a twofold opinion is gathered.
Very many, relying upon the words of the Angelic Doctor, “so much more is given to someone ... as he has greater principality in the community,” establish a universal rule: that common goods are to be divided according to merit toward the commonwealth or according to dignity; nor do they seem averse to this interpretation, according to which a greater part of the common goods would have to be given to the higher classes than to the lower.
Recently, however, in the distinguished study Il concetto cristiano della democrazia [The Christian Concept of Democracy], the distinguished Professor Toniolo proposes a plainly different rule, according to which, in the right order of society, burdens would have to be distributed according to capacity, but goods according to incapacity or necessity.5
5 He states his opinion literally thus: “In this hierarchical social order, directed toward mutual protection and assistance in the assignment of the common good, he who can do more owes more; he who can do less receives more.”
Finally, mention must be made of the strange manner in which the socialists understand distributive justice. For they wish the possession of all productive property to be common, but the fruit of collective labor to fall to each one according to the work furnished, until progress in culture and morals should permit the more perfect rule by which each one would contribute according to his powers, but would receive according to his needs.6 Cf. the thesis concerning socialism.
6 “Our ideal ... is communism: from each according to his powers, to each according to his needs.... But meanwhile ... we say: to each according to his work.” Vandervelde, Le Socialisme en Belgique, pt. 2, II, §3 (pp. 300–301, ed. 1898).
It remains now for us, having assumed a position, to disclose distinctly our opinion concerning these points, yet modestly, as in a matter little explored.