Parergon: The Remaining Virtues Connected with Justice

Aristotle, Ethics, bk. 4; St. Thomas, On bk. 4 of the Ethics; II–II, q. 80; qq. 108-114; qq. 117-119; Lessius, bk. 2, chap. 47, doubts 4-8.

507. Concerning their division. The account of the virtue of justice will be somewhat completed if, following St. Thomas, we speak briefly of the remaining virtues which are referred to it as potential parts. We have already seen in no. 28 how they can be ordered dialectically.

From the notion handed down there, it is apparent that they can conveniently be divided into two classes.

For some, which we said differ from justice because of the mode in which they render a debt, contain a legal debt, that is, one which is also urged, or can be urged, by human law. Furthermore, the virtues which regard a debt of this kind—that is, religion, piety, and observance—are more fittingly discussed in the first volume, where the fourth precept of the Decalogue is treated.

Others possess only a moral debt, or one which is required by the moral rectitude of virtue but does not fall under civil law. This debt in turn consists of two degrees. If the first is neglected, moral rectitude cannot be preserved: such are the debt of truthfulness and of gratitude, and the fitting mode of vengeance or vindication. The other contributes rather to greater moral rectitude and usually is not necessary by reason of any precept. I say usually, for there is no virtue some act of which cannot be commanded.¹ These virtues are liberality, affability, and friendship, to which St. Thomas refers equity as we have chiefly considered it.

¹ Cf. Gregory of Valencia, Theological Commentaries, vol. 3, disp. 5, q. 26, point 2.

508. Concerning vindication. 1. After gratitude, vindication is next in order, since it occupies the opposite side. For the one strives for the requital of a good work, the other of an evil work. Often it is not a special virtue, as was said in no. 25. But insofar as it is a special virtue and a potential part of justice, it gives form to the mind of a private person for seeking, in a legitimate manner, fitting penalties from him by whom he was unjustly injured; and this indeed with the intention of making himself free either from a past injury, through satisfaction and reparation of the injury, or from a future one, since punishment is accustomed to restrain wrongdoers. Cf. St. Thomas, II–II, q. 80, sole article, corpus and ad 1; q. 108, art. 2, corpus and ad 1.

In a legitimate manner, I say, that is, generally (except for small vindications carried out immediately), not by private authority, but by having recourse to a superior and with due moderation.

To make himself free. Thus is indicated the moral rectitude of the end which he pursues.

For if it is done for some higher rationale, for example, for a public cause, the act must be referred to another virtue; but if someone intends it reduplicatively as directed toward another's evil, it will be an illicit act of hatred.

But insofar as you exercise vindication in this manner to obtain your own good, it is not contrary to reason; nevertheless, vindication acquires the name and praise of virtue from the fact that it perfects the natural inclination by which we are borne toward vengeance (St. Thomas, place cited, art. 2, corpus and ad 3), that is, insofar as it observes the due circumstances of mode and measure. Lessius, no. 26.

2. The moral rectitude preserved in exacting vengeance is therefore its formal object. Hence it is to be numbered among the virtues which pursue a moral debt.

3. But because the praise of that virtue is small, and, moreover, the matter is exposed to many dangers, in a private cause the forgiveness of injury according to the evangelical counsel is for the most part rather to be advised. Lessius, no. 27.

4. Cruelty sins against this virtue by excess; excessive remissness in punishing, by defect.

509. Concerning truthfulness. This virtue “procures that in speech, writing, gestures, and other signs by which we intend to signify something... there be conformity and agreement between tongue and mind, between external signs and internal conscience.” Lessius, no. 29.

It is a (potential) part of justice insofar as it regards our manner of acting toward another and makes signs adequate to the things signified. St. Thomas, q. 109, art. 3, corpus. It discharges a moral debt. This is discussed in the first volume.

510. Concerning affability. 1. Affability is the virtue by which “a man is fittingly ordered toward other men in common intercourse, both in deeds and in words, so that he conducts himself toward each one according as is becoming.” St. Thomas, q. 114, art. 1, corpus. From this it follows that a man “conducts himself neither too blandly nor too harshly in encounters,”² but is pleasant in company.

² Lessius, place cited, no. 47.

Because it exhibits signs of that common friendship which joins all men to one another, it is sometimes called friendship.

Lessius restricts its matter to serious things, for “that our intercourse may be pleasant in jests, another virtue provides, which Aristotle, bk. 4 of the Ethics, chap. 9, calls eutrapelia, which makes us use jests and amusements becomingly... so that we neither exceed the measure in them as buffoons, nor shrink from them as certain rustics and boors.” Lessius, place cited, no. 47.

It does not have the full rationale of a debt. St. Thomas, q. 114, art. 2; q. 80, sole article.

2. Nevertheless, two vices are contrarily opposed to it:

a) Flattery, namely, by which someone strives excessively to please others in company. Yet more strictly he is called a flatterer who approves and praises all things for the sake of his own advantage.

b) Moroseness or quarrelsomeness, on the contrary, sins by defect. The morose and harsh “are difficult everywhere, contradictors everywhere, and accommodate themselves nowhere.” Lessius, no. 51.

511. Concerning liberality. 1. “Liberality is the virtue which moderates the love of money and renders us ready and prompt to spend it when reason dictates.” Lessius, place cited, no. 54.

Its material, immediate, and proximate object is the desire for money, upon which it bears so as to impose a mode upon it; this mode is its formal object. Consequently, it regards the expenditure of money, which it makes willingly, cheerfully, and abundantly, according as the rationale of becomingness in civil life demands that it be done. Lessius, no. 57. Now money here designates riches of every kind. Since such an expenditure is not strictly owed but pertains to the greater moral rectitude of virtue, liberality is said to possess the least of the rationale of debt. St. Thomas, II–II, q. 80, sole article, corpus; q. 117, art. 5, ad 1.

2. To liberality are opposed avarice, which, exceeding in the estimation and love of money, is excessive in acquiring or retaining money (Lessius, no. 59); and prodigality or profusion, which is deficient in preserving wealth and excessive in bestowing it, by giving to those to whom one ought not, or more than one ought.