§ 2. Formulation and Arguments of the Conclusion

A just wage is the true price of labor considered in itself, to be defined from agreement and common estimation.

A wage thus established is neither to be diminished nor increased from justice according to the varying fortune of the business.

Nevertheless, it is licit for the employer to agree with the workers upon a recompense less than the just amount, in order that he may safeguard for himself a moderate fruit of capital and of his own industry, but not in order that he may seek pure profit for himself.

406. I. State of the question. 1. THE INTENTION OF THE THESIS appears to be threefold: what the objective rationale of a just wage and its measure are; with what rigor justice permits adherence to just agreements and the disregard of the various vicissitudes of affairs; for what cause an agreement for a lesser wage can be excused. That is, we shall treat in order of the stipulation of a just wage, of its force, and of the promise of a lesser wage.

2. OPINIONS. Since these three conclusions are readily derived from the theses concerning the just price of things and the form of the stipulation of labor, they ought per se to please all those who defend with us the things thus far handed down in this matter. Nevertheless:

a) As to the first part, there are some who, while acknowledging the letting of labor, nevertheless abhor the expression price of labor: thus Liberatore, to whom a wage seems to be not a price but a recompense;¹ or they will the worker, although hired, to have a perpetual right to the fruit of his industry, so that the wage must be equated with this fruit, after deducting, however, the price of the twofold insurance (no. 390)² and the just discount (escompte) on the anticipated payment.³ It is especially this opinion that we refute at present. It is defended by Rev. Fr. Weiss⁴ and was proposed by Rev. Mr. Keesen at Liège in 1890, in the third Catholic Congress.⁵ Indeed, the distinguished Périn does not seem altogether foreign to it, Principes d’économie politique [Principles of Political Economy], appendix, p. 404 (2nd ed.). The same author, p. 307, note, denies that the price of labor must be accommodated to its value alone.

¹ “Not a price but a recompense.” Work cited, no. 89.

² There we described this twofold security by which the manufacturer, by paying a definite sum to the workers, frees them from the danger of losing as it were their principal and promises them a smaller but certain profit. The matter then falls back into a certain kind of triple contract (no. 385.2).

³ Rev. Mr. Gayraud acutely states the question in this way in Science Catholique, 1894, p. 989, in Au congrès catholique de Lille en 1893 [At the Catholic Congress of Lille in 1893]: “Is the wage the price of the letting of labor, or the price of the worker’s renunciation of the product of labor?” We maintain the former; the adversaries, the latter. Not without reason does Cauwès, no. 803, object to them that their tenet is not dissimilar to a certain dogma of the socialists: “The alleged relationship between the wage and expected profit has an evident affinity with a socialist theory. According to this theory, the worker has a right to the value of the product. The theory which we criticize likewise gives the worker, not the integral value, but a proportionate share of the value of the product.” Cf. also no. 798, where he well explains the opinion which he rejects with us.

⁴ Soziale Frage [The Social Question], vol. 2, pp. 663, 664, 698. Here is his formula: “Its amount—that is, the amount of the fixed wage—must indeed be calculated according to the product or return of the business conducted jointly by capital and labor. Thus from the wage (Lohn) there arose the remuneration (Löhnung).”

⁵ First section, Terminologie sociale [Social Terminology], pp. 93, 95.

Finally, several economists say ambiguously that they estimate the wage from the productivity (productivité) of labor. For what productivity, I ask, do they understand? That which the labor possessed in the particular business for which it was hired? Then they are deceived by an error and by a confusion of contracts. Or that which commonly inheres in some kind of labor? We do not indeed object insofar as the common estimation of labor of this kind is sought from it. But how will you transfer this rule to the labor of servants strictly so called and of all those whose use is not profitable?

Even Rev. Fr. Castelein by no means escapes either reproach—of ambiguity and of excessively narrow utility—in this formula of his, which, besides, regards the sum of wages rather than individual wages: “A twofold norm of a just wage must be acknowledged: namely, a proximate, strict, and absolute norm, which is to be defined as the value of labor according to the equitable price of the thing produced, after the share of capital and management has been deducted in proportion to its merit; and a supreme, general, and conditional norm, which can be called the collective family wage.” Institutiones philosophiae moralis et socialis [Institutes of Moral and Social Philosophy], p. 376. Moreover, since management is a certain kind of labor, in what manner, so long as you are ignorant of the value of labor, can you investigate it by considering what share falls to management? Nor is it any less obscure to us how the norm which is called conditional can be compared as superior with an inferior norm which is declared absolute. What is more, while the proximate norm directs commutative justice, this justice, on p. 383, is denied to be affected by the supreme norm, so that the words just wage are placed ambiguously in the formula cited. Finally, by this manner of speaking, in which that which remains after the share of capital and management has been deducted is ascribed to labor, he seems to concede to these two some priority of right over labor. This is certainly foreign to the mind of the most distinguished writer. Nevertheless, the price of labor cuts off every occasion of odium. And thus, from zeal for the truth, we have candidly disclosed our mind, with every esteem for the man and friend preserved and without detracting anything from the many praises which he has justly and deservedly obtained through the distinguished fruits of his ready talent.

b) As to the second part, all who interpret the stipulation of labor after the manner of the triple contract must, if they think consistently, regard an extraordinary profit or a loss which could have been foreseen as a necessary cause for increasing or diminishing the customary sum of the wage. Otherwise, the risk which the master of the partnership assumes is inequitably estimated.

Those, however, formally oppose us who, with the socialists, claim for the worker a certain necessary right to a proportionate part of the fruits.

But although there are many who profess the worker’s right to participate in the fruits, there do not seem to be any who, at least in express words, acknowledge the correlative obligation to sustain a part of the losses. This already makes indirectly for our thesis.

c) As to the third part, there are some among Catholics who excuse the payment of a wage less than that which is just per se only when the businesses of some region are commonly in straits. But they think that one who has undertaken a business whose successful outcome is not foreseen unless wages are depressed below the customary price of the region acts unjustly per se. Thus Génicot, Theologiae moralis institutiones [Institutes of Moral Theology], vol. 1, no. 648.

The distinguished Périn, although on p. 298 he regards only general circumstances which generally prevent a wage just per se from being paid, nevertheless seems to speak with us on p. 311 (Premiers principes [First Principles], 1st ed.; p. 323, 2nd ed.). And, unless something deceives us, Mr. A. Verhaegen maintains the same, work cited, no. III.

3. THE TERMS ARE EXPLAINED.

Just, or that which is due per se from commutative justice.

Wage, or the recompense of any labor hired, even labor of the noblest kind.

Is the true price of labor, that is, the commutative value of labor estimated in money. We say labor and not work, lest we confuse this hiring of labor with the letting of a work. No. 391.

Labor considered in itself, that is, not terminatively or in its fruit, but insofar as it signifies the use of a man’s powers promised to another—the prestation of a human act—almost as the annual rent of a hired house is the price of the use of a certain house.

From agreement and common estimation. Although we posit these two things, we merely transfer here the general conclusion of Thesis XXV concerning the just price of things. For within the limits of this price established by common estimation, the consent of the parties itself is accustomed to designate the price more precisely.

But beware lest you immediately think that the price customary in a definite place (prix courant [current price]) is defined by common estimation. For this signifies the common judgment both of the people and of employers concerning the justice of a certain valuation. It happens, however, that what is paid somewhere by a very powerful master of a business is commonly judged to be too little. Cf. Gayraud, Questions du jour [Questions of the Day], V, p. 166.

A wage thus established. Thus, that is, according to these rules.

Is not from justice. The rationale of equity will often be different.

Neither to be diminished nor increased according to the varying fortune of the business. Whether the profit has increased immensely or an enormous loss has been suffered, the debt is not affected by these vicissitudes. Here, therefore, the discussion is necessarily restricted to profitable industry alone.

Nevertheless, for the employer, or, universally, for him who hires workers.

It is licit to agree with the workers. Their consent is therefore required, and indeed consent which is vitiated by no fraud or force. Nevertheless, the fact that they assent somewhat reluctantly and under the compulsion of necessity does not prevent it.

Upon a recompense less than the just amount. For although guilt of injustice is then absent, the recompense must be called less than the just amount insofar as it remains below the merit or value of the labor. Cf. what we said, as if from the opposite side, concerning a higher price in no. 349.

In order that he may safeguard for himself. We require a serious end, so that, another path being morally closed, he is himself driven to enter upon this one.

A moderate fruit of capital and of his own industry. If, therefore, some business has turned out adversely, or if through excessive competition among rivals (concurrence [competition]) the price of merchandise has become low, and it is shown for either reason that the owner cannot hope to acquire from the sum of the return a fitting recompense both for himself and for others, we concede that he is not bound from justice to persevere in what he has begun. But if he wishes to proceed further, the same justice does not prohibit him from offering, without force or fraud, a wage which in other circumstances would be less than the just amount to workers who, taking counsel for themselves, will accept or reject the proposed conditions. Cf. A. Verhaegen, Le minimum de salaire [The Minimum Wage], pp. 24–25.

But not in order that he may seek pure profit for himself, strictly understood (no. 405), or that greater but uncertain advantage by the hope of which those who undertake a business or who adhere to them as partners are moved. Therefore, we permit them, in making the agreement, to strive to have first place so long as there is question of the customary fruit either of money which has been lent at interest or of labor let in another’s affair; but we command them to pay a just wage before they think of gathering the fruit which is proper to partners or employers.

II. Proof.

407. A. OF THE FIRST PART. I. A just wage is the true price of labor considered in itself.

Argument 1, direct. In order that a just wage be regarded as the true price of labor considered in itself, it is necessary, but at the same time sufficient, that the temporary cession of the use of one’s powers be compensated by the wage.

But. A cession of this kind is compensated by the wage. Therefore.

To the major. For the pecuniary compensation of an exchanged thing is its very price, which is called just if the true price is given.

Proof of the minor. The cession of use is compensated by the wage, for labor is truly hired for a wage. Cf. above, no. 395.2. The use of human powers is compensated, for the labor which is hired is some use of these powers.

And in truth, one who lets his labor deprives himself of the faculty of employing his powers for his own advantage. He is deprived of this use; therefore, this use must be compensated. “That which is let,” says Rev. Mr. De Gryse, work cited, p. 30, “is the use of the human operative power, nothing besides; the wage is then established.”

Argument 2, indirect. The other opinions, if the statement of Liberatore is excepted, a) neither preserve the generic rationale of the contract of letting and hiring; b) nor distinguish either between partnership and letting, or between the letting of a work and the letting of labor; c) nor can they befit every species of wage. Liberatore himself, however, seems to dissent from us less in reality than in words and, struck by a vain fear, to have chosen an ambiguous word.

Therefore. They are to be rejected, and Liberatore’s manner of speaking is not to be approved.

To the antecedent. For they come back to this: that they will the fruits of the worker’s own labor to be attributed to him and the wage to be estimated from the presumed (estimé à forfait [estimated at a lump sum]) merit of the labor in the definite business for which it was hired. But in this manner: a) letting and hiring perishes; for he who lets a thing alienates the use of the thing for a time and therefore can no longer make its fruits his own. Moreover, b) this manner of speaking which we oppose corresponds perfectly to the triple contract, which is a species of true partnership. Moreover, insofar as its defenders wish to estimate the wage from the merit of labor in a definite business, they in reality measure this by the work accomplished. For the merit of labor is regarded by them terminatively; it is estimated in its efficiency, that is, from the work insofar as this is to be ascribed to the labor. But determination from the work pertains to the letting of a work. c) What if labors in no way fruitful are exacted, or if the owner commands the worker to remain idle? What place is there then for the rationale opposed by us?

As to Liberatore’s statement, recompense is an uncertain word which can in reality sound the same as price. In the present matter, however, it cannot be the recompense of labor insofar as labor signifies some service and willingness on the worker’s part; for thus, unless you fall into the error of Bastiat, it is a matter of grace, not justice. It remains, therefore, that labor be understood without any consideration of a beneficent intention. But understood in this manner, what remains in it to be compensated besides its economic function or value, whose pecuniary recompense is most formally a price?

Moreover, let this confirmation from St. Thomas be heard, Summa Theologiae, I–II, q. 114, art. 1: “For that is called a wage which is recompensed to someone in return for a work, as a certain price of it.”

Nor on this account, as Liberatore fears, is anything detracted from the innate nobility of human industry, since we by no means deny that it has other aspects and contend this one thing alone: that this labor, as formally hired, is compensated by a price strictly so called. “Although the work of the worker,” the author of the Roman document elegantly observes, “is something nobler than merchandise, it nevertheless retains the whole rationale of merchandise from that part by which it signifies an order to price.” Cf., besides, the difficulties and scholia.

2. To be defined from agreement and common estimation.

This assertion follows immediately upon the rationale of price which has been proved. For the thesis concerning a just price has universal force. Therefore, until they have clearly established that something else must be maintained here, it is licit for us to pass over many things. Besides, this formal rationale for defining a just wage is already proposed by St. Antoninus, Summa theologica, pt. 2, tit. 1, chap. 17, § 8, and is expressed in explicit words by Molina, disp. 506, no. 4; Lessius, chap. 24, no. 23; and C. de Lugo, disp. 29, no. 62.

408. B. OF THE SECOND PART. A wage thus established is neither to be diminished nor increased from justice according to the varying fortune of the business.

The vicissitudes of another’s business profit or harm no one from commutative justice.

But. From the things demonstrated above, the business for which a worker is hired for a wage strictly understood is formally alien to him.

Therefore. The vicissitudes of the business neither profit nor harm him from commutative justice, and consequently leave the amount of the wage owed intact.

This is confirmed by the fact that the various vicissitudes of a definite business do not affect the interest to be paid on borrowed money. But the formal relation to the business of money and labor which have been let is equal.

N.B. Observe that one must not, as some patrons of our opinion do, have recourse to the efficient causality of unexpected profit. That argument, sought outside the nature of the contract, furnishes an occasion for controversies and doubts. Cf. above, no. 401.

409. C. OF THE THIRD PART. Nevertheless, it is licit for the employer to agree with the workers upon a recompense less than the just amount, in order that he may safeguard for himself a moderate fruit of capital and of his own industry, but not in order that he may seek pure profit for himself.

In order that the force of the argument may be perceived better, observe that in this part we are not treating of the uncertain fortune of a business already undertaken, whose risk is compensated by the hope of profit and pertains entirely to him to whom the pure profit itself will fall. Rather, we are treating of a business which, in the circumstances in which it is to be undertaken, does not promise so great an abundance of returns as would be necessary so that, when that wage for labor which is defined as just by common estimation has been established, a fitting fruit of one’s own labor and capital, or even some pure profit, may nevertheless be gathered. Now, if you wish to hire workers for this business, will it be licit for you to stipulate a lower wage? The workers certainly remain free to reject such a condition. But can you, in these circumstances, impose it upon them, insofar as you deny that you will hire their labor on another condition?

Now, we establish as follows that this is honestly done by you in the former hypothesis, but not in the latter:

Argument. a) Standing within strict justice and the limits of the equality to be preserved, each person can justly provide for himself in making an agreement and procure the best conditions. He can therefore, by honorable means—that is, without force or fraud—use his prevailing condition to bring it about that that which is just per se is repaid to himself before another, although the latter is perhaps more needy.

b) Commutative justice, however, forbids you to become rich from what belongs to another in such a manner that, formally or virtually, you gather as fruit for yourself that which is another’s good.

But. He who, in stipulating a contract, agrees upon a lower wage in order that he may gather a fitting fruit of his own labor and capital merely provides for himself in the former manner. But one who attempts to rely upon another excuse becomes rich from what belongs to another. Therefore.

For the evidence of this matter, a) observe that the fitting fruit of labor or money is, from the very notion, its equivalent compensation, or, if you prefer, its restitution under another form. But it is immediately evident that all who freely contribute something of their own for procuring some end, or place some good of their own in some business, have the right to recover what is their own, that is, to receive a fitting recompense for their money or labor. Nevertheless, they can depart from this right, either by a voluntary abdication from a liberal spirit or by force of necessity, even somewhat unwillingly, when, without anyone’s fault or promise to compensate the damage, the thing has perished wholly or in part—that is, when the sum of the returns is unequal to paying each person what is his own. It is then licit for each person, in a similar cause, to prefer himself to another, that is, to provide first for himself. Therefore, if it happens that some debtor is insolvent, it is licit for each of the creditors, with consideration of the others omitted, to contend with the others in diligence and, by honest arts, bring it about that satisfaction is made to himself, even in full. In like manner, in the present class of case, where a smaller future sum to be gathered is foreseen, it will be licit for individuals, through the very conditions of the agreement, to attempt to preserve themselves unharmed. It will happen per accidens, and must be attributed to unconquerable necessity, that this is attempted in vain by many and falls only to the stronger. Nevertheless, this victory of the stronger will not be repugnant to justice, since no one, by this title, is bound to remit anything of his own right.⁶

⁶ “He [the employer],” the distinguished Périn says very well, “owes the just wage ... only when he finds in the result of his operation the means of ... paying it, at the same time as he finds there the means of paying himself, in the measure which the situation permits, the recompense of his work of conception and direction....” Note sur le juste salaire [Note on the Just Wage], p. 6.

b) But a far different judgment must be made concerning pure profit. This is not mere compensation or restitution, but an increase which it is licit for the owner of a business to seek from his own thing if it truly yields that increase. But it yields none so long as the returns merely equal a fitting recompense for all. Therefore, one who then wished to make a profit would make gain not from his own thing, but by taking away from another’s thing or by converting another’s loss into his own profit. Nor could their consent, which they would give unwillingly in a certain respect, remove the character of injury. Cf. nos. 146, 344.

This is confirmed from the received maxims that fruit is not understood except after expenses have been deducted, nor profit except after debt has been deducted. Cf. law 30, Digest, Pro socio [On Partnership] (XVII, 2).

It is confirmed again by the fact that no one, on account of a cause of this kind, thinks of paying creditors interest on money which is less than the just amount. Hence a different manner of acting in the case of workers truly savors of a certain oppression of the poor.

410. III. Difficulties.

1. FROM THE DIGNITY OF THE HUMAN PERSON. Human labor is not to be placed among commodities. Cf. Liberatore, no. 89. Therefore, the rules by which the price of these is defined cannot be transferred here.

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent. It is not to be placed among commodities under every respect, C.; under the respect under which it is exchanged in letting, N.

For insofar as it is a human action, it certainly exceeds the entire economic order; but insofar as the causality of economic utility is present in that action, it acquires economic value. Whatever possesses economic value is, as such, placed among commodities. But it is exchanged in letting under this respect. Besides, the reason objected would bring this excessive consequence: that labor cannot properly be let. For commodities are properly exchanged. But as soon as you concede a true letting, you must concede the true price of the thing let, if you wish to adhere to general principles.

Instance. A worker cannot be regarded as a machine. But by placing his labor among commodities, you regard the worker after the manner of a machine. Therefore.

Reply. I concede the major; I distinguish the minor. If you equate his labor with a commodity simply, the worker is regarded as a machine, C.; if under a definite respect, N.

For by saying that the price of labor let must be estimated from the value of its use, we do not deny that there are other duties, even of justice, to be observed toward the person of the worker, insofar as the labor cannot be separated from that person as furnishing the labor. But just as the person is present concomitantly, so these duties will be present concomitantly or mediately, and not immediately by force of the contract of letting labor. Both are often outside and above this contract.

The various rationales by which workers are assimilated to machines will be handed down in the scholium.

2. THE WHOLE RATIONALE OF A JUST WAGE MUST BE SOUGHT FROM AN AGREEMENT FREELY ENTERED INTO.

Reply. I distinguish the assertion. From an agreement freely entered into, with the rules of a just price observed, C.; otherwise, N.

Thus returns the error of the liberals who deny the objective rationale of price or consider nothing except the customary price such as the law of supply and demand has made it. Nevertheless, it is astonishing with what force this error held many minds, even those of the best men. Cf., for example, the things disputed at Liège in the third Catholic Congress by Mr. Théry, so that he contended that the customary wage of the place is always just.⁷

⁷ Second section, Durée légale de la journée du travail [Legal Duration of the Working Day], p. 107 ff. It is useful to transcribe some things from his words: “The employer is no freer than the worker, or rather both are sufficiently free to contract validly.... The just wage is the wage which conforms to the custom of the place; and when you, the employer, have paid the wage which conforms to the custom of the place, in justice you are quit. From the standpoint of justice, you have done what you had to do. Nothing more can be demanded of you. This, then, is what the just wage is. It is nothing else.

Now, however, not a few have begun to confess that they had been deceived by a false appearance and that the free option which would exclude every injustice had often existed in name only.⁸

⁸ Thus, for example, C. Goblet d’Alviella, in a speech delivered in 1897 to the students of the (liberal) University of Brussels: “One only compromises the cause of liberty when one invokes it in the conclusion of the contract between the employer, who can wait with the sole reservation of restricting his profits, and the worker, who is incapable of doing so, pressed as he is by his poverty and that of his family.” See Revue de l’Université de Bruxelles, vol. 3, pp. 91–92.

St. John Chrysostom already derided that fictitious kind of liberty in the question of usuries: “Do not tell me that he willingly accepts such a thing and gives thanks for the interest. For this happens through your inhumanity. For even Abraham, when he handed his wife over to the barbarians, readily made their evil counsel acceptable to himself—not willingly, but from fear of Pharaoh. Thus also the poor man ... is compelled to give thanks for cruelty.” On Matthew, homily 56 (otherwise 57), no. 6; Migne, P.G., vol. 57, col. 557.