Article II. Formulation and Arguments of the Conclusion

I. Although, with the exception of domestic society, the general equality of men and women is not excluded by any absolute or perpetual reason,

II. Nevertheless, the confusion of the kinds of life, or the access of women to public affairs, are neither things to be desired per se, nor to be hoped for according to some law of progress, nor likely to profit women themselves in living well and happily.

III. Nevertheless, there is a place today for prudent feminism.

515. I. State of the question. 1. THE INTENTION OF THE THESIS. While some, lovers of innovations and rash patrons of a new justice which consists entirely in arithmetical¹ equality, say that every separation of the sexes must be overturned fundamentally together with the rest of the present order, others, on the contrary, strive for the absolute exclusion of women from public affairs and from several offices. We prepare to speak more moderately and temperately concerning the same cause, so that, although little disposed in mind toward the public action of women and the exercise of certain arts by them, we nevertheless reject these things less strictly, and do not deny that, provided you preserve intact some authority of the husband, they must be undertaken in certain circumstances or can even, at least in part, be expedient.

¹ Cf. no. 68.

In this manner we propose the first two parts as the more polemical. For there is hardly anyone who would be unwilling to add his vote to the third.

2. THE TERMS ARE SET FORTH.

Although, with the exception of domestic society. By these words we wholly reprove that feminism which would have it that even in domestic society the man is not the head of the woman; that is, we posit some essential right of marital authority, although its character can vary and be very benign.

By any absolute or perpetual reason. An absolute reason would be one which, without any regard for circumstances, or in any circumstances whatever, would prove equality to be evil; a perpetual reason, one which would avail for all time.

Is not excluded, as something in no way to be tolerated. We are not speaking strictly about its opportuneness.

Of men and women. By women we mean principally,² but not solely, those who are not joined to a man.

² Stuart Mill himself, work cited, p. 244, grants access to political offices only to unmarried women.

General equality. We say general rather than universal. For it seems that women can be excluded more absolutely from the exercise of certain arts, for example, the military art.

Nevertheless, the confusion of the kinds of life, that is, by which all the arts and conditions of life which now fall to men alone or women alone would be held promiscuously by all. I say all, because we do not deny that, according to circumstances and customs, several things formerly separated can be made common.

Or the access of women to public affairs, whether they could also seek honors or merely cast a political vote.

Are neither things to be desired per se. That is, we deny that by their nature, or for the most part, they are things to be desired.

Nor to be hoped for according to some law of progress. For not a few are deceived by a false image of culture evolving itself, as though this equality pertained to a more humane and more perfect constitution of society.

Nor likely per se to profit women themselves in living well and happily. Therefore, the cause of the “feminists” is not always to be embraced in order that provision may be made for the good and happy life of women. Nor will you be a truer defender of women in proportion as you are more of a feminist. We again understand this to be said per se.

Nevertheless, prudent feminism has its proper place, that is, the effort by which one applies oneself to the protection and defense of women, provided that one proceeds cautiously and circumspectly.

Today. That is, this effort is neither useless nor inopportune at present. For the laws and customs are not of such a kind that they cannot be changed for the better, and we can prepare a more perfect condition for women.

516. A. OF THE FIRST PART.

1. The perfect equality of the two sexes is absolutely repugnant in domestic society.

For by the natural law itself the man is ordained the head of the family. And in truth:

a) It is necessary that there be some domestic government. For the things which certain men say or write concerning a universal government of reason, by which all those matters now placed in the judgment of a superior could be defined, pertain to the dreams of anarchism; and they vanish from this consideration alone: that reason itself leaves several things in the middle as uncertain, doubtful, or indifferent. These matters must either be decided by the authority of one commanding, or they can have no resolution unless one willingly yields to the other. Thus, with the right of one suppressed, in place of him to whom the right belongs there will usually succeed, not the better, but the more stubborn!

b) The government must be constituted within the confines of the household. Otherwise, the matter would have to be assigned to a judge, as indeed a few have thought.³ But this must be wholly denied, both because, if the proper power which it needs were taken away, domestic society itself would perish and would not be sufficient unto itself per se in its own order of private affairs; and because appeal to a judge would be most frequent unless one spouse, endowed with a gentler disposition, yielded to the other, though not without that bitter sadness which an undue concession is accustomed to produce. But the frequent intervention of an outside person in domestic and intimate matters would be most repugnant to domestic peace and happiness.

³ Laurent, Principes de droit civil, vol. 3, pp. 112-115; René Colaert and René Henry, La Femme-Électeur.

c) Which, then, of the two spouses will preside? Is it not he who is perceived to have been chosen by nature, who per se excels in strength, exercises the parts of the agent and the dominant one in the very function of generation, and is constantly seen to be more free for work—that is, the man—while the woman is greatly impeded for a long time, for example, after childbirth and during nursing? Or perhaps did most wise nature rightly make inferior the one whom she gave greater strength, so that in this manner the temptation to injury would per se be more vehement and there would be more abundant room for inequity?⁴ Or did she leave the matter to the greater part of the votes, when a domestic assembly can consist of only two?

⁴ Observe that the right of the superior is indicated by stronger powers per se, lest these greater powers have been given by a futile design.

Nor should you say that it sometimes happens that the woman is superior in virtue, ability, and strength itself. For since no one can decide government in individual cases, it was necessary that by a general decree of nature the right of commanding be attributed to the one who was perceived to be more fit per se. For it was more important to the common good of men that there be a universal determination, although per accidens this could be less congruous with a few families, than that the matter be left confused and disordered. Add also that, where the man is less skilled, it often happens that the reins of governing are graciously handed over to the woman by a man who is content with the name and title.

2. For the rest, the general equality of men and women is not excluded by any absolute or perpetual reason.

By what absolute or perpetual reason would you think to reprove equality, unless you establish that this equality is either physically impeded by the incapacity of women or morally conflicts with an essential office of women?

The adversaries contend this in vain. For:

a) In qualities of intellect, women are proved at most to be somewhat inferior to men per se, yet not to be so distant from men that they are incapable per se and that there are no contrary exceptions. But where, as in the conferral of offices, there is an opportunity to make a selection of persons, even the accidental fitness of someone is not to be excluded per se.

b) No office of women can be opposed except the matrimonial office. But besides the fact that very many women abstain from marriage, domestic obedience is not so great that it cannot strictly be combined with the fulfillment of an office or even with a certain public power.

Nor is any case adduced in which feminists cannot refute the absolute conclusion by the examples themselves. For they will either bring forward women who excelled in letters, sciences, and constancy of soul, and well exercised those offices from which you would wish to bar all women; or, if you transfer the discussion to the commonwealth, they will show forth great queens or empresses.

And add that the dissimilarity of the female and male intellect is not undeservedly attributed, at least in part, to dissimilar education and customs.

517. B. OF THE SECOND PART.

1. The confusion of the kinds of life, or the access of women to the commonwealth, are not things to be desired per se.

N.B. After what we have just written, no one will wonder that the arguments to follow cannot contain such force that the position of the adversaries is convicted of manifest absurdity, especially if, as often happens, it is attenuated in some manner and the discussion is instituted merely, for example, concerning the right of political suffrage.

But two things are especially to be maintained in this place.

a) The commonwealth is not to be accommodated to every arrangement which can strictly be tolerated, but to that which sound principles and experience demonstrate to be safer and better.

b) As soon as a certain kind of affairs is proved to be foreign to women, all participation in that kind is to be denied to them per se, even that which, taken separately, may seem to be attended by fewer inconveniences. To say it in other words: no step is to be made on a bad road, although we do not go headlong in one step. Yet one step is understood already to prepare an approach to the remaining and worse things.

By this reasoning, furthermore, we fortify the conclusion beforehand:

a) All who have inquired into human customs are witnesses that men and women are accustomed to differ so in disposition that the male and female disposition can each be described by its own marks. By these marks the man is said to be broader in intellect, stronger in soul, more constant in counsel, harder in heart, freer in body, more elevated by desire and pride; while the woman, on the contrary, excels in grace and in the force of affections, is more solicitous about particular matters with a rather narrower intellect, is more changeable in soul, less restrained in tongue, is compelled to serve more on account of her own needs or those of her offspring because of the slender body which she uses, and is shown by flatteries to be vain rather than proud.

Differences of this kind, which are constantly observed, a) Are to be presumed to have proceeded from nature, so that they cannot be derived wholly from customs or education.⁵ b) They are proved to be natural because they are consonant with the domestic place of women⁶ and with the physiological office by which they are destined to give particular care to infants, which requires patience and an abundance of affections.

⁵ Especially since you can scarcely appeal here to a certain ancestral tradition. For sons and daughters are born from one mother. By what mysterious fate would the artificial disposition of the father be implanted only in the sons, but that of the mother only in the daughters? That is at least scarcely probable. “Who knows whether, through a change of regime, we shall not succeed in making everything equal between the two sexes? Who knows whether woman cannot be rendered as vigorous, as agile, as capable of science as man!... It is as though you were saying: who knows whether the oak is not in the process of becoming a reed, the dove a hedgehog, and conversely.” Thus Proudhon himself, La Pornocratie, p. 145, quoted by Defroidmont, work cited.

⁶ Xenophon already elegantly described the domestic province of wives, Oeconomicus, chap. 3 at the end and chap. 7.

b) But if you enumerate the kinds of life, several seem to demand a masculine disposition and a person who can give himself wholly to them without bodily impediment; and they are often such that someone is withdrawn per se from domestic cares by them. Of this kind certainly are the public functions themselves. Add that, if political rights are also conceded to women, it will easily happen that the man and the woman follow contrary parties, which, since political pursuits are accustomed to be full of heat, creates no slight danger to domestic peace. But if for this reason you exclude wives, by this diminution of status you will render marriages less desirable, unless perhaps women, by such disregard for the right and by a slight desire, are shown to be more fitted for private affairs.

Hence the argument is made thus:

It is not to be desired per se that the kinds of life be mingled without regard for aptitude, or that women be called away from the domestic province; while, on the contrary, laws and institutions ought to strive toward this: that each person actually obtain in the state the place for which he is more fitted.

And this must be carefully noted: even if the natural or artificial origin could be disputed, the commonwealth must be adapted to persons such as we have, nor is it lawful to turn everything upside down in order that unexplored ways may be attempted.

Exclusion from the commonwealth is also confirmed by this rationale: political equality seems less fitting with the lower place which a woman ought to hold at home.

2. Nor are they to be hoped for according to some law of progress.

For insofar as offices become more confused, a way is entered rather contrary to this law of progress, according to which provinces ought to be distinguished more and more in accordance with varied aptitude. Will you say that it pertains to progress that a greater equality of persons be introduced? But only that equality which imitates nature is to be ascribed to the genus of progress. Yet nature has varied the disposition of man and woman, so that the one can more fully complete and perfect the other.

3. Nor will they profit women themselves in living well and happily.

a) Not in living well. For who denies that, under present customs and modesty, by which she remains more within and at home, a woman is greatly assisted in cultivating virtue? Who denies that many dangers will await women in public administrations? Who denies—to add a brief word about present opportuneness—that, since religion itself is accustomed to be contested today, it will happen that women, if they obtain suffrage, will be solicited by every art to lay aside religion and piety?

b) Nor in living happily. Omitting the fact that happiness is not purchased at the cost of virtue, to what will this feminine ambition lead? The peaceful and honored course of private life, where she is protected by a certain sacredness of weakness and is exempt from troublesome labors, where she enjoys no slight authority of persuasion—this course, I say, she will exchange per se for a fierce contest in which, endowed with unequal gifts of body and intellect, she will possess equal rights scarcely without futility. And through the contest itself she will be deprived of the benefit of the reverence which one who is weaker is accustomed to procure for herself by her modesty. But this most wretched condition of most women, which would prevail in full force if perfect equality were introduced, already seems in some manner to be prepared by every participation in the commonwealth.

What of the fact that the very diversity of pursuits is proved to contribute to the happiness of domestic life?

518. C. OF THE THIRD PART. Nevertheless, prudent feminism has its proper place.

No one will deny that it can easily happen that the weaker sex suffers certain unjust things, and that the laws themselves are less consonant with new circumstances. But besides this, it is established today:

a) In the order of workers, that a woman is to be withdrawn from excessive labor and has assumed too many of the parts of men in factories, so that she is said to have to be restored to the family.

b) In the ordering of domestic government, too free a discretion over common goods has been permitted to the man; and, with the circumstances of laborious occupations neglected, the woman herself has often had too little power over her own earnings.

c) As not a few seem to judge correctly, by the excessive indulgence of the laws an adulterous husband is permitted to go unpunished.

For the rest, the more recent laws themselves, by which the utility of women has been provided for opportunely, demonstrate the opportuneness of a wise feminism. We gave several examples at the beginning.⁷

⁷ For a comparison of the rationales of the Civil Code of France and of that which was drawn up for Germany a few years ago, see Réforme sociale, July 16 and November 16, 1901. The studies were written by Crétinon and Saleilles.

519. III. Difficulties. Most of them have been cut off, whether by the preceding conclusions of this book, by the arguments made, or by the very moderate manner in which the thesis was proposed.

1. If, for example, they argue from the fact that it happens that a wife is superior to her husband in merit and ability, it has been shown that this accidental superiority cannot change the law and that another means of employing that superiority is supplied by mutual affection.

2. If the supporters of an absolute conclusion rely upon diversity of disposition, they accomplish nothing against us unless they prove that it is so great that the woman appears unfit.

3. But if feminists contend at least that the male and female arts are not to be indicated by laws, we deliberately deferred this question to a scholion, so that it can be passed over in this place.

4. CONCERNING POLITICAL SUFFRAGE, an objection can be made to our position thus:

Universal suffrage cannot be granted unless, consequently, women are to be summoned to the voting assemblies.

Reply. I distinguish the assertion: Universal suffrage prudently granted for a public cause, I deny; universal suffrage which rests upon a certain feigned right of individuals, I concede.

If political suffrage belonged to every man by an innate right, it would certainly belong to women also, since it is indubitable that they are numbered within the human race. But the rationale of suffrage which is founded merely upon the presumed ability of all and was therefore introduced so that a better commonwealth could be hoped for, in no way demands that women be presumed equally fit or, even if they are thought capable, that they be adorned with this suffrage in the face of private and public inconvenience. Cf. nos. 88, 89, 94.

I insist. The interests of women, which are often different from those of men, ought to be represented in Parliament.

Reply. a) Nor is it generally true that the interests of women and men are contrary per se, since rather the one sex completes the other, so that it is in the common interest for both to conduct life well. On the contrary, men also enjoy the proper earnings and advantages of women. The earnings, for example, of a wife who is permitted to retain property of her own will profit the whole family, including its male part. The adversaries, therefore, were renewing the error of the socialists concerning the struggle between men and classes.

b) Even without a vote of their own, the considerations of women are represented in Parliament, both because of the very great influence which they are accustomed to exercise over their husbands,⁸ and because of the diligent care which many who will be blinded by no contrary interest will exercise with a view to the common good. Thus, for example, when the defect of a law was demonstrated in Belgium by which a lazy and prodigal husband was permitted to spend upon himself what his wife had gathered by praiseworthy thrift, although its correction seemed repugnant to the interests of husbands, nevertheless the correction of that defect was seen to be truly popular.⁹

⁸ Aristotle already observes that among the Lacedaemonians, for example, many things were transacted by the rulers of the commonwealth at the judgment of women.

⁹ Cf. Vermeersch, Manuel social, p. 240.

I insist. Women are as capable as very many men.

Reply. What follows from this, if the inconveniences recited stand in the way of suffrage?

5. Finally, THE DEFECTS OF THE PENAL CODE we readily concede, at least in part; nor can this difficulty, by which the third part of the thesis is confirmed, be objected against us.