Article II. On the End of Civil Society and the Common Good

554. What the end is. By its very origin, the State is shown to be directed toward the common happiness of men. For the cause of the union is the effort, by joined forces, to supply the poverty which is discerned in every order of goods. But since beatitude consists in the satiating enjoyment of every good, the common endeavor or conspiring to procure an abundance of goods of every genus by which approach to a satiety of this kind lies open as widely as possible is to be called an endeavor to procure happiness.

The same appears from the fact that by common society men seek perfection, or the remedy for common imperfection; but happiness is inherent in perfection.

In the merely natural order, these things would have to be said without exception. But now account must be taken of the divine condescension by which man is born for a supernatural end, for whose common procurement another perfect society distinct from the State—that is, the Church—has been appointed. Therefore, sacred things having been excluded, the end of civil society is circumscribed by the positive counsel of God, and no longer comprehends except inferior goods, or goods of this world, yet to be procured in such a way that they can assist the supernatural end, much less be an obstacle to this end. For there is no good of men except that which can be referred to the supreme end or good.

555. In what manner can temporal happiness be called the end of civil society?

1. Insofar as the present sufficiency of goods and the very preparation for the future life already bring the happiness which can now be possessed—that is, the happiness of this time—the solemn saying by which temporal happiness is called the end of the State is most true. “Having arisen,” thus Aristotle, “for the sake of living, it remains for the sake of living well.”¹

¹ Γενομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν (Politics, bk. 1, chap. 2, no. 1).

2. Insofar as only the things of this life can be administered by political power, and religious and sacred things do not pertain to it, this is not established until after the divine constitution of the Church has been proved. For a right disposition toward the future life is a part of temporal happiness itself; citizens, through a perfect society, universally seek a sufficiency of every good for procuring which individuals have little power; they labor under this need in sacred things no less than in profane; by general usage, non-Christian nations commit decrees concerning religious things to public power. All these things show that solicitude for the future life is not foreign to the State. Hence St. Thomas² does not hesitate to write: “If indeed this end—divine enjoyment—could be attained by the power of human nature, it would be necessary that it pertain to the office of the king to direct men toward this end.” And Suarez:³ “The nature of men demands that it be gathered into one political body of the commonwealth; but this political body ought to be ordered principally to the worship of God.”

² On the Government of Princes, bk. 1, chap. 11.

³ On the Sacraments, vol. 1, disp. 73, sect. 4.

It cannot therefore be said that a twofold rationale of perfect society proceeded from nature itself, of which the one would govern divine things and the other human and present things. Rather, certain genera of things which in the natural order would have pertained to the State are now reserved to the Church by the positive will of God.

From this it is also more easily explained how, with non-Catholics, the controversy concerning the legitimate province of the Prince⁴ is almost inevitable and insoluble, and why you cannot suitably define that province from natural reason alone.

⁴ We call Prince the one who possesses the supreme affairs, whether he be one person, several, or many.

556. What the common good is. If you consider that an end is a good which is presented to the will, you will perceive that the common good is the very end established beforehand for any society, to be attained by common work. Thus, in a society of merchants, the common good is the profit sought from the business undertaken. And in the State, which is formed to supply in a general manner the impotence of individuals and lesser groups, the common good will embrace: a) First, those things which would be lacking to all unless the State existed: public peace, interior and exterior security; b) Every genus of assistance to be granted according to the faculty which is at hand and the degree of necessity, with the rationale of distributive justice observed. According to this, the more excellent good is to be preferred to the lesser; and, in an equal society such as ours, that which directly or indirectly profits more persons is to be preferred to the utility of fewer.

Moreover, the common good and the good of several differ formally, although materially they can be the same. For a good which several persons individually have procured for themselves will pertain to several, yet will not be a common good. But if, by joined work, something is attributed to one person according to the end of the society—as if an annual sum of money were established for one widow of a citizen who deserved well—this prestation will be, under a diverse respect, the good of one and the common good. But where, by common effort and according to the legitimate rationale of the State, some good is made that of several, the good of several and the common good will be materially the same. But the common good and the good of the assembled multitude as such differ in no way, although individual procurations do not affect the whole multitude.