Article — Vermeersch, Questions on Justice

Article I. Conclusion with Notions and Arguments

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¶3799.

Thesis XXX

The relation of the hiring of labor is accompanied by duties of justice: on the one side, of preserving intact both the person of the worker—that is, his body and soul—and his honor; on the other side, of not injuring the property or reputation of the master.

¶3800.

The same relation is attended by a bond of a certain closer kinship, by which each is joined to the other, and by a debt of quasi-piety in the master, but of observance in the worker.

¶3801.

A certain imitation of master-servant society is especially consonant with nature.

¶3802.

2. The conclusion’s formula shows that there are three parts of the thesis, of which the duties are defined by the first two, while by the third there is defined that which agrees with the desires of nature rather than being strictly commanded by it.

¶3803.

3. Yet the relation of the duties to that contract is not one and the same. For the duties of justice which are adduced do not arise so much from the agreement as through its occasion, insofar as the very danger of violating them ought to exhort us to direct our mind more toward fulfilling them; while the agreement itself can be declared mediately the author and effecter of the other duties.

¶3804.

4. Opinions. Omitting the first part, against which there has been more sin in practice than will or opportunity for disputing, Socialists and Liberals oppose the other two parts together, yet for a different rationale. For the Socialists, from their principal dogma concerning the absolute equality of men, reject everything except those things which are referred to strict justice; while the teachers of liberalism long passed over in silence any duties of the master other than paying the promised wage, and the disciples too often plainly neglected the exercise of those duties. But if at times a certain humanity is commended in that school, the whole matter ends in temporal advantages and is generally so arranged that it induces no greater conjunction of persons and souls.

¶3805.

No Catholic is formally contrary to us here. Yet what things are to be referred to precepts and what to counsels; and, among the precepts, what things are commanded by justice, what are governed by another virtue, and what is the more suitable manner of inculcating them in minds and exacting them—this has often been left uncertain or stated ambiguously, nor is it without controversy. Therefore, we shall speak more explicitly concerning these things in the corollaries or scholia, according to our powers.

¶3806.

In this dissertation we shall use the Encyclical Rerum novarum as our principal support.

¶3808.

Of the hiring of labors: By labors here we understand those which are said more properly to be hired, because they place the person himself under some determination and direction of another. Therefore, the present consideration is less extensive and must be almost circumscribed to domestic servants; then to those who exercise their powers in factories; and finally to clerks and officials who discharge lower services.

¶3809.

The common relation: We say this both lest we appear to treat here special cases either of domestics or of those for whom the master in some manner takes the place of parents themselves, and so that we may signify that the things said avail in every agreement of this kind.

¶3810.

Is accompanied: that is, the duties are present concomitantly, proceeding not from the contract but from the rights of the human person.

¶3811.

Duties of justice: of commutative justice.

¶3812.

On the one side: that is, in masters or employers.

¶3813.

Of preserving intact: that is, of inflicting no detriment whose fault is deservedly imputed to the master himself.

¶3814.

What this demands we shall say distinctly in the corollary, no. 464. Here it will suffice to warn that we require no other positive care than that which comes down to the execution of the negative duty of harming neither the person of one’s neighbor nor his goods.

¶3815.

Both the person of the worker. Take the person, namely, together with those parts which so pertain to it that they are under the dominion of no one except God alone. For the use of our own body and soul is indeed conceded to us, but not dominion itself. For those things which constitute man as a possessor cannot at the same time be possessed by man in the strict sense.

¶3816.

That is, his body, which regards dangers to life and to the integrity of the members; the powers to be nourished and restored; illnesses and premature old age or infirmity to be warded off.

¶3817.

And soul, whether you regard the intellect or the more strictly moral life, which consists of human acts.

¶3818.

And his honor, which is violated by reproaches and affronts. Honor is now placed among goods properly possessed.

¶3819.

On the other side, as though from the contrary part of the worker.

¶3820.

Of not injuring: therefore, it is again a question of a negative prestation.

¶3821.

The property: for example, instruments and animals.

¶3822.

Or reputation of the master: through detraction or calumny, to which workmen are not rarely accustomed to be moved by a certain hatred or vengeance.

¶3823.

The same: I mean the agreement by which the labors are hired.

¶3824.

Is attended: mediately, through those things which it proximately induces.

¶3825.

By a bond of a certain closer kinship, by which each is joined to the other. Thus, in the order and duties of charity, the master and worker are to be regarded as prior to strangers in relation to each other. Moreover, when we say a certain kinship, we signify that this very kinship varies according to the object of the contract and the familiarity which is demanded or has customarily come into use.

¶3826.

And by a debt of quasi-piety in the master. Therefore, besides the duties of a special love, and of that love as reciprocal, we acknowledge proper duties of either party, which arise on account of the unequal place in which, once the agreement has been made, we thus confess that the master of the business and the worker are established together. For piety, which is the virtue that properly governs the order between parents and children, taken more broadly is placed over an order bearing some likeness of that which is sanctioned by nature between superiors and inferiors.

¶3827.

But of observance in the worker. By this name is properly designated the virtue by which those things which must be rendered to superiors are directed.

¶3828.

These duties, both of quasi-piety and of observance, pertain to the fourth precept of the Decalogue.

¶3829.

Is especially consonant with nature. That is, if it can be done, nature, although it does not strictly command it, has it among its desires and appears to exhort it by the very beginnings which are demonstrated to be contained in the agreement once made.

¶3830.

A certain imitation of master-servant society. Master-servant society properly so called is contracted with servants who are admitted permanently into the household. And this society is a certain extension of the family, an enlargement of that society by which marriage and birth join parents with children.

¶3831.

The imitation of that society is composed of greater zeal for the common good of both, a certain more universal care by which the master provides for the good of the worker (Institutions patronales [employer institutions]); and a more grateful mind, trust, and, to the extent that the faculty permits, benevolence with which the worker regards the master. Moreover, in the corollary, no. 467, we shall endeavor to set these things forth more distinctly.

456.

II. Proof

456. A. Of the first part. The common relation of the hiring of labor is accompanied by duties of justice: on the one side, of preserving intact both the person of the worker—that is, his body and soul—and his honor; on the other side, of not injuring the property or reputation of the master.

¶3832.

1. As regards those things which are said to be preserved by the master for the worker.

¶3833.

The matter is plainly established, provided that you attend for a little while:

¶3834.

That it is the worker’s right that these things be preserved intact;

¶3835.

That self-love itself prevents the worker from being judged to yield his right;

¶3836.

That in the action by which the master exposes the body or soul to dangers or assails honor there inheres some moral coercion, by which it comes about that external consent does not remove that involuntariness without which there is no injury terminatively. Cf. Thesis IX.

¶3837.

2. As regards those things which are said to be preserved by the worker for the master.

¶3838.

The matter is no less evident, because he too, unwilling and in some manner coerced, will bear his things becoming worse and detriment being brought to his reputation.

457.

457. B. Of the second part. 1. The same relation is attended by a bond of a certain closer kinship by which each is joined to the other.

¶3839.

This is already gathered from the authority of theologians, who agree concerning this matter, and from common sense. For that knowledge is spread among the people, so that in regions not yet corrupted by the contagion of socialism, if workers need anything, they spontaneously flee to the master as to one more closely joined, before they approach other strangers; and at the same time they have been accustomed to grieve at the master’s misfortunes or rejoice at his praise as though at their own lot.

¶3840.

Moreover, the same is established by reason. For the order of charity toward one’s neighbor is founded wholly upon union, society. But every hiring of labors is attended by a certain union and society in the execution of some intended work, superadded to the essential union by which all men are joined together. There is also added the rationale of mutual benefit, since one serves the other, which rationale is especially accustomed to join men.

¶3841.

2. And by a debt of quasi-piety in the master, but of observance in the worker.

¶3842.

For that debt will arise as soon as the hiring of labors is shown to make the condition of the worker and master unequal, and indeed in such a way that the latter becomes in some manner the superior of the former.

¶3843.

For when that relationship is introduced, duties will arise of which it is itself the title.

¶3844.

But: Every hiring of labors refers the worker to the master in this manner.

¶3846.

The minor premise is proved. Such is the character of this contract that it immediately regards not the fruit of the labor of the person but the labor itself, the labors themselves. Since these cannot be separated from the person, through that contract, as Schmalzgrueber already said, bk. 3, tit. 18, nos. 1, 2, 17, the very “person is handed over for another to use”; the “person is hired out for labors.” Therefore, there is necessarily introduced a certain relation between the person of the one letting and of the one hiring. But that relation is of the one using and the one to be used; or, in the order of attaining the end of the work undertaken, of the principal, moving, and directing cause, and of the instrumental, moved, and directed cause.

¶3847.

Therefore, the master (of himself or through an agent) becomes in some respect a principle of governance as regards the worker. But (from St. Thomas, II-II, q. 102, art. 1, corpus) this is the very title of superiority or dignity to which honor and reverence are owed, and which cannot make itself immune from the consequent burdens and duties.

¶3848.

2. From the labors promised there arises a certain cooperation of master and worker toward one end. But the cooperation of several toward the same end cannot be efficacious unless there is a head moving efficaciously, or imperatively. Now, that head here is necessarily the master. For his parts are the more principal, since he orders the whole business. Moreover, he either devised the undertaking or succeeded to the place of its inventor, and the affair is administered at his risk: “The loss of a thing, however, falls upon its owner.” Therefore, he is most truly called the master of the affair undertaken. Therefore, authority necessarily belongs to him in the order of perfecting this affair.

¶3849.

By these arguments it is also sufficiently shown that the excuses which can be brought forward are vain. For the special rationale of a particular contract cannot take away the essential generic mark of the letting and hiring of labors. The varying condition of the worker is plainly extrinsic to the common rationale of a hired worker such as we have described it. Finally, the varying form of the society brings it about that the authority of the master is constituted or exercised in a varying manner; but not that the nature of the agreement existing between the master and the workers is changed.

¶3850.

The conclusion is confirmed by demonstrating directly the titles of the duties of quasi-piety and observance.

¶3851.

a) Of quasi-piety. For just as an adult worker who himself determines the account of his labor will have to observe positively toward himself certain things which pertain to the suitable culture both of body and of soul, so, when he hands himself over to another to be directed, he necessarily transfers to the latter a part of that care which in a governor pertains to quasi-piety.

¶3852.

b) Of observance. For the deference consisting of obedience and gratitude, which pertain to observance, is founded upon excellence of status together with some power. (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 102, art. 2, corpus.) But excellence together with the power which belongs to a superior insofar as he is a mover is not absent from the hirer of labors, since, in procuring the very business, he governs persons. At the same time, he is to be regarded as the author of a benefit, at least by this rationale, that he furnished the worker an opportunity of earning.

458.

458. C. Of the third part. A certain imitation of master-servant society is especially consonant with nature.

¶3853.

Besides the fact that all things by which honorable friendships are cemented correspond especially to the desires of nature, nature cannot fail to approve an institution whose seeds it itself has cast and whose beginnings it has made.

¶3854.

But: In the very condition of master and workman and in the necessary relationship of each are found the seeds and beginnings of some master-servant society.

¶3855.

Therefore: The imitation of this society is especially consonant with nature.

¶3856.

To the minor premise. The worker is generally situated in a humbler condition, in which he is pressed by various necessities and is subject to various seductions. The master, by contrast, per se enjoys both that culture of intellect and those resources by which he is able to be a most useful protection.

¶3857.

Moreover, if the necessary order which obtains between an employer and a workman permanently attached to some factory is well preserved, the latter will be inclined to foster a grateful mind and to show trust toward him whom he now knows to be the author of more than one benefit to himself; while the master will be borne by an affection of humanity and benevolence toward the worker as toward the most useful helper of his undertaking. Does not a certain more universal providence and a closer conjunction imitating master-servant society, of which it can be called an enlargement, flow in a ready channel from that capacity and zeal?

¶3858.

This is confirmed by these words of Leo XIII, writing on July 10, 1895, to the Bishops of Belgium: “Nor is this the least thing: to bring it about that, with the reverence which is plainly fitting, obedience be rendered to the supreme counsels of God, who willed there to be a disparity of classes in the community of the human race and a certain equilibrium among them from friendly cooperation; thus, let the workers in no way cast off observance and trust toward their employers, nor let anything of just kindness and provident care toward them be lacking from the latter.”

¶3859.

And already above, no. 238, we gave from the same Pontiff this elegant description of the counsels of God: “The substance is this: whoever has received a greater abundance of goods by the gift of God—whether they be goods of the body and external goods, or goods of the soul—has received them for this reason: that he may employ them for his own perfection and likewise, as a minister of divine Providence, for the advantage of others.” And, in the same place, we took the same document from the First Epistle of St. Peter 4:10.

¶3860.

1. The master, in hiring a workman, often directed his mind in no way to these duties. Therefore, he is not bound to them on account of that agreement.

¶3861.

Reply. I deny the supposition: that an intention is required for contracting debts which either do not arise from the agreement or are necessarily joined to the principal will. “In taking this man into my house, I did not have the intention of making this agreement with him.—But God made it for you.” Thus vigorously Bourdaloue, Sermon sur les devoirs des maîtres et des domestiques [Sermon on the Duties of Masters and Servants].

¶3862.

2. When the company concerned is “anonymous” [a joint-stock company], the power is in the hands of so many persons; shareholders and workers are so unknown to one another, and shares so often change possessors, that these duties cannot be fulfilled and the relation whence a special debt of charity arises appears fictitious.

¶3863.

Reply. Just as through common action they delegate administrators to whom honor and obedience are rendered, by the same rationale they can and must delegate them to fulfill these debts.

¶3864.

This is common to every society: that certain physical persons act in its name. Nor does the frequent change of “shareholders” stand in the way, since each predecessor transfers his rights and debts to his successors. And whether through a certain fiction or otherwise you explain the duties of justice which certainly belong to this genus of moral persons, with no greater difficulty and by no dissimilar rationale will you explain the duties of charity and the relation upon which they rest. Therefore, it pertains to each of the “shareholders,” through his vote, to intend this: that persons who can and will satisfy these duties be placed over the work and furnished with such a mandate. But if someone did not prevent this from being done, he can be excused from those duties which cannot be fulfilled personally in a proportionate part—unless perhaps, on account of prohibited cooperation in evil, he cannot possess the “shares” themselves. Concerning this question elsewhere.—But what they can do in this matter is apparent from recent examples.1

1 Cf., for example, that which the French railway companies provided. It is reported in Bien Public, May 7, 1896, p. 32.