Article III. Supplements to the Doctrine

66. Concerning other norms. The two other norms proposed toward the end of article I cannot be admitted.

a) The norm which estimates a right from merit does not apply to burdens to be distributed, nor can it be employed for every rationale of common goods.

b) The distinguished Toniolo also wishes too absolutely to order the division according to needs.

67. Whether offices are matter of distribution.

Because public offices carry with them several advantages which can be received by magistrates without detriment to the public good for which they were chiefly instituted, it is evident that these offices must be placed among those goods which are to be distributed equitably among the citizens.

But in vain would you object with Cardinal de Lugo’s argument.¹ For we freely concede to him that those offices which are merely accessory to some principal function—so that the officials by whom they are filled are merely auxiliaries attached to someone who cannot furnish all things by himself—do not pertain to distributive justice, and that it is sufficient for the one placed over the principal function to associate suitable assistants with himself;² but he would be greatly deceived who, especially today, considered all public offices as parts of one potestative whole which one man—for example, a king—possessed. For very many offices subsist as something principal, concerning which the argument objected in no way holds; so that without doubt their proper parts must here be assigned to distributive justice, as Sánchez explains excellently in Consilia Moralia, cited place, ch. 1, doubt 36.

¹ De Iustitia et Iure, vol. 2, disp. 34, no. 19.

² For example, those who are called in French “secretaries” and “heads of a minister’s cabinet.”

What obtains, however, when magistrates are designated by popular suffrage, you have below in the scholium.

68. Concerning the proper equality of distributive justice.

Because distributive and commutative justice are two species of justice properly so called, each equals a debt. But that debt in distributive justice is constituted according to the just proportion to be preserved among the citizens, while in commutative justice it is constituted according to the quantity which already belongs to someone. To define what must be rendered to Gaius, the former observes what Peter has obtained according to his condition or merit; but the latter, neglecting consideration of Peter, observes how much already belongs to Gaius so that as much may be rendered to him. Therefore distributive justice attends, as Cardinal de Lugo says, disp. 1, nos. 45, 46, to equality between two proportions; commutative justice, to equality between thing and thing.

To use other words, the intention of the just distributor is directed toward preserving an equal proportion among the citizens, so that as the persons stand to one another, so too do the things which are rendered. This proportion will be defined both by the quantity of the thing to be distributed, if it is divisible, such as a sum of money to be expended as a subsidy, and by the degree which each one possesses according to the title to which attention must be given. That equality is expressed formally by comparing with one another, not two simple numbers, but two proportions, in approximately this manner: to Titius, who has a title as 1, there fall 5; therefore, to Gaius, whose title exceeds the title of Titius twofold, 10 must be rendered. This reduces to:

1/5 = 2/10.

This equality is called geometrical by the Scholastics, following the Philosopher; and it is the property by which distributive justice is distinguished from commutative justice. For they call the equality of the latter arithmetical,³ because it is constituted between the performance and the thing which already belongs to someone, so that per se no account is to be taken of other citizens or men: the quantity of my goods is not changed because of those things which Titius may happen to possess. Moreover, an equality of this kind is represented by this formula: 5 = 5.

³ But someone would uselessly raise the question why these names were invented, as Cajetan already observed, In II–II, q. 61, art. 2.

Suárez⁴ seems to deny that geometrical equality is a property of distributive justice. He attempts to establish this with examples. But through them the distinction which intervenes between each justice, commutative and distributive, is instead illustrated. For he adduces the example of a debtor who, since he cannot satisfy all his creditors in full, pays a part to each one from commutative justice.

⁴ Opusculum de Iustitia Dei, sect. 3, nos. 4–8. Moreover, on account of what he has in no. 19, he differs from us in words rather than in the matter.

But if distributive justice were in question, the proportion observed would correspond perfectly to the intention of the virtue and would equal the debt. Now, however—setting aside the question whether the debtor is strictly bound to preserve this equality among the creditors in order to render to each his proportionate part—the obligation of completing the payment remains upon him as soon as he can, so that he may render to each one as much as he received from them and thus arrive at arithmetical equality.

Nor does the other species objected cause greater trouble, concerning a commercial society whose profit falls to the individual members in proportion to their shares. For why is that proportion observed? Not precisely in order that the persons be treated equitably, but so that each one may receive the proper fruits of his own thing. Hence an agreement was made among the members by which, with common consent, they assessed what each one would contribute to the common fund; and immediately from that agreement each one has the right to claim this or that quantity in proportion to his own contribution.

You will say the same thing briefly thus. Sometimes commutative justice preserves the appearance of distribution, just as distributive justice sometimes seems to render an absolute quantity, as when it wholly protects and safeguards certain rights of citizens. But commutative justice establishes a proportionate part as a means of defining the absolute quantity of a right, while distributive justice renders this absolute quantity in order thereby to observe the just proportion.

In still other words: 1 = 1 and 5/5 = 5/5 sound the same materially. But commutative justice considers the former manner of writing formally; distributive justice, the latter.

Nor must this other rationale of the distinction be neglected: commutative justice per se confers things of the same order. If you possess another’s watch, a watch or its price must be returned. Therefore, if you cannot return something of the same order, you are not strictly bound to furnish a thing of another order.⁵ In distributive justice, on the contrary, the title and the thing which is rendered generally pertain to diverse orders. It grants, for example, money for virtue. This in turn demands geometrical equality, by which virtue is not immediately compared with monies, but, after virtues have been compared with one another, the same proportion is preserved between rewards as exists between the virtues.

⁵ Understand this per se and before the sentence of a judge.

69. Concerning privileges. Distributive justice is not injured when a true rationale of the common good either does not permit equality to be preserved among citizens or demands an unequal distribution. The reason is that the distribution itself is to be made only with the common good safeguarded.

Therefore, privileges which have a public cause are in no way repugnant to distributive justice.

70. Concerning subsidies by which institutions, civil States, and societies are assisted from the treasury. There is a twofold legitimate rationale for granting these subsidies. For either they are rendered as rewards by which citizens, whether all or those of a definite order, may be encouraged to cultivate virtues—for example, sobriety and thrift—or they are true subsidies for the relief of some need. In either case, they are to be rendered insofar as it conduces to the common good that by the assistance of this means these virtues flourish in society or such a need is relieved. And he who, led by another rationale, decrees subsidies would act against distributive justice, besides another sin to be defined from the title by which he is bound to care for the commonwealth. The same distributive justice will then provide that the subsidies be divided equitably in a proportionate part.

Rightly and deservedly, therefore, public power assists municipalities in completing works which either directly redound to the good of the whole commonwealth—for example, a harbor by which the commerce of a nation is enlarged—or whose utility, although circumscribed in place, is such that it is of public interest that it be fostered in towns or villages.

But care must be diligently taken that all are favored equitably.

Nevertheless, some allowance may safely be made for the distinction of the place: both because the good of the capital city is diffused into the subject localities, and because the splendor of the head adds splendor to the whole commonwealth.

Similarly, subsidies, if any are granted to societies of the kind in which some render mutual aid to others for a definite end (called in French mutual-aid societies), admit of a twofold explanation. For through these the commonwealth intends to excite or foster among the lower classes the endeavors by which future circumstances are provided for (provision for the future); and at the same time it desires to diminish the need and misery of workers. Nor in practice, if you attend to the rationales which are commonly proposed, is the consideration which the Holy Pontiff himself invokes neglected: namely, equitable compensation for the services by which even men of the common people benefit the universal community.

71. In what manner the exigency of the common good is the higher norm of just distribution. Because the quantity of the mass of goods to be distributed and the title by which a part of the accumulated mass belongs to the citizens must be defined according to the exigency of the common good, this exigency was therefore established as the higher norm. Nevertheless, regard for the common good that is owed pertains to legal justice; and public power is bound from commutative justice to regard that good. Therefore, the Prince, insofar as he attends to the common good, exercises not distributive but legal and commutative justice. Distributive justice then enters, by which he is obligated to make an equitable division for the citizens. The matter becomes manifest in the conferral of a public office. Who is worthy of the office appears chiefly from consideration of the common good; and from commutative justice toward the commonwealth, the Prince must assume one who is worthy. Then per se, distributive justice commands that the worthier be preferred from among those who are worthy.

But lest you wonder that a norm of distributive justice is thus taken from legal justice, take care to observe that the mean of some virtue need not be constituted by the virtue which intends it.

Thus the mean of temperance is manifested through the disposition of the body; the mean of commutative justice through the accomplished occupation of certain things. Therefore, nothing prevents the mean of distributive justice from being derived remotely from the exigency of legal justice.

72. Concerning the acceptation of distributive justice among the ancients. Sometimes whatever things have the appearance of distribution are referred by them to distributive justice: in that case this term in no way stands for a special virtue. Thus in St. Thomas, II–II, q. 63, art. 4, the judge himself, while assigning a thing to its true owner, exercises a certain distributive justice.

Moreover, the ancients had before their eyes almost exclusively the distribution of goods (monies) which might remain in excess in the commonwealth. In other words, they imagined resources to be available to the commonwealth in such abundance as exceeded the necessity of the common good. They declared that these goods must be divided among the citizens by the citizens’ own right. But Molina⁶ already wisely observed that this happens very rarely. Today, however, this hypothesis can be banished among the most vain.

⁶ Treat. 1, disp. 12, no. 3.

73. How distributive justice is observed in conferring one office. Just as a divisible thing must be divided in a proportionate part among those who have a title, so distributive justice demands that an indivisible thing be rendered to him who is superior in merit.⁷ For in this way a just comparison is made among the citizens, and each one in his own place will come into a share of this kind of goods. In this manner, therefore, even when only one office is to be conferred, there is place for the observance of distributive justice. Cf. de Lugo, disp. 1, nos. 43, 44.

⁷ But if they are morally of the same merit, the choice seems to be left to the distributor.

74. Concerning popular election. For two reasons the people ought not to have regard to distributive justice in choosing deputies. For the right of electing is conceded to the people less as a certain office than as a prerogative and privilege of having rulers of the commonwealth acceptable to themselves; then, deputies in some manner participate in the rationale of mandataries who administer the commonwealth for the people, to whom the direct administration of the commonwealth cannot be entrusted.

Thus it happens that the people, while choosing certain persons, are considered rather to confer something of their own. But in entrusting our own affairs, we are free from consideration of distributive justice.

Therefore, to persons who are first in merit for obtaining a certain office there belongs: a) sometimes a right of commutative justice, as when, after a competition has been announced, it is sufficiently apparent that the one conferring the office has obligated himself from justice to choose the one who would win; b) sometimes a right of distributive justice, as when offices are conferred by someone from his official duty and there inheres in them a secondary rationale of private good; c) sometimes no right, as when the election is permitted to the judgment of the people. Cf. what was said above.

75. You will ask whether distributive justice must be observed in lesser communities. This question cannot be raised concerning societies proceeding merely from the compact of private persons who, for the end either of profit or recreation, or led by some similar intention, possess certain goods in common, exercise a trade, etc. Here, all rights, if there are any, pertain to commutative justice. Rather, it concerns societies of persons which constitute a true community and which, by the generality of their end and their whole external species, present as it were an image of the perfect society of which they are parts. Of this kind in civil society are municipalities and to some extent provinces; of this kind also are religious communities in the Church.

Now, we judge that distributive justice inheres in these societies in approximately the same manner as legal justice. As we saw above, the legal justice which has a part in them is the same as that which safeguards the rights of the perfect community to which these lesser communities belong; and in no other manner does their authority, insofar as it assumes a public rationale, together with jurisdiction participate in the office of distributive justice belonging to those who are placed over the perfect society.

These things also hold concerning a religious community, especially as regards spiritual goods. At the same time, however, profession contains a certain rationale of compact, whose obligations, by reason of the motive for which they were undertaken, are urged chiefly by the virtue of religion.

76. You will ask concerning the rationale by which travelers and foreigners come into a share of common goods.

Reply. Everywhere today foreigners participate in many goods of the citizens: they are permitted to plead a cause in court, they make contracts, buy and sell goods, etc.

These things are explained first of all by the present law of nations, by which foreigners, especially residents, are assimilated to citizens in many matters, so that they must even be able to earn wages in the region in which they dwell. Then this humanity is in the interest of the citizens themselves, so that among other nations they may enjoy the same benefit. Nor is a rationale of equity lacking. For if, to give an example, foreigners are prohibited from employing private vengeance, ought not access to the judicial forum to lie open to them? If they pay taxes, ought not their goods and rights to be protected?