Article II. Formulation and Arguments of the Conclusion

Gratitude is a virtue connected with justice, which brings the will of him who has been moved by a benefit into equality with the affection of the benefactor.

Formal ingratitude, but not material ingratitude—at least not immediately—is a mortal sin by its genus.

496. I. State of the question. 1. THE INTENTION OF THE THESIS looks to this: that the essence of the virtue of gratitude and the guilt of the contrary vice be declared. We shall endeavor to accomplish this briefly in two parts.

2. THE TERMS ARE EXPLAINED.

Gratitude, or the habit by which, a benefit having been received, the soul is inclined to return the favor,

Is a virtue: We therefore call that propensity laudable, in which there inheres a necessity of moral goodness, not one that is merely indifferent;

Connected with justice, so that it is a potential part of justice;

Which brings into equality: Here, therefore, we find that equality which is the proper mark of justice;

With the affection, I mean of benevolence. Therefore, unlike justice, it does not regard effects, but principally the mind, the will which is manifested by effects;

Of the author, that is, of him who conferred the benefit;

The will, or affection,

Of him who has been moved by a benefit, or of him toward whom the affection of the author of the benefit was directed. For the effect sometimes has another material terminus, as when for the sake of another we receive someone kindly or attend him with gifts.

Formal ingratitude, or that which contains contempt for the benefit;

But not material ingratitude, which is the mere omission of this debt;

At least not immediately. We add this because, since we do not deny that beneficence induces a closer proximity which establishes a stricter debt of charity, grave of itself, so a grave obligation can arise mediately from a benefit received;

Is a mortal sin by its genus. Nevertheless, from the imperfection of the act—by which name we understand also the smallness of the matter—it becomes venial. That, on the contrary, which is venial by its genus does not become grave except from another species superadded.

3. OPINIONS. Here again it is a question less of resolving a controversy than of resolving an ambiguity. What we say concerning guilt is confirmed by the authority of Lessius.¹

¹ Cf. On Sins, in the first volume.

497. A. OF THE FIRST PART.

1. Gratitude is a virtue.

The special moral goodness of this habit is already proved by the most evident testimonies of common sense, by which a grateful mind is treated with praise, while the ungrateful man is so blamed that there is no one who does not strive with every effort to repel this reproach from himself. And from the very wisdom which is accustomed to inhere in words, he to whom a favor has been done is said to be bound, obligated by a benefit.

The same appears directly:

a) Because gratitude joins friendships, than which nothing is more desirable to nature;

b) Because it observes the special proximity by which an effect is necessarily joined and coupled with a cause.

That an effect is referred to its cause by a special relation is most manifest. Come then: one who is affected by a benefit, in a qualified respect—that is, as regards that knowledge of the intellect, good movement of the will, or joy which is in him from the beneficent man—is compared with the latter as an effect with its cause.

c) Because the cause of some material effect rightly and deservedly calls it its own. Thus we saw that the fruit of labor pertains to him by whose proper powers it was produced. Indeed, one who has received a benefit, since he is a person, cannot properly be possessed by another. Yet because he has experienced in himself the good action of another, he must in a nobler manner—I mean by an affectionate and pious inclination of soul—acknowledge that he has something from the other and is in some manner the other's. Therefore, gratitude participates in the moral goodness of piety toward parents.

Thus we appear to have explained the brief argument of St. Thomas, II–II, q. 106, art. 3, corpus: “Every effect naturally turns toward its cause. For it is always necessary that an effect be ordered toward the end of the agent.² But it is manifest that a benefactor, insofar as he is such, is the cause of the one benefited. And therefore the natural order requires that he who has received a benefit be turned toward the benefactor through the recompense of gratitude, according to the manner of each.”

² For the effect is something of the agent. But the agent, as such, is wholly for the sake of the end—the good—of the agent.

2. It is connected with justice.

For it is at once referred to justice, since it satisfies a title which is in another, and falls short of the perfect rationale of justice, because a benefit is a liberal prestation from which a right cannot flow. For one who wished to acquire for himself a right to an equivalent price sells or exchanges; he is not a benefactor. But if he wished merely to conciliate the will of another for himself, this will is not numbered among the things to which a right of commutative justice can be held.

3. It brings the will of him who is bound by a benefit into equality with the affection of the author.

For an equality of affections, not of effects, is intended:

a) The consent of the doctors³ and common sense itself testify to this. In estimating the benefit itself, men are already accustomed to attend principally to the will of the giver; but after the benefit they say that mutual gratitude and benevolence are owed;

³ Thus Seneca, bk. 1 of On Benefits, chap. 6: “A benefit does not consist in that which is done or given, but in the very mind of the giver or doer”; and Cicero, On Duties, bk. 1, chap. 15: “Choices must be made among benefits received, and first of all it must be weighed with what zeal and benevolence each one acted.”

b) The distinction between gratitude and justice proves it: for if thing were compared with thing, that arithmetical equality which is the property of commutative justice would be intended (no. 68);

c) It is no less apparent from the fact that the means or opportunity to render an equal thing is very frequently lacking, as when the debtor of gratitude is poor but the author has need of nothing; yet a virtue does not formally rest upon those things which per se cannot be done or are not expedient;

d) It is also established by this rationale: that the repayment of gratitude is owed to a benefit insofar as it is praiseworthy. Come then: as such, a benefit consists materially in the effect but formally and principally in the will. For there is question of a benefit strictly so called, which is done not in view of some advantage to be received but freely, or from an affection of benevolence. Therefore, the greater the affection has been, the greater the praise of which the benefit will be worthy. Cf. St. Thomas, q. 106, art. 5, corpus and ad 1; Lessius, no. 6.

498. B. OF THE OTHER PART.

1. Formal ingratitude is a mortal sin by its genus.

a) It is a mortal sin. For of itself it induces grave offense against one's neighbor. As Lessius notes, no. 16, charity is injured more by contempt for the benevolent affection of the benefactor and by an unfavorable interpretation of the benefit than by a rash judgment, which is contained, moreover, in these things.

b) By its genus. For there are various degrees in contempt itself, and from the contempt of a small benefit an occasion of grave offense does not appear to be given per se. Lessius, in the same place.

2. Material ingratitude is not, at least immediately, mortal by its genus.

For mere negligence or forgetfulness does not of itself have a movement contrary to charity, nor does it per se bring grave distress upon one who has deserved well. Nevertheless, it can happen that his want produces an obligation of assisting which becomes grave from the proximity itself. The refusal of assistance will then be a grave omission of the duties of charity, whose weight will also be estimated from the debt of a grateful mind. Therefore, we said that material ingratitude is only immediately light. Cf. Lessius, no. 18.

499. III. Difficulties. (Cf. more in St. Thomas at this place.)

1. GRATITUDE IS NOT A SPECIAL VIRTUE. For the congruous repayment of a thing received pertains to commutative justice.

Reply. Repayment which is intended directly and principally by the virtue, which is made according to the necessity of right and is accommodated to the quantity of the thing received, I concede; that which is intended secondarily, which is not exacted by right and must be measured by affection, I deny.

Repayment, as was said, is not the one or principal mode by which someone proves himself grateful. Otherwise, a poor man would be excused from the debt of returning gratitude. The remaining things are clear from the notions handed down.

I insist. But: The very thanksgivings to be rendered and the very acknowledgment of the benefit pertain to commutative justice.

Reply. I deny, because the formal rationale of a debt of commutative justice—a strict right of the other—is lacking.

Concerning this difficulty, cf. St. Thomas, q. 106, art. 1, ad 2; art. 3, ad 5; art. 5, ad 2; q. 107, art. 1, ad 2.

2. IT APPEARS THAT A BENEFIT MUST BE REPAID ACCORDING TO THE EFFECT RATHER THAN THE AFFECTION. For:

a) Repayment is owed to the benefit. But: The benefit consists in the effect. Therefore. (St. Thomas, q. 106, art. 5, ad 1.)

Reply. I concede the major. I distinguish the minor. It consists in the effect materially, I concede; formally and principally, I deny. For that which was given is not strictly a benefit except insofar as it is informed by a benevolent will.

b) Repayment cannot be made according to the affection, since the interior affection is hidden from man. St. Thomas, in the same place, ad 3.

Reply. I distinguish the minor. The interior affection is hidden from man per se, but it is manifested through many signs, as are, in the present case, a prompt and cheerful mind, obstacles overcome in rendering the benefit, and other circumstances which accompany the deed. Indeed, lest you oppose to this position that a benefit which was greater in reality commonly appears to require repayment with greater praise and affection, observe that a greater gift contains of itself a greater affection. For the rest, it is not denied that the importance of the thing furnished must also be considered. Cf. the corollary, no. 503.

3. EVERY INGRATITUDE, EVEN IF MERELY MATERIAL, IS A MORTAL SIN. For every ingratitude is repugnant to charity. Cf. St. Thomas, q. 107, art. 3, ad 2.

Reply. I deny. To the rationale, I distinguish. Insofar as it is beyond charity and excludes some act of charity, I concede; insofar as it is properly contrary to charity and destroys the very habit of charity, I deny.