Minor Question I. Concerning the Obligation of Undertaking Military Service

121. Someone may ask whether the obligation of military service can truly be called a tax. Many economists deny it, although they seem to be sufficiently at sea in defining the class of the obligation.¹

¹ Let Cauwès, no. 1217, be an example: “It is a civic burden of a particular character.”

And indeed, if you take the word tax strictly, since no money is to be contributed, it does not seem to apply to military service. But if you consider the formal rationale of the obligation of serving as a soldier, you will find it to be the same as that of paying a tax. For it is a certain burdensome performance imposed upon citizens for the common good. Hence it is aptly referred, with the theologians, to the class of a tax; nor do the common people err in the name “tax of blood” (French: impôt du sang).

122. A question of no small importance is raised today concerning the faculty of redeeming oneself by money from this burden.

1. a) Not a few, among whom are DD. Beernaert and Cauwès (no. 1217), contend that this faculty is repugnant to the rationale of that obligation, inasmuch as it would be strictly personal.

b) Others judge that a law by which one is given the opportunity to seek with gold someone who would become a soldier in one’s place is contrary to distributive justice, since the poor are excluded from a benefit of this kind.

2. Yet the very emptiness of the arguments by which each opinion is defended already demonstrates that they have little force.

a) For by what rationale would you say that the obligation of serving as a soldier is personal?

Insofar as all citizens are bound personally, according to their ability, to contribute to the security and safety of the fatherland? They are no less bound, by their combined strength, to devote their labor to internal peace and prosperity and to every rationale of the common good.

Yet because it is established that citizens need not furnish these things immediately and through themselves, in what manner can you derive from that general obligation that all must proceed into the camp?

Insofar as a definite number of citizens who are to be conscripted is defined by law? It does not follow from this that the very persons who, for example, are designated by lot must personally perform the military service. For why should they be forbidden to hire another who would willingly furnish it in their place, provided that the soldiers are present in the defined number?

Insofar as the obligation of itself so adheres to the person that the latter cannot discharge this debt through another? An argument is wanting by which this assertion, by no means evident of itself, might be proved.² For if the office of nourishing his children can be entrusted by a father of a family to others who are worthy of trust, by what rationale is every choice of a representative said to be of itself illicit here?

² From this it is evident how empty the reasoning is which they employ when they argue approximately thus: It is forbidden to cast a personal burden upon another. But. The obligation of serving as a soldier is of this kind. Therefore. For the major must be denied unless you take a personal burden to mean a burden which, on account of a peculiar rationale, you must bear through yourself; and thus you formally say the same thing twice (a tautology). The minor, however, contains a begging of the question.

b) As regards the other assertion, or the alleged inequity of the distribution, they would not be far from the truth if, after money had been paid, the wealthier were made exempt in such a way that others were compelled to enroll in their place. But since the matter is reduced to a voluntary contract of letting and hiring, from which the condition of the poor becomes no worse at all—rather, they have there an opportunity for honorable gain which is not to be despised—there is no place here for envy except that which an unjust hatred of another’s happiness and a false rationale of equality engender.

Add that this faculty benefits not only the wealthy, since many families of moderate means have in this way preserved a son who was very useful or even necessary to them.

Add that minds are so disposed today that the legitimate immunity of clerics can be preserved by almost this rationale alone.

Therefore one must labor instead so that, with errors and prejudices removed, those who, hired for a price, become soldiers in the place of others may no longer be compelled to live under the contempt of the rest.

For a most just cause of piety [family duty], etc., can impel them to this; and if it is lawful and not unbecoming to hold military offices for the sake of gain, how would it be disgraceful to undertake voluntarily, for an honorable wage, the burden of service as a common soldier?

If, however, a more general faculty could be given to citizens of seeking for themselves a suitable substitute, under conditions which are more open to all, a law of this kind, on account of its very equity, would be most worthy of commendation.

123. So that we may now speak positively and precisely about the matter itself, the question comes down to this: Whether or not the common good, the end for which troops are raised, cannot be obtained unless citizens are compelled personally to become soldiers? If the matter should stand thus, and if the utility of a personal obligation should prevail over the disadvantages which are rightly and deservedly feared, the burden can be imposed by law upon the necks of citizens as personal. But if not, the law ought, far from merely being able, to permit the burden to be alleviated by a chosen substitute. For this principle holds: beyond what necessity bears, political authority cannot burden citizens with an obligation.

And here there is question of the gravest burden of all, by which a very great number of citizens are deprived of their liberty and handed over to a certain public servitude, even if temporary.

124. We sufficiently agree with the theologians who judge that the distribution of this tax is of itself not very equitable.³ For it is exacted only from those families which are endowed with male offspring; and the legislator often does not even think about compensating them for this burden. It would certainly be necessary, if our judgment is of any value, that those who cannot give persons should contribute a greater sum of money with which military expenditures would be provided for, so that, insofar as can be done, the obligation of providing for this common undertaking would fall more uniformly upon all.

³ Of itself, I say. For if the distribution of that burden is commonly judged just, you could not “practically,” on account of the persuasion of a few, even if it is truer, change that form or exact compensation. Therefore that inequality must then be borne with equanimity, from zeal for the common good; because it cannot be avoided, it will no longer be formally repugnant to justice.

A rationale for repairing the loss can also be entered upon in this manner: that a suitable stipend be paid to conscripted soldiers. Therefore the Belgian law is to be approved which, for some years now, has established a greater salary for soldiers, certainly for those who are of humbler condition. Nevertheless, all, even the wealthier, appear of themselves to have a right to equitable compensation.