Article II. Formulation and Arguments of the Conclusion

Distributive justice is directly concerned with common goods to be divided; with burdens, however, only indirectly.

By the proportion which it observes, it intends to equal the special right which the members claim for themselves in the goods of the community.

The quantity of this right must be measured primarily by the exigency of the common good, secondarily by the norm of equality.

60. I. State of the Question. 1. THE END OF THE THESIS is sufficiently shown of itself to be threefold: so that in the first part the material object of this justice is defined; in the second, its formal object; finally, in the third, the mode of measurement by which the formal object is to be estimated quantitatively—or, what comes to the same thing, what rules are to be observed in an equitable distribution.

2. THE TERMS ARE EXPLAINED.

Distributive justice is directly concerned with goods ... but with burdens only indirectly. Therefore, we defend a middle opinion, by which we do not indeed banish the distribution of burdens from the province of this justice, but nevertheless refer it to this province only indirectly. Directly, I say, that is, in itself, under this rationale of goods to be distributed; indirectly, that is, in another, insofar as an unequal distribution of burdens is reduced to an unequal division of goods.

Under the name of goods, moreover, we also embrace public offices. With how much right and merit we do so we shall not teach by arguing it distinctly, since it seems sufficient to us if in the corollary we show Cardinal de Lugo’s rationale to be vain.

With common goods to be divided. By this final word, we deny that the care concerning the manner in which citizens divide private possessions among themselves pertains to distributive justice.

By the proportion which it observes. By these words we describe the material function of this virtue: to maintain proportion in distributing.

It intends to equal, that is, to render according to equality.

The special right which the members claim for themselves in the goods of the community. You have this right outlined above, no. 8.

The quantity of this right, or what the just thing is.

Must be measured primarily by the exigency of the common good. Therefore, a just distributor must first consider what rationale of distribution conduces to the common utility.

Secondarily: that is, insofar as the prevailing rationale of the common good permits.

By the norm of equality. So that he is perpetually occupied with the endeavor of rendering the same to all, except insofar as the common good requires diversity. That is, so far as the end of society allows, the distributor strives to maintain equality among the citizens.

Moreover, we propose this position in modern societies, in which the citizens enjoy equal right, although it also retains its truth in aristocratic societies. For in these societies distributive justice then has regard to those inequalities which exist by a legitimate fact; and, while it considers no inequality beyond these, it can again be said to tend toward equality.

II. Proof.

61. A. OF THE FIRST PART. 1. Distributive justice is directly concerned only with common goods to be distributed.

It pertains directly to justice to render to another, but not to exact for oneself.

But in the distribution of goods alone is something rendered to another. For he who distributes burdens defines what must be furnished to himself or to the community.

Therefore, distributive justice, which, insofar as it is distributive, is concerned with distribution, cannot, insofar as it is justice, be concerned directly except with goods.

That the discussion concerns only common goods is already evident from the fact that this justice resides solely in the community, since it alone is referred to the members as a whole to its parts. But a community which undertook to distribute things other than common things would violate private rights of ownership.

2. Nevertheless, it is concerned indirectly with burdens.¹

¹ Cardinal de Lugo treats the same argument, disp. 1, nos. 56, 58; and although we consider his explanation insufficient, he nevertheless brings forward several things plainly worthy of consideration. For example, at the end of no. 56, he explains the difficulty excellently.

For a) to be free from a burden has the rationale of a good—indeed, a negative one, but one which is very often valued most highly; b) just as the goods of someone’s patrimony are not understood except after debt, or obligations, has been subtracted, so the sum of the goods which someone enjoys in society must be compared with the burdens annexed to them.

Therefore, distributive justice is concerned with burdens insofar as, by imposing upon each one only that which it is just for him to bear, it does not diminish his goods beyond what is equitable and in this manner preserves for him a proportionate part of the common advantages; in other words, insofar as the distribution of burdens reduces to a certain division of goods.

62. B. OF THE SECOND PART. 1. By the proportion which it observes, distributive justice intends to equal a right.

For to render a right, and indeed according to equality, is the generic formal rationale of justice properly so called (no. 29).

2. That right is the special right which the members claim for themselves in the goods of the community.

For a special right is needed in order that there be a special rationale of debt. But a special rationale of debt alone can introduce a new species of justice, since justice regards a debt (cf. no. 29).

Therefore, a special right to be rendered is needed in order that distributive justice be a distinct species of justice. But it is evident that the special right presently in question is that by which the community is bound toward the members as its parts.

63. C. OF THE THIRD PART, which concerns the norm to which a just distribution must conform, especially in a society where the citizens enjoy an equal regime. Come now: we argue briefly as follows that this norm is twofold, the one primary, which the rationale of the common good supplies,² the other secondary, namely, the preservation of equality among the citizens.

² Concerning how this is to be understood, cf. below, no. 71.

Argument 1. An adequate norm must correspond perfectly to the nature of the right of which it is the measure. But only the twofold norm which we have indicated does this. Therefore.

The minor is proved. For the good which distributive justice furnishes is essentially subordinated to the common good: for it is the good of the parts; but the good of the parts as such must yield to the common good. Moreover, that good is per se and under the present regime to be rendered to the citizens in an equal manner: for it is owed to the parts as such, and the citizens are per se parts of society in the same manner, which equality is preserved under the regime which we use today. But regard for the common good corresponds to the subordination of the right; the intention of preserving equality corresponds to the manner in which the right inheres in the citizens; while if either consideration is omitted, only an imperfect rationale of the right is possessed. Therefore.

This is confirmed from the Encyclical Rerum Novarum, where the Supreme Pontiff, entering upon our argument, begins thus: “This further must be considered ... that the rationale of the civil State is one, common to the highest and the lowest. For working people are by nature citizens with equal right with the wealthy, that is, parts ... from which the body of the commonwealth is constituted.”

Argument 2. What we were saying concerning the norm can be established briefly by this other reasoning.

Each citizen has a right to that part—all and only that part—of the common goods which will come to him from a rightly administered commonwealth. But this part is defined by that twofold norm. Therefore.

To the minor. For a commonwealth is rightly administered when regard is had first for the common good and then for the form in which the society itself is concretely constituted. Today, however, this form rests upon equality.

64. You will ask how distribution is actually to be ordered according to these rules.

For it is preferable to join immediately to the proof already given that corollary by which it may become more apparent to what our opinion amounts and by which the difficulties may more easily be solved or even proposed.

We omit the case of an unequal society. Therefore, in our civil States, attention must generally be given to the goods which are the matter of distribution and to the end of civil society.³

³ For, as we have already observed, we are treating political rather than religious society.

The goods to be distributed are: various offices; the protection of liberty and rights; and monies by which institutions, such as public schools, etc., are founded, the arts and sciences are fostered, or the need of citizens is relieved in various ways.

Nor must this be passed over: today practically all the resources supplied to the treasury come from duties and taxes.

The end of civil society comprises two parts: the efficacious protection of rights and the positive procuring of those things which are of common interest, since the private efforts of citizens would be ineffectual for attaining them.

It must further be observed that it is advantageous to the commonwealth that fitting rewards for virtues and distinguished deeds await the citizens, and that the destitution of many citizens which is in no way consonant with the general culture and happiness of society be repelled. For unless you oppose this misery, you will scarcely avoid indignation and disturbances.

Let us now explain briefly what rationale of distribution seems to us to be adopted:

a) There are goods—for example, public offices—which, even after they have been assigned to one person, retain a principal ordering toward the common good. These must always be conferred primarily with a view to the commonwealth. Therefore, the principal consideration is of all those qualities from which it is permissible to hope for a good administration of the office. Qualities of this kind are knowledge or skill, probity, prudence, practice or experience in affairs, and sometimes the very agreement of mind with those with whom the office must be discharged.⁴ Then, other things being equal, account must be taken of merits. For offices, since they have honor, profits, and various advantages annexed to them and can be bestowed upon only a few, seem by their nature to possess the character of a reward. Usage and common judgment agree, which command that, besides fitness, consideration be given to the time from which someone began to devote himself to the commonwealth, which magistracies he has already discharged, etc.

⁴ We borrow this from St. Thomas, II–II, q. 63, art. 2, ad 1, where he writes: “Sometimes, however, the kinsmen of an ecclesiastical prelate are equally worthy as others. And thus, without respect of persons, he can licitly prefer his kinsmen, because at least in this they are preeminent: that he can have greater confidence in them to treat the affairs of the Church in harmony with him.”

b) Concerning certain other advantages which citizens rightly hope for themselves from their community, all are pressed by the same species of necessity, although perhaps not to the same degree. For all need public protection for the peaceful possession of goods and rights. This protection must be exercised toward all according to the quantity of rights which are exposed to danger. Nevertheless, if, as regards a certain species of rights, a danger is proper to some class, assistance must be brought to this class by a special provision.⁵

⁵ This is the most manifest doctrine of the Encyclical Rerum Novarum: “Rights, in whomsoever they exist, must indeed be observed as sacred; and public power must provide that individuals possess their own, by warding off and punishing injuries. Except that, in protecting the rights of private persons, account must be taken chiefly of the lowest and the poor.”

c) Finally, the civil State may procure for itself from the fortunes of the citizens fitting resources by which it may foster the arts and letters and give to all the means of attaining that moderate sufficiency of fortune (modeste aisance) which seems to correspond to general prosperity.

Therefore, the distribution of those resources must be ordered in such a way that rewards are given to those who are prior in merit, while those which have the rationale of aid and subsidy are given according as each one is more in need and lacks a more excellent good.

65. III. Difficulties.

1. THAT JUSTICE SEEMS ALSO TO BE CONCERNED WITH DISTRIBUTING GOODS OTHER THAN COMMON GOODS.

For if a private person by testament appoints some college of persons—for example, a chapter—as heir, so that a proportionate part of the goods belongs to each individual canon according to his dignity in the chapter, the distribution will have to be made according to each one’s dignity. But this kind of distribution pertains to distributive justice. Therefore, that justice is also concerned with goods other than common goods.

Reply. I deny the antecedent. To the proof, however, I distinguish the major. A distribution properly so called will have to be made, I deny; an analogical distribution, which retains some figure and appearance of distribution, will have to be made, I concede. I contradistinguish the minor. This kind of distribution (according to dignity) pertains to distributive justice where there is question of distribution properly so called, I concede; otherwise, I deny.

For not every distribution pertains to the species of distributive justice, but that by which satisfaction is made to the peculiar right which a perfect community is bound to observe toward its members. We call this distribution properly so called. But in the species objected, the individual canons, after the death of the testator, have a strict right, or a right of commutative justice, to a proportionate part of the goods.

2. ANOTHER NORM SEEMS TO HAVE TO BE ASSIGNED TO THE QUANTITY OF THE RIGHT: A JUST RECOMPENSE FOR WORK CONTRIBUTED TO THE PUBLIC UTILITY.

For a) it is perpetual in societies which join merchants or citizens that they participate in the common profit in proportion to the share which they contributed.

b) Nor is another norm suggested by Leo XIII in his Encyclical Rerum Novarum; for in the place where he recalls that distributive justice must be observed and explains its parts, he states the conclusion thus: “Equity therefore commands that public care be taken of the workingman, so that from what he contributes to the common utility he may himself receive something.”

Reply. I deny the assertion if it is taken in such a way that the works furnished are either the principal or the universal norm to which attention must be given.

For we do not deny that the rationale of merit is among those rationales which, since they increase dignity, must be considered in the conferral of offices.

Nor do we deny that it is very expedient for rewards to be placed, as it were, in the midst, by which citizens may be attracted to the good arts and distinguished deeds.

But: a) insofar as the commonwealth precisely shows itself grateful, it satisfies a duty which is not juridical, is not proper to the community, and must not be furnished to citizens alone. This threefold characteristic sufficiently shows that recompense from gratitude is formally foreign to the province of distributive justice.

b) The stipend which is paid to those placed over certain administrations is owed to them from commutative justice as an agreed wage.

c) There are many goods by the distribution of which the State in no way remunerates merits, but alleviates needs.

d) And, in general, to define what utility the various orders of citizens contribute to the commonwealth and to compare their merits with one another is a work teeming with difficulties and errors which no one has thus far undertaken.

Therefore, no universal norm can be constituted in the remunerating of merits; indeed, if account is sometimes taken of them, they are nevertheless not the title which justice immediately regards, but the reason for conferring the good upon him who surpasses the others in merit is taken from the common utility or from the equality to be preserved among the citizens. Otherwise, that justice would scarcely be distinguished from the virtue which renders thanks.

With these things established beforehand, we arrange briefly the formal reply to the difficulties objected as follows:

To a) I distinguish the argument. And this proportionate part of the profit falls to each individual from distributive justice, I deny; from commutative justice, I concede.

For although, because of the facility of commerce, these societies in some manner imitate a moral person, this is a mere juridical fiction and something artificial. In reality, the goods do not belong to some person distinct from the members; they each preserve dominion over the common patrimony according to their own share and can exact a part of the profit as the fruit of their own thing, according to the maxim: a thing bears fruit for its owner.

To b) The Holy Pontiff teaches that certain goods are to be distributed according to merit toward the commonwealth, and that even in this respect the order of workingmen is not to be neglected, since they too, although less directly, serve the public utility, I concede; the Holy Pontiff establishes this rationale as the universal and supreme rationale of making a distribution, I deny.

For above he argues from the rationale of a part which the rich and the common people possess equally; while below he teaches that, in protecting private rights, singular care must be taken of wage-earners. “For the nation of the rich, protected by its own safeguards, needs public protection less; the wretched multitude, secured by no resources of its own, relies especially upon the protection of the commonwealth. Therefore the commonwealth ought to embrace wage-earners, since they are numbered among the needy multitude, with singular care and providence.”

3. ST. THOMAS wishes the division of common goods to be made according to principality.

Reply. I distinguish the assertion. According to any principality whatsoever—for example, of wealth or talent—I deny; according to the principality which someone has reduplicatively as a part, I concede.

In establishing a norm of this kind for every society, St. Thomas is not opposed to the more definite norm which we posit for modern society. In a democracy, he thus continues, “principality is considered according to liberty.” What does this mean? Unless we are mistaken, precisely this: in a democracy, men equally free are distinguished by no principality per se. There remains, therefore, that principality which they acquire per accidens from their free act or condition, according to the various quality of the goods. These things plainly agree with our manner of speaking.

4. From the norm handed down, monies which are expended from the treasury for the relief of the needy would be governed by distributive justice, while they ought rather to be referred to charity or mercy.

Reply. I distinguish the assertion. From the norm handed down, those public subsidies by which need is relieved insofar as the common good demands would be governed by distributive justice, I concede; other subsidies, I deny. And I also deny the supposition: that others can be granted. For it is foreign to the modern regime to exercise mercy properly so called. Liberality must be performed from one’s own goods. Today, however, the civil State cannot meet even necessary expenditures from its own private dominion, but, as has often been said, is compelled to procure resources for itself through exactions. But the quantity of taxes must be measured according to the necessity of the common good. Therefore, the civil State is not permitted to exercise mercy except through goods left to it for this end. But the poor again seem to have a right of distributive justice to the equitable distribution of revenues of this kind.