Article I. The Various Opinions Are Set Forth

43. 1. ST. THOMAS, who on this matter agrees with the Philosopher, teaches that legal justice is a general virtue which is not divided alongside the other virtues in the manner in which piety, fortitude, and temperance are,¹ since it has as its material object the good or the acts of the other virtues; although it does not lack a special essence, because it further orders that good of the other virtues toward the common good,² commanding their acts as owed to the community.

¹ Art. 5, ad 1.

² Art. 6, corpus.

This is the position which we shall defend in this chapter.

2. Several hold that legal justice merely signifies the aggregate of all the virtues, so that they deny it a special essence.

3. According to MOLINA, legal justice is justice taken broadly, adorned with the name of justice because it produces equality with the laws. Its formal rationale, accompanying the acts of all the virtues, would be found in every act of virtue which is exercised for the common good. The act of legal justice would therefore be “the act of any virtue whatsoever, not insofar as it is such, but insofar as it is ordered toward the common good of which the one who exercises it is a part.” (Cited place, no. 1. Cf. no. 5.)

4. LESSIUS remains rather uncertain. Nevertheless, he is more pleased with the view that legal justice is a special virtue which intends this special moral goodness of procuring the good of the commonwealth of which the agent is a citizen. As he judges, it is called justice because it regards another; nor is the opinion of those who think that it does not differ from piety improbable. Finally, he considers that the parts which Aristotle attributes to this justice agree most closely with the virtue of obedience. Cf. cited place, nos. 10, 11, 12, 14, 19.

5. For Cardinal de Lugo, legal justice is justice improperly so called, concerning which Aristotle held various opinions, but which in reality inclines one to procure the common good of the commonwealth “because of the peculiar conjunction which the agent has with the commonwealth.” Therefore, he agrees sufficiently with Lessius. Cf. C. de Lugo, cited place, nos. 62, 64, 68.

6. Among more recent authors, very many—for example, R. P. Cathrein³—embrace Cardinal de Lugo’s opinion. Some, such as R. P. Bucceroni,⁴ reduce legal justice to the obedience by which the laws are obeyed. Nor do they consider themselves opposed to St. Thomas.

³ Philosophia Moralis, no. 141.

⁴ Theologia Moralis, De Iustitia, no. 4.

Finally, several seem to hold an opinion sufficiently similar to ours. Thus Most Illustrious D. Waffelaert,⁵ and, besides R. P. Van Gestel⁶ and R. D. Pottier,⁷ R. D. Marrès,⁸ who very briefly describes legal justice as that “by which its right is rendered to the commonwealth or civil State for procuring the common good of the citizens.” Carrière speaks ambiguously.

⁵ Tractatus de Iustitia, no. 4, note 20.

⁶ De Iustitia et Lege Civili, second edition, pp. 11, 12.

⁷ Cited place, nos. 68 and 86.

⁸ De Iustitia, no. 2.