Article — Vermeersch, Questions on Justice

Article II. Formulation and Arguments of the Conclusion

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¶3404.

Thesis XXVII

The profit to be made from a business belongs per se, proportionately, both to him who contributes labor and to him who furnishes capital.

¶3405.

Nevertheless, some form of partnership between the employer and the workers, although per se more perfect and more consonant with the equal dignity of the human person, is not the only just form of contract; rather, a true letting of labor is also honorable in itself.

393.

393. I. State of the question. 1. THE INTENTION OF THE THESIS is that in the first part we establish among whom profit acquired by human industry is to be divided when every agreement is excluded; and, in the second, what species of agreements are approved or even preferred by nature in themselves. In themselves, I say. For a form which is better per se can be impeded by many difficulties. Therefore we pass over this other question concerning the use of the better form: whether there is an opportunity or even a universal possibility of introducing it.

¶3407.

The profit to be made from a business, or the economic fruit for the acquisition of which a man must in some manner expend his labor. This, morally speaking, is always required, since no property is acquired, at least, without occupation. The word business is therefore taken broadly. We in no way circumscribe the thesis to those fruits which are strictly called industrial, because in generating these the labors of men have the principal part.

¶3408.

Moreover, by the name of profit we understand an increment of value, la plus-value, le produit net [surplus value, net product]. Therefore, both classes of persons can claim not only as much as they have contributed—which no one denies—but, if the affair has prospered, more than they contributed.

¶3409.

Per se. For both a just agreement and a social ordinance can change these things. Thus slavery legitimately introduced deprives a servant of ownership of his labors, and consequently of every portion of the profit.

¶3410.

Proportionately, which is to be defined from quantity, quality, and efficacy according to common estimation, and, insofar as this is lacking, according to an agreement freely made. This we can call proportionately to merit.

¶3411.

To him who contributes labor. We understand both labor which is exercised by the body and labor which pertains to the intellect, or by which the business is conceived, ordered, and so forth.

¶3412.

And to him who furnishes capital. Take capital properly, though not strictly. Cf. no. 389.

¶3413.

Nevertheless, some form of partnership. We gave the various modes in no. 390.

¶3414.

Between the employer. Understand by this the one who seeks the aid of another’s labor, especially for conducting a business profitable in hope, of which he has the principal care (le patron [the employer]).

¶3415.

And the workers. Here we understand especially those who offer their labor as servants or workmen.

¶3416.

Although per se more perfect. In French one would say, répondant mieux à l’idéal [corresponding better to the ideal]. Therefore, we pronounce nothing concerning its practical opportunity. Indeed, it is sufficiently evident that, at least today, it cannot be introduced universally.

¶3417.

And more consonant with the equal dignity of the human person, by reason of which men are not subordinated, but coordinated toward the same end.

¶3418.

Is not the only just form of contract. We understand commutative justice.

¶3419.

Rather, it is also honorable in itself, insofar as it is not procured by any evil arts.

¶3420.

A true letting and hiring of labor. Cf. no. 391.

¶3421.

3. OPINIONS. The socialists oppose both parts of the thesis, since they think that a portion of the profit falls unjustly to capital and reject the alienation of labor such as the contract of letting establishes.

¶3422.

Catholics will deny neither the first part nor the general and tempered assertion with which the second part begins, except that, according to the various studies by which they are led in dividing the fruit, some will favor capital or administration more, others the labor of the workmen more; and some will more readily commend the form of partnership than others. The latter assertion, however, concerning the honorableness of a true letting of labor, seems less pleasing even to certain Catholic men. For, in a conference concerning the social question which Catholics from various nations held in June 1882 at the castle of Haid in Bohemia, they judged the contract between workers and employers necessarily to be a contract of some partnership; and, at the same time, that justice required that the wage not remain below the sum sufficient for the sustenance of the worker and his family, and that account be taken of the profit received from the business. From what will be said, it will readily be evident that these two things can scarcely fail to conflict.1

1 The “social contract,” which bears the name contrat de Haid [contract of Haid].

394.

394. A. AS TO THE FIRST PART. The profit to be made from a business belongs per se, proportionately, to him who contributes labor and to him who furnishes capital.

¶3424.

Praises, rewards, and advantages received from some thing commonly belong per se to those who are the moral cause of the thing. From the personal equality of men, however, it follows that the distribution must be made proportionately to merit.

¶3425.

But. Those who deliberately, and with the intention of contributing to the generation of value, furnish either labor or capital are the moral cause of the new value effected.

¶3426.

Therefore. Profit falls to each proportionately to merit.

¶3427.

To the major. For, in the present argument, a moral cause is that which, through a human act, procures something which either contributes to the effect or is at least required in order that the effect can be had. The effect is therefore imputed to it.2 Imputation, moreover, signifies the merit of praise, worthiness of reward, and the acquisition by occupation of a thing which can become one’s own. Therefore, to whom the moral efficacy of a thing of this kind is ascribed, to the same the ownership of the thing itself is denied by no one. This is so true that some have placed in labor the primordial fact by which things become one’s own. Cf. no. 213.

2 Cf. Schiffini, Principia philosophica [Principles of Philosophy], no. 613.

¶3428.

To the minor. He who furnishes labor furnishes that which has the character of a principal efficiency with respect to new value. For because value is not so much a thing in itself as a thing actually useful, to generate value is not only to increase the stock of things, but also to confer actual new utility upon existing things. Now the physical labor of human industry does this, whether it extracts things hidden in the earth (industrie extractive [extractive industry]); or, by employing the powers of nature, usefully changes things, for example, weaving cloth from thread (industrie manufacturière [manufacturing industry]); or conveys things to him who will use the thing (industrie commerciale [commercial industry]). Intellectual labor likewise does this, whether it exercises the principal roles of prudently directing physical operations, or is comprised in the secondary cooperation of clerks.

¶3429.

The causality is principal because a man moves himself and applies himself to the work.

¶3430.

He who furnishes capital, according to its various elements, either furnishes an instrument of working,3 which, although a moved mover, possesses a distinct power; or furnishes matter from which, to which a certain material causality belongs; or furnishes some positive assistance, whether food by which the agents are disposed, so that it can be said, “the cause of a cause is the cause of the thing caused,” or a place where the industry is exercised, and so forth.

3 Those instruments are rightly called fruitful both when they help to produce the things themselves or to adapt them to human uses, and when things are conveyed by means of them. Thus, in substance, Rev. Fr. Lehmkuhl, Theologia moralis [Moral Theology], vol. 1, no. 1901.

¶3431.

The same is evident indirectly as regards capital, because, when capital is removed, the efficacy of human industry is, as it were, immeasurably diminished. This is confirmed by daily experience, so that now they say, for example, that certain arts are pressed by no other necessity more than by that of capital supplied on credit (le crédit [credit]).

395.

395. B. AS TO THE SECOND PART. 1. Some form of partnership between the employer and the workers is of itself more perfect and more consonant with the equal dignity of the human person.

¶3432.

For when this is introduced, a man immediately employs his own powers for his own good, and is not subjected to another as regards the use of his person.

¶3434.

a) This is more congruent with the natural condition of men;

¶3435.

b) It fosters industry and diligence more;

¶3436.

c) It more firmly establishes the observance of personal equality.

¶3437.

Therefore, per se, this form is more perfect, and so forth.

¶3438.

To the major. For by this form of contract each person immediately gathers, proportionately, the fruits of which he is a partial cause; he expends labor for himself; whereas, in the other contract, he cedes the right which he has to the fruits of his own labor. If the employer and the workers have been joined in partnership, both are engaged as equals in the same business.

¶3439.

To the minor. a) Nature made the faculties and powers of each person his own, and consequently their fruits. This order is preserved in the contract of partnership.

¶3440.

b) The hope of one’s own utility is accustomed to add incentives and spirit to us.

¶3441.

c) Because we are inclined perversely to use any superiority, we shall certainly more securely reverence the personal equality of those who, with no subjection previously introduced, as independent persons conduct with us the same business and pursue the same end, than that of those who by the very agreement are made inferior to us.

¶3442.

2. A true letting of labor is not only a just form of contract, but is also honorable in itself.

¶3443.

Argument 1. This is proved directly: a) Both from the consensus of theologians, who placed human labor among the things capable of being let. This was so evident to Molina, vol. 2, disp. 489; Lessius, chap. 24, no. 1; C. de Lugo, vol. 2, disp. 29, nos. 1, 54; Sporer, tr. 6, On the Decalogue, chap. 7, sect. 2, no. 17; St. Alphonsus, bk. 3 (4), no. 857; and so forth, that without circumlocution they defined the contract of letting as: a contract by which a thing or person is conceded for use. And already in the thirteenth century Robert de Courçon, in the work De contractibus [On Contracts], inscribed a title De locatione operarum [On the Letting of Labor].

¶3444.

b) And from reason. They concede that a man has beneficial ownership of his body, powers, and faculties. But ownership can per se be sold or let. By what means would an exception be proved?

¶3445.

Not by the fact that the fruits fall essentially, proportionately, to everyone who has had some part in generating them; for otherwise neither the owner of a field nor the possessor of money could concede them for use at a definite price. Nor by the fact that this contract introduces a relation of subjection; for nature itself necessarily willed many men to be subject to others, such as a son to his father and a subject to his prince.

¶3446.

Argument 2, indirect. 1. If the adversaries spoke the truth:

¶3447.

a) Contrary to the received doctrine, all servitude would be essentially evil. For this contains not only a letting, but an alienation of labor.

¶3448.

b) The passages of the Old Testament in which there is frequent mention of and legislation concerning male and female servants, but no reprobation of their condition, could scarcely be explained.

¶3449.

c) The practices of all peoples, among whom the form of the contract of partnership has never prevailed, would have to be condemned.

¶3450.

d) As soon as a borrower expended money profitably, he would have to cede a portion of the profit to the creditor. This cannot in any way be reconciled with ecclesiastical documents.

¶3451.

2. Moreover, when someone uses another’s labor for nonprofitable affairs, for example, in many things which servants furnish, under what form, unless some form of letting, could the agreement be made? And even in affairs fruitful of themselves, for example, in a house to be built, how will you estimate the proportionate part which belongs to the secondary workers who carried the bricks, assisted the masons, and so forth? Cf. A. Verhaegen, Le Minimum de salaire [The Minimum Wage], p. 21.

396.

396. III. Difficulties. A. AGAINST THE FIRST PART.

¶3453.

1. They generally contain a begging of the question, as when they say that the moneyed live upon another’s labor. For they tacitly pretend that value is generated by labor alone. But if it is otherwise, you could equally well say that workers live upon another’s money. Yet things have certainly been so constituted by nature that each is sustained by the legitimate fruit of an operation in which one has aided the other, although in a different manner.

¶3454.

Nor may you reply that a great part of capital, for example, raw material, is merely “passive”; for, passing over the fact that natural powers are also present in it, did not its possessor have to act both to preserve the things and to furnish them usefully to the workman?

¶3455.

2. K. Marx argues approximately as follows (Das Kapital [Capital], chap. 5). After saying that it was a mystery why raw material increased in value after it had been worked, he offered this explanation of the matter: that more labor had been expended upon it. But since the workman generally procures his daily sustenance for himself after six hours and nevertheless works longer, no wage is given to him for the remaining labor. The increase of value, therefore, is a definite quantity of labor whose price is paid not to the workman but to the “capitalist,” who is thus the “parasite” of the worker. These things, however, have already been refuted by the thesis concerning value. Cf. nos. 341–343. For the present it will suffice to recall that this conclusion contains two things wholly foreign to the truth:

¶3456.

a) That the value of every thing is estimated by the quantity of labor universally necessary for perfecting the thing. Cf. no. 343.2.

¶3457.

b) That a wage is exacted according to the measure of the workman’s necessary sustenance.

¶3458.

But as regards the mystery, when a thing that has been changed becomes of greater use, what wonder is it if it is valued more highly and consequently has a greater price?

¶3460.

1. To one who works there necessarily belongs a right to those things which he produces, just as an effect is ascribed to its cause. Therefore, an innate right to a proportionate part of the fruits inheres in the worker.

¶3461.

Reply. I concede the antecedent; I distinguish the consequent. Unless he has sold or let the labor itself, C.; otherwise, N.

¶3462.

Once that letting has been made, the worker ought no longer to receive proportionately the industrial fruit of his cooperation; rather, it is sufficient per se that the wage correspond to the profit which labor of that kind is commonly capable of generating. Cf. the following thesis. We therefore resolve the difficulty otherwise than those who attempt to prove ad hominem that by the wage itself it comes about that the worker obtains per se the whole fruit of his labor. Thus, for example, P. Leroy-Beaulieu, in the article inserted in Say’s Dictionnaire d’économie politique [Dictionary of Political Economy], under salaire [wage], 6.

¶3463.

2. This alienation itself is repugnant to justice.

¶3464.

Reply. I deny it until it is proved.

¶3465.

For many causes that absolute equality, by which one person owes nothing positive to another from justice, is altered without justice being in the least repugnant to this.