Article III. Supplements to the Doctrine

145. “Speaking per se and formally, no one can do what is unjust unless willing, nor suffer it unless unwilling.” St. Thomas, II-II, q. 59, art. 3. The former is evident because, since the proper principle of a human act is the will, what someone does apart from the will he does not do properly and per se (cf. St. Thomas, ibid., art. 2). The latter has just been demonstrated.

But although injury ceases in each case, in the former case, since the subject of the right is able to resist, the objective moral character of injustice can remain in the action, which is not participated in on account of the subjective excuse of the one acting; while in the latter case, the resistance of the right having been removed, the action would only less properly be called materially unjust.

146. Why consent is required to be morally spontaneous. The arguments made well show that the character of injury is not removed from an action which of itself violates a right unless the consent is spontaneous. For he whose will resists in a qualified respect has that whereby he suffers (argument 1); nor would personal “independence” be sufficient if it were protected merely against external force, but not against moral coercion (argument 2).

It can be added that the abdication or non-use of a right is well compared with a donation; but a donation requires an intention of liberality and of itself requires a more spontaneous movement of the will. Cf. John Duns Scotus, loc. cit., no. 24.

But the robber who, after money has been agreed upon, spares one’s life, and the upright man to whom a traveler has promised money so that he might bring him aid, must be carefully distinguished. The helper, when he demands this payment, exacts nothing unjust of itself. Therefore this species is foreign to the present argument.

147. Although Christ, the King of Martyrs, and many martyrs willingly met death, it is nevertheless not established that they so yielded their right to life that they removed from the crime of their enemies this malice of injury against themselves. Yet it would be lawful to do this in order to diminish the sin of another, who would thereby in no respect become more emboldened to sin (cf. C. de Lugo, disp. 8, nos. 7, 14).

148. Other cases. Nor is an abdication of right signified by arguments of friendship and blandishments, which prove only forgiveness according to the evangelical precept or counsel. For the affection of charity according to which “we forgive our debtors” can be combined with an orderly vindication of right.

Finally, the distinction between consent to a harmful action and the abdication of the right to compensation which arises from injury must not be passed over. Often, for example, parents do not will that some damage be repaired by their children, although they were entirely unwilling that they be affected by that damage. Cf. C. de Lugo, disp. 8, no. 8.

149. Occasions for abusing this maxim of ours are afforded especially by contracts in which an inequitable price is established, whether for the purchase or lease of some thing, or for the hiring of labor. Cf. the encyclical Rerum Novarum, at the passage which will be explained after the thesis concerning the just price.