Summary of Contents (as printed)

The marginal numbers are inserted in the lines themselves.

QUESTION ONE

THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE AND ITS DIVISION

Outline of the Question — p. 1

Importance of the question, 1. — Division, 2. — A preliminary notion to be set down, 3.

INTRODUCTION. The right that is the object of justice — p. 2

The various meanings of the word itself, 4. — Right taken subjectively, 5. — Right, a sign at once of nobility and of weakness, 6. — Right taken objectively, 7. — The threefold species of right taken objectively, 8. — Right taken as law, 9. — You will ask about the order of reason between right taken as a faculty and law, 10. — What is to be held concerning right taken objectively, 11.

CHAPTER I. Definition of the Virtue of Justice

Article I. Justice Taken More Broadly — p. 10

There is not one meaning of this word, 12.

Article II. Formulation and Arguments of the Proposition — p. 11

Thesis I. Justice properly so called is a cardinal moral virtue, according to which “someone, with a constant and perpetual will, renders to each one his right.”

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: The terms are explained, 13.
II. PROOF, 14.
III. DIFFICULTIES, 15.

Article III. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 15

COROLLARIES: The formal object cui (“to whom”) of justice, 16. — The just is rightly called the equal due, 17. — Justice safeguards the personal equality of men, 18. — You will ask whether we mean an infused or an acquired virtue, 19.

CHAPTER II. Parts of the Virtue of Justice

Article I. Notions Concerning the Parts of Virtues — p. 17

Subjective parts, quasi-potential parts, quasi-integral parts, 20.

Article II. Formulation and Arguments of the Conclusion — p. 17

Thesis II. Justice properly so called has three lowest species: general or legal justice; and the two divisions of particular justice, commutative and distributive.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: What the conclusion aims at; Opinions; The terms are explained, 21.
II. PROOF, 22.
III. DIFFICULTIES: Legal and distributive justice are justice only analogically, 23. — Concerning the opinion of St. Thomas, 24. — The traditional division suffers from a defect, 25.

Article III. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 23

I. COROLLARY: Concerning the division of the virtue of justice, 26.
II. SCHOLIA: You will ask about the quasi-integral parts of justice, 27. — You will ask about the quasi-potential parts of justice, 28.

CHAPTER III. Properties of Justice

Article I. Formulation and Arguments of the Proposition — p. 25

Thesis III. “To be toward another” and “to regard a debt” are properties of justice.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Intention of the thesis; The terms are explained, 29.
II. PROOF, 30.
III. DIFFICULTIES: Even commutative justice is not always toward another, 31. — In two species, certainly, otherness is lacking, 32. — Otherness is not a property of justice, 33. — Justice does not always regard a debt, 34.

Article II. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 31

I. COROLLARIES: Justice is concerned with operations, 35. — Justice is said to have a mean of the thing, 36. — The just is said absolutely, 37.
II. SCHOLIA: The otherness proper to justice is otherness of supposit, 38. — Between father and son there is no relation of justice properly so called, 39. — Whether from justice you may pay the same thing twice. Recourse to Cardinal de Lugo, 40.

QUESTION TWO

LEGAL AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

Outline of the Question — p. 34

Timeliness of the question, 41. — Reason for the order, 42.

CHAPTER I. Legal Justice

Article I. The Various Opinions Are Set Forth — p. 35

St. Thomas; Molina; Lessius; de Lugo; more recent authors, 43.

Article II. Formulation and Arguments of the Conclusion — p. 36

Thesis IV. General justice commands, as due for the sake of the common good, acts of the various virtues that are imposed upon citizens either by the positive law of the community or by their necessary connection with the common good.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Scope of the thesis; The terms are explained, 44.
II. PROOF: Concerning the formal object, 45; Concerning the material object, 46.
III. DIFFICULTY: The will of the public good has a special moral goodness, 47.

Article III. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 40

I. COROLLARIES: Defects of the other opinions, 48. — The generality and specificity of legal justice, 49. — The debt of legal justice, 50.
II. SCHOLIA: What social justice is, 51. — The subject of general justice, 52. — You will ask about the subject of right, 53. — Concerning the international character of general justice, 54.

CHAPTER II. Distributive Justice

Article I. Initial Presentation of the Controversy — p. 45

The office of distributive justice, 55. — To whom this province belongs, 56. — The object of the disputation, 57. — Various opinions concerning just distribution, 59.

Article II. Formulation and Arguments of the Conclusion — p. 53

Thesis V. Distributive justice is directly concerned with common goods to be divided, but with burdens only indirectly. By the proportion that it observes, however, it intends to equalize the special right that the members claim for themselves in the goods of the community. The quantity of this right is to be measured primarily by the requirement of the common good, and secondarily by the norm of equality.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Scope of the thesis; The terms are explained, 60.
II. PROOF: Of the First Part, 61; Of the Second Part, 62; Of the Third Part, 63.
You will ask how distribution is actually to be arranged according to these rules, 64.
III. DIFFICULTIES: This justice seems also to be concerned with the distribution of goods other than common goods. — It seems that another norm must be assigned for the quantity of the right: just recompense for works contributed to the public utility, 65.

Article III. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 59

I. COROLLARIES: Concerning other norms, 66. — Whether offices are matter for distribution, 67. — Concerning the equality proper to distributive justice, 68. — Concerning privileges, 69. — Concerning subsidies, 70.
II. SCHOLIA: In what way the requirement of the common good is the superior norm of just distribution, 71. — Concerning the acceptation of distributive justice among the ancients, 72. — How distributive justice is observed in conferring a single office, 73. — Concerning popular election, 74. — You will ask whether distributive justice is to be observed in smaller communities, 75. — You will ask about the manner in which strangers and outsiders receive a share of common goods, 76.

PARERGON. Christian Democracy — p. 66

In what sense we speak of Democracy, 77. — In what various senses the name is used, 78. — What things are commonly approved by those who defend true Christian Democracy, 79. — Which of these things ought to be agreed upon among Catholics, 80. — About what matters Catholics chiefly disagree among themselves, 81. — Consequences of what has been said, 82. — What the Encyclical Graves de communi taught, 82 bis.

QUESTION THREE

THE RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE AND TAXES

Outline of the Question — p. 76

The timeliness and place of the question, 83. — Treatment of the question, 84.

CHAPTER I. The Right of Suffrage

Article I. Initial Presentation of the Controversy — p. 77

The subject of this chapter is defined more precisely, 85. — Opinions of the doctors, 86.

Article II. Formulation and Arguments of the Proposition — p. 81

Thesis VI. The right of suffrage is the legal and burdensome faculty of designating the magistrates through whom the commonwealth is governed, at least in part. Therefore, in its ordering, the common good must be considered primarily, and the equal distribution of the right secondarily.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Intention of the thesis; The terms are explained, 87.
II. PROOF OF THE THESIS: Of the first part, 88; Of the second part, 89.
III. DIFFICULTIES: The law commands that votes be cast, 90.

Article III. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 86

I. COROLLARIES: Concerning the obligation of conscience, 91. — Certain statements are proved, 92. — From what the ordering of the right of suffrage is to be judged, 93.
II. SCHOLIA: Concerning universal suffrage, 94. — You will ask why, when recourse is had to votes, it is customary to give first place to the majority, 95. — Why the people, when it elects magistrates, is to be regarded, more than other bestowers, as dispensing something of its own, 96.

CHAPTER II. The Justice to Be Observed in Exacting Taxes

Article I. Preliminary Notions — p. 92

What a tax properly is, 97. — Various less principal notions that pertain here, 98. — Divisions of taxes, 99. — Quantity of taxes, 100. — Various systems of taxation, 101. — Principal characteristics of the prevailing system, 102.

Article II. Entrance into the Controversy — p. 101

Matters to be treated, 103. — Various opinions, 104.

Article III. Formulation and Arguments of the Conclusion — p. 107

Thesis VII. Taxes are not a real burden immediately imposed upon goods, but correspond to the personal obligation by which citizens are bound, from legal justice, to contribute from their own possessions to the common good. The perfect method of distributing taxation, however, toward which one ought to approach as closely as possible, yet prudently, is not that portions of the tax correspond equally to portions of income, nor that, in accordance with each person’s income, they increase by a constant law according to an arithmetical or geometrical proportion; rather, that method is perfect which, proceeding as a kind of mean between the two, rests upon the various functions of incomes.

Scope and division of the thesis, 105.

I. FIRST PART: The terms are explained, 106. — Proof, 107. — Difficulties: Strangers pay taxes; Why we reject the other opinions, 108.
II. SECOND PART: The terms are explained, 109. — Proof of the first member, 110. — Proof of the second member, 111. — Difficulties: Benefits must be considered; Progression lacks a rule; The system is useless, ineffective, and uncertain, 112.

Article IV. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 121

I. COROLLARIES: The threefold form of the distribution of taxes, 113. — Rules concerning fathers of families, 114.
II. SCHOLIA: Another question concerning the ordering of taxes, 115. — Characteristics of the form called impôt dégressif, 116. — Concerning a tax imposed immediately upon incomes, 117. — What is to be thought about heavy taxes, 118.

Concerning the Graphic Description of Taxes — p. 124

Uses, 119. — How the table is arranged, 120.

Remaining Minor Questions

Minor Question I. The Obligation of Undertaking Military Service — p. 127

Whether the obligation of military service can be called a tax, 121. — Concerning the faculty of redeeming oneself from this burden with money, 122. — To what the question reduces, 123. — The rather unequal distribution of this tax, 124.

Minor Question II. How Conscience Is Bound by Present-Day Tax Laws — p. 130

Why we write about this matter, 125.

Concerning taxes strictly so called. Certain statements made less correctly are rejected, 126. — Diversity of opinions, 127. — General conclusions, 128.

Concerning military service. The state of the question is defined, 129. — Matters sufficiently agreed upon in this affair, 130. — The disputed question, 131.

QUESTION FOUR

THE VICE OF INJUSTICE AND RESTITUTION

Outline of the Question — p. 142

Reason for the order, 132.

CHAPTER I. The Vice of Injustice

Article I. Formulation and Arguments of the Proposition — p. 142

Thesis VIII. Injustice is opposed both to legal and to particular justice; it is a special vice, whose act is by its genus a mortal sin.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: The terms are explained, 133.
II. PROOF: From Sacred Scripture; From reason, 134.
III. DIFFICULTIES: Injustice is not a special vice; It is not by its genus a mortal sin, 135.

Article II. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 146

SCHOLIA: Concerning illegal injustice, 136. — Concerning respect of persons, 137. — A broader acceptation of injustice, 138. — Confirmation from a passage of the Apostle, 139.

CHAPTER II. The Consent by Which Injury Is Removed

Article I. Initial Formulation of the Question — p. 150

Definition and parts of the question, 140. — Various opinions, 141.

Article II. Formulation and Arguments of the Conclusion — p. 152

Thesis IX. Without exception, this principle holds: “No injury is done to one who knows and consents.”

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Intention of the thesis; The terms are explained, 142.
II. PROOF, 143.
III. DIFFICULTIES: Consent does not remove the character of injury; Consent is not universal, 144.

Article III. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 157

I. COROLLARIES: “Speaking per se and formally, no one can do what is unjust unless willing, nor suffer it unless unwilling,” 145. — Why consent is required to be morally spontaneous, 146.
II. SCHOLIA: Christ and the Martyrs, 147. — Other cases, 148. — Occasions of abuse, 149.

PARERGON. The Taking of Another’s Property When the Owner Is Unreasonably Unwilling — p. 158

The object of the question, 150. — Its difficulty, 151. — Approach to the solution, 152. — Solution, 153. — Corollary and general principle, 154.

CHAPTER III. Restitution

Article I. Introduction to the Disputation — p. 161

The notion of restitution, 155. — The object of the disputation; Opinions, 156.

Article II. Formulation and Arguments of the Conclusion — p. 164

§ 1. The Nature of Restitution and the Virtue by Which It Is Commanded

Thesis X. Restitution is always an act of commutative justice, and its obligation arises solely from violated commutative justice.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Intention of this part; The terms are explained, 157.
II. PROOF, 158.

DIFFICULTIES: Restitution is not always an act of commutative justice; The obligation of making restitution does not arise from violated commutative justice; The obligation of making restitution also arises from another violated virtue, 159.

§ 2. The Roots of Restitution and the Norm of Quantity — p. 173

Thesis XI. The root of restitution is twofold: another’s thing received and its injurious reception. Moreover, the quantity to be restored is defined, in the former case, by the quantity of another’s thing that someone retains in its own species or in an equivalent; in the latter, by the quantity of the damage that you voluntarily inflicted.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Meaning and intention of the thesis; The terms are explained, 160.
II. PROOF, 161.
III. DIFFICULTIES: Damaging without injury; The whole damage is to be referred back to the culpable cause, 162.

Article III. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 177

I. COROLLARIES: Concerning the mind of St. Thomas, 163. — Comparison of the two roots, 164. — Concerning an error about the person upon whom damage is inflicted, 165. — Restitution in another species, 166.
II. SCHOLIA: Concerning uncertain debts, 167. — The necessity of making restitution is not a necessity of means, 168. — Concerning the necessity of distinguishing the two roots, 169. — You will ask whether the obligation of restitution is positive or negative, 170. — You will ask what obligation of making restitution exists with a theologically venial fault, 171. — You will ask whether the force of an intention to cause damage can be so great that, on account of it, the action becomes unjust and induces the debt of restitution, 171 bis. — You will ask what difference there is between a right to a thing and a right to common goods, 172.

QUESTION FIVE

SOCIALISM AND THE PRIVATE POSSESSION OF GOODS

CHAPTER I. Socialism

Article I. Various Notions Concerning Present-Day Socialism — p. 188

What meaning is placed under the word, 173. — Concerning mixed or agrarian socialism, 174. — Concerning the socialism called State Socialism or Chair Socialism, 175. — The scientific arguments of socialism properly so called, 176. — The remaining tenets of the socialists, 177. — Species of socialists, 178. — Historical notions: Concerning the genesis of the doctrine; Doctrines of present-day socialism; Principal teachers of present-day socialism; Experiments in a regime that is in some manner communal, 179.

Article II. Formulation and Arguments of the Conclusion — p. 203

Thesis XII. Collectivism, whether pure or mixed, coheres with false reasonings and judgments, and no less is it entirely to be rejected in itself.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Intention of the thesis; The terms are explained; Note on the thesis, 180.
II. PROOF: Of the first part: Concerning pure collectivism; Concerning mixed or agrarian collectivism, 181. Of the second part: Concerning pure collectivism; Concerning mixed or agrarian collectivism, 182.
III. DIFFICULTIES: From pure collectivism: The rich are condemned in the New Testament; Pure collectivism is not repugnant; It is to be introduced. From mixed collectivism: Rent properly so called belongs to the community; Other taxes are unjust; Private ownership of lands harms the common good; Private possessions are unjust, 183.

Article III. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 232

I. COROLLARIES: Anarchism is to be rejected, 184. — Mixed collectivism, 185. — Comparison of liberalism and socialism, 186. — Whether socialists belong to the Masonic class, 187. — In what way the present social order is held by collectivists to be unjust, 188. — The true manner of attacking socialism, 189.
II. SCHOLIA: Teachings of Aristotle, 190. — Whether possessions were originally common, 191. — Concerning the iron law of wages, 192. — What is to be thought about mitigations, 193.

CHAPTER II. The Right of Private Property — p. 240

Ordering of this chapter, 194.

Section I. The Object and Causes of Private Property

Article I. The Object and Source of the Regime (the Remote Cause of the Right)

§ 1. Notions and Opinions — p. 241

Outline of the right itself, 195. — The object of the disputation, 196. — Opinions, 197.

§ 2. Formulation and Arguments of the Conclusion — p. 248

Thesis XIII. By the law of nature itself, this kind of institution is sanctioned: the private ownership of external things, even immovable things.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: The terms are explained; Note on the thesis, 198.
II. PROOF: Of the first part, 199; Of the second part, 200.
III. DIFFICULTIES: From the natural community of things; From the faculty of renouncing this right; From the evils that accompany it, 201.

§ 3. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 260

I. COROLLARIES: Private property is prior in reality to civil association, 202. — What the parts of natural right and human right are, 203. — In what sense the institution of private property belongs to natural law, 204.

II. SCHOLIA: Concerning the possession of external things before sin, 205. — Less effective arguments, 206. — Whether a human agreement is required as a condition, 207. — What sort of community of things exists by nature, 208. — Whether or not an external thing is called mine in the way that the powers and operations of my body are mine, 209. — Concerning passages of the Holy Fathers, 210.

Article II. The Proximate Cause of Property, or the Primordial Fact

§ 1. Notions and Opinions — p. 279

What the proximate cause of property is, 211. — What is asked here, 212. — Opinions, 213.

§ 2. Formulation and Arguments of the Proposition — p. 282

Thesis XIV. The primordial fact by which stable ownership of a thing belonging to no one is acquired is true occupation, by which the thing, according to its nature, is shown to be subject to someone’s power or to serve him for a use that cannot be common.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: The terms are explained; Note on the thesis, 214.
II. PROOF, 215.
III. DIFFICULTIES: Ownership already exists before occupation; Appropriation can be ascribed to labor, 216.

§ 3. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 288

I. COROLLARIES: Concerning hunting and fishing, 217. — Concerning coal seams, 218.
II. SCHOLIA: Occupation through another, 219. — The historical process, 220. — In what manner property is preserved, 221.

Section II. The Law by Which Inheritances and Wills Are Sanctioned

Article I. Notions and Opinions — p. 291

Concerning the alienation of goods in general, 222. — The object of the question and the opinions, 223.

Article II. Conclusion and Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 294

Thesis XV. Nature itself requires that there be among men some right of inheritance. Indeed, as regards their substance, both the right of making a will and the hereditary succession of the family seem to be sanctioned by nature. Regularly, however, the right of the family is subject to the will of the deceased.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Intention of the thesis; The terms are set forth, 224.
II. PROOF: Of the first part, 225; Of the second part, 226; Of the third part, 227.

III. DIFFICULTIES: The right of inheritance is not sufficiently defined; The right of making a will is not necessary; One who makes a will yields his right only after he has lost it, 228.
IV. SCHOLIA: Concerning the proper civil ordering, 229. — Disadvantages of the opinion of Grotius, 230.

Section III. The Limits of the Right of Property

Article I. Notions and Conclusion — p. 302

Thesis XVI. The perfect right of ownership is circumscribed by those, and only those, properly so-called limits which are placed by the right of another’s necessity and by the jurisdiction through which public authority is able—not indeed to abolish or directly restrict the right of private ownership, but to touch it indirectly insofar as the common good requires.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Timeliness, intention, and parts of the thesis; Opinions; The terms are explained, 231.
II. PROOF: Of the first part, 232; Of the second part, 233; Of the third part, 234.
III. DIFFICULTIES: Limits are repugnant to a right; Limits are placed upon every duty, 235.

Article II. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 310

I. COROLLARIES: Definition of the right of property, 236. — The Christian rationale of the right of property, 237. — The common destination of all endowments and gifts, 238. — Acquisition from necessity, 239. — The error of more recent jurists, 240. — What the State can or cannot do with respect to the regime of private property, 241. — Concerning taxes and the eminent domain of the State, 242.
II. SCHOLIA: The power of the Church, 243. — Lavish promises, 244. — Whether positive law ought to acknowledge the right of necessity, 245.

Remaining Minor Question. The Ownership of a Published Book and of a Disclosed Invention — p. 317

Thesis XVII. The right by which a writer or inventor can prevent others from publishing anew a book that has been made public or from imitating his invention is to be ascribed to the genus of property. Moreover, that right seems to be derived from positive law, whose principal provisions are consonant with natural equity.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Occasion of the question, 246. — The facts established in this matter; Opinions; The terms are explained, 246.
II. PROOF: Of the first part, 247; Of the other part, 248.
III. DIFFICULTIES: From the author’s loss; From a tacit reservation of the right; From the publication of the book considered formally, 249.
IV. SUPPLEMENTS TO THE DOCTRINE.

COROLLARIES: Concerning the obligation of conscience, 250. — Concerning the publication of a sermon or of lectures, 251. — The photographic depiction of an unwilling person, 252. — What the object of the right is, 253.

QUESTION SIX

THE PRIVILEGES OF THE POSSESSOR

Outline of the Question — p. 329

Occasion and division of the question, 254.

CHAPTER I. The More Favorable Position of the Possessor

Article I. Notions and Conclusion

§ 1. Notions — p. 330

What possession is and how manifold it is, 255. — The privileges of possession, 256. — What we ask in this place, 257.

§ 2. Conclusion — p. 333

Thesis XVIII. By the law of nature itself, the mere possession of one person is per se to be preferred to the uncertain right of another.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Intention of the thesis; The terms are explained, 258.
II. PROOF, 259.
III. DIFFICULTIES: Possession is a matter of fact; The possessor is to be favored only when the cases are equal; A probable reason in favor of the possessor is required; Contrary reasons can overcome the presumption arising from possession, 260.

Article II. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 336

I. COROLLARIES: Restitution on account of violated possession, 261. — A right that is acquired by possession, 262. — A conditional intention of possessing, 263.
II. SCHOLIA: The exercise of a presumed right, 264. — The rationale of the common good, 265. — Concerning a possessor in bad faith, 266.

CHAPTER II. Prescription

Article I. Initial Presentation of the Controversy — p. 339

Notions concerning prescription, 267. — Matters disputed and opinions, 268. — The force of the Lateran decree, 269.

Article II. Formulation and Arguments of the Proposition — p. 345

Thesis XIX. By human law there can validly and suitably be introduced both the usucaption of a real right and prescription by which an obligation is truly extinguished. Nevertheless, per se it will be unlawful for a possessor or debtor in bad faith to enjoy the benefit of the law. Nor for that reason are laws to be judged unjust which, without regard to good or bad faith, extinguish an action after a definite time.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Intention of the thesis; The terms are explained; Note on the thesis, 270.
II. PROOF: Of the first part, 271; Of the second part, 272; Of the third part, 273.
III. DIFFICULTIES: Against the first part: Injury is done to another; A just cause is lacking; Comparison with an erroneous judgment. Against the second part: The good or bad faith of the possessor does not change the rights of the governing authority. Against the third part: The law favors fraud, 274.

Article III. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 353

I. COROLLARIES: Concerning a servitude of not acting, 275. — The bad faith of the debtor does not harm the creditors, 276. — Concerning successors, 277. — Concerning good faith in liberative prescription, 278. — Concerning the thief, 279.
II. SCHOLIA: The rationale of the ancients, 280. — Property is not lost by prescription alone, 281. — Quasi-possession of freedom, 282. — Judgment concerning present-day laws, 283. — What is to be held concerning the assignment of fruits to a possessor in good faith, 284. — What is to be held concerning the rule of article 2279 of the French Code, 285. — What is to be held concerning the prescription of a stolen thing in French law, 286.

QUESTION SEVEN

CONTRACTS IN GENERAL

General Notions and Outline of the Question — p. 363

The notion of a contract, 287. — Species of contracts, 288. — Consequences to be kept in mind, 289. — The obligation of fidelity, 290. — Ordering of the question, 291.

CHAPTER I. The Shameful Cause of Contracts — p. 368

Thesis XX. A contract whose cause is shameful has no force; nevertheless, after a shameful act has been performed by one party, the other party already owes per se from justice the fulfillment of the promise of an indifferent thing.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Intention of the thesis; Opinions; The terms are explained, 292.
II. PROOF: Of the first part, 293; Of the other part, 294.
III. DIFFICULTIES: From the act considered in itself; From the nullity of the prior contract; From the consequences, 295.

COROLLARY: The proximate cause of the obligation, 296.
SCHOLIA: The case of retention and of petition is equal, 297. — Concerning French civil law, 298.

CHAPTER II. The Consent of the Contracting Parties

Article I. The Necessary Qualities of Consent

§ 1. Notions and Conclusion — p. 376

Thesis XXI. True or internal consent, manifested by an external sign and mutual among the contracting parties, pertains to the essence of every agreement.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Intention of the thesis; Opinions; The terms are explained, 299.
II. PROOF, 300.
III. DIFFICULTIES: An external promise implies a true promise; External consent is not required; In gratuitous contracts acceptance is not necessary; The consent of both parties is not required; At least mutual consent is not required, 301.

§ 2. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 384

I. COROLLARIES: How each consent operates, 302. — Obligation from a feigned promise, 303. — The will not to bind oneself, not to stand by one’s promises, 304.
II. SCHOLIA: The force of external consent, 305. — The required advertence, 306. — Concerning a light obligation if the matter was grave, 307.

Article II. Defects of Consent

§ 1. Notions Concerning These Defects and Their Efficacy upon Consent — p. 386

Practical rules, 308. — The argument and opinions, 309.

§ 2. Conclusion and Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 388

Thesis XXII. Per se, every error truly giving cause to a contract invalidates the contract, but no fear, even grave fear, does so. In practice, however, a contract infected by a non-substantial error will often bind simply, on account of a tacit ratification or one imposed by nature itself; while an injury to be repaired or natural equity not rarely gives to one who has suffered fear the power of rescinding a stipulation made from fear.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Intention of the thesis; The terms are explained, 310.
II. PROOF: Of the first part, 311; Of the other part, 312.
III. DIFFICULTIES: Concerning error; Concerning fear, 313.
IV. COROLLARIES: How the opinions differ in reality, 314. — A gratuitous stipulation made from fear, 315.

Article III. The Notification of Consent and the First Beginning of the Obligation — p. 396

Thesis XXIII. It is essential to a contract that consent itself, insofar as it is the offerer’s, but, more probably, not insofar as it is the acceptor’s, be notified by the one to the other. Therefore, per se, an absolute obligation from a contract takes its beginning, in a unilateral agreement, from the external acceptance of the other party, but, in a bilateral agreement, from the notified consent of the counter-promisor.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Intention of the thesis; Opinions; The terms are explained, 316.
II. PROOF: Of the first part, 317; Of the other part, 318.
III. DIFFICULTIES: It is not required that the offerer’s consent be notified; Notification of acceptance is required; The rules concerning the beginning of the obligation are false, 319.
IV. COROLLARIES AND SCHOLIA: Notification made to an agent suffices, 320. — A promise in favor of a third party, 321. — Concerning the obligation of the first promisor, 322. — Concerning the positive law of France, 323.

CHAPTER III. Laws That Render Juridical Acts Invalid

Article I. Preliminary Notions — p. 404

Concerning an invalidating law and a prohibiting law, 324. — Concerning nullity and natural obligation, 325.

Article II. Conclusion and Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 406

Thesis XXIV. Even over contracts, and generally over juridical acts, which have force by natural law, the authority of the civil power is per se so great that by just laws it is able to render them fully invalid, so that, before any sentence of a judge, they produce no obligation even in the internal forum. Nevertheless, these laws are of strict interpretation. Therefore, concerning present-day positive law, it must be answered that, as a rule, acts which are pronounced null are not deprived of their natural force before the sentence of a judge.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Force and intention of the thesis; Opinions; The terms are explained, 326.
II. PROOF: Of the first part, 327; Of the second part, 328; Of the third part, 329.
III. DIFFICULTIES: The law cannot take away a right granted by nature; This law is favorable, 330.

Article III. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 414

I. COROLLARIES: A practical norm for discerning, 331. — Concerning the sentence of a judge, 332. — Consequences in the forum of conscience, 333. — Concerning an inofficious donation, 334.
II. SCHOLIA: Complete nullification arising from the intention of the parties, 335. — You will ask what the law is if the party to whom the faculty of rescinding belongs has renounced this faculty in advance, 336. — You will ask why, after the sentence of a judge, you affirm effects in conscience that were denied before the sentence, 337.

QUESTION EIGHT

JUST EXCHANGE AND A JUST PRICE

Article I. Preliminary Notions of Value and Price — p. 420

The importance and difficulty of the disputation, 338. — The true nature of value, 339. — Concerning price, 340. — Other opinions, 341.

Article II. Formulation and Arguments of the Conclusion — p. 428

Thesis XXV. The true value of things flows proximately from common estimation and cannot be adequately measured by human labor. By this value the just price of a thing is defined per se. Nevertheless, the seller can also stipulate compensation for the special deprivation that he sustains from the cession of the thing, on account of its use or his own affection for the thing, but not per se on account of the buyer’s peculiar advantage.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Importance and intention of the thesis; Opinions; The terms are explained, 342.
II. PROOF: Of the first part, 343; Of the second part, 344; Of the third part, 345.
III. DIFFICULTIES: Value cannot flow from common estimation; The just price is defined by the consent of the parties; A price of affection cannot be exacted; The special utility of the buyer seems capable of being reckoned, 346.

Article III. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 439

I. COROLLARIES: The mean of the thing in contracts, 347. — Exchange conduces per se to the advantage of both parties, 348. — In what manner the seller’s advantage is to be reckoned, 349. — What if there is no common estimation, 350. — The office of common estimation, 350 bis. — Social value, 351. — What if it is sold more dearly to outsiders, 352. — Concerning the law of supply and demand, 353. — Concerning monopolies, 354.
II. SCHOLIA: A moderation of the doctrine, 355. — Concerning the opinion of Bastiat, 356.

QUESTION NINE

THE LOAN FOR CONSUMPTION AND USURY

Article I. Initial Presentation of the Controversy — p. 450

Reason for the order, 357.

§ 1. Historical Notions — p. 451

Concerning usury in Sacred Scripture, 358. — Concerning usury among the Holy Fathers, 359. — Concerning usury in the canonical laws and among the Scholastic doctors or classical interpreters of canon law, 360. — Concerning usury in civil laws, 361. — Concerning usury according to the opinions of the doctors, 362.

§ 2. Doctrinal Notions — p. 473

Concerning the loan for consumption (mutuum), 363. — Concerning usury, 364. — Concerning the sterility of money, 365. — Concerning extrinsic titles, 366. — Definition of the question, 367.

§ 3. Several Explanations of Catholics Are Refuted — p. 480

The stricter opinion, 368. — An explanation from intention, or the system of two contracts, 369. — An explanation from the end of the loan, 370. — An explanation from the presumption of a just extrinsic title, 371. — An explanation from civil law, 372.

Article II. Formulation and Arguments of the Conclusion — p. 485

Thesis XXVI. Every profit sought from a loan taken reduplicatively is unjust. Nevertheless, under a certain condition of society it can be per se lawful for everyone to lend money at moderate interest. The former severity of the Church and her present-day indulgence are free from every fault.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Intention of the thesis; Opinion; The terms are explained, 373.
II. PROOF: Of the first part, 374; Of the second part, 375; Of the third part, 376.
III. DIFFICULTIES: By force of the loan a profit may be made; There is no sin except from abuse of another’s necessity; Money is altogether sterile, 377.

Article III. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 505

I. COROLLARIES: With what intention interest may be exacted today, 378. — The loan is the proper seat of the sin of usury, 379. — The fixing of the rate of interest, 380.
II. SCHOLIA: Modern usury, 381. — The sin contrary to usury, 382. — Patrons of our opinion, 383. — From what time it was universally lawful to lend at interest, 384. — Concerning census contracts and the triple contract, 385.

QUESTION TEN

THE LETTING AND HIRING OF LABOR

Outline of the Question — p. 512

Ordering of the question, 386. — In what manner we speak of the form of the contract, 387.

CHAPTER I. The Form of the Stipulation of Labor

Article I. Preliminary Notions — p. 513

Concerning the genesis of value; Various opinions, 388. — Concerning wealth and capital, 389. — Concerning partnership, 390. — Concerning letting and hiring, 391. — Economic, industrial, and civil fruit, 392.

Article II. Formulation and Arguments of the Conclusion — p. 517

Thesis XXVII. The profit to be made from a business belongs per se, proportionally, both to him who contributes labor and to him who supplies capital. Nevertheless, the form of some partnership between the master of the undertaking and the workers, although per se more perfect and more consonant with the equal dignity of the human person, is not the only just form of contract; rather, a true letting of labor is also honorable in itself.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Intention of the thesis; The terms are set forth; Opinions, 393.
II. PROOF: As regards the first part, 394; As regards the other part, 395.
III. DIFFICULTIES: The part played by capital is passive; The argument of K. Marx; It is repugnant that the worker should lose his right to the fruit of his labor, 396.

Article III. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 524

I. COROLLARIES: The true origin of new value, 397. — In what way money pertains to capital, 398. — St. Thomas agrees with us, 399. — The choice permitted to one who undertakes a business, 400.
II. SCHOLIA: The reciprocal parts of directors and workers, 401. — Concerning bonuses and a share of the profit granted to workers, 402.

CHAPTER II. The Just Wage

Article I. The General Nature and Debt of a Just Wage — p. 528

How broadly the present question extends, 403. — Division of the chapter, 404. — Concerning pure profit, 405.

§ 1. Formulation and Arguments of the Conclusion — p. 530

Thesis XXVIII. A just wage is the true price of labor considered in itself, to be defined from agreement and common estimation. A wage thus established is, from justice, neither to be diminished nor increased according to the varying fortune of the business. Nevertheless, it is lawful for the master of the business to agree with the workers upon a compensation less than the just amount, so that he may safeguard for himself a moderate recompense for capital and his own industry, but not so that he may seek pure profit for himself.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Intention of the thesis; Opinions; The terms are set forth, 406.
II. PROOF: Of the first part, 407; Of the second part, 408; Of the third part, 409.
III. DIFFICULTIES: From the dignity of the human person; From freedom of agreement, 410.

§ 2. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 541

I. COROLLARIES: There is no privilege either of capital or of labor, 411. — Just causes for increasing or diminishing the wage, 412. — Concerning the contracting of a work at a lower price, 413.
II. SCHOLIA: Reasons by which the innate dignity of human labor is depressed, 414. — Concerning the foundation of common estimation, 415. — Other grounds of injustice, 416.

Article II. The Lower Limit of a Just Wage — p. 546

With what purpose and with what hope of fruit we write about these things, 417. — Order of treatment, 418.

§ 1. The Acts of the Holy See — p. 548

Interpretation of the Encyclical Rerum Novarum, 419. — Concerning the Roman response, 420. — Conclusion concerning the mind of the Holy See, 421.

§ 2. First Approaches to the Disputation — p. 558

I. NOTIONS: What it is about which we ask, 422. — What sort of worker we understand, 423. — Which of his labors, 424. — The rationale of the wage, 425. — Forms of the family wage, 426.
II. OPINIONS: Liberal tenets, 427. — Concerning those who establish the price of things as the absolute norm, 428. — Concerning those who appeal to legal justice, 429. — Concerning those who ascribe the absolute family wage to commutative justice, 430. — Concerning the patrons of the relative wage, 431.
III. CONCERNING CERTAIN ARGUMENTS: Whether the lower limit depends upon the price of things, 432. — Arguments that are too particular, 433. — What if you argue from the Encyclical, from the duty of preserving oneself and one’s own, 434. — Concerning the argument from similarity, 435. — What is chiefly to be considered, 436.

§ 3. Formulation and Arguments of the Conclusion — p. 572

Thesis XXIX. The lower limit of the wage for which the labor of a healthy and adult workman is to be exchanged is the remuneration that is per se suitable to a father of a family.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Intention of the thesis; Opinions; The terms are explained, 437.
II. PROOF: Preparation for the arguments, 438; The arguments, 439.
III. DIFFICULTIES: There is no lower limit; The limit cannot be derived from necessity; The limit is not a family wage; The Scholastic doctors stand in the way, 440.

§ 4. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 591

I. COROLLARIES: Care to be had for a suitable wage, 441. — The cause of the limit of a just wage pertains to all, 442. — A business undertaken at the prompting of charity does not per se excuse the stipulation of a lower wage, 443. — A fuller account of the family wage, 444.
II. SCHOLIA: Why is the customary rather than the average number of children considered? 445. — The relation of wages to suitable sustenance, 446. — For what causes it is lawful to pay a wage that is not a family wage, 447. — You will ask whether you are thereby excused from paying a family wage because there are others who give a sufficiently voluntary consent to a lower wage, 448. — You will ask what the law is when, while affairs generally languish in some region, one factory flourishes, 449. — You will ask about works that are customarily entrusted to unmarried persons, 450. — You will ask how servitude is not strictly repugnant to nature, 451. — You will ask what the law is concerning a collective wage, 452. — You will ask by whom the determination of the wage to be paid is more suitably made, 453. — You will ask whether what has thus far been said can be transferred to a tenant farmer who leases a farm, 454.

CHAPTER III. The Reciprocal Duties of the Master and the Workers after the Hiring Has Been Made

Article I. Notions and Conclusion — p. 602

Thesis XXX. The relation of the hiring of labor is accompanied by duties of justice: on the one side, of preserving intact both the person of the worker—that is, his body and soul—and his honor; on the other side, of not injuring the property or reputation of the master. The same relation is attended by a bond of a certain closer kinship, by which each is joined to the other, and by a debt of quasi-piety in the master, but of observance in the worker. A certain imitation of master-servant society is especially consonant with nature.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Intention of the thesis; The three parts of the thesis; The manifold relation of the duties to the contract of hiring; Opinions; The terms are explained, 455.

II. PROOF: Of the first part, 456; Of the second part, 457; Of the third part, 458.
III. DIFFICULTIES: In hiring a workman, the master does not attend to those duties; The matter is too difficult when the company is a joint-stock company, 459.

Article II. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 611

I. COROLLARIES: The permanence of the duties of quasi-piety and observance, 460. — In the hiring of a work there is per se no peculiar relation of persons, 461. — Inequality is subsequent to the contract, 462. — Concerning the internal government of the factory, 462 bis. — Duties of the hired worker, 463. — Duties of the master toward an adult male worker, 464. — Concerning duties toward adult women, 465. — Concerning duties toward children, 466. — An imitation of master-servant society, 467.

Remaining Minor Question. Strikes — p. 624

Various notions, 470. — Economic judgment, 471. — Moral judgment, 472. — Unlawfulness of strikes from their end, 473. — From their manner, 474. — From their effects, 475. — The lockout, 476. — Concerning the legitimate intervention of public authority, 477.

QUESTION ELEVEN

EQUITY

Article I. Approach to the Disputation — p. 632

Timeliness of the question, 478. — What the word equity signifies, 479. — Opinions, 480.

Article II. Formulation and Arguments of the Conclusion — p. 633

Thesis XXXI. Equity is a special virtue, intermediate between justice and charity and a potential part of justice, by which the soul is inclined to the humane use of right.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Intention of the thesis; The terms are explained, 481.
II. PROOF, 482.
III. DIFFICULTIES: It is not a virtue; It is not special; It is not a part of justice, 483.

Article III. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 638

I. COROLLARIES: There seem to be three species of equity, 484. — Concerning the middle order that equity safeguards, 485. — Other definitions and rationales of equity, 486. — The obligation of equity, 487. — Comparison of equity and affability, 488. — What equity is invoked in the Encyclical Rerum Novarum, 489.
II. SCHOLIA: The excellence of equity, 490. — Concerning the saying, “The utmost right is the utmost injury,” 491. — Concerning epikeia, 492.

QUESTION TWELVE

GRATITUDE, OR A GRATEFUL MIND

Article I. Notions — p. 643

Why we write about gratitude, 493. — What a benefit is, 494. — Concerning material and formal ingratitude, 495.

Article II. Formulation and Arguments of the Conclusion — p. 644

Thesis XXXII. Gratitude is a virtue connected with justice, which brings the will of him who has been moved by a benefit into equality with the affection of the benefactor. Formal ingratitude, but not material ingratitude—at least not immediately—is a mortal sin by its genus.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Intention of the thesis; The terms are explained; Opinions, 496.
II. PROOF: Of the first part, 497; Of the other part, 498.
III. DIFFICULTIES: Gratitude is not a special virtue; A benefit is to be repaid according to its effect; Every ingratitude is mortal, 499.

Article III. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 649

I. COROLLARIES: The threefold duty of a grateful mind, 500. — The measure of the duties, 501. — The debt is not removed by a concession of the author of the benefit, 502. — The debt of gratitude follows the conferral of the benefit, not a merely beneficent intention, 503. — Concerning ingratitude, 504.
II. SCHOLIA: Whether it is lawful to decline a benefit, 505. — Concerning gratitude to be rendered to God, parents, and superiors, 506.

PARERGON. The Remaining Virtues Connected with Justice — p. 653

Concerning their division, 507. — Concerning vindication: Its notion; Its goodness; Contrary sins, 508. — Concerning truthfulness: Its notion; Concerning it in the first volume, 509. — Concerning affability: Its notion; Contrary vices, 510. — Concerning liberality: Its notion; Contrary vices, 511.

QUESTION THIRTEEN

THE RIGHT AND PLACE OF WOMEN IN THE STATE

Article I. Initial Presentation of the Question — p. 657

Notions of feminism, 512. — Historical outline, 513. — Causes why this question is disputed with such great contention, 514.

Article II. Formulation and Arguments of the Conclusion — p. 660

Thesis XXXIII. I. Although, with the exception of domestic society, the general equality of men and women is not excluded by any absolute or perpetual reason,

II. Nevertheless, the confusion of the kinds of life, or the access of women to public affairs, are neither things to be desired per se, nor to be hoped for according to some law of progress, nor likely to profit women themselves in living well and happily.

III. Nevertheless, there is a place today for prudent feminism.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Intention of the thesis; The terms are set forth, 515.
II. PROOF: Of the first part, 516; Of the second part, 517; Of the third part, 518.
III. DIFFICULTIES: The wife is sometimes deservedly superior; Diversity of character; Laws should refrain from defining male and female occupations; The rationale of universal suffrage demands women’s suffrage; The penal code favors the man too much, 519.

Article III. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 669

I. COROLLARIES: The education of children ought not to be one and the same for both sexes, 520. — The proper rationale of plural suffrage; What if husband and wife disagree in mind, 521. — The political suffrage of unmarried women, 522.
II. SCHOLIA: Why the two sexes are distinguished by a slight difference, 523. — The municipal suffrage of women, 524. — Whether the distinction of occupations is to be made by laws or by customs, 525. — Whether an inquiry concerning the uncertain father of a child is to be introduced, 526. — What Sacred Scripture teaches, 527. — The Catholic Church has deserved well of women; Calumnies are refuted, 528.

QUESTION FOURTEEN

THE MORAL PERSON THAT IS THE STATE

Outline of the Question — p. 674

Timeliness of the question, 529. — Order of treatment, 530.

CHAPTER I. The Moral Person in General

Article I. The Historical and Present State of the Controversy — p. 675

Origin of the division, 531. — Opinions, 532. — Various names, 533.

Article II. Formulation and Arguments of the Conclusion — p. 680

Thesis XXXIV. Although the distinction between a physical and a moral person can be allowed on account of received usage and convenience of speech, nevertheless, in reality, besides physical persons, there is no subject of rights in any society of men; but all the goods and rights of any association are the goods and rights of the members, to be possessed, however, not separately but in common.

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION: Division and intention of the thesis; The terms are set forth; The matter to be disputed, 534.
II. PROOF: Of the first part, 535; Of the second part: The historical prejudice; The argument, 536; Of the third part, 537. — The conclusion is confirmed by authorities, 538.
III. DIFFICULTIES: A society and its good are something other than the sum of the men and their good; Those goods differ formally; The essential qualities of the society and of the members, even taken collectively, are different; A member who takes for himself even the smallest part of the good of the society is unjust, 539.

Article III. Supplements to the Doctrine — p. 691

I. COROLLARIES: What the capacity of an association is in reality, 540. — Charity toward the community, 541. — Concerning the very name “moral person,” 542.
II. SCHOLIA: The true doctrine concerning a moral person is explained, 543. — Several persons in one, 544. — Possession in common is distinguished from the undivided possession of several persons, 545. — The varying perpetuity of societies, 546. — The guilt and punishment of associations, 547. — Concerning aggregates of things in Roman law, 548. — Concerning foundations, 549. — Where the full right over foundations, and so forth, resides, 550. — Whence the great success of the moral person, 551.

CHAPTER II. The State, or Commonwealth

The rationale and timeliness of the argument, 552.

Article I. The Origin or Nature of the State — p. 697

The State is a natural institution, 553.

Article II. The End of Civil Society and the Common Good — p. 699

What the end of the State is, 554. — In what way temporal happiness is the end, 555. — What the common good is, 556.

Article III. The Means to the End and Public Authority — p. 702

The general norm for judging the means possessed by the State, 557. — The origin and office of sovereignty, 558. — Concerning the first subject of power, 559.

Article IV. The Members or Associates of the Commonwealth — p. 707

In what way the comparison of the parts and the body applies to the State and its members, 560.

Article V. The Worst and the Best Commonwealth

What a corrupt commonwealth is, 561. — Concerning the best commonwealth, 562. — Excellent sayings from Cicero, 563.

APPENDIX

MOTU PROPRIO OF HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS X ON CHRISTIAN POPULAR ACTION

I. Certain Things to Be Noted Concerning This Document — p. 713

The object of the Motu Proprio, 564. — The force of the Motu Proprio, 565. — Its end, 566. — The manner of correct interpretation, 567. — What if it is silent about certain things, 568. — Concerning the political plans of democrats, 569.

II. The Motu Proprio of the Pontiff — p. 715

Bibliography — p. 725

Index of Names — p. 738

Alphabetical Index of Subjects — p. 745

Errata — p. 758