Article II. Formulation and Arguments of the Proposition

The right of suffrage is a legal and burdensome faculty of designating magistrates through whom, at least in part, the commonwealth is governed.

Therefore, in its ordering, the common good is to be considered primarily; the equal distribution of the right, secondarily.

87. I. State of the Question. 1. THE INTENTION OF THE THESIS. We propose two parts. In the former we define both the nature of the right of suffrage and its object: its nature, indeed, when we say that the right of suffrage is conceded as a burdensome privilege—and thus we assent both to the common tenet of the theologians and to the opinion of those who ascribe the right of suffrage to the class of imperfect offices; its object, however, when we add that the privilege looks toward the designation of magistrates through whom the commonwealth is governed. For by these words we cut off the false understanding according to which the right of suffrage would be the manner in which the people administered the commonwealth through deputies as through mandataries strictly so called.

In the latter part, in the manner of a corollary, we then hand down the rules for the best constitution of this right, and at the same time explain what parts justice can sometimes claim for itself in this matter.

2. THE TERMS ARE EXPLAINED.

The right of suffrage—popular suffrage, namely, by which deputies are principally elected.

Is a faculty. By this word we remove from this right the rationale of an office properly so called. For a faculty directly signifies a certain benefit, honor, or advantage of the privileged person.

Legal: because it flows from law and belongs to those whom the law judges should be furnished with this faculty; it is far from being a right conferred by nature upon individuals of itself.

Burdensome, insofar as it produces obligations.

Of designating magistrates through whom ... the commonwealth is governed. By these words we contend that those who are elected properly preside over the commonwealth and are adorned with true power, so that in their own name and by their own judgment they administer the commonwealth, and do not merely receive a mandate to determine affairs according to the judgment of the electors. We therefore repudiate what are called imperative mandates. Nevertheless, electors are not prohibited from seeking deputies who agree with them, or even from exacting certain guarantees. Hence we see candidates announce what they intend to do (their program); and, as equity counsels, deputies resign their office if in some principal matter they disagree with the electors.

The designation itself is not always immediate. For not rarely, at least as regards senators, the people designate only electors who then designate the senators.

Magistrates are ordinarily, as we have already warned, those who enact laws and are called deputies or senators. But if, as in the federal States of North America, the judges themselves, or, as in England, the distributors of the tax which is exacted to support the poor, or finally other magistrates, are to be appointed by suffrage, the matter plainly must be determined, as is evident, by the same principles.

At least in part. We add this because, where the regime is mixed, there are some who come into a share of public power by a title other than suffrage.

Therefore, in its ordering, the common good is to be considered primarily. Therefore, this must be the direct and principal consideration of those who enact laws concerning the right of suffrage: that they consider what rationale of the right of suffrage can contribute to the best administration of the commonwealth, according to those qualities which it is established are required in administrators: the will for the common good, prudence, efficacy of rule, etc.

For it is unlawful to establish the order in such a way that your private opinion concerning the commonwealth prevails.¹

¹ Yet today nothing occurs more frequently in practice. And, what is worse, while the rationales of the true religion are neglected, the vain dogmas of a certain liberalism are proclaimed as unshaken; and, without scruple, rights and liberties are constituted in such a way that they can inflict no detriment upon “that higher idea.” This appears especially in France, concerning the “inviolable” laws of the impious republic, and likewise in Italy, concerning the manner of conceiving the political unity of the kingdom.

The equal distribution of the right, secondarily. Therefore, if we give the first place to the common good, we do not thereby regard the rationale of distributive justice as none or as to be despised. Therefore, insofar as the public good permits, one must strive toward this: that those who possess this right by an equal title have the same power of suffrage, and that those who are equally able through it to assist the public good equally possess it. For in this way distributive justice will be satisfied.

II. The thesis is proved.

88. 1. THE FORMER PART, WHICH CONCERNS THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE.

But. The right of suffrage is a legal faculty.

First Argument. For unless it is an innate right of the citizens,² it is entrusted by law either as an office properly so called or as a faculty. But it is neither of the first two. Therefore.

² Thus D. Janson, in the chamber of deputies of Belgium, 1893, p. 921.

The truth of the major—that is, that there are only three options—is sufficiently evident both of itself and from the opinions cited.

The minor is proved. a) For an innate right:

α) It is defended only by those who falsely imagine that perfect society is similar to a private society, so that it would be entered into and dissolved by the will and consent of its members. The right of suffrage then looks toward this: that each one may have the opportunity to surrender his autonomy or to assent to the form and government of the society.

But civil society, since it is a natural institution, has drawn from nature itself the right to exist as well as to possess that tempering of the commonwealth which is expedient for the common good. For these things to be introduced, the consent of individuals is by no means necessary; nor is it lawful for anyone to assent to the state only under this condition, that through the right of suffrage he be a participant in the commonwealth.

β) Logically it would infer the universal suffrage of women and of all who are sufficiently possessed of reason. Yet this has hitherto pleased very few.³

³ Cf. the things set down below concerning this question.

b) The rationale of an office properly so called must also be excluded.

For α) an office properly so called must be discharged from an obligation of commutative justice, as though from a contract. But a contract rests upon mutual consent, and especially upon the consent of him who undertakes the obligations. Hence only in desperate circumstances, as when the Roman Empire was declining, did certain public offices begin to be imposed upon citizens. But it is not only those who have asked for it or have not shunned it who obtain the right to cast a suffrage, but whosoever are adorned with the legitimate qualifications. Therefore, if it were an office, an almost perpetual and involuntary attachment of nearly all citizens to an office would be introduced.

β) Moreover, if you consider the object of an office properly such, that object is a certain necessary administration of the commonwealth, such as enacting laws, pronouncing judgment, etc. Here, however, it is a question of the election of magistrates; but this manner of constituting them is by no means essential of itself to the state.

γ) Both the doctrine of the theologians⁴ and the common sense of men agree with our position: there is no one who judges himself bound in justice, as though by reason of an office, to cast a suffrage. Indeed, there are very few regions in which citizens are compelled by any law to present themselves at the elections.⁵

⁴ Cf., for example, Most Illustrious Waffelaert and Génicot, cited places.

⁵ See the things said by D. Woeste in the Belgian Chamber of Deputies, Annales Parlementaires [Parliamentary Proceedings], 10 March 1893, p. 898.

Second Argument. The very rationale under which the right of suffrage is ordinarily celebrated and extolled is that of political liberty, the prerogative of a free people, etc. For these things sufficiently reveal a faculty, but by no means an office properly understood.

B. It is a burdensome faculty.

a) By that right, citizen-electors can do something so that the best rulers may be placed over the commonwealth; and no one fails to see how greatly this matter concerns the common good of civil society. Indeed, that it matters greatly to the Church herself and to her peace and safety who preside over political society is placed beyond doubt. But, as citizens of the Church and of the State, we are held by a perpetual obligation to care, according to our ability, for the necessary common good. Therefore, as citizens and Christians, obligations accrue to us from the right of suffrage.

b) Furthermore, if you wish to use your right, then in electing magistrates the strict right (of commutative justice) which Society possesses—that those honored with offices be worthy—cannot be neglected. Hence, from commutative justice, you cannot, at least by an efficacious suffrage,⁶ vote except for a candidate who is judged worthy either absolutely or relatively. We call him relatively worthy whose election seems likely to bring fewer detriments to the common good⁷ than the election of his opponent, so that, at least to ward off the worse man, it is lawful to favor him.

⁶ We call efficacious a suffrage which has a probable influence upon whether this man rather than that one is elected.

⁷ We use these words deliberately. For it can happen that the election of a person worse in himself (for example, a socialist) may seem less harmful than the election of a person enrolled in the more moderate parties of liberalism. But since the matter must be judged from the common good, the person worse in himself must be called, in this case, less unworthy.

C. It is a faculty of designating magistrates through whom, at least in part, the commonwealth is governed.

For this is the obvious interpretation of the matter. The same laws which confer suffrage upon the people attribute the right of enacting laws not to the people but to the deputies (taken collectively). The conclusion is confirmed from the fact that, when popular elections are held, even most matters to be deliberated are unknown. Nor is a deputy ever accused of strict injustice toward the electors because he has approved these laws or decrees rather than those. Furthermore, if the deputy were properly a mandatary, he would hold the place only of those who had elected him; nor, by passing beyond the limits of the mandate, would he still act as a deputy. But now, in however small a region he was designated, the good of the entire realm is entrusted to him,⁸ and no care is taken concerning the observance of the limits of any mandate. Moreover, the doctors agree in this matter. Nor does St. Thomas intend anything else when he says that, in a mixed regime, this pertains to democracy: that the people elect princes.⁹ For princes are none other than those who truly rule.

⁸ Hence the Belgian Constitution has these words, art. 32: “The members of the two chambers represent the nation and not only the province or the subdivision of the province which appointed them.”

⁹ I–II, q. 105, art. 1, corpus. Cf. above, no. 86.

89. 2. THE LATTER PART IS PROVED, CONCERNING THE RULES ACCORDING TO WHICH THE ORDERING OF THE RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE IS TO BE MEASURED.

But. Therefore, in its ordering, the common good is to be considered primarily.

For a faculty or prerogative whose cause is public must be ordered chiefly with a view to the common good.

a) The right of suffrage is of this kind. For when, in an equal society, we see a certain faculty attributed to some citizens and denied to others, every just rationale of the discrimination must be sought from a public cause.

Furthermore, by its object the right of suffrage is concerned with designating magistrates. But since it is a strict right of Society that it be ruled by worthy men, the privilege must plainly be ordered in such a way that it conduces to the election of the best. But thus, again, the primary ordering of the right must be made with a view to the common good.

B. The equal distribution of the right is to be considered secondarily.

This is evident from the fact that this right has the rationale of a good, of a privilege pertaining to the community. Cf. the preceding thesis.

90. III. Difficulties.

The difficulties which cohere with errors concerning the nature of political society being omitted (concerning which, consult the books which treat natural law), only one seems that it must be touched upon. It proceeds from the law which, as has been enacted for some years in Belgium, compels citizens to involve themselves in the elections. Hence it is argued thus:

Such is the right of suffrage that sometimes it must necessarily be exercised by law. But a right of this kind differs in nothing from the exercise of an office.

Nevertheless, the reply is that this difference intervenes: that obligation is merely the one which penal laws produce, while we are held to exercise an office from commutative justice.

That the obligation of the law concerning the casting of suffrage is no greater is suggested both by the common understanding of the matter and by the very rationale of the law.¹⁰ For the rationale is, first, lest too many abstain from the election to the detriment of the common good, especially since citizens who are greater lovers of civil peace are ordinarily infected with this indolence; and second, that those who are of a humbler condition may have a protection by which they can evade the devices of powerful men who might wish to prohibit them from exercising their right. Now, for this end the sanction of a penalty to be sustained is sufficient.

¹⁰ Cf. Génicot, vol. 1, p. 359.

The same is confirmed from the fact that he who deliberately casts a suffrage of no value does not violate the law.