Article I. Formulation and Arguments of the Proposition

Injustice is opposed both to legal justice and to particular justice; it is a special vice, whose act is of its kind a mortal sin.

133. I. THE STATE OF THE QUESTION. THE TERMS ARE EXPLAINED.

Both to legal justice and to particular justice. By the latter name we understand both its species: distributive and commutative.

Injustice, which is a vice, is opposed. We call a moral vice that which is a bad habit discordant with right reason.¹ As a habit, it signifies a stable disposition of the subject.² Therefore, not everyone who does what is unjust is infected by the vice of injustice. Indeed, because the will is generally enticed to choose what is unjust by an end different from the formal dishonesty of injustice—for example, by cupidity, anger, or hatred—the vice of injustice is rarely found in a man, as St. Thomas judges, although acts of injustice are most frequent. Cf. II-II, q. 59, art. 2, corpus and reply to obj. 2.

¹ Schiffini, Ethica [Ethics], no. 91.

² I-II, q. 49, art. 2, reply to obj. 3.

Special, insofar as it is not a mere common denomination of every sin, or its general condition, but is a vice inclining toward a sin specifically distinct from the sins which are opposed to other virtues.

Nor is injustice itself one species, but as a certain genus is referred to its inferiors, which, as is evident from the things handed down above, will be illegal injustice and particular injustice. The latter, in turn, contains under itself respect of persons, opposed to distributive justice, and the injustice which is opposed to commutative justice, whose act is properly called injury.

Whose act, which through the divine law prohibiting it becomes a sin.

Is of its kind a mortal sin.—Of its kind, or per se, when someone is not excused either by smallness of matter or by defect of deliberation.

134. II. THE THESIS IS PROVED.

1. FROM SACRED SCRIPTURE, especially as regards commutative injustice.

For not only does the Apostle generally exhort the faithful in the Epistle to the Romans 13:7 to render to all what is owed, but very frequently in the sacred writings sins, especially those against commutative justice, are so forbidden or reproved that they are not rarely declared in express words to be mortal— sins. Cf. Exodus 20:13–17, where the Decalogue is promulgated, confirmed in the Gospel of Matthew 19:17–18: “If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments”; the grave admonition of the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 6:9–10; 1 Thessalonians 4:6; etc. But it is clear to the reader that those sins are regarded as special.

2. FROM REASON.

a) Injustice is a special vice.

First argument. A vice is contrary to a virtue.

But. The threefold rationale of the virtue of justice is special according to its essence; and the vice of injustice is opposed to it.

Therefore. The vice of injustice is special.

Second argument. To act in contempt of the common good that is owed, and to violate the rights of another private person, have in themselves a special rationale of dishonesty, one not common to all sins according to their formal rationale. Therefore. The vice which formally inclines toward these things—namely, injustice—is special.

b) Its act is of its kind a mortal sin.

First argument. Every sin which of itself is positively opposed to charity, which is the life of the soul, so that of itself it destroys the bond of friendship among men, is of its kind mortal.

But. The sin of injustice is of itself opposed to charity in this manner. Therefore.

Proof of the minor. To charity, by which we are led to will good to our neighbor, there is of itself opposed in this manner an act by which harm is positively inflicted upon another, or a right is denied. Therefore. (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 59, art. 4.)

Second argument, particular to “illegal” injustice.

The formal and practical contempt of a good which is greatest and necessary of itself brings about a grave disorder.

But. This is the special malice of illegal injustice. Therefore.

135. III. DIFFICULTIES.

N.B. Our position does not appear capable of being seriously attacked. We shall therefore propose those difficulties which the Angelic Doctor opposed to himself, so that by their solution the understanding of the doctrine may be perfected.

1. INJUSTICE IS NOT A SPECIAL VICE. For:

a) “Every sin is iniquity.” 1 John 3:4.

Reply. Insofar as every sin is against the divine law, the divine good, and thus merits the name of injustice, I concede. Insofar as every rationale of sin is against legal or particular justice, I deny. Under some rationale, but not under every sinful rationale, a sin is opposed to the common good.

b) No special sin is opposed to all the virtues. But. Injustice is opposed to all the virtues. Therefore.

Reply. I distinguish the major. Per se and directly, I concede. Accidentally and indirectly, insofar as it touches the matter of all the virtues, but by its own special rationale, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor. Injustice is opposed to all the virtues directly, I deny. For not every rationale of sin is injustice. Injustice is opposed to all the virtues indirectly, I concede or pass over.

For in external operations which pertain to other virtues, attention must also be given to right order toward one’s neighbor. If this is violated, particular injustice also will be found in that matter. Legal injustice, however, will be present when the common good to which the act of another virtue commandingly pertained is contemned.

c) Injustice and justice are in the will; and every sin is in the will. Therefore. Every sin is injustice.

Reply. To the first part of the antecedent: Injustice is in the will, I distinguish the antecedent. As a habit inhering in the will and regarding its proper object, I concede. As a habit regarding every matter which the will touches, I deny.

To the second part. Every sin is in the will: I distinguish the antecedent. Insofar as the will extends itself to every moral matter, since by command it governs the passions and external operations, and consequently insofar as the rationale of sin inheres in an act through denomination from the will, I concede. Insofar as every sin is an act of the will, I deny.

2. IT IS NOT OF ITS KIND A MORTAL SIN.

a) Against the argument: Charity is the mother of all the virtues; Therefore. A sin contrary to any virtue whatsoever is repugnant to charity. But. Not every sin is of its kind mortal. Therefore. Therefore it cannot be established that the sin of injustice is mortal because it is contrary to charity.

II-II, q. 59, art. 4, third difficulty.

And St. Thomas replies by denying the first consequent. For from the fact that charity is the mother of all the virtues it follows only that every sin is not from charity, but not that every sin is directly and positively repugnant to charity.

b) He who induces someone to venial sin harms him more. Therefore. If from harm inflicted upon another it follows that a sin against justice is mortal, a fortiori it is mortal to induce someone to sin venially. But. This is false. Therefore.

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent. He harms him more and under the same rationale, I deny. Under a disparate rationale, I concede. Namely, one who wills is induced to sin venially; one who does not will suffers what is unjust.