§ 2. Formulation and Arguments of the Conclusion

By the law of nature itself, this kind of institution is sanctioned: the private ownership of external things, even immovable things.

198. I. State of the question. What our intention aims at, and why we discuss specifically the dominion of immovable things, are sufficiently evident from the preceding chapter and the notions just handed down. Therefore, we may immediately turn to explaining the terms.

1. THE TERMS ARE EXPLAINED.

By the law of nature itself, whose solemn definition is: “The participation of the eternal law in the rational creature.”¹ It therefore contains an ordinance commanded by God Himself, the author of nature, and promulgated in our nature itself. Hence it cannot be separated from our nature. Moreover, we say by the law of nature itself in order to indicate the force which accrues everywhere to private possessions from positive laws.

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 91, art. 2.

Is sanctioned, that is, it obtains validity and efficacy as soon as it exists; and, with nature as guide and instigator, it has been commonly introduced.

This kind of institution. Kind, I say, because in addition to the generic approval which it has from the law of nature, the manner in which it exists and has force “in the concrete” is not, as Cardinal de Lugo observes, “completely from the natural law alone, but depends at least negatively upon human law; not only because many modes of acquiring, losing, and transferring dominion can be introduced, and in fact have been introduced, by merely human law, but also because those other modes of acquiring dominion which appear to have been introduced by the law of nature still depend at least negatively upon human law, insofar as they could have been impeded by human law, just as in fact ... many are rendered incapable by human law of acquiring dominion.” (Disp. 6, no. 5.)

Which is private property, not merely momentary or precarious, but stable and firm.

Of external things, and not merely of one's own action, reputation, and honor, which, as all admit, are appropriated to individuals by the law of nature itself. The members of the body themselves, moreover, are a part of the possessing person rather than things possessed.

Even immovable things, whether buildings or lands. This does not prevent some things from being withdrawn from the commerce of private persons by positive law and others from being assigned to the treasury itself.

2. NOTE TO THE THESIS. a) That the regime of private property is among lawful things is clearly contained in the Scriptures, so that it must be held with Catholic faith.

b) He would incur the censure of temerity who ascribed a civil origin to this regime, or denied that, with respect to external things, any right of private property arises from nature itself. For he would openly conflict with the doctrine which the Supreme Pontiff declared to be the doctrine of the Church.

c) We would not, however, judge anyone per se worthy of censure who simply adhered to the doctrine of the Scholastics, except that he would act somewhat imprudently by employing terms which today supply an occasion for abuses. And in truth, the Scholastics themselves would entirely assent to this formula by which the Supreme Pontiff concludes his discussion concerning the division of things, especially immovable things, and pronounces his judgment: “Rightly, therefore, the whole human race, hardly moved at all by the dissenting opinions of a few and attentively contemplating nature, found in the law of nature itself the foundation of the partition of goods, and consecrated private possessions by the usage of all ages, as being most consonant with human nature and with peaceful and tranquil common life.”²

² Encyclical Rerum Novarum, in the first part.

The formula of the thesis itself, moreover, is such that it does not decide the question concerning the consent which is required negatively or positively as a mere condition for introducing the regime of the division of possessions. Cf. the Scholium, no. 207.

II. Proof.

199. A. OF THE FIRST PART: By the law of nature itself, this kind of institution is sanctioned per se: the private property of external things.

Argument 1. From the end of external things.

The argument can now be set forth precisely in this manner: Nature sanctions that regime of goods by which alone the end for which they were created is well attained. But. Such is the regime by which at least many goods are possessed as their own by private persons. For above we showed that both kinds of communism are repugnant, namely, negative and positive communism. Therefore.

Yet, to speak more explicitly, our argumentation proceeds in this manner:

Nature sanctions that kind of institution concerning external things which, upon easy consideration, appears necessary to all in order that external things may be fittingly adapted to the end for which they are destined by the Author of nature.

But. Such is, per se, the private property of external things.

Therefore. By the law of nature itself, therefore, this is sanctioned per se.

To the major. On the one hand, the willing of the end demonstrates in the Author of nature the willing of the means which alone is suitable; on the other, the common evidence of the necessary connection between the means and the end, concerning which men readily agree, brings it about that this means is commonly received and observed even before human law has exercised its force and efficacy. But this indicates a natural institution. For, as we say in Volume I, where we treat Laws and the Law of Nations, true causality is to be acknowledged in human ordinances for this reason: in obscure matters, or those which permit a choice among several things, the consent and agreement of the citizens would not be obtained unless the prince, by his choice, imposed a necessary rule upon his subjects. Cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 91, art. 3, ad 1.

To the minor. These things are clearly apparent to anyone who gives even a little thought to them:

a) The external things of this world were created for the human race, as aids for its manifold need and as instruments of every advancement.

b) Most things, however, were not so granted to men that, of their own accord and at men's command, they are present in the abundance required and in the form in which they are immediately useful. Fields, although fertile, will not be fruitful without cultivation. And the fruits themselves which are produced are generally unsuited to our uses unless they are transported by our industry and assume suitable forms. No small amount of labor must be expended, not only upon inanimate things, but also in feeding cattle and subduing wild beasts. Therefore, most external things cannot be left, as it were, to themselves, but care must be expended upon them which is diligent, constant, and orderly. That is, in order that many things may be disposed in a manner consonant with the end intended by the Author of nature, they must enter into the lasting possession of men.

c) This possession can thus far be conceived as common or private. But if it is undertaken as common, men for the most part will be neither industrious in caring for things nor orderly; nor will they long associate peacefully with one another.³

³ St. Thomas already proposed the same thing elegantly, II-II, q. 66, art. 2, in these words: “It is lawful that man possess his own things. And this is also necessary for human life for three reasons. First, because each person is more solicitous in procuring something which belongs to himself alone than something which is common to all or to many; for each person, avoiding labor, leaves to another what pertains to the common good, as happens with a multitude of servants. Secondly, because human affairs are conducted in a more orderly manner if to each person falls the proper care of procuring some thing. But there would be confusion if anyone indiscriminately took care of anything whatsoever. Thirdly, because by this a more peaceful condition of men is preserved, while each person is content with his own thing. Hence we see that quarrels arise more frequently among those who possess something in common and undividedly.”

This is taught both by human behavior, which, if you attend to it even a little, you will see to be of itself very much inclined toward idleness, self-love, and envy; and by continual experience, which shows that common things are generally neglected in comparison with private things, unless perhaps a private advantage can be hoped for from the very care of common things. Finally, the sharing of goods with strangers, unless it appears necessary for some special end and for a short time, is little sought by men and contains the seeds of perpetual dissensions, quarrels, and enmities.

These things, I say, are immediately proved to cohere with community of goods taken generically.

But if you look to that form of community which the adversaries proclaim, all the arguments made in the preceding thesis against present-day collectivism recur.

The truth of the assumed minor also now becomes sufficiently manifest from the universal fact that men, led by common sense, as soon as they began to multiply and to apply themselves to the arts, at the same time had possessions divided among themselves. This rationale becomes all the more urgent because, as St. Thomas most excellently observes,⁴ “it is to be judged that, throughout the length of preceding times, nearly everything concerning human intercourse which can be devised has been discovered.”

⁴ In II Politicorum, lect. 5.

Argument 2. From the nature of men, both personal and social.

It is repugnant that nature should not have sanctioned this kind of institution: a) toward entering which man is borne by the strongest propensities of his personal and domestic life; b) which alone accommodates these propensities to the requirements of political society. But. Such is the private property of external things. Therefore.

The major is evident, because nature, which made man a rational, domestic, and political animal, would have conflicted with itself if it had of itself denied him the means by which he could satisfy the first two characteristics of his substance and by which the three characteristics could be in harmony with one another.

The minor is proved in parts.

a) Concerning the propensities themselves.

α) The propensity of a man who has reached maturity to govern himself by his own judgment, and consequently to provide by himself for his necessities and desires, is very great. By reason, moreover, he is conscious that the necessities by which he is pressed are by no means allayed by a momentary use of things, but constantly recur and, as Leo XIII says, return perpetually, even after he has been rendered by old age or infirmity unequal to labor. By reason he also foresees various advancements, not only those which pertain to temporal utilities or the conveniences of bodily or present life, but also those which concern the nobler pursuits of letters, the fine arts, and virtue. But security for the future, a greater enjoyment of life, and leisure for nobler pursuits - unless he wishes to depend upon another's judgment for all these things - from what source will they be available to him except from stable and private property in external things? Therefore, by the same propensity by which he is impelled to pursue those things, he is impelled to acquire this property for himself.

If, as generally happens, complying with his natural inclination, he has by marriage begun a domestic society, the one who is the head of the family will experience in himself at one and the same time both the authority and the will to govern his own in a manner similar to that by which he governs himself. Again, in the possession of external things he recognizes the one means adapted today for extending a provident care which reaches to his offspring and passes beyond the limits of his present life.

β) No less vehement is the inclination in man to claim as his own the fruit of his labor. Indeed, this persuasion rests upon truth, by which all judge that the work belongs to him whose labor it was. But nature has so disposed things that no labor would be fruitful unless it were applied to some external thing, with which it would thereafter become one indivisible body.

Come then, if the wood from which you have fashioned a hammer or a plow belonged to no one, or the land which you have converted into a field or a meadow, or, universally, the matter which you have permanently clothed with your operation, to whom, I ask, will that whole composite of an external thing and your personal operation belong? Will men not, under nature's prompting, assign to you the hammer or plow itself, and the field itself - at least as long as it remains clothed with your labor - since, with the intention of enjoying the thing, you applied time and diligence to it? By this other path, therefore, perhaps a shorter one, man is led, as though by the hand of nature, to the opinion of private property.

What of the fact that the very pleasure which men are accustomed from childhood to take in the property of external things reveals no slight propensity or instinct of nature?

b) Through private property, these propensities are accommodated to the requirements of political society. And indeed:

α) Political society requires a head who commands and is furnished with suitable power. At the same time, however, as human ambition now is, there is a very great danger that rulers will exceed the measure and render the citizens excessively subject to themselves. Remove private property in things, in which - as history bears witness - the greatest force for resisting tyrannical attempts is situated; also hand over the goods themselves to the rulers of the community to be governed: from what source are the citizens to seek a protection for themselves in defending personal liberty?

β) Political society requires that citizens apply themselves to the most varied arts; that there be some who have at the same time rendered themselves capable and are able to free themselves from occupation in order to devote themselves to the commonwealth. These things are supplied of their own accord by the regime of private possessions, by which citizens, with necessity itself or their own advantage compelling them, are moved to cultivate every kind of art and differ among themselves no less in knowledge and prudence than in fortunes. By the same regime it is brought about that they can promise themselves from their diligence such a fruit as may incite them not to refuse the burden of certain offices. Remove private property in things: it will scarcely be possible for citizens to be assigned to fixed dwellings and arts otherwise than by public force, or for some to enjoy that leisure and devote themselves to those studies by which they prepare themselves for discharging offices at some future time, otherwise than by public decree. Therefore, the propensities described above will once more be done away with.

Add to these things that, by the things which they privately possess, citizens are especially incited to will that the commonwealth be safe and prosperous; and that by reciprocal exchanges, partnerships, and agreements which are made concerning private things, men are joined to one another by so many bonds, as it were. How greatly these things contribute to the common good can be hidden from no one.

N.B. The force of this argument appears more clearly if you recall the things proposed at greater length in the refutation of socialism. Concerning the same reasoning, both the Encyclical Rerum Novarum and the cited work of Rev. Fr. Holaind, who from chap. 4 onward is excellently occupied in explaining it, may profitably be consulted.

Nor should you say, in order to weaken the reasoning made:

1) That it proves too much, and consequently proves nothing, since it would follow that access to private possessions would have to be open to all men; for there is no one who is without the propensities from which the reasoning was drawn;

2) That the Catholics themselves are persuaded of this, since religious who live a common life make sufficient provision for their needs and better than others provide for their advancement and the higher arts. Therefore, all these things can be had more easily and happily by the common possession of goods.

Do not say these things, I repeat. For:

1) As regards the former doubt: from the fact that all possess propensities of this kind which demand private property in things, it is perhaps not without reason inferred that, per se, an opportunity is provided by nature to each person to obtain that property which is sufficient to satisfy these propensities in some suitable manner; and that a society employs a less correct regime of goods where this opportunity seems per se to be lacking to most persons. Yet per accidens that faculty can be lacking, just as other faculties, such as that of marriage, which correspond to a natural propensity. Nor is it required that it be present equally perfectly in all. For nature itself made men of varied talents and powers. Nevertheless, whatever relation the system of private property which flourishes in a given place may bear to the perfect intention of nature, property, even if imperfect, will still be sanctioned by nature insofar as by it the innate propensities are certainly satisfied in some manner. In truth, however, if we now turn to the actual fact, all men who in some part govern themselves and their own by their own judgment, and have a choice of place or condition, must ascribe this to stable property, so that to deprive someone of this right is equivalent to reducing him to servitude. Nor, once servitude strictly so called has been abolished, is any person per se without at least an opportunity of possessing more. Furthermore, merely by the hope of better fortune the industry of men is nourished and those pursuits which contribute greatly to the advancement of civilized culture are fostered. External things, under the regime which we employ, might be said to be placed, as it were, in the midst, so that no one who strives is per se denied some share; but abundance is obtained by those who, in a most useful contest, have more successfully reached the goal.

2) As regards religious communities, they do nothing to impair the evidence of the conclusion. For the rationale by which they themselves are constituted, and the selection by which members are enrolled, are such that individuals can entirely trust in common care and providence. These persons, moreover, led by a higher motive, renounce liberty and marriage for themselves, so that, greatly subject to a Prelate, they lead a life of a simple and humble tenor which can belong to very few.

If, in addition, any groups are mentioned in which community of goods appears to flourish, the same simplicity of life occurs, and at the same time, generally - not to say always - a religious cause which joins the members more closely to one another.

Only then would the adversaries accomplish anything if they could set before us an example of a merely civil society in which the arts and civilized culture flourished without a division of possessions.

200. B. OF THE OTHER PART: By the law of nature itself is sanctioned ... the private property of external things, even immovable things.

This part is easily established by the following:

1) Immovable things exhibit the character by which they are to be assigned to the class of things subjected to private dominion. For nature grants dominion of those things which are a) distinct from the human person, b) useful to man, c) finite in abundance, and d) such that, unless they are consumed by use, they can be stably marked by man or their possessor, as though by a sign. Cf. Rev. Fr. Holaind, chap. 7, at the beginning. For a) the object of a right is never a person, as we saw in no. 7; b) and c) property in useless things or things of infinite quantity would lack a just cause; d) unless a thing appears by a stable bond to be assigned to the service of someone, the privilege of property collapses from its foundation, nor can the right become known per se to other men, which is nevertheless required in order that they be bound by the duty of observing it. But if these four things are present, the utility and rationale of property will be present at the same time.

Now it is evident that lands are distinguished by these endowments. For, to pass over the first three, which are known to the eyes of all, as regards the fourth quality, lands retain the trace of their owners more than other things do. “For a field subdued by the hand and skill of the cultivator greatly changes its condition: from wild it becomes fruitful, and from barren, productive.” Encyclical Rerum Novarum.

2) Private possessions of immovable things have special advantages of a public character. Cf. what was said in no. 182, B.4.

3) The public seizure of immovable goods would benefit no one and would create the greatest danger for society: that the power of those who command would pass into the worst tyranny; that the officials occupied in that immense administration would indulge without restraint in their desires, perverse favoritism, and embezzlement; and that the citizens would be far less devoted to the commonwealth and to peaceful arts.

201. III. Difficulties, after the arguments made and the refutation of collectivism, are neither numerous nor do they occasion any trouble, so that it is enough to present a few which attack the first part of the thesis.

1. FROM THE NATURAL COMMUNITY OF THINGS. For:

a) Private property attributes to one person what nature did not make for one person. Therefore. It is not from nature.

Reply. I divide the antecedent. Private property attributes to one person: I distinguish this part. Private property, that is, the act of the lawful faculty of appropriating things to oneself, C.; that is, the faculty itself or the regime of private property, I subdistinguish. It attributes proximately to one person, N.; remotely, C. Nature did not make it for one person, I distinguish: proximately, C.; remotely, in the present state, N. I distinguish the consequent likewise. Therefore. Private property, understood as the act of appropriation, is not from nature, C. or I pass over; the faculty itself, or the regime, is not from nature, N.

What we say is sanctioned by nature is the regime itself of private property, once it has been introduced, and this under the common rationale by which it universally permits divided possession to private persons. Yet by this no one already possesses anything; a positive, human fact is required in addition, by which a thing enters into the dominion of someone. That fact, at least if you take the original fact of occupation, appears to some to be a mere condition, so that they derive the property of the occupied thing itself from hypothetical natural law. Others, whom we judge to speak better, attribute true causality to that fact. But because the present thesis concerned merely the regime itself, we conceded or passed over that the act of appropriation is not from nature alone.

Instance. Nature did not even remotely make for one person that which the regime of private property attributes to one person. For it destined external things to the whole human race.

Reply. I deny the exception made. As regards the rationale added, besides the fact that it would attack the common possessions of one nation no less than the private possessions of one private person, I distinguish it thus: It destined things to the human race in order that they be possessed by it as the subject of dominion, I deny; in order that they redound to its good and utility, I subdistinguish. If you take things and the human race collectively, C.; if you take things and men distributively, I subdistinguish again. If you take things and men together, or things alone, I deny; if men alone, I subdistinguish. In some manner, C.; equally, I deny.

The end to which these distinctions tend is readily apparent. Since all things were made for man - not so much for this or that man as for the human race - the manifest intention of nature is that external things universally be useful to men taken generically; therefore, we conceded the proposition concerning things and the human race taken collectively. Yet nature did not thereby establish that each and every thing must serve each and every man, or that the human race must receive utility from each individual thing; hence we denied that either things and men together, or things alone, can be taken distributively. Finally, as regards men themselves, there is no one who, according to the command of nature, ought not to come into some share of external things. Yet nature, which introduced the causes of inequality, by no means apportioned the same share to individuals. Under this rationale, therefore, we granted that men be taken distributively. But from this destination it is in no way brought about that things must be possessed in common, since, as we have shown, the very division of things is necessary in order that this end be well secured. Indeed, the very things which are the property of one person nevertheless customarily benefit many.

b) It is a solemn maxim of the Holy Fathers and of canon law that by nature all things are common.

Reply. I distinguish. By nature in its integrity, I pass over. By nature as it exists after the fall of Adam, I subdistinguish. All things are common negatively, on account of the common faculty granted for legitimately acquiring things, C.; all things are common positively, as regards the right of disposing of them, N.; as regards use, under the rationale just explained, C. Cf. the Scholia concerning negative community and the opinion of the Fathers.

2. FROM THE FACULTY OF RENOUNCING THIS RIGHT. Hence it is argued thus:

With a regime of private property which is from nature there cannot stand: a) the faculty which private persons possess of renouncing the right of possessing goods; b) the valid establishment of common property in certain societies.

Reply to a). I deny, since many divest themselves of the very right of marrying.

The rationale for this is that something is commanded or instituted by nature only insofar as the dictate of right reason demands this command or institution. Hence, if right reason merely demands that some right be present per se in man, in such a way that in certain circumstances the necessity or opportuneness of that right itself can vanish, it will be lawful for the man who is situated in these circumstances to divest himself even of a natural right. Now, from the arguments presented, only these things are concluded: a) that the regime of private property is today commonly necessary in a society of many men; b) that the right of legitimately acquiring goods is innate in each person. But since, in certain circumstances, such as those which surround religious, provision can be made for the preservation and perfection of man otherwise than through stable property, nothing prevents religious from casting aside that right.

Observe, however, that it is by no means established that, without the authority of law, someone can so renounce the faculty of acquiring goods that, if he afterward attempted to possess them, his possession would not even be valid. Indeed, the opinion which denies that this is within the power of private persons is to be preferred.

To b), I distinguish. With the natural regime of private property there cannot stand the introduction of common property or of a contrary regime in societies in which, on account of special circumstances, division is not necessary, I deny; for the regime itself is natural only for those societies in which the necessity of private property is evident to all.⁵ In the societies concerning which the thesis was proposed, I pass over. No society of this kind has existed or will exist for long. We nevertheless reserve the question concerning validity for a Scholium.

⁵ Cf. no. 199, Argument 1.

3. FROM THE EVILS AND ABUSES WHICH PRIVATE POSSESSIONS BRING WITH THEM.

Reply. The evils arise per accidens and are less than they would be if the contrary regime were introduced.