§ 3. Formulation and Arguments of the Conclusion

The lower limit of the wage by which the labor of an able-bodied and adult workman is to be exchanged is the stipend which per se is suitable for a father of a family.

437. I. State of the Question. 1. The intention of the thesis, therefore, is wholly concerned with defining the value which inheres per se in every human labor, whether it has a profitable use or not, and which consequently must be called its most proper value and the minimum among true values. We contend that this value is that absolute family value described above and to be explained more fully below.

Nevertheless, we defend this position in such a way that we do not deny the probable, although extrinsic, force of the opinion which places the limit in a suitable recompense for an individual man.

2. Opinions. We have already said, no. 430, to whom we subscribe.

Opposed to us are: a) All those who, adhering to the tenets of the liberal school, deny every objective rule of value, or admit only the fatal necessity of some economic law; b) those who establish the sustenance of one man as the lowest price, and at the same time deny every obligation of a family wage. For those who maintain that this is owed from a present office of legal justice differ from us almost only in words and in an ambiguous manner of speaking; c) communists, who defend the obligation of a relative family wage, if indeed they concede any wage. For all those who follow the banners of some kind of socialism are rather opposed to the form itself of an agreement of this kind.

3. The terms are explained.

The lower limit: that is, the sum below which an objectively just price cannot remain; not, however, one which is always sufficient, or from paying which no rationale excuses per accidens.

Of the just wage: we mean commutative justice.

By which labor is to be exchanged: for the discourse concerns hired labor.

Of an able-bodied workman: By able-bodied we understand one who possesses strength and that knowledge and art which, on account of a more perfect civil culture, can be morally common to all. We do not speak of one whom in French you would call un déclassé [a person who has fallen from his social station].

And adult: We take as adult one who is of the age at which persons in the region are accustomed to be joined in marriage and to have children, whether he has in fact taken a wife or has remained a bachelor.

Is the stipend which per se: By these words we indicate that we regard the ordinary circumstances in which a father of a family is accustomed to find himself. Therefore, we do not require that wage which would be needed for an extraordinary number of children. Observe that we do not say an average family. For we do not judge this to be said accurately, as we shall explain later, no. 445. Rather, we posit a family whose burdens are morally regarded as ordinary.

Is suitable for a father of a family. Therefore, we do not say a wage by which the sustenance of the entire family can be procured, or one which always actually corresponds to present necessities, even with the just assistance of the wife and children, but such a wage that a frugal and honorable workman can, by employing the fruit of his thrift and that which he deservedly expects from the work of his wife and children, provide decently for himself and his own—as they say, moderately, according to his condition.

438. Preliminary safeguards of the arguments. Three things seem first to have to be proposed, of which there will be an almost continuous tacit use in the argument, so that ignorance or forgetfulness of them would weaken the credibility and clarity of the rationales.

1. Since all justice has a mean of the thing (no. 36), while commutative justice, wholly free from every regard for persons, compares thing with thing, it is altogether manifest that the wage by which human labor is to be exchanged from justice does not vary whether it is to be given to a bachelor or to a father of a family whose offspring are few or many in number. For under this title of justice, the labor alone must be compensated, whose value must depend upon the rationale of the labor itself and not upon the quality of the one laboring. Therefore, the family wage, if any such wage is owed from commutative justice, can be neither collective nor relative, but absolute; and the same right of obtaining it avails for all who furnish labor not unworthy of that price, whether they have a wife or not.

2. The married state is so much the common state of men that nature has willed there to belong per se to all fully adult persons a morally unimpeded faculty of entering that state. The following prove it: a) The powers of begetting children bestowed per se upon all, and a certain proper insufficiency by which per se either sex needs the assistance of the other, so that both spouses effect something one and as it were one first complete being; b) the greatest propensity innate per se in individuals toward conjugal love;¹ c) the common necessity of that state for preserving morals. The worst morals generally accompany celibacy which a superior rationale has not commended to someone. Therefore, the Holy Fathers extol perfect chastity as something angelic and above human powers; d) the universal and perpetual fact.

¹ It is already read in Cicero, De finibus [On Ends], bk. 1, chap. 16: “The desires which proceed from nature are easily satisfied without any injury.”

Moreover, that state also induces per se the condition of a father of a family.

3. A father is per se ordered to supporting the family. (St. Thomas, II–II, q. 101, art. 2, ad 2.) At first the children are supported from the very body of their parents, and for a long time thereafter they cannot even beg alms for themselves. Therefore, if some father speaks of his own necessities, all understand also the necessities of his own, which, by theologians as by the common people, are held in an equal right and place. Hence, for example, the necessity of the family, like one’s own need, excuses from restitution.

Confirming this, the distinguished Mr. Waffelaert, place cited, has the following: “The workman may reckon as his subsistence—his complete subsistence—that of a workman who is a father of a family.”

439. B. Arguments.

Argument 1. From common estimation. The norm of the value of things and of human labor is common estimation (Thesis XXV).

But: Common estimation does not permit the wage of an able-bodied and adult workman to remain below the stipend per se suitable for a father of a family.

Therefore: This is the limit of the just stipend of an able-bodied and adult workman.

The minor premise is proved. For the following estimate thus:

a) Workmen² and all those who hire themselves out for a stipend; unless they have perceived in an unstable state of affairs or in extraordinary circumstances in which they themselves find themselves a cause of exception, they break forth into complaints and murmuring if they are hired for less;

² “The workers, contrary to the economic datum, did not cease to claim that the wage ought to be regulated by their needs, not by the relation of supply and demand.” Ém. Ollivier, cited by de T’Serclaes.

b) Most others commonly, who, from a spontaneous affection of mercy, regard such a lot of the workmen as though unworthy. How often are these or other similar things heard: “That wage is too small in the city. How can the workman’s family be supported by it?”

c) The theologians themselves who, relying upon St. Paul, First Epistle to the Corinthians 9:14,³ will that even one who applies himself to spiritual works has a right to suitable sustenance and culture. How much less would they deny such a thing to those who directly seek gain! But one must always keep in mind, as we warned, that an adult workman does not obtain per se the suitable supports of life unless the wage is familial.

³ “Thus also the Lord ordained that those who preach the Gospel should live by the Gospel.” Here observe that for St. Paul “to live by the Gospel” is equivalent to receiving one’s wage. For the Lord had said, Luke 10:7: “For the laborer is worthy of his wage.”

d) Indeed, morally all persons. To this belong sayings such as, “To procure sustenance by labor; vivre de son travail [to live by one’s work]; travail = gagne-pain [work = a means of earning one’s bread],” by which words labor and sustenance appear joined and coupled. Thus it is explained why, in defining and increasing the stipend of officials, this rationale is perpetually brought forward: such a recompense is required that the official can live according to his condition with his family; the force of this rationale is denied by no one.⁴ And how great would be their grieving murmurings and complaints if honoraria were established for them lower than those by which the means of honorably supporting themselves and their own would be supplied! But we showed from the beginning that the matter of officials and workmen is similar. Nor is anything else demonstrated by the perpetual efforts of all who are accustomed to undertake works or sell things, that from the price they may suitably support their whole household.⁵ What of the fact that the notion of this proposition is so natural and implanted in our minds that there is no one who ever judges an able-bodied workman to ask too much or to act unjustly when he demands such a wage and moves every stone to obtain it? Therefore, without doubt, the demand is just. But see where this beginning tends. If it is a just demand, it is therefore a demand for a just price. But if the price is just, it is therefore owed. For what is just except an equal due (no. 17)? Nor should you say that a lower wage is not for that reason pronounced unjust. We judge—and the preceding rationales furnished confirm it—that a lower wage is pronounced objectively unjust or unequal by all who consider the matter with a mind free from prejudices. Moreover, apart from the fact that most explain the latitude of a just price from the mere discrepancy of probable judgments (no. 340), so that a price which is positively thought just by all is necessarily owed, all certainly acknowledge that the interval between the lowest and highest price, as regards things which are in use, is not great. On the contrary, a vast difference intervenes between a family and an individual wage, since it is formal and affects no small part of the total sum. And already, in those things which will be said to pertain to the rationale of either one, there will be a place for various and probable opinions.

⁴ Thus Taparelli, because the magistrate furnishes labor to the state, binds the latter by the obligation of paying a stipend: a) by which the magistrate may support himself and his own; b) by which cessant gain may be compensated to him. Saggio, and so forth, vol. 2, no. 1143. Since he said, vol. 1, no. 428, that a servant furnishes labor to the employer, he would judge in the same manner concerning the wage of workmen.

⁵ Already in the fourteenth century, Henry of Langenstein, De contractibus [On Contracts], pt. 1, chap. 12, wishing to indicate the manner in which a “laborer” can per se estimate his things justly, has the following: “Let him consider for how much, by selling his things, he can continue his state and nourish himself suitably in it; and according to this, with expenses and labors rationally estimated, let him measure also the price of the works.” In Brants, Les théories économiques au XIIIe et au XIVe siècle [Economic Theories in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries], p. 119.

Let this excellent confirmation be heard from the words of Mr. Charles Périn, speaking of the morals of a Christian state: “Opinion, deeply penetrated by Catholic thought and sentiment, would never have regarded as just a wage which did not procure what is necessary for the father of a family living by his labor.” Premiers principes, 2nd ed., p. 307.

Argument 2. From the order of nature or of divine providence.

N.B. By this argument we touch, as it were, a deeper rationale, by which the common estimation itself and the force by which we are borne to judge a family wage just are explained. It is of the following kind.

Among necessary things in which nature is held not to fail, since it rather operates toward abundance, there is certainly found this: that nothing is per se disordered or unarranged, and consequently that means per se apt and sufficient are prepared for natural ends. Per se, I say: for nature regards those things which occur for the most part, so that a defect can occur in the fewer cases. Yet nature is then accustomed to meet this defect itself by extraordinary provision according to the more or less absolute necessity of the contrary good. From these things it is now perceived why, in adapting the wage to the family, we must posit the ordinary necessities by which it is per se pressed, and why the force of the argument is not the same as regards extraordinary conditions of affairs.

But: This order of nature demands in many ways the obligation of an absolute family wage.

Therefore: Nature sanctions this obligation by the virtue to which it pertains, that is, commutative justice.

The minor premise is proved. With this obligation removed:

1. The personal independence of men fails, as it is intended by nature. For in order that independence may be full, it is necessary not only that the means strictly necessary for the ultimate end itself be inviolably available to individuals, but also that a free and independent approach to the goods and the state which nature per se wills to be common should lie open per se to all.⁶ But he to whom, at adult age, a wage suitable for a father of a family is not paid does not have an unimpeded and independent way to the common state of marriage and the consequent sufficiency of goods, which nature wills to be common just as much as the state itself; but, as regards them, he becomes subject to the good will and mercy of others. Therefore.

⁶ We say common, that is, of most persons, not of all, so that we may signify a lesser necessity than that which is called almost extreme. Cf. nos. 231–232. We borrowed this distinction of goods from Cardinal de Lugo, disp. 16, no. 154, who consequently would plainly subscribe to our reasoning, unless something deceives us.

To this minor premise. For an independent approach signifies either a faculty which is physically present and whose use cannot morally be impeded—thus liberty, the use of things which have not been appropriated, and the very faculty of laboring—or an inviolable faculty of demanding, that is, a right strictly so called. The wage-earner who is compelled to seek sustenance by hiring out his labor alone lacks the former faculty in our state, where morally all riches have been appropriated. It remains, therefore, that a right belongs to him. But this, since we are not treating a case of extreme necessity, will be none other than that which arises from the value of the labor. Therefore, lest personal independence perish in part, it is necessary that at least a family recompense correspond per se to the value of human labor.

2. The efficacious destination of temporal goods to the common use of men fails. For this destination, in order that it may be efficacious, demands: a) That the earth bring forth for men laboring such an abundance of fruits as is per se sufficient for supporting all decently; b) that no other appropriation of things be held valid except that by which the faculty of sufficiently providing for themselves from these goods is given per se to all.

But: This demand is met only by the fact that, for paying a family wage to adults, a) the means are available per se, and b) there is an obligation of justice in the employers of labor.

Therefore: The efficacious destination of temporal goods to common use fails unless a family wage is to be paid per se from justice.

To the major premise. a) What suitability between the means and the end would there otherwise be? Nor should you object original sin. For, as theologians say, it left nature intact in substantial things, so that this sin cannot be demonstrated by reason, but by revelation alone. And from revelation itself we have, indeed, the punishment of hard labor imposed as a condition, but not that the sufficiency of fruits was taken away. On the contrary, Genesis 9:1–3 relates the blessing imparted to the generation of Noah—and therefore after sin—by which men are commanded to increase, multiply, and feed upon animals as well as the fruits of the earth.⁷

⁷ Here there can be a certain negative use of the words of Genesis to which appeal is made in the encyclical itself: “In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread,” insofar as, in pronouncing the punishment, God did not withdraw bread but merely made the way of obtaining it harsher. Rev. Fr. Castelein, Institutiones philosophicae [Philosophical Institutions], p. 374, not without reason disproves and censures the excessively positive use of this passage which several writers, for example Liberatore, seem to make.

b) For we saw above, no. 232, that the common destination of goods is not taken away, but rather sanctioned by the division of possessions, as by a more suitable means. But that destination would not be sanctioned if the force of the division would per se come down to this: that it deprived very many of an unimpeded faculty of providing sufficiently for themselves from these goods.⁸

⁸ We are always treating a free state. The state of servitude itself is had per accidens. Cf. the scholium, no. 451.

To the minor premise. a) For because the common condition of adults, with nature persuading, is that they be fathers of families, a suitable abundance of things is not per se available to all unless it corresponds to the common necessities of a father of a family. b) Unless there inheres in the employers of labor an obligation from justice to pay a family wage, most men—I mean those who seek sustenance by labor—have no means per se of providing sufficiently for themselves. For the office of charity by which the rich man is bound, and which is joined to an abundance of goods, indeed places in the rich man the faculty of giving and the will, if he observes honorable conduct; but it places in the poor man no faculty either of taking or of demanding, and consequently no means. For a means is that which you have an unimpeded power of using.

3. The powers and faculties of an adult man per se fail. Per se, the powers and faculties of an adult man are directed to providing not only those things which are necessary for himself, but also the greatest part of those which the family needs. Cf. no. 438, point 3. Nor are children per se committed to the care of any others than their parents. Therefore, just as food consumed by adults is destined in part, but in sufficient quantity, to offspring to be generated; just as breasts full of milk are prepared for a mother for the offspring born; so it is necessary that, in a state in which a great part of adults has almost only its industry in place of wealth, the powers of adults be endowed per se with this fruitfulness by which they are able to suffice for themselves and, for the greatest part, for their household. This fruitfulness, after the manner of a certain cessant gain, must be compensated by a wage which, consequently, in order to be just, must at least be familial. Whoever denies this is at the same time compelled to acknowledge that the powers of an adult man are poorly adapted to the end.⁹ Therefore, even if we wished to estimate every labor from economic fruitfulness, we would nevertheless not depart from our opinion as though defeated in any respect. Cf. the same argument in A. Verhaegen, work cited, no. III, who also cites Taparelli; or in Charles Périn, work cited, 2nd ed., p. 413; or Liberatore, no. 89.

⁹ “Labor, therefore, is virtually for the workman that which is necessary for his own maintenance and that of his little family. If, therefore, he employs it for the employer, it is necessary that the employer recompense him with the equivalent, so as thus to preserve ... justice.” Thus Liberatore, work cited, no. 89.

4. The common good is not sufficiently safeguarded. That a family recompense is supremely expedient for the common good, indeed that it is almost necessary, is scarcely doubted. And Rev. Fr. Antoine, Cours d’économie sociale, 2nd ed., p. 606, sets this forth excellently above the rest. Therefore, we shall say that wise nature, which directed rights themselves to the common good, so disposed affairs that human labor is per se worthy of that recompense which the rationale of the common good demands. Nor should they appeal to legal justice, which is nothing unless it says confusedly in the case the same thing which we expressly contend. And besides, how astonishing and how little probable it would be if it must be acknowledged that the common good requires that human labor be recompensed too much, that is, beyond its true value! Recall also the things said above (no. 429) concerning the similar example of grave matter of theft. Nor should you say that the common good requires this alone: that the necessities of families be amply met per se, and that this is done through a collective wage. For this, since it varies according to the varied necessities as they actually are, cannot, as we warned in no. 438, be owed from commutative justice. But with this obligation excluded, all the disadvantages return by which those are refuted who derive the obligation of a family wage from charity, from equity, and from legal justice.

Argument 3, or various confirmations.

1. Economists, when they inquire concerning economic requirements, establish as the norm or rule of the minimum wage that wage by which adults can provide not only for themselves but also for some children.¹⁰ Are not these things an indication to us that this wage is per se just, so that all things may suitably cohere with one another in the state?

¹⁰ Cf. the accurate analysis of this wage in Cauwès, vol. 3, nos. 805–814, where note these statements: “The rational economic unit from the standpoint of income is the family” (no. 813); “The normal wage, such as it has just been analyzed, is, when the economic interests of society are considered, a minimum of recompense” (no. 814). Cf. also Charles Périn, Premiers principes, 1st ed., pp. 295–296.

2. We showed above, nos. 429 and 437, point 2, that those who contend that the family wage is presently owed from legal justice tacitly subscribe to us.

3. Unless you concede our thesis, but place the lower limit of the just wage in a recompense suitable for an individual man, you at the same time acknowledge that provision has not been made per se for the necessities of children who belong to the most frequent order of proletarians, and that they themselves are pressed by misery and need not merely per accidens.¹¹

¹¹ “If labor were to provide only for the personal needs of the worker, who then would be charged by natural right with furnishing what is necessary to those who cannot work?” Gayraud, Questions du jour, p. 170.

4. The argument of the Encyclical fits our case perfectly. For in the office imposed by nature of preserving life, it finds the rationale for taking as the lower limit of the just wage that wage which is not unequal to supporting the workman. Since the conjugal state is intended per se by nature as common, the consequent office of supporting offspring grounds an altogether similar argument.

5. Let this confirmation from the Rev. Mr. Marrès, the distinguished professor of Roermond, writing even before the Encyclical, bk. 4, no. 353, be heard: “That stipend appears to be just by which the one who hires out his labor can provide for himself and his own according to his condition; for the dignity of human nature and the right order of society, and therefore also natural right, demand that each person be able by laboring to provide for his own sustenance.”

6. We are confirmed by Rev. Fr. Castelein. For he: a) on p. 381, § 5, holds that, in the “normal” state of affairs, the wage to be paid from commutative justice extends to procuring the decency of its state for the working class. No one will fail to see how near this opinion is to ours; and it logically comes down to our opinion if you observe, as we said (no. 438), that justice has a mean of the thing, so that this justice cannot furnish this decency except by awarding to each able-bodied workman an absolute family wage. b) On p. 388 he argues thus: “Divine providence must have willed that the workman, as a man, be able to acquire by his own power not only the necessities of life but an honorable, free, and secure condition of living.... But in the state of society in which immovable goods and the instruments of labor have already been preoccupied by legitimate possessors, the workman cannot procure such a condition for himself except by means of a collective family wage.... Therefore....” Here you see that the distinguished writer reasons elegantly and erred only in the word collective, in place of which it is readily evident that absolute must be put.

7. Finally, we shall place, as it were, the summit upon our work with this argument of the Most Illustrious Mr. Waffelaert, by which, in the study so often praised, he vigorously comprehends these same things: “The employer owes the workman the just wage, the equivalent of the labor furnished; it is the workman who, with the wage, must provide for his subsistence; this subsistence must be understood as the subsistence of an honorable workman who is a father of a family. Whence it follows that, in the normal state of society and apart from a passing crisis of industry, the wage must be sufficient for the workman to be able to fulfill the obligation proper to the head of a family. Therefore, in these normal conditions, the employer is unjust if he gives less.”

N.B. 1. We can therefore say: whether we argue from common estimation, or from the innate fruitfulness of labor, or from the common good, from these starting points alike we are led to the limit of an absolute family wage.

2. It does not help here to appeal to charity or equity. Lest there appear to be some cause for doubt on account of the exception which some attempt to seek from rationales of equity or charity, it is useful to show briefly how futile this exception is, since both the offices of equity and charity, if there are any, cannot be regarded as means which nature uses per se to provide for some common and ordinary necessity. For:

a) Both regard cases which occur per accidens. Equity fittingly tempers, in particular cases, the excessive rigor of strict right. Cf. the following thesis and Lehmkuhl, vol. 1, no. 776.

The office of charity which is treated here regards misery. But misery cannot be a condition intended per se by nature for some class of men. This is repugnant to the common good. Cf. Nicotra, work cited, p. 25; Charles Périn, work cited, 2nd ed., appendix, p. 413; Gayraud, pp. 170–171.

b) Charity confers no right upon the needy person. Therefore, in the hypothesis of the adversaries, most families, as regards decent sustenance, would per se be subject to (dépendraient de [would depend upon]) the good will of others.

Nor should you object by the rationale by which God provided for the propagation of the Gospel (Rev. Fr. Castelein, p. 374, note). Several things would have to be observed. This one thing will suffice: we are warned more than once by St. Thomas that the supernatural economy cannot be compared with the natural. Cf., for example, his reply to objection 3, art. 7, q. 23, First Part of the Summa.

440. III. Difficulties.

N.B. Concerning the consequences objected. After the not inconsiderable things which we have discussed concerning the cause and the very rationale of arguing, the confirmations of the adversaries appear to be dissolved without difficulty. Indeed, there are several which do not touch us in any way and which we shall recount here briefly, both lest they appear to have escaped us and because they provide an occasion for saying what may perhaps be pleasing or useful to someone. There are, however, certain consequences through fear of which the minds of some are held back from embracing a cause to which, on account of their good will toward the less fortunate, they cannot be hostile.

Therefore, the following are by no means connected with our conclusion and arguments:

1. The right to labor, I mean that spurious and adulterine right which must plainly be rejected. For the faculty of profitably applying one’s labor is no less inviolable than the right of cultivating one’s own field and selling its fruits. But just as there is joined to this right no office of justice by which others are bound to buy, so there is in others no obligation of justice to hire anyone’s labor; nor can anyone, unless an agreement has been made, demand that another furnish him the opportunity of exercising his powers.

Come now: it is manifest that our reasoning by no means leads us to vindicate that false species of right, because from the natural office we gathered this one thing alone: that provident nature has prepared per se suitable means which are either a faculty of acting or a faculty of demanding. We say that the right to labor pertains to the former kind: namely, that affairs have been so disposed by nature that an abundance of useful and profitable labor is not lacking per se to a skilled and industrious man. Indeed, we made use of the support of this rationale in the third confirmation of the second argument.

At the same time, we do not deny that it can happen per accidens that there are too many who for a time lack an opportunity of working; the civil authority will then have the right and office of meeting this evil by suitable remedies, to the extent required. Yet by suitable remedies, which, rather than itself hiring the labor of idle persons uselessly, will generally have to be placed in these things: a) That knowledge be spread of the places, persons, and businesses in which labor is sought, and that the institutions which are called in French Bourses du travail [labor exchanges] therefore be fostered; b) that access to those places be made easier;¹² c) that an easy opportunity be available to all of acquiring that skill which never fails to render labor valuable. This is the utility of schools in which young persons are trained in various trades (Écoles industrielles, professionnelles [industrial and vocational schools]).¹³

¹² To this belong les trains ouvriers, abonnements à prix réduit [workmen’s trains and reduced-price season tickets]; yet these devices do not lack their drawbacks per accidens. For through them it happens that happier regions are infected by contagion from places where faith or morals have been corrupted. It will pertain especially to active charity to diminish or alleviate these evils.

¹³ What is the rationale and utility of these institutions, and what has laudably been done or attempted among us in this matter, you may see in our Manuel social, pp. 382 ff. (2nd ed.).

2. A relative family wage. For we did not immediately direct some just rationale of the wage to necessities, but in the necessity which is generally present we saw an indication of the value which inheres per se in every human labor from nature.

3. An unequal wage by which the labor of a bachelor and of a father of a family is recompensed. Cf. what was said in no. 438.

Come now: a few contrary rationales remain to be dissolved in form.

I am not bound to buy labor except for as much as it is worth to me. Therefore, if it is worth less to me than the limit which you wish to assign, why must I regard this limit?

Reply. I distinguish the major. I am not bound to buy it except for as much as it is worth to you according to the proximate rule of value, or the agreement, without regard for the higher law concerning the equality to be preserved (cf. Thesis XXV), I deny the antecedent; except for as much as it is worth to you according to an agreement not repugnant to the higher rule, I concede. I distinguish the consequence likewise. If the wage is worth less to you according to the proximate rule without regard for the higher one, there is no reason why you should assign the quantity established, I deny. If it is worth less to you with the higher rule considered, I deny the supposition that this can occur per se. Per accidens, however, we concede an exception.

Here, as always, in place of an arbitrary estimation, we require a true estimation, which we showed against the liberals in Thesis XXV to be objectively available; and we deny that the same estimation is sufficiently gathered from the faculty of hiring at a lower price others who, pressed by some necessity or unwilling, are prepared to accept any conditions whatsoever.

a) The just wage is to be elicited not from the need of the workman but from the value of the labor. But the argument rests upon that need as the means of demonstration. Therefore, it does not establish that this wage is owed from commutative justice.

Reply. I distinguish the major. The just wage is not to be elicited from the need of the workman immediately or formally, I concede; mediately and materially, insofar as we show that the value of labor remotely depends upon the (common) need of the workman, and that quantity is demanded per se as the minimum which is just, I deny. To the minor: The argument rests upon that need. I distinguish. All the arguments do so, I deny; one of those adduced does so, I subdistinguish: immediately or formally, I deny; mediately or materially, I concede.

We do not argue formally from need; otherwise, the just quantity would vary according to various necessities, whereas we reject the relative wage and establish an absolutely minimum quantity. Therefore, neither do we argue immediately from that necessity. But the common necessity indicates to us that provision has been made by nature for some suitable means; and since we find that this is nothing other than such a stipend as is per se suitable for a father of a family, we rightly establish this limit below which, at the command of nature, human labor cannot become cheap.

b) By arguing from the office of preserving oneself and one’s own by means of labor, you tacitly introduce a right to labor itself.

Reply. If you argue immediately from the office, I pass over; if mediately, as we have done, I deny. Cf. the things said just now here in the N.B.

a) That regard must be had for the workman’s family appears absurd and, moreover, such as would move employers to hire bachelors instead.

Reply. I distinguish the assertion. In a relative family wage, I concede; in an absolute one such as we have described, I deny. I concede the rationale added; but I deny that regard is had by us for the family, since we establish the same rationale for all.

Instance. But if one spoke consistently, the same wage should not be established, but one for one family and another for another.

Reply. I distinguish the minor subsumed. If one argued immediately from the necessity of the family,

I concede; if from the value of labor demonstrated through its common destination, I deny.

Instance. Nature, which is said not to fail in necessary things, ought no less to have provided for the extraordinary cases of an invalid workman or of an unusual number of children, for which, nevertheless, as is conceded, it destined labor unequal to caring for them. Therefore, the argument inconsistently stops at ordinary circumstances.

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent. It ought to have provided in the same manner and through the same means, I deny; in another manner and through supplementary means, which we do not doubt must, to the extent needed,¹⁴ be placed in equity and charity, I concede.

¹⁴ We add this because, in order to meet an unusual necessity, it will not rarely suffice for you to live somewhat more sparingly for a time. Thus, for example, a father of a family earning the stipend which we say is per se suitable for an ordinary family will, without too much difficulty, also have at hand the means of supporting two or three children who exceed the number of an ordinary household. Moreover, let us always be mindful that the just wage is not necessarily equaled by this lower limit of the wage.

It is a perpetual principle that it is not repugnant to the natural order for the customary means to fail per accidens. These are then customarily supplied to some extent in another way, although not rarely less perfectly. Thus reason is given as the guide of an adult man. It fails per accidens in an insane person. Provision is made through the extraordinary remedy of another’s charity. Cf. Gayraud, pp. 175–176.

b) Labors are personal to the workman. Therefore, the recompense ought not to be familial (behold the Achilles of the adversaries).

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent. They are personal from the efficient and moral cause, I concede. From the destination which they have per se, I subdistinguish. From the primary and principal destination, I concede; from the adequate destination, I deny. That is: insofar as they are from the workman and belong to the workman, I concede; insofar as they are directed to the workman alone, I deny. I distinguish the consequence likewise. The recompense ought not to be familial, insofar as it is neither owed to the family nor to be accommodated to the family actually possessed, I concede; insofar as a wage which is per se suitable for a father of a family is not owed to the workman himself, I deny. Cf. Gayraud, p. 175.

Thus the eating of food is personal and proper to the one eating; and yet it not only restores the powers of the adult but supplies the powers of generation and furnishes milk to the mother for nourishing her little children.

N.B. Observe that by this rationale only those can be affected who see in the wage nothing but the virtual restoration of the powers hired out. We warned above, no. 429, that they are deceived by a false appearance.

c) The obligation of supporting a family is freely assumed by entering marriage; not so the office of preserving life. De Gryse, p. 48.

Reply. At most, this difficulty suggests that there is not a complete parity between the two; and that the obligation of a wage suitable for a father of a family cannot immediately be inferred from the obligation of paying sustenance to the workman himself. But more directly:

I distinguish the antecedent. It is freely assumed by entering a state which is intended by nature as common, I concede; it is freely assumed without a connection with a state of this kind, almost as you freely contract a debt (the comparison which the Rev. Dr. De Gryse uses, place cited), I deny.

Now, we by no means argue from an office of marrying, but from the fact that this state is common and the consequent necessity is imposed per se upon most men.

d) A vicious circle is committed in the argument made, when it wills that the wage be required according to the manner of a decent life. For this manner depends upon the wage itself as upon its measure. Therefore, it cannot be made the measure of the just wage.—They confirm this antecedent thus. What things pertain to decent sustenance and culture is defined differently at one time and in one region than at another; and the price of labor itself has very great force in this matter. For it is necessary to accommodate expenditures to income, whereby it comes about that the abundance of things available governs the pursuits and desires themselves.

Reply. I deny the assertion. And to the rationale submitted, I distinguish the antecedent. The present manner of decent sustenance depends upon the wage as upon its adequate measure, I deny; as upon an inadequate measure, I subdistinguish: upon the present wage, I deny; upon a wage whose use has been sufficiently universal and sufficiently long-lasting, I pass over, at least if it be conceded that its influence is slight rather than principal. I distinguish the consequence likewise. Therefore, it cannot be an adequate norm of the just wage, I concede; an inadequate norm, I subdistinguish: of the wage to be paid at present, I deny; of the wage of a preceding time, or of a subsequent and later time, I concede or pass over.

Observe that we estimate by the decent sustenance of a father of a family not so much the just wage as its lower limit. We do not deny that this notion varies according to circumstances. We explain this as follows.

The increasing culture and prosperity of the civil community make the use of many things which were previously possessed by few more common, so that some things can be regarded as luxuries in one age which in another are judged to pertain to necessary sustenance. For custom, as though a second nature, produces necessities. Moreover, the place which the various conditions of men hold in the common estimation has no small force for defining what supports of life, according to the common abundance of things, appear necessary or decent for each order of citizens. We can all the more readily pass over the fact that the incomes of individuals themselves are not without influence upon the formation of customs, because we judge that there will scarcely ever be a long-lasting disagreement between the agreements which are customarily made and those which are commonly judged ought to be made.

Culture and prosperity must be posited as progressing per se. For this appears to be the intention of Providence even in this visible world.

If, however, prosperity recedes per accidens in some region, we shall not deny that the same causes then operate in the contrary manner. It will be necessary, gradually and imperceptibly, to abstain from several things whose enjoyment was formerly sufficiently common; and after some interval of painful and troubling privation, fewer things will then be judged morally to pertain to the decent sustenance of some order.

Briefly, therefore, we shall say this. From the manner of living which is congruent with general prosperity and one’s proper dignity, the decent sustenance of each person—the standard of life, as they say—is defined, and therefore also the present lower limit of the wage. The wage can contribute something to that manner, not indeed the one which is actually paid, but the one which has become sufficiently established. If the present wage had to be judged adequately from the present manner, and this in turn depended entirely upon the present wage, the difficulty raised would offer some appearance of force; but now, since from the present manner we estimate only the lower limit of the present wage, and this limit is in no way subject to the present wage but only in part to the wage of a former age, where can even a blemish or shadow of that fault be detected?

Instance. By the very fact that decent sustenance varies, it cannot be the measure of what is just.

Reply. I deny. For it varies not formally but only materially, or as regards the things which it contains in various regions or times. Besides, what measure can be proposed which is more certain and stable? Necessities? Their rationale also varies and is placed in large part in moral consideration.

Price? How mobile and inconstant it is cannot be unknown even to those who are most unskilled in economic sciences.

Instance. But this rationale: a) also varies comparatively, that is, for different workmen; b) comprehends several grades, so that it is not definite.

Reply to a). Insofar as there are several grades within the very order of those who are hired, I concede. Indeed, we freely admit this, since we ascribe the honoraria of magistrates and the stipends of workmen to the same genus. Insofar as it cannot be morally estimated which are of the same condition, which of a disparate condition, and what pertains to decent sustenance for each grade, I deny.

This is no more difficult than establishing various prices in any other manner, but far easier than comparing with one another the merits of dissimilar labors which have been usefully furnished.

To b). We define the limit not by just any grade but by the lowest, therefore by that grade whose removal is followed by misery.

Besides, is not the use of this norm constant in theological discipline and jurisprudence? How often does it happen that judges thus estimate the sustenance owed to parents and children, and casuists what can be retained by a debtor who is insolvent!

Cardinal de Lugo, vol. 2, disp. 29, no. 62, following Molina, vol. 2, disp. 506, warns that it is not always unjust “for a wage not to suffice for the decent food and clothing of a servant,” and much less, as Molina observes, place cited, no. 2, if it is unequal only “to supporting his children or family.” Indeed, in no. 4 Molina is content with the stipend which, “with consideration given to the abundance or scarcity of those who are found at that time to serve in such a manner,” is customarily paid in that region.

Reply. They are treating servants who, as they immediately add in confirmation of the things said, can “at the same time attend to other things by which they can supply what is lacking for food and clothing and provide for themselves,” or who at the same time are taught an art useful to them afterward and derive compensation therefrom.

In a similar manner you will explain what Cardinal de Lugo has in no. 63.—As regards Molina, consider the rationales by which in no. 3 he explains why several are content with a lower stipend. Observe, moreover, that he has before his eyes domestic servants, who often obtain an accession to the price from other advantages. And in an age in which principles and judgments were less corrupted, he could more readily trust the customary determination of a region than now, when the causes which he himself indicates in no. 4 as inducing a less just wage so frequently have place: errors, coercion, necessity.

Finally, from the Roman response itself, what Molina has in no. 3—that a hirer can establish the stipend for which others willingly offer their labor—is to be accepted with a grain of salt. It is true, provided that the wage is just as regards them and, moreover, that there is at hand an opportunity of hiring others who are not inferior in excellence to those whom you actually hire.