§ 3. Supplements to the Doctrine

202. Private property is prior in fact to civil union. Even if private property had taken its beginning with civil society, it would nevertheless be confirmed by the law of nature itself, as are not a few other things which necessarily follow the public association of men. Yet matters do not stand thus. In a city already possessing a certain civilization, perhaps the complete regime of private property is first seen, because at that time the frequency of men and needs generally demands a more complete ordering of things. Yet the arguments we have given make it manifest that already in smaller groups or associations, indeed not infrequently in one family, in order to preserve peace and concord it was necessary that each begin to have his own things stably.

Do we not, even today, although households or domestic societies generally consist of few persons, see that things do not remain perfectly common even among brothers? It is therefore to be thought that it came about in practice that, the more strongly the rationales favoring private property prevailed as the multitude increased, the more the regime of property itself was at the same time perfected, gradually and imperceptibly, and without a formal deliberation or decree of men. This occurred in two ways: with respect to the object, so that movable things were possessed first, and then immovable things, the possession of which could for a time have been less permanent - as if the settlements of the tribe itself were less fixed;¹ and with respect to the right itself, or the possession itself, which in the beginning was less “exclusive.”

¹ Thus Tacitus said that the Germans changed their fields each year.

203. What belongs to natural law and to human law. In sanctioning some regime of private property, nature and positive law flow together, as it were, into one. Yet it is not so evident what must be attributed to each, what is common to both, and what is proper to human ordinance. For whatever manifestly appears necessary to human association, all of this pertains to the order of reason which, at the command of nature, already obtains among men. But the transition from those things which are manifestly required in order that the arts of peace, etc., may flourish, to those things which are left to the judgment of men to define, is by no means abrupt; rather, many degrees intervene between necessary and indifferent things. Therefore, only this can be said universally: the more some part of the regime appears to cohere with the common good, the more evident it is that it has arisen from nature.

204. Under what rationale the generic institution of private property is of natural law. The arguments prove that some division of goods is altogether necessary now for the peaceful association of men and their advancement. Therefore, by the same impulse of nature, men are drawn to civil association and to the partition of goods; and private property is as natural as civil society.

Yet private property does not flow from nature in the same manner as certain other institutions. Marriage, for example, is a natural precept in every state of the human race; nor is any other marital union permitted except one which is rendered inviolable by the conjugal covenant. But if men wished to possess goods in common, they would by no means be prohibited from using those goods. Cf. also no. 207.

205. Concerning the possession of external things before sin. The Scholastic Doctors agree that the rationales why nature now demands that private property be joined to the condition of the human race as it is after sin are such that they judge it would instead have come about that, if Adam had not sinned, things would have remained common. Indeed, there were some who asserted a certain precept of nature concerning the preservation of community, either properly so called - thus Alexander of Hales and Conrad - or understood more broadly, which appears to have pleased John Duns Scotus, loc. cit., no. 5; this precept would have been abrogated after the fall of Adam. Yet such a precept is more rightly denied by most. Cf. Suarez, De legibus [On Laws], bk. 2, chap. 14, no. 13; Lessius, chap. 5, no. 4.

As regards us, insofar as one may conjecture anything concerning a state so little known to us, we think it must be said thus:

a) Because, by reason of the preternatural gifts, both the necessity and the abuses of private property would have been absent, nature would have pronounced nothing concerning the regime of goods; and it would have pertained to human law to define, according to the circumstances, whether goods were to be possessed separately or conjointly.

b) Yet this community, if any had been pleasing, cannot be understood in that manner which would produce the greatest confusion. Therefore, of the three rationales according to which, in Aristotle's opinion, goods can be conceived to be common among men,² we consider more probable the one by which estates and fields are held separately, but everyone is given the faculty of using the fruits reasonably.

² Politics, bk. 2, chap. 3. The other two tend to this: that either the fields alone, or the fields and fruits together, be made common.

206. Less effective arguments. 1) While the ancients thought thus concerning the state of integral nature, they at the same time tacitly refuted this rationale for demonstrating the right of property which certain modern writers have employed. It is of this kind: Man knows by reason that he is superior to external things, and that they are ordered to his good. On the other hand, dominion over any thing is conferred by nature itself upon no one, not even upon society. Therefore, he who takes for himself some thing which was in the patrimony of no one does injury to no one and uses the thing according to its natural end. Hence nature itself has rendered this use, that is, appropriation, lawful and inviolable.

This manner of speaking, I say, does not accord with the opinion of the ancients. For it would follow that private property was a natural right even before the fall.

Moreover, it is shown to be ineffective per se. For the right at issue is not the mere faculty by which goods are granted to men for use - “which is, as the Supreme Pontiff says, common to all living things” - but permanent dominion, which contains the faculty of excluding others from the use of a thing which does not actually serve the owner. Now, from the dominion over earthly goods which nature granted to man, perhaps the momentary dominion of the user can be inferred; but how from this alone you can establish the perpetual exclusion of others, to whom the earth was equally given for use and enjoyment, is by no means apparent. Perhaps you have found gold; you have begun to cultivate a field. Another person appears: “I now need that gold, which you will use only much later; after you have harvested, I too wish, in my turn, to sow the field, and I am prepared to reimburse your expenses.” By what right, I ask, will you object to the natural dominion which he has in common with you?

2) The argument which others bring forward from the needs to which the human person is subject limps in like manner.

Therefore, the complete regime of private property is effectively shown to pertain to natural law only after you have demonstrated the disadvantages of common possession. Therefore, communism must be refuted before you establish private property. Cf. Cathrein, Moralphilosophie [Moral Philosophy], vol. 2, sect. 1, bk. 4, chap. 4, art. 3, § 1, no. 1, and § 2, no. 1 (pp. 290 and 292, 3rd ed.).

207. Whether a human agreement is required as a condition. But beyond this it is asked whether the division of goods is now so much of natural law that no consent or agreement of men is required, not even as a condition; or whether, on the contrary, the positive dissent of the greater part can validly impede the private appropriation of things.

In this matter it seems that we must employ a distinction. For the private appropriation of several things, such as those movable things which are assigned to the use of the person or household, appears so necessary that the peaceful association of men cannot subsist without it. To make these things one's own is granted by nature per se to every man in such a manner that either a tyrant or popular assemblies would attempt in vain to impose a contrary regime upon resisting citizens. Yet there are other things whose private property does not thus cohere with the essence of civil order. It is not altogether repugnant, for example, that the soil be possessed by the commonwealth itself. What, therefore, if, without injury to a right already acquired, some city wishes to employ laws by which nothing except an imperfect possession of fields is permitted to private persons? Although we plainly disapprove of that regime and judge that it should be changed, nevertheless, as long as it has force, we judge that private persons must accommodate themselves to such an ordinance. For the private property of a few persons does not greatly benefit the common good; their rebellious protest would instead harm this good. But the division of goods is not sanctioned by nature itself except insofar as it is evidently joined to the common good of men.

With these things said, to conclude precisely: as regards certain kinds of things, we ascribe the institution of private property to a more absolute natural law; but the divisions of other things, especially immovable things, we attribute rather to the law of nations, which, as we explained in the preceding volume, has such a foundation in nature that, unless men dissent, it receives its force and strength from nature itself. Our manner of speaking appears to be strongly confirmed by the Encyclicals of the Supreme Pontiff, in which, on the one hand, it is taught simply that “to possess things privately as one's own is a right given to man by nature”;³ while, on the other hand, concerning the possession of fields a more qualified formula is offered, which we praised in no. 198.2.c. Nor perhaps did Vasquez intend anything else when he assigned the division of fields to the law of nations understood as secondary natural law, which permits rather than commands or forbids that it be done otherwise. Cf. Vasquez, In I-II [On the First Part of the Second Part], disp. 157, no. 17.

³ Encyclical Quod Apostolici.

208. What sort of community of things exists by nature. After the things said and disputed, it seems that the whole matter can be accurately explained in this manner, if you say that things were made common by nature:

a) Because God “assigned no part of the earth to any person to possess.” (Encyclical Rerum Novarum, first part.) This is called negative community, in which nevertheless the whole rationale of original community is not contained. For external things are also common:

b) Because God destined the earth to the common utility of all, and thus conferred upon each person some power of using it. Hence comes the right of taking in extreme necessity; hence the duty of the richer to give readily from their own goods to the needy,⁴ and thus, as regards use, to consider things as common.

⁴ Encyclical Rerum Novarum; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 66, art. 2.

c) Because He conferred upon the community of men jurisdiction to order the regime of external goods in that manner which would accord with the commands or wishes of nature and would appear to be advantageous to the commonwealth. “Men,” says Rebellus,⁵ “were able to establish concerning things what appeared more expedient.” Nor without such jurisdiction you would explain the sayings of the Fathers and Scholastics, or the solution handed down in the preceding number.

⁵ Op. cit., part 1, q. 2, no. 22. Cf. Suarez, De legibus [On Laws], bk. 2, chap. 14, nos. 16-18.

It follows further from this that some positive dominion over things must be recognized “in the community of men, so long, however, as they have not been legitimately taken into possession by some private person”;⁶ it also follows that, besides the occupation by which some thing passes to a private man, there is an occupation by which a city obtains the power of jurisdiction over its own territory. That power is designated by the name eminent domain (altum dominium). Cf. below, sect. 3, On the Limits of the Right of Property.

⁶ C. de Lugo, disp. 8, no. 6. Hence Suarez, loc. cit., no. 16, says that nature does not confer private ownership in the same manner as it “conferred dominion over all things in common”; and he himself, no. 17, understands the community of things to be of natural law negatively, because “nature did not command that things should always be common.”

209. But if, finally, you should ask whether or not, once appropriation has taken place, an external thing is said to be mine in the same way that the powers and operations of my body are mine, we think this must be denied. For neither physically, or in fact, does the apprehension or detention of the thing continually remain, as my members adhere to me; nor can the intention of nature, by which that thing belonged to the common patrimony of the human race, ever be disregarded, whereas from the beginning the powers and faculties of body and soul were ordered to my good. Therefore, the inviolable faculty of the person does not regard the latter and the former in altogether the same way (cf. nos. 5 and 7).

210. You will ask about the passages of the Holy Fathers which the enemies of property are accustomed to bring forward in their favor.⁷ For we spoke above, no. 183.1, about the statements of the New Testament.

⁷ On this question one may profitably consult Rev. Fr. Cathrein, Moralphilosophie [Moral Philosophy], vol. 2, sect. 1, bk. 4, chap. 4, art. 3, § 5 (p. 312, 3rd ed.); Rev. Fr. Capart, op. cit., pp. 485-501; Rev. D. de Gryse, Revue sociale catholique [Catholic Social Review], 1897, p. 74 ff.

Reply. 1. First of all, let the adversaries observe that, by putting forward passages of this kind, they accomplish nothing until they have established that, according to the judgment of the Fathers, private possessions are condemned as unjust, or at least that some positive form of communism is sanctioned by law.

But so far are they from being able to prove this that even those Fathers from whom they are accustomed to draw their arguments openly oppose them instead.

Thus, among the Greek Fathers, St. Basil, in his homily on the words of Luke, “I will pull down, etc.,” no. 7, openly acknowledges that goods have been received from God, and indeed unequally: “Is God unjust,” he says, “who distributes to us the necessities of life unequally? Why, when you are rich, is that man poor? Is it not surely so that you may receive the reward of kindness and faithful stewardship, and that he may be endowed with the great rewards of patience?” (Migne, P.G., vol. 31, col. 275.)

St. John Chrysostom, in Homily 2 To the People of Antioch, no. 5, inquires why the Apostle did not say, “Command the rich of this present age not to be rich; command them to become poor; command them to empty out what they possess”; and, after the first reason which he gives, he adds this second: “Besides, he knows that riches are not forbidden, if anyone should use them for necessity. For, as I have said: wine is not an evil thing, but drunkenness is evil; so riches are not an evil thing, but avarice is evil, covetousness is evil.... For even to that rich man who approached Him and spoke about life, He (Christ) did not say: Go, sell all that you have; but, passing this over, He instructed him concerning other commandments. Then, after the man invited Him, saying: What yet is lacking to me? not even then did He say simply: Sell all that you have; but: If you wish to be perfect, sell what you have. I place this within your choice; I make you master of the election; I do not draw you into necessity.” (Migne, P.G., vol. 49, cols. 39-40.)

Among the Latin Fathers, St. Ambrose, On Naboth the Israelite, chap. 16, no. 67, professes that riches have been received from God, saying: “From Him you received what you offer; His is what you pay to Him. My gifts, He says, and My things given—that is, the gifts which you offer to Me—are My things given; I gave and granted them to you.” (Migne, P.L., vol. 14, col. 753.)

St. Augustine sufficiently discloses his mind in the book On Heresies, where he condemns the heresy of the Apostolics. (Cf. no. 180.3.) No less clear are these few words taken from Sermon 113: “From just labors make alms; give from that which you rightly possess.”

Finally, when St. Jerome comments upon Ezekiel, chap. 46, v. 16 ff., and explains the regime by which parents were bound to leave intact to their sons the possession received from their ancestors, what does he tacitly acknowledge if not private property? (Migne, P.L., vol. 25, col. 463.)

2. Similar expressions are found even among preachers of a more recent age—for example, among those who flourished in France in the seventeenth century—although there is no one who has dared to assign them to any class of socialists. “The poor will rise up against you to demand an account of their squandered income. You have alienated the fund upon which divine Providence had assigned them their livelihood; that fund was your surplus.... You have killed those whom you did not assist.” Thus Bossuet himself.⁸ And, even in our own age, the mind of the Holy Fathers who spoke more severely seems to breathe in the writings of Ketteler, Bishop of Mainz.⁹

⁸ Sermon sur nos dispositions à l'égard des nécessités de la vie [Sermon on Our Dispositions toward the Necessities of Life] (Fourth Sunday of Lent, part 2).

⁹ Cf. Œuvres choisies [Selected Works], edited by Decurtins.

Nor must this be passed over: those Fathers whose sayings present some appearance of difficulty¹⁰ belong to the same age; that is, they wrote, whether in the East or in the West, from after the middle of the fourth century until the twentieth or thirtieth year of the fifth century. For they are St. Basil (331-379) and his contemporary, St. Gregory of Nyssa; St. John Chrysostom (347-407); St. Ambrose (340-397); St. Jerome (340?-420); and St. Augustine (354-430). This fact is a clear indication to us that these holy Doctors had, from the circumstances of their own age rather than from the doctrine of Christ taken in itself, the reason why they assailed the rich and, with all the force of their words, impressed upon the minds of their hearers the evangelical lesson of brotherly charity.

¹⁰ We add this because St. Gregory the Great occasions no difficulty; nor can any passage of his be brought forward against us with any greater seriousness than the words of pseudo-Clement which are imprudently alleged by de Laveleye, Le Socialisme contemporain [Contemporary Socialism], p. xvii.

4. Now to explain briefly what their arguments generally regard in reality: they do not think in the least of any order in which private possessions would vanish or be reduced to equality; but, moved by the harsh avarice and tenacity of the wealthy, and sometimes also by great calamity,¹¹ they set before those rich men—who were striving to enlarge their fortunes by right and wrong and were refusing assistance to the poor—the grave duty by which they are bound to aid the needy. To this end they appeal especially to the manifest intention of God, from whom, as supreme Lord, the rich have received their goods, and to the common destination of goods to the utility of men, by reason of which external things never become the property of anyone from nature alone, nor ever perfectly and absolutely. At times, comparing their own age with the customs of the first Christians, they are affected with a desire for that most blessed charity by which the multitude had one heart and one soul, not without prayers that a more perfect virtue of the faithful might restore those golden times of the Church.

¹¹ Thus St. Basil in a homily delivered during a time of famine and drought.

Moreover, the rich men whom they attack are chiefly moneyed men, whose wealth, especially at that time, had an ill repute, being often of little-trusted origin and the offspring or source of unjust usury and of very many vices. Thus, for example, in St. Ambrose's On Naboth the Israelite, the word money recurs continually; while St. Chrysostom, when the fortunes of Abraham and Job were objected to him, replied: “Their riches were not gold or silver or buildings, but cattle alone.” (On the First Epistle to Timothy, chap. 4, Homily 12; Migne, P.G., vol. 62, col. 562.) We shall make this mind of the Holy Fathers, as we have explained it, manifest to readers if we place before their eyes the principal passages employed in this matter. It therefore remains for us to weigh them.

1) They bring forward, as though it were from St. Clement of Rome, the passage in Gratian's Decree, canon 2, C. XII, q. 1: “For the common use of all things which are in this world ought to have belonged to all men. But through iniquity one man said that this was his, and another that that was his, and thus a division was made among mortals.”

Now: a) Considered in itself, this passage was taken from the pseudo-Isidorian collection, where it is found in the last of five decretal epistles which that forger assigns to St. Clement. Those spurious letters were composed from older documents, especially from those which are customarily called the Clementines (Klēmentina).¹² In fact, the words concerning the community of goods are read in the tenth book of the Recognitions—a work by an unknown writer of the third century—but there they are placed in the mouth of a certain old pagan man who is asking about the truth. Hence he immediately adds: “Among all things, however, which ought to be common among friends, wives also are without doubt included.”¹³ (Migne, P.G., vol. 1, cols. 506 and 1422.)

¹² Cf., for example, Bardenhewer, Patrologie [Patrology], pp. 44-46 (1st ed.) or 73-75 (2nd ed.).

¹³ That passage, omitted by pseudo-Isidore, nevertheless erroneously made its way into the body of canon law, whence it was expunged by the Roman correctors.

b) In Gratian's Decree, this canon commends common life to clerics. The words mentioned, however, have long been understood to signify that private possessions followed from original sin, without which, according to the wish or precept of nature, the use of things would have been common.

2. St. Basil:¹⁴ a) The homily on the words of Luke, “I will pull down, etc.,” has these words in no. 7: “‘Why,’ says the rich man, ‘do I inflict injury while retaining and preserving my own things?’ Tell me, what things are yours? Whence did you receive them and bring them into life? Just as if someone, having occupied a place for viewing in a theater, were then to keep out those entering, thinking that to be his own property which is offered for the common use of all: such also are rich men of this kind.... Are you not avaricious? Are you not a despoiler—you, namely, who make your own property those things which you received to be dispensed? Will he who strips a clothed man be called a thief, while he who does not clothe a naked man, although he can do so, is worthy of some other appellation? The bread which you hold back belongs to the hungry; the cloak which you preserve in a chest belongs to the naked; the shoe which is rotting in your possession belongs to the unshod; the silver which you have buried belongs to the needy. Therefore, to as many men as you could give, to so many do you inflict injury.” (Migne, P.G., vol. 31, cols. 275, 278.)

¹⁴ In presenting the Greek Fathers, we shall generally use the Latin translation as it stands in Migne, unless a few things should seem to require correction so that the mind of the Holy Doctors may appear more clearly.

b) The homily delivered during a time of famine and drought, no. 8: “Flocks of sheep feed upon one and the same mountain; very many horses take their pasture in one and the same field. In short, the individual brute animals yield to one another the use of necessary pasture. We, on the contrary, hide common things in our bosom; we alone possess what belongs to many.” (Migne, P.G., vol. 31, col. 326.)—

To a):

α) In the former passage, St. Basil merely inveighs rhetorically against the rich who do not readily share goods that are useless to themselves and were made for all. For these words are read immediately before it: “Make your brothers sharers in the grain; what will rot tomorrow, hand over today to the needy. The worst kind of avarice is not to distribute to the needy even those things which are perishing.” He argues from the intention of God who bestows goods (we gave the words above, no. 1); he appeals, in no. 8, to the Last Judgment: “For there the plunderer is not accused, but he who did not share his goods is condemned.” The comparison of the theater which he proposes is true if you understand it of a rich man who, however much he may abound in wealth, makes no liberal use of his goods.

β) By reason of the common destination of goods, in a broad sense he who does not grant things useless to himself to a needy man is injurious to the poor and a despoiler, for those things can be said to belong to the needy man in that broad sense. But since the Holy Doctor nowhere gives the poor man the faculty of taking them away, he plainly attributes to him no right strictly so called.

To b): In those extreme circumstances, by various arguments he exhorts the wealthier faithful to imitate through their largesses the Christians who followed a common life at Jerusalem. But once again he affirms only a community of destination. So far is he from denying rights of possession that, in the same passage, he asks them at least to appoint equal parts for pleasure and for the soul—that is, for present prosperity and heavenly life, which he presents as two daughters of the rich: “If you do not wish to give all things to the better daughter, at least divide them equally between the incontinent daughter and the chaste.”

3) St. Gregory of Nyssa, On the Love of the Poor, Oration 1: “Do not consider all things your own. Let there be a share also for the poor and the friends of God. For all things truly belong to Him whom we have as Father. But we are brothers. Therefore, as persons united in race and as brothers, it would indeed have been better and more just to receive the inheritance in equal shares. But since this has happened and one or two have taken the greatest part, let the rest at least receive some share.” (Migne, P.G., vol. 46, col. 466.)

In truth, what else occurs there but a most beautiful exhortation to almsgiving, which is the purpose of the whole oration? Nor is it surprising that he desired a more equitable distribution of goods, since that distribution was then rather unhappy, and even now there are those who express similar wishes, although they are very far removed from socialism.

4) Not a few words of St. John Chrysostom must be explained.

a) In Homily 10, chap. 3, On the First Epistle to the Corinthians, he seems to deny the very ownership of money when he says in no. 3: “Your soul is not yours, and how will your money be yours?... Therefore do not say: I spend my own; I enjoy my own. Certainly not your own, but another's.... For these things are common and belong also to your fellow servant, just as the sun is common, and the air, the earth, and all other things.” (Migne, P.G., vol. 61, col. 86.)

The matter presents no difficulty.

α) By the very fact that he employs the example of the soul, he sufficiently indicates that he merely denies us the absolute dominion which belongs to God alone, as he himself had just said: “For all things belong to God.”

β) He also denies that money is ours alone, because by destination it belongs to all: “It was handed over to you for your brothers.”

γ) He denies that it will truly be ours unless we share it with our brothers. For if we have given those goods away, they will truly profit us; otherwise they will destroy us. “You do not know that we shall be accused because we have used them badly.... The things of another become yours if you distribute them to others; but if you lavishly expend them upon yourself, then your own things become another's.” He then develops this in no. 4. He employs the same manner of arguing in Sermon 2 On Lazarus, no. 5 (Migne, P.G., vol. 48, col. 988).

δ) He pursues this end: to restrain the pride and arrogance of priests.

ε) As regards the last words, where money is said to be common like the sun and air, the Holy Doctor does not wish to make the two kinds of community altogether equal to each other. For in Homily 2 To the People of Antioch, no. 6, he expressly teaches that money is not common like air, water, etc.; and he adds the reason: “For if these necessities were not common, the rich, perhaps employing their customary avarice, would have suffocated the poor; for what they do with riches, they would have done much more with those things. On the other hand, if riches had been common and equally set before all, the occasion for almsgiving and the opportunity for benevolence would have been taken away.” (Migne, P.G., vol. 49, col. 43.)

b) Sermon 2 On Lazarus, chap. 4: “And this too is robbery: not to share from your resources.” (Migne, P.G., vol. 48, col. 987.)

The explanation is ready at hand: it is robbery because the resources were given in order that they be shared with the needy.

c) Homily 12, no. 4, chap. 4, On the First Epistle to Timothy: “For tell me, whence are you rich? From whom did you receive it? Whence did that other man receive it? From his grandfather, you will say, from his father. Will you be able, by ascending through the line of descent, to show that that possession is just? Surely you cannot; but its beginning and root must necessarily have proceeded from injustice. Why? Because from the beginning God did not make this man rich and that man poor; nor, when He created, did He show many treasures to this man and deprive that man of this discovery, but He left the same earth to all to be cultivated. Whence, therefore, since it is common, do you have so many acres, while your neighbor does not have even a clod?” (Migne, P.G., vol. 62, cols. 562-563.)—

In this passage, which is somewhat more difficult, the Holy Doctor resolves a doubt. In chap. 2 he had maintained that those who had placed their hope in worldly affairs would depart with empty hands. An adversary attacks this proposition: “What then, you will say, do you not see those who have obtained very many things, who with the least labors have attained great goods?” He himself replies that those things are not to be counted among goods. He adds the reason: because those riches, avariciously amassed and acquired without labor, are the fruit of iniquity. For since, as he argues approximately in this way, God made the condition of acquiring dominion equal for all men, it could not happen without injustice that one man should arrive at immense riches in comparison with another who is destitute. Unless we are mistaken, the Holy Doctor understands this proposition of those things which happen for the most part, yet not without exception. However he may have judged these matters, it is already evident from what has been said that he is far from wishing to establish anything new concerning property. Nor does he assail all riches with his words, but those which are acquired with the least labor and consist of gold or estates. For he defends the riches of Abraham and Job because they consisted of cattle, and the fortunes of Jacob because he became rich “after receiving the reward of his labors.” Moreover, as though conscious that he had amplified the matter somewhat, he corrects his words when, after the passage which is objected to us, he adds: “But I shall not examine these things more precisely. Let the riches, then, be just and free from every robbery; for you are not at fault if your father robbed: you indeed have those things from robbery, but you did not rob. Moreover, let it be granted also that he did not rob, but possesses gold brought forth from the earth: what then? Are riches good on that account? By no means.”

d) In Homily 7, nos. 2 and 3, On the Acts of the Apostles, he extols with praises the community of goods which flourished among the Christians of Jerusalem. “This was an angelic commonwealth: they said that nothing was their own. Hence the root of evils was cut away.... They cast away money and rejoiced, and there was great gladness.... That cold word, mine and yours, did not exist. Therefore there was exultation at the table.” (Migne, P.G., vol. 60, col. 66.)

St. John Chrysostom turns all these things to the praise of simplicity, a virtue which, in no. 3, he declares to be “far greater than contempt for riches, fasting, and perseverance in prayer.” But that one lives more happily by despising riches and pleasure and by cultivating holy simplicity than by pursuing earthly interests is a fact which religious experience daily, although they in no way hope that their manner of living will ever become common among men. Therefore, the socialists accomplish nothing from this.

e) But the Holy Doctor seems to have been of the opinion that a community of this kind should be commended and recommended universally. For he speaks thus in Homily 11 On the Acts of the Apostles, no. 3 (we transcribe the passage on account of its importance):

“If this were done even now, we would live with greater pleasure, both rich and poor; nor would it bring greater pleasure to the poor than to the rich. And, if you please, let us describe this in discourse and draw pleasure from it, since you are unwilling to do it in works. For it is especially apparent from what was done then that those who sold did not become needy, but also procured riches for the poor.

“But let us now describe this in discourse: let everyone sell all his possessions and bring them into the common stock—I say it in discourse; let no one be disturbed, neither rich nor poor. How much gold do you think would be collected? I conjecture, indeed (for it cannot be said with certainty), that if every man and woman here were to empty out all their money, if they were to hand over their fields, possessions, and houses (I would not say slaves, for there were none then, but perhaps they set them free), perhaps one million pounds of gold would be collected; indeed, twice or three times more. For tell me, how great a number of all kinds of men does our city (Constantinople) contain? How many do you suppose to be Christians? Do you suppose there are one hundred thousand, while the rest are Gentiles and Jews? How many thousands of pounds of gold would be collected? But how great is the number of the poor? I do not think it is more than fifty thousand. But to feed them daily, how great an abundance would there be?

“Certainly, with common food and a common table set before them, I do not think the expense would be so great. What then, you will ask, would we do when the resources had been consumed? Do you think they could ever be consumed? Would not the grace of God be a thousandfold more abundant? Would not the grace of God be poured out lavishly? What then? Would we not make earth heaven? If it shone forth in this way among three thousand and five thousand, and none of them complained of poverty, how much more would it do so in so great a multitude? Who even among outsiders would not add something? But to show that wealth when thus divided is expended more and is the cause of poverty, suppose there is a household in which there are ten children, a wife, and a husband; let the wife be occupied with wool-working, and let the husband bring in income from outside. Tell me, would they spend more while living in common and in one house, or when dispersed? It is evident that they would spend more when dispersed. For if the ten sons are dispersed, there will be need of ten houses, ten tables, ten servants, and likewise provision for everything else. What, moreover, where there is a multitude of slaves? Do they not all have the same table for this reason, lest the expense become greater? For division always produces diminution; concord and consent produce increase. Thus men now live in monasteries, as the faithful once lived. Who has died of hunger? Who has not been fed with plentiful food? Yet men now fear this more than falling into the immense sea. But if we had made trial of this thing, we would undertake the matter boldly. How great do you think that grace would be? For if then, when there was scarcely any faithful person, but only three thousand and five thousand; when all who were in the world were enemies; when they expected consolation nowhere—they undertook the matter so vigorously: how much more now, when by the grace of God there are faithful throughout the whole world? Who would still remain a Gentile? No one, I think; thus we would have drawn all men and reconciled them to ourselves. But if we proceed by this path, through God I hope that the matter will be so. Only obey me, and we shall manage the matter well and in order; and if God grants life, I believe that we shall soon enter upon this manner of life.” (Migne, P.G., vol. 60, cols. 97-98.)

As regards this passage, however attractive it may be, we nevertheless think that these few remarks suffice: a) He speaks in mere words, not then thinking of execution (“I say it in discourse” [tō logō legō]), in such a way that he gives no occasion for disturbance of any kind, whether to the rich or to the poor; at most he cherishes some hope that a similar manner of life will someday be introduced. β) He celebrates the advantages of voluntary renunciation. But he is altogether silent about what he thought of legal spoliation. γ) He praises that form of community in which the fruits are brought into the common stock, while the crafts themselves are by no means conducted in common; and he seems chiefly to have intended that common tables be set up for the poor, so that perhaps by his final words he covertly designated only these.¹⁵ δ) He dares to recommend this community only to good Christians, and considers it sufficiently wonderful that by the sight of it unbelievers themselves would be led to Christ. ε) Yet he observes that the faithful are little inclined toward common life (“They fear this more, etc.”). Even if in this passage the Holy Doctor was perhaps deceived by excessive hope, nevertheless, after these things, it is evident to everyone how far he stands from the tenets of collectivism.

¹⁵ He speaks similarly in Homily 66 On Matthew, nos. 3-4 (Migne, P.G., vol. 57, cols. 630-631).

5) Among the Latin Fathers there is no one who addresses the rich more harshly than St. Ambrose.

a) On Naboth the Israelite, one book: α) Chap. 1, no. 2: “The earth was established in common for all, rich and poor; why do you rich men arrogate to yourselves a private right to the soil?” (Migne, P.L., vol. 14, col. 731.)—β) Chap. 12, no. 53: “You do not bestow upon the poor man from what is yours, but you return to him what is his. For that which was given in common for the use of all, you alone appropriate. The earth belongs to all, not to the rich; but those who do not use what is their own are fewer than those who do. Therefore you return a debt; you do not bestow what is not owed.” (Migne, ibid., col. 747.)—

But observe that, at the beginning of this book, the rich men whom he attacks here are described by him in this way: “For who among the rich does not daily covet the things of others? Who among the most opulent does not strive to drive the poor man from his little field and to expel the needy man from the boundaries of his ancestral land? Who is content with his own? What rich man's soul is not inflamed by a neighboring possession?” Hence, to α), the passage is to be interpreted thus: Since nature invited all men to possess the earth, why do you rich men, by unjustly harassing the poorer man, render this right of his fruitless, as though the earth had been made for you alone?—To β), merely the common destination of things is urged there, and the precept of almsgiving is impressed. Hence, by reason of the common destination, the rich man, in giving alms, is said to return to the poor man what is his; but, by denying alms, to appropriate for himself alone what is common. Then, to one who reads the whole of no. 53, it is evident that mercy toward the poor is merely commended there: first, as useful to the rich man—“It profits you.... Whatever you confer upon the needy grows for you; whatever you diminish grows for you.... Mercy is sown on earth; it germinates in heaven”—then, as necessary by divine precept:

“He who does not permit you to say, Tomorrow I will give, how does He permit you to say, I will not give?”—and the other words which were objected to us.

b) Exposition of Psalm 118, Sermon 8, no. 22: “It is unjust that one who shares your form should not be assisted by his companion, especially since the Lord our God willed this earth to be the common possession of all men and to supply fruits to all. But avarice distributed the rights of possessions. It is just, therefore, that if you claim as private to yourself something which was conferred in common upon the human race, indeed upon all living things, you should at least sprinkle something from it upon the poor, so that you do not deny food to those to whom you owe fellowship in your right.” (Migne, P.L., vol. 15, cols. 1304-1305.)—

The passage is a little more obscure than the former. Yet it directly affirms nothing except a community of destination. Otherwise, how would he have said that it was conferred in common “upon all living things” (and not only upon men)? Then, since it is known from elsewhere that St. Ambrose recognizes private rights of possession, it can be understood in this way: God willed the earth to pour forth fruits for all. Common possession of the earth corresponds more closely per se to this intention. But avarice distributed the goods. Yet at the same time this common avarice made this regime necessary, and therefore sanctioned by God, as though from a second intention, once the vices of men were foreseen.

N.B. There are some who think that avarice here designates original sin fairly immediately. Thus Rev. D. Dignant, relying upon bk. 5, chap. 1, no. 2, On the Hexaemeron (Migne, P.L., vol. 14, col. 206), and bk. 1, chap. 28, no. 137, On Duties (Migne, P.L., vol. 16, col. 63).

c) On the Duties of Ministers, bk. 1, chap. 28, no. 132: “Then they (the pagan philosophers) thought the form of justice to be that someone should hold common things, that is, public things, as public, and private things as private. Not even this is according to nature, for nature poured forth all things in common for all. For thus God commanded all things to be generated, so that nourishment might be common to all and the earth might be the common possession of all. Nature, therefore, generated a common right; appropriation made a private right.” (Migne, P.L., vol. 16, col. 62.)

By these words the Holy Doctor anticipates the opinion of Suarez, On Laws, bk. 2, chap. 14, no. 16: “Similarly, nature conferred dominion over all things in common and consequently gave to each person the power of using them; but it did not confer the private ownership of dominions in the same manner.” In other words, private property is not in the same manner from nature; and, as regards a right in second act, the act of appropriating (taking) a thing made a private right. Thus we explain St. Ambrose. But whether he considers this act right or illicit, he does not indicate. Therefore, whereas previously, in no. 131, he had said of another tenet of the philosophers—“that no one should harm anyone unless provoked by injury”—that it “is emptied of force by the authority of the Gospel,” concerning our tenet, with a censure of this kind omitted, he merely contends that it is not from nature; but that the Christian form of justice requires that private things not be held absolutely as private (even as regards use), but that men assist one another with money as with other endowments. Cf. also no. 135.

N.B. There is some controversy about the force which the word usurpatio has in this passage, since the Reverend Fathers Capart and Cathrein understand it as occupation, while Rev. D. de Gryse understands it as unjust usurpation—insofar as the pagan conception of property would not be lawful.

6) St. Augustine. a) Exposition of Psalm 131, no. 5: “On account of those things which we possess individually, there arise lawsuits, enmities, discords, wars among men, tumults, dissensions against one another, scandals, sins, iniquities, and homicides. On account of what? On account of the very things which we possess individually. Do we quarrel on account of those things which we possess in common? We breathe this air in common; we all see the sun in common.” (Migne, P.L., vol. 37, col. 1718.)—

The Holy Doctor teaches nothing else here except the necessity of charity, so that, according to the wish of the Psalmist, a place may be found for the Lord. Opposed to this charity is the love of a private good to the neglect of the common good. Just as the Apostle complained, “All seek the things that are their own, not the things of Jesus Christ,” in altogether the same manner St. Augustine, loc. cit., says: “But many, lest they make a place for the Lord, seek their own things, love their own things, rejoice in their own power, and covet what is privately theirs.” Hence it is apparent that, in the judgment of the Holy Doctor, lawsuits and discords must be traced back less to possessions than to private desires, of which possessions are the occasion, according to the saying: “Whence are lawsuits and wars among you? Are they not from your desires?” Hence he asks Christians to rejoice “not in what is private but in what is common.” The faithful who brought their possessions into the common stock at Jerusalem did this excellently. Yet the same is not therefore required of all, nor is it pronounced possible to do universally. Hence St. Augustine himself concludes thus in no. 6: “Therefore, brothers, let us abstain from the possession of private property; or from its love, if we cannot abstain from its possession; and we make a place for the Lord.... What does it mean, make a place for Him? Do not love yourself; love Him.”

b) Exposition of Psalm 147, no. 12: “The superfluities of the rich are the necessities of the poor. Things belonging to another are possessed when superfluities are possessed.” (Migne, P.L., vol. 37, col. 1922.)

This passage, in exhorting to mercy, merely impresses the precept of distributing the “surplus,” which, by reason of this destination, is called, in a broad sense, something belonging to another.

c) On St. John, tractate 6, no. 25: “Whence does each person possess what he possesses? Is it not by human law? For by divine law, the earth is the Lord's and its fullness.... Take away the laws of the emperors, and who dares to say, that estate is mine, or that slave is mine, or this house is mine?” (Migne, P.L., vol. 35, col. 1437.) This passage was transcribed by Gratian, D. 8, canon 1, under this rubric: “By divine law all things are common to all; but by the law of constitution, this is mine and that belongs to another.”—

When the Donatists complained that ecclesiastical estates had been taken from them by the Catholics, St. Augustine replied that they could claim these for themselves by no right. Not by human law, since the emperors had commanded that heretics “should dare to possess nothing in the name of the Church”; nor by divine law, since they had defected from Christ. “How does he possess by divine law who says, I baptize, when the dove says, This is He who baptizes, etc.?” (Ibid., no. 26.) This is the genuine meaning of the passage.

As regards the very words now alleged, we reply with Lessius, chap. 5, no. 10, that the remote cause of dominion is not in question, but the proximate cause by which a thing is assigned to this person rather than to that one. But this assignment must be made in some manner approved by human law, especially when a moral person is under discussion. “For you know, my brothers,” he says, “that these estates do not belong to Augustine,” but belong to the dove (the Church).

Gratian's rubric, however, must be understood of that divine disposition by which, before legitimate appropriation, we showed that things belong to a certain common dominion of the human race. Moreover, if anyone thinks that Gratian went beyond measure in his words, he may do so as far as we are concerned, since that collection, however great its authority, cannot nevertheless be counted among the authentic sources of law.

7. St. Jerome, Epistle 120, To Hedibia, chap. 1: “Make for yourself many friends from the mammon of iniquity.... He beautifully said, from iniquity; for all riches descend from iniquity, and unless one person has lost something, another cannot find it. Hence even that common saying seems to me to be most true: A rich man is either unjust or the heir of an unjust man.¹⁶ ... If you have more than is necessary to you for food and clothing, distribute it, and know that in this matter you are a debtor.” (Migne, P.L., vol. 22, cols. 984-985.)—

¹⁶ On this saying and the mind of St. Jerome, cf. Collationes Brugenses, vol. 2, p. 339 ff.

In the former passage which is proposed, the Holy Doctor means nothing else than that great riches—especially in his own time—are generally the fruits of avarice and robbery. Cf. St. Ambrose, On Naboth the Israelite, in the passage cited above; and St. Jerome himself, On Isaiah, chap. 33, v. 13 ff.: “For money is not amassed for one person except with the loss and harm of another” (Migne, P.L., vol. 24, col. 367); and On Micah, chap. 6, v. 10 ff.: “All riches, while they despoil others, are born from iniquity.”¹⁷ (Migne, P.L., vol. 25, col. 1213.) He then confirms this with a proverb in which, as is customary, that which commonly occurs is stated simply: “A rich man is either unjust or the heir of an unjust man.”

¹⁷ These passages are indicated in the Bruges article mentioned above.

N.B. Twice, in other works, he repeats that saying, which had become a proverb: Commentary on Jeremiah, chap. 5, v. 26, where, clearly, as in our passage, he attacks evil rich men (Migne, P.L., vol. 24, col. 719); and Commentary on Habakkuk, chap. 3, v. 7 (Migne, P.L., vol. 25, col. 1316), where the word is taken more broadly for every kind of iniquity (pleasure, luxury, avarice), by which rich men become guests of the evil demon. Therefore, no special difficulty occurs here.

In the latter passage, however, it must be observed that St. Jerome writes this letter to a Christian widow who had questioned him about perfection. “You ask how someone can be perfect and how a widow who has been left without children ought to live” (chap. 1; Migne, P.L., vol. 22, col. 982). Therefore, he speaks rather about the duty of perfection, about perfect renunciation of the world. He immediately discloses his mind: “Otherwise one is freely permitted either to give or not to give. Although, for him who desires to be perfect, present poverty must be compensated by future riches.” (Col. 985.)

8. St. Gregory the Great, Pastoral Rule, part 3, chap. 21: “In vain do they consider themselves innocent who claim for themselves as private the common gift of God, etc.” (Migne, P.L., vol. 77, col. 87.)

He too plainly merely condemns there the inhuman tenacity of the rich, whom he says must be admonished differently from those who give alms but plunder the things of others. There is therefore no reason for us to linger here.