§ 4. Supplements to the Doctrine

441. Care for a suitable wage must be reckoned among the primary offices of employers or masters of the enterprise, who ought to endeavor to sell their wares at that price by which they may at least be able to pay a family wage. It is no more lawful for them than for contractors to make gain, directly or indirectly, out of the workmen’s wage.

Moreover, not only those who administer affairs but especially those in whose name the business is conducted are bound to this office according to their powers. For to these are to be transferred the things which in moral discipline are established as to be performed by principals. They do not indeed participate from justice in the proper fault of the agent unless they have efficaciously ratified it or the advantages and profits of the fault have come to them. But they are bound so to entrust the mandate that the agent is placed in no proximate occasion or certain moral necessity of acting unjustly, but has a free choice of fulfilling the parts of an honorable employer, and understands that in this manner the administration has been entrusted to him. For it happens that the managers themselves grieve because they are unable to do several things which it is most important for them to perform.

If this office had been sufficiently observed both by employers and by “shareholders,” how many sins and iniquities would have been avoided which have furnished no slight occasion for the present dangers!

Therefore, because an uncertain will and execution are accustomed to proceed from uncertain principles, it is of such great importance that good men agree concerning this question. We have already warned that this is not difficult, provided that they are willing to consult Christian sense and to avoid the specious rationales or snares of liberalism.

For the cause which we have discussed at sufficient length—the limits of the lower just price—is rightly referred by Mr. Charles Périn for judgment to the common sense of Christians itself. Cf. the argument in the place cited.

We think that the study of the Most Illustrious Bishop of Bruges will bring no slight assistance toward this most desirable agreement.

442. That cause of the limit of the just wage, which at first sight appeared proper to the lowest order, in reality pertains to all. For it is necessary that each person obtain his own according to his condition from the suitable labor which he has hired out: namely, a competent wage, at least the decent supports of life, increased by those things which, from common estimation, complete the just price.¹ This was already taught by Taparelli, Saggio teoretico, and so forth, no. 1143 ff. Cf. also Cauwès, no. 811. Moreover, it is manifest that the things to be attributed under this title vary materially.

¹ The other argument, however, which we used in the proof does not seem to have force for those who exercise the nobler arts.

443. That you undertake a business at the persuasion of charity by no means excuses per se the stipulation of a wage lower than is equal. And this case must be carefully distinguished from another in which, from charity, you desire to number among your servants someone whose labor you do not need at all. For in the former, that motive of charity is extrinsic to the business itself and affects none of its fruits, so that a true exchange of labors takes place which is by no means released from the laws of justice. In the latter, by contrast, the workman brings you a diminished, or even no, utility of his powers; with this rationale diminished, you can estimate his labor just as you would do if you hired a workman inferior in strength or skill.

444. A more explicit account of the family wage.

1. As regards the persons to whom it is attributed. Lest we introduce confusion by novelty of expression, we proposed the conclusion in such a manner that the labor of one adult and able-bodied workman appeared to be recompensed by a family wage. If, however, the sufficiency of a wage which is familial is estimated without omitting the fruit of ordinary thrift or neglecting the moderate assistance of children and wife, it is sufficiently apparent that this account also fits the wage by which the labors of young persons and women are exchanged. It is necessary that these persons be able, from their labors hired out—in the proportion which is equal and to the extent which their very condition permits—to contribute toward supporting the family that assistance by which the father of a family rightly expects his burdens to be lightened. In this manner, although perhaps several do not even earn sustenance for themselves alone, all will receive a truly family wage.²

² Here you see a furnishing of labor which is not compensated by sustenance, and rightly and deservedly so, so that there appears again the vanity of the rationale drawn from the necessary equalization between the powers granted and sustenance. Cf. above, no. 429.

2. As regards the things contained. For it is useful to define more fully the things contained in the general formula of the decent sustenance of the workman and the family.

Come now: if we attend to the offices and cares with which a man is per se occupied in his life, it will readily be proved, unless something escapes us, that it pertains to decent sustenance that a thrifty and honorable workman, employing wise thrift and enjoying the customary assistance of the family:

a) Be able per se to provide for himself and his own moderate food according to their condition,³ clothing, and shelter;

³ To this pertains that children be nursed by their own mother. It is known that, more readily than accords with the desire of nature, other women’s breasts are sought for the infants of a wealthier family. From this it happens not so rarely either that a reward is given to daughters who have fornicated, or that an honorable woman is withdrawn from her own children and her husband. These evils then threaten: that the woman becomes averse to labor, disdains the foods of her condition, that the man gives himself to incontinence and intemperance, and that the whole household is disturbed.

b) Be able to observe feast days and indulge in some recreation;

c) Be able to provide for the suitable education of the children;

d) Be able to meet the customary cases of illness and various dangers;

e) Be able to prepare for himself an old age that is not impoverished.

What ought to be at hand for these latter two necessities will be taught by the customs of the region themselves and by the devices which have been invented whereby, with the uncertain burden and danger divided among many, the loss of those whom disaster has actually affected is repaired at less expense. Therefore, if custom has it that elderly persons are received as guests by one of their sons, it will be necessary that the infirm person be able, from his former labors, to supply those things by which the son is capable of bearing this burden. Today, in our regions, it will suffice if, while he has strength, he can contribute this money by which he may pay the price of “insurance” against illness, infirmity, and probable misfortunes.

These are approximately the things which appear to us to be contained in the absolute family wage. If you remove one of them, you must at the same time confess that, with nature as author, a great part of the human race is per se situated in a state of misery. Moreover, our exposition is confirmed by Mr. A. Verhaegen, work cited, p. 59; by Rev. Mr. Gayraud, work cited, pp. 177–178; and by Rev. Fr. Martin, writing thus in the periodical Études Religieuses: “Since the existence of a man and his family is at issue, the wage is, for the workman, housing, food, clothing, tools, school for the children, and, in addition, savings for bad days, unemployment, or illness” (Études Religieuses, 1892, vol. 55 bis, p. 214).

445. Why is the customary, or not excessive, number of children regarded rather than the average? We said that circumstances which are not extraordinary are to be chosen rather than average circumstances (against Liberatore and several others), because there is no average family, nor is nature accustomed to adapt things to the figments of our mind, but to those things which occur for the most part, and by abounding rather than by failing. Nor does common estimation, whose authority is so great in our argument, rest upon these rationales. For the account of the average family is known to few, while, by contrast, all distinguish the ordinary circumstances of families from the extraordinary.

Moreover, to calculate some average is useful only when that which is excessive and that which is too little are in reality compensated to one and the same person. Thus, if 10, 20, and 30 are to be received at a short interval, it will make almost no difference to you to obtain them as described or to acquire 20 three times in equal portions. But when different things fall to different subjects, so that what falls to one pertains in no way to another, it can happen that the average account is suitable to no one. Thus, if two persons are to be clothed, one a giant and the other a dwarf, an average garment will fit the body of neither. Likewise, in our matter, it will profit nothing for the family whose burdens exceed the average that there are other families for whom average sustenance is superabundant.

It is useful, finally, to illustrate by an example what the difference is between the two estimations. Let there be fifteen families which are distributed according to the number of children in such a way that one lacks offspring; two have each begotten one child; two, two children each; three, three each; four, four each; two, six each; and one, ten. Among us an offspring of five or six will not yet be called extraordinary; according to our opinion, therefore, a family wage can be demanded up to this number. The average account, however, or $53/15 = 3\frac{8}{15}$, would be only approximately four. Yet we warn that the difference is not enormous, since the annual expenditure of a household of slender means does not vary greatly on account of one or two children.

446. Relation of stipends to suitable sustenance. Nothing prevents certain stipends from exceeding, even greatly, the suitable sustenance of a father of a family. Yet these two things appear to demonstrate that generally the excess will not be lasting:

a) That from the abundance itself a custom of more ample culture will be contracted, by which custom the account of decent sustenance will now extend to more things; b) that, enticed by the desire for this richer stipend, more persons will begin to contend for obtaining these offices, whereby the price will be depressed.

Thus, moreover, the general law by which, with monopoly excluded, the prices of things are said to be equalized per se to suitable sustenance or customary expenditures is merely transferred by us to this case.

Therefore, the iron law of wages is false if, in establishing it, you contend that there are none from the order of workmen who can become rich and pass into another, higher order; or that decent sustenance is perpetually contained in approximately the same things, when, on the contrary, additions are constantly made to it. But if you merely contend that neither generally nor for a long time do stipends greatly exceed those things which are judged to pertain to decent sustenance, as it is variously defined for various times, you say what appears true, but which at the same time has nothing on account of which we should abhor the economic order.

447. From what causes it is lawful to pay a wage which is not familial. These causes arise:

a) From the person of the workman, both from his quality, as if he is less capable; then from his illnesses or burdens, the account of which is unusual; then from his will, as if, pressed by no necessity, he willingly offers his labors at a lower price.

b) From connected advantages which, tacitly promised, compensate for the defect. The more ample sustenance of domestic servants appears to us to pertain here.

c) From an unstable state of affairs (temps de crise [time of crisis]), which generally at least excuses the employers.

d) From the very condition of the particular business for which the labors are hired, provided that the difficulties do not lie in the will of the employer.

448. You will ask whether you are therefore excused from paying a family wage because there are others who give sufficiently voluntary consent to a lower wage.

Reply. If there truly are others at hand for you who are judged unwilling in no respect, because, for example, on account of the more frugal life which they profess or assistance which they have from elsewhere, they can suffice for themselves, you cannot be condemned for injury if you pay anyone this wage with which those others would have been content and for which they would actually have hired out their labors. Thus Molina already replied, disp. 506, no. 3.

To this pertain the complaints by which artisans of slender condition are accustomed to lament the competition of persons who lead a common life in religious houses, or of those who are detained in prison. Although these complaints are accustomed to exceed moderation, they are nevertheless worthy of consideration. For it can happen that even very religious persons, who merit so well of the human race, thus indirectly bring loss upon the family affairs of many by offering their labors at too low a price. This would be no less foreign to their most humane counsels than odious and harmful to the cause of religious congregations. Therefore, if our opinion is of any value, the competent authority will opportunely take care that either they exercise only those labors which cannot incur such ill will, or, unless charity counsels otherwise in a particular case, they demand the just price of the labor. Something similar is already established not rarely by Ordinaries concerning stipends for Masses.

449. You will ask what right applies when affairs are generally languishing in some region, so that the wage is justly depressed there below the limit, but one factory flourishes. Will its employer be bound from commutative justice to pay a wage not lower than the limit demonstrated?

Reply. This case appears capable of being disputed, so that someone may have deemed it sufficient if one pays the just price in that region. This would certainly have to be said concerning the price of any other thing.

Nevertheless, with Rev. Dr. De Gryse, work cited, pp. 41 and 60, we think the response must be that every master is bound from justice by the office of paying a wage not lower than the limit as soon as the condition of his own business permits it, even if a particular cause is present.

The rationale of this is that, as is established from the arguments, that value belongs of itself to human labor and not only from its profitable use, or common fruitfulness. Cf. the N.B. after the proof, p. 583. Nor is common estimation founded upon this fruitfulness. Therefore, even in an unstable state of affairs, although most are excused by necessity, common estimation nevertheless, rightly considered, will not establish the just price of labors below the limit. Even then the request for a family wage will be thought just. The argument made retains its force. But the just price must be paid by all who can pay it, from commutative justice.

And here it appears what difference there is between wares and human labors.

450. You will ask whether labors which are customarily committed to persons not joined in marriage are to be excepted from those to which the limit of the family wage applies.

Reply. Several say so, for example, Taparelli, no. 1143; Rev. Dr. Pottier, diss. 3, no. 221. It appears to us that a distinction must be employed.

If a kind of nonprofitable labor is at issue, and it is truly established in custom that such labors are committed to persons free from marriage, we judge that nothing prevents common estimation from establishing as the just limit of labors of this kind nothing but the proper sustenance of the workman hired.

But if the labors are expended fruitfully, and they are of that kind which per se demands the powers and prudence of an adult, the very fruitfulness which inheres per se in the labors must be compensated by the wage. Since this per se does not remain below the sustenance of a father of a family, it appears that the limit of the just price is in no way changed because those who give themselves to these labors are accustomed to abstain from marriage.

451. You will ask how servitude, by which human labors are made of no value, is not strictly repugnant to nature, which forbids that they be valued lower than a family wage.

Reply. A slave is not hired, and, on account of a particular cause, he does not have his own labors proper to himself which he may exchange for a price. Yet nature did not neglect to provide for him. For from the fact that a slave is adopted into the family of the master, the latter is compelled by piety—which is a virtue more excellent than justice itself—to provide the slave and his children and wife with suitable sustenance.

452. You will ask what right applies concerning the collective wage.

Reply. If you first maintain the rigorous debt of a just wage whose lower limit is per se suitable for a father of a family, we entirely approve the humanity and equity of the master of a business by which he assists the particular necessities of the workmen with various subsidies. Since this pertains to the common good, let the public authority itself not omit opportunely to foster it.

But we have already warned above, no. 438, why that account, which is variable and is not defined except from the state of individual families, cannot be imposed by commutative justice. Cf. Périn, Premiers principes, 2nd ed., p. 395.

453. You will ask by whom the determination of the stipend to be paid is more fittingly made.

Reply. 1. Although per se the legitimate determination of wages is no more foreign to the province of the public power than that of provisions,⁴ it is sufficiently agreed among writers that it is by no means expedient. For they judge a suitable wage to depend upon circumstances too varied for it to be well defined by law. This is confirmed by the unambiguous words of the Encyclical Rerum novarum.⁵

⁴ Thus Biederlack, Die Sociale Frage, no. 99.

⁵ “Nevertheless, in these and similar cases ... lest the magistrate interpose himself too officiously ... it will be better to reserve these matters to the judgment of the associations of which we shall speak below, or to enter upon another path by which the interests of wage-earners may, as is equal, be safe.” We warn of one thing here. Because the Holy Pontiff at the same time enumerates certain other matters in which he fears the inopportune intervention of the public power, it in no way follows that he makes all of them positively equal among themselves, nor that he wills the magistrate to abstain from one any more than from another. Rev. Dr. Pottier appears to us to err in this matter, diss. 3, no. 240, when he contends that according to the opinion of the Holy Pontiff these things are to be placed in the same reckoning.

2. If all masters of businesses were of such virtue and modesty that they judged this case according to what is equal and good, and did not abuse their prevailing condition, it would be better to leave this matter to be settled by a private agreement between individual workmen and the master. For we have learned from daily experience that associations do not lack their drawbacks, and that the workmen themselves must fear to no small degree the domination of agitators of the crowd.

3. Yet because, especially today, when so many are swept away by an insane desire for gain, with all religion not rarely cast aside, there is no hope that all or most will restrain themselves without some bridle; no outcome will be reached unless, with the Holy Pontiff, we commit these matters to associations of workmen, yet at the same time striving with every effort that, by the Christian spirit with which they are formed, most dangers be removed. And, in order to avoid many complaints, it will be best if in this manner, as is already customary in England, one scale of wages to be paid for the individual trades is established for the whole region, and a different one is not established in another factory.

454. You will ask whether the things said thus far can be transferred to a tenant farmer who leases a farm, so that his sustenance must be reckoned by the lessor among the expenses which are first to be deducted from the expected fruits.

Reply. The case of that tenant farmer and of the workmen of whom we were treating is plainly dissimilar. The latter let out their labors and are hired; the former hires fields which are let out. The workmen are occupied in another’s business, the tenant farmer in his own. It does not pertain to the workmen with what prudence affairs are administered and wares sold; the entire composition and ordering of the business pertains to the tenant farmer. In what manner the fields are prepared for grain, with what crops the lands are sown, of how many heads of cattle of the larger and smaller kinds, of how many farms and pastures the whole agricultural undertaking consists: these principal points, with which the hope of fruit is most closely joined and connected, are determined by the tenant farmer himself, and by him alone, as master of the business.

By what rationale, therefore, could you weigh such dissimilar cases on one balance and oblige lessors of land to enter in some manner into the hazard of another’s business?

You will say: Tenant farmers labor on another’s land.—Just as shopkeepers operate a shop in another’s building, just as employers themselves, even the greatest, sometimes rent a factory and very often carry on business with another’s money; yet we shall say that all these administer affairs at their own risk. Namely, the tenant farmer labors on another’s land as regards ownership, I concede; as regards use, I deny; for the use of it is assigned to him by the lease of the farm.

Nor should you bring forward the passage of St. Paul, Second Epistle to Timothy 2:6: “The husbandman that laboreth must first partake of the fruits.” For, to speak openly, this passage appears to us to contribute little here, since the words and the intention of the writer are directed to a different argument. The words, I say: for the Apostle neither treats definitely of a husbandman who has hired a field, nor declares what portion ought first to fall to him; nor does he compare the husbandman by name with the owner of the field and depress the latter’s right below the right of the tenant farmer. But how far the intention of St. Paul stands from our case becomes manifest from the connected discourse. For by these similitudes he wills to exhort the disciple to care diligently and zealously for the spiritual office. If he has not performed this, the crown will be taken away from him, just as “he who strives in the contest is not crowned unless he has striven lawfully (v. 5).” But if he has vigorously procured the salvation of others, he himself will rejoice first in spiritual goods, just as the husbandman enjoys the fruits before those who have procured them for themselves by purchase or another title.⁶

⁶ “St. Paul means that the bishops and those who, under their direction, labor for the salvation of their brethren do not lose their effort. The first fruit of their labor is for themselves. By laboring, in the proper dispositions, for the salvation of others, they thereby assure their own salvation.” Drach and Bayle, La Sainte Bible, in this place. Indeed, there were some who, pressing the force of the word “laboring,” interpreted the passage approximately as though the Apostle had said: not the idle husbandman, but the laboring husbandman, must first partake of the fruits. Thus Bisping and Beelen, in this place.

Therefore, we cannot assent in this matter to Rev. Dr. Pottier, who in diss. 3, nos. 233–234 brings forward approximately these rationales. Moreover, in no. 235, he acknowledges as something manifest that the matter of the stipulation of labors and of the hiring of fields “is altogether diverse.” Therefore, unless we are mistaken, he will readily approve this other defense of tenant farmers, to be appended immediately, whose cause we certainly judge worthy of soliciting the minds of good men, since they greatly benefit the republic no less by their religion than by the kind of their craft.

Although, where there is no stipend, the lower limit of a stipend cannot be treated, the limits of the just price, that is, of the rent of fields, are nevertheless not therefore to be denied. Cf. Thesis XXV. And certainly the rent to be paid by tenant farmers would be excessive if it were established so high that from agriculture prudently undertaken, and therefore on a farm neither too small nor without sufficient “capital,” they commonly could not gather for themselves fruits by which they would obtain: a) A suitable recompense for their own labor; b) the customary interest of the capital; c) compensation for the hazard itself, that is, the hope of mere profit by which the danger of loss is compensated.

But this, as we already warned, is the common right of all who, undertaking a business, at the same time rent a building or receive money on loan.⁷

⁷ The Collationes Tornacenses [Tournai Conferences], November 1891, no. 351, discussed this argument in a plainly similar manner.

N.B. It is evident that a tenant farmer, when there has been an unusual sterility, can use the privilege by which the law itself has defined what must then be yielded to equity.