Life and Bodily Integrity (Fifth Commandment)

¹ "Thou shalt not kill." Ex. 20:13.

This precept is formally negative, prohibiting homicide; but because death can be inflicted both on oneself and on others also by omission of necessary care, the same is virtually also positive. Insofar as it is positive, it commands the preservation of life; but insofar as it is negative, it prohibits primarily indeed the unjust killing both of oneself and of others, but secondarily every unjust injury, whether wounding or mutilation, of one's own or another's life. All these injuries are reduced to homicide, the chief injury of human life. Wherefore there must be treated: a. the preservation of life; b. the killing and mutilation of oneself; c. the killing of a criminal; d. the killing of an unjust aggressor; e. the killing of an innocent person; f. killing in a duel; g. killing in war.

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64, 65. St. Alphonsus, l. 3, n. 363-411. Lugo, De iustitia et iure, disp. 10. Lessius, De iustitia et iure, l. 2, c. 9. Reuter, Theologia moralis, III, n. 366-386. Sporer-Bierbaum, Theologia moralis decalog., II, tract. 5, n. 150-549. Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theolog. morale^3, II, n. 848-958. Lehmkuhl, Theologia moralis^10, I, n. 831-859.

326. On the obligation itself. 1. Everyone is bound to preserve his own life, health, and integrity of members; and this precept is of itself grave, but as to health and integrity of members it admits smallness of matter.

a. The same precept which prohibits the killing of oneself by that very fact also commands the preservation of one's own life, since virtually it is the same thing not to preserve life and to take life from oneself.

b. Among natural goods entrusted to us by God, bodily life occupies the first place, since it is the foundation and condition of all other goods. But a good committed to us by God as to guardians we ought carefully to protect until He Himself demands it back.

c. From revelation we know that temporal life is the time of preparation in which we merit eternal life; the time of sowing for the day of harvest;¹ the time of working in the vineyard of the Lord;² the time of gathering interest from the talents committed to us by God;³ the time of storing up treasures in heaven;⁴ the time of running in the stadium to receive the prize and of contending in the contest to receive an incorruptible crown.⁵ By divine disposition this time obtains its end with death. From these things the supreme importance of the whole of life and of any particle of it shines forth.

2. Therefore everyone is bound to procure for himself those things which are necessary for preserving life and health: food, clothing, habitation; to ward off those things which harm life and health; and to restore impaired health by suitable means, namely physician and medicines.

Those sin who voluntarily do not procure for themselves food, clothing, and habitation necessary for the preservation of life and for other ends, even if this demands hard labor (66, 2).

3. We are indeed bound to preserve life and health by ordinary means, but not by extraordinary means; for he who is bound to the end is also bound to employ the ordinary means which are required for obtaining it, but not of himself also extraordinary means. Therefore not to employ ordinary means would be the same as to inflict death on oneself; but not to employ extraordinary means is the same as to permit death, which is sometimes licit. Which means are judged extraordinary must be judged by the common estimation of men.

a. Sick persons sin who in grave illness, where hope of recovery shines forth, do not wish to call a physician and employ the remedies prescribed to them,⁶ which by reason of their condition can easily be procured and employed. But those do not sin who in a dangerous disease do not wish to employ a remedy very costly by reason of their state and condition, or a remedy very difficult on account of great pains. Therefore no one, not even the richest, is bound of himself to call the most skilled physicians to drive away a grave disease, nor is anyone bound of himself to leave his domicile and seek healthier air elsewhere, because all these things are extraordinary.

b. From this same reason it must be said that there does not exist an obligation of undergoing a grave surgical operation or a notable amputation. For although today the pains of many operations, on account of numbed senses, are not sharp, nevertheless the obligation is not to be imposed, both because most people greatly dread it, and because the success, especially lasting success, is ordinarily uncertain, and finally because it is a grave inconvenience to lead life with a mutilated body.⁷ That no one of himself is obligated to undergo a grave surgical operation which he vehemently dreads, because this very dread is an extraordinary difficulty, is suitably confirmed from this, that St. Alphonsus (n. 372), following several authors, judges that a virgin is not bound to suffer an operation by the hands of a surgeon, even if life cannot otherwise be preserved, when on account of modesty she dreads this handling more than death itself. Accidentally, however, someone can be obligated to undergo an operation or amputation, namely where the matter concerns a person very necessary to the family or to the public good and the success is morally certain.

c. Those do not sin who for a reasonable cause do not wish to employ a remedy against a light illness, because light care in recovering health can be neglected from a just cause, just as a light shortening of life admitted from a reasonable cause is licit.

d. A monk bound by rule to perpetual abstinence from meats does not sin if in grave illness he refuses to eat meats by which he could preserve life; for it is licit to omit the preservation of life for obtaining a great good. But it conduces to a great common good of the order that the rule of abstinence be strictly observed even with danger to life.

Whether a superior can command a grave surgical operation. If the sick person is necessary for the good of others and the success of the operation is morally certain, a superior, father or superior, can obligate a son or subject to undergoing an operation whose pains are not very sharp. But if some one of these conditions is lacking, the superior does not seem able to command so arduous a matter.⁸

Note. Concerning drunkenness and concerning the influence of drunkenness on health and the life of the body, cf. De principiis, n. 344.

¹ Matt. 13:24 ss.

² Matt. 20:1.

³ Matt. 25:14 ss.

⁴ Matt. 6:20.

⁵ 1 Cor. 9:24-25.

⁶ Cf. Ecclus. 38:1, 4.

⁷ Cf. Capellmann, Medicina pastor., p. 23 s.

⁸ Cf. Sanchez, Consilia mor., l. 5, c. 1, dub. 34, n. 6; Lugo, De iustitia, disp. 10, n. 33; St. Alphonsus, n. 370.

327. On the killing of oneself. 1. It is never licit by one's own authority directly to kill oneself, even if life has become hard for us and useless to others.

For the destruction of a thing is an act of dominion; but man does not have dominion over his own life. Therefore by the killing of oneself the supreme and exclusive dominion of God over the life of man is injured.¹ Moreover, charity is injured, by which man is bound to love himself, since he inflicts the greatest evil upon himself. Finally life, even if bitter or useless to others, always retains its principal importance of meriting eternal life. Wherefore self-killing is against justice toward God and against love of oneself. Also in sacred Scripture the killing of oneself is rather often prohibited,² and the Church punishes self-killing by deprivation of ecclesiastical burial.

a. He directly kills himself or another who posits a killing action with the intention of inflicting death upon himself or another; he indirectly kills himself or another who does not intend the killing of himself or another, but knowingly does something from which he foresees that his own or another's death will follow. In order that someone be said directly to kill himself or another, it is required that the action and intention be immediately and directly killing. But the intention is necessarily directly killing where the action immediately has only one effect and that a killing one. But if neither the action nor the intention is immediately and directly killing, or if the action alone is so but not the intention, someone is not judged directly to kill himself or another, as is clear from the deed of Samson.³

b. Therefore self-killing is not permitted, not even for escaping the gravest evil, for example, the miseries of the present life, vehement shame because of a crime committed, fear of punishment, or fear of ignominy. For temporal evils, however great, are lower than the good of life; but to choose a greater evil for escaping a lesser is against reason and against ordered love of oneself. Therefore it is not licit even for a virgin to kill herself to escape violent corruption or to preserve the good of integrity.

c. It is not licit, with certain loss of life, to throw oneself from a window into a river or to leap into the midst of flames to baptize a child; for this would be direct self-killing, because the action posited immediately tends to the killing of oneself, and only by this action posited can the child be baptized. In order that this can be done licitly, there must be at least some hope of escaping from the waves or flames.

2. It is licit directly to kill oneself by divine authority; for then man leaves life with the permission of the supreme lord of life itself. The same is probably also licit by public authority: for where someone has been justly condemned to death, by natural right the judge can commit the execution of the sentence to anyone, even to the guilty person. Therefore the guilty person who must be punished by death, with the judge permitting, can licitly kill himself or execute the penalty of death upon himself.⁴

The deeds which are read in the lives of the saints, namely that some killed themselves either from desire of martyrdom or to preserve chastity, are explained by some through divine inspiration by which God granted them permission to kill themselves; by others rather through invincible ignorance, which indeed can be supposed more easily because from an obvious consideration of the matter it is not immediately evident that self-killing for preserving a great good is illicit.⁵

3. From a proportionately grave cause it is licit indirectly to kill oneself. Although even indirect self-killing is of itself prohibited, nevertheless it is licit to posit an action indifferent in itself from which one's own death follows, if at least equally immediately a good effect follows, and if there is a grave cause of common or private good for positing that action. In this way the deed of Eleazar, killing the elephant by which he himself was crushed, is explained.⁶

a. It is licit to leap from a window with certain danger of death to escape a harder death, for example, one about to be undergone immediately in flames. It is licit to cast oneself from a high tower with certain danger of death to flee an atrocious death which a tyrant is actually about to inflict. But the same is not licit if the tyrant, otherwise about to inflict an atrocious death, demands it; for if death is not yet actually inflicted, the casting down is not an action from which each effect immediately follows, one's own death and the flight from the more atrocious death, but is self-killing which is chosen as a means to escape a greater evil.

b. It is licit for a virgin to cast herself from a very high cliff with certain loss of life, in order to free herself from the hands of an impure violator and thus preserve virginity, even if she reasonably hopes that she will not consent. Yet this is not licit unless force is morally being actually inflicted; for if force is not yet being inflicted, self-killing is chosen to avoid a grave evil, which is illicit.

c. It is licit to burn a ship or tower to submerge or destroy enemies, even if one's own death will certainly follow from it.

d. It is licit in shipwreck to yield to another a plank which one had already seized, even if the one who, yielding the plank, lowers himself into the sea, is certainly going to perish. And indeed St. Thomas calls this action of yielding the plank and handing oneself over to death for a friend an act of most perfect virtue.⁷

e. It is licit to present oneself to a tyrant by whom one certainly knows he will be killed, to strengthen others in faith or to save others from death, etc. For when a proportionately grave cause exists, both the obligation of preserving one's own life and the obligation of impeding another's sin cease.

Note. The two principles which follow are already contained in the preceding matter; nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, it is useful to propose them explicitly.

4. From a just cause it is licit indirectly to shorten life, even by several years. Since the precept of preserving life is affirmative, which does not oblige always and in every case, from a grave cause it is licit to do or omit something from which a shortening of life or hastening of death follows. Indeed the conditions of human life are such that sometimes even a more notable shortening of life must be admitted.⁸ - A just cause either of shortening life or of exposing life to danger is moral necessity and the exercise of virtue.

a. Blacksmiths do not sin who, handling fire daily, shorten life for themselves, nor other workers, such as those blowing glass, gilding metals, etc., whose labors bring no small shortening of life.

b. One who by labors, penances, fasts, and austerities of this kind undertaken in honor of God hastens death somewhat does not sin, provided he is ruled by the rules of prudence and discretion in undertaking them.

c. One who, on the authority of a physician, can prolong life for some time by abstaining from moderate use of wine is not bound under grave obligation to abstain. - Likewise one who, on the authority of a physician, can prolong life by drinking wine or eating meats which he was not accustomed to use, is not bound under grave obligation, because in each case the shortening is slight; indeed from a motive of virtue in the latter case he can licitly abstain.

d. Those who by excessive drink or food shorten life for some time do not sin gravely against the fifth precept, provided they do not bring on a proximate danger of death or grave disease, or a notable shortening of life.

5. From a just cause it is licit to expose oneself to danger of life; indeed to remote danger from a light cause, but to proximate danger only from a grave cause. He who without cause exposes himself to remote danger of life sins lightly; he who without cause exposes himself to proximate danger of life sins gravely. The greater the danger of death which is induced from the action, the greater must be the reason on account of which it is licit to induce it.

He is said to expose himself to proximate danger of life who exposes himself to a very probable danger of death to be undergone either proximately or after some time. He is said to expose himself to remote danger of life who exposes himself to a danger of death in some way probable, either proximately or after some time. In order that someone be judged to expose himself to proximate danger of life, he must have at least some hope of escaping; he who has no hope of escaping is said not to expose life to danger, but to destroy it. A danger is called probable in some way where death follows from some action rarely or not so frequently; on the contrary it is very probable where death follows from some action frequently or for the most part.

a. It is licit to serve those infected by plague or another contagious disease; likewise to administer the sacraments with great danger of contracting the disease. - It is licit for guilty persons detained in prison to cast themselves down from a height to escape a certain sentence of death or perpetual prison, provided there is some hope of preserving life; but the same would not be licit to escape prison of only a few years, unless the danger of life which they induce by throwing themselves down were very remote.

b. Artisans do not sin who climb upon roofs of buildings and expose themselves to various dangers where the work requires it.

c. Audacious men sin gravely who from a rash wager, from vainglory, or solely for the sake of making profit, cast themselves into proximate danger of life, for example, by provoking wild beasts, exercising the art of the rope-dancer, prolonging a fast for a very long time, etc., unless from experience it is established that probable danger of life is absent, as happens in horse races.

d. He sins who, laboring under a grave fever, makes a journey or undertakes great labor without necessity.

¹ Lugo, disp. 10, n. 21; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64, a. 5.

² Ex. 20:13; Gen. 9:6; Deut. 32:39; Wis. 16:13 ss.; Rom. 14:7-9.

³ Judg. 16:30.

⁴ Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 369; Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 861 s., where also the reasons of each opinion are submitted to examination.

⁵ Lessius, De iustitia, l. 2, c. 9, n. 23.

⁶ 1 Macc. 6:43 ss. Cf. Lessius, De iustit., l. 2, c. 9, n. 32; Lugo, De iustit., disp. 10, n. 55.

⁷ In 3, dist. 29, a. 15, ad 3.

⁸ Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 866 ss.

328. On the mutilation of oneself. Mutilation of oneself is of itself gravely illicit, unless it is necessary for preserving life itself. The reason for the first is that man, just as he is not lord of life, so also is not lord of his members, so that he can dispose of them at will. The reason for the second is that he is guardian and preserver of his body, and therefore he can cut off a part or member to preserve the whole body; for a part is ordered to the whole, and therefore must be postponed to the good of the whole.

a. Therefore it is licit, for example, to cut off for oneself a hand bound by a chain in order to escape a fire. And just as self-mutilation is licit for the preservation of life, so for the same reason it is licit to consent to the amputation of a member. - Yet in light matter, as if someone without cause cuts off for himself a little part of the ear or a joint of the little finger, grave sin is not committed.

b. Mutilations of themselves which are read as having been done by holy virgins must be explained either from divine inspiration or from good faith, as was said above concerning self-killing (n. 327, 2).

Resolutions. From another end, which does not tend to the preservation of the whole, self-mutilation does not seem licit. 1. It is not licit to castrate oneself for spiritual good, namely to avoid the sin of incontinence or to calm temptations;¹ for that end can always be obtained by other means. Moreover, mutilation of this kind renders one impotent for generating and yet does not exempt from carnal temptations.

2. Much less is it licit to mutilate oneself for procuring some profit or advantage for oneself; wherefore it is not licit for a youth to mutilate himself in order to escape the burden of military service, nor for a poor man in order to obtain greater alms.

3. Some authors admit as at least probable the opinion of those who say that castration in boys is licit so that with a sweeter voice they may sing the praises of God in church and prepare for themselves an honorable livelihood, provided this twofold condition is had: that danger of life be morally absent, and that it not be done to unwilling boys.² But if it is illicit for obtaining a notable spiritual good, much more will it be illicit for attaining a temporal good.³

The supreme pontiffs have never approved the castration of boys, nor ever said it to be licit; indeed they declared irregular those who culpably had made themselves or others eunuchs. Yet they admitted to ecclesiastical concerts eunuchs who without their own fault were made such.⁴

4. There is a surgical operation which is called by physicians, from its inventor, the physician Porro, the Porro operation. It consists in the extirpation of the uterus with the ovaries, by which a woman is rendered impotent for generating. Certainly this operation is licit for preserving life; but from another end besides the preservation of life, for example, for impeding future conception or for forestalling the necessity of Caesarean operation, it cannot be admitted.⁵

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 1, ad 3.

² St. Alphonsus, n. 374.

³ Cf. Lugo, De iustit. et iure, disp. 10, n. 23.

⁴ Benedict XIV, De synodo, l. 11, c. 7, n. 3.

⁵ Cf. Capellmann, Medicina pastoralis^6 (Aquisgrani: Barth, 1893), p. 26 ss.

329. Whether it is licit to wish death for oneself. - It is licit from the motive of obtaining a good which is better than life, or escaping an evil which is worse than death, because in this way neither God's dominion over man's life nor the charity owed to oneself is in any way violated.¹

a. Indeed, alpha. it is one thing to inflict death on oneself, another to wish death for oneself: for he who inflicts death on himself injures the divine right; he who wishes death for himself awaits death to be inflicted on him by God. beta. The desire of death, as of a thing indifferent, receives morality from its motive; therefore from an honest end it is licit to wish death for oneself, but from an evil end to wish it for oneself is of itself a grave sin. But neither to reason nor to charity is it repugnant to wish for oneself death which would be the beginning of greater goods or the end of greater evils; but it is repugnant to reason and to charity owed to oneself to will for oneself the gravest evil for avoiding another light evil.

b. Therefore death can licitly be desired in order to enjoy eternal beatitude, to love God more perfectly, never again to offend God, to avoid truly most grave evils, for example, long illness, troublesome vexations and snares, etc.; therefore sacred Scripture has: "Death is better than a bitter life."² But it is a grave sin to wish death for oneself on account of the ordinary troubles of life, unless this is done in the heat of anger or in some disturbance of mind without sufficient deliberation.

¹ Cf. 3 Kings 19:4.

² Ecclus. 30:17.

330. By the name of criminal here is understood one who has perpetrated a crime worthy of the penalty of death.

On the right over criminals. 1. Public authority, and it alone, has the right of killing criminals insofar as this is necessary for the common good. This is proved from sacred Scripture, from the universal consensus of all peoples, and from the nature of the matter.¹

a. There are those who altogether deny to civil authority the very right of inflicting the penalty of death; others do not deny the right itself, but grant it only in certain extreme cases of necessity; others indeed grant the right without limitation, yet say that its exercise in our times of civilization and humanity must be abrogated. From this it has happened that the penalty of death has been abolished in several kingdoms. But after a short time, when crimes grew strong, the subjects themselves asked that it be restored.

b. Although some testimonies of the old covenant pertain to judicial laws that were to have force only for the Israelites,² nevertheless others have universal value, as this: "Whosoever shall shed human blood, his blood shall be shed; for man was made to the image of God."³ St. Paul also attributes to civil authority as such the right of inflicting punishments in general, and specifically the right of inflicting the penalty of death: "He is God's minister to thee for good. But if thou do evil, fear; for he does not bear the sword without cause. For he is God's minister, an avenger unto wrath to him who does evil."⁴

c. Legislators of all times decree that the penalty of death is to be inflicted; even those who, imbued with perverse principles of right, thought that it should be abolished, nevertheless decreed that it must be retained for certain cases. All nations have recognized this penalty as licit and just, which they would never have done unless by the light of reason they had known it to be necessary to supreme power.

d. The right of decreeing and inflicting the penalty of death is necessary to supreme authority. And indeed, from the right and office of efficaciously defending social order and of providing stable security of rights for subjects, it can decree and inflict those penalties by which men are efficaciously deterred from even more atrocious crimes. But, as experience witnesses, many are not sufficiently deterred from the most atrocious crimes except by fear of capital punishment. Criminals of this sort, who become harmful to the community, are like a rotten member in an organism, which has lost the right to life and must be separated from the body of society for the common good.

e. But the reason for the second is that criminals can be licitly killed only on account of the common good. Therefore it belongs to him to whom the administration of the community is committed, namely to the supreme ruler, to punish criminals. Far greater evils would come upon the republic if anyone by private authority could kill criminals. Wherefore it is licit neither for a father nor for a master to kill or mutilate a son or servant for the sake of correction, or universally to inflict an irreparable damage upon him; this is licit only to supreme power on account of the common good.

2. In order that one guilty of crime can be justly killed, three things are required: a. that he has committed a truly grave crime; for the penalty of death is the gravest penalty which civil society can inflict; b. that he has certainly committed the crime; for he cannot be certainly despoiled of the right over his own life except on account of a certain crime; therefore if the crime is only probably established, the guilty person must be favored by law; c. that the crime committed be judicially established; for the law of nature demands that the guilty person be able to defend himself and that he be condemned only if juridically convicted, unless public authority in a particular case, for a reason of the common good, has given power of killing a man caught in the crime itself.

To one condemned to death there must be granted time to receive the last sacraments. Yet if he were unwilling to confess his sins, after admonition had first been given, he could nevertheless be killed; for he ought to attribute eternal damnation to himself.

¹ Cf. Vict. Cathrein, Moralphilosophie^4 (Freiburg: Herder, 1899), II, p. 634 ff.; Theod. Meyer, Institutiones iuris natur. (Friburgi: Herder, 1900), II, 593 ss.

² Lev. 24:17.

³ Gen. 9:6.

⁴ Rom. 13:4.

331. Resolutions. a. It is not licit for guardians of public order to kill fleeing criminals, even if they have already been condemned to death; for public authority's power is required for killing anyone. Hence if sometimes the same guardians discharge weapons against criminals either resisting or fleeing, they can do this either by right of defense or from a special power given to them against guilty persons already condemned to death. For anyone can of himself be constituted by the judge as executor of the penalty. But once the permission of public authority has been removed, it is licit for no one to kill even public robbers.

An outlaw, that is, one declared guilty of death by public authority, is licitly killed by anyone; for in this case anyone is constituted by public authority executor of the just sentence against the outlawed criminal. Wherefore the outlaw himself cannot defend himself and kill the aggressor; for it is licit to defend oneself only against an unjust aggressor.

b. A soldier placed on guard can licitly fire upon one approaching whom he had vainly warned not to advance, under these conditions: alpha. that the instruction of supreme power command it; beta. that the one ordered to stop be warned of the penalty, namely the discharge of a gun; gamma. that, once wounding is admitted, killing be avoided. For although the disobedience by which he resists the just order of the soldier, by reason of the common good, can in certain circumstances be gravely punished, nevertheless it is not a crime worthy of death. Something similar must be said of guards of borders who fire upon smugglers of merchandise.

c. Nor is it licit for citizens to exercise the vengeance which they call popular justice, that is, Lynchjustiz, because public order in civil society once constituted demands that the power of punishing guilty persons be reserved wholly to public authority; otherwise all things would be filled with slaughter.

332. On the right against an aggressor of life. It is licit for anyone to defend both his own life and the life of others, even with the killing of an unjust aggressor, provided the moderation of blameless defense is observed. This is both because everyone has the right of preferring his own life to the life of an unjust aggressor, and because otherwise criminals, with the greatest damage to human society, would affect others with injuries. Therefore all laws and all positive rights permit force to be repelled by force, even if from defense of oneself the death of the aggressor follows.¹

a. An aggressor is called one who is already actually attacking or actually does certain things from which he is morally judged already to be attacking, for example, he is already preparing weapons; for if physical aggression had to be awaited, defense of oneself would often become impossible. Nevertheless, it is not licit, by preventing the aggression, to kill one who lays snares and will certainly attack later, although it is impossible to escape the danger.² It is not licit after the aggression to kill the aggressor, because that would not be defense but vengeance.

b. Where the required conditions are present, anyone can defend himself against any unjust aggressor, even with the death of the aggressor, whether the aggression is formally or materially unjust. Wherefore even a son can defend himself against a father, a subject against a ruler, unless greater evils such as wars are to be feared, a layman against a cleric, a cleric against a layman, and anyone even against a furious, insane, or drunken person. For although here he commits only material injustice, nevertheless the right to life is not lost through the insanity or drunkenness of the aggressor.

c. It is licit for anyone to defend his own life in this way, but no one is bound to kill an unjust aggressor; wherefore he can licitly permit his own killing, for this means of preserving life is hard and cruel, from which nature recoils. Yet in a twofold case it is not licit to permit one's own killing: alpha. if the life of the one attacked is either necessary or very useful to the common good; beta. if the one attacked is in a state of mortal sin.

d. It is licit to defend in this way not only one's own life, but also the life of others; for what someone licitly does by himself, he can also do through another. Indeed, by reason of charity, piety, or office, this ought sometimes also to be done by those who are hired to protect the life or goods of others. But because such killing ordinarily brings great inconveniences with it, a private person is rarely bound to this, unless a reason of piety or office is added.

Therefore if the one attacked were a person necessary to the public good, or if he were father or son or wife, legal justice or piety would obligate one to defend his life. And those who are hired for the defense of others, such as soldiers and guards, are bound to defend the life of others even with their own grave inconvenience, because office obligates them to this.

e. If the one attacked knows that the aggressor is in a state of mortal sin, ordinarily he can defend himself even by killing the aggressor. For if the aggressor is formally unjust, he freely exposes himself to this danger; therefore since he himself can provide for himself, he is not in extreme spiritual necessity. But if he is materially unjust, as an insane person, in fact he is in extreme spiritual necessity and only the one attacked can assist him. Hence if the one attacked prudently judged himself to be in a state of grace, and moreover knew certainly that the aggressor was in a state of mortal sin which he would afterward amend, charity would demand that he prefer the aggressor's eternal salvation to his own temporal life. But since this twofold knowledge cannot be had, this obligation scarcely ever certainly exists; and an uncertain obligation cannot deprive another of the certain right of defending himself.

¹ C. Si vero 3, De sententia excom. (V, 39).

² Cf. proposition 18 condemned by Alexander VII.

333. On the right against an aggressor of goods. 1. It is licit to defend not only life, but also other goods of greater importance of an inferior order, even with the killing of the unjust aggressor, if they cannot be preserved in another way. For charity does not oblige that one prefer another's goods of a higher order to his own goods of a lower order, unless the other is in extreme necessity. But the unjust aggressor of another's good is not in extreme necessity, since he voluntarily exposes himself to the danger of death.¹

That even goods of fortune can be licitly defended with the killing of an unjust aggressor, theologians have always rightly inferred from sacred Scripture, which permits the killing of a nocturnal thief breaking into a house.²

2. But the goods which it is licit to defend in this way, with the moderation of blameless defense observed, are:

a. Goods of fortune of great importance. These goods must be of great importance, because charity prohibits that on account of a light damage the gravest damage be inflicted upon a neighbor.³

alpha. Goods of great importance are not only those which, if taken away, would leave someone lacking sustenance for himself and his own, but also those whose loss would be a notable damage according to the quality of the person.

beta. It is licit to kill a thief taking away a thing of great importance, if the thing cannot be recovered in another way and if, after warning, he is unwilling to let it go; but if warning is impossible or useless, it also can be omitted.⁴

gamma. It is not licit to kill one who takes away a thing of small importance; but it is licit to protect it against the thief and to recover it once taken away by the thief if it cannot be recovered otherwise with sufficient certainty. But if the thief employs force, where there is need he can even be killed. For in that case he is not killed to protect or recover the thing, but to defend one's own person.⁵

b. Chastity: for if it is licit to kill the aggressor of goods of fortune, a fortiori it is licit to kill the aggressor of chastity, which is a good more excellent than riches. Nevertheless a virgin is not bound to kill the aggressor of chastity, but can passively submit, because chastity is not lost against the will.

c. Integrity of members: for what is licit for preserving life is also licit for defending integrity of body.

¹ St. Alphonsus, n. 383.

² Ex. 22:2; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64, a. 7.

³ Proposition 31 condemned by Innocent XI: Regularly I can kill a thief for the preservation of one gold coin.

⁴ St. Alphonsus, n. 382; Bucceroni, Casus consc.^5, n. 59, 3.

⁵ Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 890.

334. On the aggressor of honor. According to the law of perfection handed down to us by Christ, injuries received are to be borne equanimously and forgiven to the enemy without satisfaction; but according to the order of justice and natural equity, these things seem able to be established:¹

a. It is not licit to kill the aggressor of reputation or honor either to impede an imminent injury or to recover honor taken away.

For this is prohibited by the first part of condemned proposition 30,² and rightly indeed, because rarely are the conditions required for bloody defense present, such as that grave damage be inflicted and that there be no other way of repairing the damage. But if the required conditions are present, nevertheless this is not licit because the moderation of blameless defense is not observed; for to recover honor taken away by verbal, indeed even real injury, according to the moral estimation of men, the killing of the aggressor is not required. Rather the retorsion of the injury suffices, even, if there is need, with the striking of the calumniator, where honor cannot be recovered through a judge.

b. It is licit to recover honor taken away by real or verbal injury by immediately inflicting an equal injury, if, as ordinarily happens, it cannot be recovered through a judge without trouble.

Therefore it is licit immediately to strike back at one who ignominiously struck someone, not indeed for the sake of vengeance, but to avoid infamy or to recover honor, where in the moral estimation of men the one struck is judged deprived of honor until he has struck back, but, on the contrary, to have recovered honor if he has struck back. Likewise it is licit to return a similar name to him who called someone by a disgraceful name. Nor should it be said that this opinion has been condemned, since only this is condemned: that one striking can be killed if he flees. Practically, however, this opinion involves a twofold danger: lest the striking back be done for the sake of vengeance, and lest the moderation of blameless defense be violated. Moreover, if the one struck back wishes to strike again, nothing prevents the second striking from being impeded, even with drawn sword, if there is need.

c. It is not licit to recover honor taken away before by real or verbal injury by killing or striking the one who took it away.

For this is prohibited by the second part of condemned proposition 30, because the killing would not be defense but vengeance. Moreover, punishment for a committed offense must be inflicted by a judge.

Note. It must be observed that by positive law he who kills an aggressor of honor, chastity, or goods of fortune is considered as a homicide to be punished; only for impeding rape can a woman by civil law kill the aggressor.

¹ Cf. Elbel-Bierbaum, Theol. mor., I, pr. 4, n. 67 ss.; Genicot, Casus conscient., I, p. 154 s.; Viva, Theses damnatae, in prop. 30 condemned by Innocent XI, n. IX.

² It is licit for an honorable man to kill an aggressor who tries to bring calumny, if otherwise this ignominy cannot be avoided; the same also must be said if someone strikes a slap or strikes with a staff and after the inflicted slap or blow of the staff flees.

335. On the moderation of blameless defense. The moderation of blameless defense, which must be observed in defense of oneself, requires that nothing be done against the life of the aggressor unless it is necessary for protecting one's own life; for what necessity does not excuse is against justice. Therefore it requires three things: a. that life not be attacked unless the aggression is actually, morally, at hand; b. that the life of the aggressor not be attacked if the danger can be avoided in another way, such as by crying out or fleeing; c. that the aggressor not be killed if his wounding suffices for defense.

a. He is not bound to flee who cannot flee without great detriment, because, for example, he would incur the disgrace of a timid and cowardly man; for the moderation of blameless defense does not require that the danger of the aggressor be avoided with the greatest detriment to oneself. Therefore the following are bound to flee if they can do so safely enough: alpha. common men, because they suffer no loss of honor; beta. clerics and religious, because for them, who ought to furnish an example of meekness, flight is not disgraceful; gamma. all, even noble and military men, if the aggressor is drunk or insane, because in this case flight is disgraceful to no one.

b. Practically, judgment concerning the means necessary for the defense of oneself must be committed to the judgment of him whose life is in danger. But if someone in sudden danger, where time is lacking for weighing all circumstances, seizes a means which would not have been plainly necessary, he is not to be blamed.

336. Definition. Homicide taken broadly or etymologically, insofar as it prescinds from whether it is licit or illicit, is defined as the violent taking of life of a man done by a man. But if there is speech simply of homicide, illicit homicide is understood, or the killing of an innocent person, who has committed no crime and is not going to commit one on account of which he would be worthy of death.

a. Of a man: by this name taken broadly is understood also a human fetus not yet brought forth into light, provided it is animated. Therefore those procuring abortion are of themselves guilty of homicide. Yet where homicide is a reserved case, this name is taken more strictly, namely for the killing of a man already born. By a man: for if a brute kills a man, the killing is not called homicide, but pauperies.

b. Since homicide is properly against justice, strictly speaking he does not commit homicide who does not free from death one whom he could free and from charity ought to free. But he who does not free from death one whom he could free and from justice ought to free, as if a physician does not assist a sick person whose care he has undertaken, commits homicide.

337. Division. a. Homicide is distinguished as voluntary and involuntary: the former is intended; the latter follows from some action or omission beyond every intention.

b. Homicide, namely voluntary homicide, is one thing direct and another indirect, according as it is intended in itself or only in the cause from which it is foreseen that it will at least probably follow.

Casual homicide is taken in a twofold sense: more strictly, if it is wholly involuntary, and more broadly, if it is voluntary indirectly or in the cause. The former is called merely casual; the latter, mixed casual. Therefore casual homicide can sometimes also be imputed as fault, just as everything indirectly voluntary is imputed as fault under certain conditions.¹

One who without just cause posits an action, even an illicit one, from which the death of another rarely follows, is not guilty of homicide, provided he has employed due diligence; as if someone, even a cleric, devoting himself to hunting and employing due diligence kills a man. For it is merely casual homicide. But one who without just cause posits an action from which the death of another frequently follows is guilty of homicide, even if he employs due diligence, as if a mother suffocates an infant in bed, or if someone throws tiles from a roof into a public road without due precautions. For this is homicide voluntary in the cause. Therefore the former action is not prohibited on account of the danger of homicide, but the latter is prohibited on account of this very danger.

c. Homicide is simple, which besides homicide contains no other species of sin from circumstances, and qualified, which moreover contains another species of sin from circumstances. Of this sort are: alpha. sacrilege by reason of the person killed or by reason of the place in which the killing happens; beta. parricide, which is the killing of father or mother, likewise the killing of an ascendant or descendant, fratricide or the killing of brother or sister, uxoricide likewise and the killing of a husband; gamma. regicide or the killing of a ruler; delta. robbery, which is killing perpetrated from the will of plundering.

alpha. To the question whether parricide, uxoricide, and fratricide differ in species, likewise whether parricide in the first degree and in other degrees differ, it must be said consistently with the doctrine set forth concerning incest: it is probable that injuries inflicted on parents or wife or brothers, and injuries inflicted in the first and in other degrees, do not morally differ from one another in species, because all are opposed in morally the same mode to the same virtue of piety. Therefore it suffices if the penitent in confession says that he killed someone closely joined to himself, without declaring whether it was father, son, brother, wife, etc.² The new species of sin which is contained in regicide or in the crime of injured majesty, as if someone killed the pope, or a king, or ruler, is the injury of observance which is owed to those persons in a special way. To robbery there accedes a new species of sin from the end, namely from the will of plundering, just as a new malice of sin accedes to the homicide of him who kills another from the will of fornicating.

beta. What is said about killing is also valid, proportion being preserved, concerning mutilation, wounding, beating, or violent striking, which sins can induce a specifically distinct malice if moreover they are opposed to religion or piety. Besides, these same sins can be light from smallness of matter, except mutilation, in which smallness of matter is scarcely to be admitted if it is taken for the amputation of a member. Thus quarrels of boys on account of smallness of matter are for the most part light sins.

¹ Cf. De principiis^9, n. 82 s.

² Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 850 ss.

338. General principles. 1. It is never licit directly to kill an innocent person, not even by public authority; for this action is evil in itself. And indeed no one has from God power to kill an innocent person, not even public authority. Moreover, charity owed to the neighbor and the rights both of the one killed himself and of his own and of society are irreparably injured. For this reason it is expressly prohibited by divine law: "The innocent and just thou shalt not kill."¹

a. Sacred Scripture depicts homicide as a nefarious crime, both because the homicide impiously invades the supreme right of God, who is the only Lord of life and death,² and because he kills man made to the image of God.³ Therefore, just as in the Old Testament, so also by most modern penal codes, homicide is punished with the harshest penalty of death.

b. Therefore it is not licit to kill those lethally wounded or any other dying persons so that they may not suffer longer; nor the furious, so that they may not harm others, provided they can be restrained from killing in another way; nor a woman placed in extremity so that her infant can be baptized; nor is it licit in shipwreck to throw anyone into the sea so that the others may be saved. For evils are not to be done that good may come.

c. It is not licit to kill hostages, even if the enemies who sent them had not observed the pledged faith and had themselves unjustly killed the hostages sent to them. Nor is it licit to kill some sons as hostages so that the parents may more easily give themselves up to free the remaining sons; for they are innocent.

d. It is not licit to kill an innocent person to satisfy a tyrant demanding his death, even if he threatens the destruction of the city. Nevertheless, an innocent person could be handed over to the tyrant to save the country,⁴ although his death is certainly foreseen; and if he himself were unwilling, he could be compelled to hand himself over to the tyrant, because for the public good he is bound to expose his life to danger.⁵

2. From a proportionately grave cause it is licit indirectly to kill an innocent person, that is, it is licit to do or omit something in itself indifferent whence, beyond the intention, the death of an innocent person follows, because from the principles concerning the voluntary in the cause, the death of the innocent person in this case cannot be imputed to the agent.

a. Therefore in a just war it is licit to direct artillery against a besieged city, although many innocent persons are foreseen to perish.

b. If someone, with an enemy pursuing, cannot be freed from death unless by trampling a child by chance sitting in a narrow road, it is licit to flee and, if there is need, to trample the child; for he is killed indirectly, because from the same action each effect proceeds equally immediately, the good effect or flight from the enemy, and the evil effect or death of the infant.

c. It is licit to baptize a little one soon to die with cold water, if no other could be had, even if from this the death of the infant is feared to be hastened.⁶

¹ Ex. 23:7.

² Deut. 32:39.

³ Gen. 9:6.

⁴ 1 Macc. 13:16 ss.

⁵ Cf. Lugo, De iustitia, disp. 10, n. 113.

⁶ St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 106.

339. On puncture of the heart (Herzstich). It happens that physicians in a corpse, before it is placed in the tomb, perform puncture of the heart or open an artery, either because the deceased himself demanded this by testament, or because surviving relatives demand it.

a. Puncture of the heart or artery which, whether by testament or by relatives of the deceased, is demanded with the intention that one who is only apparently dead not be buried alive, is certainly illicit on account of this very intention, even if in reality he is dead, because it is not licit directly to intend the killing of someone, even if this is done for the best end. But if it is demanded to be performed when certain signs of death are already present, to calm a mind disturbed by fear of apparent death, it is not illicit.

b. It is certainly not licit for a physician or surgeon to cut the heart or vein unless from undoubted signs he has a certain persuasion that death has already followed. But if from undoubted signs of death he has procured this certain persuasion for himself, it is licit for him to puncture the heart or vein to free from fear and anxiety those who seek the puncture. For if it is licit to place a man in the tomb, it is also licit to wound his heart by a blow, since each action of itself is apt to inflict death upon a man who in reality is only apparently dead.

340. On craniotomy.¹ 1. Craniotomy, which is also called perforation or cephalotripsy, is a surgical operation by which the infant in the mother's uterus is cut apart and, having been cut apart, is extracted through the birth canal. Physicians now use this operation when a mature infant, on account of the narrowness of the mother, cannot be brought forth into light in another way, and therefore if this operation is omitted, the mother with the offspring is going to perish.

2. Craniotomy is illicit, that is, it is not licit to kill an infant in the mother's uterus, even if no other means of preserving the mother is available, so that if the operation is omitted the mother and infant are going to perish. For it is the direct killing of an innocent person, since the death of the infant is intended as a means for preserving the mother. Therefore the Holy Office responded that "it cannot safely, that is, without danger of error, be taught that the surgical operation which they call craniotomy is licit."²

a. To some theologians³ craniotomy did not seem illicit if no other means of preserving the mother is available, and the infant has been baptized in the mother's uterus. By this reasoning the infant indeed perishes, but the mother is saved; but craniotomy not employed, mother and offspring perish together, while the eternal salvation of the infant is equally provided for in either case. They chiefly confirm their opinion by a fourfold reason: alpha. By this operation the death of the infant, otherwise certainly going to die, is hastened, and this to preserve the mother, otherwise likewise certainly going to die; but so slight a shortening of life for obtaining so great an end must be accounted as nothing. beta. It is licit to kill an unjust aggressor who is the cause of death for another; but the infant is indeed innocent, but objectively an unjust aggressor, because he is the cause of death for the mother. gamma. If two rights conflict with each other, the stronger right must prevail; but in this conflict of rights between mother and fetus, the right of the mother is stronger. delta. He who has a right to life can yield it to another if he wishes; and the fetus is judged to yield his right to the mother.

But although by the responses of the Holy Office the opposite doctrine is not declared simply false, nevertheless it is no longer licit to use it either theoretically or practically. The reason for the decision seems to be this. alpha. It cannot be affirmed that through craniotomy an action is exercised from which a twofold effect proceeds equally immediately, one good, the other evil. Rather it is an action which directly kills the offspring to preserve the mother; but the direct killing of an innocent person is always illicit, even if it is only the hastening of a death certainly to follow. beta. The infant cannot be considered as an objectively unjust aggressor; for he himself does not posit an objectively unjust action, since using his own right and from the natural course of things he is the cause of death for the mother. Therefore he must rather be compared to a man infected with plague and infecting others than to an unjust aggressor. gamma. But if the fetus cannot be considered as an unjust aggressor, neither can the right of the mother be called stronger in the conflict of rights between the mother and the fetus. It must be conceded that two rights collide in this case, namely the right of the mother and of the offspring to preserving life; but it must be denied that the right of the mother prevails. For no one's right to any good whatever, even a public good, can ever so prevail that the killing of an innocent person becomes licit for obtaining that good. For the dignity of the human person, who has God as the only end, prevents that person from being employed as a means for obtaining another good. delta. No one can yield to another the right over his own life in such a way that he could ever licitly permit the direct killing of himself.

b. In those circumstances in which the infant, on account of the narrowness of the mother, cannot be brought forth into light by the natural way, there exist surgical operations by which the living infant can be extracted: Caesarean section and symphysiotomy. But even if neither of these operations can be performed, nevertheless it is not licit to crush the head of the infant to preserve the mother. Rather, both are to be permitted to the natural course of things, even if death follows from it. For the author of nature is not offended by death which follows by force of the laws of nature, but He is offended by the direct killing of an innocent person. Yet since the demonstration by which from natural principles craniotomy is shown to be illicit is not so plain and evident, it can easily happen that physicians in good faith exercise it. Therefore let the confessor beware, unless he is expressly questioned about this matter, lest he disturb their good faith.

¹ Cf. A. Eschbach, Disputationes physiologico-theologicae^2 (Romae: Desclee, 1901), disp. 4; I. Pennacchi, De abortu et embryotomia (Romae: Typogr. S. C. de Prop. Fide, 1884); Bergervoort, Directer Abortus und Kraniotomie (Munchen: Abt, 1896); Capellmann, De occisione foetus (Aquisgrani: Barth, 1875); Fr. Sippel, Uber die Berechtigung der Vernichtung des kindlichen Lebens zur Rettung der Mutter (Tubing.: Pietzcker, 1902).

² Holy Office, 28 May 1884; this resolution the same Holy Office extended on 19 Aug. 1889 to any surgical operation directly killing the fetus or the pregnant mother.

³ Ballerini, Avanzini, Apicella, Viscosi, Pennacchi, Constantini.

347. Definition. A duel is defined as a single combat, undertaken by agreement, with arms apt for killing.

a. A single combat is a combat entered into between two, or between several in an equal number on each side. For constituting a true duel it makes no difference with what intention it is undertaken: for the sake of spectacle, of showing courage, of vengeance, of repairing honor, or of exercise.

b. By agreement is an essential condition of a duel, and indeed by agreement concerning time, place, and arms; whence between the agreement for the duel and the duel itself some space of time ought to intervene. Therefore it is not a duel if two men, from an impulse of anger, provoke each other to a fight and immediately engage, even if they betake themselves to a determined place in order to fight; nor if someone provokes another to a duel and immediately attacks him, while the latter, having snatched up arms, defends himself.

c. With arms apt for killing: for it is of the notion of a duel that it be done with arms, and indeed with arms apt for killing or lethally wounding, such as guns, swords, daggers. It is not of the notion of a duel that a lethal wound can be inflicted, or that there be danger of killing or mutilation; but this is required, that a grave wound can be inflicted of itself and not only by accident, that is, a wound which constitutes a grave injury of the body or a gravely sinful injury. Therefore fights which are made with switches or sticks, or with iron whose edge is blunted, are not duels; nor are they duels which are so instituted that a grave wound cannot be inflicted except by accident, for example, because of the lack of skill of the combatants.

d. A grave wound is taken in a threefold sense: in a moral sense it signifies an injury which constitutes grave sin; in a juridical sense it signifies an injury which is punished in court by a determined penalty; in this sense, in the Austrian code, an injury is considered grave which cannot be healed within twenty days; in a specific sense it signifies a lethal injury.

e. Therefore three things are of the notion of a duel: alpha. a single combat; beta. undertaken by agreement; gamma. with arms apt for killing or lethally wounding. By reason of the second condition, a duel differs both from a brawl and from legitimate defense.

f. A fictitious duel is not a duel. Therefore those who fictitiously provoke and accept without the intention of engaging, or with certain hope that the duel will be impeded, or who only fictitiously fight without any danger of a wound, do not incur censures and do not sin except by reason of scandal, since the will of dueling is excluded.

¹ Ferraris, Bibliotheca, s. v. duellum. Das Duell in seinem Ursprunge und Wesen (Paderborn: Schoningh, 1864). M. Hofmann, Stellung der Kirche zum Zweikampf (Zeitschrift fur kath. Theol., XXII, 1898, pp. 455, 601). A. Wiesinger, Das Duell vor dem Richterstuhle der Religion, der Moral, des Rechtes und der Geschichte (Graz, 1895).

348. A duel is divided: a. Into solemn, which is done with certain solemnities, namely letters of provocation and employed seconds, etc., and simple, which is done without solemnity.

b. Into fatal, which is to death or with the intention of killing, and non-fatal, which is done only with the intention of wounding.

c. Into public and private, according as it is undertaken by public authority or only in a private name.

That even non-fatal duels are by law true duels and fall under the penalties of a duel is gathered from the constitution Illius vices of Clement VIII, who interdicted even duels entered into with the pact "of ending the combat as soon as either one has been wounded or has shed blood." But the reason why the Church also punishes non-fatal duels as fatal by the gravest penalties is chiefly this: because they promote fatal duels.

349. Principles. 1. A duel undertaken by private authority is never licit. And indeed it is opposed to the law of nature: for duelists expose themselves to danger of death, mutilation, or at least wounding, to be inflicted both on themselves and on another; but this is equally illicit as the very killing, mutilation, or wounding inflicted on oneself or another. Nor can that action be made honorable from its end; for it is never licit to posit an action evil in itself for a good end. It is also opposed to ecclesiastical law: for the duel has been prohibited and punished with penalties by the Council of Trent and afterward more often by the Church.¹

a. Among the decrees by which duels are prohibited by the Church, especially to be noted is the constitution Detestabilem of Benedict XIV, by which five theses concerning the duel are condemned.² From these it is clear that every duel properly so called is illicit, even if it is offered or accepted to avoid the gravest evils, for example, lest reputation, office, or goods of great importance be lost. For that the acceptance of a duel may be licit for preserving the greatest goods, the good effect, or the conservation of the goods, ought to follow from the duel at least equally immediately as the evil effect, or the danger or injury of one's own and another's life. But the conservation of the goods does not follow immediately from this, that someone exposes his own or another's life to danger or injures it in reality, but from this, that one accepting a duel procures for himself the common estimation of those who, by a dangerous confusion of concepts, call culpable rashness true fortitude.

b. From the older authors, several had taught that it is licit to accept a duel if it were the only means of avoiding the gravest evils.³ But now this opinion, after the Benedictine constitution, can no longer be defended; rather this must altogether be held, that to expose one's own or another's life to danger is licit only for defending one's life or goods against an actual aggressor. But in this case there is no actual aggressor.⁴

2. Duels which are undertaken by public authority for the common good are licit, when that common good cannot be obtained without the shedding of blood. For if an army can licitly fight against an army by public authority, a few against a few, or one against one, will also be able to do this.

The sole cause of the common good on account of which a duel is licitly undertaken is this: that a just war may be ended or forestalled. But if duels are undertaken by public authority from another end, for example, to avenge an injury, to finish private controversies, or to manifest truth and innocence (the vulgar purgation), they are equally illicit, because to obtain these ends there is at hand another more apt means, namely legitimate judgment.

¹ Sess. 25, c. 19, De reform. Constitution of Gregory XIII, Ad tollendum (5 Dec. 1582); constitution of Clement VIII, Illius vices (17 Aug. 1592); constitution of Benedict XIV, Detestabilem (10 Nov. 1752); constitution of Pius IX, Apostolicae sedis (12 Oct. 1869); encyclical letter Pastoralis officii of Leo XIII (12 Sept. 1891). The Austrian criminal code also punishes duelists with the penalty of grave prison of at least ten years.

² They can be consulted in Lehmkuhl, I, n. 852; their first is this: A military man who, unless he offers or accepts a duel, would be held as fearful, timid, abject, and unfit for military offices, and thence would be deprived of the office by which he sustains himself and his own, or would have to lack forever the hope of promotion otherwise owed and merited by him, would be free from fault and penalty, whether he offers or accepts a duel.

³ St. Alphonsus (n. 400) attributes this doctrine to Holzmann, Pichler, Reiffenstuel, Sporer, Elbel, Lessius, Sanchez, etc.

⁴ Cf. Lugo, disp. 10, n. 172; Lehmkuhl, Das Duell im Lichte der Vernunft (Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, 1894, I, p. 345).

350. On academic duels. From the declaration of the Holy See it is clear that duelists of this sort and their seconds are irregular from infamy of law.¹ From this these three things are gathered: a. The single combats of students are true duels; for infamy of law is a penalty imposed on duelists by the Council of Trent. The same is clear from the nature of the thing: for in academic fights all things are present which constitute a true duel: a single combat undertaken by agreement with arms apt for lethally wounding. And although the danger of killing or mutilation is excluded of itself, nevertheless it is so instituted that a grave wound (in the moral sense) can be inflicted of itself, not only by accident. b. For a duel prohibited by the Church under penalties it is not required that there be danger of a lethal wound, but the danger of grave injury of the body suffices. c. Students who commit the Mensur incur excommunication; for if they incur the other penalty imposed by the Council, namely infamy, they also undergo this one imposed by the same Council. And indeed, if from the declaration of the Church they commit a true duel, they cannot escape the penalties inflicted by the same Church on duelists.

The penalties which are always affixed to duels and still have force are reckoned: a. infamy of law, which is contracted by the very fact of committing the duel, and from which irregularity arises; b. excommunication simply reserved to the Roman Pontiff; c. deprivation of ecclesiastical burial, if the duelists die in the conflict itself; to these penalties there can be added d. irregularity from delict, if death or mutilation really occurs.²

¹ S. C. C., 9 Aug. 1890.

² Cf. Acta s. sedis, XXIII, p. 212.

351. Declarations. a. War is a fight of multitude with an external multitude, undertaken on account of the common good by public authority.

b. War is distinguished as offensive, which is instituted either for avenging an injury or for recovering possession, and defensive, which is instituted for repelling by force the force brought by another republic.

War differs from a brawl, which is done in a private name and is of few or single persons against few or single persons; it differs from sedition, which is a fight of multitude against multitude in the same republic or city; it differs from a duel, which is a single combat, not of a multitude, and is instituted by agreement.

¹ Cathrein, Moralphilosophie^4, II, p. 611 ff.; Meyer, Institutiones iuris nat., II, n. 732 ss.; Kirchenlexikon^2, Krieg.

352. On the lawfulness of war. 1. War, both defensive and offensive, is licit if the due conditions concur. Defensive: for if it is licit for a private man to repel force by force, the same will also be licit for the republic. Offensive: for the law of nature gives to each one the power of prosecuting his right or avenging an injury inflicted by public authority; therefore the same power of prosecuting right or avenging an injury belongs also to a prince if his right has been injured by another prince. But since princes do not have a higher authority, they cannot prosecute their right or avenge an injury inflicted on them except through offensive war.¹

2. In a just war all things are licit which are necessary or apt for obtaining the end, provided they are permitted by the law of nature and by the law of nations. For he who has a right to the end also has a right to the necessary or useful means. Therefore those things which are neither necessary nor useful to the end of war, or which are interdicted by the law of nature or by the law of nations, cannot be inflicted on enemies without injustice, and therefore damage inflicted in this way must be repaired.

Therefore it is licit to prepare ambushes and to employ stratagems, for example, to feign flight; but it is not licit to employ frauds which can be guarded against by no prudence. - It is licit to besiege cities and deprive them of water, to discharge artillery against them, to destroy monasteries and churches if enemies use them to defend themselves; but it is not licit to infect wells or fountains with poison. - It is licit to kill all those fighting against one or existing in arms, of whatever condition, state, or sex, until perfect victory has been obtained; but it is not licit directly to kill the innocent, nor ambassadors, who by the law of nations are inviolable, nor is it licit to suborn assassins who may secretly kill the commander. The innocent, whom it is not licit directly to kill, are children, women, old men, pilgrims, rustics, merchants, etc., who are not found in arms. Captured enemies cannot be killed by today's law of war; for they can be killed insofar as soldiers fighting in an unjust war are guilty of a grave crime, on account of which the penalty of death may be inflicted on them. But in our times fighting soldiers, as compelled men, cannot be considered guilty of a grave crime. - Private goods of enemies by the strict right of war can be given to soldiers as spoil; for citizens of a hostile region are considered participants in the injustice on account of which war is brought. Yet by today's custom it is not licit to give the private goods of enemies as spoil unless a special reason exists, as if some private person or some village had exercised a special hostility.

3. After the owed thing has been recovered, or after the injury has been sufficiently avenged, the victor is bound to accept peace offered on just conditions: for when the just cause ceases, the war becomes unjust. Accidentally, even the conquered is sometimes bound to accept peace, lest he expose himself and his subjects to greater damages.

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 40, a. 1.

353. Required conditions. The just conditions under which it is licit to bring war are three:

a. Supreme authority: for if a greater authority is present, this ought to settle the controversy and avenge the injury inflicted.

Yet if the supreme authority either did not wish or were unable to avenge the injury inflicted on a subordinate society, necessity itself seems also to give to the subordinate republic the right of bringing war upon enemies.¹

b. A just and grave cause. The sole just cause of offensive war is an inflicted injury which the enemy refuses to repair. Hence, that war can justly be begun, it is required that satisfaction be demanded from the opposing party; and if it is offered, it must be accepted from justice. A grave cause is one which would outweigh so many evils coming from war both to body and to soul.

Causes of this kind, on account of which it is licit to bring war, are these: a province usurped by an adversary to be recovered; a grave injury inflicted on the republic to be driven away; religion to be protected against aggressors, even against unbelieving peoples who impede the preaching of the faith by expelling or killing missionaries;² a people unjustly oppressed to be defended. For the proposition (62) of the Syllabus is condemned: "The principle which they call non-intervention is to be proclaimed and observed," etc. But just causes are not: enlargement of the kingdom, glory of name, the power of a neighboring prince to be diminished, etc.

c. A morally certain right, if the war is offensive, or at least probable, if the war is defensive. The reason for the first is that the damages coming from war are so many and so great that it is not licit to declare it unless the right to be vindicated is certain; besides, no one can be despoiled or punished unless the unjust possession or delict is certain. The reason for the second is that, for force brought to be justly repelled, it suffices that it be probable that the force is unjustly brought.

There are not lacking authors who say that it suffices that the right of the prince bringing war be probable (Sporer, Azor) or more probable (Suarez, Victoria, St. Alphonsus). Others reject both (Elbel, Holzmann, Laymann, Tamburini). Genicot joins himself to these; citing Waffelaert, he has these things worthy of note (I, n. 383): "If doubt remains about the right, recourse must be had to the arbitration of other princes and especially of the Roman Pontiff: but if the other party wholly rejects this recourse, or refuses to obey the sentence given by the arbiter, then there will already be a certain injury, on account of which it will be licit to declare war."

¹ Laymann, l. 2, tr. 3, c. 12, n. 4.

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 10, a. 8.

354. On soldiers. a. In a certainly unjust war it is not licit to serve as a soldier, and in the conflict itself it is not licit for soldiers to kill enemies, not even for the sake of defense: for they themselves are unjust aggressors. Therefore, if they cannot flee, they ought to see to it that by their blows they strike no one except the air.

b. In doubt concerning the justice of the war, a soldier who is a subject or hired before the war is bound to obey, both because a subject ought to obey unless the sin is certain, and because he ought to presume that the war is just unless the contrary is established.

c. But a soldier who is not a subject, or who is hired after the war has been declared, cannot serve as a soldier unless he is certain of the justice of the war: for since the matter concerns a very grave damage to be inflicted on another, it is not licit to inflict it unless it is established that the war is just. Yet if the war is defensive, a probable judgment concerning the justice of the war also suffices.

d. It is not licit for soldiers fighting in a just war to take away anything from the goods of enemies, except those things which are necessary for sustenance, unless the commander of the war has permitted it. Wherefore those things which have been taken away against the commander's will must of themselves be restored, provided he is unwilling with respect to the taking itself, not only with respect to the violated military discipline.

Although a war cannot be just on both sides, nevertheless it can happen that the soldiers of each side wage war with a safe conscience. For on the one hand grave authors deny that the right of the prince bringing war must be certain; and on the other hand soldiers usually do not know the more hidden causes of the war declared. But the causes which are spread abroad among the common people can seem just to them. Nor are they bound to inquire into the more hidden causes of war unless there is grave suspicion of injustice and at the same time hope of knowing the truth.

Theologians of an earlier time, having made a distinction between just and unjust war, absolutely forbid the plundering of fellow soldiers, and in a just war also of enemies; but they permit the plundering of enemies in an unjust war. In our time, by force of the law of nations or of international conventions, the plundering of the slain is absolutely interdicted; their goods, which can be recognized, pertain to their heirs.

The Fifth Commandment is, ‘‘ Thou shalt not kill.”¹

¹ Exod. xx 13.

The crime of homicide is primarily forbidden by this precept, but inasmuch as quarrelling, fighting, wounding, lead up to homicide, these and similar acts are secondarily forbidden. Implicitly, the precept prescribes the preservation of life, since death will follow if care be not taken to preserve life.

SUICIDE, or the killing of one’s self, when one’s own death is the direct and immediate object of the will, is forbidden by the Fifth Commandment and is grievously sinful. It is the same when death is not the direct object of the will, if some act is done of which the only immediate effect is the destruction of one’s own life; for in that case by willing the action I implicitly will the effect. And so if, out of bravado, I jumped from the top of the tower of Westminster Cathedral into the street below, I should be guilty of the grave sin of suicide, even though that was not my direct object.

The reason why suicide is unlawful is because we have not the free disposal of our own lives. God is the-author of life and death, and he has reserved the ownership of human life to himself. We cannot leave the post where he has stationed us without his authority, Moreover, a man belongs to his country, and so suicide is a crime against the commonwealth, and as such is punished. There is a controversy among divines as to whether it would be lawful for a malefactor who had been condemned to death and entrusted by public authority with the execution of the sentence against himself to take his own life. Many hold that it would be lawful, for there seems no conclusive reason why the State might not appoint a man to be his own executioner.

It is not unlawful to do something which will cause one’s own death provided that the action has some other immediate and good effect of great importance, which counterbalances the loss of human life, and this is not intended. This is merely an application of the principle of a double effect which was explained in the Book on Human Acts. The captain of a man-of-war, for example, which in time of war is in danger of falling into the hands of the enemy, might blow up the ship in order to prevent so great a disaster befalling his country, although the act would cause his own death and that of others in the ship. He does not intend the destruction of human life; the immediate effect of his action is to prevent the ship falling into the enemy’s hands. The public advantage counterbalances the loss.

Similarly, for good reason I may undertake dangerous work, go to unhealthy climates, or lead a kind of life which will lessen the number of years that I shall live. Somebody must do such things; they are useful to the community or to myself, and I do not intend the shortening of my life. It would be wrong to expose my life to probable danger merely for the sake of getting money or notoriety; such reasons do not justify us in seriously risking human life.

As we have not the ownership of life, so neither are we the owners of our limbs so as to be able to dispose of them at will. A man is not justified in mutilating himself in order to avoid military conscription, or to excite commiseration, or to gain money. The amputation of a limb is permissible when such an operation is necessary in order to preserve life; for we may sacrifice a part for the safety of the whole.

We are obliged to take ordinary means to preserve our lives, for to do otherwise would be virtually to commit suicide. There is no obligation to take extraordinary, unusual, or very painful or expensive means to preserve our lives. And so one in feeble health, who will probably die if he spends the winter in England, is not bound to expatriate himself and go and live in a milder climate. Nor am I bound to undergo a painful and costly operation in order to save my life; I may if I like choose rather to die, unless my life is of great importance for the common good, for then the public good must be considered first. Except in such a case as this, a superior could not oblige a subject to undergo a very painful operation or to submit to the amputation of a leg; obedience to human authority does not seem to extend to such matters as these.

THE right of the State to punish criminals with the infliction of death is either expressly conceded or clearly supposed in Holy Scripture.¹ It is sufficiently evident, too, from natural reason, for the State should be endowed with all those powers which are necessary to secure its end, the temporal happiness of its citizens. But it would not be possible to keep human passion within bounds and ensure the safety of the lives and property of its peaceful citizens, unless the State had the power of inflicting death on those who have been guilty of great crimes. The practice of the most civilized states confirms this view, and experience seems to demonstrate its truth. If the time should ever come when the infliction of less severe penalties will suffice to punish crime and safeguard life and property, then capital punishment should be abolished, but that time does not seem to be at hand yet.

If the State has the right to deprive a criminal of life, a fortiori it may inflict lesser punishments, such as flogging and imprisonment. Indeed, certain persons who have authority over others, such as fathers of a family, captains of vessels at sea, and schoolmasters, have the power to inflict smaller punishments in moderation on delinquents under their authority. Before capital punishment can be inflicted the essentials of a judicial process by which a grave crime is brought home to the delinquent must be gone through. For the right of capital punishment belongs to the State as such, to the public authority, and so before punishment is inflicted it should be proved that the crime was committed by the person charged, and judicial sentence according to law should be passed upon him. In certain cases when the ordinary process of law cannot be followed, and there is danger in delay, the public authority might empower anyone to kill a notorious criminal, but in settled times and ordinarily this should not be done. It would be a very dangerous remedy for crime if the State empowered its citizens to punish delinquents without previous trial and conviction. 196 ‘The innocent sometimes suffer in spite of the elaborate precautions and delay of modern criminal trials. If these were abolished and every citizen became a judge and executioner for crime, the remedy would be far worse than the disease. The Roman - law and that of some more modern states permitted a father or husband to kill a daughter or wife found in adultery. Such laws were not approved by the Church, and they could not in conscience justify one who took advantage of the immunity they gave to commit so cruel a murder.

¹ Rom. xiii 4.

To take means to safeguard the public welfare, and especially to inflict the punishment of death on criminals, belongs to the public authority and not to private citizens, and so these cannot lawfully arrogate to themselves the power of inflicting capital punishment. Lynch-law, then, is against sound principles of morality. In places where no effective government exists, the people should constitute a government to safeguard the common interests and to punish crime; this duty must not be left in private hands.

I quote the following from the Encyclopedia of the Laws of England, s.v. Escape: ‘‘ Considerable controversy has from time to time arisen on the question whether the officers of the law or persons entitled to apprehend or detain a person accused or suspected of crime are entitled to kill him on pursuit if they cannot otherwise stop him, or to kill him to prevent his escape after arrest. It seems to be agreed that the custodian is not entitled to kill to prevent escape from custody on a civil charge, nor from custody on a charge of misdemeanour. Where the escaped prisoner is accused of a capital offence, the custodian appears to be entitled to kill him if he cannot otherwise retake him; but it is not clear whether the mitigation of the severity of the law as to punishments for felony during this century (the nineteenth) can be regarded as reducing the right of the officers of the law to kill a fugitive from justice. With respect to convicts under sentence of penal servitude escaping from prison, questions arose in 1896 owing to the shooting of an escaping convict on Dartmoor which cannot be regarded as settled, and which have led to a revision of the Convict Prison Rules.”

IN defence of my own life from unjust attack I may use whatever violence is necessary and even go to the length of killing the aggressor, if I cannot otherwise save my life. This right of self-defence all laws, human and divine, concede, as Innocent III declared. Nature herself teaches us that an act which is necessary for self-defence is lawful, and even if it lead to the taking of the life of the unjust aggressor it does not cease to be lawful. A higher value must be set on the life of the innocent than on that of the guilty, especially when the guilty one is the cause of his life being put in jeopardy. No one is justified in using greater violence than is necessary for the purpose of self-defence,so that if by striking or wounding an assailant of my life I can effectually defend myself, I am not justified in killing him. On the same principle no private person can take vengeance for violence which has already been done, by offering violence in return; vindictive justice is reserved for public authority, at any rate in more serious matters. Nor may one whose life is threatened anticipate the attack; defence is only lawful when the attack is practically being made or is at any rate imminent. Unless the attack is practically imminent it is always possible to resort to other means than homicide for the defence of one’s own life; one may invoke the protection of the law or at least fly the intending assailant.

Under the same limitations it is lawful to kill the assailant not only of one’s life, but also of limb, of chastity, and of property. For all these goods belonging to an innocent person may be lawfully defended by him even at the cost of the life of the unjust assailant of them, who is responsible for his own death by his unwarrantable action. When it is said that we may kill an unjust assailant in defence of property, it is supposed that the property which is threatened is of considerable amount. Innocent XI condemned a proposition which asserted that, “As a rule I may kill a thief for the preservation of a gold piece.” This proposition is false, for a rich man would not be justified in shooting a thief whom he saw walking off with one of his silver spoons. If, however, the thief threatens property of considerable value—say, twenty pounds or so—and the only way of saving the money is by taking the life of the thief, this would be lawful. Moreover, when a highwayman demands my purse or my life, I am not bound to hand him my purse, even though it contain little money; I may always defend myself from such unjust attacks, even though it finally involves the death of the aggressor.

It is not lawful to kill another who attacks my honour with insulting words. The contrary used to be held by some theologians, but the doctrine was condemned by Alexander VII and Innocent XI. The reason of the difference between this case and the foregoing is that verbal insults are often not of very serious consequence; they are better and more effectively met by quiet contempt than by being taken seriously, and that would be a perilous doctrine which taught that a man might avenge an insult with the death of the offender. What constitutes an insult is often a very subjective question, and the results of the doctrine would be deplorable.

What one may lawfully do, that, as a rule, another may help him to do; and so I may kill or maim an unjust assailant not only of my own life, limb, chastity, or property, but when any innocent person is similarly threatened I may also do the same in his defence. Although I may lawfully do this, yet there is seldom an obligation of doing it, for the obligation would only arise from charity, and as we saw above, this virtue does not usually bind with such serious inconvenience as would always be involved in taking life in defence of another. Those who have charge of the public peace and security are more strictly bound to perform their duty of protecting life and property even at the sacrifice of the lives of wrongdoers.

It is never lawful directly to kill the innocent, or, in other words, it is never lawful to kill the innocent when the death is intended in itself, or when it is inflicted as a means to the attaining of some other object. Such an act is expressly forbidden by God: “‘ The innocent and just person thou shalt not put to death.”¹ Reason, too, teaches us the same truth; for if ever it were lawful directly to kill the innocent, it would be so when such a death would be of great advantage to the commonwealth. But even to save the State an innocent man’s life must not be taken directly, for the State exists that good men may lead honourable and peaceful lives; the State is for the good citizens, not the good citizens for the State. Not even the good of the State, then, makes it right to take an innocent man’s life, and if that does not justify the act, nothing does.

¹ Exod. xxiii 7.

The death of the innocent may be permitted, not intended, when it follows from some action lawful in itself which also produces an equally immediate and good effect, and when this counterbalances the evil effect. This, again, is but the application of the principle of a double effect, and it is evident from what has been said before. The general of an army who orders the bombardment of a beleaguered town knows that his order cannot be executed without killing perhaps many innocent non-combatants, yet the action is not unlawful.

Casual homicide which was not intended in itself, but which was the consequence of doing some dangerous action, as furious driving in a frequented street, is imputable to the agent if he adverted to the probable danger of killing someone, If such probable danger did not exist, or was not adverted to, casual homicide will not be imputable in conscience, although if the action be forbidden by law, even on other grounds than the chance of its causing another’s death, and someone is killed by it, English law punishes it as manslaughter.

It is usual to treat here of abortion, and of certain surgical operations concerned with child-bearing. Abortion is the premature ejection of the living fetus. The human fetus reaches maturity about nine months after conception, but it is capable of living even if born a considerable time before maturity. A child may live when born at seven months or even somewhat earlier, especially if artificial means are taken for preserving its life. When the foetus is ejected at such a time that in the judgement of a skilled medical man it will probably live, this is called acceleration of birth rather than abortion in the strict sense. We are here concerned with the lawfulness of procuring abortion and of performing such operations as craniotomy and embryotomy, which destroy the life of the foetus. There is only question of the living, not of the dead, foetus, as is obvious.

Inasmuch as it is never lawful directly to kill the innocent, it is never lawful directly to procure abortion at a time when there is no probability that the foetus can live outside the mother’s womb. This is clear, for the foetus is a human being, with a human soul, which, as is commonly held by theologians, is infused into it by God at the moment of conception; it has, then, as much right to live as anyone else, and it certainly is innocent of all personal crime. To deprive it directly of the medium in which alone it can live is to kill it directly, just as to deprive a man of air by plunging him under water is to kill him directly. The direct procuring of abortion, then, is never allowed, inasmuch as it is the direct killing of the innocent, and intrinsically wrong. In the same way, anticipated homicide and a grievous sin are committed whenever means of whatever sort are taken to prevent conception.

However, just as the indirect killing of the innocent is lawful for a just cause, as we have seen, so a pregnant woman who is suffering from disease or tumour, or any complication which threatens life, may lawfully adopt the necessary means to save herself, even if what is a remedy for her causes the death of the foetus, In all these cases we have but the application of the principle of a double effect; the mother is not bound to sacrifice her life by abstaining from adopting the remedy indicated, especially as her own death would also involve the death of the child. Thus we may approve of the following solution by Dr. Capellman of the “ case where the uterus with the foetus is locked in the upper strait, as may happen through retroversion, sinking, and prolapsus of the pregnant womb. If all other known means of turning or replacing the uterus fail, I believe it to be allowable to induce abortion indirectly, by procuring the discharge of the waters, or by the perforation of the foetal membranes.”¹ On the same principle P. Antonelli thinks that it is lawful to remove an ulcerated womb which is threatening the life of a pregnant mother though the operation cause the death of the foetus, as also to remove an extrauterine foetus whose further growth would cause the certain death of the mother.²

All who unlawfully procure abortion incur the penalty of excommunication, the absolution of which is reserved to the Bishop by Canon 2350.

¹ Pastoral Medicine, p. 16.

² Medicina pastoralis, p. 220.

Craniotomy, or any other similar operation which has for its immediate and direct effect the destruction of the life of the foetus, is a direct killing of the innocent, and is never allowed. If the child is already dead, there is of course no difficulty in permitting craniotomy or embryotomy, but if it is still alive it is not lawful to kill it, even if otherwise both child and mother were certain to die. Evil must not be done that good may come of it. The end does not justify the means. Some medical men consider the foetus, until it is born, as a portion of the mother which may be destroyed to save her life. This view is not in keeping with Christian principles, according to which the child has a soul of its own, and has its own independent right to live.

Some theologians used to think that such operations were lawful if the mother’s life could not otherwise be saved, because the child might be considered a materially unjust assailant of its mother’s life, and so be lawfully killed; or because when there is a conflict of rights the stronger right should prevail. However, in no sense can it be allowed that the child is an unjust assailant of its mother’s life; it is where nature placed it, through no fault of its own, and it has a right to be there and to be born. If either is an unjust assailant of the other’s life, it is the mother, who voluntarily undertook the obligations of motherhood. In the same way, when the stronger of two conflicting rights prevails, this is due to the fault of the other party, and such fault is out of the question in this case. This doctrine is now theologically certain after the repeated declarations of the Holy See that no operation which tends directly to the destruction of the life of the foetus is lawful.

When the child cannot be born in the natural way, and the life of both mother and child is in danger, Caesarian section or some similar operation may be, and should be, performed, by which the lives of both may very probably be saved. The operation which takes its name from Dr. Porro, and which consists in removing the uterus together with the foetus, requires some special reason to make it lawful, for such mutilation of the mother is only allowed when it is necessary in order to save life.

In all operations which involve danger to the life of the child, Catholic parents should be careful to have the living foetus baptized, which may be done by the doctor or nurse while it is still in the womb. But according to Canon 746 this should not be done as long as there is any hope of the child being born alive.

A DUEL is defined to be a premeditated and prearranged combat between two persons with deadly weapons, and usually in the presence of at least two witnesses, called seconds, for the purpose of deciding a quarrel, avenging an insult, or clearing the honour of one of the combatants or of some third party whose cause he champions.

A duel, then, is a premeditated and prearranged single combat, for if two persons begin to quarrel and then come to blows, it is not a duel even if death be the result. Nor is it a duel if two enemies meet by accident and begin straightway to fight. A duel is a combat with deadly weapons, so that a fight with sticks or with the fists is not a duel. Although seconds are commonly present, yet their absence would not prevent a single combat from being a duel if the other conditions were verified. The duel is for the purpose of deciding a private quarrel, and for such a purpose it is unlawful even if it have the sanction of public authority, for there are other and lawful means of settling such matters. A single combat between champions of hostile nations entered into by public authority for the purpose of terminating the war, or giving courage to the army, would not be a duel, and might be permitted.

It is never lawful to fight a duel by private authority, for it obviously exposes the parties to grave risk of killing or wounding, or of being killed or wounded, and this is never lawful by private authority except under the conditions which justify killing in self-defence, and these are not verified in the duel. The Council of Trent¹ very emphatically condemned duelling as a detestable practice and excommunicated the guilty parties, their seconds and abettors, as well as emperors, kings, and princes who permit it in their territories. This excommunication is renewed by Canon 2351, and the power of granting absolution if it has been incurred is reserved to the Pope. Benedict XIV, by a constitution dated November 10, 1752, condemned the following propositions as false, scandalous, and pernicious: ““(a) A military man who, unless he offer or accept a duel, would be considered cowardly, timid, worthless, and unfit for office in the army, and so would be deprived of his post by which he gains support for himself and his family, or would for ever lose all hope of promotion otherwise due to him, would incur neither fault nor penalty if he offered or accepted a duel.

“‘(b) Those who accept or challenge to a duel for the sake of defending honour or avoiding disgrace may be excused when they know for certain that the combat will not come off, inasmuch as it will be prevented by others. (c) A general or officer in the army who accepts a duel through serious fear of losing reputation or office does not incur the penalties inflicted by the Church on those who fight a duel.”

The contradictory of these false propositions must be held by all who admit the authority of the Church.

¹ Sess. 25, c. 19, de Ref.

Clement VIII, in a constitution dated September 1, 1592, declared that those incurred the penalties of duelling who fought under the stipulation that they would stop after a certain number of blows, or as soon as either was wounded or blood was drawn. Grave sin, then, would be committed by challenging or accepting a duel even under these conditions, at least on account of the scandal and disobedience to authority, if not on account of the danger.

By English and American law duelling is illegal, and if death be the result, it is regarded as murder, and the seconds are liable to punishment as accessories.

War, or an armed struggle between sovereign states, is defensive when it is undertaken to resist attack; otherwise it is offensive when undertaken to avenge an injury, or in vindication of a right.

When a quarrel has arisen between two sovereign states, if it is clear that one of the parties is in the wrong, it is bound to make reparation to the offended party. In national quarrels, however, this is seldom the case; as a rule, international disputes are matters of great complexity, and it is very difficult to say on which side right and justice lie. In ordinary cases, then, defensive war is always lawful, for if individuals have the right of self-defence the same right must a fortiori be conceded to a sovereign state. Even offensive war is lawful, provided that certain conditions be fulfilled. This is the certain teaching of Catholic theology, although the Church constantly prays to be delivered from all wars and from the terrible evils to which they give rise. Although war is a great evil, yet it is sometimes a hard necessity if still greater evils are to be avoided. For there is no higher tribunal to which sovereign states can have recourse to settle their disputed rights, and nothing is left but the final arbitrament of the sword. In modern times arbitration courts have been established, and they have done useful work, but cases arise in which their aid cannot be invoked with effect.

The conditions on which war may be lawfully waged are three:

(a) The public authority of a sovereign state is requisite to declare war, for war, except in just defence, cannot be made on private authority, or by a less than sovereign state; for private persons and subject states can always have recourse to higher authority for the vindication of their rights.

(b) A just and weighty cause is necessary, for the cause should be such as to outweigh the grave evils and risks which always accompany war. Such causes, in the judgement of divines, are: the retaking of a conquered country or rebellious province, the avenging of a grave insult or injury offered to the State, the freeing of the unjustly oppressed, the refusal of infidel states to allow the Gospel to be preached in their dominions. There is considerable difference of opinion as to whether certainty of the existence of a sufficient cause is required or not for the lawfulness of a war. Some divines hold that a probability of right is sufficient, for with such a probable right a private person may commence an action at law, and states should not be in a worse position than private persons in the prosecution of their claims. However, on account of the grave public evils connected with war, and because it is unlawful to deprive another of what he possesses on the ground that it is only probably mine, it would seem that at least a more probable right or even a moral certainty of right is required on the side of the state that begins the war.

(c) There must be an upright intention of advancing the cause of good or preventing evil. Mere delight in the excitement of war, or the desire of showing one’s prowess or obtaining promotion, would not justify war.

When the end of the war has been sufficiently obtained the victorious party should be ready to make peace on proper guarantees being given.

Where conscription exists or soldiers have already enlisted before the outbreak of war, they are not bound to make inquiries about the origin of the war in order to satisfy their consciences of its justice; they may presume that their country is in the right unless it is evident that it is in the wrong, and in doubt they are bound to obey the commands of their lawful superiors. If the war is clearly unjust it only remains for the conscientious soldier to abstain from inflicting unjust damage on the enemy, otherwise he will be a co-operator in injustice. Volunteers who had not enlisted at the outbreak of war are bound to satisfy their consciences as to its lawfulness before they take any part in it, just as they are bound to form a morally certain conscience about the lawfulness of any action that they undertake, as we saw in the Book on Conscience.

In a just war all means that conduce to the end of gaining victory over the enemy are lawful, provided that they are not against the law of nature and international law or agreement. International agreements are only binding if they are faithfully adhered to by the adverse party. In modern war it is the practice to spare the persons and property of non-belligerents as far as possible. In naval warfare not only the enemy’s ships of war may be attacked and taken, but his merchantmen, and any British vessel or vessel of an ally trading with or acting in the service of the enemy at war with England, or any neutral vessel engaged in the same way or in the carriage of contraband, and blockade runners, may be captured and made lawful prize by duly commissioned British ships. war on land is restricted to arms, ammunition, Booty of and military provisions and stores. Private property on land is no longer liable to capture and confiscation, but requisitions and contributions of men for labour, money, victuals, etc., are still levied on the invaded territory by duly qualified officials of the invading army. Beyond these limits, or at least beyond what is permitted by lawful authority, it is not allowed to appropriate private property belonging to the enemy.

The sins against charity toward self are:

I. Direct killing of oneself. This occurs when the self-killing act, as such, either is intended as an end or is assumed as a means by which another end is obtained.

1. Direct killing of oneself is always prohibited under grave sin. For first, an act of this sort is against natural inclination, "because naturally every thing loves itself; and to this it belongs that every thing naturally preserves itself in being, and resists corrupting things as much as it can" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64, a. 5). Then self-killing "is against charity, by which each one ought to love himself" (St. Thomas, ibid.). Then the killer "does injury to the community" (St. Thomas, ibid.), because each one, as part of the community, is ordered also to the good of the community. Moreover, it is illicit to destroy what is not yours, but God's alone; and such is life. Hence Sacred Scripture: "You shall not kill";¹ "I will kill and I will make to live";² "You are Lord, who have power of life and death."³

It is indeed reported that some Saints killed themselves; but these things can be explained either through the inspiration of God, who, as Lord of life and death, permitted it, or through good faith (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64, a. 5; St. Alphonsus, III, 366, 361).

2. It is disputed whether the killing of oneself, by which certainly one sins against charity toward self, also involves a sin against commutative justice; not indeed with respect to oneself - for justice and injustice are toward another - but with respect either to the community or to God, or to both. St. Alphonsus leaves the matter undecided (III, 366); St. Thomas indeed states: "It must be said that homicide is a sin, not only because it is contrary to justice, but also because it is contrary to charity, which one ought to have toward oneself: and on this side killing oneself is a sin by comparison with oneself; but by comparison with the community and with God, it has the character of sin also by opposition to justice" (II-II, q. 64, a. 5); but the holy Doctor can be understood of social or general justice, and perhaps he did not intend a sin distinct in species.

Question. Whether it is lawful for one condemned to death, by command or by positive permission of legitimate authority, to kill himself.

Response. More commonly it is denied, because punishment is an act of vindicative justice, which is essentially toward another. Yet St. Alphonsus (III, 369) and others hold it as quite probable that this is lawful, because nothing prevents the condemned man from acting as two persons, namely as the one executing the sentence and as the punished one. Therefore they hold as probable that vindicative justice is not essentially toward a physically different person. Hence practically it is lawful. Yet there is no obligation of satisfying a precept of this sort - and consequently the guilty person cannot be compelled to such an act - because the judge probably cannot impose it, and it is a matter that is arduous (n. 146). "Yet they commonly concede that the guilty person can climb the ladder, fit his neck to the sword, etc.; since these actions tend only remotely toward death" (St. Alphonsus, ibid.).

¹ Exodus 20:13.

² Deuteronomy 32:39.

³ Wisdom 16:13.

II. Omission of self-preservation - for example by abstaining from food or drink until you die - seems altogether illicit, namely as it is exercised practically. For it is altogether illicit to intend death as a means of obtaining something (n. 523). But he who abstains from food or drink intends, as that manner of acting practically obtains, death as a means of obtaining something. It must be said otherwise of one who abstains from food or drink so that another may have that by which he can escape death, because he intends the preservation of another's life, but merely permits his own death. Likewise it seems lawful to abstain from food and drink for a time for the end that you may be freed from prison, provided there is hope of fruit. For diminution of health and strength - equally as mutilation - is lawful if it is ordered to the good or better condition of the whole (n. 526). But this seems to have place in the proposed hypothesis, because it is better to live freely and weakly than in prison.

Question 1. Whether one condemned to perish by hunger can refuse food secretly offered.

Response. It seems one must answer affirmatively, because to one condemned to perish by hunger there seems to have been granted permission to abstain from offered food; which permission, according to the things explained above, is quite probably valid.

Question 2. Whether it is lawful to wish death for oneself.

Response 1. Affirmatively, provided however it is done with due resignation: 1. if death is wished from desire of possessing God or of no longer offending Him. Hence St. Paul: "Who will deliver me from the body of death?";¹ 2. if life seems more bitter than death to someone, according to that saying: "Death is better than a bitter life"² (St. Alphonsus, II, 30, 2).

Response 2. Negatively, if someone wishes death for himself from anger or for a slight reason, for example on account of small troubles.

¹ Romans 7:24.

² Ecclesiasticus 30:17.

III. Indirect killing of oneself occurs when the self-killing act, as such, is neither chosen as an end nor assumed as a means by which another end is obtained. Now indirect killing of oneself is of itself illicit; it becomes lawful if a proportionate cause is present. The former is clear from the fact that charity toward self of itself demands that I guard life at least by ordinary means, much less does it permit that I neglect it (n. 521). The latter is deduced from what has been said about an act with a double effect, one good, the other evil.

Corollary I. They sin gravely: 1. who by living intemperately notably accelerate death; 2. unskilled tightrope walkers, acrobats, and other performers who, induced by greed for profit alone or by empty glory, expose themselves to grave danger of life; the skilled do not expose themselves to such great danger and are more easily excused; this also holds concerning skilled persons who undertake courses by means of a flying machine.

Corollary II. They do not sin: 1. who, with danger of death but with hope of fruit, preach the Gospel, or with hope of usefulness in time of persecution do not flee; yet those things seem illicit on account of the sole desire of martyrdom. Likewise they do not sin who by vigils, fasts, etc., shorten life even by some years, or from a just cause undertake unhealthy labors or seek a region very harmful to health, even if it is foreseen that life must be lessened by some years; 2. who in a shipwreck yields a plank, even one already grasped, to another, with his own death even certainly permitted, or throws himself before a missile or blow to save the life of a ruler or friend, or takes the place of a friend unjustly condemned to death; nor is it illicit to throw oneself from a ship into the sea, lest all perish; 3. who ignites gunpowder to overturn an enemy fortification, or sinks a ship lest the enemy gain possession of it, even if he foresees that he himself will perish at the same time; yet the latter is illicit if it is done solely for preserving honor, although there are many prejudices which more easily excuse; 4. who, to avoid a more bitter death actually to be undergone or inflicted, casts himself into the danger, even certain danger, of a less bitter death, "for example, if someone throws himself through a window to escape a fire; especially if there is some hope of escaping death.... And Elbel permits this also to guilty persons detained in prison, for escaping a certain sentence of death, or even perpetual prison" (St. Alphonsus, III, 366, 367, 370-372). Likewise it is lawful for a virgin "to cast herself into certain danger of life, but not into certain death, for preserving chastity from an assailant" (St. Alphonsus, III, 372, question 2). For the rest, in the cases set forth, commonly either there is some hope of safety, or time for serious thought is lacking, and subjectively they are excused at least on account of a good intention.

Corollary III. Bullfights are not prohibited under grave sin; since, with attention to the skill of the fighters, grave danger is commonly absent. Yet they are prohibited under light sin, because, considering the nature of the act and a danger not altogether to be despised, there seems to be lacking a sufficient cause for conducting them. Horse and bicycle races are lawful, even though they are not without any danger.

IV. Mutilation of oneself. 1. Notion. Mutilation properly so called occurs when, with cutting off, an organic function or use of members is suppressed; hence under the name of mutilation there do not come, for example, circumcision, cutting off the extremity of the ear or nose; yet there are certain mutilations, even if less properly so called. Woundings are generally reduced to the latter. Now we shall present all mutilations and woundings in one treatment and under the one name of mutilation.

2. Division. Mutilation of oneself is distinguished, as killing of oneself, as direct and indirect. It is direct when the mutilating act, as such, is chosen as an end or assumed as a means by which another end is obtained; otherwise it is indirect.

3. Morality. a) Direct mutilation of oneself is lawful if it is ordered and necessary for the preservation or well-being of the whole body. Otherwise it is illicit; nevertheless mutilation improperly so called admits smallness of matter (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65; St. Alphonsus, III, 373). It is said:

Alpha) It is lawful if it is ordered and necessary for the preservation or well-being of the whole body. The reason is that a mutilation done so that you may preserve the whole, insofar as otherwise it cannot be preserved or be well, for the Lord, and so that you may use the whole well, does not contain an act of one's own dominion, but an acknowledgment of divine dominion, and it consults the end for which the whole has been granted, namely its use. Hence it is lawful to amputate a member infected with gangrene, lest the whole body be infected. The same is lawful if danger of death threatens from an extrinsic necessary cause, for example if the hand is attached to a burning beam. The same seems lawful if danger threatens from an extrinsic free cause, as if a tyrant says: I will kill you unless you cut off a member. For it does not appear why that should rather be permitted if danger threatens from an intrinsic cause than if it threatens from an extrinsic free cause. Yet it is not lawful to perform a lawful mutilation on another except by the consent of the one whose interest it concerns, or, if it is a question of one who lacks the use of reason, of the one under whom the person to be mutilated is subject.

Beta) Otherwise it is illicit; that is, it is illicit if it is not ordered to the good of the whole body, or indeed is ordered to it, at least by the agent, but is not necessary for obtaining that end. The reason is that mutilation of oneself in either hypothesis - that is, both in the case in which it is not ordered to the good of the whole body, and in the case in which it is indeed ordered to the said good, but is not necessary for that end, because the whole can be helped in another way - involves an act of dominion over a thing which belongs to God alone. Hence Aquinas: "A member is not to be cut off for bodily health except when the whole cannot be aided otherwise" (II-II, q. 65, a. 1, ad 3). And St. Alphonsus: "It is not lawful to mutilate oneself unless it is necessary for the preservation of the whole" (III, 373).

Gamma) Mutilation improperly so called admits smallness of matter; as if someone without cause extracted a tooth, or amputated a little piece of the ear, or slightly weakened the eyes, or underwent the operation which is called transfusion of blood. Indeed, an altogether slight amputation is lawful for a proportionate cause, even if it is not ordered to the well-being of the whole, but to another end, for example that notable gain may be acquired; likewise it is lawful for a virgin to disfigure herself so that she may repel an assailant from herself. Yet note again that the gravity of mutilation must also be judged from the gravity of the function by which the member functions. Hence the operation which in a man is called vasectomy, and in a woman oophorectomy or fallectomy, even though light in itself, must be counted among grave mutilations, because it deprives a human being of a grave function, namely the power of procreating offspring. The same seems to have to be said about amputation or severing of one gland, even if the other suffices for intercourse; namely, by almost the same right as that is admitted concerning the removal of one eye.

b) Indirect mutilation of oneself is of itself illicit, but becomes lawful on account of a proportionate cause, as was said about indirect killing of oneself (n. 525).

Corollary I. It is illicit to mutilate oneself: 1. for collecting alms, for exercising a profitable art, or for avoiding military service.

The reason is that in the said cases there is direct mutilation - since the mutilating act, as such, is assumed as a means by which another end is obtained - which is not ordered to the good of the whole body (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 1, ad 3; St. Alphonsus, III, 373). For the same reason, 2. castration for preserving sweetness of voice and singing divine praises is illicit. To this is added that a manner of acting of this sort does not serve the common good, that is, the piety of the faithful, since the singing of castrati feminizes minds and ears (cf. St. Alphonsus, III, 374).

Corollary II. It is illicit to admit castration, vasectomy,¹ oophorectomy,² extirpation of the ovaries or procurement of their atrophy, for the end that conception and procreation of offspring may be prevented. For again there is direct mutilation - since the mutilating act, as such, that is, insofar as it is injurious to a genital organ, is assumed as a means by which another end is obtained - which is not ordered to the good of the whole body. To this is added that the acts set forth in the proposed hypothesis directly impede the good of the species; and this is always illicit, because the good of the species is ordered immediately to God alone, and therefore cannot be directly impeded on account of any intermediate end. Nor do the aforesaid operations become lawful if they are done because danger to life threatens from conception, and therefore at least by the agent they are ordered to the preservation of the whole. For even in that case avoidance of conception is directly and proximately intended as a means, so that even such a manner of acting is directly and proximately opposed to the good of the species. To this is added that the intended end, that is, the good of the whole, can be obtained in another way, namely by abstaining from intercourse.

Nor are the assigned mutilations lawful if they are done for quieting temptations and preserving chastity, because again there is direct mutilation - since the mutilating act, as such, that is, insofar as it is injurious to a genital organ, is assumed as a means by which the said end is obtained - which is not ordered to the good of the whole body. To this is added that the said mutilations commonly do not conduce to the intended end: for the stimulus of the flesh remains. Finally, chastity can be preserved by other means. "Spiritual welfare," says St. Thomas, "can always be helped otherwise than by cutting off a member; because sin is subject to the will, and therefore in no case is it lawful to cut off a member for avoiding any sin whatsoever" (II-II, q. 65, a. 1, ad 3).

But the aforesaid mutilations seem lawful for forestalling sexual erethism arising from the fact that the genital organs are abnormally affected. The reason is that in the case, the mutilation is ordered to the well-being of the whole body, almost as the amputation of a member infected by disease.³

To what extent public authority can impose the said operations, see in the treatise on the Fifth Precept.

¹ Vasectomy is a surgical operation by which someone is rendered impotent for generating through the cutting of the organ which in a man carries seed to the penis.

² Oophorectomy is done through the cutting of the organ which in a woman carries ova to the womb.

³ Cf. De Smet, De sponsalibus et matrimonio, n. 440, 441; Grosam in Linzer Quartalschrift 1910, pp. 59, 285, 497.

V. Ecclesiastical penalties established for suicide and self-mutilation are:

1. Those who have mutilated themselves or others, or have attempted to take life from themselves, are irregular from delict (can. 985, 5).

2. Those who have killed themselves by deliberate counsel are deprived of ecclesiastical burial (can. 1240, § 1, 3); to one excluded from ecclesiastical burial there must also be denied both any funeral Mass, even anniversary Mass, and other public funeral offices (can. 1241).

3. Those who have laid hands on themselves, if death has not followed, are to be barred from legitimate ecclesiastical acts, and if they are clerics, they are to be suspended for a time to be determined by the Ordinary, and removed from benefices or offices having care of souls annexed in the internal or external forum (can. 2350, § 2).

4. A lay person who has been lawfully condemned for the delict of grave mutilation or wounding or violence is to be considered excluded by the law itself from legitimate ecclesiastical acts and from any office, if he has any in the Church, with the obligation of repairing damages remaining firm (can. 2354, § 1).

(St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64; St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, book III, n. 363-411; Homo Apostolicus, tract 8, n. 1-32.)

By the fifth precept there is prohibited "the unjust killing, mutilation, beating, and other similar affliction" of oneself and of one's neighbor (St. Alphonsus, III, 363).

Killing is distinguished:

1. Into direct and indirect. It is direct when the act of killing, as such, is intended as an end or is assumed as a means by which another end is obtained. Otherwise it is indirect.

2. Into simple and qualified, according as circumstances which contain a special malice are not joined or are joined to it. Qualified killing is again distinguished:

a) Into parricide, by which name the killing of some relative is designated. In parricide there is added a sin against piety, if the killing concerns parents or other blood-relatives. Moreover, the killings of the aforesaid persons quite probably do not differ from one another in species.

b) Into regicide, which is the killing of a king, pope, or prince. In regicide, which is also called the crime of lese-majesty, there is added a sin against observance.

c) Into robbery-killing, which is killing done with the intention of plundering. Another species of injustice is added.

d) Into sacrilegious killing, which is the killing either of a sacred person or one done with profanation of a sacred thing or place. The sin of sacrilege is added.

Civil laws for the most part distinguish killing or voluntary homicide, and homicide that is voluntary and perpetrated with deliberate purpose.

With these things noted beforehand, we shall speak first about the killing of an innocent person, then about the killing of a criminal, finally about the killing of an unjust aggressor. About the killing of oneself, something was said in the treatise on charity (n. 523).

We shall treat first of the killing of an innocent person in general, then of the killing of a fetus in particular.

I. Direct killing of an innocent person is a grave sin from its whole genus. This is clear both from Sacred Scripture,¹ and from the fact that the murderer: 1. destroys what is not his, but God's; 2. deprives his neighbor of the use of life and of the faculties, to which the neighbor has a right from divine ordination; 3. cuts off a member of the commonwealth (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64, a. 6; St. Alphonsus, III, 393).

Corollary I. It is illicit to kill those lethally wounded, the dying, so that they may not suffer longer, and so forth.

Corollary II. Puncture of the heart or artery is illicit when done for this end, that one who seems to be dead may certainly be deprived of life, lest, namely, he be buried alive (euthanasia). But if it is certainly established that life has passed away, it is indeed per se lawful for a physician to puncture the heart or artery; yet since by acting thus a practice to be disapproved is promoted, that manner of acting is illicit unless both the physician signifies that he does not approve the wicked intention of those requesting it, and a grave cause is present.

II. Nor is it ever lawful for public authority directly to kill an innocent person; both because public authority does not have a right over the life of innocent subjects, and because the common good itself, for which public authority must provide, is promoted above all by the protection of the life of the innocent.

"The killing of a sinner," says St. Thomas, "becomes lawful, namely for public authority, by comparison to something else: considering man indeed according to himself, it is lawful to kill no one, because in any man, even a sinner, we ought to love the nature which God made, and which is corrupted by killing; but, as was said above (art. 2 of this question), the killing of a sinner is by comparison to the common good, which is corrupted by sin; but the life of the just is preservative and promotive of the common good, because they are the more principal part of the multitude; and therefore in no way is it lawful to kill an innocent person" (II-II, q. 64, a. 6; St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Hence neither "is it lawful to kill hostages, even if those who sent them do not keep faith, because they are innocent" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.); nor can an innocent person be killed even if, for example, a tyrant besieging a city threatens that, unless he is killed, he will overturn the city. Nevertheless an innocent subject, when the besieging tyrant demands it, can be sent and handed over to the enemies, especially because the innocent person, if he is not a stranger, seems bound to expose his life for his own commonwealth (St. Alphonsus, III, 393).

Corollary. The killing of an innocent person can become lawful by the authority of God. "For God has dominion of death and life: by His ordination both sinners and the just die; and therefore he who kills an innocent person by the command of God does not sin in such a case, just as neither does God, whose executor he is; and he is shown to fear God, obeying His commands" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64, a. 6, ad 1).

III. Indirect killing of an innocent person likewise is per se illicit; it becomes lawful if a proportionate cause is present. It is said:

1. Indirect killing of one's neighbor is per se illicit, because charity per se demands that I avert damage from my neighbor, much less does it permit that I create it for him.

2. It becomes lawful if a proportionate cause is present; this follows from what was said about an act with a double effect (St. Alphonsus, III, 393).

Corollary I. Homicide is not imputed if someone places a work, even an illicit one, that is little dangerous, so that death rarely comes from it, provided, if it can be done, due diligence is used for forestalling death; as if someone rings a bell, and by chance the little bell, falling, crushes a traveler; if someone, giving attention to hunting wild beasts, by chance kills a man; if someone fornicates, and the woman dies from childbirth (St. Alphonsus, III, 398).

Corollary II. "For taking a city and winning victory, if it is necessary, it is lawful to direct cannons at that place where there are many innocent persons, because their death follows outside the intention" (St. Alphonsus, III, 393); in other words, because the aforesaid act is not assumed as a means insofar as it is killing of an innocent person.

¹ Gen. 4:10; Exod. 20:13.

Before we speak about abortion, some things must be noted beforehand.

By the name fetus is understood the ovum of a woman fertilized by the semen of a man. Now it is freely disputed whether the rational soul, apart from a miracle, is infused at the very instant of fertilization or afterward; afterward, I say, that is, after the fetus has grown to the due organism of a human body.¹

A fetus regularly cannot live outside the uterus unless after seven complete months of gestation. Yet if artificial incubation takes place, sometimes there is hope that a fetus may go on living outside the uterus after six complete months of gestation. In these matters one can stand by the judgment of an expert.

¹ Those who deny that the soul is infused at the first instant of fertilization admit a miracle with respect to Christ and the Blessed Virgin Mary.

I. Notion. Abortion is the expulsion from the mother's uterus of a fetus not yet viable outside the uterus.

Abortion differs from acceleration of birth, or from premature delivery, which consists in this, that the offspring is brought forth artificially before nine complete months of gestation, but when it can live outside the uterus.

II. Division. Abortion is distinguished into direct and indirect. It is direct when the act of ejecting the offspring as such is either intended as an end, or is assumed as a means by which another end is obtained. Otherwise it is indirect.

III. Morality. 1. Direct abortion is to be judged as follows:

a) Direct abortion of an animated fetus is always gravely illicit. This is clear from the constitution Effrenatam of Sixtus V;¹ likewise from the encyclical Casti connubii of Pius XI;² likewise from the decrees of the Holy Office;³ finally from reason: namely, if the fetus is animated, direct abortion involves the killing of offspring, that is, its tearing away from the maternal uterus, whereby it happens that it can no longer live; it involves direct killing of offspring, because it involves an act which, insofar as it is killing or insofar as it is tearing away and expelling the offspring from the mother, is assumed as the means by which another end, for example the safety of the mother or avoiding disgrace, is obtained. It is commonly added that the fetus about to die is not baptized (St. Alphonsus, III, 394).

b) Direct abortion of a fetus not yet animated is likewise gravely illicit; for if the fetus is not yet animated, there is an action which is directly opposed to the good of the species, equally as is the disordered use of semen; indeed even more, because a fetus not yet animated approaches more closely to man than semen does. Hence abortion of a fetus not yet animated is reduced by some to homicide, and is called by them imperfect or anticipated homicide. There is added proposition 34 condemned by Innocent XI: it is lawful to procure abortion before the animation of the fetus, lest a girl discovered to be pregnant be killed or disgraced⁴ (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Objection 1. He who procures an abortion does not kill the offspring, but merely ceases to preserve its life.

Resp. I deny the assertion, since he who procures abortion positively places the offspring in that condition in which it cannot live. Such a manner of acting cannot be called a mere cessation from preserving the offspring.

Objection 2. A fetus which creates danger for the mother can be regarded as an unjust aggressor.

Resp. Since the fetus is merely present to the mother, and indeed with nature itself directing the matter thus, there can be no discussion of an aggressor of the mother.

What if it is doubted whether the fetus is dead?

Resp. Doubt about the death of the fetus easily persists. Some indeed judge that the death of a sufficiently developed fetus can be established by means of a stethoscope, which demonstrates that the pulsations of the heart have ceased; but from the recent opinion about apparent death, the said certainty does not seem to be had unless it is established that for a sufficiently long time, for example for an hour, the pulse of the heart has altogether ceased. With these things noted, I answer: in doubt whether the fetus is dead, direct abortion is gravely illicit, because, to use the words of St. Alphonsus, "it is intrinsically evil positively to expose an innocent person to danger of direct death" (III, 394), or because it is illicit to place an act which probably is directly killing an innocent person.

2. Indirect abortion likewise is per se gravely illicit; it becomes lawful if a grave cause is present, provided, however, that the hope of baptizing the offspring is not diminished.⁵ For the things said about indirect killing have force, since such killing is had in the case (n. 731). Moreover, a cause is required that is graver in proportion as the means employed has more influence on the abortion (St. Alphonsus, III, 394).

Corollary I. For saving the life of the mother, it is lawful to use a medicine which of itself tends equally to the cure of the disease and to abortion, because the act of taking medicine is not employed as a means of saving the mother insofar as that act is killing. Likewise it is lawful to extirpate a uterus infected with cancer, even if the death of the fetus must follow from this, because the extirpation is not assumed as a means insofar as it is killing the fetus (St. Alphonsus, III, loc. cit.).

Corollary II. Incision or puncture of the membranes of the fetus, so that the uterus may be replaced, seems illicit, because the act of cutting or puncturing is assumed as a means insofar as it is killing, that is, insofar as it is expelling the fluid without which the fetus cannot live, indeed also insofar as it is expulsive of the fetus. Make an exception if, as they contend can sometimes be obtained, the incision or puncture can be done in such a way that only part of the fluid flows out and ejection of the fetus does not follow.

Corollary III. Mothers sin gravely, objectively, who, with their condition considered, induce grave danger of abortion: by carrying heavy burdens, undergoing hard labors, indulging in vehement sadness or anger, dancing, riding, and so forth; likewise those who strike a pregnant woman, afflict her with vehement pain, or excite her to vehement anger. But if in the aforesaid cases abortion is intended, there is guilt of direct abortion.

Note 1. Since the illicitness of feticide carried out to save the mother is not so evident, good faith is not always excluded either among physicians or in the mother. Moreover, if good faith is present and there is no hope of fruit, the priest can be silent, unless there is danger of apparent connivance and thus harm can also be done to the common good. For the rest, baptism of the fetus should always be provided for as much as can be done. But those who procure abortion to avoid the disgrace of a girl, to forestall more numerous offspring, to strengthen the health of the mother, or to remove a light danger of death, should ordinarily be instructed, and, unless they are willing to renounce the perverse practice, should be sent away without absolution. The same must be said of those who induce abortion when sufficient provision can be made for the mother by acceleration of birth.

Note 2. Medicines which are usually prescribed for diseases commonly cannot influence abortion except remotely, so that, provided some good effect is intended, there is scarcely an obligation of abstaining from them. Several causes which are assigned by some, such as violent disturbances of the mind, excessive fatigue, riding in a carriage, and so forth, although for the most part they do not induce abortion, nevertheless are not done without moderate danger. But more dangerous are extensive abuse of intercourse, the wearing of garments constricting the uterus, baths that are too hot, and so forth.⁶

Note 3. Today indirect procurement of abortion is rarely necessary for saving the life of the mother, since provision can be made for both mother and offspring by Caesarean section, symphysiotomy, pubiotomy, and so forth.

¹ October 29, 1588.

² December 31, 1930.

³ July 24, 1895, decree of the Holy Office de abortus illiceitate; May 4, 1898 (Collect., n. 1898).

⁴ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1184.

⁵ This hope is commonly not diminished, since the fetus can usually be baptized either in the uterus (cf. treatise on Baptism) or after abortion has followed.

⁶ Surbled, La vie sexuelle, p. 230.

IV. Penalties against the crime of abortion. 1. Those are irregular by reason of delict who have procured the abortion of a human fetus, the effect following, and all cooperating (can. 984, 4°).

2. Those procuring abortion, not excepting the mother, incur, the effect following, excommunication latae sententiae reserved to the Ordinary; and if they are clerics, they are besides to be deposed (can. 2350, § 1). These matters are more fully explained in the treatise on ecclesiastical penalties.

I. Embryotomy - from Greek embryon = fetus and temno = I cut - to which craniotomy - kranion = skull - and cephalotripsy - from kephale = head and tribo = I crush - pertain; embryotomy, I say, and similar operations, are gravely illicit. For they contain killing, and that direct killing (n. 731). There are added the responses of the Holy Office,¹ which declare that in Catholic schools it cannot safely be taught that craniotomy and any surgical operation directly killing the fetus or the pregnant mother are lawful.

¹ May 28, 1884 (Collect., n. 1618) and August 14, 1889 (Collect., n. 1716).

IV. Extraction of an ectopic or extra-uterine fetus¹ is to be judged as follows:

1. If, considering the time elapsed from conception, provision can be made for the offspring, it is lawful,² indeed it even obliges if otherwise the fetus cannot certainly be baptized.

2. If provision cannot be made for the offspring, it is not lawful to extract it from the body of the mother, because the act of extracting is assumed as a means insofar as it is killing, that is, insofar as it tears the offspring away from the mother. Nevertheless it is lawful to extirpate a tumor infected with cancer or lethal on another count, even if the fetus is cut out at the same time, because the act of extirpating is not assumed as a means insofar as it is killing, that is, extirpative of the offspring itself.

3. If there is doubt whether or not a true fetus is had, the same solutions have force. Others judge that in the case an ectopic fetus can be extracted from the mother's body, even if provision cannot be made for its life, because, they say, the certain right of the mother must be preferred to the uncertain right of the offspring. But these things are not pleasing, because, to use again the words of St. Alphonsus, "it is intrinsically evil positively to expose an innocent person to danger of direct death" (III, 394), or because it is illicit to place an act which probably is directly killing an innocent person.

¹ Namely, sometimes it happens that conception occurs outside the natural place, that is, outside the maternal uterus; in that case birth cannot occur in the natural way. Moreover, a threefold ectopic pregnancy is distinguished, namely tubal, ovarian, and abdominal, of which tubal, which takes place in the oviduct, seems more frequent.

² Cf. Holy Office, May 4, 1898 (Collect., n. 1997); likewise May 5, 1902; yet the latter decree lacks pontifical approval.

V. Acceleration of birth (n. 733) is lawful for a proportionate cause, as if the safety of the mother is hoped for from accelerated birth, or if it is feared that the woman cannot give birth to a more developed fetus. Hence the Holy Office¹ declared that acceleration of birth is not per se illicit, provided it is performed for just causes, and at that time and by those methods by which, according to ordinary contingencies, provision is made for the lives of the mother and fetus.

¹ May 4, 1898 (Collect., n. 1997).

What mutilation is, and what direct and indirect mutilation are, has been set forth in the treatise on charity (n. 526). Now proceed:

I. Direct mutilation of an innocent person, with the required consent posited, is lawful if it is ordered and necessary for the preservation or well-being of the whole body. Otherwise it is illicit. For the reasons brought forward where there was discussion of direct mutilation of oneself have force (n. 526).

II. Indirect mutilation of an innocent person is per se illicit; but for a proportionate cause it becomes lawful, as was said about indirect mutilation of oneself (n. 526).

III. Imprisonment of an innocent person is likewise illicit, because each person has a right of procuring his own good even by external action; this right is violated by one who imprisons someone (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 3).

IV. Finally, beating of an innocent person is illicit, because each person has a right to the delight or quiet of his senses, "to which beating is opposed, or anything whatever that affects the sense with pain" (St. Thomas, loc. cit.).

V. Nor is it lawful for public authority directly to mutilate an innocent person; for just as it is not lawful for it to deprive an innocent person of life (n. 731), so also and for the same reason it is illicit to deprive him of the integrity and use of members (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 108, a. 4, ad 2). Likewise it is illicit for it to imprison or beat an innocent person, because neither can public authority injure the goods of the body of innocent persons; and goods of the body, besides life and integrity of members, are the use of members, which is impeded by imprisonment, and the quiet of the sense, to which beating is opposed (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 3).

Nor does public authority lawfully impose mutilation, for example vasectomy, oophorectomy, and so forth, for this end, that the procreation of weak, miserable, and similar offspring may be forestalled. Thus expressly Pius XI in the encyclical Casti connubii.¹ And the Holy Office, to the question, "What must be thought of the theory called eugenic, whether positive or negative, and of the means indicated by it for improving human progeny, with laws, whether natural, divine, or ecclesiastical, concerning marriage and the rights of individuals set aside," answered on March 31, 1931: "That it is altogether to be disapproved and to be held as false and condemned, as in the encyclical letter on Christian marriage, Casti connubii, given on December 31, 1930."² And indeed, first, the end does not justify a perverse means, such as the mutilation of an innocent person. Next, neither can public authority directly impede the good of the species, since it is ordered to no intermediate end, but to God alone, and therefore cannot be impeded for any intermediate end.³

Objection 1. Public authority can provide for the common good; consequently it can mutilate an innocent person and impede the good of the species, if that is necessary for the common good.

Resp. I deny the consequence; or rather, public authority can provide for the common good, but not by an evil means, of which sort are mutilating an innocent person and impeding the good of the species.

Objection 2. Public authority can provide for the good of the species. But by impeding the procreation of weak offspring it provides for the species.

Resp. That public authority can provide for the good of the species by using an evil means, such as mutilation of an innocent person, I deny. Besides, the Minor must be denied, because the good of the species pertains in no way to the accidental condition of the offspring.

¹ December 31, 1930.

² Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 1931, p. 118.

³ Cf. Brouillard in Etudes, 1931, p. 440 sq. and 578 sq.; Dr. Grosam in Theologisch-praktische Quartalschrift, 1931, p. 497 sq.

I. Public authority has the power of killing criminals. This is clear first from Sacred Scripture,¹ likewise from the doctrine² and practice of the Church;³ then from reason. For public power has a power which is very useful, and sometimes necessary, for the common good, for example for the security of citizens. But such is the power of imposing the penalty of death (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64, a. 2).

With the primary natural end of punishment considered, which is the reparation of a violated order or retribution, it seems one must say that all grave transgressions of the public order can be punished with the penalty of death without injustice. Yet such a use of power would have to be disapproved, both because it would tend toward the harm of the community, and because "the punishments of the present life are more medicinal than retributive; for retribution is reserved to divine judgment, which is according to truth upon sinners; and therefore, according to the judgment of the present life, the punishment of death is not inflicted for any mortal sin whatever, but only for those which bring irreparable harm, or also for those which have some horrible deformity" (II-II, q. 64, a. 2, ad 2). Note, however, that sometimes deservedly, especially by military law, capital punishment is established for faults light in themselves but, with the circumstances considered, grave.

II. Only the supreme authority in the commonwealth has the power of killing criminals. This is drawn both from the fact that it belongs to the governor alone of the commonwealth to establish those things which are ordered to the safety of the whole community (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64, a. 3; St. Alphonsus, III, 379), and from the fact that it belongs to the governor alone of the community to subtract from the community what pertains to the community. But "man himself and all his parts" belong to the community (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 1). For the rest, observe:

1. It is another question to what extent public authority is bound to use the aforesaid power; the solution of this question depends on whether, with the circumstances of things and also the condition and character of subjects considered, certain very grave crimes, such as homicides and seditions, can be sufficiently forestalled in another way. Yet the safety of the commonwealth seems to require that in time of war and sedition the penalty of death be decreed against certain persons.

2. Authority, where the penalty of death is concerned, is per se bound to observe the order of law; namely, per se it is not lawful to kill criminals unless they have first been both cited and heard, and, with the crime legally proved, have been condemned, "because by the law of nature a public act must be done from public knowledge and authority" (St. Alphonsus, III, 377). I said per se, because on account of an extraordinary necessity of the commonwealth it is lawful to depart from the order of law, provided, however, that the crime is established. Moreover, an extraordinary necessity can occur especially in time of sedition or war.

Corollary I. Killing which in English is called lynching is altogether to be rejected, although perhaps good faith can excuse by reason of custom; likewise killing of traitors in time of war carried out by one's own authority. Officers cannot kill a criminal, even if he flees or wrests himself from their hands, unless they have a special mandate (St. Alphonsus, III, 380).

Corollary II. It is not lawful to kill either a tyrant of government, as it is called, that is, a tyrant who possesses rule by a just title but greatly abuses it (n. 727), or a tyrant of title who possesses the kingdom peacefully.⁴ But a tyrant of title who does not yet possess the kingdom peacefully can be killed by the authority of the legitimate Prince (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tract 8, n. 13).

¹ John 19:11; Rom. 13:4.

² The doctrine of the Church is known, for example, from the profession of faith proposed by Innocent III to the Waldensians, where it was read thus: "Concerning secular power we assert that without mortal sin it can exercise judgments of blood, provided that in inflicting vindication it proceeds not from hatred but from judgment, not incautiously but advisedly." Then among the errors of Luther proscribed by Leo X in the bull Exurge Domine, this proposition 33 is read: "That heretics be burned is against the will of the Spirit" (Sweens, Theologia moralis fundamentalis, 2nd ed., n. 524).

³ As regards the practice of the Church, history teaches that formerly Superiors of the Church often handed over heretics or other criminals to the secular judge to be punished with death; something the Church certainly would not have done unless the State had the right of punishing evildoers with death (Sweens, Theologia moralis fundamentalis, 2nd ed., n. 524).

⁴ These things in practice also have force in the case in which the one who peacefully possesses the kingdom is not yet judged a legitimate prince (n. 727).

I. Public authority, just as it can kill a criminal, so a fortiori can mutilate, imprison, and beat him. But it is another question whether public authority lawfully imposes certain mutilations, namely vasectomy, oophorectomy, and so forth, as a punishment. Now, speaking theoretically, a punishment of this kind, although it can be defended from the fact that it deprives criminals of a great good, that is, of the faculty of procreating, seems less congruent with the common sense of morality. I said theoretically, because in practice it will impose the said punishment for this end, that the procreation of offspring to be procured by the criminal may be impeded. But that is illicit, because it is not lawful even for public authority directly to impede the good of the species (n. 740).

II. Superiors lacking supreme power, for example parents and those taking their place, cannot mutilate or strictly imprison their delinquent subjects; nevertheless they can beat them moderately. It is said:

1. They cannot mutilate them, because "man himself and all his parts" belong to society (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 1); but it belongs only to the supreme governor of society to subtract from the community what pertains to the community (n. 741).

2. They cannot strictly imprison them, because not only man and all his parts belong to the community, but also his activity; hence again it belongs only to the supreme governor of society to impede the activity of man by strict imprisonment (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 3). Nevertheless inferior Superiors can keep their subjects at home for just causes.

3. They can beat them moderately. For they enjoy the power of coercing subjects insofar as by acting thus they do not inflict injury on the community. But beating a subject inflicts no injury on the community, because it removes neither life, nor the integrity of members, nor activity (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 2). Yet it is not lawful for a man to beat his wife, unless a most grave necessity urges, since the wife is not his servant but his companion (St. Alphonsus, VI, 972).

III. Equals, for example brothers and sisters, even if older by birth, cannot even beat delinquents, unless by consent of a superior. The reason is that by beating some harm is inflicted on the body of him who is beaten; moreover, it is not lawful to inflict harm on someone except by way of punishment, on account of justice. But no one can punish someone unless he is subject to his power. Therefore an equal cannot beat an equal (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 2).

I. It is lawful to repel an unjust aggressor against life, even, with the necessary conditions posited, by killing him. This is clear from Sacred Scripture¹ and from the doctrine of the Church contained in the old Law.² And indeed what prevents me from repelling unjust force by force, if otherwise it cannot be repelled? Or: what prevents me from returning like for like to him who is on the point of inflicting unjust harm on me, if otherwise the damage cannot be averted? For the rest, if the proposition were denied, sufficient provision would not have been made for the security of life (St. Alphonsus, III, 380).

Nor is it an obstacle that the one attacked, by killing the attacker, seems to prefer his own temporal life to the eternal life of his neighbor, since we are bound only to give life for a neighbor who is placed in extreme spiritual necessity. But the attacker is not placed in extreme spiritual necessity, because he can rescue himself from necessity by ceasing from the attack. In a word: his spiritual necessity is voluntary, and therefore not extreme (St. Alphonsus, III, 380).

I said: it is lawful, because a man is not bound to use an extraordinary means, of which sort is the killing of one's neighbor, for saving life. Indeed it is even an act of charity "to permit one's own killing, lest another be deprived of temporal and eternal life" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). Make an exception, however, if the life of the one attacked is necessary or quasi-necessary to the community or family.

I said: with the necessary conditions posited. Moreover, the conditions required so that it may be lawful to kill an aggressor against life are: 1. that the aggression be unjust; 2. that the aggression be physical; 3. that the moderation of blameless defense be observed. It is said:

1. That the aggression be unjust; this is clear. Thus it is not lawful to kill an executioner who carries out a sentence of death. Yet it suffices that it be materially unjust, for example if it is done by a madman, by a drunk person, and so forth. The reason is that a right, in this case the right to life, by its nature can be defended absolutely or always without injustice; without any sin, if charity does not stand in the way. But charity stands in the way only in the case in which the one attacked is in the state of grace, while the aggressor, for example a drunk person, is morally certainly in the state of mortal sin, and therefore, in the posited hypothesis, is placed in extreme spiritual necessity (St. Alphonsus, III, 390).

2. That the aggression be physical; for the negation of this condition would give occasion to delusions and would gravely harm public order. Thus it does not suffice, for example, that another has merely decided on or threatened aggression; that someone persuades or orders an attack on you; that a judge pronounces an unjust sentence against you. Hence proposition 18 was rightly condemned by Alexander VII: it is lawful to kill a false accuser, false witnesses, and even a judge from whom an unjust sentence certainly threatens, if an innocent person cannot avoid damage in another way³ (St. Alphonsus, III, 388). Yet it suffices that the aggression has begun in some way; therefore it is not required, for example, that the enemy already aim a gun, but it suffices that he take up arms to kill you at once (St. Alphonsus, III, 387).

3. That the moderation of blameless defense be observed, as it is usually said, that is, that in defending oneself one not proceed beyond necessity. Thus it is not lawful to kill an aggressor if the one attacked can flee or by beating or wounding rescue himself from danger of death. But if he cannot flee without great dishonor, which nevertheless today generally has no place unless perhaps you except a military man, especially one constituted in a higher rank, he is not bound to flight (St. Alphonsus, III, 381). And generally it is not evident that one attacked who is bound to flight is bound to it from justice. Moreover, observe that those who in the case, especially of a sudden attack, exceed in their own defense are easily excused from grave sin, namely because of disturbance of mind and lack of time for deliberating.

¹ Exod. 22:2.

² Chapter Significasti nobis (18, book 5, Decretals, title 12); chapter Si perfodiens (3, book 5, title 12); the single Clementine De homicidio, etc. Civil laws agree.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1118.

II. What is lawful for preserving life is also lawful for preserving the integrity of members, for forestalling grave wounding, for preserving chastity, and for acquired goods of fortune of great importance.¹ Namely, the said goods are regarded as sufficiently grave goods, which may be defended by any force whatever, even lethal, if there is need, against an unjust aggressor. But the same is not lawful for protecting honor and reputation. These indeed are more grave than goods of fortune; but, besides the fact that honor and reputation can generally be defended in another way, the faculty of defending them by death would open the way to delusions and innumerable killings. Hence proposition 30 was condemned by Innocent XI: "It is lawful for an honorable man to kill an attacker who strives to inflict calumny, if otherwise this ignominy cannot be avoided; the same also must be said if someone strikes with the open hand or beats with a stick, and after the open-hand blow or blow of the stick flees."² Yet one is not bound to permit another by deed, for example by a blow, to assail one's honor; he can therefore repel ignominious treatment and, if the other then proceeds further, oppose force (St. Alphonsus, III, 313, 386; 381).

¹ As regards goods which are either of lesser importance or are not yet possessed, note the propositions condemned by Innocent XI. Proposition 31: regularly I can kill a thief for the preservation of one gold coin (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1181). Proposition 32: it is lawful to defend by killing-defense not only the things which we actually possess, but also those to which we have an inchoate right and which we hope to possess (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1182). Proposition 33: it is lawful both for an heir and for a legatee to defend himself in such a way against one unjustly impeding either the entering upon an inheritance or the payment of legacies; likewise also for one having a right to a chair or prebend against one unjustly impeding possession of them (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1183).

² Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1180.

III. Finally, it is lawful, even by killing the aggressor, to defend the life, integrity of members, chastity, and great goods of one's neighbor; and indeed the life and integrity of members, whether the neighbor dissents from or consents to the killing or mutilation of himself; for since he is not the master of life and members, his consent is invalid. It is generally not lawful to defend the chastity and goods of one's neighbor in this way if the neighbor consents to the one attacking. I said generally, because it is lawful for him upon whom disgrace or damage redounds to defend even the one who consents to his own damage (St. Alphonsus, III, 389, 391).

IV. Generally there is no obligation of defending one's neighbor by killing, because charity does not oblige one to such a burden. Make an exception: 1. if the common good requires it; 2. if the neighbor is very near, namely a parent, child, spouse, or brother (St. Alphonsus, III, 390).

Question. Whether it is lawful to kill an unjust aggressor directly, or only indirectly.

Resp. Several teach that an unjust aggressor can be killed only indirectly. Namely, they judge that the killing of the aggressor is lawful insofar as it is lawful to place the act of defending oneself; from this act a double effect follows, one's own preservation, which is intended, and the killing of the aggressor, which is permitted. Thus Cajetan¹ and Billuart.²

Others defend the contrary, and it seems one must adhere to them. For it is lawful by the consent of all to place an act of defending oneself, for example the discharge of a gun. But sometimes an act is defensive of oneself only insofar as it is killing of the aggressor. Therefore it is lawful to place the act insofar as it is killing of the aggressor. But this is nothing other than to take the killing of the aggressor as a means, or to kill the aggressor directly.

Objection. The defended opinion is contrary to the doctrine of St. Thomas.

Resp. St. Thomas (II-II, q. 64, a. 7), at first glance, seems to oppose our opinion; for he reasons, in order to prove that the killing of an unjust aggressor is lawful, from an act with a double effect, of which one, namely the preservation of life, is intended, while the other, namely the death of one's neighbor, happens outside the intention. But if you suppose that, according to the mind of St. Thomas, only that which is sought as an end is properly intended, but not that which is only assumed as a means, the holy Doctor is not opposed to us. But that this is wrongly supposed is not proved; hence there remains doubt for me about what St. Thomas judges (cf. St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tract 8, n. 12).

¹ Commentary on II-II, q. 64, a. 7.

² De tractatu de iure et iustitia, dissertation 10, article 5.

(St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, book III, nn. 399-401; Homo Apostolicus, tract 8, nn. 21-28.)

I. Notion. Dueling, in the canonical sense, is defined: a contest of two persons, or at least of a few, entered into by a prior agreement about place and time, and that with lethal weapons. It is said:

1. A contest of two persons, or at least of a few; these words are to be understood so that single and determined persons fight with single and determined persons.

2. By a prior agreement about a determined place and time. Therefore both the place and the time must be designated. Hence it would not suffice that they say: we shall fight wherever we first meet each other (St. Alphonsus, III, 401).

3. With lethal weapons. It is not required that the contest be entered into with grave danger of killing or grave wounding; rather, it suffices that the weapons with which the contest is carried on be lethal.

Corollary. To dueling accepted in the canonical sense there also pertain: 1. duels to first blood, as they are called;¹ 2. academic duels (Bestimmungsmensuren), that is, those which students are accustomed to enter into for the sake of display, with weapons indeed lethal, namely with a small knife, but with such cautions employed that danger of killing or grave wounding is morally removed.² But so-called American duels do not pertain here, that is, those by which both expose themselves to danger of death or grave harm, so that one falls by chance and the other by chance escapes unharmed; for example, if of two tablets one is harmless and the other is infected with poison, and both must consume one or the other.³ Such duels, I say, do not pertain here, because they exclude combat; hence they are not subject to the ecclesiastical penalties against duelists, although, as is clear, they are gravely illicit. Nor do fictitious duels seem to pertain here, that is, duels offered and accepted with the sole intention of simulating combat, in order to avoid the mark of timidity among uncultivated men; nevertheless these too are gravely illicit on account of scandal (St. Alphonsus, III, 399).

¹ Clement VIII, Constitution Illius vices, § 5 (1592).

² Sacred Congregation of the Council, June 13, 1926 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1926, p. 132).

³ Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis, II, 614.

II. Division. A duel is distinguished into public or solemn and private, according as it is entered into without or with certain ceremonies, for example with witnesses, whom they call seconds, and so forth.

III. Morality. 1. A duel entered into by public authority in place of war is lawful. For what authority can impose on many, it is also lawful to commit to a few; indeed, it is preferable that a few should fight in the name of the commonwealth in place of many (St. Alphonsus, III, 400).¹ Yet if the ranks are very unequal, the common good seems to require that the leader of the stronger rank, provided he is waging war justly, choose war, unless they prefer to choose unequal persons for single combat; but duels of this kind now have no place.

Corollary. I said that a duel entered into by public authority in place of war is lawful; for not even public authority is permitted to impose or permit a duel for displaying or increasing skill, for investigating truth or manifesting innocence,² for vindicating an injury, and so forth. It is illicit to permit these, both because a duel, unless it takes the place of war, is evil in itself, and because, if there is question of investigating truth, or manifesting innocence, or vindicating an injury, a duel is an unsuitable means to the intended end (St. Alphonsus, III, 399).

2. A duel entered into by private authority and with danger of killing or grave wounding is gravely illicit. For it is an attack upon the life or integrity of members of one's neighbor, done deliberately and by private authority; according to what was said in n. 741, this is altogether prohibited. There is added the malice of suicide, insofar as it involves consent to one's own killing or wounding. Add the ecclesiastical documents which altogether reprobate dueling;³ and especially note the propositions condemned by Benedict XIV in the Constitution Detestabilem,⁴ which are:

First: A military man who, unless he offers or accepts a duel, would be regarded as fearful, timid, abject, and unfit for military duties, and would thereby be deprived of the office by which he sustains himself and his own, or would have to lack forever the hope of promotion otherwise due and deserved by him, would be free from fault and penalty, whether he offers or accepts the duel.⁵

Second: Those who accept or provoke a duel for the sake of protecting honor or avoiding human contempt can also be excused, when they know certainly that the fight will not follow, as it is to be impeded by others.⁶

Third: The commander or military officer who accepts a duel from grave fear of loss of reputation or office does not incur the ecclesiastical penalties laid down by the Church against duelists.⁷

Fourth: In the natural state of man it is lawful to accept and offer a duel in order to preserve one's fortunes with honor, when the loss of them cannot be repelled by another remedy.⁸

Fifth: The asserted license for the natural state can also be applied to the state of a badly ordered city, namely one in which, either by the negligence or by the malice of the magistracy, justice is openly denied.⁹

Objection. It is lawful to place an act which has an evil effect, provided it also has a good effect. But a duel also has a good effect, namely honor to be restored.

Resp. Strictly speaking, a duel does not have a good effect, or it is not ordered to a good effect, that is, to honor to be restored; rather, once the duel has been posited, insulting men regard honor as restored. There is added that the good effect is obtained by means of an evil act.

3. Duels entered into without danger of killing or grave wounding are likewise gravely illicit; either because, according to what was said in n. 747, they pertain to dueling taken in the canonical sense, in which case they are prohibited by the Church under grave obligation; or because they bring grave scandal with them, as fictitious duels do; or because they expose persons to danger, even though they exclude combat, as American duels do.

Corollary I. "If a nobleman, or a soldier, is challenged to a duel, he can lawfully respond: I, as a Christian, cannot accept a duel; nevertheless I am prepared to defend myself against unjust aggressors" (St. Alphonsus, III, 400).

Corollary II. If someone challenges you to a duel, prepared to kill you in any way whatever, it is lawful to accept the fight and weapons, because then you are rather defending yourself against an unjust aggressor than accepting a duel (St. Alphonsus, III, 400).

¹ Cf. 1 Kings 17.

² Chapters 1 and 2, De purgatione vulgari.

³ Council of Trent, session 25, De reformatione, c. 19; Gregory XIII, Constitution Ad tollendam (1582); Clement VIII, Constitution Illius vices (1592); Leo XIII, letter given to the Bishops of Germany and Austria (September 22, 1891).

⁴ November 10, 1752.

⁵ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1491.

⁶ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1492.

⁷ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1493.

⁸ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1494.

⁹ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1495.

IV. Penalties against duelists. 1. The penalties established against a duel accepted in the canonical sense are:

a) Excommunication simply reserved to the Apostolic See (can. 2351, § 1), which is explained in the treatise on delicts and penalties.

b) Deprivation of ecclesiastical burial, according to the norm of can. 1240, § 1, which likewise is explained in the cited treatise.

c) Infamy of law, according to the norm of can. 2351, § 2.

d) Irregularity from delict, according to the norm of can. 985, 4° and 5°.

2. As regards remission of penalties, see the treatise on delicts and penalties.

V. Obligation of restitution which a duel can bring with it is explained in the treatise on the seventh precept.

(St. Thomas, II-II, q. 40; St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, book III, nn. 402-411; Homo Apostolicus, tract 8, nn. 29-32.)

I. War, that is, a fight of one people against another, is distinguished into defensive and offensive. Defensive war is that which repels force here and now being brought against one; offensive war is that which is undertaken to compensate for or vindicate an injury that has been inflicted (St. Alphonsus, III, 402).

II. War is sometimes lawfully waged; defensive war, because a commonwealth, just as a private person, can repel unjust force by force; offensive war, because society ought to enjoy a means of defending its rights and of vindicating or recovering things lost. But sometimes no other means is at hand except war (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 40, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). There is added that God in the Old Testament more than once commanded war.

III. Only the supreme authority in the commonwealth can declare war. For since "the care of the commonwealth has been committed to princes, it pertains to them to protect the commonwealth of the city, or kingdom, or province subject to them" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 40, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, III, 402). Nor can an inferior authority or a private person declare war which regards only part of the commonwealth. The reason is that inferiors can "prosecute their right in the judgment of a superior" (St. Thomas, loc. cit.). Besides, as regards a private person, "to summon a multitude, which must be done in wars, does not pertain to a private person" (St. Thomas, loc. cit.; St. Alphonsus, III, 402).

Nevertheless, with natural law considered, the Supreme Prince can confer on an inferior magistrate, for example on the governor of a town or province, the faculty of declaring war on another town or province of a kingdom; and the same faculty can also belong to an inferior magistrate by force of the law of nations.

IV. In order that war may be lawfully declared, a just cause is required, and that the end justly intended cannot be obtained in another way.

1. A just cause, that is, one proportionate to the damages annexed to war. Moreover:

a) For defensive war, the unjust aggression itself of the other party suffices. As regards offensive war, "just wars are usually defined as those which avenge injuries, if a nation or city is to be punished because it has either neglected to vindicate what was wickedly done by its own people, or to restore what was taken away by injury"¹ (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 40, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, III, 402).

b) In doubt whether a just cause is present, war cannot be declared; both because in doubt the condition of the possessor is better, and because "war commonly brings with it such crimes and damages to religion, to the innocent, to the honor of women, and so forth, that practically it can scarcely ever seem just if it is inferred from things merely probable and not certain" (St. Alphonsus, III, 404). But subjects, called by law or already bound by contract before the war, are not bound to inquire into the justice of the war as long as no vehement suspicion occurs; indeed, even in doubt about the justice of the war, although an arduous matter is involved, they are bound to obey on account of the common good. The contrary must be said of those who are bound neither by law nor by contract (St. Alphonsus, III, 408).

2. That the end justly intended cannot be obtained in another way; for example, through arbiters who settle the case. Indeed, with the immense damages annexed to war considered, princes must strive with every effort and work that wars always be averted.

V. As regards things lawful, prescribed, and prohibited in war, it suffices to have noted these things:

1. It is lawful, if it conduces to the end of the war, to lay waste fields, to destroy fortresses, to occupy hostile goods and lands, to besiege cities and harass them with fire, although by accident it happens that innocent persons are harmed and killed. Indeed, sometimes it is right to destroy monasteries and churches, and in them to despoil and kill, if, for example, enemies use them as a fortress to defend themselves. Yet the aforesaid things are not lawful for private soldiers or inferior officers without the permission of the commander² (St. Alphonsus, III, 409, 410). It is likewise lawful to use ambushes and stratagems, provided lies are absent (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 40, a. 3; St. Alphonsus, III, 410).

2. "Faith pledged to an enemy must be kept, unless either you gave it under compulsion, or it would turn to grave detriment of the commonwealth or of religion; or if the enemies do not keep it; or finally if the conditions and circumstances have been altogether changed" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

3. "Soldiers sin with the burden of making restitution if they take from country people or others, among whom they lodge or through whose places they pass, or extort from them unwilling, anything beyond those things which, by the constitution of the prince, these persons ought to furnish to them; unless, however, they are in extreme or at least grave necessity" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

4. To the question, who can be justly killed in war, one must answer thus:

a) The following can be killed directly: commanders and soldiers of the hostile army; likewise those who bring aid to them.

b) The following cannot be killed: 1. the conquered and captured, unless from another source they are guilty of a crime of death; 2. those who have surrendered, under an agreement that they be spared; 3. the innocent, such as children, women, the elderly, country people, clerics, religious, pilgrims, unless it is established that they themselves are guilty; nevertheless they can be killed indirectly, insofar as their death cannot be avoided in military operations (St. Alphonsus, III, 409).³

5. Finally, citizens not belonging to the army, by force of the law accepted among nations, are bound to abstain from bloody defense of the fatherland and bloody attack upon enemy soldiers.⁴

¹ St. Augustine, book 6, Quaestiones (on Joshua, q. 16).

² Aertnys-Damen, I, 590.

³ Aertnys-Damen, Theologia Moralis, I, 590.

⁴ Nederlandsche Katholieke Stemmen, 1915, p. 86.

I. Spiritual damages consist in this: that the one killed is deprived of the last sacraments, of time for meriting, etc. Moreover, they must be restored only if both the damage that followed is certain and the damage can truly be compensated; for example, if the killer prevented Masses from being celebrated which the one killed certainly would have taken care to have celebrated for his soul.

III. Temporal damages are distinguished into damages inflicted on the injured person himself and damages inflicted on third parties.

1. Damages inflicted on the injured person himself consist in the expenses of treatment, yet with those things deducted which he, if healthy, would have had to spend on food; likewise in emergent damage or ceasing profit for the time in which the injured person still lived and had to cease from labor. Restitution must be made according to the valuation of the hope of obtaining the goods, and indeed to the injured person himself or, if he has died, to his heirs. But if the killer does not restore these things, his heirs are held to restitution, unless the injured person has condoned them. "When remission of the injury has been made, remission of the damages is not understood to have been made" (St. Alphonsus, III, 630, 631).

Question 1. Whether something can be deducted from restitution of ceasing profit for the labor which the injured person would have had to spend in order to obtain the profit.

Response. Some affirm it; others seem rightly to deny it, for by his unjust action the killer caused the deprivation of the whole profit; hence he is also held to restore the whole profit. Yet in practice "Bonacina reasonably reconciles the opinions, saying that only that should be subtracted which the one killed is presumed to have been willing to give for the redemption of the labor" (St. Alphonsus, III, 639).

Question 2. Whether the heirs of the killer are freed from the obligation of restoring if the killer is punished with death.

Response. It seems this must be denied, because the penalty is judged to have been imposed only to satisfy vindicative justice, not commutative justice. Nevertheless, the heirs are excused from restitution if compensation for damages is not sought, because then the parties are presumed to condone, unless the thing still existed, or unless the damage was very grave (St. Alphonsus, III, 705).

2. Damages inflicted on third parties can chiefly regard the family, that is, parents, wife, and children; other blood-relatives; those to whom the one killed was doing good; and the creditors of the one killed. Now:

a) Damages inflicted on the family consist in deprivation of the support which the one killed was procuring for it, and likewise of the profit which he would still have procured for it. By the consent of all, these must be restored. The reason is deduced from the fact that the killer injured not merely a physical person, but, as it were, a moral person; a moral person, I say, which the others constituted with the person killed. Hence restitution is to be made to them (St. Alphonsus, III, 631). Nevertheless, "nothing is restored for funeral expenses, because those eventually would have had to be made at some time; unless perhaps, on the occasion of the death inflicted, for example outside the homeland, it was necessary for greater expenses to be made" (St. Alphonsus, III, 631). For the rest, restitution again must be made according to the valuation of the hope of obtaining those goods (St. Alphonsus, III, 631, question 2). A right norm will be the one which insurance societies follow on the occasion of an adverse event.

Question 1. Whether restitution is to be made to the family if it can conveniently provide for itself.

Response. Affirmatively; since the fact that the family can provide for itself does not prevent its right from having been injured; but from an injured right there arises the obligation of restoring. Yet the killer is not held to restore if the family receives from another what it would have received from the injured person, for example, "if the wife (and the same would have to be said of children and parents) afterward has married equally conveniently, nothing is to be restored to her; because then in reality she does not suffer damage" (St. Alphonsus, III, 631, question 1).

Question 2. Whether the injured person can remit the restitution owed to the family.

Response. Many deny it, because no one can remit restitution owed to another; but with St. Alphonsus and others it seems this must be affirmed, because the right of the family is entirely subordinated to the right of the father. Hence just as the father can validly transfer goods into another's ownership, so too he can validly remit restitution for them. But here again note: "When remission of the injury has been made, remission of the damages is not understood to have been made" (St. Alphonsus, III, 630).

b) Damages inflicted on other blood-relatives do not have to be restored: neither by reason of the good from the obtaining of which he impeded them, because they did not have a strict right to it; nor by reason of the means employed, since it would be unjust only with respect to the one killed. For the same reason the same must be said about the poor to whom the one killed was doing good, and about others who would have received certain things from the testament (St. Alphonsus, III, 632).

c) Damages inflicted on creditors likewise do not seem to have to be restored. It is indeed true that they are impeded, as we suppose, from obtaining a good in which they had a strict right; but they are not impeded by the killer, but by the heirs or by the law exempting the heirs, while the killer is only an occasional cause (St. Alphonsus, III, 634).

Nevertheless, St. Alphonsus and others judge that the enumerated damages must be restored if the killer acted with the intention of harming the enumerated persons (n. 996).

Corollary I. He who provokes another to a duel and kills or wounds the provoked man, who freely accepts the contest, is not held to restitution, neither toward the injured person, because he consented to the damage in fortune that would follow, nor toward the family, because the injured person, from whom the family would have received goods, by his own consent prevented him from acting unjustly toward it, since it had only a consequent right in the goods (St. Alphonsus, III, 638).

Corollary II. The one attacked, who deliberately exceeded the measure of blameless defense, seems to be held to restitution for the damages that followed from the excess, because the excess was truly unjust (St. Alphonsus, III, 637).

Objection. The attacker knowingly and willingly exposed himself to the danger that the one attacked would exceed the measure of blameless defense; but no injury is done to one who knows and wills.

Response. He who knowingly and willingly exposes himself to the danger that his right be injured is not therefore judged to yield his right.

Corollary III. What has been said about damages following from homicide is also to be applied to damages arising from wounding and other injuries of the body.

I. Justice of the law. The law of forced conscription is just. For by those to whom it especially belongs to judge about this matter, especially considering conscription as commonly admitted, it is judged very useful, or rather necessary, for protecting the republic. Nor is injustice present in the fact that families which do not have suitable young men are not held to some compensation, because the burden of military service is not familial but individual; nevertheless it would be equitable for the aforesaid families to contribute in another way. Furthermore, those whom ecclesiastical law exempts are to be exempted from the law of conscription.¹

¹ Cf. Damen, De vrijdom der Geestelijken van den krijgsdienst als Kerkelijke en Staatkundige Instelling.

II. Obligation of the law. According to some, the law of military service is merely penal; according to others, it is mixed or obliges to the act of serving. Moreover:

1. First, the natural law dictates that the republic must be protected against unjust aggressors in good time and in a due manner, even with danger of life.

2. The law of military service seems mixed, or to oblige to the act. For the legislator, as we argued in n. 1054, is judged to make laws in that manner which is especially suited to the matter of the law. But to the matter of military law, since it is moral and even determinative of the natural law itself, it is especially suited that the very act of serving be prescribed; as was said about tax laws (n. cited). Nor does common estimation hold that military law is merely penal.

3. The law of military service does not oblige from commutative justice, but from legal justice or another virtue, yet one distinct from commutative justice; this is proved by the same reason by which it was proved in n. 1054 with respect to tax laws.

Corollary. Those sin who neglect registration in order to conscription; likewise those who obtain exemption by illegitimate means; and these indeed sin even apart from the sin which the means themselves contain, such as a lie, corruption of physicians, mutilation of oneself; likewise those who do not obey the precept of mobilization, or desert military service. And this holds even if someone, after the precept has been issued, is staying in another region; for, as common estimation has it, he remains a subject until he has been naturalized in another region, as it is called. Yet deserters are not held to return if a grave penalty threatens them.

Question 1. Whether those act unjustly with respect to those who are substituted in their place, and therefore are held to restore to them: 1° those who render themselves unfit for military service; 2° those who deceive physicians or magistrates, so that they are declared unfit; 3° those who desert military service.

Response. It is disputed; but it seems it must be denied, since those who act thus are not the cause, but only the occasion of the damage. The cause of the damage is the law itself, which orders that a fixed number be called, so that, when one is lacking, another is called.

Objection. Those who draw lots tacitly enter among themselves an aleatory contract, by force of which they are held to leave all things to the lot, and therefore to abstain from deceiving officials.

Response. A contract of this sort is asserted gratuitously; indeed, it would be entered even by those unaware of it.

Question 2. What must be said about those who corrupt magistrates or physicians?

Response 1. Those corrupting certainly act unjustly toward the republic, namely by cooperating toward an unjust act of magistrates or physicians, who with respect to the republic are held from justice to fulfill their office faithfully. Yet the damage which the republic suffers cannot be estimated, nor practically does restitution seem to be imposed on the penitent.

Response 2. It is sharply disputed whether they also act unjustly with respect to those who are called in their place, i.e. in the place of those corrupting. Moreover, sufficiently probably it is denied, because also in this case those corrupting are not the cause, but the occasion of the damage coming upon a third party; nor is it clear that the officials are held by a tacit contract with respect to the third party, namely, to turn the damage away from him.

I. Jurisdiction over soldiers. 1. It is clear that soldiers can confess to a priest who has jurisdiction from the local Ordinary in whose place the confessions are instituted. What military chaplains can do independently of the local Ordinary depends on the special prescriptions of the Holy See (cf. can. 451, § 3). Namely, if a military bishop has been constituted, or at least if a chief chaplain has been placed over the whole army, the faculty of conferring jurisdiction over soldiers on other priests is easily granted to these.¹

2. Soldiers called to war, or mobilized as it is said, are equated with those constituted in danger of death; hence for them there hold the things which we shall say about jurisdiction over the dying (n. 370).²

¹ Cf. A.A.S. 1915, p. 217.

² Sacred Penitentiary, March 18, 1912; May 29, 1915 (A.A.S. 1915, p. 282); cf. Sacred Penitentiary, December 18, 1914 (A.A.S. 1914, p. 712); December 4, 1915 (A.A.S. 1915, p. 526).

IV. Slaves in slavery properly so called, before liberty has been accepted (canon 987, 4°).

V. Those who are bound by civil law to ordinary military service, before they have completed it (canon 987, 5°).

1. Those who by the law itself are called to care for the sick are not said to be bound to military service.

2. Annual exercises to which citizens are bound after ordinary service has been completed do not pertain to ordinary military service.¹

3. Those are also judged still bound by law to military service who perhaps will be called to military service, but are not yet called, either because they are unequal in age, or because they have been declared temporarily unfit.²

¹ Sacred Congregation of Religious, January 1, 1911 (A.A.S. 1911, p. 37).

² Pontifical Commission, June 2-3, 1918 (A.A.S. 1918, p. 344-345).

IV. Cases of impotence. The following are impotent:

1. A man who lacks the male member.¹

2. One who is deprived of both testicles.² For men of this sort, although at least sometimes they can penetrate the vagina and ejaculate some liquid, nevertheless cannot produce true semen. The same must be said of one who has testicles broken, bruised, or wholly atrophied or dried up, because he cannot elaborate semen.

3. One who is so frigid that he cannot erect the male member, or so ardent that he always pours forth the whole semen before he can penetrate the female vessel. But the aforementioned impotences are rarely perpetual, so that commonly they do not diriment marriage.

4. One who pours forth semen not at the extremity of the member but near its root, so that he can indeed enter into the female vessel, but cannot inject semen into it.

5. One who has undergone vasectomy.³ For he is impotent who cannot posit an act of itself apt for generation, in other words, who cannot penetrate the vagina together with effusion of semen into it. But one who has undergone vasectomy cannot posit an act of this sort, as follows from its nature, described in the note.

6. A woman who lacks a vagina or has it closed at the very entrance. There is dispute concerning a woman who has a vagina closed in this way near the uterus. But she seems to be called impotent, because the vagina is like a flaccid canal open on both sides, so that a vagina closed near the uterus is substantially vitiated, and therefore in the stated case a properly so-called vagina seems to be lacking. The responses of the Sacred Congregation of the Council favor this in the Salernitana,⁴ in the Verulana,⁵ and in the Monasteriensis.⁶ Namely, those responses declare null the marriage of a woman who lacked a uterus but had a short vagina closed near the uterus. But lack of a uterus does not seem to obstruct potency, as will be said under 9; therefore it remains that the closing of the vagina is the obstacle. For the rest, the stated impotences, if they can be cured without grave danger, are only temporary.

7. A woman who indeed has an open vagina but one so narrow that the male member cannot enter it. Some few, indeed, judge that in this case impotence is absent, or in other words, that it suffices that the man can deposit male semen at the exterior part of the vulva, or at least, the vulva having been penetrated, at the orifice or entrance of the vagina. But these opinions seem wholly to be rejected. For first, chapter 6, title 15, de frigidis et maleficiatis, declares that the impediment of impotence is had if a man cannot penetrate the woman's vagina. Next, for potency there is required aptitude for consummating marriage in that mode by which generation can follow of itself and not only by accident (cf. canon 1081, § 2). But from the deposition of semen either at the exterior part of the vulva or at the orifice of the vagina, generation does not seem to follow except by accident. Finally, this opinion is recommended by the fact that in the stated case there is lacking the faculty of consummating marriage according to the mode instituted by nature, that is, by penetrating the vagina. St. Thomas so thinks (In IV, dist. 41, q. un., a. 1, sol. 4, ad 2), and St. Alphonsus teaches the same at least implicitly (VI, 1075-1097). But the fact that the vagina can be penetrated only partially does not constitute impotence, or does not prevent there from being an act or copula of itself apt for generation. This is first deduced from the fact that copula which, as to substance, follows the mode indicated by nature, must be judged of itself apt for generation. But the copula of which we have spoken follows, as to substance, the mode indicated by nature; for it involves some penetration of the vagina, and more perfect and less perfect penetration differ only according to more and less, or are judged substantially similar to each other. Add that no theologian up to this point has taught that those who cannot coire more perfectly are impotent; indeed, the practice of the Roman Curia supposes that they are potent.

8. A woman who suffers from vaginismus, that is, hyperesthesia of the vaginal nerves, by which she cannot endure the contact of the man.

9. There is dispute whether a woman is impotent who lacks a uterus or ovaries, or who has the aforesaid organs wholly atrophied⁷ or dried up. Now a woman of this sort seems to be potent, because for potency it suffices that one be capable of copula of itself apt for generation. But the copula of which the stated woman is capable is of itself apt for generation, or in other words, from itself or by its nature it is ordered to generation, although generation in fact cannot follow because of the defect of another organ required for it. Therefore all things are present which are required for generation insofar as generation depends on human action; once that action has been posited, the act of nature begins. This opinion is confirmed by the fact that, if the contrary opinion is admitted, or if capacity for generating is required for potency, it would also have to be admitted - something admitted with difficulty - that many men and many women, as being totally impotent for generating, are incapable of marriage: for example, men who have semen irremediably vitiated, and women who have ovaries irremediably inert. That there are many such persons in advanced age cannot be denied, although which persons are such cannot be determined with certainty.⁸

This controversy cannot be decided by authority. "Since authors dispute," says the Sacred Congregation of the Council,⁹ "whether a marriage entered with a woman lacking ovaries is valid or not, and since ecclesiastical authority has not yet defined this question, and indeed the Congregation of the Holy Office has several times declared in particular cases, when the matter concerned a marriage to be contracted, that this is not an impediment,¹⁰ but when the matter concerned a marriage already contracted, that the spouses are not to be disturbed, now in practical reality it does not seem opportune to institute a process for declaring the nullity of marriage from defect of ovaries in a woman." The Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments¹¹ indeed permitted marriage to a woman for whom, after the matters set forth and the express attestation of a surgeon were considered, the ovaries had certainly and completely been excised; but it can be said that, while the theoretical doubt stands, the marriage was declared licit for practice, without the theoretical question thereby being settled.

What has been said concerning a woman deprived of ovaries, you should also apply to a woman who has undergone oophorectomy, that is, resection or division of the canal by which male semen is carried to the ovaries, and ova to the womb.

10. Finally it is evident that a woman is impotent who cannot be fertilized except artificially, supposing artificial fertilization properly so called.¹²

11. It belongs to physicians to decide whether hermaphrodites¹³ or androgynes can contract, and according to which sex (St. Alphonsus VI, 1095).

¹ He is called an ectomus if his male member has been cut off.

² Constitution of Sixtus V, Cum frequenter, June 22, 1587. From those deprived of both testicles must be distinguished those apparently such, or cryptorchids, who carry their testicles in the groins and can produce true semen, although infertile.

³ Vasectomy consists in this: after an incision has been made through the scrotum, the organ carrying the semen elaborated by the testicles is resected, so that the path to ejaculation is broken off for the semen. One who has undergone vasectomy can indeed produce semen, but cannot pour it into the vagina, nor secrete it internally, since it is absorbed by the body (cf. De Smet, De spons. et Matrim., n. 550). Moreover he can preserve the erectibility of the male member and penetrate the vagina, indeed even ejaculate a certain liquid; but this liquid is not, as follows from what has been said, true semen, but some watery humor secreted by the prostate gland (cf. De Smet, op. cit., n. 550).

⁴ March 21, 1863.

⁵ January 24 and June 22, 1871.

⁶ December 16, 1899.

⁷ Note that complete atrophy can scarcely be established; hence, even in the opinion of those who hold perfect atrophy of the ovaries to be a cause of impotence, scarcely anyone can be barred from nuptials.

⁸ Cf. Collectanea Brugenses, 1910, p. 701.

⁹ December 16, 1905.

¹⁰ Holy Office, February 3, 1887; July 23, 1890 (Collectanea, n. 1733); July 31, 1895 (Collectanea, n. 1007).

¹¹ April 2, 1907.

¹² It consists in this: that the physician receives in a little vessel male semen poured forth by the man solitarily or onanistically, and by means of a syringe pours it into the woman's genitals. In this case copula is lacking, so that a woman who cannot be fertilized except in such a way is incapable of copula and therefore impotent.

¹³ That is, those who, besides the perfect organs of one sex, display some essential thing of the other, or who are endowed incompletely and monstrously with the organs of both sexes. But more commonly it happens that persons are born apparently hermaphrodites: namely boys who, since they still have testicles hidden in the abdomen, imitate in part the female sex; or girls who, having obtained a more extended clitoris, seem to be endowed with a male member (cf. Eschbach, op. cit., p. 53).

This excommunication is contracted by:

I. Those making gain from indulgences (canon 2327). By force of this canon, those are excommunicated who, after receiving a price, gain profit either by granting, publishing, or causing indulgences to be published. It is required that the price have been accepted, but not that a simoniacal intention was present; it does not matter whether the price is expended on pious works. By force of this canon those are also excommunicated who, because of indulgences, sell for more objects enriched with indulgences.

Bishops also can contract this censure.

II. Those giving their name to a Masonic sect or to other associations of the same kind which machinate against the Church or legitimate civil powers (canon 2335). For the penalty to regard a certain association, it is required that it machinate against the Church or legitimate civil powers. It is disputed whether there are also required, as obtains in the Masonic sect, a strict bond by which members are united and a hidden organization. Some deny this, because they take the words "which machinate..." as merely explanatory of "of the same kind." Others affirm it, because they judge the words "of the same kind" to be taken in a broader sense, so that they also include the hidden organization which obtains in the Masonic sect. Given the doubt, we follow the milder opinion, the more so because if it were enough that an association machinated against the Church or legitimate civil powers, the legislator would certainly have omitted from the new Code the words "of the same kind," which gave occasion to the dispute. Hence canon 2335 certainly regards, besides the sect of Masons, the societies of the Carbonari,¹ Fenians,² Anarchists, Nihilists, and Internationalists; but not, although they are prohibited, socialist,³ biblical,⁴ clerico-liberal societies; nor the workers' societies called Odd Fellows,⁵ Sons of Temperance, Knights of Pythias, Independent Order of Good Templars (Guttempler-Orden)⁶ and societies which promote the cremation of human corpses.⁷ Moreover:

1. Clerics who have committed the delict discussed under II are punished with the penalty of suspension or privation of the benefice, office, dignity, pension, or function itself, if perhaps they have any in the Church; religious, however, with privation of office and of active and passive voice and with other penalties according to the norm of the constitutions. In addition, clerics and religious giving their name to a Masonic sect and other similar associations must be denounced to the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office (canon 2336).

2. The confessor to whom the faculty is granted of absolving from the censure set forth should require from the delinquent those things which the Holy See is accustomed to require: that they separate themselves entirely from the prohibited society and abjure it. But in a case in which great damage would flow from this for them, they can materially sustain the enrollment, but they are bound formally to renounce the society; and therefore: 1° let them promise that never again will it be the case that they involve themselves in any act of those societies, whether secret or public, and especially that they will never again pay the required contribution; 2° let scandal be removed in the best way that can be done; 3° let them be disposed in mind to withdraw their name if and when they can do this without grave damage.⁸

In the faculties of the Sacred Penitentiary it is established: 1° let them separate themselves entirely from the prohibited society and abjure it; 2° let them denounce ecclesiastical and religious persons, if they know any enrolled in it; 3° books, manuscripts, and signs pertaining to the same, if they retain any, let them hand over into your hands, to be cautiously transmitted to the Holy Office as soon as possible, or at least, if just and grave causes demand it, to be destroyed; 4° with a grave salutary penance joined according to the measure of the faults, together with frequency of sacramental confession and the obligation of repairing the scandals caused.

III. Those presuming, without due faculty, to absolve from an excommunication latae sententiae reserved to the Apostolic See in a most special or special manner (canon 2338, § 1). As to the word "presuming," see what was said in n. 858. For the rest, it is required that they actually absolve from the censure; it is not enough that they merely hear the delinquent or pretend to absolve him.

IV. Those furnishing any help or favor whatever to an excommunicated person to be avoided in the delict for which he was excommunicated; likewise clerics knowingly and spontaneously communicating with the same in divine things and receiving him in divine offices (canon 2338, § 2).

1. As to the former, it should be noted that it concerns a delict already committed, and therefore help or favor furnished by which someone can persist in the delict for which he was excommunicated.

2. As to the latter, observe: 1° since the law is to be interpreted strictly, religious do not come under the name of clerics unless they have received first tonsure (canon 108); 2° those communicating in divine offices are those who perform divine things with one to be avoided; 3° those receiving in divine offices are understood to be those who, enjoying the right or office of admitting to divine offices, admit an excommunicated person to be avoided to them.

V. If anyone against the prescription of canon 120 has dared to drag before a lay judge another, that is, not his own, Bishop, even merely titular, or an Abbot or Prelate nullius, or one of the supreme Superiors of religions of pontifical right (canon 2341). The prescription of canon 120, insofar as it must here be attended to, establishes that Bishops, even titular ones, Abbots or Prelates nullius, and supreme Superiors of religions of pontifical right cannot be summoned before a lay judge without the permission of the Apostolic See, unless in some place by special concession there has been derogation at least in part from the privilege of forum.

On the phrase "has dared," see n. 858; on the phrase "those dragging," p. 766.

Note. A cleric who, without having obtained permission from the local Ordinary, has dared to drag before a lay judge another person enjoying the privilege of forum, apart from those enumerated here and on p. 766 under IX, incurs ipso facto suspension from office reserved to the Ordinary; but a layman is to be punished by his own Ordinary with suitable penalties according to the gravity of the fault (canon 2341).

¹ Cf. Constitution of Pius VII, Ecclesiam, September 25, 1821, and Leo XII, Graviora, March 13, 1825.

² Cf. Holy Office, January 12, 1870.

³ Encyclical of Leo XII, Quod Apostolici, December 28, 1878.

⁴ Constitution of Pius IX, Qui pluribus, 1846.

⁵ Syllabus, § 178.

⁶ Holy Office, August 20, 1894.

⁷ Holy Office, August 9, 1893; Holy Office, May 19, 1886.

⁸ Holy Office, March 7, 1883 (Collectanea, n. 1593).

Moreover, the following contract an excommunication reserved to the Ordinary:

I. Catholics: 1° who enter marriage before a non-Catholic minister against the prescription of canon 1063, § 1; 2° who are united in marriage with an explicit or implicit agreement that all or some of the offspring be educated outside the Catholic Church; 3° who knowingly presume to offer their children to non-Catholic ministers for baptism; 4° parents or those holding the place of parents who knowingly hand over children to be educated or instructed in a non-Catholic religion (canon 2319, § 1).

1. The prescription of canon 1063, § 1 is this: "Even if a dispensation has been obtained from the Church over the impediment of mixed religion, the spouses cannot, either before or after the marriage entered before the Church, also approach, whether by themselves or by proxy, a non-Catholic minister as one dedicated to sacred rites, in order to give or renew matrimonial consent." Hence it is not prohibited, indeed as § 2 has it, "it is not disapproved that, when civil law commands it, the spouses present themselves, even before a non-Catholic minister, performing only the function of a civil official, and that only for accomplishing the civil act, for the sake of civil effects." The censure is contracted, however, whether matrimonial consent is entered or renewed before a non-Catholic minister as one dedicated to sacred rites.

2. An implicit agreement is had, for example, when the Catholic party obliges himself to fulfill all the wishes of the non-Catholic party concerning religious education. The excommunication is incurred at the moment at which the marriage is contracted with the agreement, whether previously entered and not retracted or now entered.

3. On the word "knowingly" see what was said in n. 858. Since it is said "their children," for example, a midwife who offered another's offspring to a non-Catholic minister for baptism would be immune from the excommunication. For the rest, the excommunication is incurred also in a case in which baptism would probably be conferred invalidly.

4. Those holding the place of parents can be tutors or even others who are endowed with the right and office of looking after education or instruction.

Note. Those mentioned under 2, 3, and 4 are moreover suspected of heresy (canon 2319, § 2).

II. Whoever makes false relics, or knowingly sells, distributes, or exposes them to the public veneration of the faithful (canon 2326). The word "knowingly" refers to the acts of selling, distributing, and exposing to public veneration. Since it concerns false relics, one does not incur the excommunication who distributes or exposes for veneration relics whose document of authenticity has perished, or concerning whose genuineness he doubts (cf. canon 1285).

III. Whoever has laid violent hands on the person of other clerics, that is, clerics inferior to Bishops, or of religious of either sex (canon 2343, § 4). What violent laying on of hands imports, see p. 766 under X. For the excommunication to be incurred, it is required that the delinquent lay hands on the person of another, not on his own person, and that he know that person to be a cleric, religious, etc. The persons whose violent handling is punished with excommunication are:

1. Clerics, that is, those who by at least first tonsure have been assigned to divine ministries (canon 108, § 1), and have not been deprived of the privileges of clerics; hence even excommunicated, suspended, interdicted, and deposed clerics (cf. canon 2303, § 1), but not those perpetually deprived of the right of wearing ecclesiastical habit (canon 2304, § 2), the degraded (canon 2305, § 1), and all who have legitimately been reduced or have returned from the clerical state to the lay state (canon 213, § 1).

2. Religious of either sex, that is, those who have pronounced vows, whether solemn or simple, perpetual or temporary, in some religion (canon 488, 7°).

3. Male and female novices (cf. canon 614), but not postulants.

4. Members of either sex without public vows, living in common under the governance of Superiors according to approved constitutions (canon 680).

Note. The Ordinary should moreover punish the delinquent with other penalties, if the matter requires it, according to his prudent judgment (canon 2343, § 4).

IV. Those procuring abortion, the mother not excepted, the effect having followed (canon 2350, § 1).

1. Abortion is to be taken in the strict sense, that is, for the ejection of a fetus not yet viable (volume I, n. 733). Therefore the so-called acceleration of birth, the ejection of a dead fetus or a mere mole, and the expulsion of received semen, likewise embryotomy and similar illicit operations, are excluded. But no distinction is to be made between an animated and an unanimated fetus.

2. Those procuring abortion are understood to be the mother and others, whether female or male, who intend abortion and either physically cause it, or by command or by fear induced cause another to cause it. It is said, who intend abortion; hence one is immune from excommunication who, not intending abortion, for example, strikes his wife from anger, even if he foresees abortion. It is said, either by command or etc.; but if you were to deny that those commanding and those inducing fear come under the name of procurers, nevertheless one commanding, as the principal author of the delict, and one inducing fear, as inducing to the delict, are subject to the excommunication. Counselors and others concurring proximately are not counted among procurers, although as cooperators they contract the excommunication if the delict would not have been committed without their work (canon 2209, § 3). Those selling means do not ordinarily incur excommunication, both because ordinarily even without their work, namely with another selling the means, the delict would have been perpetrated, and because the concurrence is remote.

3. The effect having followed, that is, certainly followed; hence in doubt whether a fetus or a mere mole, whether a living or dead fetus, was ejected, the excommunication does not hold.

Whether one whom it repents of the committed crime before the effect follows incurs the excommunication, see p. 723.

Note 1. If the delinquent is a cleric, he is moreover to be deposed (canon 2350, § 1).

Note 2. Those who have procured the abortion of a human fetus, the effect having followed, and all cooperators, are irregular from delict (canon 985, 4°).

V. A religious, apostate from religion, incurs by the law itself an excommunication reserved to his own major Superior, or, if the religion is lay or non-exempt, to the Ordinary of the place in which he is staying (canon 2385).

1. One is called an apostate from religion who is professed from perpetual vows, whether solemn or simple, and who illegitimately leaves the religious house with the intention of not returning, or who, though having left legitimately, does not return with the intention of withdrawing himself from religious obedience (canon 644, § 1). The malicious intention mentioned in § 1 is presumed by law if the religious within a month has neither returned nor manifested to the Superior his intention of returning (canon 644, § 2).

2. The excommunication is reserved to his own major Superior if the religion is clerical exempt; if the religion is lay or non-exempt, it is reserved to the Ordinary of the place in which the delinquent is staying (canon 2385), that is, actually staying, even if he has domicile or quasi-domicile elsewhere.

Note. A religious apostate from religion is excluded from legitimate ecclesiastical acts and deprived of all privileges of his religion; and if he returns, he perpetually lacks active and passive voice, and moreover must be punished by the Superiors with other penalties according to the gravity of the fault, according to the norm of the constitutions (canon 2385).

VI. Professed members of perpetual simple vows, both in Orders and in religious Congregations, who presume to contract marriage even only civilly, both they themselves and all who contract with them (canon 2388, § 2). Note that the excommunication does not affect professed members of temporary vows. For the rest, see p. 772 under IX.

The mere presence, however, of condemned matter in a writing does not cause it to fall under prohibition.

(a) Some works are not forbidden unless the author’s purpose to teach error or attack the truth is known. Hence, books on religion written by non-Catholics which contain errors against the Catholic Faith are not forbidden, unless they deal with religion ex professo (i.e., not incidentally or cursorily, but clearly for the purpose of teaching). It is not necessary, however, that religion be the main theme of the book, Similarly, books that attack religion are forbidden, not when attacks are casual or by the way, but when they are made purposely; and the same is true as regards books that insult the clerical state. The purpose is recognized from the declaration of the author, from the nature of the work, from the systematic treatment, length or frequency of argumentation or attack, etc.

(b) Other works are not forbidden, unless they contain not only agreement with error, but also argument in defense of error. Thus, books in favor of heresy, schism, suicide, duelling, divorce, Freemasonry, etc., are forbidden when they champion wrong causes by disputing in their behalf.

(c) Other works are forbidden, not because they state, but because they approve of error. Such are books that attack or ridicule the foundations of religion or the dogmas of faith, those that disparage worship, those that are subversive of discipline, those that defend proscribed propositions, those that teach and favor superstition, etc.

War.—War is defined as a state of conflict between two or more sovereign nations carried on by force of arms.

(a) It is a state of conflict, and so differs from passing conflicts, such as battles, skirmishes, campaigns. The enemy in war is not only those with whom one is actually fighting, but all those who side with them, as counsellors, helpers, etc.

(b) War is between sovereign nations, and so differs from civil war, sedition, riots, duels. Moreover, war is made by nation against nation, not against particular individuals or groups of individuals within a nation.

(c) It is carried on by force of arms, and so differs from trade war, rivalry in preparedness for war, embargo, blockade, breach of diplomatic relations, etc.

There are two kinds of war, just and unjust. (a) War is just when undertaken for a right cause (e.g., the independence of the nation); (b) it is unjust when undertaken for a wrong cause (e.g., the enslavement of a nation).

Just war is either offensive or defensive. (a) Offensive war is attack made on an enemy in order to avenge an injury or enforce a right (e.g., invasion of the enemy’s territory to obtain compensation for damages inflicted by him); (b) defensive war is resistance to unjust attack made or menaced by an enemy (e.g., war made on the invader of one’s country).

Just war is called defensive in two senses. (a) In the strict sense, it is defensive when the nation whose rights are unjustly attacked does not initiate hostilities, that is, does not declare or begin the war. (b) In a less strict sense, it is defensive when the nation unjustly attacked declares war or strikes the first blow. Thus, if the innocent nation knew that the enemy was secretly preparing war against its independence, it would be on the defensive, even though it declared war.

War is not against the law of God. (a) Under the law of nature Melchisedech blessed Abraham returning from victory over the four kings (Gen., xiv. 18-20). (b) Under the written law, God many times ordered or approved of war, as can be seen from Exodus and following books in numerous places. (c) Under the New Law, John the Baptist acknowledged the lawfulness of the soldier’s profession (Luke, iii. 14), a centurion was praised by Christ (Matt, viii. 10), Acts, x. 2, speaks of the officer Cornelius as a religious man, and St. Paul lauds warriors of the Old Testament such as Gedeon, Barac, Samson, etc. (Heb, xi. 32-34). Our Lord Himself used physical force against evildoers (John, ii. 14 sqq.).

Certain sayings of our Lord—for example, that those who take the sword shall perish by the sword (Matt, xxvi. 52), and that one should not resist evil (Matt, v. 39)—are not an endorsement of extreme pacifism, but are respectively a condemnation of those who without due authority have recourse to violence, and a counsel of perfection, when this serves better the honor of God or the good of the neighbor. Moreover, these words of Christ were addressed, not to states, which are responsible for the welfare of their members, but to individuals. The Quakers have done excellent service for the cause of world peace, but their teaching that all war is contrary to the law of Christ cannot be admitted. The spirit of the Gospel includes justice as well as love.

War is not against the law of the Church. (a) The Church has never condemned war as such. She has always labored for the promotion of peace or for the lessening of the evils of wars that could not be prevented; but her official declarations and the writings of the Fathers and Doctors show that she recognized that recourse to arms by nations is not necessarily sinful. (b) The Church has put her approval on some wars as necessary and laudable. Thus, the Crusades, to which the salvation of Christian civilization is due, were promoted by the Church; military orders for the defense of the Holy Sepulchre were instituted by her, and she has raised to the honors of the altar soldiers like Sebastian, Maurice, and Martin of Tours.

War is not against the law of nature. (a) As the law of nature allows even a private individual to use force to drive off an unjust aggressor, it cannot be unlawful for a nation to have recourse to defensive war when its rights are invaded. (b) As the law of nature allows the individual to seek satisfaction for injury and restitution for loss, it cannot be unlawful for a nation to make offensive war when another nation will not make reparation, unless compelled to it by force. If physical coercion were unlawful, a conscienceless nation would take advantage of this at the expense of other nations, and thus a premium would be set on iniquity.

Like every other act, war is not morally good, unless its object, its purpose and its circumstances are in accord with right. War is not lawful, therefore, unless the three following conditions exist:

(a) Hostilities must be authorized by the public authority, for the care of the State against internal and external disturbances has been committed to the ruler (Rom., xii. 4; Ps. lxxxi. 4), and the individual or the subject state can have recourse for protection of its rights to the higher authority.

(b) There must be a just cause for war, that is, some fault on the side of the other nation; for, if a nation may not use force against its own subjects without sufficient reason, much less may it do so against those who are not its subjects.

(c) There must be a right intention, that is, the desire to obtain some good or to ward off some evil. Even if war is declared by the proper authority and there is a sufficient reason for it, those who take part in the war are guilty of sin if they have evil motives, such as the exercise of cruelty, revenge, pride, or avarice. To delight in war because one loves excitement or wishes to show one’s skill or get promotion, is not a right frame of mind.

What public authority has the right to declare war? (a) Ordinarily, only the sovereign power—that is, the person or body in whom the chief authority is vested according to the constitution of the nation—can make war. War is an act of the nation, and hence only the authority that represents the nation can make war. Subordinate bodies in a confederation or union of states have the right to make war, if custom or law allows it.

(b) In extraordinary circumstances, an inferior power can authorize war, as when war is necessary and it is impossible to await a declaration from the sovereign power. Thus, if a province were suddenly invaded, it would be lawful for the head of the province to make war on the invaders at once. It seems, indeed, that the head of a province could justly authorize the invasion of a neighboring state, to protect such province against aggressions, if the central authority would do nothing; for such a war would be really defensive.

In order that the cause of war be just, it is necessary that the enemy nation has done or now menaces an injury which cannot be repaired without war, and which is so serious that the evils of war are less than that of toleration.

(a) Thus, a serious injury or grave dishonor inflicted by another nation is the only just cause for the armed conflict which constitutes war, for war is exercised as a punishment or a compulsion, and these are unjust if no grave and formal fault is supposed.

(b) Only an injury that cannot be otherwise repaired is a just cause for war, because a state has no right to use force against another sovereign state except as a last resort. Hence, if the country at fault has already made satisfaction or has promised to make satisfaction, war should not be declared.

(c) Only an injury so grave that it outweighs the risks and losses of war is a justification for making war, for when two effects, one good and one evil, follow from an act, there must be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect before acting (see 104, 105). It would be wrong to avenge some small insult or some isolated injury at the expense of immense treasure and enormous loss of life. Modern warfare is so devastating that only the gravest reasons known to society can authorize it. For, according to scientists, a single H-bomb may cause death and destruction over a wide area, perhaps the space of a hundred square miles. In view of the havoc which is foreseen to outweigh the benefits of victory, it could happen that a nation with justice on its side and the potential to wage war would nevertheless not be justified in waging war (see 1410). This destructive power of modern weapons, however, need not imply a sweeping condemnation of all warfare. Spiritual values, e.g., freedom from tyranny, freedom to worship God, still hold primacy over material values and can be deemed so precious as to outweigh the great loss of lives and property involved in defending them or recovering them through modern warfare. “A people menaced by, or already victims of unjust aggression, if it desires to think and to act in a Christian manner, cannot remain in passive indifference” (Pope Pius XII, Christmas Message of 1948).

In comparing the advantages and disadvantages of war, one should take into consideration, not only the losses oneself will suffer, but also the losses that will be suffered by others. (a) Thus, if the enemy nation will be ruined as the price of one’s obtaining some small right, charity would urge that one abstain from war. (b) If the world in general or posterity will suffer greater evils materially or spiritually than a nation is now suffering from the denial of some non-essential right, charity at least should rule out a declaration of war.

Is there a just reason for war, when a fault has been committed on both sides? (a) If the injuries are about equal and still in being, there is no reason for war, for neither nation is in a position to accuse the other of injustice. (b) If the injuries are quite unequal or one nation has shown a willingness to cease from injury, the less guilty nation has a right to make war; but it should first clear itself of injustice, before it proceeds to chastise injustice in the other.

Sufficient causes for making war are: (a) grave injury to the honor of a nation, such as insult to its ruler or ambassadors (II Kings, x.); (b) injury to the natural right of the nation to existence, self-preservation, property, free action within its own sphere; thus, a people may make war to defend their independence (I Mach., iii. 59), to recover territory taken from them unjustly, to resist a violation of neutrality (II Kings, viii. 5), to protect their own citizens and commerce; (c) injury to the rights of the nation under positive law. Thus, a nation may make war to uphold important international agreements, to enforce the observance of treaties, and the like.

Injury done to a third nation or to the subjects of a third nation may also be a sufficient reason for war. (a) Thus, out of justice, a nation is obliged to help its allies in a just war; for to help those with whose interests one’s own interests are involved is only self-defense. (b) Out of charity, a nation that has the right of intervention may lawfully go to war to protect a weaker nation against a stronger and bullying nation, to assist a government unjustly attacked by its subjects, or to help innocent subjects who are tyrannized over by their government.

Is it lawful to go to war over religion or morality?

(a) Error in the religion or immorality in the practices of another people is not a sufficient reason for making war on them. No one can be forced to believe, says St. Augustine; and it is likewise true that no one can be forced to love virtue, whereas external conformity without conviction or love is hypocritical. Moreover, a nation has no authority to correct the sins of those not subject to it. Hence, it would not be right to attack a people for the sole reason that it was pagan or polygamous.

(b) Interference, however, with the religious rights of others or sinful practices that are injurious to others are a sufficient reason for war. No war ever had a more legitimate cause than the Crusades, which were undertaken to defend the Christian religion against the unspeakable atrocities of infidels. The cause of humanity justifies a war to put an end to such evils as cannibalism or human sacrifice.

Is it lawful to make war on another nation in order to bring to it the benefits of modern civilization? (a) If the uncivilized nation lacks a government and suffers from disorder, it is an act of charity for a civilized nation to set up a government there which will act for the benefit of the people of the country. It is also lawful to make war on those who resist the government thus established. (b) If the uncivilized nation has its own orderly form of government and is at peace, no other nation has the right to interfere under pretext of introducing a higher type of government. Colonial expansion is not a sufficient reason for war in such circumstances.

The following causes for war are not sufficient:

(a) Motives clearly sinful are such as do not suppose any injury done by the other nation, but rather some evil passion of pride, greed, jealousy, suspicion, or selfishness on one’s own side. Hence, it is not lawful to go to war for the glory of a ruler or of the nation, for the enlargement of one’s territory, for the advantage that may be gained over a commercial rival, for the preservation of the balance of power, or for the prevention of difficulties at home.

(b) Motives apparently just, but really sinful, are injuries done by another, if one has secretly provoked them in order to have a pretext for war. It is not right to make war on a people because of attacks made by their citizens, if these attacks were purposely caused by one’s own citizens.

(c) Motives of displeasure with another nation are not sufficient as motives for war, if the other nation has violated no right of justice, but only acted in a way not consonant with charity or friendship. Thus, the fact that one nation denies another financial assistance or the tariff advantages granted to a third nation is not a casus belli; for in matters of benevolence or privilege there is no strict claim or title, and hence no right to have recourse to arms.

Is war lawful when the justice of the cause is doubtful? (a) The government may not declare war, unless it is morally certain that right is on its side. The consequences of war are so dreadful, and the use of force against another nation is such an extreme measure, that one should refrain from hostilities as long as one’s moral right is uncertain.

(b) Volunteers not already enlisted may not offer their services to a belligerent, unless they are morally certain that his cause is just. They participate in war from choice, and they should assure themselves that their choice is correct.

(c) Subjects called to the colors should fight for their country, even if they are in doubt about the justice of the cause, for the presumption is on the side of the government. This does not mean, however, that one should be willing to fight for one’s country, right or wrong. nor that one would be obliged to fight for a cause manifestly unjust, or to obey an order flagrantly wrong.

What is the meaning of “moral certitude” in the previous paragraph? (a) Some moralists believe that a high degree of probability of the righteousness of his cause suffices in order that a ruler may take steps towards war. (b) The greater number of moralists, however, hold that no degree of probability suffices. The justifying reasons must be clearer than day, and the state which goes to war must not entertain a single doubt that its cause is right. This opinion we prefer; for, if a jury may not sentence an accused to death as long as there is a reasonable doubt of his innocence, neither ought a nation to pass what is really a death sentence on hundreds or thousands of citizens as long as there exists a doubt of a compelling reason for such a course. It should, however, be observed that a ruler who has only probable evidence that an injury has been done already, may have certainty that it will be done, if it is not prevented by war.

Is it possible that the cause of war should be just on both sides? (a) Materially or objectively, the cause of war is just only on one side, for, if one nation has the right to demand satisfaction or restitution, manifestly the other nation has no right to refuse or resist. (b) Formally or subjectively, the cause of war is just only on one side, if the facts and obligations are known to both disputants, for the nation that knows the right of the other side and yet opposes it, does not act in good faith. (c) Formally or subjectively, the cause of war is just on both sides, if the nation that is objectively in the wrong is subjectively persuaded that it is in the right. And, even though a government is in bad faith, its people as a rule will be in good faith as a result of not understanding the facts or merits of the controversy.

It is possible that there should be objective justice and injustice on the same side. (a) Thus, the side which is just as regards the cause of the war, may be unjust in its conduct of the war on account of the unlawful means it employs to win, or its continuation of a hopeless struggle. (b) The side which was just as regards the original cause of the war, may be unjust as regards a new cause that appears. Thus, a nation which goes to war to regain a lost territory, but which continues to fight for the sake of conquest after the legitimate end has been achieved, contends for a just cause at the beginning, but for an unjust cause later on. (c) The side whose grounds are justifiable from the immediate point of view may be in the wrong if causes are traced farther back.

What are the duties before the beginning of war, according to natural law?

(a) Examination of the Cause of War.—It is clear that those charged with the declaration of war are bound to examine diligently and prayerfully into the dispute, weighing the reasons on both sides, and asking light from on high. To this end they should seek the counsel, not of a few, but of many—not merely among those who are experts in the diplomatic, legal, economic, and military aspects of the question, but also among those who will look at the matter from its ethical side and who are guided by fairness and justice. Since it is the people who have to bear the burdens of war, it seems that many wars in the past would have been prevented, had the wishes of the people been consulted.

(b) Judgment about the Merits of the Controversy.—It is also clear that those who have to decide for war or peace should be impartial in their judgment. Hence, they have to be on their guard against jingoism, yellow journalism, and war interests, as well as against the pacifist or the favorer of a foreign country at the expense of his own. They should not proceed to offensive war, if their cause remains doubtful, unless the other side provokes war by refusing peaceful settlement; but, if they are in possession, they have the right to make defensive war.

(c) Judgment about the Feasibility of War.—Prudence demands that, even when a nation is convinced that it has a just cause to make war, it should nevertheless refrain from this, unless it has a well-grounded expectation that war will improve matters (Luke, xiv. 31, 32). Statesmen who plunge their people into adventures whose end they cannot at all foresee, are criminals.

(d) Efforts at Peaceful Solution.—Even if the cause is just and the war feasible, hostilities should not be resorted to except as a last means. Hence, pacific means—such as direct negotiation, mediation, arbitration, judicial settlement, or pressure through trade embargoes, boycotts, breach of diplomatic intercourse, etc.—should be tried in the first place.

The Chief Duties before Beginning War, According to International Law.—(a) Before war is declared, an ultimatum should be issued to the other nation, offering it final terms and a last opportunity to make apology or satisfaction. (b) Foreigners who are in one’s territory should be given an opportunity to settle their affairs and leave the country within a reasonable time. (c) Ambassadors and other representatives of the enemy should be provided with passports.

In itself, as said above (see 1380 sqq.), war is not unlawful. But in the light of the conditions required for a just war and of circumstances as they are today, can war at the present time be ever justifiable? (a) If the supreme interests of a nation are at stake (such as its independence, the policies or interests vital to its existence, its obligations under covenant or treaty of peace), war can still be lawful today, for a nation cannot surrender its right to self-defense, or betray its solemn engagements of cooperative defense. (b) If less than supreme interests are at stake, war today seems unjustifiable, for what proportion is there between the minor interests of a single or several nations and the enormous destruction of modern war and the dislocation of international security? Efforts of statesmen to secure a world pact, outlawing or renouncing war as a means of national policy, indicates progress for this view.

What are the duties during war? (a) One should use every lawful means, according to one’s position, to secure victory for one’s country. Fighting to gain only a “stalemate,” in itself, is immoral. (b) One should avoid such means as are opposed to natural or international law.

It is not true that all is fair in war, for even a just cause cannot sanction unjust means. The commandments of God and the laws of nations retain their force even amid the clash of arms. Examples of acts of war that are unlawful, as being opposed to the natural law are the following: (a) acts of irreligion, such as wanton destruction of churches or monasteries; (b) attempts to seduce enemy soldiers from the obedience or loyalty owed their commanders; (c) murder, that is, the direct killing of innocent and unarmed persons, as when one refuses quarter to soldiers who wish to surrender, fires on an officer bearing a flag of truce, sinks passenger ships not engaged on errands of war, massacres the civil population by raids from the air, places a defenceless population at the mercy of savages or criminals employed as soldiers; (d) the dishonoring of women, the establishment of brothels for soldiers; (e) stealing, such as the unauthorized pillage of a town or countryside; (f) lying, such as breaking treaties, not keeping faith with the foe, entering into perjured agreements, circulating false stories of atrocities, forging of documents, etc.

Just war is resistance to unjust aggression, and so the same means are lawful in warfare as are lawful in private aggression. (a) Thus, the means used against an aggressor must not be evil in themselves, as when a person protects himself against a murderer by making an innocent person a shield. Hence, in war one may not use any means that is opposed to the law of God, or to human contracts or other obligations. (b) The means employed must be such as are really necessary for overpowering the aggressor. Thus, it is not lawful to kill a burglar when wounding him will suffice for the protection of one’s property. Likewise, in war it is not lawful to exterminate or depopulate an enemy, if the end of war can be attained by depriving the enemy of his weapons.

The principal classes of acts of war from the moral standpoint are: (a) acts in which violence is done to things connected with religion; (b) acts of violence against persons; (c) acts of violence against property; (d) acts used to conceal truth.

Acts of War and Sacred Times.—(a) It is lawful to carry on warfare, offensively or defensively, on feasts, when this is necessary, just as it is lawful to do servile work on those days in case of necessity (I Mach., ii. 41; John, vii. 23). (b) But if a suspension of hostilities can be arranged for feast days (especially for the greater ones, such as Christmas and Easter), warfare should be discontinued at those times.

Acts of War and Sacred Places.—(a) It is lawful to attack a church building, if it is certainly being used for military purposes. It is also lawful to attack fortifications, and thus unintentionally to harm adjacent church buildings. (b) It is not lawful, apart from these reasons of real military necessity, to injure sacred places or edifices.

Acts of War and Sacred Persons.—(a) It is lawful for clerics to cooperate in a just war in spiritual ways, as by exhortations, prayers, and religious ministrations. Moses prayed for the armies of Israel during battle (Exod., xvii. 8 sqq.), the priests accompanied Josue around the wall of Jericho (Jos., vi. 4), and St. Bernard and other holy men preached crusades. (b) It is not lawful, apart from necessity (as in case of conscription), for clerics to take part in actual fighting. Warfare is unbecoming in a cleric, because he is enrolled for a spiritual warfare (II Tim., ii. 4), and because his leader, Christ, shed His own blood, not that of others (Matt, xxvi. 52). Hence, the Church forbids clerics to volunteer as soldiers (Canon 141).

The persons to whom violence is done during war are: (a) Combatants, that is, all those who are engaged in the actual promotion of the war. Direct combatants are the fighters, such as the officers and privates of army, navy, and air force; indirect combatants are the unarmed auxiliaries of the soldiers in military ways, such as makers of munition, transporters of supplies, and those in the communication service. (b) Non-combatants are enemy subjects who are neither fighters nor auxiliaries of the armed forces, such as chaplains and members of the medical service in the army, persons in civil life and occupation, old men, women, and children. (c) Neutrals are those who are not subject to either of the warring contenders, and who take no part in the hostilities, although they may sympathize with one side.

The Killing or Wounding of Enemy Combatants.—(a) According to natural law, it is lawful to kill or wound the enemy in battle, or to starve him by blockade, just as it is lawful in self-defense to kill or wound an unjust aggressor. (b) According to international law, it was expressly forbidden to attack in ways that make war more cruel without hastening the decision.

The Killing or Wounding of Non-Combatants.—(a) The indirect killing of non-combatants (i.e., killing which is unintentional and unavoidable) is lawful, according to the rules given for double effect (see 103, 104). Hence, it is lawful to bombard the fortifications, arsenals, munition works, and barracks of a town, to sink passenger liners that are carrying arms or stores to the enemy, to cut off food supplies from a town or country in order to starve out its troops, although these measures will entail the deaths of some civilians as well as of combatants. Humanity requires, however, that an effort be made to spare the non-combatants, when possible, as by serving warning of attack, so that they may be removed to safety. When it is a question, however, of the use of modern weapons (the atom, hydrogen or cobalt bombs) on military targets in the vicinity of large cities, where it is foreseen that many thousands of civilians will be killed or severely wounded, then the principle of double effect seems to rule out the lawfulness of using such devastating weapons. The immediate evil effect, the slaughter of the innocents, could hardly be called incidental and only reluctantly permitted. Concretely, the inevitable results of the use of such weapons would have to be intended directly, if not as an end, at least as a means.

(b) The direct killing of non-combatants (i.e., killing which is intentional) is unlawful and constitutes the sin of murder. Obliteration bombing, the dropping of H-bombs or atom bombs on a residential section of a city containing no military objectives, are of this character; for they are attacks on civilians. It can not be argued that such an attack would probably break down the morale of the citizens to such an extent that they would force their rulers to make peace and so save many thousands of lives. For this argument is based on the principle that a good end justifies evil means.

Occasionally it is argued that modern “total” warfare demands that all citizens contribute to the war effort and that consequently everyone is a combatant. The argument can hardly be sustained, for Catholic doctrine insists that those whose participation is only remote and accidental are not to be classified as combatants. In a well-documented article on “The Morality of Obliteration Bombing,” by John C. Ford, S.J. (Theological Studies, V, 1944, pp. 261-309), the validity of the distinction between combatants and innocent non-combatants, even in the condition of modern war, is upheld. Fr. Ford shows that in an industrial city, as found in the United States, three-fourths of the population belong to the non-combatant category, and he lists more than a hundred trades or professions which, according to the natural law, exclude their members from the category of combatants. Direct attacks on such a population clearly would constitute unjustifiable killing or wounding of non-combatants.

The Sentence of Death for Military Crimes.—(a) It is lawful to sentence to death persons guilty of international crime, such as those who approach when warned to halt, civilians who fire on the troops, guerrillas, pirates, spies and deserters. (b) It is not lawful to sentence to death persons not guilty of international crime. Thus, a private soldier should not be executed because under orders he killed a non-combatant; a hostage, not guilty of any capital crime, should not be put to death, because his fellow-citizens for whom he is held rebel or break faith.

Imprisonment and Restraint.—(a) Combatants may be made prisoners of war, non-combatants are subject to the restrictions of military rules when their territory is occupied, and in very exceptional cases they may be transported behind their enemy’s lines. (b) Prisoners of war and inhabitants of occupied territory are to be treated as human beings, but not better than the soldiers of one’s own army. They may not be reduced to slavery, held as hostages, tortured or starved to death, or placed in front trenches as a shield to one’s own forces.

The Destruction or Seizure of Property During War.—(a) The military property of the enemy nation or of its subjects may be confiscated or destroyed, just as an individual has the right to destroy the weapon of an unjust aggressor. Hence, a commander may demolish fortifications, war factories, airships, warships, weapons and artillery; he may cut off or seize supplies and provisions of money, food or drink.

(b) The public, non-military property of the enemy may be occupied by a successful invader. He may appropriate movable goods (works of art and some others are excepted by international law), and he may use immovable goods (public places of worship, museums, etc., are excepted by law).

(c) As to private property of enemy subjects on land, international law requires that immovables generally be respected, and movables can be seized only for some necessary purpose of war. Requisitions and contributions may be exacted and soldiers may be billeted in the homes of citizens, but only so much may be levied as is needed for army maintenance and civil administration, and compensation must be made, or a receipt be given for future compensation. War is made, not against private persons, but against the state.

(d) As to private property on sea, the usage has been that the merchant ships of the enemy may be captured and made a lawful prize.

(e) The property of neutrals on land must not be molested, unless it is not really neutral, as when it is being used by the enemy. As regards the ships and shipping of neutrals on the high seas, they are not up to the present protected by international agreement. Rather the naval powers are divided between the theories of command of the seas and freedom of the seas. Thus, Great Britain claims the right to search, seize and hold the vessels or cargoes of neutrals who carry contraband or attempt to trade with the enemy in the face of a blockade.

It is an axiom that booty taken in war belongs, not to the private soldiers, but to their government. Hence, the question arises: Are private soldiers, who take the goods of citizens without authorization from their officers, bound to make restitution? (a) If they take what is necessary for their own sustenance, they act against military discipline, but not against justice, and are not bound to restore. (b) If they take other things, they are bound to restore, since international agreements make this a duty of justice. But, if neither of the belligerents observed this agreement, the obligation of restitution cannot be insisted on as grave.

What is the order of the precepts among themselves? - "After the three precepts pertaining to religion, by which the debt is rendered to God, and after the fourth precept, which belongs to piety, by which the debt is rendered to parents, in which is included every debt which by some special reason is owed, it was necessary that consequently some precepts be placed pertaining to justice properly so called, which renders the debt indifferently to all." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 122, a. 6.

Therefore the six precepts of the Decalogue which follow, as the same Angelic Doctor teaches, l. c. a. 1, are "about the acts of justice commonly so called, which is considered between equals." In these six precepts are prohibited homicide, adultery, theft, and false testimony. "But all other harms which are inflicted on neighbors can be reduced to these, which are prohibited by these precepts, as to certain more common and principal things. For all harms which are inflicted on the person of a neighbor are understood to be prohibited in homicide, as in the more principal thing. But those which are inflicted on a connected person, and especially by way of lust, are understood to be prohibited together with adultery. Those, however, which pertain to damages inflicted in things, are understood to be prohibited together with theft. But those which pertain to speech, such as detractions, blasphemies, and any such things, are understood to be prohibited in false testimony, which is more directly contrary to justice." S. Th. l. c. a. 6 ad 2.

What is the fifth precept of the Decalogue? - The fifth precept is: You shall not kill, Ex. 20:13. Now this fifth precept, insofar as it is negative, primarily indeed prohibits homicide, that is, the unjust killing of a man; secondarily, however, and consequently, unjust anger, or the inordinate appetite of vengeance, Matth. 5:21, 22, and every other unjust injury, wounding, or mutilation of the body, whether one's own or another's, which is reduced to homicide as the principal bodily injury. But insofar as it is virtually positive, it commands the conservation of life. Those things, however, which will be established here concerning killing, whether lawful or unlawful, will be applied, with due proportion preserved, to mutilation or any injury of the body.

Struggl 3, 5; L. 363.

Is suicide lawful? Without divine authority it is wicked directly to kill oneself. Someone is said directly to kill himself or another when truly, per se and directly, by doing something, he intends to take life from himself or another; but indirectly, when he does not positively intend this, yet voluntarily does something from which he foresees the death of himself or another will follow. Proof: For 1. this is openly prohibited by Sacred Scripture, Ex. 20:13; Deut. 52:39; Wis. 16:13. 2. It is contrary to charity toward oneself, and is injurious both to God, who alone is the direct and absolute master of human life, and to society and the commonwealth, which is unjustly deprived through suicide of its part or citizen. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 64, a. 5. Hence suicide is deservedly punished by both laws. For by Common Civil Law both suicides and those who attempt this crime, even if death has not followed, are punished with the penalty of infamy. By ecclesiastical law, however, suicides are deprived of sacred burial and the suffrages of the Church, as is established in C. 12, c. 23, q. 4, and as may be seen in the Roman Ritual; this penalty nevertheless does not include those who, by madness, insanity, or imagination disturbed through most grave sadness of soul, have taken life from themselves, or those who repented of the crime before death. Struggl 7; Ithur. Cas. 40, n. 3 seqq.; L. 366, 375.

You will resolve: It is not lawful for a virgin directly to kill herself even to preserve chastity, which is esteemed a very great good. Nor is it lawful to kill oneself, although the least space of life remains. Struggl 8; Ithur. l. c.; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 64, a. 5 ad 3, 5; L. 366.

Is it lawful by a positive act to concur in one's own death? Never, without divine authority, is it lawful to posit an external act tending per se immediately to one's own destruction, unless that act has another good and immediate effect, which alone is intended, and a grave reason urges the obtaining of that good effect. The reason is that, where the physical act, even though per se indifferent, has no other effect than suicide, it already becomes evil, since no reason is present by which the precept of conserving life and of avoiding the danger of death ceases, and the killing of oneself would be directly intended, at least implicitly. Hence in whatever case it is prohibited. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 64, a. 5 ad 4; L. 366. Cf. here 717.

You will resolve: It is wicked to throw oneself into a river, with certain danger of death, in order to baptize a child. For this would be directly to take life from oneself; namely because first one posits a means which directly and immediately tends to the killing of oneself, so that afterward, once that is posited, he may be able to administer baptism. Likewise it is wicked to do or omit something with the design that death be accelerated. But it is lawful to serve those infected with plague, to go to dangerous places of missions, and to undertake a dangerous journey from a grave and proportionate cause, as Christopher Columbus and others did. L. 366.

Is mutilation of oneself lawful? It is not lawful to mutilate oneself, or even to mutilate another, unless this is necessary for the conservation of the whole body, and with the consent of him whose member it is, or of him "to whom it pertains to care for the safety of him who has a member corruptive" of the other members. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 65, a. 1. But otherwise to mutilate someone in a member is altogether unlawful; and this even if it is done to preserve chastity and avoid temptations. The reason is that God is the absolute and direct master of human life; but man has only useful or indirect dominion over his own body. Unless this is necessary for the conservation of the whole body; for since the part is ordered to preserving the whole body, under the pressure of such necessity, some member certainly can be cut off, for example, to cut off for oneself a hand bound by a chain in order to avoid death impending from a beast, or a tyrant, or fire. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 64, a. 2; q. 65, a. 1; Lugo de Iust. d. 10, n. 22; La-Croix 786. Even if it is done, etc., because this remedy is neither absolutely necessary, nor in fact does it exempt from carnal temptations, although someone becomes impotent for generating. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 65, a. 1. Hence, a fortiori, it is more probably not lawful to castrate boys in order to preserve the voice in them, L. 374. "And indeed the reason is most valid... For man is not so the master of the members of his body that he is able to assent to the cutting off of any one of them, except if the safety and conservation of the whole body cannot otherwise be obtained." Benedict XIV, de Syn. l. 11, c. 7, n. 4; Lugo d. 10, n. 23; S. Th. l. c. The discipline of the Church, moreover, brands with the mark of irregularity a eunuch who, outside the necessity of saving life, has given assent to his own mutilation. Benedict XIV, l. c. n. 5. 1. Nor indeed is it lawful for someone to cut off his own fingers in order to avoid military service. Struggl 9, 10; L. l. 7, nn. 416-418.

714bis. Note: The Porro operation, so called from the Italian physician Porro, consists in the extraction of the uterus with the ovaries and other annexed parts. It is a true mutilation and utero-ovarian castration of the woman. Therefore it is not lawful unless for the conservation of one's own life. Just as mutilation and castration, whether in a man or in a woman, is unlawful, so also unlawful is atrophization or cutting of the canals conducting spermatozoa "or nemaspermata in a man." This atrophization or cutting is equivalently a grave mutilation, and a grave sin, unless it is done to save life itself. Nor indeed can public authority introduce this vasectomy, as it is called, lest degenerate men be procreated from degenerate parents, whether as the punishment of some crime, or as a necessary means because of the common good. For the power of procreating offspring pertains to personal dignity itself, and to the species, or to the propagation of the human race, over which public authority has no power. Nor can it be a punishment of crime, since it would render them still more criminal and unbridled in lust, and against the order of nature; nor can it of itself be a necessary and useful means because of the common good, for which wholly other, quite different means are necessary and useful, especially moral ones.

What is the obligation of conserving life? - Each one, from charity toward himself and from justice toward God and toward society, is bound to ordinary means for conserving life. The reason is that it is the same thing not to preserve life for oneself as to take it away from oneself. By ordinary means; for one is not bound to extraordinary means, unless his life is altogether necessary for the common good. And indeed extraordinary means are placed outside common powers. Therefore the law cannot commonly command them. But the labor of those who are occupied with the necessity of supporting life, such as workers, is not an extraordinary means, but an ordinary one, since it is a means given by nature itself for the necessities of life. L. 372.

You will resolve: A sick man in danger of death, when there is hope of safety, cannot reject ordinary medicines prescribed for him. One is not bound to make immense expenses for conserving life for oneself, or to use choice remedies which cause immense pains for him, for example, the amputation of a leg, incision of the abdomen for extracting a stone, etc. A virgin is not bound to suffer an operation by the hands of a physician, even if life is endangered, when because of modesty it happens to be most grave for her, and brings upon her a greater horror than death itself.

It is also lawful for a virgin to suffer death rather than permit her own violation, because of the very great good of virginity. It is lawful, for probably she is not bound, at least speaking speculatively, provided that she resists with a positive will, and the proximate danger of consent is absent. The reason is that this permission is not formal cooperation in the sin of another, but only material, and a just cause of permission is present, namely the danger of death. Likewise it is lawful for a virgin, in order to preserve chastity, to expose herself to the danger of death, at least if death is not certainly going to follow, and this both because of love of chastity and because of the danger of sin, which is often present in such an occasion. Indeed, more probably it must still be affirmed, even if death is certainly going to follow and there is no proximate danger of consent; because even bodily integrity alone is esteemed very highly. L. 366, 368, 372, 430, 433; H. A. l. 2; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 65, a. 1; Struggl 6; tr. 6 de Iust. et Iure q. 5, a. 1, nn. 5, 10; La-Croix l. 3, p. 1, n. 916; Lugo d. 10, nn. 197, 198.

Is it lawful to concur indirectly in one's own death? It is lawful, from a grave cause, to concur indirectly in the killing of oneself, or to posit an action from which, besides the intention, one's own death certainly follows, provided that from that action there follows at least equally immediately some good, and this alone is intended. The reason is that then death, if it follows, is not willed, but merely permitted, from a proportionate cause. Cf. 36. Struggl 7; L. 366.

You will resolve: It is lawful for an accused man not to flee, indeed even voluntarily to present himself before the judge, although he certainly must be punished with death; because that action is per se indifferent, indeed even honorable. For in the case to will to die is the same as to will the order of justice; and just as for a just cause it is lawful to desire death for another, and also to procure it in a legitimate way, so also for oneself. L. 369; H. A. 2. Artisans do not sin who ascend upon the roofs of buildings, and expose themselves, where there is need, to various dangers; nor blacksmiths, who daily diminish life for themselves by handling fire; the reason is that they do this from a reasonable cause.

On the contrary, bold men sin gravely who by rash wagering, from vainglory, or merely by reason of gain, throw themselves into grave dangers, by ascending on high, letting themselves down, bearing heavier burdens, etc. Hence dangerous bullfights also are prohibited, unless the danger is sufficiently removed by art and skill. L. 365, 369; l. 7, n. 209. It is never lawful to macerate the body in order to shorten life, nor also, that end being excluded, by immoderate and wholly indiscreet penances gravely to ruin health. Yet it is lawful, from virtue, to use penances ordinarily grave, with a certain abbreviation of life, because for the sake of merit and the mortification of depraved nature, some loss of longer life can be contemned.

They are very useful to the spiritual life, as the practice of the Saints and the unanimous opinion of doctors show well. L. 370, 371; H. A. 2; Lugo de Iust. et Iur. d. 10, nn. 32, 36; S. Th. Quodl. 5, a. 18; Denifle, Lutero, l. 1, s. 2. But these things concern the ordinary way; for God often inspired altogether extraordinary penances in the Saints, whose health was often the more robust the less they spared themselves. Cf. Benedict XIV, de Canoniz. SS. l. 3, c. 29, n. 6; L. Prax. 25, 26.

It is lawful, at least more probably, to set fire to a ship or a tower, so that enemies may suffer grave damage, although with the certain loss of one's own life, because it is expedient that public damage be avoided, or that the common good be procured, even with the most certain damage of private persons. L. 367. Consequently it is also lawful for a soldier, with certain danger of life, to occupy a station, or to rush into the midst of enemies. Likewise someone can leap through a window from a burning house, or throw himself into the sea from a burning ship, not indeed to seek death, but to avoid a harder one. The same must be said of a virgin who casts herself headlong from a very high window, in order to be snatched from the hands of an impure violator. Elbel 13; Struggl 8; Gur. Cas. 377, 379, 384.

Is it lawful by public authority to kill the guilty? - It is lawful by public authority either to imprison, or to beat, or to mutilate in some member, or even to kill malefactors, according to the various gravity of offenses. The reason is that this is a necessary means for procuring the common good of the whole society. Indeed, for preserving society itself; which indeed cannot be obtained except by these penalties, and often not except by the death of wicked men. Therefore God must be said to have conferred the power without which society could not stand. "Every singular person is compared to the whole community as a part to the whole. And therefore, if some man is dangerous to the community and corruptive of it because of some sin, he is laudably and wholesomely killed, so that the common good may be preserved... he is deprived of a member because of some lesser faults." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 64, a. 2; q. 65, a. 1. And by the same reason it is lawful to beat him and imprison him because of the abuse of the free use of his members to the harm of the community. S. Th. 2, q. 65, aa. 2, 3. This is also clear from the practice of every legislation, from Sacred Scripture, and from the universal consent of all. Lugo d. 10, n. 64; Struggl 34; Ithur. Cas. 40, nn. 11-12; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 64, aa. 2, 3; q. 65, aa. 1, 3; q. 66, a. 6 ad 2, a. 8; q. 67, a. 3; q. 108, aa. 3, 4; L. 375; E. M.

In what manner are the guilty to be punished with death by public authority? - "To kill a malefactor is lawful insofar as it is ordered to the safety of the whole community, and therefore it belongs only to him to whom care of preserving the community is committed... But care of the common good has been committed to Princes having public authority; and therefore it is lawful for them alone to kill malefactors, but not for private persons." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 64, a. 3. But the Prince or magistrate sins, regularly speaking, who orders the guilty to be killed without public judgment, not cited, or not heard, or not condemned, even if by private knowledge it is evident that they are guilty. Without judgment; for judgment is necessary so that the malefactor may be discerned from the innocent, and what must be subtracted from the part for the safety of the whole. Public; for public judgment is necessary so that it may be discerned whether the malefactor is to be killed because of common safety. Besides, from the law of nature, a public act ought to be done from public knowledge and authority. Make exception: 1. If the crime is altogether certain and notorious. 2. If there would be danger of sedition in the delay, if one were to proceed juridically. L. 377; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 64, a. 3 ad 2, ad 3; Struggl 35, 36.

Note: The judge is bound under grave obligation to grant to the guilty man sufficient time for Confession. He is also bound to grant time for the reception of Communion, since the guilty man is then in the article of death, in which the precept of Communion obliges by divine law, and then also the guilty man, even not fasting, can communicate on the same day of death, provided that Communion precede the execution by an hour. If the guilty man is unwilling to confess sins, after exhortation he can lawfully be killed by the executioner, because then his damnation is attributed to his own fault. L. 379; l. 6, nn. 233-285, par. Hic autem, 247.

Is it lawful to kill the guilty even by private authority? - It is not lawful to kill malefactors by private authority. Proof: because it is not lawful to kill malefactors except for the common good, just as it is not lawful to amputate a member except for the safety of the whole body. But the administration of the common good pertains to public power, which is in the Prince or in the commonwealth, not to private persons. Therefore. Besides, if it were lawful for anyone by private authority to kill malefactors, and anyone in his own cause could be judge, all things would be full of unjust homicides. Therefore God, as author and conserver of nature, did not give private men the power of killing malefactors. C. 7, c. 33, q. 2; Pr. 19 condemned by Alex. VII; S. Aug. de Civ. Dei l. 1, c. 26; S. Th. 4, d. 37, q. 2, a. 1; 2. 2, q. 64, a. 3; q. 66, a. 8; L. 376; E. M.

Note: Any secular person, speaking per se, can lawfully kill within the territory of the proscriber a highwayman and malefactor publicly proscribed. The reason is that through the proscribing sentence by public authority anyone is constituted minister of justice. Any secular person, for in C. Sententiam Ne cler. vel mon. it is gravely prohibited to a cleric that he involve himself in causes of blood, even just ones. Speaking per se; for a son cannot lawfully kill a father banned or proscribed, nor a parent a son, or a wife a husband, because this is gravely contrary to charity and natural piety. Nevertheless make exception unless the common good demands it. Within the territory of the proscriber; for one banned cannot justly be killed in another's territory, unless with the tacit, or reasonably presumed, consent of the other Prince. Struggl 36, 37; L. 376, 378, 380; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 64, a. 4.

You will resolve: A guilty man condemned to death cannot by himself execute the sentence of death, by inflicting death on himself. Whether, however, he can do this at least in the case in which he is constituted by the judge a public minister of justice in order to his own killing, many affirm. Struggl 8; but many also deny, and St. Alphonsus calls this opinion the more common, 369. Yet the Holy Doctor calls both probable, l. 4, n. 284; Cf. ib. n. 281.

Soldiers ordered to seize and guard a malefactor cannot kill him when he flees, even if he has already been condemned to death, because by force of their office and, a special mandate of the Prince being excluded, attendants can only restrain the guilty man. L. 380; H. A. 9; Cf. Struggl 36.

It is not lawful for a father to mutilate or kill his own children, nor for a master his own servants, for the sake of correction. The reason is that to punish by mutilation and killing, which bring irreparable damage, certainly requires a perfect power, which neither father nor master has. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 65, aa. 1, 2.

Is it lawful at least, by private authority, to beat or imprison someone? - It is lawful for no one to beat someone not subject to his power, unless there be added at least the tacit consent of him who has power, for example of a father over a son, of a husband over a wife, of a master over a servant; for beating is punishment, and this supposes governing power. Since, however, this beating is done for the sake of discipline, it must be moderated. Hence per se teachers can moderately beat pupils, because they hold the place of parents. On the contrary, an elder brother cannot per se beat younger brothers, unless this has been commanded him by the father, or unless, the father being dead or absent, he himself governs the family, because primogeniture does not confer such a right upon him. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 65, a. 2.

Likewise "to imprison someone, or in any way to detain him, is unlawful unless it is done according to the order of justice, either as punishment, or as a precaution for avoiding some evil," S. Th. 2. 2, q. 65, a. 3. Cf. here 422.

Is it lawful to kill an aggressor against one's life? - Anyone can kill an unjust aggressor against his life, with the moderation of blameless defense. Thus S. Thomas, and he confirms his thesis from the fact that in Exod. 22:2 it is lawful to kill a nocturnal thief. Therefore much more, he says, is it lawful to defend one's own life. Then, all laws and all rights proclaim that force may be repelled by force. Finally, nature itself teaches that there is in man a true right of defending his own life if it is unjustly attacked, and of preferring it to the life of the unjust aggressor, who from his own malice has cast himself into such danger. And this holds not only for secular persons, but also for clerics themselves and religious; for the right of defense is implanted in each one by nature. If it were otherwise, weapons would be supplied to injustice, to the slaughter of the good, and to the overthrow of commonwealths. Hence the Roman Catechism, n. 8, attributes this right to all without distinction. C. Significasti 18 de Homic. vol.; C. Si vero de Sent. exc.; C. L. 2367; S. Th. 1. 2, q. 64, a. 7; L. 380.

Note: Can; for no one is bound to kill an aggressor. It is a dreadful means for conserving one's own life; but lawfully and praiseworthily someone can permit his own killing, lest another be deprived of temporal and eternal life. Make exception: 1. When the life of the one attacked would be necessary and very useful to the common good. 2. When he himself would be in mortal sin, because then he would be altogether bound to defend himself. L. 380.

With the moderation of blameless defense, which is situated in these three conditions: 1. That the killing of the aggressor not be done for vengeance, since this does not belong to private persons; nor from hatred, since this would be opposed to charity; but only for repelling injury and force, or for defense of oneself. 2. That one who suffers aggression not use greater violence than is necessary for avoiding death; and therefore, if he can free himself from the unjust aggressor by fleeing or only by wounding, he cannot kill; otherwise he would kill unjustly, and would be bound to restitution proportionate to the excess, since he would exceed the right granted by nature. By fleeing; otherwise charity is injured, though not justice. For is there any right in the unjust invader that the other should flee? By fleeing; provided this can be done without danger, and, if the matter concerns a noble man or a soldier, perhaps also without grave harm. 3. That the unjust aggression actually, morally speaking, be brought, that is, be so impending that one cannot repel it except by using force. For if by striking or killing he forestalls an aggression scarcely probable, he himself becomes the aggressor of another's life, not the defender of his own. Impending: yet it is not to be awaited until the other already begins to harm. Otherwise defense would already be ineffectual. C. Significasti 18 de Homic. vol.; C. L. 2367, 2370; Struggl 17, 20, 30; Ithur. Cas. 40, nn. 9-10; Lugo d. 10, n. 161; L. 380, 381, 387, 388.

Is the same lawful for preserving the integrity of life? - It is lawful with the same moderation to kill an unjust aggressor also for the defense of members. Proof: 1. from the common opinion of theologians. 2. Because each one has the right of preserving a good most necessary to life for himself, even with danger to the life of another, to which danger the other from his own malice exposes himself, provided another means is lacking and the death of the aggressor is not intended. C. L. 2367; L. 380, 398.

Is the same lawful for defending chastity? - It is lawful for a woman to defend herself by killing the invader of her modesty. Proof: 1. from the common opinion of theologians. 2. Because the woman uses her own natural right, by which it is lawful to repel force by force, and she is more bound to provide for herself than for the life of another; for she exposes herself to the danger of consenting to the act of sin by permitting herself to be oppressed. Besides, if it is lawful to kill an invader of goods, how much more an invader of modesty, since it is a good of a superior order? Hence, although a girl is not bound to kill the invader, but can conduct herself passively, because chastity is not lost unwillingly, nevertheless she is not obligated to do this, both because even material bodily integrity itself is a very great good, and because there is present the danger of shame, which is more grave than death for good women. C. L. 2367; L. 368, 386.

Note: Here theologians rightly observe that it is lawful for a girl not only to repel the aggression in the act in which she suffers it, but also afterward she can strike the aggressor with slaps, fists, a rod, staff, and similar blows minimally dangerous, so that thus she may show her displeasure and constancy, and the aggressor may more easily depart and not return. Moreover this, provided it is done immediately after the injury received and never for vengeance, is not only to be permitted, but also altogether to be counseled to women. Struggl 28; L. 386; Lugo d. 10, n. 196.

Is the same lawful for defending goods of fortune? - It is lawful to defend goods of fortune of great importance with the killing of a thief, if they cannot otherwise be retained. Proof from the common opinion of theologians, which S. Th. 2. 2, q. 64, a. 7 supposes. Besides, because the precept of charity does not oblige one to prefer the goods of a neighbor of a higher order, unless when he is in extreme necessity, but not when he himself of himself, voluntarily and from his own malice, meets the danger of death, as happens in the case. C. L. 2367 seqq.; C. B. 227 seqq., 904; L. 380, 382; Struggl 23; E. M.

Note: Of great importance; for it is not lawful to kill a thief taking away a thing of lesser importance, because charity then prohibits us from inflicting a most grave damage on our neighbor for our own light damage, although he voluntarily exposes himself to its danger. And indeed our damage is only light, whether the thing taken away is considered, which is of lesser importance, as is supposed, or the injury which is had in that taking away is considered, and consequently the contempt and dishonoring which follows that injury. For who is thought to be gravely dishonored because a thief has violently snatched some thing from him?

Nevertheless, even in this case, if precisely the force which is brought against the owner guarding his own thing, although of lesser importance, is considered, it will always be lawful for him to repel force by force, but with the moderation of blameless defense. The reason is that "when someone thus defends his own things, regularly he defends at the same time his own person, which he exposes to danger for the defense of his things." Molina tom. 4, tr. 3, disp. 16, n. 4. Besides, the public good itself demands this. Otherwise the impunity of crimes would render the wicked more audacious for doing harm. C. L. 2367; Laymann l. 3, tr. 3, c. 3, p. 3, n. 4.

Generally speaking, however, those goods are judged to be of great importance, which, if taken away, would leave someone without sustenance for himself and his own; theologians of grave note, among whom is Card. de Lugo, teach that even those things can be given this name whose loss would bring a notable harm to the owner according to the quality of the person. Although it must not be denied either that some gravity of damage must be admitted, absolutely grave with respect to all, and far greater than that which suffices for mortal theft. Therefore, absolutely speaking, the sum of 4 or 5 gold coins certainly does not suffice; today, 40 or 50 lire. But the sum of 40 or 50 gold coins seems to suffice; today, 400 or 500 lire. L. 382, 383, 384, 385; Struggl 23, 24; E. M.

Is the same also lawful for defending honor? - It is not lawful indeed to kill an invader of honor if honor is attacked by words only. For, since the injury can, must, and usually is then repelled otherwise, a striking and killing has the nature not of defense, but of private vengeance. Likewise it is not lawful to kill an invader of honor if honor is attacked by deeds after the deed itself. For even an injury to the aggressor after the deed does not have the nature of defense, but of private vengeance. But it is lawful, with due moderation, to defend oneself against an invader even of honor, if it is attacked by deeds, for example, by a slap or kicks, or a staff, before the deed itself. The reason is that all laws permit force to be repelled by force. Therefore he is not to be reproved who wishes to use that right which all laws permit for guarding a good great in the estimation of men, which is better than a thousand precious and great treasures, Ecclus. 41:15, and who defends himself with fists and also with kicks and a staff. C. L. 2367; Lugo d. 10, n. 166; La-Croix 803; Struggl 25, 26, 31; L. 380, 381, 382, 391; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 41, a. 1; E. M.

Is the aforesaid defense lawful, if it concerns others? - Some private person can defend the life, goods, and modesty of a neighbor, even by the killing of an unjust aggressor. Proof: 1. from the common opinion of theologians. 2. "Because just as the innocent neighbor himself can defend himself by killing the aggressor, so it is lawful to cooperate with him in a lawful thing which he himself can do, and to help him." Lugo de Iust. d. 10, n. 201; C. L. 2368; Struggl 29; L. 389, 391; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 60, a. 6 ad 2.

Note: Some private person; for it is certain that Princes, magistrates, and soldiers, who have been specially hired for the defense of citizens, are bound to this. C. L. 2371. These are bound even with danger of their own life, where the matter concerns turning away a public evil from citizens; but where the matter concerns only the life of some private person, they are not bound to protect it with so great an inconvenience. Can; for it is more probable, at least speaking generally, that he is by no means obligated to such defense of an innocent man with the killing of the unjust aggressor; and this both because the precept of charity does not seem to oblige in that case, since it is rather better to avoid the eternal death of the aggressor himself; and because in the killing of another, a grave inconvenience can never be avoided, for example, because of fear of enmities, or of public justice, or even because of the horror conceived in staining one's own hands with human blood. At least speaking generally; for make exception: 1. If the one invaded would be necessary for the public good, which each one is bound under grave obligation to care for. 2. If he is father, son, wife, or brother, whom piety itself obliges one altogether to protect.

If the matter concerns an invader of another's modesty, understand this provided that the woman does not furnish her consent to the invader, but positively resists him; otherwise to kill the invader would not be to repel force by force, since there is no injury where there is consent. Lessius, Sporer, and others make exception if the one attacked is very closely related to you; then, they say, before the deed you can still kill the invader, although the one attacked consents; for in that case you repel the injury which redounds upon you. L. 389-392.

Is it ever lawful to kill an innocent person? - It is never lawful directly to kill an innocent person, whether by private or public authority, even for procuring the public good. For it is an intrinsically evil action, and expressly prohibited by divine law, against charity and against justice, inflicting injury upon God, Society, and neighbor. Exod. 23:7: The innocent and the just you shall not kill. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 64, a. 2 ad 3, a. 6; L. 393; Struggl 11, 32; Lugo d. 10, n. 104.

You will resolve: It is not lawful to kill those lethally wounded, nor any others whatever who are dying, lest they suffer longer; nor the rabid, lest they harm others, provided they can otherwise be restrained from doing harm. The reason is that, according to the well-known maxim, evils are not to be done in order to obtain good. It is not lawful to kill an innocent person in order to satisfy a tyrant demanding his death, even under penalty of the city being overthrown, and even if he should consent to his own death, because he does not have dominion over his own life. More probably, however, he could be compelled to hand himself over to the tyrant for the public good, and probably, if he were unwilling, even be handed over. For he has this obligation for the public good, to expose himself to a danger of this sort. L. 393; Struggl 11. But it would be otherwise if the tyrant should demand a girl to be violated, or sacred books to be burned. For each is intrinsically evil. In the former case the girl would be exposed to the proximate danger of sinning; in the latter there would be contempt of God. Cf. Lugo d. 10, nn. 114-116.

It is not lawful to kill legates or hostages, even if the enemies who sent them have not kept the faith given, and have unjustly killed the hostages or legates sent to them, because they are innocent. L. ib.

Is it lawful at least indirectly to concur in the death of an innocent person?

It is lawful, because of a grave cause, to posit an action good in itself, from which, besides the intention, the death of an innocent person follows. The reason is that then from a proportionate cause the death of the innocent person is merely permitted.

You will resolve: It is lawful in war to direct artillery against the stations of enemies, although from this also some innocent persons are going to suffer death, because their death follows besides the intention. L. 393. If, when an enemy is pursuing, you cannot flee death except through a narrow way, in which someone sitting there would be crushed, nevertheless it is lawful to flee with his danger and destruction, besides your intention, provided however that, if he is an infant, he has been baptized. The same must be said if the aggressor, by placing the body of an infant before himself, protects himself. For if the death of the innocent person follows, it will be imputed to the aggressor. Lugo d. 10, nn. 124-127; Struggl 13; L. 393, 599.

Note: He is not guilty of homicide who, even without cause, but with diligence used, posits an action, even otherwise illicit, which does not of itself bring death, although it is dangerous, but from which death rarely occurs. For then the homicide is altogether fortuitous and involuntary; for example, if a cleric, engaging in prohibited hunting, by chance kills a man, provided he used due diligence that this not happen. But it is otherwise if he posits an action which, although it does not of itself bring death, is nevertheless commonly dangerous, even if diligence is used for guarding against harm. For it is voluntary in its cause, provided however that he foresees it at least confusedly; for example, if someone, for instance, hurls stones with a sling into a public road. Inst. l. 4, t. 3, sections 3, 4, 5; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 64, a. 8; L. 398. By the name of voluntary homicide, where the matter concerns reservation, is understood not homicide culpable in any way whatever, but homicide sought on purpose and procured by design. Otherwise that added word would be altogether useless. Cf. Ithur. Cas. 40, n. 19 seqq.

Is it lawful to kill a drunken or insane aggressor? R. Affirmatively, more probably, unless it is evident to you that he is in the state of mortal sin. The reason is that although a drunken or insane man is not your formally unjust aggressor, nevertheless he is materially unjust, and you preserve your right of repelling force by force. The right of defense arises from the right to one's own life, not from the injustice of the other. But if you know certainly, which is rare, that he is in the state of lethal sin, and there is hope that he will do penance after the frenzy or drunkenness, but on the contrary you morally believe that you are in the state of grace, since he is in extreme necessity, charity requires that you prefer his eternal salvation to the preservation of your temporal life. Yet nothing prevents you from striking or wounding him in such a way that, with his life preserved, you take away from him the power of harming. Lugo d. 10, n. 143.

What is abortion? Abortion is commonly defined: the ejection of an immature fetus. Immature, that is, not yet fit for vital birth, in such circumstances of the time of gestation that the fetus, although still living when it comes forth into the light, nevertheless must necessarily die soon. Therefore abortion is not really the same thing as mere acceleration of birth. In acceleration of birth the fetus is not immature, and although it comes forth into the light before the completed time of gestation, nevertheless it can naturally live. Abortion properly has place in the first seven months of gestation; in the remaining two months it is mere acceleration of birth, commonly speaking and according to the general rule. The ejection of the fetus; hence abortion is properly distinguished from any action which is not per se primarily ejective of the fetus, but injurious to that same fetus, such as that surgical operation which is called craniotomy and embryotomy, because it is the cutting of the cranium of the infant, or fetus, in order to extract him from the mother's womb.

E. M. According to the general rule. Absolutely speaking, the fetus can live outside the womb after six months, six and a half months, and even before this term, if extraordinary means for nourishing the fetus are present. But in order that the moral danger of the death of the fetus be excluded, the term of seven months must be awaited. Cf. here 663.

How many kinds of abortion are there? - The ejection of the fetus can be procured in two ways: 1. Directly and per se. 2. Indirectly and per accidens. Direct procurement of abortion or of the ejection of the fetus is had by applying a means or medicine per se efficacious and per se primarily ordered to expelling the fetus, as are those local causes which have an action on the womb for ejecting the fetus; such is the perforation of the secundina, or of that leathery membrane in which the fetus is enclosed and swims in fluid, which, when removed, he can no longer live there, but is necessarily ejected. Therefore direct procurement of abortion here is understood not only by direct intention, insofar as someone intends the ejection of the fetus, but also by direct exterior action, insofar as this per se primarily tends efficaciously to expelling the fetus.

Indirect procurement of abortion is had by applying a means or medicine per se primarily ordered to conferring health on the mother, from which, however, the expulsion of the fetus also follows, or also by using a means or medicine from which equally the health of the mother and the expulsion of the fetus are had. Of the former kind are certain irritating and violent drugs, which per se primarily tend, by their own efficacy, to correcting bad humors and bad dispositions of disease, but consequently also procure abortion. Of the latter kind are those remedies which cause relaxation of the fibers, such as a bath, flow and emission of blood; whence at the same time that health is being provided for, abortion is produced, by one and the same cause. This indirect procurement of abortion is indirect both in action and at the same time in intention. But someone can, with a direct intention for procuring abortion, use a means indifferent in itself and per se ordered to another honorable end. Antonelli, Medicina Pastoralis, ed. 2, vol. 2, p. 193, n. 396.

Is indirect procurement of abortion lawful? - It is sometimes lawful indirectly to procure abortion, or rather to permit it, namely by supplying to a mother laboring under grave disease remedies per se suitable for curing the disease, even if consequently abortion can follow, or remedies equally per se suitable for curing the disease and harmful to the fetus.

This is proved first from the common doctrine of theologians. L. l. 3, n. 394; Struggl tr. 7, q. 3, n. 15; Sanchez de Matr. l. 9, d. 20, n. 13 seqq.; Diana tr. 6, de Abortu, r. 38 seqq. Besides, when some remedy, by itself and with one and the same efficacy, can produce both effects at once, namely of healing the mother and killing the offspring, whether primarily the health of the mother and consequently abortion follows, or whether these effects are parallel to each other, one is not necessarily assumed in reality or intention as a means for procuring the other. Therefore there is then the case of a good or indifferent action, from which a double effect follows, one good and the other evil, which it is lawful to posit, if the end of the agent is honorable, namely if he does not intend the evil effect, and if there is a proportionately grave cause. It is lawful sometimes; namely if the matter concerns a lethal disease of the mother, whose life to be preserved is a proportionately grave cause with respect to the temporal life of the offspring. "It is certain," says St. Alphonsus, l. c., "among all, that it is lawful to give a remedy to a pregnant woman directly for curing her, even with danger of abortion, if the disease is mortal, but otherwise if it were not such." And below: "If the remedy tends directly to preserving the life of the mother, as would be purging of the body, cutting of a vein, a bath, etc., these are certainly lawful, when otherwise it is judged morally certain that the mother will die with the offspring," namely if the remedy is not used; or when the danger of abortion would be equal, whether the remedy is used or not; or when it is morally certain that the fetus is not yet animated, as at least for the first days of conception can be held. 1 Kings 1:19, 20. The reason is that then the safety of the mother is provided for without a greater danger to the offspring; and because, in equal necessity, the mother can provide more for herself than for the offspring. And the necessity is equal, for there is no hope of procuring baptism for the offspring in the first and third case; but that hope in the second case is equal. Antonelli, Medicina Pastoralis, ed. 2, vol. 1, p. 1, c. 19, p. 2, c. 4.

On the contrary, the necessity is not equal when the death of the mother is indeed certain if she does not take the medicine; but, if she takes it, the death of the offspring is certain not only temporal, but also eternal, because baptism will not be able to be administered to him, which certainly could be administered to him if the mother abstained from the medicine, because the offspring of the certainly dead mother will survive her; and then "the mother is certainly bound from the order of charity to abstain from the medicine, and to prefer the spiritual life of the offspring to her own bodily life." L. l. c. And "so also from the same charity she is bound to abstain, when there is doubt concerning the safety of the mother and the offspring." L. l. c.; namely when there is doubt whether, the medicine being neglected, the mother can be healed; and whether, the mother perishing, the offspring can survive and be baptized. "And even if the death of the mother were morally certain, if she does not take the remedy, not even then would I dare to permit her the medicine, if some reasonable hope shone forth that, the mother having died, the offspring might survive and be baptized; because it is lawful for no one, for protecting his own temporal life, positively to expose a neighbor constituted in necessity to the danger of eternal death. But otherwise I think one must say, if there were no reasonable hope concerning the life of the offspring after the death of the mother, so that he could be led to the grace of baptism, because then charity does not seem to oblige the mother placed in extreme necessity to neglect her own life by abstaining from remedies, because of a slight and very remote hope of the life of the offspring." L. l. c. And here, as regards practice, the Holy Doctor, l. c., observes that "physicians, as to drugs to be supplied to mothers, are not to be troubled scrupulously, because it is most probable that the case is exceedingly rare, and morally impossible, so that it is almost a miracle, that, the mother perishing, the offspring survive so that he can receive baptism." Nevertheless this matter is not to be so neglected; because it has happened more than once that, because of the skill of surgeons, as soon as the mother breathed out her spirit, the mother's womb was opened, and the offspring was extracted alive and baptized. Consequently mere acceleration of birth is lawful, namely when the fetus will be able to live outside the womb from ordinarily occurring things, and provided that seriously and suitably, as much as can be done, provision is made for the lives of the fetus and of the mother, and that there is grave necessity for that acceleration, whether this is on the part of the life of the mother, or on the part of the life of the offspring itself. E. M. 742, 745.

Is direct procurement of abortion lawful? - In no case ever, or for any cause, is it lawful directly to procure abortion, even if the fetus were supposed still unanimated. Proof: For if the discussion is about direct procurement of abortion improperly so called, namely through means or medicines by which one tends directly to injuring and killing the fetus or infant, as, for example, when physicians with the help of forceps crush the cranium of the little infant in the mother's very womb, in order afterward violently to extract the dead fetus, there is had a very true homicide, directly intended and directly exercised, which is never lawful.

If the discussion is about direct procurement of abortion through means or medicines which directly cause only premature acceleration of birth, from which the offspring, necessarily, by the very laws of nature, must succumb to death, "after animation this would be directly to kill the infant, which is never lawful"; for by a positive action to eject an immature infant outside the womb is positively to withdraw from him the means instituted by nature itself for the conservation of his life, which is directly to kill someone. "But before animation it is not lawful directly to procure this either, just as it is not lawful to procure the emission of seed even to save life, in which case Tertullian seems to speak in Apol. cap. 3; for he gives a universal reason: he who will be a man is a man, he says, for the fruit is in the seed." Lugo de Iust. et Iure d. 10, n. 130. Therefore, since even the non-animated fetus is ordered to forming a man, its ejection is anticipated homicide. Hence Ithur. Cas. 21, n. 5 says, "it is most certainly always infected with grave malice, direct procurement of abortion."

There are indeed grave and many doctors, whom Sanchez de Matr. l. 9, d. 20, n. 9 and Struggl tr. 7, q. 3, n. 16 follow and report, who judge that directly procured abortion, where nevertheless the matter concerns only the mere premature ejection of a non-animated fetus, is not so intrinsically unlawful that at least in the case of preserving the life of the mother, extremely endangered from present disease, it is not lawful. Indeed doctors are not lacking who defend the direct procurement of abortion even of an animated fetus in the aforesaid case, "which opinion once the illustrious D'Annibale judged not improbable," p. 2, n. 284, ed. 4. But this opinion is altogether excluded by the Decrees of the Holy Office concerning the unlawfulness of craniotomy. Indeed, between the killing which is had through craniotomy and abortion of this sort there is in fact no difference. For who would deny that he equally kills a man who pierces him through, and who casts him down from a tower, and who drowns him in the sea? Besides, that opinion is rejected by the Decree of the Holy Office, 24 Jul. 1895, by which the unlawfulness of abortion itself is expressly declared. E. M.

Hence it is clear that laparotomy also is unlawful for extracting from the bosom of the mother ectopic or extrauterine fetuses, still immature. On the contrary, necessity compelling, laparotomy is lawful for extracting from the bosom of the mother ectopic conceptions, provided that the lives both of the mother and of the fetus are seriously and suitably cared for, as much as can be done. Since they cannot be born, they often carry death with them also for the mother. E. M.

What is a duel? A duel strictly so called, and as it is prohibited by canon law with grave penalties, is a fight between two or a few, undertaken by private authority and by agreement, with danger of killing, mutilation, or grave wound.

Between two or a few, namely in equal number; and thus it is distinguished from war, which is of many against many. By private authority, for by public authority, such as that of David with the giant Goliath, and of the Horatii with the Curiatii, it is lawful, since a fight of a few is no less lawful than of many, if each is undertaken by public authority for the common good. By agreement, namely an agreement which by common consent indicates place and time, and thus it is distinguished from a brawl, which supposes no preceding pact. The weapons also must be designated for the penalties to be incurred. For this is the ordinary custom of duels, that weapons also be designated. Therefore the Roman Pontiffs, prohibiting duel and establishing penalties against duellists, are to be judged to be speaking of such a fight, a detestable practice, although they make mention only of agreement, a fixed time, and an appointed place. Gregory XIII, C. Ad tollendum, a. 1582. With danger, etc., so that all those fights unsuited to inflicting grave injury are excluded from the notion of duel strictly such, such as those which are done with light rods or other instruments not ordered to killing or gravely wounding, although in such a fight one is injured per accidens. Hence it is clear that one acts unlawfully indeed and sins mortally, but nevertheless it is not a duel strictly so called, and consequently not subject to the penalties of law, when two men, burning suddenly with anger because of an injury, and provoking each other to a fight, suddenly engage, although from the same impulse of anger and vengeance they immediately go together to some suitable place for this. The reason is that thus the provocation and fight are not morally two actions, but only one, and therefore it is not properly a fight from a previous agreement or designation of time and place. Struggl 55 seqq.; Sanch. in Decal. l. 2, c. 39, aa. 13, 14; La-Croix l. 3, p. 1, n. 843 seqq.; L. 399, 401.

Is a duel lawful? - Duel is intrinsically evil and mortal. Proof: 1. For it is contrary to natural law knowingly and by private authority to expose oneself and another to the proximate danger of killing, mutilation, or wound; for the right of God is usurped, who alone is Lord of life. 2. Trent, s. 25, C. 19 de R., teaches "that the detestable practice of duels was introduced by the devil's contrivance, so that from the bloody death of bodies he may also gain the ruin of souls." Leo XIII, Letter Pastoralis officii, 12 Sept. 1891; C. 1, 2 de Cler. pug. in duel.; L. 399, 400, 401; E. M.

1. Maurus, a novice, of strong powers and robust complexion, began to labor under grave pain of the head, although before entrance into Religion he had enjoyed the best health. Several remedies were applied, but in vain, to the great sorrow of Maurus, because, as the disease grew worse day by day, he became altogether unfit for the ministries proper to that Religion, and there was already question of his departure. After other physicians, Eugenius was called, a physician endowed with extraordinary knowledge and experience, but not of equal fame. Eugenius observed the sick man and, without any hesitation, immediately declared that he could cure the sick man, and with all certainty, if nevertheless the matter turned out well. For after other medicines had been applied, he said, one most efficacious still remains, which indeed will place the sick man in proximate danger of death; but if this is overcome, as there is certain hope, Franciscus [i.e., Maurus] will be immune thereafter through his whole life from an infirmity of this sort. The medicine was applied, and Maurus completely recovered, and is still well, and is an outstanding preacher.

Q. 1. Is there a precept of conserving one's own life? 2. Could Maurus apply such medicine?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 715, 716. To the second. Since the danger of death is nothing but a mere probability and not certainty of death, whence danger of death is distinguished from the article of death, a proximate danger of death, in the case, is really only a grave and very grave probability of death; on the contrary, in the case, there is moral certainty of health to be restored. That probability in no way contradicts this certainty speculatively. For that danger of death is considered from the extrinsic efficacy itself of the drug, not from the intrinsic disease of the sick man. But the certainty is taken from the intrinsic state of health of the sick man. Hence practically, in the case, there really is not a grave danger of death; but on the contrary there is moral certainty of recovering health. But this can be had, in the case, because Maurus, a young man otherwise of robust health and strong complexion, is deservedly judged able to resist the crisis which the violent drug will determine in him; and in this crisis every root of the evil is to be directly destroyed altogether by the powerful virtue of the aforesaid drug, or by force of the same crisis the aforesaid cause of the infirmity is to be dissolved. Therefore, since there is had a moral certainty both of overcoming the danger and, as is asserted by the skilled physician, of expelling the cause of the disease and the disease itself, it is permitted to commit oneself to such a danger, given the most grave cause: that otherwise Maurus would have to pass his whole life uselessly and be afflicted with grave pain of the head. Besides, in that first hypothesis made, namely that from the power of the drug the crisis is directly determined, and the root of the infirmity is directly extinguished, there is had an act producing two effects, of which one is good and is the one which alone is intended, while the other is evil, and this is beyond the intention and is merely permitted. But a very grave reason is not lacking why the bad effect can reasonably be permitted and the act placed. But in the other hypothesis, that the drug determines the aforesaid crisis of the whole organism, and by this same crisis the whole cause of the evil is resolved, as happens in various diseases, then the crisis cannot be called simply evil, but indifferent, since it is both evil and good at the same time: evil on account of the loosening of powers and weakness, good on account of the extinction of the depraved quality which is the cause of the disease. Wherefore again the case returns to an act producing two effects.

Hence, a fortiori, that seems to have been licit which I heard narrated about a certain man who was coming from America into Europe. Having been seized by a most grave disease of fever, which is commonly called flaca, and now altogether despaired of, he was cured by a certain hot and very powerful intoxicating potion. - Cf. I. M. 334 and V. 2, n. 89.

2. Eulalia, a pious virgin and most loving of chastity, when on a certain day she was being compelled to lust by a soldier and could not otherwise escape the danger, threw herself from a high window and, falling upon sand which by chance was found heaped in great quantity in the public way for repairing it, remained unharmed. After some months, violently seized by the same soldier, most constantly refusing to sin, she most urgently asked him that he would rather kill her than violate her; and then the fierce soldier, burning with anger, slew her with the sword.

Q. 1. Is it permitted to kill oneself? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 710 seqq. To the second. Eulalia could rightly throw herself from the window, although this was done with evident danger of life, and although in fact she had afterward died. The reason is that first Eulalia did not intend to kill herself, but only to escape from the hands of the worst man who wished to violate her. But that action of throwing herself from the window, in these and similar circumstances, is an indifferent action, namely of fleeing in the case from the hands of a lascivious man, and of falling from the window to the earth. And, if it is considered well, that action is first an action of fleeing, and then of falling from the window to the earth, that is, first it is flight, and then a casting down from the window to the earth. And thus the same is permitted, even to escape a harder death, for example, in a fire, or also, probably, to free oneself thus by flight from the squalor of perpetual prison. G. 377, 379, 384; L. 367.

Eulalia could also ask the soldier that he kill her rather than violate her. For by this request Eulalia first certainly did not intend to induce the soldier to kill her, but only to avert him from the base violation of herself, to which she preferred death. But by that request Eulalia did not directly procure her killing, nor did she induce the soldier to kill her. For, force having been inflicted on her, since she had already been violently seized, she asked the soldier that he inflict on her rather the lesser evil of death than the evil, far greater to her, of base violation. Therefore she did not directly procure death, nor provoke the soldier to homicide; but she directly procured that she avert the soldier from inflicting a greater harm on her and from violation of herself, permitting her own death instead, if that soldier should be unwilling to desist from so great a crime. And in fact, to ask the soldier to kill her rather than violate her is not to ask that he kill, but to ask that he not violate, while at the same time showing a spirit prepared to undergo death rather than to consent to her violation.

3. Anselmus, a Carthusian, exercises grave tortures upon his own body by disciplines and hairshirts, uses sparing food also, and takes brief sleep; although he thinks that for this reason perhaps he will die sooner. Nevertheless, only after several years is he gravely ill, but even then he refuses to eat meat, although the physician has prescribed it as a necessary means for recovering health. Likewise he refuses to leave the cloister and return to his family for some time, although the same physician asserts that a change of air is altogether necessary for him.

Q. 1. What is the obligation of conserving life? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M., n. 715 seqq. To the second. Anselmus in no way sinned by exercising various exterior penances. For by exercising them discreetly, which sufficiently appears in the case, life is not taken away, but only its vigor and longevity are not procured; and to this no one is held of itself. But spiritual utility and the exercise of virtue prevail over bodily convenience. Otherwise so many saints would have sinned gravely, rather than having been sanctified. And if it is permitted to artisans to sweat over hard works, and to diminish life for themselves by daily laboring, and to expose themselves to so many dangers of death, why will it not be permitted to a religious man to embrace bodily austerities for the good of virtue, by the counsel of a prudent prelate or confessor? Lig. 371. Wherefore Anselmus is not held either to eat meats even to avoid death, or to seek healthier air outside the cloister in his own country and family. Hence also someone can enter Religion although he is weak in health, nor afterward is he held to depart from the novitiate, or to seek food different from the common food, although he foresees that his life will be shortened from this. - Lugo, De Iust. et Iur., d. 10, n. 32 seqq.; Lig. 370, 371; G. 386, 387.

Besides, in singular cases, it matters very much to attend to what age, physical complexion, disposition, state, and condition that person is, to whom mortifications and exterior penances of this sort are conceded. "One must judge differently concerning the end, and differently concerning those things which are for the end. For that which is sought as an end must be sought without measure. But in those things which are for the end, measure must be applied according to proportion to the end. Therefore it must be considered that in the spiritual life the love of God is as the end; but fasts, vigils, and other bodily exercises are not sought as the end, but are applied as necessary for the end; and therefore things of this sort must be applied with a certain measure of reason, so that namely concupiscence may be tamed and nature not extinguished.... But if someone weakens the power of nature so much by fasts and vigils and other things of this sort that he is not sufficient to execute due works, for example, the preacher to preach, the doctor to teach, the singer to sing, and so concerning others, without doubt he sins; just as a man would also sin who by excessive abstinence rendered himself impotent to render the debt to his wife." St. Thomas, Quodlibet 5, a. 18.

1. Martialis, a soldier, quarreled with his fellow soldiers, and when he had afflicted one of them with insulting words, that one, impatient of the injury, aimed the gun which he held in his hand at him in order to kill him. But Martialis, who had inflicted the insult, forestalled him and killed the assailant with his own gun.

Q. 1. Is it permitted to defend life by the killing even of an unjust aggressor? 2. Was Martialis guilty of homicide?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 726, 727. - To the second. "In his favor the doctrine of those could be brought forward who say that he who provoked another by insults or injuries, if nevertheless he is attacked by him to the point of death, can licitly defend himself and kill the assailant.... Hence an adulterer who, detected by the husband, cannot flee, if he cannot otherwise avoid death, can kill the husband.

Nevertheless, in our case, that doctrine can with difficulty have place, because, according to the narration of the fact, first the adversary, provoked by insults, pulled the trigger of the gun so that it might catch fire, and then this other man pulled the trigger of his gun to the same effect; at which time indeed that defense was useless, by which he could not escape the blow of the adversary, but only strike back. Therefore then it was better either to flee or to avoid the blow, if he could; especially since, although in other cases a soldier attacked is not held to flee, but can defend himself by killing when he cannot otherwise be rescued from the assailant, nevertheless, when he himself gave the unjust cause of the attack, he ought to flee, nor can he licitly kill the assailant if there is place for flight, because he himself unjustly cast the assailant into those straits; wherefore he ought to render him unharmed.... Then... because it cannot be denied that the killing, in our case, was culpable in its cause, with insulting words having been rashly uttered against an angry and armed soldier, in which circumstances the danger of killing him could and ought to have been foreseen, if he wished to avenge himself, as it could be feared almost certainly; which suffices so that he who unjustly gave a culpable cause is guilty of the homicide afterward following." Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 4, d. 17.

But the question properly is not whether Martialis could and ought to have foreseen homicide, but whether in fact he at least confusedly foresaw it; and this, from the very fact of the homicide afterward following, without Martialis himself being questioned in order to know the truth of the matter, is difficult to assert with certainty. For it was a matter of mere insulting words, which are altogether frequent among soldiers, and nevertheless homicide does not ordinarily follow from this.

Moreover, it is also difficult to assert with certainty that Martialis did not lack another means of defending himself, namely by fleeing. For if the gun, as these arms were in the time of Lugo, was not yet prepared to fire, it can be understood how Martialis truly had time both to flee and to avoid the blow. But if the gun was already altogether prepared to fire, it does not indeed appear how Martialis could otherwise have escaped death or at least a grave wound.

And these things seem not to have escaped Cardinal Lugo himself, since at the end of his discourse, n. 7, he concludes: "These things at least render our case doubtful." Certainly it is not permitted to forestall the aggressor and kill him before the actual aggression; for this is not to defend oneself by repelling force with force. But to defend oneself in an actual aggression does not consist in this: that someone first ought to wait to be killed, or for an action to be placed by which he will soon be certainly killed; for then defense will already be impossible, and it will be impossible to repel force with force. To defend oneself in an actual aggression consists in this: that someone defend himself in an unjust aggression actually, morally speaking, already so impending that he cannot repel it unless force is applied. I. M. 727. Otherwise, not even someone against whom the sword of the aggressor has already been directed with every impetus could kill the aggressor with his own sword unless he himself had first been struck and wounded; and then there would no longer be place for force to be repelled, since force would already have been inflicted. If not with a sword, but with a gun already prepared to fire, someone unjustly attacks another, and has already aimed the gun toward him, so that nothing is lacking except that it fire, what else is required for actual aggression? That it fire, strike, and kill? Therefore the other will be able, by firing first, to defend himself. This is, in the case, the only efficacious mode of defending oneself: by the blow of one's own gun, efficaciously to forestall the lethal blow of the adversary's gun. But it is one thing to forestall a blow in actual aggression, another thing actually to forestall the actual aggression. In this forestalling, there is no actual aggression, but there is an aggressor prepared to attack. And concerning such forestalling, whether it is permitted, St. Alphonsus, 387, brings forward three opinions. The first denies it, because to forestall an enemy only prepared to attack would not be true defense. The second affirms it, because, in order to kill an assailant for one's own defense, it is not necessary that the other already have begun to harm, but it suffices that he be prepared to harm. The third affirms it, if someone from some action has known that the enemy is determined to attack, for instance, if he knows with moral certainty that the enemy has already prepared arms for this, or has given a mandate to a servant; then, if he cannot otherwise escape, he can licitly forestall him. But otherwise it must be said, if he does not know certainly, but has only suspicion or doubtful fear concerning the attack. The Holy Doctor, giving his judgment concerning these three opinions, says: "I judge that the second opinion, even with this distinction supposed (of the third opinion), can scarcely be followed in practice, on account of the danger of hallucination which can be present in a matter of this sort." Wherefore, as regards Martialis, since he did not forestall an actual aggression, but only forestalled the blow of the adversary in an actual aggression, it does not seem that he can be regarded as guilty of homicide.

2. Martialis and Hector, leaders of soldiers, start a quarrel between themselves and contend with harsh words. After words they come to blows. Hector first suddenly inflicts a notable slap on his companion, in the presence of other distinguished men. Immediately Martialis, with incredible dexterity, retorts and augments the argument by inflicting two slaps on Hector. Hence the storm grows, until by other friends the two contestants are separated one from the other.

Q. 1. Is it permitted to defend honor by force? 2. Is it permitted to defend honor even by killing the aggressor? 3. Did Martialis sin by striking Hector back?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 733; E. M. 733, 748. To the second. Cf. St. Alph. 381; I. M. 750. - To the third. "It is not permitted to kill if the injury has already been contracted, or the aggressor has already fled, because this would not be to defend oneself, but to avenge.... But Henry and Navarrus say that, if the injured party would suffer a great loss of honor unless he at once pursued the fleeing one, he can pursue and strike him as much as would be enough for the defense of honor. But the opposite must altogether be held. The reason is that then honor is not recovered in itself, but through the harm of another among wicked men, which is intrinsically evil. And I cannot understand why the contrary opinion ought not be called proscribed from proposition 30 condemned by Innocent XI, which permitted one to strike back at the one striking, who flees, if otherwise ignominy could not be avoided." Therefore Martialis cannot be excused from sin, and from grave sin. St. Alph. 382; I. M. 733; Enchir. Mor. 733; G. 390.

3. Gerardus, a parish priest, was keeping at home the gold and silver furniture of the church and a great sum of gold money pertaining to various pious causes, in a well-locked chest. This became known to three thieves. Behold, at an untimely hour of night, equipped with arms and with face disguised, they burst into the house of the parish priest and threaten that they will take his life from him unless he swiftly hands over to them whatever of gold and silver he has at home. Gerardus, placed in certain danger of life, is compelled to bring out for the thieves all that they require, even his own money and his own silver furniture and other precious objects. The three thieves carry away all things with three chests. But Gerardus, freed from danger, as soon as the thieves have gone out from the house, closes the door well and approaches the window armed with a firearm. As soon as he saw them going out from the door of the palace, lest he afterward be unable to discern them on account of the dense darkness of the night and the copious rain, he fires the firearm at them and kills one. The other two flee. But they leave the chests. And thus Gerardus recovered the whole thing.

Q. 1. Is it permitted to defend goods by force? 2. What must be thought concerning the case of Gerardus?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 731, 732; E. M. 731. - To the second.

"Card. Lugo, Molina, Lessius, etc., with Diana, concede that it is permitted to pierce with a dart or arrow a thief fleeing, for example, with your horse, because the invasion still endures." Thus Busembaum, 382. "We say with Lessius, etc., that it is permitted to kill a thief from a distance with a weapon, if he himself carries off the thing and, having been forewarned of his danger, is unwilling to leave it." Thus St. Alphonsus, 383. But those three thieves, in the case, were now carrying off the thing, nor could it be recovered by another way, and any other warning would have been useless. Moreover, the thing was altogether of great value. Wherefore Gerardus cannot be condemned of the sin of homicide. Nor indeed is it an obstacle that he is a priest, because the right of defense is of natural right and therefore belongs to each one. Hence Gerardus incurred no irregularity, whether from delict, which was absent, or from lenity, which has no place here. For it is incurred by soldiers in a just offensive war and by ministers of justice in the killing of a guilty person. - St. Alph. 183, 184; G. 394, 395; I. M. V. 2, 1330.

1. Sempronius, wearied of his wife, made espousals with another. Wherefore, in order to free himself from his present wife, while she was on a journey, in a certain solitary place, he pierced her with a bullet; and seeing her as though struggling with death, he commanded his servant, whom he had taken with himself as a companion of the journey, under penalty of death to be inflicted immediately upon him likewise, to slaughter the still-breathing mistress with a sword, and without delay to commit her, slaughtered, to the earth.

Q. 1. Is homicide ever licit? 2. Could the servant in this case licitly obey his master?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 719 seqq., 736 seqq.; E. M. 722. - To the second. The servant could not obey his master by slaughtering the mistress with a sword; nevertheless he could licitly obey by committing her to the earth after death. The reason for the disparity is this: because to commit a dead woman to the earth is not evil, but rather good, or certainly indifferent of itself. But what is good, or at least indifferent, we licitly do from a just and grave end, namely that of escaping death or another grave evil threatened to us. On the contrary, to slaughter an innocent person was evil, intrinsically such, forbidden by natural and divine right. But an evil intrinsically such may never be committed, however grave a fear of death may impend over us. - Elbel, De Act. hum. 43.

Hence another case is resolved: whether, at the time of the Paris Commune, and generally, whether in a time of anarchy, regular soldiers of the preceding Government, from fear of death, could fire upon religious, clerics, and honest citizens, and slaughter them. Altogether negatively, since neither by private nor by public authority is it licit to kill the innocent. And this is intrinsically evil; and accordingly it remains evil even when most grave fear of death stands.

2. "The Catholics of this diocese are inexorable in vengeance, and this because there is no one in those regions who administers justice. Therefore it is asked: 1. Whether, every other means of obtaining redress for their wrongs being excluded, Christians can consider themselves with respect to this point as if they were in the natural state. 2. Whether they are capable of the sacraments so long as they persist in this desire of vengeance. The reason which they bring forward to prove the necessity in which they are of avenging themselves is that the killer and his supporters would become fiercer and more intolerable against the relatives of the killed man, and would commit new homicides, if these did not resist and did not oppose force to force.

R. Negatively to each part." S. C. de P. F., 21 May 1759; Collectan., n. 2092, 2094, 2098.

3. A popular disturbance having been made in a certain great city, the Prince is expelled, and Anarchy is proclaimed for several weeks. Meanwhile thieves and highway robbers commit thefts, robberies, and homicides with impunity. Carolus, a powerful and honest man, judging that crimes ought to be punished, in order to protect honest citizens, public authority being lacking, himself assumes this office for himself. Hence, when he hears that either thefts and robberies or homicides have been committed by someone, judging that no other punishment in the present circumstances is possible and efficacious except the punishment of death, by night he himself with his servants kills thieves and homicides. And the matter always succeeds prosperously for them, so that it is altogether unknown by whom they were killed. What of Carolus?

R. Carolus acts altogether badly. For he himself has no power of exercising public vindication of crimes, since he has no authority in civil society. But citizens, for protecting themselves, can rightly use, if thieves and homicides attack them, the natural right of defense, repelling force by force, with the moderation of blameless defense. For indeed, "to kill evildoers is licit insofar as it is ordered to the safety of the whole community; and therefore it belongs only to him to cut off a rotten member, when the care of the safety of the whole body has been committed to him. But the care of the common good is committed to Princes, having public authority, and therefore it is permitted only to them to kill evildoers, not to private persons." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 64, a. 3. Nor indeed does it avail to object from the same Holy Doctor, ibid., q. 108, a. 1, that vindication is a virtue of a private person, and accordingly that it is also permitted to private persons at least to avenge injuries inflicted on themselves. For it is singular in this virtue of vindication that the person who is the subject of the virtue cannot through himself consummate the proper action of that virtue because of the necessity of the matter; because namely its matter is the evil of punishment, which requires coercive power in the author; and accordingly, although vindication is a virtue of a private person, nevertheless a private person cannot consummate his action unless public power is joined, on account of the condition of the matter to be rendered, namely the evil of punishment for the evil of the inflicted injury. Cajetan, in l. c. Cf. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 66, a. 8.

4. Gaspar, a physician, gave a drug to a certain woman to impede conception, namely in order that he might remove the most grave danger of death which he knew from experience threatened her; and accordingly he intended this only, that is, to procure her safety. But that woman, already made pregnant, is in reality placed in the highest danger of life, together with the offspring, which consequently would die without baptism together with the mother. Hence Gaspar, in order to save the mother from death and to procure baptism for the offspring, at the suitable time procures abortion by medical art. And thus the mother is in reality saved, and the offspring, having come forth alive, dies only after baptism.

Q. 1. Is it licit to procure abortion? 2. Has Gaspar acted rightly?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 742 seqq.; E. M. 742, 745; Comment. Theolog. Moral., fifth commentary, De Procuratione Abortus; sixth commentary, De Responso S. Officii circa craniotomiam.

To the second. Gaspar first sinned gravely by impeding generation, which in reality he himself intended, although he illusorily asserts that he intended only to procure the woman's safety. He indeed intended this as an end; but as a means to obtaining that end, he assumed this means: to impede generation by a drug, whence the woman's safety, from asserted experience, was being brought into danger. Therefore he intended this also. G. 400.

Gaspar also sinned gravely by directly procuring abortion, which from its intrinsic nature is true homicide. Nor indeed can he be excused from the excellent end of saving the mother and baptizing the offspring; for evils must not be done so that goods may come. But in the case the abortion is procured directly; for abortion is assumed and is intended in itself as the means to each. G. 400 seqq.

Hence Gaspar, on account of the direct procurement of abortion, incurs the excommunication reserved to bishops from the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis. Moreover, he becomes irregular; for since the question concerns a fetus which is so harmful to the health of the mother, it cannot be doubted that it is now informed by a rational soul. Cf. I. M. V. 2, n. 1204, 1335.

"Thou shalt not kill." Exod. 20. 13.

388. • This precept, insofar as it is negative, prohibits primarily homicide, that is, the unjust killing of a man; but secondarily and consequently every unjust injury, wounding, or mutilation of the body, whether one's own or another's ¹. But insofar as it is virtually positive, it commands the preservation of life.

¹ Certain divisions of homicide are accustomed to be handed down here, as that one is casual, and another voluntary, and this latter either direct or indirect. But especially homicide simple is to be distinguished from qualified, namely having another species of sin adjoined. Of this sort is: 1. sacrilege, either by reason of the person killed or by reason of the place in which the killing is done; 2. parricide, namely the slaughter either of parents or of children, or of brother or sister, or of a spouse, or even of a Prince; 3. robbery, namely killing or wounding from the will of plundering; 4. magical poisoning, namely when by the aid of the demon bodily evil or even death is brought upon someone.

Also numbered among qualified homicides are customarily: 1. treacherous homicide, namely perpetrated under the appearance of friendship; 2. assassination, both on the part of the hirer to kill and on the part of the one hired; 3. simple poisoning. Yet these distinctions, which some have incautiously transferred as if to diverse moral species, merely serve to measure the gravity of the crime in the external forum; for as regards the forum of conscience, they constitute a merely aggravating circumstance.

Moreover, those things which will be established concerning killing, whether licit or illicit, will have to be applied, with due proportion observed, to mutilation or any injury of the body.

We must treat: 1. of killing oneself; 2. of killing the neighbor; 3. of duel; 4. of war.

214. A tyrant is either of regime or of usurpation. The first is a prince who, possessing the principate legitimately and justly, exercises its power wickedly and unjustly. The latter is a prince who possesses the principate illegitimately and unjustly, by reason of wicked usurpation made by force or fraud.

215. A tyrant of regime, from the fact that he abuses his authority, does not therefore, per se, lose it. Wherefore no obedience indeed is owed to his unjust laws, and by passive resistance subjects can defend themselves against them; but to deprive a tyrant of the kingdom, or to kill him, is lawful to absolutely no one. - To deprive the king of the kingdom. "Too pernicious in this matter," says St. Alphonsus, "was the principle of John Gerson, who dared to assert that the monarch can legitimately be judged by the whole nation if he rules the kingdom unjustly... a principle, I say, not only false, but most pernicious." The reason is that subjects, by the very fact that they are subjects, cannot arrogate to themselves power above the prince by judging and punishing him. Hence the objection is dissolved which is made from the Angelic Doctor, 2.2, q. 42, a. 2, ad 3, where he says: "that tyrannical rule is not just, because it is not ordered to the common good, but to the private good of the ruler... And therefore disturbance of this rule does not have the character of sedition," which is opposed to the common good. For indeed, although that disturbance of rule does not have the character of sedition, it does not therefore follow from the Angelic Doctor that it is lawful. For from the same St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 60, a. 6: "just as it would be unjust that someone should compel another to observe a law which was not sanctioned by public authority; so also it is unjust if someone compels someone to undergo a judgment which is not borne by public authority... and therefore it is unjust that someone be judged by him who does not have public authority."

216. And from these things it is clear much more that it is lawful to absolutely no one to kill a tyrant. Nor likewise is it valid to object from the Angelic Doctor, 2.2, q. 70, a. 1, that "as it is lawful to resist robbers, so it is lawful to resist bad princes." For St. Thomas is treating there of just defense, in the case of actual unjust aggression, namely of one condemned unjustly to death. Wherefore the objection taken from procuring the common good is also of no value. For it is not sufficient for the honesty of an action that the end be good, but the means also must be good. And the means assumed in the case is intrinsically evil.

217. Aptly Leo XIII, encyclical Quod apostolici muneris: "If at any time it should happen that public power is exercised rashly and beyond measure by princes, the doctrine of the Catholic Church does not permit rising up against them by one's own force, lest the tranquillity of order be disturbed more and more, and lest society take greater detriment from this. And when the matter has come to such a point that no other hope of safety shines forth, it teaches that remedy is to be hastened by the merits of Christian patience and by urgent prayers to God. But if the decrees of legislators and princes have sanctioned or commanded something which is repugnant to divine or natural law, the dignity and office of the Christian name and the apostolic sentence persuade that God must be obeyed rather than men."

218. Therefore from a twofold head it is illicit to rise up against a legitimate prince: because one rising up by his own force violates the rights of justice, and because from this violation of justice a greater damage of the commonwealth follows, against the common good, under pretext of which that insurrection is attempted to be made honorable. "Wherefore," says Gregory XVI absolutely, Ep. a. 1832, "both divine and human rights cry out against those who by the most disgraceful machinations of treason and seditions strive to withdraw from fidelity to princes and to cast them down from command." Therefore rebellion against legitimate princes, possessors of the supreme authority or principate, is altogether illicit. It is a manifest denial of due obedience; for the legitimate right of authority exacts the office of obedience on the part of subjects. Besides, it is manifest injury against commutative justice; for a legitimate prince cannot be despoiled of the right to authority which he legitimately possesses. Each crime is proscribed in proposition 63 of the Syllabus, which is condemned thus absolutely: "It is lawful to refuse obedience to legitimate princes, indeed even to rebel."

219. The same certainly must be said, in proportionate reason, of a tyrant of usurpation after he is already in peaceful possession of the kingdom. Before the usurper comes into this possession, it is clear from what has been said that subjects are bound, according to their powers, to defend the legitimate prince, nor can they in any way help the usurper to despoil the legitimate prince of supreme authority. But after the usurper has now despoiled the legitimate prince of this authority, and he himself now possesses it peacefully in fact, he himself is certainly bound to restore it while he possesses it; but by reason of the common good subjects are bound to obey him, because the commonwealth cannot ruin itself, if that usurper truly provides for the public good by his laws, just as the obligation rests upon him and at the same time he has the right of doing this, by reason namely of the usurped authority itself, not of the legitimacy of the usurper. For although that authority is detained unjustly, nevertheless it cannot be deprived of its own force and its own proper effect. Therefore subjects are bound to obey those laws which conduce to the common good, to public order, and to public peace; but they cannot furnish obedience to laws which would tend directly to confirming the usurper in the unjust possession of supreme authority. Yet the usurper can become legitimate, in various cases, in various ways: by consent of the people, by spontaneous cession of the legitimate prince, by natural prescription; for society cannot always endure in a violent state.

220. But if subjects are bound to observe the common good, public order, and peace, how indeed could they promote sedition, which is opposed to the common good, public order, and public peace? How could they themselves, private persons, kill the usurper? "A fight which is lawful," says St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 42, a. 2, "is done for the common utility. But sedition is done against the common good of the multitude." And St. Alphonsus: "It belongs to subjects to obey, not to judge concerning the prince, who is subject to God alone concerning the things of his dominion, nor depends on any other earthly power. If subjects could bear judgment concerning the title or possession of the prince, those who are affected with a depraved mind would never lack a pretext to find for stirring themselves against the prince... Neither prince nor private person can be despoiled of his life and things, unless first he is heard, or at least condemned by his legitimate judge. But subjects can never have the right of bearing judgment upon their actual lord." The contrary opinion, which even now some sustain at least speculatively, is soon called by the Holy Doctor "improbable, false, most false." And then the same St. Alphonsus adds: "But he who occupies the kingdom of another without any title and possesses it without any reason is neither its lord nor prince, but a thief and usurper. Let him indeed be, I answer, a thief, usurper, and not prince nor lord. I ask: is he a man like others? And if he is a man, he cannot himself be deprived of life or goods by those who do not have the right to despoil him of life or goods. The doctrine of the Holy Fathers is common, that it is never lawful for any private person to kill a man, although private, and however wicked he may be, unless he has public authority, or unless this is necessary for protecting his own life... But St. Thomas gives the reason for this, saying: To kill an evildoer is lawful insofar as it is ordered to the safety of the whole community, 2.2, q. 64, a. 5. Then he adds that killing evildoers is permitted only to princes, who have public authority and to whom care of the common good has been committed: But care of the common good has been committed to princes having public authority, and therefore it is lawful for them alone to kill evildoers and not for private persons." Homo Apost., tr. 8, n. 13.

221. "But it is altogether false that in the community of subjects there is present a certain superior authority, independent from the prince, so that in a case in which the prince governs the kingdom perversely, the whole community can despoil him of kingdom and life. Too pernicious in this matter was the principle of John Gerson, who dared to assert that the monarch can legitimately be judged by the whole nation if he rules the kingdom unjustly; for he said that, since the nation is the whole of the kingdom in respect to the prince, who is only a part, supreme authority must necessarily exist with the nation itself. A principle, I say, not only false, but most pernicious; for in this way there would be two supreme powers in the kingdom, whence most enormous schisms and the desolation of the kingdom would occur. St. Thomas recognizes no other supreme authority except that which princes have, to whom care of the common good is attributed. Care of the common good has been committed to princes having public authority. Wherefore, even if the prince were perverse and burdensome to the people, nevertheless the people is bound to furnish obsequium and obedience to him, since subjects can never have the right of judging concerning the deeds of the prince, and much less of condemning him to losing life or kingdom." St. Alphonsus, l. c.

222. Therefore it is not valid to object that a tyrant cannot be deposed by the proper authority of some private person, which is the crime of treason, but can be deposed by the common judgment of the whole nation. The whole nation certainly could do this if it retained the principate itself, which is contrary to the hypothesis; but if it does not retain the principate itself, it would do that by no authority, and it would indeed be treason not of one, but of all.

223. Nor likewise is a better objection taken from the fact that public power is for the public good. For even private ownership of things is for the good of the proprietor himself and of others. If someone abuses it to his own evil and that of others, he does not therefore lose ownership of his things. And the reason is that the title or cause of having dominion, whether of property or of jurisdiction, is not the use of it. Therefore, so long as that title or cause remains, each dominion remains.

224. Lastly, it cannot be objected that society can cast out a tyrant by force not by the right of punishing, but by the right of defense. For for this no jurisdiction is needed; but the right of proper conservation, which belongs to society just as to individuals, seems to suffice, and this certainly prevails over the right existing in such tyrants to possession of authority. - But these things, speciously said, in reality are nothing. For if the question concerns individuals, legitimate defense will not be lawful to them except in the act of unjust aggression, and by repelling force with force, with the moderation of blameless defense. But if the discourse is of the whole commonwealth or society rising up against a tyrant and moving war against him, to undertake war against him, whether offensive or defensive, besides a just cause, public authority is needed, which, from the hypothesis, is in no private person nor in the whole nation. For the question concerns a prince in whom supreme authority is found absolutely. Besides, just defense is not lawful except with the moderation of blameless defense, which is held to be most sufficient and most efficacious by passive resistance, by not obeying wicked laws. Therefore, speculatively speaking, it is illicit to disturb a tyrant from possession of authority, and to deprive him of kingdom and life. But practically all agree that it is illicit from the fact that greater damages follow, and greater detriment of the public good is had from the consequent disturbance; then true sedition is had, which from its kind is a mortal sin. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 42, a. 2, ad 3.

And, as the distinguished adversaries themselves confess, there exists much hallucination in that matter practically; and the people does not rise up to disturb a tyrant without a ruin greater than the tyranny following.

225. This condemnation is had concerning tyrannicide: The Sacred Synod of Constance, a. 1414-1418, declares and defines that this sentence: "Any tyrant whatever can and ought licitly and meritoriously to be killed by any vassal or subject of his, even by secret ambushes and subtle flatteries and adulations, notwithstanding any oath given, or confederation made with him, without waiting for the sentence or mandate of any judge whatsoever" is erroneous in faith and morals; and it reproves and condemns it as heretical, scandalous, and giving a way to frauds, deceptions, lies, betrayals, and perjuries. It declares besides, decrees, and defines that those pertinaciously asserting this most pernicious doctrine are heretics.

“Concerning the secular power we assert that it can exercise judgment of blood without mortal sin, provided that in inflicting punishment it proceeds not from hatred but by judgment, not incautiously but advisedly.” Profession of Faith of the Waldensians.

“19. A husband who by his own authority kills his wife caught in adultery does not sin.” Proposition condemned by Alexander VII.

“The Catholics of this diocese are inexorable in vengeance, and this is because there is no one in those regions who administers justice to them. It is therefore asked: 1. Whether, every other means of obtaining redress for their wrongs being excluded, the Christians can, with respect to this point, consider themselves as if they were in the state of nature. 2. Whether they are capable of receiving the Sacraments so long as they persist in this desire of theirs for vengeance. The reason which they bring forward to prove the necessity under which they are of avenging themselves is that the killer and his supporters would become fiercer and more intolerable against the relatives of the one killed, and would commit new homicides, if these relatives did not resist and oppose force to force. Resp. In the negative to both parts.” Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, 21 May 1759.

“It is a custom among the independent Gallas that, if anyone is killed or afflicted with a grave wound, from that very moment all and each of his relatives and fellow tribesmen are bound to swear mortal hatred against all and each of the killer’s relatives and fellow tribesmen, and to pursue them to extermination; and no one can exempt himself from this obligation without losing his social rights in his own tribe and being expelled from it as an enemy. But this right and duty of avenging blood lasts until a certain sum of money, to be determined by the judgment of arbitrators, is paid for the homicide, and thus the tribe to which the one killed belonged receives satisfaction. This satisfaction would be hoped for in vain if an obligation of this kind to undertake the aforesaid hostility or vengeance were removed, because among the independent Gallas there is a complete absence of public magistrates who watch over the punishment of crimes and the protection of rights. Therefore it is asked:

“1. Whether hostilities exercised in the aforesaid manner can be regarded as a just war of one tribe against another. — 2. Whether one can be admitted to the sacraments who on the one hand protests that he fosters no hatred or animosity whatsoever in his soul against the men of the enemy tribe, but rather shows himself ready and desirous of exhibiting to them the customary signs of friendship as soon as satisfaction has been made for his right; but who on the other hand promises that he will never seek an occasion of quarreling with his enemies, but will avoid encountering them, lest he be cast into the danger either of accepting a fight or, if he refuses it, of incurring the displeasure of his own people.

“Resp. Of the three conditions required for a just war, namely, legitimate authority, a just cause, and a suitable manner, it is manifest that the third is entirely lacking in the case of fact to which the first doubt refers. For a suitable manner especially demands that war be waged neither with the cruelty of taking vengeance nor with a desire to do harm, but with the right intention of obtaining due satisfaction, and that the innocent be in no way harmed, insofar as this can be done. But the Gallas, as soon as anyone from their family or tribe has been killed, swear mortal hatred against all and each of the blood relatives of the killer, and, without discrimination, if they meet them, attack, strike, and slaughter them, looking only to this: that by a barbarous rite they expiate blood with blood, until the satisfaction customary among them is furnished. Nor do they take vengeance under the guidance of public authority, to which alone it belongs to declare and direct war, but private persons rise up against private persons in the manner of wild beasts. Nor do they examine beforehand whether the homicide might have been committed accidentally or from the necessity of lawful defense and without fault. Nor, before they rush to arms, do they try every way through common friends by which they might peacefully obtain the satisfaction due to them; but, as the same Vicar Apostolic reports in another letter, from the very moment at which any homicide or lethal wounding occurs, all the blood relatives of both the killer and the one killed immediately separate themselves in such a manner that they are bound not only to break off every intercourse of speech and life with one another but also, if they meet, to fight even to extermination. Certainly no one fails to understand how greatly all these things are abhorrent to a suitable manner of waging war, indeed to the very notion of a true war. Therefore let the Vicar Apostolic take care, and let all the missionaries dwelling in those regions take care, that they utterly root out from their midst so barbarous and pernicious a custom, from which incredible slaughters of men and devastations of goods arise.

“But in the meantime will he be able to admit to participation in the sacraments one who is disposed in soul as is explained in the second doubt? The response depends upon the best-known principles of moral theology concerning the love of enemies, restitution on account of homicide, and the dispositions necessary for receiving the sacrament of Penance. That rule which the Vicar Apostolic relates that he gave to the missionaries subject to him is in no way opposed to these principles: namely, that the sacraments are not to be denied to one who protests that he has no personal hatred in his soul and wishes nothing else through the external hostility than what belongs to him by right according to the laws of his country, and who at the same time promises that he will accomplish by every means that he abstain from killing any of his enemies. The missionaries will therefore be able to follow this rule with respect to those who belong to the family or tribe of the one killed. But if there is question of those who are from the family or tribe of the unjust killer, it is required in addition that, insofar as it lies within them, they be prompt and prepared to furnish due satisfaction, and to undergo the displeasure of their own tribe rather than attack and injure anyone from the opposing tribe if perhaps they meet him, with the exception of the right of self-defense with the moderation of blameless defense.” Holy Office, 20 June 1866.

“According to the custom of this kingdom, every chief, even the least, although placed over only ten men, has full judicial and coercive power over his subjects, so that he can even pronounce a capital sentence against them according to his pleasure. Likewise a master has this power over his slaves. Nor would they permit their delinquent subjects to be brought before another tribunal. The customary form of judgment, moreover, is very summary. It is asked: — 1. Whether a Christian chief or master, with a safe conscience and with natural and divine law preserved, can exercise this power over his subjects or slaves and even decree capital punishment against them for an enormous crime; for example, if some subject wishes to destroy him or another, or to hand him over to persecutors for death on account of religion or another cause? — 2. Insofar as the answer is affirmative, when the chief himself questions the missionary concerning his right, can the missionary advise him concerning his right either in general or in a particular case? — Resp. To the first and second, that it can be tolerated until an exact form of judicial proceedings is introduced, with justice preserved and provided that in graver causes, especially capital ones, the procedure is as mild as possible and follows the counsel of upright men.” Holy Office, 27 January 1892; C. 2098.

“31. As a rule, I can kill a thief for the preservation of one gold coin. — 32. It is lawful to defend with a lethal defense not only the things which we actually possess, but also those to which we have an inchoate right and which we hope that we shall possess. — 33. It is lawful both for an heir and for a legatee to defend himself in this manner against one who unjustly prevents either the inheritance from being entered upon or the legacies from being paid; likewise also for one having a right to a chair or prebend against one who unjustly prevents possession of them.” Propositions condemned by Innocent XI.

“17. It is lawful for a religious or cleric to kill a slanderer who threatens to spread grave crimes concerning him or his religious order, when another manner of defending himself is not available; as it does not appear to be available if the slanderer is prepared publicly and before most eminent men to charge the aforesaid things against the religious himself or his religious order unless he is killed. — 18. It is lawful to kill a false accuser, false witnesses, and even a judge from whom an unjust sentence certainly threatens, if the innocent person cannot avoid harm in another way.” Propositions condemned by Alexander VII.

“30. It is lawful for a man of honor to kill an assailant who endeavors to inflict slander upon him, if this ignominy cannot otherwise be avoided; the same is also to be said if anyone strikes him with an open hand or with a club and, after inflicting the blow of the hand or the stroke of the club, flees.” Proposition condemned by Innocent XI.

“1. Will acceleration of delivery be lawful whenever the emergence of the fetus at its natural time would become impossible because of the narrowness of the woman? — 2. And if the narrowness of the woman is such that even premature delivery is judged impossible, will it be lawful to procure an abortion or to perform a Caesarean operation at its proper time? — 3. Is laparotomy lawful when there is question of an extrauterine pregnancy, or of ectopic conceptions? — Resp. To 1. Acceleration of delivery is not unlawful in itself, provided that it is performed for just causes and at that time and by those methods through which, according to ordinary contingencies, provision is made for the life of the mother and of the fetus. — To 2. As regards the first part, in the negative, according to the decree of Wednesday, 24 July 1895, concerning the unlawfulness of abortion. But as regards the second part: nothing prevents the woman in question from being subjected to a Caesarean operation at its proper time. — To 3. When necessity compels, laparotomy for extracting ectopic conceptions from the womb of the mother is lawful, provided that serious and opportune provision is made, insofar as this can be done, for the life both of the fetus and of the mother.” Holy Office, 4 May 1898.

“34. It is lawful to procure an abortion before the animation of the fetus, lest a girl who has been discovered to be pregnant be killed or defamed. — 35. It appears probable that every fetus, so long as it is in the womb, lacks a rational soul, and begins to have it only when it is born; and consequently it will have to be said that homicide is committed in no abortion.” Propositions condemned by Innocent XI.

“Can it safely be taught in Catholic schools that the surgical operation which they call craniotomy is lawful, namely, when, if it is omitted, the mother and child will perish, but if it is admitted, the mother will be saved while the infant perishes? Resp. After all matters had been considered for a long time and maturely, account also having been taken of those things written on this matter by expert Catholic men and transmitted by Your Eminence to this Congregation, they judged that the response must be: It cannot safely be taught. The Most Holy Lord fully confirmed it.” Holy Office, 28 May 1884.

“It cannot safely be taught in Catholic schools that the surgical operation which they call craniotomy is lawful, as was declared on 28 May 1884, nor that any surgical operation directly destructive of the fetus or of the pregnant mother is lawful.” Holy Office, 19 August 1889.

“When the physician Titius was called to a pregnant woman who was gravely ill, he commonly observed that there was no other underlying cause of the lethal disease apart from the pregnancy itself, that is, the presence of the fetus in the womb. Therefore, in order that he might save the mother from certain and imminent death, one way was available to him, namely, to procure an abortion or the expulsion of the fetus. He customarily entered upon this way, but employed means and operations not indeed tending of themselves and immediately toward killing the fetus in the mother’s womb, but only toward bringing it forth alive into the light, if this could be done, although it would soon die, since it was still altogether immature.

“Now, after reading what the Holy See wrote in response to the Archbishop of Cambrai on 19 August 1889—‘it cannot safely be taught that any operation directly destructive of the fetus is lawful, even if this were necessary to save the mother’—Titius remains doubtful concerning the lawfulness of the surgical operations by which he had not rarely procured abortion up to this time, in order to save gravely ill pregnant women.

“Therefore, in order to provide for his conscience, Titius suppliantly asks whether he can safely undertake the stated operations again in the circumstances repeatedly described. — Resp. In the negative, according to the other Decrees, namely, those of 28 May 1884 and 19 August 1889.” Holy Office, 24 July 1895.

“Whether it is sometimes lawful to extract from the womb of the mother ectopic (extrauterine) fetuses which are still immature, before the completion of the sixth month after conception? — Resp. In the negative, according to the decree of 4 May 1898, by force of which serious and opportune provision must be made, insofar as this can be done, for the life of the fetus and of the mother; but as regards the time, according to the same decree, let the petitioner remember that no acceleration of delivery is lawful unless it is performed at a time and by methods through which, according to ordinary contingencies, provision is made for the life of the mother and of the fetus.” Holy Office, 5 March 1902; Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, 20 March 1902. Cf. no. 742.

Apostolic Letter to the Ordinaries in the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires:

“Moved by the consciousness of your pastoral office and by charity toward your neighbors, you judged it necessary, in letters sent to Us last year, to report the frequency among your people of single combats which they call duels. You indicated with sorrow that this kind of fighting, as though a right established by custom, prevails even among Catholics; and at the same time you requested that Our voice also endeavor to deter men from an error of this kind.

“This error is certainly exceedingly pernicious, and indeed it is not confined within the borders of your states, but extends much more widely, so that scarcely any nation is found free from the contagion of this evil. Therefore We praise your zeal; and although it is known and thoroughly understood what Christian philosophy, with natural reason certainly agreeing, prescribes in this matter, nevertheless, since the depraved custom of dueling is especially nourished by forgetfulness of Christian precepts, it will be expedient and useful that this very matter be recalled briefly by Us.

“Namely, both divine laws—that which is natural from the light of reason, and that which has been promulgated in writings composed by divine inspiration—strictly forbid anyone to kill or wound a man apart from a public cause, unless, compelled by necessity, it is for the sake of defending his own safety. But those who challenge another to a private combat or accept one offered act for this purpose and direct their mind and strength toward this: although constrained by no necessity, to take away the life of their adversary or at least to inflict a wound upon him. Moreover, both divine laws forbid anyone rashly to cast away his own life, exposing it to grave and manifest danger, when no consideration of duty or magnanimous charity urges it; but this blind rashness, contemptuous of life, plainly inheres in the nature of a duel. Therefore it can be obscure or doubtful to no one that upon those who privately engage in single combat there fall both the crime of another’s destruction and the voluntary endangerment of their own life. Finally, there is scarcely any plague which is more abhorrent to the discipline of civil life and more subversive of the just order of the state than the permission granted to citizens that each man should become the defender of his own right by private force and hand, and the avenger of honor which he thinks has been violated.

“For these reasons the Church of God, which is guardian and vindicator both of truth and of justice and uprightness, by the union of which public peace and order are maintained, has always vehemently condemned the practice and has taken care that those guilty of private combat be restrained by the graver penalties which she could impose. The Constitutions of Alexander III, Our predecessor, inserted in the books of canon law, condemn and execrate these private combats. The Council of Trent punished with singular severity of penalties all who enter into them or participate in them in any manner; for, besides other things, it also branded them with the mark of infamy and, having cast them from the bosom of the Church, judged them unworthy, if they died in the combat, of ecclesiastical burial. Our predecessor Benedict XIV enlarged and explained the Tridentine sanctions in the Constitution issued on 10 November 1752, whose beginning is Detestabilem. But in the most recent period Pius IX, of happy memory, in the Apostolic Letter whose beginning is Apostolicae Sedis, by which latae sententiae censures are limited, openly declared that ecclesiastical penalties are incurred not only by those who fight in a duel, but also by those whom they call seconds, and likewise by witnesses and accomplices.

“The wisdom of these laws shines forth the more clearly, the more evident it is how foolish are those things customarily brought forward to defend or excuse the savage custom of dueling. For what is spread among the common people—that combats of this kind are adapted by their nature for washing away the stains which another’s slander or insult has placed upon the honor of citizens—is such as can deceive no one but a man bereft of judgment. For although the one who, having received an injury, declared the combat should depart from it victorious, the judgment of all sensible men will be that by such an outcome of the combat the challenger is proved better indeed in strength for fighting or in handling arms, but is not thereby proved superior in uprightness. But if that very man should fall, to whom in turn would this manner of defending honor not appear inconsiderate and altogether absurd? Indeed, We think that there are few who undertake this crime because they have been deceived by an error of opinion. It is altogether the desire for vengeance which impels proud and fierce men to seek punishment. If they were willing to restrain their haughty spirit and to obey God, who commands men to love one another with fraternal love and forbids anyone to be violated, who most gravely condemns the lust of taking vengeance in private men and reserves to Himself alone the power of exacting punishments, they would easily depart from the savage custom of dueling.

“Nor do those who accept an offered combat have available a just excuse of fear, because they fear that they will be considered cowardly by the common people if they refuse the fight. For if the duties of men were to be measured according to the false opinions of the common people and not according to the eternal norm of right and justice, there would be no natural and true distinction between upright actions and deeds shamefully committed. The wise pagans themselves both knew and taught that the fallacious judgments of the common people are to be despised by a brave and constant man. Rather, it is a just and holy fear which turns a man away from unjust slaughter and makes him solicitous for his own safety and that of his brethren. Indeed, he who disdains the empty judgments of the common people and prefers to undergo the lashes of insults rather than to abandon duty in any matter is clearly of a far greater and loftier spirit than one who, when provoked by an injury, rushes to arms. Indeed, if the matter is judged rightly, he alone is the one in whom solid fortitude shines forth—that fortitude, I say, which is truly called virtue and whose companion is a glory neither counterfeit nor deceptive. For virtue consists in a good consonant with reason, and unless glory rests upon the judgment of an approving God, all glory is foolish.

“Finally, the baseness of the duel is so manifest that even the legislators of our age, although it is supported by the votes and patronage of many, have judged that it must be restrained by public authority and by prescribed penalties. In this matter, however, it is most perverse and pernicious that written laws are nearly eluded in deed and fact, and this not rarely while those whose office it is to punish the guilty and to provide that the laws be obeyed know of it and remain silent. Thus it comes about that everywhere it is possible with impunity to descend to single combats, the majesty of the laws having been spurned.

“Foolish also and unworthy of a wise man is the opinion of those who, although they think that civilians are to be restrained from this kind of combat, nevertheless judge that it is to be permitted to soldiers, because they say that military virtue is sharpened by such exercise. First, honorable and base things differ by nature and can in no manner be changed into their contraries on account of the diverse state of persons. All men, in whatever condition of life, are altogether bound in an equal manner by divine and natural law. Furthermore, the reason for such indulgence toward soldiers would have to be sought from public utility, which can never be so great that under its pretext the voice of natural and divine right may be silenced. What if the very reason of utility is manifestly lacking? For the incentives of military virtue aim at this: that the state be better instructed against enemies. But will that be able to be effected with the aid of that custom which by its own nature aims at this: that, when a quarrel arises among soldiers, causes of which are not rare, one or the other of the defenders of the fatherland, on either side, is harmed?

“Lastly, the recent age, which boasts that it excels earlier centuries by far in a more humane culture and elegance of manners, is accustomed to make little of more ancient institutions and all too often to reject whatever is at variance with the complexion of more recent refinement. What is it, therefore, that, amid so great a zeal for humanity, it does not repudiate these ignoble remnants alone of a ruder age and of foreign barbarism—We mean the custom of the duel?

“It will be your office, Venerable Brethren, diligently to inculcate in the minds of your peoples these things which We have briefly touched upon, lest they rashly accept false opinions concerning this matter or allow themselves to be carried along by the judgment of lighter men. Take care in particular that young men become accustomed early to think and judge concerning the duel that which, with natural philosophy agreeing, the Church judges and thinks; and let them constantly take from that judgment their rule of action. Indeed, just as in some places it has been received by custom that Catholics, especially those of flourishing age, spontaneously and perpetually forbid themselves to enroll in disreputable societies, in like manner We deem it opportune and very salutary that they should make among themselves something like a covenant, pledging their word that at no time and for no cause will they fight a duel.

“We suppliantly ask God to strengthen our common endeavors with heavenly power and graciously to grant that which We desire for the public welfare, for integrity of morals, and for the Christian life. And as a pledge of divine gifts and likewise a witness of Our benevolence, We most lovingly impart to you, Venerable Brethren, the Apostolic blessing in the Lord.

“Given at Rome at Saint Peter’s, on 12 September 1891, the fourteenth year of Our Pontificate. LEO PP. XIII.”

“The Bishop of Breslau explained to the Holy See that at that University the very evil custom prevails among the young students of fighting duels very frequently; indeed, societies have been established there in which the young men do not obtain the higher ranks without having sustained a great and fixed number of duels. Nevertheless, combats of this kind among the said students are not so dangerous that there is reason to fear for life or the mutilation of any member. For the most part they take place with a short knife, with which the face alone is aimed at, and the contest very often ends with a small wound, curable within a few days, which leaves no trace whatsoever.

That Bishop, having to admit certain young men to ecclesiastical tonsure and orders, who had been students of that University and who at that time had themselves also been duelists or seconds in duels, asked the Sacred Congregation whether, and from what irregularities, they had to be dispensed: whether from that which arises ex homicidio, or from the other which arises ex defectu lenitatis, or finally from that ex infamia iuris imposed by the Council of Trent.

Hence the following doubt was proposed: Whether, by whom, and under what title an irregularity is contracted when a duel is committed in the manner in which it is customary for one to be conducted in these times among the students of a German University, as in the case. — Resp. In the affirmative: by the duelists and their seconds, from infamy of law.” Sacred Congregation of the Council, 9 August 1890.

“1. A military man who, unless he should offer or accept a duel, would be regarded as fearful, timid, abject, and unfit for military offices, and hence would be deprived of the office by which he supports himself and his family, or would have to lack perpetually the hope of a promotion otherwise due to and merited by him, would be free from guilt and penalty whether he offers or accepts a duel. — 2. Those accepting a duel or challenging another to it can also be excused for the sake of defending honor or avoiding human contempt, when they know with certainty that the fight will not follow, since it will be prevented by others. — 3. A commander or officer of the military who accepts a duel from grave fear of the loss of reputation and office does not incur the ecclesiastical penalties imposed by the Church against duelists. — 4. In the natural state of man, it is lawful to accept and offer a duel in order to preserve one’s fortunes with honor, when their loss cannot be averted by another remedy. — 5. The license asserted for the state of nature can also be applied to the state of a badly ordered commonwealth, in which, namely, through either the negligence or the malice of the magistrate, justice is openly denied.” Propositions condemned and prohibited as false, scandalous, and pernicious by Benedict XIV in the Constitution Detestabilem, 10 November 1752.

“2. A gentleman challenged to a duel can accept it, lest he incur among others the mark of cowardice.” Proposition condemned by Alexander VII.

“34. To fight against the Turks is to resist God visiting our iniquities through them.” Proposition of Martin Luther condemned by Leo X.

“62. The principle which they call non-intervention is to be proclaimed and observed.” Proposition condemned by Pius IX in the Syllabus.

"Whether it can be safely taught in Catholic schools that the surgical operation which they call craniotomy is lawful, namely, when, if it is omitted, mother and child will perish; but, if it is admitted, the mother will be saved, the infant perishing? - Resp. After all things had long and maturely been weighed, account also having been taken of those things which in this matter were written by expert Catholic men and transmitted by Your Eminence to this Congregation, they judged that response should be made: It cannot be safely taught.

Which response, since Our Most Holy Lord fully confirmed it in the audience of the same feria and day, I communicate to Your Eminence..." S. O. 11 May 1884.

1. To all moral theologians the question concerning craniotomy is known, and known is the response which concerning it came forth from the Congregation of the Eminent Fathers of the S. R. and U. I. As soon as a response of this sort was published, doubt began to arise concerning its value, namely whether it really settled the controversy, and truly condemned the opinion concerning the lawfulness of that surgical operation. For there were not lacking, nor are there lacking, grave theologians who thought and still think that that decree has no other value except a merely disciplinary one, and that it does not render improbable the opposite opinion concerning the lawfulness of craniotomy. Therefore it will not be unpleasant to students of moral matters briefly to weigh the force of the aforesaid decree.

2. The preceding Response can be explained by a twofold consideration, extrinsic and intrinsic. Let us begin from the first. A similar question was proposed to the S. R. U. I. concerning Ontologism, namely: "whether the following propositions can safely be handed down:" there follow the seven known propositions concerning Ontologism. The Sacred Congregation, Feria IV, on the day 18 Sept. 1861, rescripted: "The Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lords, the vote of the Consultors having first been had, and all and singular of the propositions above enunciated having been maturely weighed, responded to the proposed doubt: Negatively," namely: that they cannot safely be handed down.

3. By this decree theologians and the Philosophers themselves understood a true condemnation and proscription of the doctrine. Wherefore those who were defending Ontologism attempted to show that in those seven condemned propositions there was not contained the doctrine of Ontologism which they themselves were maintaining, but another doctrine quite different. Cf. the little work of the most learned philosopher and theologian Joseph Kleutgen, L'Ontologismo e le sette tesi censurate dalla Sacra Inquisizione, Rome, with the types of La Civilta Cattolica, 1867, p. 10 ff.

4. Nor did private and public Professors alone interpret that decree in this way; but also the Roman Congregations themselves understood that decree in this sense, namely of true condemnation and proscription. These things are read in the Decree transmitted through the Most Eminent Card. Patrizi to the Most Eminent Cardinal Archbishop of Mechlin concerning the philosophical books of G. C. Ubaghs, decurial doctor in the University of Louvain. "Moreover, what already, as from my letters given to the individual Bishops in Belgium on the day 11 Oct. of the year 1864 they had reserved to themselves to be done, the aforesaid Cardinals undertook to examine other doctrines which are contained in the more recent editions of the works of the same author. And indeed they had to perceive that in those books are handed down doctrines plainly similar to some of the seven propositions... which the Supreme Congregation of the Holy Office on the day 18 Sept. of the year 1861 judged could not safely be handed down; ... hence it will be altogether necessary that not only those books and those similar to them be kept away from the Catholic University and from all Schools; but also," etc. Rome, 2 March 1866. Cf. the cited little work, p. 84 ff.

5. After the decree related in the preceding number, new doubts arose on the part of the defenders of Traditionalism and Ontologism. For they said that the decisions given were disciplinary, not doctrinal; that those things which had previously been handed down could not be taught, but could be kept in the heart; and that they were still probable and lawful. When these things had been denounced to the Supreme Pontiff by the Most Eminent Cardinal Archbishop of Mechlin and other Bishops of Belgium, by letters given 1 Aug. 1866, the Most Eminent Patrizi in the name of the Most Holy Father rescripted these things to them: "In the letters... given to Most Holy Pius IX, a judgment is sought from the Apostolic See concerning certain doubts stirred up... concerning the responses of the sacred Congregations of the Holy Office and of the Index, both in the year 1864 and in this year 1866, sanctioned by the authority of the Supreme Pontiff. But those doubts are not of such a sort as to require a new interpretation and declaration of a matter already defined: for to dissolve them utterly, through the very responses of the Sacred Congregations, more than enough is done. Indeed it has been heard not without admiration that doubts of this sort have been proposed.... Moreover, Catholic men, much more indeed ecclesiastics, have this duty, that they subject themselves fully, perfectly, and absolutely to the decrees of the Holy See, contentions being removed from the midst which would obstruct the sincerity of assent." Rome, on the day 30 Aug. 1866. Cf. the cited little work, p. 86-89.

6. The preceding letter having been received, the Most Eminent Cardinal Archbishop of Mechlin and other Bishops of Belgium, on the day 17 Dec. of the year 1866, gave letters to the Rector and Professors of the University of Louvain, in which, speaking of the resolution of both Congregations, of the Holy Office and of the Index, on the day 2 March of the year 1866, cf. above n. 5, they assert these things: "These decisions are so clear that the cause must be held as definitively decided. But we know that the most firm will of the Most Holy Lord is that, errors having been removed, all think the same. And so, that all dissensions may remain extinguished forever, and that in a question long agitated and now defined there may remain nothing to be wished for or expected, we send the formula of letters to be subscribed by all who either handed down the reprobated doctrines or adhered to the same in any way." But in the formula it is said: "To the decisions of the Holy Apostolic See of the day 2 March and 30 August of this year, 1866, cf. above nn. 4, 5, I submit myself fully, perfectly, and absolutely, and from the soul I acquiesce. And therefore from the heart I reprobate and reject whatsoever doctrine opposed," etc. Cf. cited little work, p. 90, 91.

7. The retractation of Ontologism, by force of the condemnation pronounced by the Holy Office, was required from Rev. Dr. Ugonin when he was proposed for the Episcopate. This was the formula of retractation: "Since I, the undersigned, have received from the Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lord Archbishop of Myra, Apostolic Nuncio in France, that the doctrine which I set forth in my philosophical work on Ontologism (Etudes philosophiques-Ontologie) is disapproved by the Holy Apostolic See, as especially either explicitly or implicitly favoring those propositions which the S. R. and U. I. C. in the year 1861 decreed could not safely be handed down; I myself, no delay having been interposed, freely and spontaneously declare that I hold and disapprove the aforesaid doctrine in precisely the same way as the Holy See has judged, as wandering more or less from sound principles of philosophy; and at the same time I promise that, as far as will be in me, I will take care in the future that it be no longer handed down in the schools. Given at Paris on the day 13 Oct. 1866." Cited little work, p. 15.

8. Therefore, if craniotomy has been condemned by the Holy Office in the same manner in which Ontologism was condemned, if parity stands for each condemnation, it plainly appears how great is the force of that juridical censure concerning craniotomy, it cannot safely be taught. Nor indeed should it be objected that not once but several times proscriptions and decisions intervened against Ontologism on the part of the Most Holy Congregations and of the Holy See itself, which has not yet been had against craniotomy. For those repeated proscriptions and decisions do nothing else than inculcate and confirm that first condemnation of the Holy Office on the day 18 Sept. 1861, by force of which the Most Eminent Card. Patrizi, in his Letter and Decree on the day 2 March 1866, pronounces books infected with that doctrine to be kept away from the University of Louvain and from all Schools, and the Most Reverend Bishops of Belgium hold the cause as definitively decided; and the cause also concerned Ontologism; and, errors having been removed, they exhort all to subscribe to sound doctrines.

9. We now make a step to the intrinsic consideration of the matter. That is called safe which is without danger. Therefore an opinion which cannot safely be taught is an opinion which cannot be taught without danger. And thus in the cited Decree of 2 March 1866, given through the Most Eminent Patrizi, after it had been affirmed that in the philosophical books of G. C. Ubaghs "doctrines plainly similar to some of the seven propositions... which the Supreme Congregation of the Holy Office on the day 18 Sept. of the year 1861 judged could not safely be handed down" are handed down, it is then said that in the same books there are found doctrines or opinions which cannot be handed down without danger.

10. Moreover this danger is the danger of error, if we wish to understand the mentioned decision of the Holy Office in its proper and obvious sense. For it is said that it cannot safely be taught, and danger in teaching some opinion, properly and in the obvious sense, is nothing other than the danger of error. Wherefore that Decree is not some mere disciplinary prohibition of teaching or handing down in public or even private schools that opinion; but it is a true doctrinal judgment concerning the truth and falsity of the same opinion, which consequently can no longer be handed down in any schools, but must be altogether kept away from them.

11. Nor indeed should it be said that this danger is to be understood from the subject matter, which is some practical thing. For the matter about which there is question is practical and most practical, but it is a matter not regarding ecclesiastical and positive discipline, but regarding morals and touching the natural law itself. Wherefore from the consideration of the subject matter it does not follow that that decree is merely disciplinary, but that it is doctrinal in a matter of morals. For that decree involves this in other words: that that opinion concerning craniotomy cannot be taught without danger of error in a matter of morals. Nor should it be urged by saying that it can very well happen that that opinion cannot be safely taught, even speaking speculatively, because practically someone could easily abuse it, by applying it badly to practical cases, and by not rightly distinguishing the cases in which it can lawfully be given to execution from the cases in which that would be altogether illicit. This objection has no force, for that confusion of the case of lawful application and the case of unlawful application is impossible, and thus that danger is not this danger, of badly applying practically the aforesaid opinion and of confounding case with case. For indeed the opinion concerning craniotomy has not been condemned in the abstract, considered according to itself and generally; but the opinion concerning craniotomy has been condemned in the concrete, according to determined circumstances and considered in particular. For the question proposed, which the Sacred Congregation resolved by its decision, is not: "Whether it can safely be taught in Catholic Schools that the surgical operation which they call Craniotomy is lawful," thus, generally; but in that peculiar and determined case concerning which there was question and controversy among theologians, "namely when, if it is omitted, the mother and child would perish, but if it is admitted, the mother would be saved, the infant perishing." In this case, surely, the doctrine concerning craniotomy is declared dangerous. Therefore the very application to a determined case is declared a dangerous doctrine; IT CANNOT SAFELY BE TAUGHT. Therefore that danger is not the danger of practical abuse, the danger of unlawful application, but it is the danger of error in the opinion enunciating the lawfulness of craniotomy in that aforesaid case.

12. But it is still objected that the aforesaid opinion could well be called not safe, although determined to that peculiar case concerning which there was question, because of the practical danger itself of discerning the case of true necessity, namely that, if craniotomy is omitted, the mother and child truly would perish, but if it is admitted, the mother truly would be saved, the infant perishing. This cannot reasonably be objected. For that case of necessity is supposed as certain in that proposition concerning the lawfulness of craniotomy. Only in such a hypothesis was the question made by Theologians and proposed to the Sacred Congregation, and the Sacred Congregation certainly understood it in this sense; for it says in its Response, "account also having been taken of those things which in this matter were written by expert Catholic men and transmitted by Your Eminence to this Congregation." Besides, that objection would then have force when that case of necessity were truly difficult to know; but where craniotomy is concerned the matter is most clear and subject to no difficulty, unless the Surgeon is wholly stupid, which is accidental and is not attended to in the condemnation of a general proposition. For the matter is considered in itself.

13. Danger is one thing intrinsic, another extrinsic; and likewise one is proximate, another remote. The danger of error in asserting the lawfulness of craniotomy cannot be from a circumstance extrinsic to craniotomy itself, insofar as it is applied in such circumstances of things as render it unlawful. For, as has just been observed, what is condemned is not the lawfulness of craniotomy in general, but the lawfulness of craniotomy in the stated circumstance of the death of the mother and child, if that operation is omitted, and of the safety of the mother and death of the child, if it is done. Moreover, if any circumstance can be thought up which could render craniotomy lawful, this plainly is no other than the one just enunciated, since without that operation neither mother nor child is saved, while, when it is applied, the child is not placed in a worse condition and the mother is saved. But the Holy Office, in this very case, declares it dangerous to teach the lawfulness of craniotomy. Therefore the danger of error is intrinsic to craniotomy itself; namely because it is the direct killing of an innocent person. The danger of error is intrinsic to the complex itself, that is, to craniotomy clothed with the aforesaid circumstance; for in that complex craniotomy remains with its whole nature, which is not changed in the least by that maximally favorable circumstance. But if the danger of error is intrinsic, namely by force of craniotomy itself, consequently that danger of error cannot be remote, but proximate and most proximate; for nothing is more proximate to any thing than its intrinsic and innermost nature. Therefore the lawfulness of craniotomy cannot be taught without proximate and intrinsic danger of error.

14. An action which is a danger of sin is an action distinct from the action itself of sin, and is sin not properly and strictly speaking by reason of itself, but by reason of that action sinful in itself with which it is connected. Likewise an opinion containing danger of error is an opinion distinct from another certain and unshaken doctrine against which that opinion contains the danger of erring, and thus is connected with it insofar as it is opposed to it. Therefore, generally and speaking in itself, an opinion which cannot safely be taught, or which contains danger of error, is an opinion which, although it is not in itself error, nevertheless is connected with error; at least insofar as of itself and in the obvious sense, and not accidentally from mere inconsideration, it so labors under equivocation between error and truth that by an easy way it turns aside toward error rather than toward truth, and one who adheres to it is judged to embrace error indeed, not truth. Nevertheless, when from the subject matter a proposition is so determined that no way lies open to truth, although it is defined merely as not safe, and by reason of the note itself or censure cannot be held except as merely dangerous, or containing danger of error, consequently that proposition must nevertheless be held as error, namely by reason of legitimate deduction. And hence it is easily explained why, although those seven propositions of Ontologism were not marked with any other censure than that they cannot safely be handed down, nevertheless in the Schools they have commonly been held as altogether improbable after that Decision of the Holy Office. The same seems to happen in our case. For no true sense can be thought up, since in the very case most favorable it is said that it cannot safely be taught. Wherefore it does not appear how craniotomy can still be defended probably.

15. That adverb, safely, can be explained in another way; but the conclusion is nearly the same. That adverb can be resolved into an adjective, and then the substantive understood under it is to be sought. Moreover this substantive, which can be thought up more favorably in the present matter, is conscience; so that it cannot safely be taught is the same as it cannot be taught with a safe conscience. This interpretation, which pertains most greatly to a moral and practical matter, seems altogether to agree with the decision of the Holy Office which we are treating; for in it there is question of a moral and practical matter. Moreover, in Moral matters, that opinion is called safe which someone can follow practically without danger and fear of violating some precept or some law. Likewise in a moral matter an opinion is called safe in the merely speculative order which someone can hold in the mind and teach externally to others without danger and fear of erring against some certain law or precept. In our case that certain and unshaken law is the law, Thou shalt not kill. Wherefore that craniotomy in that case set forth above cannot safely be taught is the same as that craniotomy cannot be taught without danger and fear of error against the law, Thou shalt not kill. But this danger and fear of error would then remain on the part of the thing a mere danger of error, and would not consequently become error, if a case could be given in which the law Thou shalt not kill was in reality not infringed. But here this case cannot be given. For if this case were given, it would be no other than the proposed case itself. But that proposed case would then on the part of the thing remain a mere danger of error, and would not become error, directly against that law Thou shalt not kill, since it would not yet be ultimately determined by every favorable circumstance, and could still be further determined. Therefore, although by force of the condemnation that opinion is only a doctrine not safe, nevertheless in reality by force of the matter that opinion becomes altogether improbable.

16. But someone will ask why then the Holy Office negatively said that sentence was not safe, and did not positively say that it was erroneous, if not safe is in reality the same as erroneous? It is responded, first: it did not say this, because this was not asked, but that; and Sacred Congregations respond with customary formulas to proposed doubts, nor are they accustomed in their brief responses to make a treatment of the matter about which there is question, so as to set it forth and explain it. It is responded, secondly: although the sentence not safe in our case falls back in reality, by reason of the matter, by legitimate conclusion, into an erroneous or false sentence, nevertheless that theological censure, not safe, is not the same as the other censure: erroneous or error, which is a far graver censure. We contend for the former, not the latter. But we say erroneous or false also to restrict the signification of error, since strictly speaking error and false are not the same. "From Augustine, in the Enchiridion, ch. 17, and Contra Academicos, ch. 4, to err is nothing other than to approve true things for false, or false things for true. In this signification error is nothing other than a false proposition, and so it can be found not only in the matter of faith or Theology, but also in any natural or human matter: but according to the common manner of speaking, error, as it were by antonomasia, is accustomed in each matter to signify not just any false judgment, but, by a certain exaggeration, that which is more evidently or more certainly false." Suarez, De Fide, D. 19, S. 2, n. 11. Hence the same Suarez, discoursing on an erroneous proposition, as it is distinguished from a heretical one in theological censures, says that it is one "which is opposed to a truth certain by theological certitude, which does not attain the certitude of faith; because it is in no way immediately revealed, as is supposed, but is a conclusion evidently inferred from one proposition of faith and from another evident by the natural light.... A proposition contrary to such a proposition does not attain the grade of a heretical proposition, because it does not have the highest opposition with a proposition of faith, such as immediate opposition is: but that it is erroneous is manifest; because after a heretical proposition, it has the highest repugnance with the truth of faith, namely mediate through evident inference." l.c., n. 14. The doctrine of Cardinal Lugo, De Fide, D. 20, S. 3, n. 73, is the same. "The word error, taken most broadly, can be attributed to any false proposition in any matter; for he who believes the false as true errs from the true and is deceived. Commonly, however, that word is accustomed to be restricted to the false which is opposed not only to the true, but to the evident or certain, which among all is commonly known certainly. Nor in Philosophy is just any false opinion called error, but one which is opposed to a certain dogma and received as such among philosophers. Wherefore in Theology that will not be called error unless it is opposed to some certain truth which is held as certain among Catholics and Theologians." But insofar as error is a special censure below heresy, according to the same Lugo, "error properly is that which is not opposed immediately, but only mediately to the doctrine of faith, insofar as it immediately denies a proposition which is not of faith, but only a theological conclusion, evidently deduced from one proposition of faith and another evident by the light of nature." l.c., n. 78.

17. Wherefore if that censure, it cannot safely be taught, is taken altogether properly and strictly by reason of itself, according to the general rule of interpreting condemned propositions, the aforesaid opinion concerning craniotomy is a dangerous opinion, which namely cannot be taught without danger of error; consequently, moreover, it is also a dangerous opinion, which cannot be reduced to practice without danger of sin. But if the censure, it cannot safely be taught, is considered in the subject matter, that same opinion concerning craniotomy is simply false, and in this sense can also be called not safe and dangerous in the true and proper sense; for it contains an intrinsic and proximate danger of denying a truth, evident, certain, received by all; namely, Thou shalt not kill.

18. Finally it must be noted that if craniotomy cannot safely be taught, neither can the direct procurement of abortion in the same circumstances be safely taught. This follows by legitimate reasoning. For first, the arguments by which craniotomy was defended are the same as the arguments by which the direct procurement of abortion is defended. Besides, it matters little whether the infant's head is cut or compressed, or whether the infant is infected with poison, or an immature fetus by mere ejection from the maternal womb is directly and of itself deprived of the natural element altogether necessary to it for life. It is surely the same thing to kill a man by steel, poison, or projection into fire, or immersion into water.

72. IV. On abortion and craniotomy². It is known that voluntary destruction of the fetus flourished among the Pagans; but the Christian religion, zealous for human life and the salvation of infants, strictly prohibited it as true homicide. Yet in our days not a few physicians have attempted to make honorable abortion and embryotomy or craniotomy (i.e., the destruction of a living fetus)³, at least in the case in which the life of the mother otherwise cannot be saved. Now as regards abortion, the violent ejection of an immature fetus, at the time when it cannot live outside the uterus, must be distinguished from acceleration of childbirth, which takes place when the fetus, already conceived for seven months, can live outside the uterus. - These things being posited, we set forth the responses of the Congregations on this matter:

² Eschbach, op. cit., pp. 273-286; 381-476; Surbled, op. cit., vol. II, p. 184-258; Dissez, Craniotomy from the theological point of view.

³ Embryotomy etymologically means the cutting of the embryo, craniotomy the cutting of the skull or head.

73. (A) On craniotomy. In the year 1884, on May 28, the Holy Office recalled for examination the doubt proposed by Cardinal Caverot: "Whether it can safely be taught in Catholic schools that the surgical operation which they call craniotomy is licit, namely when, it being omitted, the mother and son would perish, but on the contrary, it being admitted, the mother would be saved, the infant perishing"; it judged that it must be answered: that it cannot safely be taught⁴. But when there was dispute concerning the sense and extension of this decree, especially in the Catholic Faculty of Lille, the Archbishop of Cambrai proposed new doubts concerning certain surgical operations akin to craniotomy; after three years, the Holy Office, on August 14, 1889, confirmed the first response, and declared that it cannot safely be taught that "any surgical operation directly killing the fetus or the pregnant mother" is licit⁵.

⁴ Apud Eschbach, op. cit., p. 461-462; Acta S. Sedis, XVII, p. 556.

⁵ Eschbach, p. 464-467; Acta S. Sedis, XXII, p. 748.

74. (B) On abortion of the immature fetus. Since procurement of abortion differs from craniotomy, some thought, even after the aforesaid decrees, that abortion was licit for saving the mother.

Therefore a new case was proposed to the Holy See: "Titius, a physician, when he was called to a pregnant woman lying gravely ill, everywhere observed that there was no other cause underlying the lethal disease except the pregnancy itself, that is, the presence of the fetus in the uterus. Therefore there was one way at hand for him, that he might save the mother from certain and imminent death, namely of procuring abortion or ejection of the fetus. He was accustomed to enter upon this way, having employed means and operations nevertheless not indeed tending of themselves and immediately to this, that they should kill the fetus in the maternal womb, but only that it should be brought to light alive, if it could be done, although it would soon die, as being still altogether immature." Now the Holy Office, on July 24, 1895, decreed that this could not be done¹.

¹ Eschbach, p. 468-469.

75. (C) On acceleration of childbirth. Wherefore nothing remained except to inquire concerning acceleration of childbirth; therefore the following doubts were proposed by the Bishop of Sinaloa (Sinaloa, in the Mexican region): "1. Will acceleration of childbirth be licit whenever from the narrowness of the woman the exit of the fetus at its natural time would become impossible? - 2. And if the narrowness of the woman is such that not even premature childbirth is judged possible, will it be licit to provoke abortion or to perform the Caesarean operation at its own time? - 3. Is laparotomy (i.e., section of the abdomen) licit when there is question of extra-uterine pregnancy, or of ectopic conceptions?"

Moreover the Holy Office on May 4, 1898 responded: "To 1. Acceleration of childbirth is not illicit of itself, provided it is performed from just causes and at that time and in those modes by which, from ordinary contingencies, care is taken for the life of the mother and fetus. - To 2. As regards the first part, negatively... But as regards the second, nothing prevents the woman concerning whom there is question from being subjected to the Caesarean operation at its own time. - To 3. Necessity compelling, laparotomy is licit for extracting ectopic conceptions from the womb of the mother, provided that for the lives of both fetus and mother, insofar as can be done, serious and opportune provision is made."²

² Eschbach, p. 470-471; Acta S. Sedis, XXX, p. 704.

The Holy Office again confirmed this response on March 5, 1902, renewing the prior decrees³.

³ Ami du Clerge, XXIV, 1902, p. 478.

76. From the aforesaid decrees it is permitted to infer a threefold rule: (A) It is not licit directly to procure immature abortion⁴ or to perform craniotomy; for each action is directly killing of an innocent. Therefore the following sin gravely: (a) pregnant girls who procure abortion lest they lose reputation or suffer some other grave evil; or women who, fearing lest they are pregnant, take potions or employ other means in order to induce abortion; (b) physicians who directly procure abortion, even for saving the mother; for evils are not to be done that goods may come¹; moreover there are other suitable means for helping the mother, namely acceleration of childbirth and the Caesarean operation, which today, especially in great cities, where skilled surgeons are found, is performed easily and safely².

⁴ This indeed is true even if it were admitted that the fetus, although living, is not yet informed by a rational soul; for by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679, this proposition 34 was condemned (apud Denzinger, n. 1051): "It is licit to procure abortion before animation of the fetus, lest a girl found pregnant be killed or defamed." - The excommunication imposed against those procuring abortion is set forth in the Treatise on Censures.

¹ Nor can it be said that the fetus is an unjust aggressor; for, as Cangiamilla already said in his time, the infant is not an unjust invader, but compelled by nature, whose author is God; indeed compelled by the mother herself, as D. Huber says. Cf. Eschbach, op. cit., p. 424.

² Hence today many physicians, even non-Catholics, reject immature abortion and craniotomy as something scientifically antiquated: "To kill the fetus, under pretext of favoring delivery, is to misunderstand the certain resources of modern obstetrical surgery; it is to be behind the times." Thus Dr. Guerinoprez, apud Eschbach, op. cit., p. 389.

77. (B) It is licit indirectly to procure abortion from a proportionately grave cause; e.g., if the mother labors under a lethal disease which cannot be cured unless a remedy is furnished from which abortion will follow by accident; provided these conditions concur: (a) that the disease be truly lethal; (b) that the remedy be directly employed for curing the disease, not for expelling the fetus; (c) that in the best way possible provision be made for the baptism and salvation of the animated fetus.

(C) It is licit directly to procure acceleration of childbirth, when it is foreseen that the infant can live, provided there is a grave cause; for by such a manner of acting the life of the infant is not taken away, but only exposed to danger; and this indeed is licit whenever it is required for averting a greater danger of the infant itself or of death.

78. Note for practice. Since in some Schools of physicians it is taught that craniotomy is licit and expedient for saving the life of the mother, certain surgeons in good faith perform it when from various circumstances the Caesarean operation seems less opportune; in which case, as regards the past, they are indeed excused from sin, but they are prudently to be instructed as regards the future, according to the rules handed down in the Treatise on Penance.

Printed by the Society of St. John the Evangelist, Desclee & Co. - Tournai (Belgium).

1100. 1. It is not prohibited: (a) to kill animals, "because they are not associated with us by any reason,"⁸ and to eat them has been granted by God to men; (b) to inflict capital punishment upon wicked and criminal men, by which the life of men may be kept safe; (c) to take life from enemies, with only the aim of public utility; (d) to kill another for the sake of defending one's safety; (e) nor is he guilty of this precept who by chance kills a man; in this, however, one can sin for two reasons: 1) if someone, occupied in an unjust matter, kills a man; 2) if, not having examined all things, he negligently and incautiously kills someone.

⁸ St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, I, 20, P. L., XLI, 35.

2. What is forbidden. (a) But other killings are prohibited, whatever be the difference either of the killer, or of the one killed, or of the killing. All, namely even the rich, even the powerful, even parents, ought to abstain from killing; all, even those of humble and abject condition, are defended by the force of this law; nor is it lawful for anyone to kill himself; every manner also of accomplishing killing is interdicted, namely physical perpetration and moral cooperation. (b) It is also prohibited to indulge anger without just cause, by which a way can be prepared for killing.

3. But we are commanded to have peace and charity with all, even enemies and those causing troubles;⁹ and consequently to cultivate patience,¹⁰ beneficence, meekness, and forgiveness of injuries.

⁹ Matt. 5:23.

¹⁰ 1 Cor. 13:4.

4. Indeed, for the perfect observance of the precept we receive from the Lord the counsel of not resisting evil, of offering the other cheek to one striking the right, and of letting go cloak and coat to one seeking them.¹¹

¹¹ Matt. 5:39.

Concerning these things we discuss in the Treatise on Justice, namely: concerning suicide and self-mutilation, n. 289-308; concerning the killing of the innocent, of malefactors, and of an unjust aggressor, 311-333; concerning duel, 334-344; concerning war, 345-363.

289. Historical survey. (A) Among the Jews very few examples of suicide are found, both because that crime was prohibited by God, and because the Israelites desired to be long-lived upon the earth. The cases indeed are alleged of Samson,³ Saul,⁴ Achitophel,⁵ Eleazar,⁶ Razias;⁷ but Samson and Eleazar did not properly commit suicide, but gave their life for their country, in order to rout enemies.

² St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 64, a. 5; Lugo, disp. X, n. 1-55; Lessius, lib. I, cap. 9, dub. 6; Billuart, diss. X, art. 3; St. Alphonsus, n. 366-375; Carriere, n. 833-856; Ball. P., tr. VI, n. 855-875; Tissot, De la manie du suicide, Paris, 1841; Lisle, Du suicide, Paris, 1856; Morselli, Il suicidio, Milan, 1879; Legoyt, Le suicide ancien et moderne, Paris, 1881; Masaryk, Der Selbstmord als sociale Massenerscheinung, Vienna, 1881; Westcott, Suicide, its history, litterature, etc., London, 1885; Bonomelli, Il suicidio, Milan, 1892; E. Durkheim, Le Suicide, etude de sociologie, Paris, 1897; P. Hauviller, Du suicide, unite de son etiologie, son traitement, Paris, 1899; L. Proal, Le Crime et le suicide passionnels, Paris, 1900; Gurnhill, The Morals of suicide, London, 1900.

³ Jud., XVI, 22-30.

⁴ I Reg., XXXI, 2-6.

⁵ II Reg., XVII, 23.

⁶ I Mach., VI, 43-46.

⁷ II Mach., XIV, 37-46.

(B) Among the Greeks,¹ the chief philosophers, such as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, regarded self-killing as something cowardly; yet some killed themselves, whether on account of the public good, or to avoid disgrace or other private evils; such were Codrus the Athenian, Menoeceus the Theban, Cleomenes, king of Sparta, Themistocles, Isocrates. The Stoics advocated suicide as an act of virtue, by which they could at their pleasure be snatched from the bonds of life; and also the Epicureans, as a means of fleeing the bitternesses of life.

¹ Concerning the history of suicide among the Greeks and other Nations see Legoyt, op. cit., p. 7 sq.

(C) At Rome, as long as the citizens cultivated virtues and honorable and simple morals, suicide was almost unknown; especially the examples of Lucretia, Scipio of Utica, Cassius, and Brutus are cited. But as soon as wealth, luxury, and love of pleasures flourished, namely in the last times of the Republic and under the reign of the Emperors, many citizens, in order to avoid pains or a more cruel death, took away their own life.

290. (D) These morals the Christian religion corrected, by often inculcating human dignity, the value of life, patience in adversities, and trust in God. Hence, among Christians, suicides became exceedingly rare. There were indeed some who went to meet martyrdom, and also Christian virgins who, lest they lose virginity, did not hesitate to bring death upon themselves;² but the Fathers, especially St. Augustine,³ while they praised their virtue and right intention, reproved the deed itself. Likewise certain heretics, akin to the Donatists and called Circumcellions, approved suicide; these "were accustomed to kill themselves by various deaths, especially by precipices and waters and fires, and to seduce into that madness others of either sex whom they could."⁴ But for this reason they are severely censured by the Fathers.

² Thus St. Pelagia (in St. Ambrose, de Virginibus, III, 7), Domnica with her two daughters (Eusebius, Eccles. Hist., VIII, 12, in Migne, P. G. XX, 770-771), Sophronia (Eusebius, op. cit., VIII, 14, Migne, l. c. 786-787).

³ De civit. Dei, l. I, c. 26-27, in Migne, P. L. XLI, 39-40.

⁴ St. Augustine, De Haeresibus, n. 69, in Migne, XLII, 43.

291. (E) But in more recent times, as faith decreased and pagan morals gradually were reborn, not a few writers again advocated suicide, among whom were Montaigne, Montesquieu, Rousseau, who, otherwise little consistent with himself, elsewhere reproved that crime, - d'Holbach, Barbieri, J. Robeck,⁵ and generally the positivists and materialists. Therefore suicides became more frequent, especially in France and Germany.⁶ Besides, in various regions many more are committed among Protestants than among Catholics, even according to non-Catholic writers as witnesses.¹

⁵ Concerning these see Legoyt, op. cit., p. 85-99.

⁶ In France suicides are multiplied daily; - namely, in the year 1826 there were counted 1739; in 1851: 3639; in 1888: 8451; in 1897: 9156. If a comparison is made with other regions, already in the year 1888 France held the first place; for this was the proportion of suicides per 1,000,000 inhabitants: - in France: 212; in Prussia: 198; among the Belgians: 116; in Austria: 114; in England: 80; in Italy: 53. - In cities suicides are more frequent than among country people; thus per 1,000,000 inhabitants there are had at Leipzig: 450; at Paris: 400; at Berlin: 300; at Vienna: 290. Cf. M. Block, L'Europe politique et sociale, Paris, 1892, p. 459, 460, 462. - As to the causes of suicide, these things are read in M. Block, op. cit., p. 461: "Relatively to the presumed motives of suicides, the General Account gives the following averages for the period 1876-80: poverty and reverses of fortune, 698; family sorrows, 842; love, jealousy, etc., 254; drunkenness, 799; desire to withdraw oneself from judicial proceedings, 236; physical sufferings, 202; cerebral maladies, 1901; others and unknown, 627."

¹ Durkheim, op. cit., p. 149-173; Hauviller, op. cit., p. 62-65.

292. Division of the matter. Suicide is sometimes directly intended as an end or a means: then it is called direct; but sometimes it is not intended in itself, but is foreseen as probably going to follow from the action which is placed; thus a soldier about to fight for his country foresees that death will probably follow from the battle; then suicide, if it really occurs, is indirect. Hence we shall speak: 1. of direct suicide; 2. of indirect suicide; 3. by way of corollary, of mutilation of oneself, surgical operations, and care of one's own body.

293. 1. Principle: Suicide, directly and by one's own authority intended, is of itself a grave sin, injurious to God and harmful no less to the individual than to society.

It is said: by one's own authority... so that the case of one who would kill himself by divine inspiration may be excluded; - of itself, grave, because there can be some who in good faith, on account of various motives, take away their own life; but of itself the sin is mortal, on account of the motives which we now explain.

294. (A) It is a sin injurious to God;² for, from what has been said above (n. 34), perfect dominion over his own life does not belong to man, but only dependently upon God, its founder, supreme lord, and last end. Now, by taking away life from himself by his own hand, he violates God's rights: (a) since God, and indeed He alone, as supreme lord of all, has the right of disposing of human life, which He handed over to us after the manner of a deposit, and which we ought to use according to His will: for creatures essentially and according to their whole being depend upon the Creator; this indeed the Apostle intimates: "For none of us lives to himself, and no one dies to himself. For whether we live, we live to the Lord; or whether we die, we die to the Lord. Therefore whether we live or whether we die, we are the Lord's."¹ (b) Moreover God, insofar as He is the last end, has a strict right that we tend toward Him by the means which He has determined; now He has established according to His wisdom the term of our life and probation, and therefore we usurp His rights if by premature death of our own will we put an end to this probation.²

² This is the chief argument; the two others only confirm it.

¹ Rom., XIV, 7-8.

² Some pagans had already understood this; for Socrates (in Plato, Phaed., c. 6) says: "This seems to me, O Cebes, to be said rightly, that God indeed has care of us; but we men are one certain thing among the possessions of the gods. Would you not therefore also be angry if one of your slaves killed himself, and, if you had power, would you not affect him with some punishment?"

Therefore deservedly St. Augustine writes that self-killing is prohibited by these words, You shall not kill: "It remains that we understand of man what was said, You shall not kill: neither another, therefore, nor yourself; for he who kills himself kills nothing other than a man."³

³ De Civ. Dei, lib. I, c. 20, in Migne, P. L., XLI, 35; a little above, c. 17, p. 30-31, he had said: "For surely, if it is not licit by private power to kill a man, even a guilty one, whose killing no law permits, certainly also he who kills himself is a homicide; and he becomes so much the more guilty when he kills himself, the more innocent he was in that cause for which he thought he ought to be killed."

295. (B) Harmful to the individual himself; for he who spontaneously casts away life by that very fact takes from himself not only a present good, but every further abundance of good. (a) For life is the greatest good which we can enjoy in the present life;⁴ for it is the condition without which we cannot enjoy other goods; as long as we live, we can acquire not only external goods, but also internal goods, namely knowledge, virtue, merits; but by voluntarily deserting life, we are deprived of all these things. (b) Moreover, as long as we preserve life unharmed, even if we are oppressed by various miseries and immersed in vices, hope remains that, circumstances having changed and morals having been reformed, things may proceed prosperously for us, and that we may redeem the faults of our past life by due satisfaction and by the practice of virtues; but if suicide is perpetrated, every hope vanishes, and nothing remains except that we pay the penalty proportioned to our faults. (c) It is a law implanted in our nature that we cultivate by manly effort the faculties received from God, physical, mental, and moral; the more perfect this development is, the greater is our happiness, since by the legitimate and progressive exercise of the faculties we approach more closely our last end; but, on the other hand, if life is cut off immaturely, man withers like a dried flower, before he has attained the degree of perfection destined for him.

⁴ On the moment and value of life Olle-Laprune discusses excellently, Le prix de la vie, 3rd ed., Paris, 1896.

296. (C) Harmful to society. Every man is inserted into society as a useful member, and remains bound to it by certain bonds and duties, because he unceasingly receives many benefits from it: for he enjoys the protection of society, and by its aid he is able so to cultivate his faculties that their force is increased a hundredfold. Therefore he ought to pay the debts of charity and justice to the State; this indeed he can furnish by working, teaching, giving good example, and by other means by which the public good is promoted. Now, by departing from life by his own motion, the citizen despises all these duties, and gives scandal to those to whom he ought to have been of utility and edification. Deservedly, therefore, he is compared to a soldier who deserts the post where he ought to fight strenuously; deservedly he is held guilty of cowardice.

297. (A) First of all there are alleged the infirmities and miseries of human life, such as poverty, disease, especially incurable disease, old age, bitter pains, weariness, griefs, and other things of this kind; and from this it is inferred that death is more desirable than a life overwhelmed by so many and so great miseries.

But in this a false concept of life is presented; for we are not here upon earth in order to enjoy pleasures, but in order to cultivate virtues by the legitimate exercise of the faculties, to increase moral perfection, and to obtain a better life. Now nothing is more efficacious than tribulation for the practice of virtues; for virtue is perfected in infirmity, fortitude is strengthened in adversities,¹ patience is exercised by bearing pains bravely, merits are greatly increased; moreover, if we have sinned, an occasion offers itself for expiating faults by salutary penance. Thus the distresses of this life are rendered more tolerable; indeed they bring a certain joy, according to that word of the Apostle:² "And not only this, but we glory also in tribulations, knowing that tribulation works patience; and patience probation; and probation hope. And hope does not confound."

¹ Already Martial the poet had said: "In adverse things it is easy to despise life; he acts bravely who is able to be miserable."

² Rom., V, 3-5; cf. VIII, 18-39, where the same thing is set forth more fully.

298. (B) Others kill themselves because they cannot tolerate disgrace, since honor is life itself, and more precious.

A foolish excuse indeed! From the fact that others unjustly attack our reputation, must we punish ourselves by taking away life with a cruel hand? Nor indeed do we thus recover the good estimation of our neighbor; but, on the contrary, by living honestly and acting nobly we overcome false accusations. But if we have been guilty of some fault, reputation is recovered not by suicide, by which disgrace is increased, but by a praiseworthy life.

299. (C) Some, in order to preserve chastity, have gone to meet death, since virtue is much more precious than life.

And these indeed are subjectively worthy of excuse, on account of the right intention which they had, as St. Augustine notes; but, according to the same, this is not in itself a sufficient reason for committing suicide; for since purity is a virtue of the soul, it is not lost even when the body is oppressed, as the holy Doctor says:³ "Wherefore a woman violently oppressed without any consent, and forced by another's sin, has nothing which she may punish in herself by voluntary death: much less before this happens; lest certain homicide be admitted, while the very crime, although another's, still remains uncertain." - In reality, material integrity of the flesh is not more precious than life, since sometimes it is licitly lost, in surgical operations, in order to save life. - But what if there is present a danger of inwardly consenting? Not even in this case is it licit to kill oneself; for in so great a danger grace will not be lacking for resisting lust, provided it is earnestly sought: "But God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able, but will make also with temptation an outcome, that you may be able to bear it."⁴ Therefore nothing remains except that one must fight strenuously; and what is said of this temptation must be said of others: it is licit for no one, in order to overcome any temptations whatever, to kill himself; for evils are not to be done that goods may come.

³ De Civit. Dei, l. I, c. 18, in Migne, XLI, 31-32.

⁴ I Cor., X, 13.

300. (D) Not a few contend that they lead a useless life, indeed one burdensome to others, or even harmful, insofar as they give scandal, so that by killing themselves they promote the good of their neighbor or of society.

But that these motives are not sufficient is already clear from what has been said. (a) If someone leads a useless life, nothing prevents him by praying, working, and helping others by works of charity from bringing many benefits both to himself and to others;¹ for this is the law of Providence: that, while we do good to others, we contribute most greatly to our own happiness. (b) But if we impose burdens upon others, because of disease, old age, etc., by that very fact we offer them an occasion of exercising patience and acquiring merits; on the other hand, by bravely tolerating our infirmities, we are unto edification for them: "Bear one another's burdens, and so you shall fulfill the law of Christ."² (c) But if we have harmed society or our neighbor, the duty lies upon us of repairing scandal by honesty and sanctity of life; by no means, however, do we have the right of taking away our life, since this rather gives new scandal.

¹ This J. J. Rousseau, who elsewhere favors suicide, explains eloquently: "Suicide is a furtive and shameful death; it is a theft committed against the human race. Before leaving it, give back to it what it has done for you. - But I am attached to nothing, I am useless to the world. - Philosopher of a day! do you not know that you could not take a step upon the earth without finding some duty to fulfill, and that every man is useful to humanity by the sole fact that he exists? Senseless youth! if there remains at the bottom of your heart the least sentiment of virtue, come, that I may teach you to love life. Each time that you are tempted to go out of it, say to yourself: 'let me do one more good action before dying,' then go seek some indigent person to aid, some unfortunate person to console, some oppressed person to defend." (Nouvelle Heloise, III, letter 22.)

² Galat. VI, 2.

301. A point to be noted for practice. Since some are led to suicide by a certain auto-suggestion, by the force of which, by frequently thinking about their own miseries, they gradually persuade themselves that there is no other means of extricating themselves from these difficulties except to perpetrate suicide, it is of the greatest moment to turn their mind away from this continual thought, by suggesting to them some work of charity, or another occupation by which they may more easily overcome weariness of life.

302. 1. Principle: It is not licit to kill oneself indirectly, or to do or omit something from which death is foreseen as going to follow, unless from a proportionately grave cause.

This is clear from what was said in the Treatise on Human Acts, where voluntary indirect action was treated. For indirect suicide is nothing other than an act good of itself, or at least indifferent, from which death follows per accidens and beyond the intention; now an act of this kind is indeed not licit when there is no sufficient reason, because to posit the cause of some grave evil, without a sufficient motive, is something gravely sinful; but if a proportionate cause is present, it becomes licit; for the evil effect is not intended, but only permitted, and otherwise is compensated for by the good effect directly intended.

303. 2. What cause is proportionately grave? The general principle is that a greater cause is required the nearer and more certain the danger of death is. Let us run through the principal causes:

(A) The public good is a sufficient cause for someone to expose himself to a danger even proximate and certain of death; thus it is licit for soldiers to set fire to a ship, or to explode a fortress, in order to submerge or destroy enemies, although their own death would certainly follow from this; but this of itself is not licit merely in order to avoid captivity, unless some hope shines forth of avoiding death. - The fulfillment of the duties of one's state can be referred to the public good; thus priests, physicians, and other men to whom by office the care of others belongs can, and sometimes ought, to expose themselves even to proximate danger of death, in order to procure the salvation, life, or security of others.

304. (B) A good of a superior order, even individual, such as the exercise of charity, faith, chastity, justice, and other Christian virtues, is a sufficient reason for going to meet even certain danger of death.

Thus, for the sake of charity, someone can expose himself to danger of death in order to save the life of parents, a spouse, a friend, a neighbor; e.g., in shipwreck it is licit to yield to another a plank already seized, although it is foreseen that death will follow from this. For the sake of faith, it is licit not only to bear death bravely, but also not to flee, even if an opportunity offers itself, - indeed to present oneself to judges, if this is judged necessary for strengthening others in the faith. For protecting chastity, a virgin upon whom violence is inflicted can flee, and in fleeing can cast herself headlong from a high cliff or from a window, even if death can follow from this, yet not altogether certainly, because not death itself, but the keeping of virginity, is intended.

From love of justice, evildoers can offer themselves to judges to be condemned and killed; indeed, when someone has been found guilty of death, more probably he can, at the judge's command, take poison with his own hands (as is narrated of Socrates), because then he does nothing other than execute a just sentence; yet not a few contradict this, because it is repugnant to equity that the guilty man be compelled to kill himself.

305. (C) In order to avoid a more certain danger of death, or a more cruel kind of death, it is licit to expose oneself to a morally certain danger to life; thus it is licit to leap from a window, with very probable loss of life, in order to flee flames; to cast oneself headlong from a tower, even with certain danger of death, in order to flee a more atrocious death which evildoers are actually about to inflict.

306. (D) When there is question of a danger to life not certain, but more or less probable, a lesser cause suffices. Thus it is licit to serve those laboring under a contagious disease, even if there is a great danger of contracting the plague; craftsmen can exercise a dangerous art, e.g., ascend the roofs of buildings, even with probable danger of death, when this is useful for the support of themselves and their family. - But if there is question of arts less necessary and more dangerous, e.g., of taming wild beasts, penitents indeed should be kept away from these, insofar as this can be done; but if they have exercised these arts for a long time, and, because of the special skill with which they are endowed, the danger is not so proximate, and on the other hand they can scarcely otherwise provide for themselves and their own, they are not to be compelled to abandon their art.

307. When something is done or omitted from which life is shortened by several years, a less grave reason suffices; for the danger of death is not so proximate.

(a) Hence it is licit for workers to blow glass, gild metals, and exercise other arts by which life is rendered shorter; for the good, both private and public, demands that sometimes human life be shortened, whether for one's own support, or for the progress of industrial or mechanical affairs. Nevertheless an effort must be made that, in the best way possible, works entrusted to craftsmen be rendered less dangerous.

(b) Regularly no one is bound to use extraordinary means in order to live longer; for the law of prolonging life for a long time does not oblige with so great an inconvenience. Thus those who inhabit a region not very healthy are not bound to seek a healthier one by going to a distant region; those who could live longer by abstaining from a certain drink or food are not bound under grave sin to abstain from these, provided they observe the laws of temperance; nor is it necessary to undergo a dangerous operation in order to prolong life, unless per accidens this is necessary for the good of the family or of the State.

311. Homicide means the same thing as the killing of a man. But those who are killed can be innocent, or evildoers condemned by public authority, or unjust aggressors. Hence we shall speak: 1. of the killing of the innocent; 2. of the killing of an evildoer; 3. of the killing of an unjust aggressor. - But the things which we say concerning homicide can, with due proportion, be predicated of wounding and mutilation.

³ St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 64; Lugo, disp. X, n. 56-223; Lessius, lib. II, c. 9, n. 36-111; Billuart, diss. X, art. 4-9; Carriere, II, n. 744-805; Ball. P., Tr. VI, n. 876-922; Lehmkuhl, n. 832-849.

312. Principle: The direct killing of an innocent person is a most grave sin, injurious to God, to the neighbor, and to society. - I say most grave, because by taking away life it inflicts a most grave injury.

(a) It is a sin injurious to God; for, since He is the supreme lord of life and death, His rights are violated by such homicide; hence He severely reproves this crime both by the words related above: You shall not kill; and by these, which declare the former: "The innocent and just you shall not kill, because I abhor the impious."⁴

⁴ Exod., XXIII, 7.

(b) Injurious to the neighbor; for since, from what was said above (n. 295), life is a very excellent good, and a means of enjoying many other goods, both natural and supernatural, he who voluntarily takes away the life of an innocent person does him the greatest injury; and this indeed is greater when he leaves him no time to be reconciled to God, if he is in the state of mortal sin.

(c) Injurious to society; for since the innocent person is a useful member of society, injury is done to the community by prematurely cutting off this member; whence the more useful the citizen was, the graver the crime is.

313. Corollaries. (a) It is not licit to kill the lethally wounded, the old, the sick, the dying, lest they suffer longer; nor the insane, lest they harm others, provided they can be restrained otherwise; nor a mother placed in extremis, so that the infant can be baptized; all these retain the right to life, and must be committed to God, who alone can dispose of their life.

(b) Nor can hostages (otages) be killed, even if the enemies who sent them have not kept the faith given, indeed even if they have killed other hostages.

(c) They sin gravely who, from whatever motive, kill infants, or directly accelerate their death: for these are innocent. Parents are guilty of a horrible crime who hand over their own children to others to be killed, so that they may make the insurance price their own.¹

¹ "Parents without entrails insure at a high rate the head of very young children, and, coldly, slowly, let them die of starvation and misery. The death which carries off these little beings, revealing no manifest violence, is most often reputed natural, and secures good annuities to its skillful and sinister authors." (Dr. Surbled, op. cit., t. III, p. 238). - Concerning the killing of an infant in the mother's womb we speak in the Supplement to the Treatise on Matrimony, n. 72-78.

(d) Sometimes relatives or kin of someone deceased ask from the physician that the heart of the dead man be pierced or an artery opened, lest perhaps he be buried alive. Now if the physician seriously doubts concerning death, he cannot perform this, since he would expose himself to the danger of killing a man who perhaps survives; but if certain signs of death are present, puncture of the heart is not illicit, since this is done only to free relatives from vain anxieties.

314. Principle: It is not licit to place an action from which certainly or probably the death of an innocent person will follow indirectly, unless from a proportionately grave cause and with a right intention. This is clear from what was said where indirect suicide was treated, above, n. 302.

Hence (a) in a just war it is licit to direct artillery (canons) against a besieged city, even if it is foreseen that many innocents will perish from this, provided this is held as a necessary and efficacious means for attacking the city; nevertheless it is equitable that the head of the city first be warned, so that women and infants can flee to a safe place.¹

¹ Bonfils, Manuel de Droit international, 3rd edition, Paris, 1901, n. 1083-1086.

(b) If someone, while an enemy pursues, cannot avoid death except by passing through a narrow way, with the danger of trampling an innocent person, he can do this.

(c) It is not licit for a physician, for the sake of experiment, to use a new remedy, or to perform a dangerous operation, when a more efficacious and less rash remedy is at hand.²

² Guermonprez, L'assassinat medical et le respect de la vie humaine, Paris, 1904.

315. (d) Likewise, in industrial matters, those sin who use dangerous materials or machines, from which the life of workers is placed in great danger, especially where the law prohibits this.³

³ P. Pic recounts the principal laws recently promulgated concerning this matter in various regions, Traite elementaire de legislation industrielle, Paris, 1903, n. 609-648.

(e) But he who places an action of itself not dangerous, or rarely and therefore not probably dangerous, from which nevertheless death follows by chance, is not morally guilty of homicide, provided he has applied ordinary diligence; thus a hunter who, while he gives himself to hunting with due diligence, by chance kills a man; for then he neither could nor ought to have foreseen death; otherwise it would have to be said if he is guilty of negligence, e.g., by imprudently playing with a gun; then he is gravely or lightly guilty, according as the negligence was grave or light.⁴

⁴ Concerning accidental homicide, with respect to French law, see Cod. pen., a. 319-320.

316. State of the question.⁵ It is indeed unjust to kill the innocent, but when there is question of evildoers who have been guilty of a most grave crime, the matter stands otherwise. For among almost all peoples, both ancient and recent, the punishment of death has been received by common usage.

⁵ Meyer, op. cit., II, n. 594.

Yet the Waldenses denied that even evildoers could be punished with the death penalty: this opinion was then commonly reproved. Nevertheless, already from the eighteenth century, not a few philosophers and jurists went over to the same opinion. Thus Cesare Beccaria (1716-1793) taught that the right of inflicting the penalty of death is to be restricted to the crime of dangerous sedition, or to the case in which the death of the delinquent is the only means for restraining the crimes of others;⁶ Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), who acknowledges as the principle of morality utility alone, denied that capital punishment is useful and consequently just.¹ Ch. Lucas² (1803-1889) proceeded further, directly asserting that the penalty of death is neither just nor useful: for neither in the individual nor in society is there an inherent direct right over the life of the neighbor, but only the right of repelling an unjust aggressor by force; now the penalty of death established by laws is not inflicted in self-defense, since the evildoer, having been captured by authority, is no longer able to harm, but only in vengeance; and this is manifestly unjust. - Others, with Spedalieri (1741-1795), defend the same in another way; namely they say that the State obtains its rights from a social pact, and therefore does not have the right of death, since citizens could not validly renounce the right and duty of preserving life.

⁶ Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene, § 16.

¹ Theorie des peines et des recompenses, Paris, 1812.

² Many others wish the penalty of death to be abolished; among whom are Mittermaier, De la peine de mort, transl. Leven, 1865; C. J. Paton, Death Penalty, New York, 1891, with the authorities alleged, p. 140-160; Hello recounts others, Revue critique, 1867, t. 31, p. 322.

Hence in certain regions capital punishment in fact was abrogated: in Italy, in some parts of Switzerland, and in certain of the United States of America;³ but, after a few years, already in several of these States it was restored anew.

³ Garraud, Precis du Droit Criminel, 8th ed., 1904, n. 164; Tarde, La Philosophie penale, 3rd ed., Paris, 1892, p. 534-536.

317. Principle: The supreme civil authority can punish with capital punishment evildoers fully convicted of a most grave crime, as often as the public good requires this.

(A) To supreme authority there certainly belongs the right of protecting society against evildoers, who disturb the public order, by efficaciously deterring them from crimes especially harmful to the security of the commonwealth and of citizens; for upon it lies the right and duty of protecting the common good against any invaders of rights whatever. Now both historically and psychologically it is clear that the boldness and propensity of some toward committing crimes are not broken except by fear of capital punishment. (a) Historically: for among almost all peoples capital punishment flourished down to these last times. Thus, already in the time of the Patriarchs, it had been said to Noah and his sons: "Whoever shall shed human blood, his blood shall be shed";⁴ likewise to the Jews: "You shall not suffer sorcerers to live⁵... He who strikes and kills a man shall die the death."⁶ Among the Greeks and Romans, and also other Nations, the same penalty was inflicted not only on slaves, but also on free men, whose life was greatly esteemed. The Apostle acknowledges it as legitimate, writing concerning supreme civil authority:¹ "But if you do evil, fear; for he does not bear the sword without cause. For he is the minister of God, an avenger unto wrath to him who does evil." In reality, among Christian nations, otherwise protectors of human life, the penalty of death was by no means abolished, but on the contrary was always held as a necessary means for protecting the life of peaceful citizens. But in more recent times capital punishment, removed from the midst in a few regions, after the experience of a few years, has already been restored in certain places, so that public security might be provided for more efficaciously;² since indeed the boldness of evildoers and the number of crimes were increasing each year. But, on the other hand, in regions in which the penalty of death was preserved rather firmly, as in England, the number of crimes is accustomed to decrease. Historically, therefore, it is clear that a penalty of this kind is an efficacious and morally necessary means for providing for the public good.

⁴ Gen., IX, 6.

⁵ Exod., XXII, 18.

⁶ Levit., XXIV, 17.

¹ Rom., XIII, 4.

² Thus especially in certain parts of Switzerland and of the United States of America. As regards Switzerland, Garraud has these things, op. cit., p. 234, note 1: "Following a very active campaign of petitioning for the restoration of the death penalty, the National Council (of Switzerland) decided that a new constitutional provision would be submitted to the popular vote; it was adopted on May 18, 1879, and revises art. 65 in this sense, that each canton is permitted to reestablish the death penalty for crimes of common law. Some cantons have profited from this faculty, among others those of Zurich, Lucerne, and Zug." Likewise, of the four American States which had abolished the penalty of death, two established the same anew.

318. (b) The same is proved psychologically. For man by a certain natural instinct dreads death more than other evils; this feeling even the most abandoned of evildoers experience, though impervious to other motives; hence those condemned to death earnestly beg that the sentence be changed, and, when the punishment is imminent, not a few strive with all their strength to escape; on the other hand, from various testimonies it is clear that many are deterred from crime by terror of the final punishment;³ but if some are not deterred from crime even by fear of death, this generally arises from the fact that, entangled by depraved passions, by an inveterate habit of evil, or by occasions, they do not think of capital punishment, or hope to elude the ministers of justice; but many others in reality abstain from crimes through terror of the extreme punishment. - But, on the other hand, no other penalty sufficiently deters certain evildoers from homicide; not long and laborious detention, because today it is usually tempered, at least after some time, so that some value it more highly than a life indeed free, but subject to many miseries; on the other hand hope remains, because of the instability of political affairs, of recovering liberty after a short time, - nor that solitary detention which in Italy holds the place of a capital sentence: for this does not sufficiently terrify abandoned men, who retain hope of escaping.¹ Therefore both historically and psychologically it is clear that the penalty of death is a most efficacious means for deterring evildoers from crimes, and therefore can be inflicted by supreme authority, on account of the public good.

³ Thus, in the Italian Chamber, March 10, 1865, the deputy Conforti narrated that a conspiracy for perpetrating theft and homicide had been abandoned because on that day on which it had been agreed to carry the crime into execution, two other evildoers underwent the penalty of death. Cf. Garofalo, La Criminologie, 1890, p. 225.

¹ On the other hand this penalty is more cruel than death itself, since it is accustomed to bring on weariness, desperation, and a certain form of insanity.

319. (B) This is confirmed by another argument from the ethical order. Justice demands that the wounded moral order be healed and repaired by suitable satisfaction; and therefore the duty lies upon the rulers of the commonwealth of taking care that grave offenses be punished by a proportionate penalty; for otherwise the moral order is disturbed and endangered. Now there are offenses so grave that, according to common estimation, they can be expiated only by the penalty of death; such are especially homicides cruelly perpetrated after mature deliberation; for offenses which include the highest injury of the moral order and the highest injury demand a penalty highest from its kind, or the penalty of death. This indeed is so true that, as the adversaries admit, the rule set forth above is approved by common sense: "Whoever shall shed human blood, his blood shall be shed."

320. The principal difficulties are solved. (a) Some indeed object that evildoers, as long as they live, can be amended for the better; therefore they are to be spared so that they may do penance and thus repair the injured order.¹ - St. Thomas had already solved this difficulty:² "But the fact that the evil, as long as they live, can be amended, does not prevent their being justly able to be killed; because the danger which threatens from their life is greater and more certain than the good which is expected from their amendment. They also have in the very article of death the faculty that through penance they be converted to God. But if they are so obstinate that even in the article of death their heart does not recede from malice, it can be estimated with sufficient probability that they will never recover sense from malice."

¹ Thus C. Lucas, op. cit., p. 129: "From the Christian point of view, society commits a crime greater than that of the assassin whom it immolates; it kills the soul; it is the life of the soul, it is the penitential life that it tears away."

² Contra Gentiles, lib. III, c. 147.

321. (b) Others say that in no one, except God, is there an inherent right of life and death, and therefore society usurps divine rights while it kills evildoers. - We indeed confess that in God alone there is the full and direct right over the life of man; but He can delegate to Princes, and in fact has delegated, an indirect power; for to them has been entrusted the charge of promoting the common good of society; now the common good sometimes requires that certain evildoers be punished with the penalty of death, so that these and others may be deterred from similar crimes;³ then they act not indeed by their own authority, but insofar as they take the place of God: "For there is no power except from God... For he is the minister of God, an avenger unto wrath to him who does evil."⁴

³ "The common good is better than the particular good of one. Therefore the particular good must be taken away, so that the common good may be preserved. But the life of certain pestiferous men impedes the common good, which is the concord of human society. Therefore men of this kind are to be taken away from the society of men through death." (St. Thomas, l. cit.)

⁴ Rom., XIII, 1, 4.

322. (c) They insist: Capital punishment, as inflicting irreparable damage, can be decreed only by an infallible authority; now what judge can claim infallibility for himself? - We willingly concede that only those are to be punished with death who, not from indications more or less probable, but from morally certain proofs, have been juridically found guilty, as we said in the thesis; but for this an infallible judgment is by no means required, but that certainty suffices which can be found in human affairs after diligent examination; in reality, does not moral certainty, which does not exclude every danger of death, suffice for performing surgical operations? Do men not also daily expose life for pursuing a private good? If the matter stands thus, why could supreme authority not punish with extreme punishment him who with moral certainty has been judged harmful to society?

323. Moreover it is equitable that death be decreed only for the gravest crimes, namely fully deliberate homicides, as in reality is done today among cultivated nations. Indeed it is to be wished that morals be so tempered that the penalty of death is no longer necessary. Meanwhile, however, it is unjust, by sparing the guilty, to expose the life of the innocent to danger.

What duel is? Which things are touched here

81. 1. Duel, namely undertaken on private authority; since it is established that other combats can be justified. Moreover, a duel is a dangerous combat of two persons (or of a few, equal in number), which is undertaken from agreement, or from a certain pact previously made concerning place, time, and also, at least as usage bears, concerning weapons, and these lethal. It is called dangerous insofar as it brings danger of life, of mutilation, or at least of grave wound.

What suicide is

2. Suicide, or the direct killing of oneself, done by one's own authority.

Divorce?

3. Divorce, namely in the modern acceptance, or perfect, by which is designated the sacrilegious attempt of breaking the bond of marriage, even consummated marriage, so that the faculty is given of entering a new marriage while the partner is living.

What if they are said to be lawful by accident?

4. Lawful: whether in themselves, or even in any case whatsoever or by accident. For the mind of the Legislator is clear, by which he wished to protect Catholic doctrine.

When they are established as lawful

5. They establish, that is, they do not merely assert, but contend that it is so, or attempt to demonstrate it;¹ and this with that breadth which satisfies the inscription of chapter 5. Cf. n. 74, 2.

¹ Cf. Gennari, cited place, p. 40.

1. THE CHRISTIAN VIEW OF THE BODY.—The Catholic Church in her ethical teaching avoids two false extremes: she neither undervalues the body, nor does she overestimate it. a) Against what we may term false Spiritualism the Church upholds the value and importance of the material element in man. She teaches that the human body is superior to the bodies of all other creatures because it was directly created by God and is (not so much the prison as) the organ of an immortal soul.¹ Through the body the soul exerts its activity and comes into contact with the material universe. In and through the body man exercises control over the lower creatures² and communicates with his fellowmen. There could be no social intercourse if men had no material bodies.

¹ Cfr. Saint Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech., IV, c. 23 (Migne, P. G., XXXIII, 484). —Saint Bernard, De Diligendo Deo, XI, n. 30 sq. "The flesh is plainly a good and faithful companion to a good spirit: if it burdens him, it helps him; if it does not help him, it relieves him of his burden; or surely it helps him and does not burden him at all. The first state is laborious but fruitful; the second is at rest but by no means wearisome; the third is also glorious." (Migne, P. L., CLXXXVII, 993).

² Gen. I, 25.

The human body was raised to its true dignity when the Son of God was made flesh and suffered and died to redeem men from sin and its consequences. With the same body that endured the death agony on the cross, Christ rose from the grave, ascended into Heaven, and now sits at the right hand of God the Father, whence He shall come to judge the living and the dead.

Through the instrumentality of the Sacraments the body, having been redeemed by Christ, participates in the graces of the atonement and thereby becomes a temple of the Holy Ghost,³ destined to rise again after death and to be forever transfigured in Heaven. Hence every Christian is in duty bound not to "yield his members as instruments of iniquity unto sin," but to present them "as instruments of justice unto God."⁴ b) The Catholic view of the body differs also from that of the Materialists, who unduly exalt, nay fairly worship, the flesh. The Church values the body only in connection with, and as ennobled by, the spirit, and commands it to be mortified. "Put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make not provision for the flesh in its concupiscence."⁵ "Mortify therefore your members which are upon the earth; fornication, uncleanness, lust, evil concupiscence, and covetousness, which is the service of idols."⁶

³ 1 Cor. III, 16.

⁴ Rom. VI, 13; cfr. 19; 1 Cor. VI, 13, 20.

⁵ Rom. XIII, 14.

⁶ Col. III, 5 sqq.

To mortify the body does not, of course, mean to kill or maim it, but merely to subdue its sensual inclinations, so that it may become a fit companion for the spiritual and immortal soul —"bonus plane fidusque comes spiritui bono" as St. Bernard calls it,⁷ —and that it may be gradually prepared for its final transfiguration in Heaven.

⁷ See note 1, supra, p. 9.

2. LIFE. —Of even greater value than the body is life. a) Life ranks first among the blessings of the natural order because it is the foundation and an indispensable condition of all the rest. According to revelation, man's life on earth is intended as a preparation for the life eternal in Heaven. It is the period of sowing for the great harvest;⁸ the day assigned for laboring in the vineyard of the Master;⁹ the time appointed for trading with the God-given talents,¹⁰ for running the race and competing for the grand prize.¹¹ Again and again Holy Scripture tells us, "What things a man shall sow, those also shall he reap,”¹² and, "We have not here a lasting city," but should "seek one that is to come."¹³ If this terrestrial journey forms but a moment, as it were, of our total existence, which is for the most part to be spent in the world beyond, then that moment is extremely precious, and every fraction thereof possesses incalculable value for the welfare of the soul. What Christ said of Himself applies in a measure to every man: "I must work the works of Him that sent me, whilst it is day: the night cometh, when no man can work."¹⁴ b) Life being a gift of such immense value, we are in duty bound to cherish it; or, as St. Paul says, we must "redeem the time."¹⁵

⁸ Luke XII, 23.—Cfr. V. Cathrein, S. J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. I, Freiburg 1911, 5th ed., pp. 119 sqq.

⁹ Matt. XX, 1-16.

¹⁰ Matt. XXV, 14-30.

¹¹ 1 Cor. IX, 24 sq.

¹² 2 Cor. IX, 6; Gal. VI, 8 sq.

¹³ Heb. XIII, 14.

¹⁴ John IX, 4. —Cfr. St. Jerome, Comment, in Evang. S. Matth., l. IV, c. 25: "After the day of judgment no opportunity for good works and justice remains." (P. L., XXVI, 185).—St. Augustine, Serm., 93 (al. De Verbis Domini, 23), c. 10, n. 16: "It has been said, it is true, it has not been said deceitfully: ‘Knock, and it shall be opened to you’ (Matt. VII, 7), but now, when it is the time of mercy, not when it is the time of judgment. For those times cannot be confused, since the Church sings mercy and judgment to her Lord (Ps. C, 1). It is the time of mercy: do penance. Do you wish to do it at the time of judgment? You will be among those virgins against whom the door was shut." (P. L., XXXVIII, 579).

¹⁵ Eph. V, 16; Rom. XIII, 13 sq.; Col. IV, 5. —Cfr. St. Augustine, Serm., 16 (al. I inter Homil., 50), n. 2; Serm., 17 (al. 28 inter Horn., 50), n. 7; Serm., 167 (al. 24 De Verbis Apost.), n. 3 (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 122, 138, 910).

a) Hence no man is allowed to destroy or curtail his life, even though it may have become a burden and is seemingly of no further value. By the aid of divine grace all temporal adversities and sufferings can be borne, nay made productive of supernatural glory. A life of suffering is not necessarily useless, but may be rendered highly meritorious by prayer, patience, and a good example, and thus become beneficial to the afflicted individual as well as to the entire human race. He who has to suffer much should frequently recommend himself to God, practice the virtue of resignation, cultivate good cheer, and never lose hope.¹⁶ Like St. Paul, he should offer the tribulations which he suffers "in the flesh" for the purpose of "filling up those things that are wanting of the sufferings of Christ."¹⁷ Illness and suffering are by no means always a punishment for personal sins.¹⁸ Oftentimes they are graces in disguise, given by a merciful God to enable man to train his soul for Heaven. "Sufferings are lessons," runs an old saw,¹⁹ but they are also, in the words of a modern poet, favors from on high.²⁰ When borne for the love of God, "tribulation worketh patience, and patience trial, and trial hope; and hope confoundeth not: because the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us."²¹

¹⁶ Matth. XVI, 24; XXVI, 39; St. Augustine, Confess., l. II, c. 42; 1 Pet. IV, 22 sqq. —Cfr. Horace, Carmina, II, 3, 1: "Aequam memento rebus in arduis servare mentem." —Seneca, Ep., 78, 20: "What then? Do you think that you are doing nothing if you are temperate while ill? You will show that sickness can be overcome, or at least endured. Believe me, there is room for virtue even on a sickbed."

¹⁷ Col. I, 24.

¹⁸ Matt. IX, 2; Mark II, 5; Luke XIII, 1-5; John IX, 1-3.

¹⁹ Παθήματα μαθήματα.

²⁰ Luise Hensel: "Leiden sind Gnaden."—Cfr. Ecclus. II, 3 sqq.; Phil. I, 29; 1 Pet. I, 17; Heb. XII, 7-11. —St. Ambrose, Expositio in Evang. sec. Lucam, l. IV, c. 41 (v. Koch-Preuss, A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. II, p. 38, n. 11).—Cfr. St. Augustine, Confess., l. II, c. 2, n. 4: “Lord, who formest suffering into a precept (Ps. XCIII, 20), and strikest in order to heal, and puttest us to death lest we die apart from Thee.” (P. L., XXXII, 677). —IDEM, Enarrat. in Psalmos, LXVIII, s. 2, n. 1: "And when the Lord permits or causes us to be in some tribulation, even then He is merciful." (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 854).—Seneca, De Provid., II, 2: "Omnia adversa [bonus vir] exercitationes putat."—IDEM, ibid., V, 9: "Ignis aurum probat, miseria fortes viros." —Ovid, Trist., V, 3, 75: “Hectora quis nosset, si felix Troia fuisset?"—P. W. v. Keppler, Das Problem des Leidens, 2nd ed., pp. 12 sqq.

²¹ Rom. V, 3 sqq.

"We suffer with Christ, that we may be also glorified with him. For I reckon that the sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us."²²

²² Rom. VIII, 17.

Thus, suffering may be made a source of joy. "In much experience of tribulation," says the Apostle, "they have abundance of joy."²³

²³ 2 Cor. VIII, 2; cfr. Jas. I, 2-4; 1 Pet. I, 6-9; IV, 12 sq.

"The cross with its stern lines," writes Bishop Keppler, "a cold, bare, branchless tree with rough-hewn stumps for arms, is indeed at first sight a sad and joyless thing to look at, so true an image is it of harsh contradiction, so good a symbol of bitter pain. Yet men find that the cross possesses a certain beauty. In its sturdy, clear-cut, well-proportioned form they see a picture of steadfastness, of aspiring effort, of opposition conquered and contradictories reconciled. The sight of a man hanging in agony upon the cross arouses, at first, no sense of joy, it is true. Yet there is a wellspring of joy in the sure faith that the Divine Hero bleeding on the cross is dying in the battle against the fiercest foe of joy and of salvation, and conquering as He dies. The cross becomes the symbol of victory and thereby the symbol of joy. Darkness and gloom are dispelled and everywhere is shed the glory of the Resurrection. In its light, the tree of the cross becomes the tree of life, of resistless power; the dried trunk is clothed with blossoms and fruit; and out of the crown of thorns spring forth roses. Thus also is it with the cross and the crucifixion in the life of each individual Christian. That a man should take up his cross daily; that he should not only bear his cross, but crucify the flesh, the old man —these are not forced figures of speech, but stern demands which certainly do seem likely to lead far away from joy. Yet the battle to which they summon is waged not against joy, but against joy's worst enemies. The cross obliges us to renounce the apples of Sodom, the wild cherries of sin, which are really no joys at all, but it does not demand a total renunciation of legitimate natural joys; it only insists that they be used in moderation and with a good intention. Excessive enjoyment always begets disgust. Unrestricted activity and gratification of the sensual instincts does not add to the sum of joy, but ruins both joy and the man; it sins not only against morality but against hygiene, which is to-day sometimes regarded as the supreme standard. A life 'beyond good and evil,' —to use Nietzsche's phrase —unscrupulous poaching, complete loosing of the wild, natural instincts, whose advocate, protector, and prophet Nietzsche was unwillingly degraded into becoming by his less worthy disciples, the feeling of 'the beast of prey within man, the fair, ravenous, blond beast, lusting for prey and conquest,' —all this does not enrich, gladden, deepen, nor sweeten life. It delivers life over to the most wretched languor, to the hospital, the madhouse, to suicide, —'those graves of lust,'²⁴ so numerous in the world to-day.²⁵

²⁴ Numb. XI, 34.

²⁵ P. W. von Keppler, More Joy, (tr. by Jos. McSorley, C.S.P.), pp. 76 sqq., St. Louis 1914.

Even Goethe realized that the spirit of austerity and self-sacrifice alone can provide the proper basis for a healthy, happy, cheerful life:

If thou hast not part In death as well as birth, A sorry guest thou art Upon the gloomy earth.

"Man must die in order to grow. He must renounce selfishness, for it makes him poorer, not richer, and especially poorer in joy."²⁶

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 79–84.

"Nothing," says a contemporary Protestant writer, "shuts in a life and shuts out satisfaction and joy like the self-considering temper and the self-centered aim. Such a life, though it may seem to itself self-developing, is in fact self-deceived. Instead of growing richer in its resources, it finds itself growing poorer. The more it cultivates itself, the more sterile it grows; the more it accumulates, the less it has; the more it saves, the more it is lost."²⁷

²⁷ Peabody, Jesus Christ and the Christian Character, p. 206.

b) To long inordinately for death is contrary to the Christian concept of life, its value and purpose. The "desire to be dissolved and be with Christ," which St. Paul extols as "by far the better thing,"²⁸ must spring from an absolutely pure motive and be accompanied by complete resignation to the will of God. To wish for death in order to escape the dangers, vicissitudes, and tribulations of this earthly "vale of tears," is opposed to the teaching of Christ.²⁹ Life is a precious gift which should be conscientiously employed.³⁰ Though time is short, it is of sufficient duration to enable us to gain eternity by making good use of the fleeting moments given to us.

²⁸ Phil. I, 23.

²⁹ Cfr. F. W. Faber, Growth in Holiness, Ch. IV.

³⁰ Phil. I, 24 sqq.; cfr. Sporer-Bierbaum, Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 2nd

"Nothing," says the Ven. Don Bosco, "torments the reprobates in hell more than the thought that they have idled away the time which they received for working out their eternal salvation; nothing so consoles the elect in Heaven as the reflection that they have employed their days for the honor and glory of God." c) By commanding us to sanctify our bodies and to employ time for the purpose of gaining eternity, the Church does not, as some assert, "preach gloom and sorrow and demand of her followers that they forego all joy, thus making hypocrites of them." Both the Old and the New Testament bid man to be joyous. "Be glad in the Lord and rejoice, ye just, and glory, all ye right of heart."³¹ "Let the just feast and rejoice before the Lord, and be delighted with gladness."³² Christ Himself says: " Ask, and you shall receive, that your joy may be full."³³ And again: "These things I speak in the world, that they may have my joy filled in themselves."³⁴ Even the "Preacher," who so frequently insists on the vanity of earthly things, counsels the "young man" to enjoy life,³⁵ though always, of course, in the fear of God and with due regard to His commandments.³⁶ Thomas a Kempis says: "There is no true liberty nor perfect joy but in the fear of God with a good conscience.”³⁷ The religion of Christ is by no means gloomy.

³¹ Ps. XXXI, 11.

³² Ps. LXVII, 4; cfr. Luke X, 20.

³³ John XVI, 24.

³⁴ John XVII, 13.

³⁵ Eccles. XI, 9.

³⁶ Eccles. XII, 13; cfr. Ps. XCVI, 12; Rom. XIV, 17.

³⁷ De Imit. Christi, I, 21 (ed. Pohl., Vol. II, p. 39): "There is no true liberty and no good joy except in the fear of God with a good conscience." —Cfr. Seneca, Ep., XXIII, 3: "Do this before all else, my Lucilius: learn to rejoice." —IDEM, ibid., 4: "True joy is a serious thing."

"Gloom is an alien and an enemy in Christian hearts," writes Charles Stanton Devas. "If Christianity is the religion of sorrow, it is also, and pre-eminently, the religion of joy; the solution of this antinomy being that Christianity is the religion of love, and that in this world love and sorrow are linked by a mysterious partnership. Now Christian asceticism is no superstitious pain-worship, no offering to some pain-loving deity, some evil principle opposed to the good, as though life and health were not God's good gifts; nor again has it ought in common, except sometimes the outward show, with the proud self-righteousness of the Hindu ascetic or Moslem dervish. Much rather Christian asceticism is a form of love; and love being the root of joy, it follows that Christian joyfulness is not in spite of asceticism, but its consequence. We are taught as an elementary truth that man is on earth for the one end of perfecting himself in the love of God. This is his purpose and probation. But only through labor, pain and suffering is love perfected. Christianity, then, has no mission to eliminate labor, pain, and suffering from this world (pati et perpeti humanum est, wrote Leo XIII), but to transmute them. They can be the means whereby we can obtain the subjection of the lower selfish life and of greedy individualism; the suppression of false self-assertion and of blind nature before the law of reason and of God. Christianity is frankly 'the religion of suffering, of mortification, of self-sacrifice, of consuming love, of self-forgetting zeal, of self-crucifying union,... the religion of the cross and the Crucified.' ³⁸ Joyous abandonment, generous self-sacrifice, these are the watchwords, and to become living images of the Divine Model of whom it is written that He pleased not himself."³⁹

³⁸ Cfr. St. Augustine, Contra Duas Epistolas Pelag., l. III, c. 8, n. 24: "These are the clouds [of the Pelagians] concerning praise of creation, praise of marriage, praise of free choice, and praise of the saints—as though any one of us disparaged these things and did not rather proclaim them all with the praises due to the honor of the Creator and Savior. But creation does not wish to be praised in such a way that it does not wish to be healed. And the more marriage is to be praised, the less the shameful concupiscence of the flesh, which is not from the Father but is from the world (1 John II, 16), is to be imputed to it. Marriage certainly found this concupiscence in human beings; it did not cause it, since concupiscence exists in very many without marriage, and marriage, if no one had sinned, could have existed without concupiscence." (Migne, P. L., XLIV, 606). —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 28, art. 1-4; Contra Gent., l. III, c. 112, n. 6. —J. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists Viewed in the Light of Principle and of Contemporaneous History, (tr. by A. M. Buchanan), New York, 1914, pp. 131 sqq.

³⁹ C. S. Devas, The Key to the World's Progress, pp. 121 sq., London, 1906.

"It is not true," says the Ven. Don Bosco, "that men are made sad by serving God. Who was more genial than St. Aloysius, or more joyful than St. Philip Neri or St. Vincent de Paul? And yet these holy men devoted their entire lives to the practice of virtue."

"The Catholic attitude towards modern intellectual life," says Father Joseph Laurentius, S. J., "requires no other weapon for its defence than an unbiased knowledge of Catholic principles. The Syllabus [of Pius IX] does not condemn progress, liberality, or culture as such; it merely rejects that which the enemies of the Christian religion have falsely decked out under these terms. A progress without God, without faith, without religion, —these are essential requisites of all true advance, —is no progress at all, but retrogression. A Liberalism detached from the principles of Christian freedom and justice, based upon State omnipotence and the tenets of an atheistic pseudo-philosophy, is a false Liberalism. A culture that excludes the true religion from education and science, and pursues materialistic aims, is a misnomer. Such tendencies are not only unacceptable to the papacy, but must be rejected by every believing Christian, be he Catholic or Protestant. True Liberalism and progress, —the kind that ennobles man, emancipates him from the slavery of passion and sin, and elevates him to the ideal atmosphere of faith, knowledge and virtue, and strengthens and fosters the family, community, State, both in a material and in a spiritual way, —such the Church is ever ready, nay eager, to enlist in her service."⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Jos. Laurentius, S.J., in the Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, Vol. LXXI (1906), pp. 241 sqq., especially 250 sq.—Cfr. Hettinger-Stepka, Timothy; or Letters to a Young Theologian, St. Louis, 1902, pp. 343 sqq.; G. Grupp, Kulturgeschichte der romischen Kaiserzeit, Vol. II, Munich, 1904, pp. 477 sqq.; Philip Kneib, Die "Jenseitsmoral" im Kampfe um ihre Grundlagen, Freiburg, 1906, pp. 133 sqq.; the Syllabus Errorum of Pius IX, n. 57, with the commentary of F. Heiner, Der Syllabus, Mayence, 1905, pp. 267 sqq.

READINGS. —P. W. von Keppler, More Joy (tr. by Jos. McSorley, C.S.P.), St. Louis 1914.—C. S. Devas, The Key to the World's Progress, London 1906. —Jos. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching and Its Antagonists Viewed in the Light of Principle and of Contemporaneous History (tr. by A. M. Buchanan), pp. 215 sqq., New York 1914. —W. Schneider-H. Thurston, S. J., The Other Life, pp. 74 sqq., New York 1920. —H. T. Henry, Catholic Customs and Symbols, N. Y. 1925, pp. 3 sqq.

1. THE CARE OF THE BODY IN GENERAL.—If the corporeal life of man is of such great importance for his eternal destiny, it follows that he must take good care of his body.

The desire to live (instinct of self-preservation) and to enjoy perfect health of mind and body is implanted by nature in every human being. "No man ever hated his own flesh, but nourisheth and cherisheth it," says St. Paul.¹ Hence it is a natural duty to preserve life and health and to acquire and employ the means by which they may be prolonged and fostered.

¹ Eph. V, 29.

Since, however, in consequence of the fall of our first parents, the sensual delight which men take in life and its pleasures easily degenerates into sinful enjoyment, the care of the body must be regulated by the precepts of Christian morality.

"By eating and drinking," says St. Augustine, addressing God, "we repair the daily ruins of the body until Thou destroy both the food and the belly (I Cor. VI, 13).... This Thou hast taught me, that I should come to take nourishment as I take medicine. But while I am passing from the uneasiness of hunger to the satisfaction of satiety, the snare of concupiscence lieth in wait for me; for the very passage itself is a pleasure, and there is no other way to pass but this, to which necessity obliges me. And thus, whereas health is the cause of eating and drinking, a dangerous delight comes in as an attendant, and for the most part endeavors to go before, that for its sake I should do what I pretend and desire to do only for the sake of health. Nor are both of these content with the same allowance: for what is sufficient for health is too little for delight, and many times it becomes uncertain whether it be the necessary care of the body that requires a further supply, or the voluptuous deceit of concupiscence that calls for this allowance. And the unhappy soul grows glad of this uncertainty, and prepares therein the protection of an excuse, being pleased that it does not appear what is exactly proportioned for the maintenance of health, that under the cloak of health she may indulge her pleasure. These temptations I daily strive to resist, and I invoke Thy right hand to my assistance, and refer my anxieties to Thee, for I have yet to seek for counsel in this matter."²

² Cfr. St. Augustine, Confess., l. X, c. 31, n. 34–44: "We repair the daily decay of the body by eating and drinking, until Thou destroyest both food and the belly (1 Cor. VI, 13).... This Thou hast taught me: that I should approach the taking of food as I do the taking of medicine. But while I pass from the discomfort of want to the repose of satiety, in the very passage the snare of concupiscence lies in wait for me. For that passage itself is pleasure, and there is no other way through which necessity compels me to pass. And although health is the cause of eating and drinking, a dangerous delight joins itself as a handmaid and generally tries to go before, so that what I say or will that I do for the sake of health may be done for its sake. Nor is the measure of each the same, for what is enough for health is too little for pleasure. And it is often uncertain whether the necessary care of the body is still asking support or the deceit of pleasure is supplying its service. The unhappy soul rejoices in this uncertainty and in it prepares the defense of an excuse, glad that what is enough for the moderation of health is not apparent, so that under the pretext of health it may obscure the business of pleasure. I strive daily to resist these temptations, and I invoke Thy right hand for my salvation, and refer my agitations to Thee, because my counsel on this matter is not yet settled." (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 797).

Whatever God has created is good, and, broadly speaking, there are no material objects which man is per se obliged to renounce. St. Paul's assurance, "All things are yours," ³ is addressed to the faithful. Nevertheless the proposition is true only in a general way. The right of the individual to enjoy the good things of nature is limited in various ways.

³ 1 Cor. III, 22; cfr. 1 Tim. IV, 3–5.

1. It is limited, above all, by the particular needs of each. These needs are manifold and far exceed the essential requirements of life and health. They are measured by the personal necessities, bodily and spiritual, of each individual, by the degree of culture he has attained, by his position in society, the nature of his vocational duties, the climate, social environment, and many other factors.

2. The right of the individual to enjoy the good things of life is limited further by the social demands of the community in which he lives. Every member of society has a right to enjoy the things God has provided for the race as a whole. To waste or destroy them is against the law of nature, and to do so wantonly, without a just and sufficient cause, would betray a brutal disposition and be a crime against nature. To waste the means of subsistence, on the proper distribution of which the welfare of entire classes depends, involves an injustice against God and men.⁴

⁴ Is. LXV, 8; Luke XVI, 19 sqq.; John VI, 13.

3. A third limitation arises from the purpose for which the good things of nature were created. The body must be nourished and fostered, not for its own sake, but that it may efficiently serve as the organ and companion of the soul. "We live not to eat, but we eat to live," says the wise Socrates. Only in so far as the good things of nature serve this higher purpose, is their use permitted. "I say to you, be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat, nor for your body, what you shall put on. Is not the life more than the meat, and the body more than the raiment?"⁵ "Put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make not provision for the flesh in its concupiscences."⁶ "Let not then our good be evil spoken of, for the kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost."⁷

⁵ Matt. VI, 25; cfr. Matt. X, 39.

⁶ Rom. XIII, 14.

⁷ Rom. XIV, 16 sqq. —Cfr. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech., IV, c. 26 (Migne, P. G., XXXIII, 490); Juvenal, Sat., X, 356: "One must pray that there be a sound mind in a sound body; ask for a courageous spirit."

Good health is a necessary condition for the development of talent. Those who are sickly depend on others, whereas robust men have courage to dare and do. Therefore suitable provision for the preservation of health is an essential part of character training.⁸

⁸ W. L. Pyle, Personal Hygiene, Philadelphia, 1917.

2. VARIOUS MEANS OF CARING FOR THE BODY.—The ordinary means of keeping the body efficient may be grouped together in two classes: those by which health is preserved and fostered, and those by which harmful and disturbing influences are warded off.

1. FOOD AND DRINK. —The chief means of preserving health are food and drink. a) Mankind as such has unlimited control of the resources of nature. The Old Testament distinction between clean and unclean foods was purely disciplinary and ceremonial, and is no longer enforced under the New Law.⁹ "I know, and am confident in the Lord Jesus," says St. Paul, "that nothing is unclean of itself."¹⁰ This includes animal as well as vegetable foods, for Christ Himself teaches that not what enters into the mouth, i. e., food and drink as such, but the inordinate use thereof defiles man.¹¹

⁹ Gen. VII, 8; Lev. XI, 8; Matt. XV, 11; Mark VII, 15; Acts X, 15.

¹⁰ Rom. XIV, 14; cfr. Col. II, 16.

¹¹ Cfr. Matt. XV, 17-20; Mark VII, 15–23; Tit. I, 15.

There is no moral objection to the common practice of making food more palatable by artificial means, because to enjoy one's meals is not to indulge in sensuality or sybaritism. Man is in duty bound to take wholesome food and to be moderate in its use, i. e., to eat neither too little nor too much for his physical well-being. b) The use of food is limited by the needs of each individual, which differ according to age, climate, constitution, occupation, etc. Every man is allowed to take as much food as he requires to maintain himself mentally and physically efficient, and all are in duty bound to avoid excess because it disturbs the equilibrium of soul and body and makes the former the servant of the latter, whereas it ought to be its master.¹² Following the example of Christ and the Apostles, therefore, we should take our daily nourishment temperately and with gratitude to God, begin each meal with a blessing (benedictio mensae) and never forget to give thanks after eating.¹³

¹² Cfr. Rom. XIII, 14; XIV, 17; cfr. Eccles. X, 17.

¹³ Matt. XIV, 19; XV, 36; XXVI, 27; Mark XIV, 23; Luke XXII, 17; John VI, 11; Acts XXVII, 35; Rom. XIV, 6; 1 Cor. X, 31; 1 Tim. IV, 3–5.

To eat or drink to satiety for mere pleasure (ob solam voluptatem) is morally illicit, even though it may not result in direct injury to the health.¹⁴ In the long run intemperance invariably revenges itself upon its victims.

¹⁴ Prop. Damnat. sub Innocentio XI, prop. 8: "To eat and drink even to satiety for pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health, because (some) natural appetite may lawfully enjoy its own acts." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1158).

On the sin of drunkenness in particular see Vol. II of this Handbook, pp. 79 sq. On the duty of self-denial, infra, pp. 72 sq.

Some believe that men were originally vegetarians and received permission to eat flesh meat only after the Flood. This opinion may be true or false, but we believe it has no basis in Holy Writ.

2. CLOTHING. —Another important means of preserving the health and warding off disease and other harmful influences is clothing. a) Clothes are worn for a fivefold purpose: to protect the body against the inclemencies of the weather or climate, to adorn it, to cover nakedness and preserve modesty, to distinguish the sexes, and to mark differences in office, occupation, or social rank.¹⁵ b) In the choice of his garments the individual is to a considerable extent limited by season, climate, temperature, custom, fashion, and other factors.

¹⁵ Gen. III, 7–11, 21; 1 Cor. VII, 34; XII, 23 sq. —Chas. S. Devas, Political Economy, pp. 153 sqq.

Custom should not be disregarded entirely, and even erratic Dame Fashion may be followed to a certain reasonable extent.¹⁶ A person may dress well without being on that account guilty of vanity. For a man to dress like a woman, or vice versa, may be sinful or not, according to motives and circumstances. If done as a matter of necessity, or for any other good and sufficient cause, it is permissible; if the intention be venially sinful, it is a venial, if grievously sinful, a mortal sin.¹⁷

¹⁶ W. T. Kane, S.J., "The Psychology of Fashion", in America, N. Y., 7 July, 1923, Vol. XXIX, No. 12, pp. 269 sq.

¹⁷ C. 6, D. 30 (Concil. Gangr. a. 355, can. 18): “If any woman, judging it useful by deliberate choice that she use male clothing, for this reason imitates the dress of a man, let her be anathema.” (Decretum Gratiani, ed. Friedberg, Leipsic, 1879, p. 107). —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 169, art. 2, ad 3; 1a 2ae, qu. 102, art. 6, ad 6. —H. Busembaum, S. J., Medulla Theol. Mor., Tournai, 1876, l. II, tr. 3, c. 2, dub. 5, a. 2: "If a woman uses male clothing, or conversely, merely from levity without a depraved intention or danger of scandal and lust, it will be venial only; otherwise mortal; but no sin if from necessity."

The Church condemns vanity, wastefulness, carelessness, uncleanness as well as indecency in regard to clothing.¹⁸

¹⁸ Cfr. St. Jerome, Epist., LII, n. 9: "Adornment and squalor are to be avoided in equal measure, because the one savors of luxury and the other of vainglory." (Migne, P. L., XXII, 535).—St. Augustine, De Serm. Dom. in Monte, l. II, c. 12, n. 41: "It must especially be observed that ostentation can exist not only in the splendor and display of material things, but even in mournful squalor itself, and is the more dangerous insofar as it deceives under the name of service to God. Therefore, one who shines forth in immoderate care of body and clothing or in the splendor of other things is easily convicted by those very things of being a follower of the pomps of the world and deceives no one by a false appearance of holiness; but one who, in the profession of Christianity, directs men’s attentive eyes upon himself by unusual squalor and filth, when he does this voluntarily and does not suffer it from necessity, can be judged from his other works whether he does this from contempt of superfluous refinement or from some ambition." (P. L., XXXIV, 1287).— On wastefulness in the matter of dress and adornments, which is so conspicuous a fault of western nations, especially since the Industrial Revolution, Charles S. Devas (Political Economy, p. 154) says from the standpoint of the economist, that it is a source of "frequent ruin." The following remark of the author deserves reproduction also in a handbook of Moral Theology: "In many modern countries, by the disorganization of family life, notably by the absence of the housewife from home and by the want of training in household work, the proper care or repair of clothes has been neglected (as well as of the house-linen and household utensils): such neglect being no trifle; for since clothing will last twice as long if properly mended and cared for, the neglect of such care will compel a man, if he is to be clad as well as before, to spend on clothing nearly twice as much." The scarcity and high price of clothing consequent upon the Great War have checked this "depraved consumption" of clothing and household utensils, and it is to be hoped that the lesson will not soon be forgotten.

For women to employ the arts of the toilet (cultus muliebris) out of vanity is not a mortal sin, but to do so in order to tempt men is grievously sinful.¹⁹

¹⁹ Cfr. Prov. VII, 10; 1 Cor. VII, 34; St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 169, art. 2; Ovid, Remed. Amor., 342 sq.

It should never be forgotten that the highest purpose for which clothes are worn is the preservation of modesty.^* The moralist has no right to inveigh against the vagaries of fashion unless they endanger modesty or health or unless people spend more money on clothes than they can reasonably afford.

^* Cfr. A. Vermeersch, S.J., De Castitate, Bruges, 1919, pp. 19 sq.

In some countries custom prescribes a definite attire for people according to profession, occupation, or social rank. Where such a custom exists, it should be respected. The clergy, in particular, have a prescribed dress (habitus clericalis), which is regulated partly by the general laws of the Church and partly by diocesan ordinances, which should be conscientiously observed.²⁰

²⁰ Conc. Trid., Sess. XIV, c. 6, de Ref.; Sess. XXIII, c. 6, de Ref.; Codex Iuris Can., can. 136; Chas. Augustine [Bachofen], O. S. B., Commentary on the New Code of Canon Law, Vol. II, pp. 84 sq.; Irish Eccles. Record, 5th Series, Vol. XI (1918), No. 606, pp. 475 sqq.

Malice. 1. Direct killing of a man, done by private authority, is intrinsically illicit. Say the same of mutilation, except that which is directed to preserving the body or temporal life. These things are manifestly gathered from the principle placed here above, n. 590, and from what was said in nn. 320-323.

Specification. The consent of the one suffering can remove only the note of injustice, but not the other malices; not even the grave offense against piety, which infects voluntary parricide, spouse-killing, or fratricide. Offenses against piety differ among themselves in gravity, but not in species. Grave cruelty annexed in the execution adds a new species of ferocity. But the means or mode of homicide does not change the species.

Nor can a private man kill a malefactor or a man condemned to death, unless there is question of one legitimately proscribed, whom it is lawful to kill, with a mandate of public authority.

2. Casual homicide, or homicide which follows an action or omission apart from intention, will be imputed insofar as it was foreseen as going to follow from an action which, on account of the danger of such an effect, was prohibited by natural or positive law. It is called mixed casual homicide. The case is that of a cleric who, not excused by necessity, illicitly has practiced medicine with burning or cutting.

— A detriment inflicted upon health, for example the active communication of a grave disease, is referred to mutilation.

Therefore they sin gravely who hand over a syphilitic infant to a nurse to be suckled. Nor can the utility of the infant, as the other good effect, alone intended, be alleged, both because, in order that another's health be thus disposed of, the consent of the nurse would be required, and she is not even accustomed to be warned; and because another way of feeding the infant is commonly at hand.

On Bloody Defense. 1. It is right to repel force by force, and to anticipate an aggressor who tries to snatch from you life or the things which are necessary for conducting it honorably, even by an action which at the same time inflicts death, with the mind of defending oneself, and with "the moderation of blameless defense" (that is, of licit defense; the classical formula is taken from Roman law, Cod. L. 8, t. 4, c. 1). That moderation is preserved if only that is done which seems necessary for warding off the injury.

2. The reason of honesty is not, as many say, some conflict of rights, for the person of the aggressor remains inviolable; nor by his delict can anyone alienate a right which he cannot lose by consent; but, with St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 64, art. 7, the principle of double effect must be used (I, 131). For the aggression of another brings it about that acts which otherwise immediately would be only wounding and killing are at the same time immediately one's own defense. Wherefore killing is only permitted, and cannot be intended as such. And to the difficulty moved by Lugo, Iust., d. 10, n. 149, that what is honestly effected is honestly intended, answer is made by conceding the major, but denying the minor: in the case, killing is not properly effected, but permitted.

3. Conditions. The reason given demonstrates: a) that an aggression morally present is required, not one past, for then vengeance would be exercised; not, however, one merely foreseen, for then there is not yet place for defense. But he is morally an aggressor who has determined in mind to attack you, and at the same time seeks the occasion of the aggression.

What in doubt? If it is confirmed by no exterior action, suspicion can give place to caution, but not to bloody defense. But he who, from the hour or manner in which he presents himself, seems to be feared, must be warned not to approach. If he continues to approach, he will be able to be treated as an unjust aggressor. But if, like a nocturnal thief, whose certain evil intention is already certain, he creates the true danger itself, unless men can be called by a shout, he seems able to be repelled as an aggressor even by death. This sometimes is sanctioned by positive law itself.

On account of the danger of hallucinations and abuses, by propositions 17 and 18 condemned by Alexander VII, the killing of a false accuser, of false witnesses, and of a judge from whom an unjust sentence is certainly imminent, is reproved (Denz. 1117, 1118); - by propositions 32 and 33 condemned by Innocent XI, occisive defense for hoped-for goods, or against him who impedes an heir or legatee lest he obtain an inheritance or legacy, is reproved (Denz. 1182, 1183). Those propositions were condemned by Alexander VII at least as scandalous; by Innocent XI at least as scandalous and dangerous in practice.

Because vengeance is not being done, but one's own defense, this can be exercised even against a materially unjust man, for instance a drunkard. Nor are we prohibited from defending another bloodily: for instance, a woman's assailant against chastity. Yet this will not be lawful if she consents, or, when she can, does not resist, unless, on account of connection, it matters to you that her honor be intact. And the bloody defense of another can be commanded by various offices.

b) That a lesion of a proportionate good is required: of life, of mutilation, of chastity, of a temporal thing which in itself or for the harmed person is of great moment. I would estimate the absolute quantity as not below a thousand francs. That regularly one gold coin suffices is proposition 31 condemned by Innocent XI (Denz. 1181); d'Ann., II, 283 (9), placed the absolute quantity at about 400 francs in his own time. But nothing must be given to a thief threatening force. Wherefore aggression against a temporal good will easily be able to be converted into aggression against the person. But let the aggressor impute to himself the danger of eternal salvation.

c) That necessity of defense is required. Whence if the injury can be averted with a lesser damage to the aggressor, it is not lawful to inflict a greater one. Indeed, if you can flee without disgrace, flight is to be chosen. Wherefore it is not lawful to kill a thief if the thing which he takes away can with sufficient certainty be recovered by another way.

You Ask concerning Vengeance. By vengeance, punishments are taken after a perfect injury. This is not lawful for a private person, but is reserved to public power. Yet a certain medicinal punishment, which is done by blows not dangerous, is permitted by a certain epikeia both to a woman who has been attacked, and to all, after small injuries which it would be too troublesome to refer to the judge.

Wherefore not even of venial sin is a youth to be accused who thus exacts an expeditious but equitable account of a modest injury. Much more will it be lawful for a solicited woman to show her constancy with her hands, so that the other may depart more certainly and not repeat the attempt. Nor is scruple to be had in this matter, nor censure or irregularity to be feared, whoever the solicitor may be. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 996, where he also alleges St. John Chrysostom.

Ecclesiastical Penalties. A layman legitimately condemned for homicide is by the law itself excluded from legitimate ecclesiastical acts and from any munus, if he has any in the Church; but a cleric must be degraded (c. 2354, §2). - Those who have perpetrated voluntary homicide, and all cooperating persons, are irregular from delict (c. 985, 4°). - By the notorious delict of homicide done in it, or by an injurious and grave shedding of blood, a church is violated (c. 1172, §1, 1° and 2°).

N. B. Concerning restitution on account of homicide, we shall treat more suitably and more fully after the question of the duel.

I. Notions. A duel is a dangerous contest of two or a few, undertaken by agreement, that is, by a preceding pact, with lethal weapons.

Danger either of death or at least of mutilation or grave wounding is required. For if such danger is absent, the exterior action cannot from natural law and taken in itself be called gravely sinful.

Without agreement, an unjust aggression, which indeed can be had, lies outside that deadly institution which the Church intends to abolish by her penalties.

Lethal weapons are required according to the common sentence. Although, as is reported in the Wroclaw case of August 9, 1890, not a few thought it sufficient that the weapons be able to inflict wounds.

Moreover, he who, whether by provocation or by authoritative command, has morally forced someone unwilling to enter upon a contest of this kind, is guilty of formal injury, since the unimpeded right of declining what he is forbidden to do by the very law of nature must be preserved for each one.

That foolish usage has a superstitious origin. It was referred to the genus of divination, like the ordeals of the Middle Ages, and was a form of tempting God. Wherefore authors treated of the duel where they treated of superstition. Cf. St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 95, art. 8, ad 3; Sanchez, Praec. Decal., L. II, c. 39.

Duels of today, especially those celebrated among military men, are a demonstration of a strong mind and of one zealous for his own honor; and at the same time a mode of restraining mutual offenses by the fear itself of a duel. As if these things ought or could be sought by illicit means! And the matter came to such an absurdity that criminal law forbade the duel, and at the same time those who did not infringe that law were excluded from the army!

II. Moral Judgment. It is sufficiently plain of itself that a duel, undertaken by private authority, is infected with the intrinsic malice of homicide and suicide.

For some years, especially after the recent war, the fortune, even worldly, of duels has begun to decline. There will be a time when they will wonder how so inept a prejudice could rage so long.

Nor are duelists excused by the evils threatening them from a refused duel, since immunity cannot be sought from an evil act. Cf. the propositions condemned by Benedict XIV in Const. Detestabilem, November 10, 1752.

Concerning duels publicly commanded, it will be said below, n. 638. 2 b.

You Ask. whether into the place of single combat some dangerous attempt can be substituted by which one may show himself a despiser of danger.

Resp. If that attempt at the same time has another, proportionate utility, one will be able to use the occasion of demonstrating constancy of mind. But proof of virtue through rashness as such cannot be elicited.

The Encyclical treats as a crime all attempts upon the life of the child in the womb of his mother.¹

¹ Pp. 40-42.

It means not only a child whose body is already formed, but also a child in the fetal or embryonic stage, in other words every fertilized ovum. In fact Canon 747 of the Code of Canon Law in prescribing the baptism of every fetus, however small, enjoins that every fetus be treated as a human being.

It includes in the first place feticide, that is the cruel operation which crushes the skull of the fetus or cuts his little body to pieces according to the need for saving the mother. Besides, it includes every direct abortion. Not only the majority of the more modern moral theologians, but the Holy Office itself consider direct abortion as similar to feticide.¹ For abortion

is not merely the placing of a child outside the surroundings which are indispensable for him to live, but it is the violent tearing away of the membranes and tissues by which the child is as it were one with his mother, and through which he breathes and receives nourishment—membranes which, at least in part, belong to him as an organ developed by his own growth. Abortion directly produced is a deadly wound inflicted on an innocent human being.

¹ See the reply of the Holy Office, August 19, 1889.

Catholic teaching is today unanimous in condemning all feticide and all abortion directly produced upon a fetus, unless it be morally certain that he is already dead. Outside of this Catholic tradition, some, holding that the unborn child has no rights,¹ allow the father or mother to decide his fate; others allow feticide only in case of imminent danger, where it is the only way to save the mother's life, or they allow abortion only for very grave medical, social or eugenic reasons. Such a determining reason of a medical nature would be to kill the child in order to solve the conflict which has arisen between the life or health of the mother and the existence of the child. Social reasons are to save the honor and reputation of the mother, or to leave her free to carry on her occupations and gain her livelihood. A eugenic reason is to prevent the birth of children who would be monstrous or idiotic. The idea of the required gravity of the motive is evidently more or less broad, according to the religion or “philosophical convictions” of the doctor or adviser. All of them, however, as the Encyclical goes on to state, demand that the “indication” which in one form or another they defend, be recognized as such by the public law and in no way penalized.² In other words, they insist that the law should conform itself to their theories and distinguish on the one hand between criminal feticide or abortion, punishable by legal penalties, and on the other, therapeutic or medical feticide or abortion, which should be legally authorized. In

fact, already a doctor is in no danger of prosecution as long as he is supposed to have acted according to the dictates of science. Worse still, it sometimes happens that a doctor is forbidden to practise laparotomy (cesarian section) in rural districts, although this operation might save both mother and child, while at the same time he is liable to prosecution for malpractice if he allows the mother to die under circumstances where he might have saved her by directly killing the child.

¹ They consider it as part of the organs of the mother, viscera matris.

² P. 40.

He opposes to them in the first place the peremptory argument embodied in the Divine commandment, “Thou shalt not kill”; and he rejects in passing the futile exceptions which have had a certain vogue. He declares that the right to take away life cannot be appealed to, since even public authority has no such power in the case of an innocent person; nor can the right of self-defense, since there is no question of an aggressor, even materially unjust, and the development of the child, even though it should become a fatal danger to the mother, does not violate objectively any of her rights, nor contain any injustice; nor the right of extreme necessity, since that never goes to the extent of killing a living person. The life of each of the two individuals is equally inviolable. Such a thing as a conflict in which one life might be regarded as of less value than the other, is an impossibility. We must, therefore, conclude with the Encyclical that physicians are bound to try to save both lives, both having an equal value in the eyes of God, the mother’s and the child’s. The physician has no right to set himself up as judge to pronounce a sentence of death. No diploma confers such power, which would exceed that of the most absolute monarch.

When the doctor abstains from interfering, he himself sacrifices no one; whereas if he does interfere by abortion or

feticide, he protects the life of the mother at the cost of committing a homicide. Here is a mere comparison, which we do not offer as an argument: suppose two men, for want

of provisions, are about to die of hunger; is it permissible for the stronger of the two to kill the weaker, in order to take his share of the provisions? That is the act of the physician who kills the weaker, the child, to save the stronger, the mother. If the parity is denied on the ground that in the supposed case the weaker person is not causing to the stronger any direct harm, whereas it sometimes happens that the fetal placenta poisons the mother, we answer in the first place that some good gynecologists have told us that the theory of placental poisoning is being more and more questioned. But suppose even that it is true, and return to our comparison. If the weaker person, forcibly held close to the other, involuntarily exhales a harmful vapor, is his right to life thereby impaired? May the stronger in that case resort to murder to free himself from this unhealthy environment? Besides, is it quite certain that unless an abortion is performed the mother and the child will die? It is very far from certain. There are not wanting cases in which a conscientious physician has saved both mother and child in spite of the medical indication of abortion. The doctor’s verdict is based on probabilities.¹

¹ See in the excellent little book of Dr. Clement, Le droit de l’enfant à naître (Bruges, Beyaert, 6th ed. 1931) the chapter, Vers la suppression de l’avortement thérapeutique.

It is not, when that principle is a saving one, which preserves greater values than those it sacrifices. Now faith in Providence assures us that every principle imposed by the law of God is a conserving force of higher values. In the present instance, one sees, it is true, some very sad, pitiable cases, in which a person dies, who might have been saved by abortion. But does not a more far-sighted vision see also a greater number of lives saved by the rigor of the principle? The severity intensifies the effort to save both lives; and this effort is sometimes rewarded with complete success. At the same time the spirit of invention is stimulated, and

this results in discoveries which render out of date even the medical indication for abortion or feticide. ‘‘Respect for the life of the child,” writes Dr. Clement,¹ “stimulates progress.” Is it not through this means that specialists now declare themselves able to control cases which were formerly despaired of, cases of so-called uncontrollable vomiting?² Let us in addition observe this psychological fact. When a physician who practices medical abortion is attending a woman who is pregnant and ill, everything conspires against the child. What reproaches are in store for the doctor if the mother dies when he had reason to believe he could save both her and the child! But the child, needlessly sacrificed, will make no complaint from beyond the grave! If one could get the statistics, we are persuaded that the number of real victims of medical abortion would be far greater than that of so-called victims who are supposed to have died for having been unwilling to consent to abortion.

¹ Work cited, p. 81.

² See for example one of the studies of Dr. Leven of Paris, Les vomissements au cours de la grossesse. La Médecine, April, 1929, in which he details the treatment which he finds successful. We have also direct assurances of the same fact from other gynecologists. Dr. Leven concludes with these words: “At a time when the birth-rate is so low, the fear of pernicious vomiting should no longer cause dread of pregnancy; nor should avoidable abortions any longer be practised.”

Because the death of the child may be a consequence, not willed, although foreseen and inevitable, of a medical treatment which is permitted in spite of this foreseen consequence. Although we may never do what is evil, still we have neither the obligation nor the power to prevent all evil from happening. We cannot be responsible for an evil consequence flowing from our good actions, when that consequence does not depend on us, and when the motive for acting is in proportion to the evil which is feared. In such cases the evil cannot be imputed to us as willed, because we do not will it; nor as permitted, because by our scrutiny of the reasons for acting, and by the precautions we have taken, we have fully satisfied our positive duty of removing, as far as is humanly possible, the accidental evil consequences of our action.

It is necessary that the abortion be not willed either as an end or as a means, but simply be permitted as occurring in spite of all, through the intervention of a factor which we cannot remove. It is, therefore, not sufficient that in an abortion the only purpose intended be to save the mother, if the abortion is a measure to that end, if the expulsion of the fetus is utilized as a means. In such a case, since the abortion is chosen, it is willed, and is, therefore, direct. Consequently, abortion will be indirect only in case the morbid condition of the maternal matrix requires the immediate removal of that organ, even though this removal necessarily entails the exit of the fetus which is enclosed in the uterus. The abortion, however, would be direct if the womb were to be emptied in order by that means to stop a hemorrhage. It is absolutely direct when it is practised because the mother is affected with tuberculosis or general weakness, or because it is feared that the child will be physically deformed or mentally affected.

It is notorious that in Soviet Russia, notably in Moscow, there is an official Institute where abortion is practised upon any woman who asks for it. About 30,000 abortions a year are performed there. But statistics supply us with precious information on the physical harm caused by these operations. Nature takes her revenge upon these unnatural mothers.¹

¹ Even outside of Russia, are not the statistics of abortion alarming? Take a single example. Already in 1923—and it is no better since then—there were in France 500,000 abortions a year, of which 85 per cent (425,000) were criminal, according to Doctors Pinard and Richet. (Speech of Mr. Zamanski at the Social Congress of Marseilles, 1929.) In Germany there are yearly one million abortions.

On the contrary, efforts and researches which tend to improve the health and vigor of the human race are in themselves praiseworthy. The Holy Father teaches that we may, and should, take account of the findings and recommendations of this science or art.

But the end does not justify the means. One cannot give to eugenics such primacy as to forget the law of God in order to satisfy its demands. On March 21 of this year (1931) the Holy Office, with the approval of the Holy Father, declared that we must absolutely reject and hold as false and condemned by the Encyclical “Casti Connubii” of December 31, 1930, the so-called “eugenic” doctrine, as well “positive” eugenics as “negative,” together with the means which it indicates for the improvement of the human race, by neglecting the laws of nature, of God, or of the Church, concerning marriage and the rights of individuals.¹ The Holy Father takes occasion in this connection to remind public authorities that it is their duty to protect the lives of the innocent, especially of those who cannot defend themselves. To deliver them to death, even at the hands of physicians, is to commit a crime that cries to heaven for vengeance.²

¹ Acta Ap. Sedis, Vol. XXXII, p. 118.

² P. 56.

We must distinguish between abortion (the moralists call it abortion when a child who is not viable is removed) and premature delivery. The latter will be allowed when it is practised at such a time and by such means that under ordinary conditions the lives of both the mother and the child will be provided for.¹

¹ Reply of the Holy Office, May 4, 1898, reply to question 2.

In the first place, the child must be already viable. At present, thanks to artificial incubators the child may be said to be viable after about six months of life within the womb. But this initial viability is a very different thing from full viability which requires at least eight months. Between these two periods viability goes through varying degrees, in which the chances of life are unequal. Moreover, premature delivery is more or less harmful to the child, according to his degree of maturity. Mere viability may not, therefore, always be a sufficient reason for delivering a child of six months. If there is imminent danger, the

operation will be legitimate as soon as the child has a chance to survive. If such a danger is not certain, then its probabilities must be considered, as well as the harm that would result from prolonging the pregnancy; and in the absence of a controlling reason of this nature, one should wait the full eight months. In short, the formula of the Holy Office gives us this rule: Consider the two lives, that of the mother and that of the child, as of equal value; and do what is for the best interests of both, everything considered, and without forgetting that the saving of the mother’s life is a very great benefit to the child himself.

41. By the various teachings which, prudently collected chiefly but not exclusively with respect to health, we report in this place, we intend in the first place to cut away or refute several errors harmful to morals, and to provide for the moral order by observing it. We hope besides that we shall furnish more than one priest with an abundance of useful counsel.

The conjugal act, when not too frequent and practiced by healthy persons, benefits health more than it harms it. Those, however, whose nerves are badly affected either by illness or by intemperance can suffer harm from it, sometimes grave harm ¹. For love, that is, sexual ardor, has been called a brief epilepsy.

¹ Ellis, in Moll, p. 181. Compare especially Féré, p. 319.

Anthropologists say that it matters greatly for the happiness of life together that the husband begin to approach his wife not fiercely but rather gently, as befits a man, and thereafter use his right discreetly ².

² Moll, pp. 446-447.

The wife, in turn, so that she may please her husband, should be rather yielding and ready in rendering the debt.

But how often, after the fervor of the first weeks, is it expedient for spouses to exercise the conjugal act? Luther established the celebrated rule for men of more vigorous age that intercourse should regularly be had twice or three times in a week. Vigorous age, moreover, is said to flourish between 25 and 40 years. Many physicians still approve Luther's norm.

Others, however, more prudently deny that a general rule can be handed down, and say that one's own experience and one's varying strength must be consulted. Artificial excitations are to be avoided; rather, spontaneous desire is to be obeyed ("to drink according to one's thirst"). But he who from the use of marriage has for a sufficiently long time felt himself weaker and of disturbed health is by that very fact invited to greater moderation ³.

³ Compare Féré, chapter 10.

Physicians and anthropologists are to be read cautiously on these matters. Often ignorant of and unconcerned with principles, deceived by incomplete experience or induction, they sometimes give enormously depraved precepts or counsels with serene countenance, which more accurate observation is later compelled to refute even under a merely scientific aspect. But let us trust more in provident God, so that we may be persuaded that infinite wisdom lies hidden in the natural order, in such a manner that the holy observance of this order must be held of itself most salutary not only for the souls of individuals but also for their bodies, and besides for the family and society.

Thus, while there are some who say it is desirable that a man abstain from his wife when she is pregnant and even when she is nursing ⁴, others think that a moderate use of marriage during the same time is in no way harmful, and indeed is commendable, for healthy persons. "A gentle embrace, from time to time (during pregnancy), will restore calm and gaiety to her (the wife), by proving to her that she is not disdained. It is good to add that gestation, because of the state of irritation in which the genital apparatus finds itself, is not without sometimes provoking erotic desires which it is very legitimate to satisfy.... A man has no greater reason to distance himself from his wife during lactation. Nature so little commands it that she gives a new radiance, a fullness of form, and an increase of freshness to the woman intelligent enough to have the coquetry to nurse.... It is wrongly believed that the excitement produced by sexual union is sufficient to give milk qualities harmful to the child. On the contrary, it is the complete prohibition of venereal pleasure which often has the effect of diminishing the quantity of milk ⁵."

⁴ Indeed, Gemelli, Non moechaberis, p. 65, appears to demand this. Yet that position affords little support to the right use of marriage and to monogamy itself.

⁵ Dr. Bourgas, Le droit à l'amour pour la femme, Paris, n.d.

Finally, this is to be observed: just as the affection of love itself impels one toward the intimate union of copulation, so in turn the use of marriage strengthens and increases the affection of love. Copulation therefore fulfills a threefold office: multiplying human beings, remedying incontinence, and fostering the mutual love of the spouses.

42. That a chaste and continent life of itself harms health in no way is attested by so many who have the greatest name among physicians and physiologists that the few who think otherwise can be disregarded; those, however, who condemn continence in the name of bodily health or give immoral counsel, as happens far too often, must be reproved from true science itself.

It is enough for us to cite two most expert writers whom no religious scruple could have led to less sincerity. They not only state what they think but also report the opinions of learned men: Féré, L'Instinct sexuel, p. 25 ff. and especially p. 315 ff.; and Moll, Handbuch der Sexualwissenschaften, p. 887 ff.

The latter, even in the rarer cases in which, because of the nervous condition of persons, he judges continence to be accidentally harmful, cannot approve a physician who therefore advises an illicit use of venery. For besides the moral consideration, which he admits cannot be neglected in this matter, he affirms that greater harms are to be feared from illicit intercourse. "It can indeed happen that a physician does not too hastily dissuade one from seeking forbidden pleasure and refrains from an untimely admonition; yet such cases are so rare that they cannot establish a rule."

The former, moreover, writes: "In the discussion which took place at the Medical Society of Lyon concerning the book of Dufieux, which made the defense of religious celibacy, his opponents found nothing to object to the denial of the maladies attributed to continence.

"Mantegazza, who is not distinguished among the apostles of continence, nevertheless recognizes no inconvenience in it. Physiologists, on the contrary, have found advantages in it.... Continence realizes a reserve of forces.... It is generally favorable to psychic activity as well as to physical activity.

"Somatic continence can be harmful only if it coincides with psychic excitation. Impotence is not the product of abstinence, but very often of abuse.... It is not necessary to rely upon religions in order to bring to light the moral merits of chastity in general, and, in particular, of chastity outside marriage. It is enough for us to take utilitarian morality exclusively into consideration.... From this point of view one can affirm without hesitation that the lack of chastity is immoral" (p. 116 ff.).

Forel himself (p. 251) has this: "The man who, for one reason or another, cannot procure normal coitus for himself ought to content himself with nocturnal pollutions, and the woman with voluptuous dreams, both abstaining from active and voluntary excitations." Dr. Löwenfeld ⁶ concludes the argument thus: "A normal man who has not diminished his power of resisting libido by sexual abuse, and who leads a sufficiently active and hygienic life, can persevere in abstinence without notable distress; moreover, the more consistently he cultivates it in all circumstances, the more easily he will preserve continence of itself." Finally, he altogether rebukes physicians who, when the opportunity for a useful marriage is lacking, advise fornication with a prostitute in order to prevent or avert the harms of continence. "This cannot suffice for a young man: it will excite libido, far from being able to calm it."

⁶ Sexualleben und Nervenleiden, p. 54.

At another International Conference for the Prophylaxis of Syphilis and Venereal Diseases, Brussels, 1902, physicians of great name approved this conclusion by unanimous vote: "Above all, the male youth must be taught that not only are chastity and continence not harmful, but also that these virtues are among the most commendable from a medical point of view."

Nor is the reason obscure. Spontaneous emissions during sleep sufficiently prevent a chaste man from having organs excessively filled with semen; and experience in turn testifies that it is, as it were, proper to the sexual organs that they preserve their power without use. "From puberty to old age, the testicles continue to secrete sperm without stimulation and no more lose their function than does the ovary, from puberty to menopause, or the uterus, or the breasts, which can remain at rest for long years without losing the faculty of responding to the call. Those who are capable of psychic chastity can preserve continence without having anything to fear for their testicles and their fecundity; and neither do they have anything to fear for their health, which does not depend upon the satisfaction of the sexual instinct. And feeling runs no more risk than do the organs; love never dies of need, it often dies of indigestion.... Beale, professor at the Royal College of London, says that it cannot be repeated too often that abstinence and the most absolute purity are perfectly compatible with physiological and moral laws ⁷."

⁷ Féré, p. 25 ff.

In the female sex alone, concerning which this question is much less accustomed to be raised, a prolonged rest of the uterus can bring this inconvenience, that internal tumors, fibromyomas, are produced more frequently.

Although an honorable life is to be commended to all, the counsel of perfect continence nevertheless is not positively to be given to all. In this matter it must be well noted that, in order to advise marriage to some, psychological or moral powers and tendencies must be considered more than strictly physical ones. Nor is marriage itself to be rashly counseled to the vicious.

43. - 1. In marriages of blood relatives there is this force, that peculiar traits (les caractères propres, "proper characteristics") are confirmed more and more in the offspring. Accordingly, insofar as an entirely healthy family or a family infected with certain defects is in question, such marriages, under this aspect, will have to be held harmless or harmful.

Certainly, if for several generations marriages were celebrated only among blood relatives, the danger of degenerate offspring could not be denied; but foreign elements are assumed sufficiently and more than sufficiently that this inconvenience need not be feared (Bushan, in Moll, pp. 908-915; Forel, pp. 179-180).

2. They say it is desirable that spouses not be separated by an excessive difference. Hence marriages between persons of the same skin and color are physiologically preferable to mixed marriages.

3. By marriages between persons of the same race, the national type will be strengthened; by marriages between various races, defects or faults proper to a certain race can be corrected.

44. Masturbation, or solitary onanism, which is a very frequent defect common to both sexes, can be procured by exterior touch or contact, friction, compression of the legs, suspect flagellations, for example upon excitable parts by means of nettles, and finally by obscene phantasms themselves. Manual masturbation, therefore, which is obtained by an exterior action, can be distinguished from spiritual or mental masturbation, which is obtained by the power of the imagination.

Not so rarely, those who indulge in this vice, especially women, introduce into the body various things suited to assisting their intention; likewise, some masturbators injure the penis with a needle or knife.

This vice is often practiced to supply the pleasure of the normal act; sometimes it also discloses or induces an inverted sexual appetite; and not so rarely it can be of doubtful signification. In estimating the intimate character of the vice, we can be assisted by the fantastic image which is accustomed to accompany the act.

Although far lesser harms are customarily imputed to that vice today than formerly, it can nevertheless never be despised as a thing of small importance.

For since the moral satisfaction of mutual love is lacking, the solitary use of venery, taken in itself, exhausts the powers of the body more than normal copulation ⁸. Furthermore, from acts which are very easily repeated there arises a habit and an ever-growing propensity, which prepares excesses harmful to the nerves. These harms can be immense in a subject whose nerves are badly affected; and they sometimes so disturb the sexual appetite that physical arousal is separated from the affection of love, and one has a man who is easily aroused and at the same time impotent for normal copulation.

⁸ Forel himself admits this, p. 250. On the harms of incontinence compare also Gemelli, Non moechaberis, pp. 85-91.

In some habitual practitioners, mental debilitation is also observed, especially in memory.

Mental or psychological masturbation is especially harmful as being exhaustive.

Moreover, these psychological effects more frequently accompany or follow this vice: arrogance, melancholy, affectation of solitude, and finally and especially neurasthenia.

To the production of these effects there contribute not a little: consciousness of the injury inflicted upon the will; the mark of turpitude with which the habitual practitioner is branded in the common estimation ⁹; remorse of conscience; religious anxieties; and the subjective persuasion or fear of a life diminished and exhausted before its time.

⁹ Gemelli, Non moechaberis, p. 93, thus beautifully describes the moral diminution of an adolescent after his first sin: "He thinks his guilt known to everyone; he imagines that his father and mother, while kissing and embracing him in their accustomed manner, perceive something new and read the truth, as it were, upon his forehead."

In sum, the pathological harms are more of the psychic than of the strictly bodily order.

Moreover, the causes of the harms are: native infirmity of body, excessive frequency of the excess, humiliation of the will after a fruitless struggle, human respect, religious consciousness of sin, and subjective fear of injuries.

45. The Neo-Malthusian arts ¹⁰ are the various manners by which spouses endeavor to procure for themselves a sterile conjugal act.

¹⁰ The theory is treated below, in the treatise itself.

The principal arts are:

1. Interrupted intercourse.

2. Mechanical arts of preventing the male semen from being able to penetrate the uterus.

The instrument which a man employs for this end is called a condom, by which either the whole male member or only the glans is covered. It is made from elastic gum (caoutchouc), from a fish bladder, or from the intestine of an animal, for example a sheep (peau de baudruche, "goldbeater's skin"). Since, however, people complain that pleasure itself is diminished because of the interposed covering, human ingenuity endeavors so to perfect the instruments that they permit the sense of pleasure to be almost full.

111. Preliminary Note. Since we have spoken of damaging in general, now one must deal in particular with some damagings in which a special difficulty is found. Following the footsteps of the Angelic Doctor,⁷⁴ we shall first treat of injuries committed by deeds, and then of injuries committed by words. By deeds injury can occur in three ways: 1. by directly injuring the very person of the neighbor; 2. by indirectly injuring the neighbor, namely in another person intimately joined to him; 3. by injuring the proper things of the neighbor. Enough has already been said above concerning this third injury, under damaging in general. Injury of the very person of the neighbor is prohibited by the fifth precept of the Decalogue: "You shall not kill"; by these words there is forbidden primarily every unjust homicide, that is, suicide and the unjust killing of the neighbor, and secondarily whatever injures one's own or another's body in an undue mode. But the neighbor is injured indirectly in a person intimately joined with him through adultery and deflowering. Therefore the order of things to be said is the following: 1. on injury against one's own body; 2. on injuries against the body of the neighbor; 3. on injury arisen from deflowering and adultery.

⁷⁴ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 64 sqq.

Preliminary Note. Injury against the body of the neighbor can be committed in many ways, e.g., by injuring his health; but especially this is done by killing him, or homicide. Homicide is the same as the killing of a neighboring man. But the neighbor can either injure the common good, and then he is an evildoer to be punished, or cause great bodily injury to a private person, and then he is an aggressor to be repelled, or finally be altogether innocent. Therefore we shall treat 1. of the killing of an evildoer, 2. of the killing of an aggressor, where there will also be discussion 3. of dueling and 4. of war, and finally 5. of the killing of an innocent person, where there will also be treatment 6. of craniotomy and 7. of abortion.

Thou shalt not kill.

(Exod., 20, 13).

St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 64 and 65; St. Alphonsus, III, 363; ed. G., I, p. 621; H. Ap., tr. VIII, n. 1-32; Lugo, disp. X, n. 1-55; Lessius, de Just., l. 2; Billuart, Diss. X, a. 3; Salmant., tr. 25 throughout; Laymann, sect. V, tr. III, P. III; Catech. Rom., de 5 Praec.; De Baets, Les bases de la Morale et du Droit; Nouv. Rev. Theol., vol. 37 (1905), p. 501; Van Gestel, de Just. et Lege civ.; Vermeersch, Quaest. de Just., n. 132-150.

719. In the fourth precept we saw how man must have himself specially toward neighbor who is superior to him. In the six last precepts of the Decalogue we shall set forth the duties which must be observed toward EQUAL neighbors. There almost all things are ruled by strict or commutative justice. Among these duties the greatest is this, that neighbor not be harmed in his own person, as to the consistency of the person and the conservation of life. Therefore the precept concerning not killing comes here very fittingly.

This precept is formally negative, virtually affirmative.

1. Insofar as it is negative, it PROHIBITS directly and primarily homicide, or the unjust killing of a man; but indirectly and consequently every unjust harming of neighbor in the goods of the body through mutilation, incarceration, beating, duel, war, etc. - It also prohibits all those things which proximately dispose to harm of this kind, such as hatred, anger, vengeance, and imprecations, which deservedly are called homicides of the heart and mouth (cf. n. 498).

It prohibits besides suicide, and unjust mutilation of oneself; and finally drunkenness, by which the use of reason, and therefore the proper life of man, is harmed.

2. But insofar as this precept is virtually affirmative, it COMMANDS that we conserve our own and another's life in all licit ways, have peace with all, and patiently bear all inconveniences (cf. n. 476 seqq.).

Therefore there must be discussed: 1. justice and injury in general; - 2. homicide and its species; - 3. duel and war; - 4. suicide and drunkenness.³

734 is confirmed by can. 2205 § 4. - 738 sqq. penalties, can. 2354 §§ 1-2. Irregularity, can. 985 n. 4. - 745 penalties, can. 2350 § 1. Irregularity, can. 985 n. 4. - 748 can. 1240 § 1, n. 4º; by can. 2351 the penalties are confirmed. - 752 Let can. 141 be noted, by which clerics are prohibited from voluntarily taking up secular military service, and can. 987 n. 5, by which those who by civil law are bound to ordinary military service are declared impeded from sacred ordination, until they have completed it. The faculty, concerning which in this number under 3º, thereafter was restricted by the declaration of the S. Penit., dated 17 March 1916, to those who are actually in the battle line, or in the line and place of combat (A. A. S. VIII p. 108). - 753 and 756 for irregularity, can. 985 n. 5, for the other penalties, can. 2350 § 2. - 759 Qu. 2º is confirmed by can. 2201 § 3 and can. 2229 § 3 n. 2.

I. General view. - Charity and justice command that the right of the neighbor to the internal goods of life be preserved unharmed, and the opposite sins are prohibited by the fifth precept of the Decalogue. We call the internal goods of man the goods both of the body and also of the soul, namely, the natural use of reason and liberty, and moral and supernatural life. To the good of moral and supernatural life scandal is opposed; to natural good, whatever harms bodily life, or natural reason or free will. Concerning these things it is necessary to recall that not man but God alone has dominion over human life and over the human body, just as over the soul with its natural powers; and therefore:

1. an action directly killing, against the life of an innocent person, is never lawful, and consequently the life of an innocent person can in no case be directly taken away, as would happen in every species of embryotomy or direct abortion, that is, direct expulsion of an immature fetus;

2. likewise direct mutilation is illicit, not only for the sake of utility or profit, but even for the sake of virtue, unless it is for preserving the life or health of the whole body, insofar as the part is for the whole, and the good of the part ought to yield to the good of the whole, lest this be corrupted. Wherefore operations which render sterile or impotent, such as vasectomy, ovosectomy, sterilization, must of themselves be held intrinsically and gravely illicit, as being grave mutilations, unless otherwise health could not be hoped for;

3. likewise harmful actions are illicit unless at the same time and immediately, or not by means of the evil effect, they procure a greater good which compensates the evil and harmful effect;

4. a fortiori it is illicit directly to intend harm to the moral or supernatural life of the soul; likewise to posit an act which can harm it, unless it is done for a proportionately grave reason.

These principles come to be considered more attentively, as regards natural goods, in the actions of physicians generally, in the use of hypnotism, in surgical operations, in the use of certain narcotic medicines, in the use of chloroform and anesthetic means, in actions, potions, and incisions which bear relation to the procreation of the human race.¹ As regards spiritual goods, which are harmed by scandal, it will be said in the following question.

¹ Concerning all these matters especially may be consulted Capellmann, Medicina Pastoralis; Noldin, Tanquerey, Vermeersch, and Prummer in their manual of moral theology; Saesmans, Geneeskundige Plichtenleer, i.e., medical deontology.

II. Concerning the actions of physicians. - The following rules bind under grave obligation:

1. The physician must always use the safer means, i.e., those which, according to what science teaches, are certain; but if such means are not known, that is to be preferred which is more likely and, other things being equal, more quickly conduces to health. There also comes to be attended to, according to the diverse circumstances of persons, the great utility or necessity of a quicker cure, for example in a laborer; likewise also whether the remedies cause less pain or are of less price, so that that is to be preferred which, all things considered, is more profitable and less burdensome.

2. It is illicit for a physician to seek experience from a man by those means concerning which he himself is ignorant whether they are harmful or truly useful, as for example by vaccination from secretions of syphilitic ulcers for the diagnostic end concerning the existence of syphilis;² however, he can employ means which he certainly knows cannot harm, although it is not established for him whether in the present case they will be useful. Nevertheless Noldin adds, Th. M., II, n. 744: it would be lawful to test a remedy with the consent of the sick person, if the matter concerned slight harm which can easily be repaired.

² It is lawful in animals; likewise in malefactors condemned to death, if the civil power establishes this.

3. To a sick person whose recovery now cannot be hoped for, even such a remedy can be provided, when it is not established for the physician whether it will be harmful or useful for curing the health of the sick person: not in order to take an experiment for other sick persons, for it is illicit to seek an experiment in another's life, since evils are not to be done, even to one, so that goods may come to others, even many; but because it is more conformable to prudence and to the will of the sick person to apply that doubtful remedy than to omit it with the certainty of death. For such a remedy, as also for other extraordinary means to be employed, consent generally is to be sought from the sick person, and, if he is not able to consent, from relatives, especially if there is much fear of the danger of great and perpetual harm.

4. It is illicit to take away or notably shorten the life of those lethally wounded, the old, the sick, the dying, lest they suffer longer, even with their consent, by an action directly tending to this, because one must not use an evil means for a good end, nor are evils to be done that goods may come: for all these retain the right to life, and must be committed to God, who alone is Lord of life and alone can dispose directly of their life.

5. Consequently it is illicit in the article of death to provide morphine or a similar soothing means to a sick person directly so that the painful exit of his life may be shortened and be terminated in quiet euthanasia, i.e., a happy death. Indeed, also so that the dying person merely be deprived of reason and depart without the sense of pain; for for this there is not present, at least regularly, a sufficient proportionately grave reason, and certainly not if he is not yet prepared for death, since thus he would be deprived of the opportunity of doing penance and so perhaps would be placed on the way of eternal damnation. Concerning this more will be said below, under n. IV.

6. Puncture of the heart or artery (ponction du coeur, steek door het hart, Herzstich), which sometimes relatives or connections of the deceased, sometimes on account of the testament of the deceased himself, ask for lest perhaps he be buried alive:

a) cannot be done by a physician, if he does not have indubitable signs of death but seriously doubts concerning it, because this is to expose oneself to the danger of killing a man;

b) but if there are certain signs of death, of itself it is not illicit,³ since this is done only to free the relatives from fear and vain anxieties;

³ If it were illicit, by equal right it would be illicit to bury the deceased.

c) nevertheless the relatives cannot licitly ask for it, because they do this from an evil intention of shortening life if it were still present and of hastening death if it had not yet supervened; with which, therefore, it is not lawful for the physician to cooperate. Wherefore let him try to lead them away from this useless purpose; and if they are unwilling, let him declare to them that he will by no means perform the puncture, unless because he is wholly certain concerning death and solely to dissipate their vain anxiety.

7. The physician is bound, by himself or through others, efficaciously to warn the sick person concerning the proximate danger of death, so that he may dispose concerning temporal affairs and provide for spiritual necessities.

That office of charity is personal; hence, if others are lacking who can or will efficaciously persuade the sick person, the physician himself is bound to warn him by himself. Nevertheless he can be excused if the warning is certainly useless, whether because the sick person certainly does not need the warning, or because the warning certainly will in no way be useful, which nevertheless can rarely be affirmed with certainty.

III. Concerning the use of hypnotism. - Hypnotism is usually described thus: the induction of a peculiar state, analogous to sleep, which is called hypnosis, in which state the man who has been placed in it merely undergoes the suggestions of the hypnotizer. It is induced by very diverse means, which nevertheless probably are all reduced to one, namely the suggestion of sleep; but it has several grades, from simple sleepiness to perfect somnambulism. Concerning this it is useful briefly to note that its practice sometimes is illicit, namely, as often as it is employed unjustly or without a grave cause and great caution. For:

1. The hypnotized person is deprived of the ready use of reason and of dominion over the lower powers, which ordinarily by his own powers he will recover with difficulty without the nod of the hypnotizer; he hands himself over to the judgment of the hypnotizer, by whom he can be led sufficiently efficaciously and often invincibly to perpetrating illicit things, and ordinarily he can be reduced to the same state even while resisting. But such a deprivation of the use of reason and abdication of liberty, involving of itself a grave danger for morals, is illicit as often as a proportionately grave cause and cautions are lacking to remove the danger.

2. Hypnotism, unless it is employed with great prudence, exposes the health of soul and body to grave harm; hence there is required the removal of such danger, or at least a founded hope of obtaining a greater good.

3. But if someone by abuse of hypnotism subjects a non-consenting person to his commands, or exercises the art in circumstances in which it is harmful, he commits grave injury, and from justice is bound by apt means to restore that person to his own right and to repair all damages.

A sufficient cause for exercising hypnotism is not a cause of recreation or of profit alone; but:

a) sometimes the cause of scientific investigation (Holy Office, 26 July 1899), provided that the expert chooses a person to whom hypnosis appears not harmful but rather useful;

b) more frequently the cause of medication, whether for putting the senses to sleep in a surgical incision, or for curing a disease of the nerves or rheumatism; nevertheless let it be noted that in more recent time the salutary effects of hypnotism are now more restricted or called into doubt;

c) also the cause of removing or diminishing evil propensities, for example to suicide, drunkenness, lust, theft, etc., when in an extraordinary case they as it were take away liberty or weaken the will. In an extraordinary case, we have said; otherwise the proportionately grave reason is lacking. The ordinary means, namely, of formation, education, and self-mastery is the exercise of one's own reason and liberty; otherwise suggestions weaken the will more than they strengthen it.

In the aforesaid cases caution is to be employed: let there be employed only a physician very expert and prudent and supremely trustworthy, who uses only honorable and harmless suggestions and only for the intended end; let a trustworthy witness also be joined, who assists present or at least remains nearby: thus for the good reputation of the hypnotizer himself, but especially on account of the good of the hypnotized person.

IV. Concerning the use of morphine and other narcotic medicines. - The matter concerns not only physicians but also nurses, indeed patients who can administer medicines to themselves, for example as a remedy for sleeplessness or against the pains of rheumatism.

For in modern times narcotics (νάρκωσις, i.e., sleep, stupor) are often employed, whether for soothing pains or for provoking pleasure, as opium, morphine, cocaine, or for putting the senses to sleep, as ether and chloroform; their effects can be harmful or even intercept the use of reason for a time, and therefore their use can be illicit.

Soothing or stupefying means (calmants, stupefiants; verzachtende, verdoovende, bedwelmende middelen), concerning which we are here treating exclusively, are medicines which cause a temporary suppression or diminution of the activity of the nerve centers, from which there arises a certain state of physical and moral inertia. They are opium, morphine, cocaine, and other derivatives or mixtures of this sort.⁴ These are taken not only by way of absorption or chewing, by smoking or inhalation, but also by subcutaneous injection, and they are very efficacious for soothing pains; indeed they provoke a certain sense of cheerfulness and pleasure, but at the same time they weaken the nerves.

⁴ The International Geneva Conference, 17 Nov. 1924 - 19 Feb. 1925, reserved exclusively the name stupefiants to certain things. They are: opium, or the latex collected from the immature fruits of the white sleep-bearing poppy, which is cultivated in Asia Minor, India, China, Egypt, Persia; morphine, which is a certain principal alkaloid extracted from opium, and heroin obtained from it by chemical operation; coca naturalis, or erythroxylon coca, which is a certain plant from the Peruvian region; cocaine, or a certain alkaloid derived from coca; hashish, or cannabis from India, which secretes a toxic resin or oil enjoying excitatory properties. Very recently also peyotl is denounced, a certain Mexican cactus plant, of which a certain extract comes into use in the United States of America and is called "mescal buttons." This first effects alacrity and vigor, but then nervous languor and depression, with illusions and disturbances, yet without loss of consciousness, so that the man knows his state to be fictitious. Nor does the use of this remedy render a man dull as the others are apt to do. Concerning these see Dupre and Logre, Intoxications par l'opium, l'ether, la cocaine, in Nouveau Traite de Medecine, fasc. VI, Paris 1922; Dr. De Block, Toximanies, Liege 1927; Dr. Lewin, Paradis artificiels, Paris 1928; Mgr. Beaupin, Le Probleme des Stupefiants, in Vie intell., 1930; Brouillard, Stupefiants et Anesthesiques, in Etudes, 1929; Dr. Vervaeck, Le Peril des Toximanies, in Dossiers de l'A. C., 1930. Likewise the periodical La Cite Chretienne, 1928; S. Luc medical, 1934; Kothen, Les Toximanes, in Coll. Mechl., 1931-32; St. Willems, in Coll. Brug., 1932; Meunier, Les stupefiants et la morale, in Rev. Eccl. de Liege, 1934.

If they are taken in great quantity, they are deadly by acute intoxication in the same way as poison; in lesser quantity they cause a sleep of the senses and privation of the use of reason, which effect differs in nothing from drunkenness; in moderate quantity but taken repeatedly for a long time they gravely harm health by slow and progressive intoxication, notably shorten life, and provoke a most vehement desire, for example for repeated use (morphomania), which can be overcome much more difficultly than even the habit of long-standing drunkenness, and scarcely can be cured except in hospitals erected for this end;⁵ indeed they cause abulia, or paralysis and as it were atrophy of the will, indolence, indifference toward the duties of state and negligence, dulling of the mind, irritability of spirit, perversion of the moral sense, and diminution of responsibility.

⁵ A moderate quantity of morphine is judged permitted at 0.1 gr., but not for a long time. One who uses 0.2 gr. or 0.5 soon comes to 1.0 and 3.0, which quantity equals 20 or 50 small bottles in a day. Thus Capellmann, o. c.

From all these things it is evident that the use of remedies of this kind is dangerous, and is to be avoided unless necessity requires otherwise; and therefore a physician cannot supply or leave with a sick person an injection syringe or morphine.

Certainly it is lawful to diminish pains, provided that by the remedies employed the healing of the disease is not delayed, or damage or danger is not directly brought to health or life. Hence in employing remedies someone can sin either from the fact that he takes too great a portion, harmful to health, or from the fact that he employs remedies too frequently.

In particular:

1. Transitory use, and so slight that it produces no other effect except restoration of strength and calming of the nerves, is lawful.

2. Use in greater quantity or frequency, employed without just cause, or for pleasure alone, or for quieting the desire for narcotics, is a grave sin if notable detriment of health and life can or probably will follow from it; venial if the detriment of health or abbreviation of life certainly is not notable; but it is lawful in decreasing quantity for him who has contracted so long-standing a custom of use, for example of opium, that he cannot abstain from it without grave detriment to health.

3. Use in such quantity that the senses are put to sleep and temporary privation of the use of reason follows: employed without just cause, it is a grave sin just as drunkenness is; but from a proportionately grave cause of necessity or utility it is lawful with the consent of the sick person, as if it is done so that he may not feel bitter pains, or in a major surgical operation so that the sick person may permit himself without resistance.

4. Especially in the article of death: a) to provide a remedy so that the sick person may be deprived of reason and depart without the sense of pain is gravely illicit, especially if he is not yet prepared for death, because he would be deprived of the opportunity of doing penance and would incur the danger of eternal damnation; also generally if he is duly disposed, because thus he would lack the opportunity of meriting and of immediately preparing himself for death and notably increasing heavenly glory. Hence a proportionately grave reason for permitting this is lacking; indeed, if there is danger that he will not return to the use of reason, this is equivalent to an abbreviation of life.

b) According to some, however, this could be tolerated, presupposing the consent and good faith of the sick person, who is already well prepared for death, namely on account of bitter pains,⁶ especially if he is very liable to movements of impatience, so that it can probably be feared that he may fall into grave sin; indeed, as has sometimes been said, even if at the same time an indirect abbreviation of life would follow in a sick person certainly soon to die. But this is more doubtful and rather to be omitted.

⁶ Not on account of agony alone, says Noldin, Th. M., I, n. 349.

c) Certainly, however, euthanasia properly so called, namely directly and in itself intended, or directly procured, is gravely illicit, namely a direct acceleration of death, so that insensibility and privation of the use of reason is only the effect of induced weakness and of abbreviation of life. For evils are not to be done so that goods may come. In the case there is rather intoxication than anesthesia.

S. Th. II-II, q. 64.

Gentlemen:—In my first lecture I proved to you the existence and the binding power of a higher law than that of human legislators, namely, of the eternal law, which, in His wisdom, the Creator, if He created at all, could not help enacting, and which He is bound by His wisdom and justice to enforce upon mankind.

We are next to consider what are the duties which that higher law imposes upon the physician. In this present lecture I will confine myself to one duty, that of respect for human life.

A duty is a bond imposed on our will. God, as I remarked before, imposes such bonds, and by them He directs free beings to lead worthy lives. As He directs matter by irresistible physical laws, so He directs intelligent and free beings by moral laws, that is, by laying duties or moral bonds upon them, which they ought to obey, which He must require them to obey, enforcing His commands by suitable rewards and punishments. Thus He establishes and enforces the moral order.

Now the duties He lays upon us are of three classes. First, there are duties of reverence and honor towards Himself as our sovereign Lord and Master. These are called the duties of Religion, the study of which does not belong to Medical Jurisprudence. The other classes of duties regard ourselves and our fellow-men, with these we are to deal in our lectures.

I. Order requires that the meaner species of creatures shall exist for the benefit of the nobler; the inert clod of earth supports vegetable life, the vegetable kingdom supplies the wants of animal life, the brute animal with all inferior things subserves the good of man; while man, the master of the visible universe, himself exists directly for the honor and glory of God. In this beautiful order of creation, man can use all inferior things for his own benefit.

This is what reason teaches concerning our status in this world; and this teaching of reason is confirmed by the convictions of all nations and all ages of mankind. The oldest page of literature that has come down to us, namely, the first chapter of the first book of Holy Writ, lays down this same law, and no improvement has been made in it during all subsequent ages. Whether we regard this writing as inspired, as Christians and Jews have always done, or only as the testimony of the most remote antiquity, confirmed by the acceptance of all subsequent generations, it is for every sensible man of the highest authority.

Here is the passage: “God said, Let us make man to our image and likeness; and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and the beasts, and the whole earth, and every creeping creature that creepeth upon the earth.” And later on in history, after the deluge, God more explicitly declared the order thus established, saying to Noe and his posterity: “Every thing that moveth and liveth shall be meat for you; even as the green herbs have I delivered them to you.” But He emphatically adds that the lives of men are not included in this grant; they are directly reserved for His own disposal. “At the hand of every man,” He says, “will I require the life of man.”

All things then are created for man; man is created directly for God, and is not to be sacrificed for the advantage of a fellow-man. Thus reason and Revelation in unison proclaim that we can use brute animals as well as plants for our benefit, taking away their lives when it is necessary or useful to do so for our own welfare; while no man is ever allowed to slay his fellow-man for his own use or benefit: “At the hand of every man will I require the life of man.”

II. The first practical application I will make of these general principles to the conduct of physicians is this: a physician and a student of medicine can, with a safe conscience, use any brute animal that has not been appropriated by another man, whether it be bug or bird or beast, to experiment upon, whatever specious arguments humane societies may advance to the contrary. Brute animals are for the use of man, for his food and clothing, his mental and physical improvement, and even his reasonable recreations. Man can lawfully hunt and fish and practise his skill at the expense of the brute creation, notwithstanding the modern fad of sentimentalists. The teacher and the pupil can use vivisection, and thus to some extent prolong the sufferings of the brute subject for the sake of science, of mental improvement, and intelligent observation. But is not this cruelty? and has a man a right to be cruel? No man has a right to be cruel; cruelty is a vice, it is degrading to man’s noble nature. But vivisection practised for scientific purposes is not cruel. Cruelty implies the wanton infliction of pain: there are people who delight in seeing a victim tortured; this is cruelty or savagery, and is a disgrace to man. Even to inflict pain without benefit is cruel and wrong; but not when it is inflicted on the brute creation for the benefit of man, unless the pain should be very great and the benefit very small. Certainly it is right to cultivate habits of kindness even to animals; but this matter must not be carried to excess.

The teaching of humane societies condemning all vivisection is due to the exaggeration of a good sentiment and to ignorance of first principles. For they suppose that sufferings inflicted on brute animals are a violation of their rights. Now we maintain that brute animals have no rights in the true sense of the word. To prove this thesis we must explain what a right is and how men get to have rights. A right is a moral claim to a thing, which claim other persons are obliged to respect. Since every man has a destiny appointed for him by his Creator, and which he is to work out by his own acts, he must have the means given him to do so. For to assign a person a task and not to give him the means of accomplishing it would be absurd. Therefore the Creator wants him to have those means, and forbids every one to deprive him of those means. Here is the foundation of rights. Every man, in virtue of the Creator’s will, has certain advantages or claims to advantages assigned him which no other man may infringe. Those advantages and claims constitute his rights, guaranteed him by the Creator; and all other men have the duty imposed on them to respect those rights. Thus rights and duties are seen to be correlative and inseparable; the rights lodged in one man beget duties in other men. The same Creator that assigns rights to one man lays upon all others duties to respect those rights, that thus every free being may have the means of working out its Heaven-appointed destiny.

Thus it is apparent that rights and duties suppose free beings, persons; now an irrational animal is not a person; it is not a free being, having a destiny to work out by its free acts; it is therefore incapable of having duties. Duties are matters of conscience; therefore they cannot belong to the brute animal; for it has no conscience. And, since rights are given to creatures because of the duties incumbent on them, brute animals are incapable of having rights. When a brute animal has served man’s purpose, it has reached its destiny.

III. But it is entirely different with man: there is what we may call an infinite distance between man and brute. Every man is created directly for the honor and service not of other men, but of God Himself: by serving God man must work out his own destiny—eternal happiness. In this respect all men are equal, having the same essence or nature and the same destiny. The poor child has as much right to attain eternal happiness as the rich child, the infant as much as the gray-bearded sire. Every one is only at the beginning of an endless existence, of which he is to determine the nature by his own free acts. In this infinite destiny lies the infinite superiority of man over the brute creation.

That all men are equal in their essential rights is the dictate of common-sense and of sound philosophy. This truth may not flatter kings and princes; but it is the charter of human rights, founded deeper and broader in nature and on the Creator’s will than any other claim of mankind. As order requires the subordination of lower natures to higher, so it requires equality of essential rights among beings of the same nature. Now all men are of the same nature, hence they have all the same essential rights.

If any people on earth must stand by these principles, certainly the American people must do so; for we have put them as the foundation-stones of our civil liberty. There is more wisdom than many, even of its admirers, imagine in the preamble to our Declaration of Independence; upon it we are to base the most important rights and duties which belong to Jurisprudence. The words of the preamble read as follows: “We hold these truths as self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” I feel convinced, gentlemen, and I will take it for granted henceforth, unless you bring objections to the contrary, that you all agree with me on this important point that every man has a natural right to his life, a right which all other men are solemnly bound to respect. It is his chief earthly right. It is called an inalienable right; by which term the fathers of our liberty meant a right which under no circumstances can be lawfully disregarded. A man who takes it upon himself to deprive another of life commits two grievous wrongs: one towards his victim, whose most important right he violates, and one towards God, who has a right to the life and service of His creatures. “Thou shalt not kill” is a precept as deeply engraven on the human heart by reason itself as it was on the stone tables of the Ten Commandments by Revelation.

So far we have chiefly considered murder as a violation of man’s right to his life. We must now turn our attention to God’s right, which the murderer violates. It may indeed happen that a man willingly resigns his right to live, that he is tired of life, and longs and implores for some one to take it away. Can you then do it? You cannot. His life does not belong to him alone, but to God also, and to God principally; if you destroy it, you violate God’s right, and you will have to settle with Him. God wills this man to live and serve Him, if it were only by patient endurance of his sufferings.

For a man may be much ennobled and perfected by the practice of patience under pain and agony. Some of the noblest characters of history are most glorious for such endurance. The suicide rejects this greatness; he robs God of service and glory, he rebels against his Creator. Even Plato of old understood the baseness of suicide, when he wrote in his dialogue called “Phædon” that a man in this world is like a soldier stationed on guard; he must hold his post as long as his commander requires it; to desert it is cowardice and treachery; thus, he says, suicide is a grievous crime.

This being so, can a Doctor, or any other man, ever presume to contribute his share to the shortening of a person’s life by aiding him to commit suicide? We must emphatically say No, even though the patient should desire death: the Doctor cannot, in any case, lend his assistance to violate the right and the law of the Creator: “Thou shalt not kill.”

I have no doubt, gentlemen, that some of you have been saying to yourselves, Why does the lecturer insist so long upon a point which is so clear? Of course, none of us doubts that we can in no case aid a patient to commit suicide. My reason for thus insisting on this matter is that here again we are dealing with a living issue. There are to-day physicians and others who deny this truth, not in their secret practice only, but, of late, to justify their conduct, they have boldly formulated the thesis that present apparent expediency can lawfully be preferred to any higher consideration. Here is the fact. At a Medico-Legal Congress, held in the summer of 1895, Dr. Bach, one of its leading lights, openly maintained it as his opinion that “Physicians have the moral right to end life when the disease is incurable, painful, and agonizing.”

What his arguments were in support of his startling proposition, I have not been able to learn. But I know that a cry of horror and indignation has gone up from many a heart. Many have protested in print; but unless, on an occasion like this, moralists raise their voice against it with all the influence which sound principles command, the saying of Dr. Bach may at least shake the convictions of the rising generation of physicians. The only argument for Dr. Bach’s assertion that I can imagine—and it is one proceeding from the heart rather than the head—is that it is cruel to let a poor man suffer when there is no longer hope of recovery. It is not the Physician that makes him suffer; it is God who controls the case, and God is never cruel.

He knows His own business, and forbids you to thwart His designs. If the sufferer be virtuous, God has an eternity to reward his patient endurance; if guilty, the Lord often punishes in this world that He may spare in the next. Let Him have His way, if you are wise; His command to all is clear, “Thou shalt not kill.”

One rash utterance, like that of Dr. Bach, can do an incalculable amount of harm. Why, gentlemen, just think what consequences must follow if his principle were, admitted! For the only reason that could give it any plausibility would be that the patient’s life is become useless and insupportable. If that were a reason for taking human life away, then it would follow that, whenever a man considers his life as useless and no longer supportable, he could end it, he could commit suicide. That reasoning would practically justify almost all suicides. For, when people kill themselves, it is, in almost all cases, because they consider their lives useless and insupportable. Whether it results from physical or from moral causes that they consider their life a burden, cannot, it seems to me, make any material difference; grief, shame, despair are as terrible sufferings as bodily pains. If, then, we accept Dr. Bach’s principle, we must be prepared for all its baneful consequences.

IV. But are there no exceptions to the general law, “Thou shalt not kill”? Are there no cases in which it is allowed to take another’s life? What about justifiable homicide? There are three cases of this nature, gentlemen; namely, self-defence, capital punishment inflicted by the state, and active warfare. With only one of these can a physician, as such be concerned or think himself concerned. He is not a public hangman executing a sentence of a criminal court; nor is he acting as a soldier proceeding by public authority against a public foe. As to the plea of self-defence, it must be correctly understood, lest he usurp a power which neither human nor divine law has conferred upon him.

1. Self-defence. It is a dictate of common-sense, already quoted by Cicero as a universally received maxim of Jurisprudence in his day, that it is justifiable to repel violence by violence, even if the death of our unjust assailant should result. In such a case, let us consider what really takes place. A ruffian attempts to take away my life; I have a right to my life. I may, therefore, protect it against him; and, for that purpose, I may use all lawful means. A lawful means is one that violates no law, one that I may use without giving any one reasonable ground of complaint. Suppose I have no other means to protect my life than by shooting my aggressor; has he a right to complain of my conduct if I try to do so? No, because he forces me to the act; he forces me to choose between my life and his. Good order is not violated if I prefer my own life: well-ordered charity begins at home. But is not God’s right violated? It is; for God has a right to my life and to that of my assailant. The ruffian who compels me to shoot him is to blame for bringing both our lives into danger; he is responsible for it to God. But the Creator will not blame me for defending my life by the only means in my power, and that when compelled by an unjust assailant, who cannot reasonably find fault with my conduct.

But it may be objected that no evil act may be done to procure a good result, that a good end does not justify a bad means. That is a correct principle, and we will consider it carefully some other day. But my act of necessary self-defence is not evil, and therefore needs no justification; for the means I employ are, under the circumstances, well-ordered and lawful means, which violate no one’s rights, as has just been shown. Of course the harm I do to the aggressor is just only in as far as it is strictly necessary to defend the inalienable right I have to life or limb or very valuable property. Hence I must keep within the just limits of self-defence. To shoot an assailant, when I am in no serious danger, or when I can free myself some other way, or when I act through malice, would not be self-defence, but unjustifiable violence on my part.

2. The principles that make it lawful for a man to defend his own life with violence against an unjust assailant will also justify a parent in thus defending his children, a guardian his wards; and in fact any one may forcibly defend any other human being against unjust violence. A parent or guardian not only can, but he is in duty bound to, defend those under his charge by all lawful means. Similarly the physician would be obliged to defend his patient by the exercise of his profession in his behalf.

Now the only case in which the need of medical treatment against unjust aggression could become a matter for discussion in Jurisprudence is the case of a mother with child. Is the child under those circumstances really an unjust aggressor? Let us study that important case with the closest attention. Let all the rays of light we have gathered so far be focussed on this particular point. Can a physician ever be justified in destroying the life of a child, before or during its birth, by craniotomy or in any other manner, in order to save its mother’s life, on the plea that the child is an unjust assailant of the life of its mother? Put the case in a definite shape before you. Here is a mother in the pangs of parturition. An organic defect, no matter in what shape or form, prevents deliverance by the ordinary channels. All that medical skill can do to assist nature has been done. The case is desperate. Other physicians have been called in for consultation, as the civil law requires before it will tolerate extreme measures. All agree that, if no surgical operation is performed, both mother and child must die. There are the Cæsarian section, the Porro operation, laparotomy, symphysiotomy, all approved by science and the moral law. But we will suppose an extreme case; namely, the circumstances are so unfavorable for any of these operations—whether owing to want of skill in the Doctors present, or for any other reason—that none can safely be attempted; any of them would be fatal to the mother.

In this extreme case of necessity, can the Doctor break the cranium of the living child, or in any way destroy its life with a view to save the mother? If three consulting physicians agree that this is the only way to save her, he will not be molested by the law courts for performing the murderous operation. But will the law of nature and of nature’s God approve or allow his conduct? This is the precise question under our consideration. We have seen that the infant, a true human being, has a right to live, as well as its mother. “All men are created equal, and have an equal right to life,” declares the first principle of our liberty. The Creator, too, as reason teaches, has a clear right to the child’s life; that child may answer a very special purpose of Providence. But whether it will or not, God is the supreme and the only Master of life and death, and He has laid down the strict prohibition, “Thou shalt not kill.”

Now comes the plea of self-defence against an unjust aggressor. If the child is such, if it unjustly attacks its mother’s life, then she can destroy it to save herself, and her physician can aid the innocent against the guilty party. But can it be proved that the infant is an unjust aggressor in the case? There can be no intentional or formal guilt in the little innocent babe. But can we argue that the actual situation of the child is an unjust act, unconsciously done, yet materially unjust, unlawful? Thus, if a madman would rush at me with a sharp sword, evidently intent on killing me, he may be called an unjust aggressor; though, being a raving maniac, he does not know what crime he is committing, and is formally innocent of murderous intent. Materially considered, the act is unjust, and I can defend myself lawfully as against any other unjust assailant. Such is the common teaching of moralists. But can the innocent babe be classed in the same category with the raving maniac? Why should it? It is doing nothing; it is merely passive in the whole process of parturition.

Will any one object that the infant has no right to be there at all? Who put it there? The only human agents in the matter were its parents. The mother is more accountable for the unfortunate situation than the child. Certainly you could not, to save the child, directly kill the mother, treating her as an unjust assailant of her child’s life? Still less can you treat the infant as an unjust assailant of its mother’s life.

The plea of self-defence against unjust aggression being thus ruled out of court in all such cases, and no other plea remaining for the craniotomist, we have established, on the clearest principles of Ethics and Jurisprudence, that it is never allowed directly to kill a child as a means to save its mother’s life. It would be a bad means, morally evil; and no moral evil can ever be done that good may come of it; the end cannot justify an evil means. In theory all good men agree with us that the end can never justify the means. But in practice it seems to be different with some of the medical profession. Of late, however, the practice of craniotomy and all equivalent operations upon living subjects has gone almost entirely out of fashion among the better class of physicians.

Allow me, gentlemen, to conclude this lecture with the reading of two extracts from articles of medical writers on the present state of craniotomy in their profession. You will find them in accord with the conclusions at which we have arrived by reasoning upon the principles of Jurisprudence.

Dr. W. H. Parish writes (“Am. Eccles. Review,” November, 1893, p. 364): “The operations of craniotomy and embryotomy are to-day of relatively infrequent occurrence, and many obstetricians of large experience have never performed them. Advanced obstetricians advocate the performance of the Cesarian section or its modification—the Porro operation—in preference to craniotomy, because nearly all the children are saved, and the unavoidable mortality among mothers is not much higher than that which attends craniotomy. Of one hundred women on whom Cesarian section is performed under favorable conditions and with attainable skill, about ninety-five mothers should recover and fully the same number of children. Of one hundred craniotomies, ninety-five mothers or possibly a larger number will recover, and of course none of the children. The problem resolves itself into this: Which shall we choose—Cesarian section with one hundred and ninety living beings as the result, or craniotomy with about ninety-five living beings?”

Even if a liberal deduction be made for unfavorable circumstances and deficient skill, the results, gentlemen, will still leave a wide margin in favor of Cesarian section. My second extract is from an article of Dr. M. O’Hara, and it is supported by the very highest authorities (ib. p. 361): “Recently [August 1, 1893] the British Medical Association, the most authoritative medical body in Great Britain, at its sixty-first annual meeting, held at Newcastle-upon-Tyne, definitely discussed the subject before us. In the address delivered at the opening of the section of Obstetric Medicine and Gynecology, an assertion was put forth which I regard as very remarkable, my recollection not taking in any similar pronouncement made in any like representative medical body. The authoritative value of this statement, accepted as undisputed by the members of the association, which counts about fifteen thousand practitioners, need not be emphasized.

“Dr. James Murphy (‘British Medical Journal,’ August 26, 1893), of the University of Durham, made the presidential address. He first alluded to the perfection to which the forceps had reached for pelves narrowed at the brim, and the means of correcting faulty position of the fœtus during labor. He then stated: ‘In cases of great deformity of the pelvis, it has long been the ambition of the obstetrician, where it has been impossible to deliver a living child per vias naturales, to find some means by which that child could be born alive with comparative safety to the mother; and that time has now arrived. It is not for me to decide,’ he says, ‘whether the modern Cesarian section, Porro’s operation, symphysiotomy, ischiopubotomy, or other operation is the safest or most suitable, nor yet is there sufficient material for this question to be decided; but when such splendid and successful results have been achieved by Porro, Leopold, Saenger, and by our own Murdoch Cameron, I say it deliberately and with whatever authority I^† possess, and I urge it with all the force I can master, that we are not now justified in destroying a living child; and while there may be some things I look back upon with pleasure in my professional career, that which gives me the greatest satisfaction is that I have never done a craniotomy on a living child.’”

You will please notice, gentlemen, that when this distinguished Doctor said, “We are not now justified in destroying a living child,” he was speaking from a medical standpoint, and meant to say that such destruction is now scientifically unjustifiable, is a blunder in surgery. From a moral point of view it is not only now, but it was always, unjustifiable to slay a child as a means to save the mother’s life; a good end cannot justify an evil means, is a truth that cannot be too emphatically inculcated. This is one of the most important subjects on which Medical Jurisprudence has been improved, and most of its text-books are deficient. The improvement is explained with much scientific detail in an address of the President, Samuel C. Busey, M.D., before the Washington Obstetrical and Gynecological Society (“Am. Journal of Obstetrics and Diseases of Women and Children,” vol. xvii. n. 2).

Abortion, gentlemen, is the theme of my present lecture.

I. An important point to be determined is the precise time when the human embryo is first animated by its own specific principle of life, its human soul. It is interesting to read what various conjectures have been ventured on this subject by the learned of former ages. They were totally at sea. Though gifted with keen minds, they had not the proper data to reason from. And yet some of those sages made very shrewd guesses. For instance, as early as the fourth century of our era, St. Gregory of Nyssa taught the true doctrine, which modern science has now universally accepted. He taught that the rational soul is created by Almighty God and infused into the embryo at the very moment of conception. Still, as St. Gregory could not prove the certainty of his doctrine, it was opposed by the majority of the learned.

The Schoolmen of the Middle Ages, while condemning abortion from the time of conception, preferred the opinion of Aristotle, that the rational soul is not infused till the fœtus is sufficiently developed to receive it. The embryo lived first, they taught, with a vegetable life; after a few days an animal soul replaced the vegetative principle; the human soul was not infused into the tiny body till the fortieth day for a male, and the eightieth day for a female child. All this sounds very foolish now; and yet we should not sneer at their ignorance; had we lived in their times, we could probably have done no better than they.

It was not till 1620 that Fienus, a physician of Louvain, in Belgium, published the first book of modern times that came near the truth. He maintained that the human soul was created and infused into the embryo three days after conception. Nearly forty years later, in 1658, a religious priest, called Florentinius, wrote a book in which he taught that, for all we know, the soul may be intellectual or human from the first moment of conception; and the Pope’s physician Zachias soon after maintained the thesis as a certainty that the human embryo has from the very beginning a human soul.

Great writers applauded Fienus and his successors; universities favored their views; the Benedictines, the Dominicans, and the Jesuits supported them. Modern science claims to have proved beyond all doubt that the same soul animates the man that animated the fœtus from the very moment of conception. The “Medical Jurisprudence” of Wharton and Stillé quotes Dr. Hodge of the Pennsylvania University as follows (p. 11): “In a most mysterious manner brought into existence, how wonderful its formation! Imperfect in the first instance, nay, even invisible to the naked eye, the embryo is nevertheless endowed, at once, with the principles of vitality; and although retained in the system of its mother, it has, in a strict sense, an independent existence. It immediately manifests all the phenomena of organic life; it forms its own fluids and circulates them; it is nourished and developed; and, very rapidly from being a rudis indigestaque moles, apparently an inorganic drop of fluid, its organs are generated and its form perfected. It daily gains strength and grows; and, while still within the organ of its mother, manifests some of the phenomena of animal life, especially as regards mobility. After the fourth month its motions are perceptible to the mother, and in a short period can be perceived by other individuals on close investigation.

461. Principles. - I. It is never licit for anyone directly, that is, from intention and by his own authority, to kill himself. This is clear 1° from the divine precept: You shall not kill.² 2° From the natural law. For man does not have direct dominion over his body, nor over his life, but only useful dominion, since he does not have these from himself, but has received them from God and must render them back to God alone when He demands them. Therefore the suicide violates the supreme dominion of God by destroying a thing not his own. He also harms society, of which he is a part, as St. Thomas says.³

II. Without divine authority it is never lawful to posit an external act, tending of itself immediately to one's own destruction, unless that act has another good and immediate effect, which alone is intended, and a most grave reason urges that that good effect be obtained. The reason is that where the physical act, even of itself indifferent, has no other effect than suicide, it now becomes evil, since then there is present no reason by which the precept of conserving life and of guarding against the danger of death would cease. Therefore in any case whatever it is prohibited.

III. It is licit to concur indirectly in the killing of oneself, or to posit an action from which, beyond the intention, one's own death certainly follows, provided from that action there follows equally immediately some good which compensates the loss of life, and this alone is intended. Sometimes we are bound to this.

462. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is it licit to set fire to a ship or fortress, so that the enemies may suffer grave damage, but with certain loss of one's own life?

Resp. In the affirmative, at least more probably; because it is expedient that public damage be avoided, or that the common good be procured, even with most certain damage of private persons. Lugo, Lessius, St. Alphonsus.¹

Quaer. 2° Can a virgin, in order to preserve chastity, expose herself to the danger of death?

Resp. In the affirmative, at least if death is not certainly going to follow; and this both on account of the love of chastity, and also (and this reason is valid for a woman in general, and not only for a virgin), on account of the danger of sin, which is often had in such an occasion. - Thus commonly. - Indeed, more probably still one must answer affirmatively, even if death is certainly going to follow, and there is not present a proximate danger of consent; because even the integrity of the body alone is very highly esteemed. - Laymann, St. Alphonsus,² etc.

Quaer. 3° Is a woman bound to permit herself to be killed rather than violated?

Resp. In the negative, probably, at least speaking speculatively, provided she resist with the will positively, and a proximate danger of consent be absent. The reason is that this permission is not formal cooperation in another's sin, but only material; and a just cause of permission is present, namely danger of death. Yet this practice is not to be counseled, on account of the danger of consent, which can easily be present in that permission.

Quaer. 4° Is it licit for an accused man to present himself before the judge, even if he must certainly be punished by death?

Resp. In the affirmative. Because that action is of itself indifferent, indeed even honorable; for in the case to will to die is equivalent to willing the order of justice; and just as because of a just cause it is licit to desire death for another, and even to procure it in a legitimate mode, so also for oneself. - Lugo, Lessius, St. Alphonsus.¹

463. You will resolve. - 1° Each one is bound to conserve life, since no one can cast away the gift of this life without sin, and it is equivalent not to conserve life and to take it away from oneself.

2° It is never licit to posit with the intention of killing oneself an action from which death, although only per accidens, is going to follow; because it is never licit to will a forbidden thing, and to reduce this will to act.

3° You are not bound to preserve life which is not necessary to the common good by remedies either extraordinary (for example, by expenses enormous for your condition), or bringing the greatest pain.² Note, however, that sections, or so-called surgical operations, are accomplished today with happier success than formerly, and scarcely without some pain, by the help of chloroform. Capellmann, Medicina Pastoralis, p. 20.

4° A virgin is not bound to suffer an operation by the hands of a physician, even if life is endangered, when on account of modesty this happens to be most grave for her, and casts into her a greater horror than death itself.³

5° It is never licit to macerate the body in order to shorten life, nor, even with such an end excluded, to ruin health gravely by immoderate and wholly indiscreet penances. Yet it is licit, from the virtue of penance, ordinarily to use grave things with a certain definite shortening of life; because, according to the common sentence of the Doctors, on account of merit, or the mortification of depraved nature, some loss of longer life can be contemned.⁴

6° Craftsmen do not sin who ascend over the roofs of buildings and expose themselves to various dangers, where there is need; nor blacksmiths, who daily diminish life for themselves by handling fire; the reason is that they do this from a reasonable cause. - On the contrary, bold men sin gravely who from rash wagering and vain glory cast themselves without cause into grave risks, by climbing high, by lowering themselves downward, by bearing heavier burdens, etc., etc. - But whether those sin who, from a cause licit of itself, work too confidently in dangerous occupations cannot so easily be defined. Custom, character, caution, etc., can bring it about that for them there is no danger, or only remote danger.

7° It is not licit to mutilate oneself, unless it is necessary for the conservation of the whole body; because man is not the master even of his members, but only their guardian, and whatever man is, the whole is God's, nor does he have any other dominion over his body except useful or indirect dominion.¹

8° It is not licit to mutilate oneself for a spiritual good, or for avoiding any sin whatever. For as St. Thomas says, "spiritual health can always be provided for otherwise than by the cutting off of a member, because sin is subject to the will. And therefore in no case is it licit to cut off a member for the sake of avoiding any sin whatever."²

9° More probably it is licit to cut off one's own hand bound by a chain in order to avoid death impending from a wild beast or a tyrant, or from fire; because the part ought to yield to the good of the whole man. - Lugo,³ Lacroix,⁴ Billuart, against others.

Namely 1° of the killing of a guilty man; 2° of an aggressor; 3° of an innocent.

464. Principles. - I. It is licit to kill malefactors by public authority. The reason is that this is a necessary means for procuring the common good of the whole society, indeed for preserving society itself; which indeed for the most part cannot be obtained except by the death of wicked men. But God must be said to have conferred the power without which society could not stand. This is clear also from the practice of every legislation, from Sacred Scripture, and from the universal consensus of all.

II. But it is not licit to kill malefactors by private authority. Because no one can kill another without power; but private persons have received no power of this sort from God: for, lest all things be filled with slaughters, this power has been given to the Superior alone of the whole civil society. Therefore.

465. You will resolve. - 1° It is licit for no one to beat someone not subject to his power, unless there accede at least the tacit consent of him who has power, for example, of a father over a son, of a master over a disciple; for beating is a punishment; but this supposes gubernative power. Except, unless this be necessary for averting a present injury, as will be said below. - Reuter.¹

2° It is not licit for a father to mutilate or kill his own children, nor for a master his own servants, for the sake of correction; the reason is that to punish by mutilation and killing, which inflict irreparable damage, certainly requires perfect power, which neither the father nor the master has. - Billuart.

3° An elder brother cannot beat younger brothers, unless this has been commanded to him by the father, or unless, the father being dead or absent, he himself governs the family; because primogeniture does not confer such a right on him. - Billuart and others.

466. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Can those upon whom, from office, it is incumbent to apprehend or guard a malefactor kill him when he flees?

Resp. In the negative, even if he has already been condemned to death; because by force of their office they can only restrain the guilty man,² indeed with weapons among us, if there is need, even deadly ones, yet avoiding his killing as much as it will be possible.

Quaer. 2° Is it licit to kill a tyrant?

Resp. 1° It is certain that it is not licit to kill a tyrant of governance, or a legitimate Prince governing the people tyrannically, and even oppressing them: for it is necessary to obey masters even harsh ones.¹ - Thus commonly with St. Alphonsus.²

Resp. 2° Nor is it licit to kill a tyrant of usurpation, if he is already in peaceful possession of the kingdom. But the opposite sentence must be called improbable and false; because according to St. Thomas a usurper ought to be held as legitimate, at least in practice, if afterward the subjects acknowledge him as such. Besides, the public good requires that obedience be furnished to him for preventing disturbances and overturnings of the Republic.³

A tyrant certainly sins by usurpation of authority, whether while he makes laws, or while he pronounces law, or imposes tributes, etc. For he usurps to himself the authority of a prince, since he is not prince.

Nor does he sin only by invading the republic or provinces, but he also sins afterward by constantly preserving them oppressed and subject to himself; since he constantly oppresses and inflicts injury, not otherwise than as someone thrusting another unjustly into prison not only sins at the beginning, but also continually afterward, as long as he continues this calamity of another.

There is added also this, that while the tyrant sins by retaining usurped power, he at the same time has another obligation, namely of providing for the common good of the usurped province; and therefore he sins still more if, when there is need, he either does not pronounce law, or does not restrain the guilty, etc. The reason is that he harms the citizens still more gravely, and inflicts a greater injury; namely just as one who retains another's thing and uses it sins by using it, and at the same time sins by not using it, if use is necessary to the thing, lest it perish or become worse.

Corollary. - Laws which are made by a tyrant of usurpation, now peacefully holding another's dominion which he unjustly occupied, are of two kinds. For either they are directed against the legitimate prince, or they conduce to the tranquillity and prosperity of another's dominion. If the former, it is not licit to obey them, provided a most grave penalty is not imminent; for then one would not sin who, for example, took up arms or stood among the ranks until he could safely flee; yet, excepting the case of pure defense of one's own life, he could not strike the defenders of legitimate authority. If the latter, the subject can and ought to observe the laws (Haine, T. I. p. 69. q. 49): for the necessity of the republic, which cannot kill itself, requires this. Nor does he sin who seeks justice from a judge constituted by the tyrant: the reason is sought from "the will, at least interpretative and implicit, of the republic, which, while it cannot repel the tyrant and the judges constituted by him, tacitly confers on them the power of governing, and ratifies their laws and acts."¹ Cf. n. 369. q. 5°; n. 459; n. 1717.

When a tyrant of usurpation or his successors become just possessors, even though the prior prince does not consent or even protests, is difficult to say. Yet that this must happen at length sometime is clear even from this, that otherwise almost no prince now could be judged legitimate.

Resp. 3° Nor is it licit to kill a tyrant or unjust usurper, even if he is not yet in possession of the kingdom, except from the authority of the legitimate Prince, or from just defense, or in an act of war of the Republic against him; for it is never licit to kill a man by private authority. - Thus commonly, and it must be held certainly.² - Recall what was said in n. 459.

467. Principles. - I. It is licit for each one to defend his own life even with the killing of an unjust aggressor; for each one has a right of conserving life unjustly attacked: therefore he can defend it by necessary means, and consequently even by mutilation or killing of the aggressor, if in no other way he is able to snatch himself from death; for the order of right and of charity permits that we prefer our own life to another's: and in Canon Law it is said: "All laws and all rights permit force to be repelled by force." - I said: it is licit, but not commanded, unless the life of him who suffers the aggression is very useful to the common good, or the one attacked would die in mortal sin. - St. Alphonsus.³

II. In just defense against an unjust aggressor the moderation of blameless defense must be observed, or nothing ought to be done except that which is absolutely necessary for protecting oneself; because what necessity does not excuse is against justice. - Likewise one must take care lest the killing, etc., be done from hatred, revenge, etc.

468. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is it licit to kill a drunken or insane aggressor?

Resp. In the affirmative, more probably, unless it is clear to you that he is in the state of mortal sin. The reason is that although the drunken or insane man is not formally your unjust aggressor, nevertheless he inflicts a true injustice, and there remains for you the right of defending your own life. But if you know certainly that he is in the state of lethal sin, since he is in extreme necessity, charity requires that you prefer his eternal salvation to the conservation of your temporal life. But otherwise if he were master of himself (for his own evil would be imputed to him), or if no prudent hope of his salvation shines forth, as almost in the insane. L. IV. 390 at the end. (T) p. 479.

Quaer. 2° Is it licit to defend an innocent neighbor by the killing of the aggressor?

Resp. In the affirmative, in every case in which it is licit to defend one's own life; and this by reason of charity.¹ Yet a private person rarely seems to be bound to this. - I said: 1° rarely; for an exception must be made if the one attacked is necessary to the public good, or if he is father, son, wife, or brother, whom piety obligates one to protect, or if he is drunk and in mortal sin, because then he is in extreme necessity. I said: 2° a private person; because by themselves those are bound upon whom the special duty is incumbent of defending citizens, yet not with danger of their own life, unless there is question of averting a public evil,² or they have specially obligated themselves also to this.

469. • Quaer. 3° Is it licit to kill an unjust aggressor also for the defense of members?

Resp. In the affirmative with the common sentence, against a few. The reason is that each one has a right of preserving a good most necessary to himself for life. Besides, in such risk the life of the one attacked is also practically endangered.³

Quaer. 4° Is it licit to defend goods of fortune of great moment with the killing of the thief, if otherwise they cannot be defended or recovered?

Resp. In the affirmative, at least more probably. The reason is deduced from what was said in the preceding question; for each one has the right of conserving goods of great moment in proportion to his condition, and therefore, by that very fact, of using means absolutely necessary for this. On the other hand, the precept of charity does not obligate one to prefer the goods of a neighbor, although of a superior order, except when the neighbor is in extreme necessity; but otherwise, when he of his own accord exposes himself to this danger of death.² (Y) p. 460.

470. • Quaer. 5° Is it licit for a woman to kill an invader of chastity?

Resp. In the affirmative, more probably. The reason is that chastity is a good more excellent than riches; therefore, if it is licit to kill an unjust aggressor of goods of fortune, it will be licit a fortiori for preserving chastity. - St. Alphonsus² and others commonly. From what was said in n. 468, Quaer. 2°, it is also clear that it is lawful to kill an invader of another's chastity, just as it is licit for the one suffering force herself; unless, however, the woman consents, or at least does not positively resist; indeed even if she consents, provided she is very closely related to the defender. - Yet this is never licit after the fact.³ Cf. n. 471. 3°.

Quaer. 6° Is it licit to kill another for the conservation of honor?

Resp. In the negative, at least speaking practically; because honor for the most part can be preserved by other means: besides, by today's morals, flight in such a case is not held shameful either for a noble or for a military man. Otherwise, moreover, a way would lie open to innumerable slaughters. This is also clear from propositions 17 and 18 among those condemned by Alexander VII, p. XIII, and 30 by Innocent XI, p. XVI.

471. You will resolve. - 1° It is not licit to kill a thief carrying off a thing of lesser moment, even with resistance of the owner; because although such taking away is done with a special injury against him on account of violence, nevertheless an injury of this sort is not judged grave according to the estimation of men.⁴ Yet the owner is not bound to let go of the thing, and, the moderation of blameless defense being observed, he can defend himself, if the other inflicts force upon his person for carrying it away.

2° It is not licit to kill him whom you merely suspect of aggression.⁵ But otherwise, speaking speculatively, if it is morally certain concerning the depraved will of the aggressor, and the danger cannot be met in another way. - I said: speaking speculatively; for in practice, on account of the danger of hallucination, and because that certainty is obtained with greatest difficulty, it will scarcely be licit.²

3° It is not licit to kill an aggressor after the fact, because it would be revenge, not defense. An exception is made when the aggression, effectively, as they say, was continuing in the flight of an aggressor carrying off a stolen thing. - Thus commonly.

4° It is not licit for a girl to kill the aggressor of her honor after oppression; yet she can strike him and treat him badly and most bitterly, especially because, unless in such a way she shows her constancy and displeasure, the wicked man will not easily depart, or will be able easily to return to solicitation.³

5° It is not licit, at least practically speaking, even for an honorable man to anticipate by killing an aggressor wishing to strike him with a slap; for he can always consult his own honor by flight or another way.² Yet it is licit to ward off the one attacking, even with weapons made ready, and to show oneself ready for one's own defense.

472. Principles. - I. It is never licit directly to kill an innocent, whether by private authority or public, even for procuring the public good; for it is an intrinsically evil action and expressly prohibited by divine law.⁴ The innocent and just you shall not kill.⁵

II. It is licit, on account of a grave cause (that is, equal to the life of the innocent), to posit an honest action from which, beyond the intention, the death of an innocent follows, according to the principle of St. Thomas set forth at n. 461.

III. He is not guilty of homicide who, even without cause, but with diligence applied, posits an action which of itself does not bring death, from which nevertheless by accident homicide follows; because that homicide is altogether fortuitous and involuntary. But otherwise, if he posits an action which of itself brings death, or is very dangerous, and from which death often follows, even if diligence has been applied for preventing damage.¹

473. You will resolve. - 1° It is not licit to kill those lethally wounded, nor any other moribund persons whatever, lest they suffer longer; nor those who are rabid, lest they harm others, provided they can otherwise be held back from harming. The reason is that according to the known maxim evils are not to be done in order that goods may be obtained.

2° It is not licit to kill an innocent in order to satisfy a tyrant demanding his death even under penalty of a city to be overthrown, and even if he consented to his own death; the reason is that he does not have dominion over his own life. Yet more probably he could be compelled to hand himself over to the tyrant for the public good, and probably, if he were unwilling, even to be handed over. St. Alphonsus² with others.

3° It is licit in war to direct artillery against the stations of enemies, although from this even some innocents are going to suffer death; because their death follows beyond the intention.³

4° It is not licit to kill envoys or hostages, even if the enemies who sent them have not kept the faith given, and have unjustly killed hostages or envoys sent to them; because they are innocent. - Busembaum, and others commonly with St. Alphonsus.⁴

5° Physicians, midwives, and guardians of infants and the infirm sin gravely if, from grave negligence, they either do not impede, or cause, or accelerate their death. Likewise if from gravely culpable ignorance they furnish harmful things to the sick.

6° It is not licit for those voyaging, tossed at sea and escaping from shipwreck in a skiff, for the sake of lightening the skiff, which otherwise they fear is to be sunk, to throw into the sea any others than those who, last descending into the skiff, are the cause why it is to be sunk.

Abortion is the lethal expulsion of the ovum, embryo, or fetus from the maternal womb. Mar.

474. Principles. - I. It is never licit directly to procure abortion, even if the fetus were supposed to be still inanimate; which supposition today, especially now that the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the B. V. M. has been proclaimed, lacks foundation.⁵ The reason is that if the fetus is animated, it is homicide properly so called; but if it is not animated, it is anticipated homicide. For the fetus even not animated is ordered to forming a man; therefore its ejection is anticipated homicide. St. Alphonsus,¹ Lacroix.²

II. Sometimes it is licit indirectly to procure abortion, or better, to permit it, namely by administering to a mother laboring under grave disease remedies harmful to the fetus, if the following conditions concur, namely 1° that there is question of a lethal disease; 2° that the remedies harmful to the fetus are directed of themselves to curing the disease; 3° that there is no hope of procuring for the fetus eternal life through Baptism. But hope of this sort can be absent in a twofold case: namely in the earlier days of conception; or where it is morally certain that the fetus, when the mother dies, will die at the same time or before. - St. Alphonsus,³ Lacroix,⁴ Billuart.

III. It is licit to give to a pregnant woman who is ill remedies suitable for curing diseases, even if sometimes abortion could follow. The reason is that it is clear from experience that abortion very rarely follows from ordinary remedies, at least most of them. - Thus commonly.

475. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is embryotomy, or the killing of an infant in the mother's womb, ever licit?

Resp. 1° It is certainly illicit, if either by a Caesarean operation, of which in the Treatise on Baptism, one can certainly consult the life of the infant and probably also of the mother, or if the fetus is soon to perish, and, its natural death having been awaited and it then extracted, some hope still probably remains of saving the mother. For where the good effect can be had from a certainly licit cause, it is illicit to use a cause concerning the liceity of which at least there is doubt.

Resp. 2° Since embryotomy is an action of itself or directly killing, but the direct killing of an innocent is licit in no case ever, embryotomy, although the sole remedy remains by which the life of the mother can certainly be provided for, cannot be permitted. And this is the common sentence of Theologians. Cf., if you please, Acta⁵ and Revue des sciences ecclés.⁶

Quaer. 2° Is at least the so-called medical abortion ever licit, or the acceleration of birth before the completed 28th week of gestation induced by art?

Resp. It is controverted. There are those to whom it seems the direct killing of an innocent, because from the very acceleration of birth before the seventh month of gestation the death of the fetus ought to follow of itself; for before that time it cannot live outside the mother's womb; therefore to extract it from that womb is the same as positively depriving it of precisely that thing without which it cannot live. Those who think the contrary say that in this case the fetus is only removed from a place in which it cannot live longer, and is placed in another in which it cannot continue life for long; wherefore they permit that acceleration of birth if the conditions are present of which in n. 474. II. Adhering to the former with Capellmann,¹ we apply the following admonition of Kenrick concerning embryotomy also to the acceleration of birth. If the mother asks what is to be done by her, it seems one must say that she ought to beg the surgeon to consult the life of the fetus in every way that he can.² (a) p. 469.

476. You will resolve. - 1° It is licit to expel a dead fetus, because the expulsion is no longer lethal. - Likewise, in the very violent oppression it will be licit to impede conception, yet not to expel a fetus actually already conceived.³ (b) p. 430.

2° It is not licit for a pregnant girl to take medicines (although these are generally taken in vain) for expelling the fetus, lest she lose reputation, because abortion would be directly intended. This is also clear from proposition 34 condemned by Innocent XI, p. XVI.

3° It is licit for a physician to furnish a remedy of itself ordered to curing the disease of the mother, if it is certain that, the remedy not being given, both the mother otherwise will die, and the fetus will be extinguished without Baptism; for thus both the mother and the fetus are helped in the better way in which they can be helped; but most rarely will there be certainty concerning both. But if the danger of abortion is equal, whether the remedy be taken or not, it is licit to apply it; because without greater danger to the offspring the life of the mother is consulted. - But if the danger becomes greater from the medicine, certainly one must proceed cautiously, since it is not lawful, in order to protect temporal life, positively to expose one's neighbor to the danger of eternal death. Yet it must be noted that, in order that this prohibition urge, there ought to be present a reasonable hope of saving the life of the offspring after the death of the mother, not indeed that a slight and most remote hope suffice; but most rarely does the offspring survive the pregnant mother. Hence the physician should weigh the circumstances conscientiously, yet not scrupulously.¹

4° They are homicides who strike a pregnant woman, or terrify her, so that abortion follows. Likewise pregnant women who with grave imprudence in various ways posit a proximate cause of abortion, for example by giving attention to excessive labors, by carrying heavy burdens. In both cases foresight of the danger is required.

5° A fortiori those girls are guilty of homicide who, pregnant from fornication, apply repeated attempts to try for abortion, by potions, jumps, burdens, strong striking and compression of the belly, etc. ... When women of this sort confess, they are to be questioned about abortion desired or attempted carefully, but not abruptly.

A duel in general is the fight of two or of a few among themselves; more strictly, the fight of two or several equal in number, from a preceding agreement concerning place, time, and weapons, with danger of killing, mutilation, or wound.

A duel is 1° public or private, according as it is done by public authority or not; 2° solemn or simple, according as it is done before witnesses, or with these omitted.

477. Principles. - I. A duel undertaken by public authority is licit if it is done for the common good, for example, that war may be brought to an end; otherwise, if it is commanded or permitted for other causes. The reason of each is evident.

II. A duel undertaken by private authority can never be licit. The reason is that it is repugnant 1° to natural right, since God has given to none of men direct dominion over his own life or another's, nor over members outside the case of defense against an actual aggressor; 2° to Canon Law, as is clear from Trent,¹ where the duel is called: "A detestable usage, introduced by the contrivance of the devil."²

478. You will resolve. - 1° It is not licit to accept a duel even for averting ignominy; because it is repugnant to reason to use that cruel means with evident danger to one's own life or that of a neighbor, indeed also of eternal salvation, on account of an end not necessary or even useless. True estimation, praise, and honor are not placed in the vain opinion of this world, whose wisdom is foolishness with God.³

2° It is not licit for a military man to accept a duel, even if for this reason he must yield an office necessary for the sustenance of himself and his own. The reason follows from what has been said: for the killing of another by private authority is never licit, except against an actual aggressor with moderation of blameless defense; but one provoking to a duel is not an actual aggressor.

3° It is not licit to undertake a duel on this law, that, when one has been wounded or when a certain number of blows has been completed, the fight cease; 1° because even in this there is the greatest danger of a lethal wound; 2° because Clement VIII, Constitution Illius vices, 1592, § 5, also forbade this; 3° because this kind of duel creates scandal and furnishes occasion for fatal duels.

4° It is not licit to undertake a duel, even with public authority acceding, for knowing the truth, for proving innocence, or for ending a private lawsuit; because it is not a means ordered to these ends.⁴

5° But it is licit to fight in a duel for mere defense, even accepting weapons from the adversary, if death is intended by him, or the loss of goods is going to follow unless the fight is accepted, and there is not another way of escaping this danger; but not to go from agreement to another place, even if death is intended for you in the case in which you would not immediately go to another place; - nor to appoint another determined time for defense; because then there would be a duel properly so called. Cf. Vind. Ed. 2. T. I. p. 317.

6° Those do not enter into a duel properly so called, and consequently do not incur the penalties inflicted on duelists, who, becoming inflamed with sudden anger on account of injury, provoke each other to a fight and immediately engage; because it is more truly a brawl, but not a duel, which ought to be done from agreement of place and time. And for the same reason, on account of an unforeseen meeting of this sort, the aforesaid penalties are not incurred, although the fighters from the same impulse of the brawl immediately betake themselves together to some suitable place.¹ - S. C. C., Oct. 5, 1744. - Scav.

See the five propositions concerning the duel condemned by Benedict XIV in the year 1752, in the Bull Detestabilem, p. XXVI.

479. • War is the fight of a multitude against a multitude foreign to the Republic, for the sake of defending or vindicating the Republic.

Hence it differs 1° from a brawl, which is a fight of a few against a few; 2° from sedition, which is a tumult or conflict of a multitude against political society, to which it belongs.

War is distinguished as 1° offensive, if it is done for vindicating an injury; 2° defensive, if it is sustained for repelling force.

Principles. - I. War of itself is licit, whether for repelling injury, or for vindicating one's right. The reason is that any society, independent from another society, ought to have a means of defending itself against injury, and of vindicating its right; but sometimes no other means is supplied for obtaining this end except war. - St. Thomas.²

II. For a just and licit war the following things are necessarily required:

1° Legitimate authority, that is, supreme, acknowledging no other Superior in civil matters. The reason is that where a greater authority is had, this ought to judge concerning the dispute.

2° A just and grave cause, which is preponderant over the inconveniences to follow from the war, for example, a kingdom or province to be recovered, or a grave injury against the Republic to be driven away, or a rebellion of subjects to be repressed, ... etc.

3° The due mode of waging war, namely that before the war fitting satisfaction be required from the adverse party; and if this is offered, it ought to be accepted from justice; for where war ceases to be necessary, it also ceases to be just. - St. Thomas,¹ Billuart, etc.

480. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is it licit to declare war with probability of one's right?

Resp. It is controverted. But the negative part is by far more probable, at least intrinsically and practically. The reason is, 1° because a possessor in good faith cannot be despoiled of the thing possessed, unless it is clear that he retains it unjustly; 2° because for positing the cause of very grave evils, such as slaughters, injustices, corruptions of morals, and other things of this sort, which ordinarily follow war, moral certitude of one's right seems to be required.² Tamburini, Billuart, against several, some of whom judge that only greater probability suffices, while others judge that even equal probability suffices.

Quaer. 2° Can soldiers wage war with doubt concerning the justice of the war?

Resp. 1° If there is question of a subject soldier (drafted), he is bound to obey, where the war is not evidently unjust, because it does not pertain to him to examine the reasons of Superiors.

2° If there is question of a hired soldier (volunteer) before war has been declared, he is bound to obey; for he is hired for this: hence he ought to conduct himself almost as if he were a subject.

3° If there is question of a soldier not yet hired, he is bound to inquire concerning the justice of the war, nor can he place himself in doubt concerning justice. The reason is that no one can cooperate in despoiling another of a thing which he possesses, unless he is certain that it is possessed unjustly by him.³ (X) p. 480.

Quaer. 3° Can the guilty or the innocent be killed by the victor?

Resp. 1° Sometimes the guilty can be killed, or soldiers who have fought, if this is necessary for establishing peace and security or for vindicating injury, unless they have surrendered themselves with a pact of life to be preserved. But this is wholly alien from the morals of our time. (W) p. 480.

2° But the innocent, that is women, old men, foreigners, Clerics, Religious, etc., ... cannot be killed directly, unless it is clear that they were associates in the war. Yet they can be killed indirectly, the fight not yet having been completed, if they are mixed with the guilty, so that, with these preserved, the remaining crowd of the guilty which needs to be destroyed cannot be killed.¹

481. You will resolve. - 1° Soldiers in an unjust war cannot licitly kill enemies even for the sake of defense; if they cannot flee, they ought to take care that they do not strike with their blows. For they themselves are unjust aggressors, and contrary rights in the same matter cannot be given, unless by accident, on account of some invincible ignorance, each side be judged just; which can often happen in soldiers, to whom in doubt it does not pertain to define the cause. - Lacroix, and others commonly.

2° A Prince, the justice of the war having been ascertained, ought to propose it to the adverse party, nor can he begin war if competent satisfaction is offered to him; indeed even war already begun, adequate satisfaction having been offered, he is bound to leave, if not from the rigor of justice, at least for the most part from charity, provided the other party wishes to compensate all expenses already made, and it is not necessary for the public good that his insolence be broken.

3° It is licit in war to prepare ambushes, to use stratagems so that enemies may be deceived by fallacies and cast into dangers. For these are not reputed lies, because the adversaries are deceived by their own fault, since those means are generally accustomed to be used in war; thus it is licit to feign flight, etc. ... But frauds which cannot be guarded against by any prudence are illicit, for example to infect wells and fountains with poison, etc.; ... for these things in the common sense fight against the rights of war.²

4° It is licit in a just war to besiege cities and fortresses, to discharge artillery against them, indeed sometimes to destroy or burn monasteries and churches, and in them to plunder and kill, if, for example, the enemies use the church as a fortress for defending themselves. - Likewise sometimes it is licit to give a captured city over to plunder, but only on account of most grave reasons.³

5° Leaders of the army and soldiers ought especially to guard against exceeding after victory in punishing the conquered: for they are ministers of legitimate vengeance, but not robbers and assassins; especially they ought to avoid whatever smacks of cruelty or the spirit of harming.

6° Leaders and soldiers cannot harm the envoys of the adverse party, because by the law of nations they are everywhere inviolable; nor can they send spies who secretly slaughter the Prince or Leader of the army or other Primates of the kingdom, because this pertains to treachery by the consensus of all.

7° By the right of war soldiers acquire things of the enemies captured in a just war, but not for themselves; for according to a very well-known principle of law: things won by war fall to the republic. It is said 1° in a just war, because in an unjust war an injury is done to the enemy, which must be repaired by restitution both by its author and by all who are participants in this injury (n. 824 and 825. q. 1°).... It is said 2° they acquire not for themselves, because they occupy those things not in their own name, but in the name of the republic, by right of war. But by today's law of nations, not private things of enemies, but only public things, among which the arms of soldiers and also the spoils of the slain are reckoned, are acquired in this way. Leaders command that harm be done to private things of citizens only indirectly, insofar as they either hold the line of battle attacking, or the enemy uses them for harming.¹

Therefore soldiers commit injury and are held by the obligation of restitution: 1° who from public things captured in war retain for themselves those things which have been granted to them neither by the express nor by the tacit will of the prince. But unless the contrary will is clear, soldiers can presume with reason that by this tacit consent the spoils of the slain are conceded to them; 2° who, besides provisions and other things of this sort commanded, extort certain things, as money, from private persons, or without reason and the authority of the leaders do damage to them.¹ 3° who, if they pass through the regions of those who are not conjoined by any treaty with the enemies, and who are called neutrals, take what is not necessary.²

By the express will of the prince, the ships of enemies and all things which are found in them are captured for themselves by those who, in these Federated States, obtain from legitimate authority letters or a license ("commission") for outfitting ships at their own expense, so that they may attack enemies. Yet he who captures and retains booty without that license does not seem guilty of violated justice; for that license pertains only to the order of law, and the tacit consent of the republic, among us, adjudicates the booty to the one capturing it. It pertains to the same order only of law that those who have obtained a license are bound to lead the booty into port and subject it to judgment.³ The things said, among us, are valid also concerning goods captured at sea, although they pertain to private persons; yet of that nation with which war is being waged.

You shall not commit adultery. - You shall not desire his (your neighbor's) wife.¹

Admonition of St. Alphonsus. "Now with difficulty we approach the treating of that matter whose name alone infects the minds of men. Would that I could have explained myself more briefly or more obscurely! But since it is the more frequent and more abundant matter of Confessions, and that on account of which a greater number of souls slide down to hell, indeed I do not doubt to assert that, on account of this one vice of impurity, or at least not without it, all are damned who are damned; hence it was necessary for me to explain myself clearly, although as chastely as it could be done, and to discuss very many particulars. - Yet I beg students who are preparing themselves for the office of hearing Confessions, that they not read this treatise (just as also the other on the conjugal debt), unless they shall already be near to receiving Confessions; and that they read it for this end alone; and, at that time, that they often raise their mind to God, lest, while they strive to acquire the souls of others for God, they themselves suffer detriment to their own."²

The Sixth precept of the Decalogue prohibits any external luxury, or that which is committed by deed. - The Ninth also prohibits sins of the heart, or evil thoughts and desires. - Each indirectly commands chastity.³

Here we must treat only of external sins; for of internal sins, or of morose delectation and evil desire, it has already been said in n. 228 sq. Hence 1° of chastity and luxury in general; 2° of sins of luxury not consummated; 3° of sins of luxury consummated.

824. Principles. - I. Soldiers are bound to nothing by reason of damage inflicted through a common action, unless the injustice of the war is established for them, because they are not formally unjust damagers. - Recall what was said concerning the Fifth Precept of the Decalogue, n. 480. q. 2° and following.

II. But soldiers in an evidently unjust war are bound concerning all damages which they inflicted through private action; and individuals are bound according to proportion concerning damages inflicted by the whole army, unless perhaps they were compelled to fight from grave fear. - See above concerning the unjust damager n. 746 and following, and concerning one participating n. 772. III.

III. But leaders or Princes are bound primarily and in solidum concerning the whole damage inflicted by the army, because they are truly commanding; or, if they did not command the damage, nevertheless they were bound to impede it by office.

825. Questions. - Query 1° Are individual soldiers, in default of the others, bound in solidum concerning the whole damage inflicted by the army?

Resp. More probably negatively, because individuals are not the cause of the whole damage, but only of a part. Moreover in practice they would be excused from absolute inability. - Lugo with others. Cf. n. 779. q. 3°. n. 780.

Query 2° To what are conscripted deserter soldiers bound?

Resp. 1° From obedience or from legal justice they are bound to return to the standards, supposing namely the justice of the law of conscription.

Except a) if they would meet grave danger to salvation, for example if means of confessing would not be at hand, etc., as can happen in some places; b) if, returning, they would be punished with death or other most grave penalties; c) if the war is evidently unjust.

Resp. 2° But certainly deserters are bound to no restitution, whether the law requires others in their place or not; because at most they injure legal justice, and probably (n. 827) they cooperate not unjustly toward the damage of others.

826. • Query 3° To what are those bound who hired themselves out for others and then deserted military service?

Resp. They cannot retain the price received, because a reason for retaining the money is lacking for them, since it is spent only on account of the burden of military service. Therefore they must restore it, and indeed to him from whom they received it in the case in which this man had to undergo military service or procure another soldier. Otherwise, to pious causes. Hence you easily resolve to whom those called "Bounty-jumpers" ought to restore.

827. • Query 4° To what are those designated by lot for military service bound, who withdraw themselves from it, or obtain exemption without true causes?

Resp. It can scarcely be denied that the opinion of those is probable who hold that the law of conscription is unjust. For, they say, it is not necessary for the common good, since the republic can sufficiently provide for its security by hiring soldiers for pay. Besides, they say, that law is opposed to distributive justice, since it imposes such a burden only upon those families having young men fit for military service. The probability of this opinion standing, the right of the Superior (of the Republic) commanding conscription becomes doubtful. But a Superior in doubt whether he exceeds his own power is not to be obeyed in a case in which, as in the present matter, the thing commanded is very difficult or exposes the subject to danger of grave damage.¹ Therefore those concerning whom in the Question are not to be compelled to restitution, whether they corrupt magistrates or physicians so that they be declared invalid by them, or deceive magistrates by lies, frauds, or previous mutilation, or desert the standards.

He to whom this opinion would seem improbable should take care not to urge the burden of restitution against conscripts imprudently, since most by no means think that injustice is committed, and otherwise they are rarely going to comply with admonitions.

Those conscripted by lot who desert the standards after they have obligated themselves by oath to military service sin, as is clear of itself, against religion. Yet for the most part they are exempted from the obligation of returning to the standards, which is implicitly contained in this oath, on account of the causes brought forward n. 825. q. 2°. They also sin on account of the lies, frauds, and mutilation by which they exempt themselves from military service; but not on account of injustice either toward the republic, if this must hire others in their place for pay, or toward those who by law would have to supply their place, because they use their own right, and that, as was said, practically certain. Nor do they sin by corrupting magistrates or physicians, since they redeem themselves from a vexation which, probably and therefore practically certainly, is unjust. Nor do the corrupted magistrates or physicians seem obligated to restitution either toward the republic or toward the corrupters; not toward the republic, because they seem to be equated to tax-collectors not exacting taxes which for a grave reason are judged unjust; nor toward the corrupters, because the price of a base work (in the case, of a lie), after it was furnished, can be retained (n. 834. q. 6°).

Query 5° What if a sufficient number of soldiers cannot be hired for pay?

Resp. 1° Even in this case the law will be unjust as to clerics (n. 112), and, if the law prohibits hiring another in one's place, as to those who are prepared to hire another.

Resp. 2° With these excepted, the rest from commutative justice must abstain from all fraud. The reason is that although the law by which military service is commanded, even in this case, obliges toward the republic from legal justice alone, nevertheless by force of the aleatory contract or of the drawing of lots an obligation of commutative justice arises toward those with whom the lot is drawn. Wherefore also physicians and magistrates exempting someone without just cause in this case, on account of the quasi-contract violated, which they entered into with the republic, must restore to it, and indeed in the first place; but the corrupters, as cooperators, in the second. But concerning the damage which was inflicted upon those who, by the frauds of those drawing lots with them, had to undertake the burden of military service, those who employed those frauds are bound in the first place, in the second place the physicians and magistrates corrupted by these, or favoring them.

War can be defined : «A clash by force and arms between two hostile armies.» By which it differs from a duel, which is a clash of one against one.

War is twofold : offensive, which is for obtaining satisfaction for an injury inflicted, and defensive, which is for repelling an injury being inflicted.

You will ask 1° whether war is licit.

[That war is always sin the Manichaeans once dogmatized, from St. Aug., lib. XXII contra Faustum, cap. 74; then the Wyclifites, as Waldensis testifies. But Luther proclaimed that to fight against the Turks was to contradict God willing through them to punish our sins. Erasmus contended that all war is forbidden Christians, against whom]

I answer. To make war is not per se evil, but, with three conditions posited, namely legitimate authority of declaring war, just cause and right intention, it is licit²¹⁴ . ²¹⁴ Here q. 40, a. 1, o.

Proof. from Scripture. In the ancient Law, God often commanded or approved war : Exod., XXII, 8 seqq. ; Num., XXI, 2 et 3 and XXV, 17 et 18 ; Deuter., VII, 1 seqq. ; I Reg., XV, 2 et 3 ; II Reg., VIII, 1 seqq. ; Josue, I, 2 seqq., VI, 2 seqq., VIII, 1 seqq., X, 8 seqq., and elsewhere often.

In the new Law²¹⁵ , Luc., III, 14, when soldiers asked what they should do that they might flee the coming wrath which John the Baptist threatened to sinners, the holy Precursor did not bid them desert military service, but to use it well : Do nothing violently, he says, nor accuse anyone falsely, and be content with your pay. By which words he tacitly approves war, as Augustine teaches, Epist. 138²¹⁶ , to Marcellinus. ²¹⁵ Ibid., in arg. Sed contra. ²¹⁶ Formerly 5.

It is confirmed. from the usage of the Church, which in several councils decreed war for the recovery of the Holy Land.

Proof by reason. By the law of nature it is licit to repel force by force. Ergo defensive war is licit. As to offensive : A private man who has suffered injury or damage can seek satisfaction or restitution. Ergo likewise can the state. — I subsume. But sometimes satisfaction or restitution cannot otherwise be had than by arms, say if those who injure or damage, being required, refuse to satisfy or restitute, nor have they a superior who would or could compel them to satisfaction or restitution. Ergo.

I said : «With certain conditions posited, namely legitimate authority, just cause and right intention.»

The authority required for declaring an offensive war must be supreme²¹⁷ , acknowledging no other superior in temporal matters, such as emperors, kings, certain dukes, independent states have, such as Venice, Switzerland, etc. 1° Because whoever has a superior can prosecute his right before him. But war cannot be undertaken except when there is no other way of prosecuting his right. 2° Offensive war is an act of supreme vindicative justice. Ergo it pertains to the supreme prince. But defensive war, the danger pressing, dependent princes, dukes, magistrates can declare it by natural law, since it is licit even to any private person to repel force by force. Understand, while danger and necessity last; these ceasing, they ought to seek and await from the supreme prince or independent state the judgment, power and execution of the injury to be avenged. ²¹⁷ Here q. 40, a. 1, c.

The just cause of declaring offensive war, generally speaking, is single, namely grave injury or damage inflicted, unrepaired, nor repairable in any other way.

As to right intention, war must not be waged except from intention of justice and common good, as Augustine teaches, Epist. 189²¹⁸ and lib. XXII contra Faustum, cap. 74. ²¹⁸ Formerly 205.

You will ask 2° whether, in doubt about the justice of a war, it is licit to make war.

I answer. 1°. If reparation of injury is at stake, a prince doubtful about the justice of the war cannot declare war; because in doubt, especially of such moment, the safer part must be chosen. If recovery of possession is at stake, the condition of the possessor is better in doubt, and therefore war cannot be moved against him. If neither possess, it is licit to bring war against him who refuses to divide the thing pro rata of the doubt.

[The true reason why, in doubt about the justice of a war, it is not licit to declare it, is because no one acts licitly, when the act can be good or evil, unless he be morally certain of the honesty of his action, as was explained and proved in the treatise on Human Acts, dissert. V, on Conscience.

When neither possesses, and the right is doubtful, it does not seem that this one or that one should be compelled by violence and arms to divide the thing pro rata of the doubt, because, proceeding thus, the one or the other would be despoiled of his right; but the titles invoked on either side are to be examined and weighed, and if the parties cannot compose their litigation between themselves, they ought to commit the decision of the cause to the arbitration of another, whose sentence they promise themselves to stand by. But if the contenders should come forward voluntarily to agree upon dividing the litigated thing between them, so that each abandon part of the right which perhaps belongs to him, this manner of proceeding is certainly to be commended, whereby justice is fully satisfied, but it seems nowise to be imposed.]

I answer. 2°. Those who are subjects of a warring prince, when ordered, can and ought to enroll themselves in the militia, and enrolled to make war, even if they doubt of the justice of the war, forming however for themselves a practical judgment that they may licitly obey and make war; because 1° the superior has a certain right of commanding, nor is he stripped of his right by the subject's doubt. Ergo the subject is bound to obey; for the right of commanding and the obligation of obeying are correlatives. 2° From denial of obedience, while its cause manifest cannot be assigned, authority is enervated in superiors, and the whole government subverted. From these principles therefore the subject can form the practical judgment that when ordered he may licitly make war. Confer what I wrote dissert. V on Human Acts, art. 2, You will ask 3°.

I answer. 3°. Those who are not subjects of the warring prince, in doubt about the justice of the war, cannot serve as soldiers; because by not soldiering they injure no one, since they have not the necessity of obeying like the subjects of whom in the preceding answer; but by soldiering they expose themselves to inflict grave injury upon another prince. The same seems altogether the reason concerning the subjects of the warring prince, if, not ordered, but of their own will, they serve for pay.

However, since the causes of wars are often not manifest, and the justice of a war also often is obscure even to theologians and jurists themselves, from this answer, true elsewhere per se, it would follow that almost all soldiers were blameworthy; for who among them, whether subjects or not, inquires into the causes and justice of the war? Therefore several weighty authors judge that, if their doubt be merely negative, insofar as they have no reasons for or against, and from the probity and prudence of the prince and his counsels they can persuade themselves that they would not move war unless it were just, they may licitly serve.

But those who are ready to make war whether the war be just or unjust, are certainly in the state of damnation, because of the will to make war even unjustly.

You will ask 3° whether there can be a just war on both sides.

I answer. War per se from the nature of the thing cannot be just on both sides, but it can per accidens and from ignorance, or, others say, it cannot be just on both sides materially, well however formally : because it cannot come to pass, according to the truth of the thing, that in one there be right of seeking satisfaction or restitution without there being in the other obligation of satisfying or restituting; for right and obligation are correlatives. Ergo, if he resist, he resists unjustly, and conversely if he resists justly, the other seeks unjustly. But truly, if one ignore the right of the other, he sins not by resisting, and thus per accidens, by reason of ignorance, the war is just on both sides.

You will ask 4° whether in a just war it is licit to kill innocents.

I answer. In a just war it is never licit per se and by intention to kill innocents, unless special authority has been made by God. Yet it is licit per accidens and beside intention. Proof of the first part. 1° From that general command of God, Exod., XXIII, 7: Thou shalt not kill the innocent and just. 2° An innocent cannot be killed in a just war except on account of the guilt of the state. But that is not licit. Ergo. — Proof of the minor. The state cannot be punished by the enemy except in goods over which it has dominion. But the state has not dominion over the life of innocents, but God alone, who granted not the right of the sword to the state except against those who do evil. Ergo.

Under the name of innocents come infants, children unfit for war, women, peasants, plebeians, merchants having nothing to do with war, clerics and religious, cap. de treuga et pace, lib. I Decretal., tit. 34, c. 2. All these, I say, by presumption of law are judged innocent, until the contrary be proved of them.

Proof of the second part: 1° If neither per accidens and beside intention killing innocents were licit in a just war, it would be impossible to carry out a war : a city could not, e.g., be stormed, or a tower demolished in which innocents were enclosed; enemies could not be attacked who placed innocents in the front of battle, which they would never omit, and thus the justice of the combatants would be frustrated. 2° When two effects, equally immediate, of one act, the one good, the other evil, can, a just reason subsisting, the good effect be intended and the evil permitted.²¹⁹ But the demolition of a tower or the explosion of war machines upon enemies is immediately protective of the homeland and destructive of innocents. Ergo the first effect can be intended for the common good, and the other permitted. This principle of the Author more widely drawn out and expounded you have dissert. VIII, On Justice, art. 2. ²¹⁹ Here q. 64, a. 7, o.

You will ask 5° what are the obligations and sins of combatants.

I answer. 1°. Supreme princes and leaders of armies 1° are bound ex officio to see that military discipline be observed insofar as they can, and to coerce soldiers from plunderings, thefts, burnings, ravishments, etc.; otherwise they sin mortally and are bound to restitution of those damages. 2° They sin mortally if they provide not just pay to the soldiers, and they are bound to restitute damages which soldiers inflict by lack of pay.

I answer. 2°. Subordinate leaders sin mortally and are bound to restitution : 1° If, no necessity compelling, they rashly expose soldiers to sure slaughter. 2° If they retain part of the pay or moneys conceded for soldiers. 3° If they have a smaller number of soldiers and receive pay for a greater, such are those who, while the troops are mustered, present not real soldiers in military dress, commonly called passe-volants, or present the same twice or thrice : into which sin also those muster-masters or commissaries implicate themselves who knowingly admit it; nor are they bound only for theft of pay, but for the damage which can accrue to the state on account of insufficient number of soldiers. Except how, they shall have seen. 4° Those sin and are bound to restitution who, while they lead troops through a province, on account of accepted gifts from certain villages or citizens, burden other villages, or citizens, with the number of soldiers.

I answer. 3°. Common soldiers 1° ought to be content with their pay, according to the precept of the holy Precursor, Luc., III, 14. Whence they sin mortally and are bound to restitution if, in lands not hostile, beyond roof, bed, straw, etc., as custom allows, they extort moneys, despoil, pillage, or otherwise do damage. Nor does the authority or connivance of leaders excuse them, unless perchance, the pay failing or diminished, they take precisely what is necessary for urgent need. 2° They are bound, even with certain peril of life, not to desert their post, or fortress, unless victory be plainly despaired of.

[I answer. 4°. While war lasts, all those things are licit which are permitted by the law of nations and are necessary for obtaining the end. Hence it is licit to prepare ambushes, employ stratagems, e.g., feign flight, etc. In a just war it is licit to besiege cities and storm them, deprive them of water. Likewise to despoil innocents of goods, if they be members of the enemy state, nor can victory be had otherwise. It is licit even to demolish churches, if enemies use them for defense. Sometimes, but only from the most urgent cause, cities can be delivered to plunder. This however is adverse to modern customs, besides the case where a justly imposed tribute is denied.

But illicit are frauds which can be guarded against by no prudence, as to infect wells and fountains with poison. Nor is it licit to hire assassins who secretly slay the leader of the opposing army; for, by consent of all, perfidy can never be made honorable.

Likewise it is not licit to kill captives taken in war and all who can harm no longer, except in punishment of crime. Captives moreover can flee, if no promise given by them stand in the way.^{220 220} Cfr. Marci, Institut. morales Alphonsianae, n. 751.

You will ask 6° whether it is licit for a Catholic prince to call heretics or Gentiles to aid.

I answer. affirmatively per se, at least speaking speculatively, provided scandal and peril of faith be far off. But it can be per accidens illicit, namely on account of damages imminent to religion.

You will ask 7° when do the fighting become irregular.

I answer. In a just defensive war, even those who kill do not become irregular. But in a just offensive war, those alone who kill incur irregularity, not indeed others. But in an unjust war, though only one be killed, all aggressors are irregular, because they act after the manner of one agent.²²¹ This last is drawn out from St. Thomas.²²² Of these things more fully below, on Irregularity. ²²¹ Id., lib. VII, n. 459. ²²² Here q. 64, a. 8, o, and ad 3.

You will ask 1° what a duel is.

I answer. A duel, in Greek monomachia, is the fight of one against one, and thus taken broadly it is the brawl of two between themselves; but as it is taken in law and with respect to ecclesiastical censures, it is commonly defined :²²³ «A dangerous fight of two entered into by agreement or compact, with designation of time and place.» And because the matter of censures is odious, and therefore to be restricted, all parts of this definition are to be taken strictly. Therefore ²²³ S. Lig., lib. IV, n. 406.

Thou shalt not kill. - Exod. xx, 13.

This precept is expressly negative and virtually positive. Insofar as it is positive, it commands the preservation of life; and insofar as it is negative, it prohibits primarily the unjust killing of a man, and secondarily every unjust lesion, wounding, or mutilation of the body, whether one's own or another's. But those things which will be established concerning killing, whether licit or illicit, will have to be applied to mutilation or to any bodily lesion, with due proportion preserved.

I Say. It is never licit for anyone directly to kill himself; but sometimes it is licit to concur indirectly in the killing of oneself. The reason of the first is both because, from the natural law, man does not have direct dominion over his body, but only useful dominion and administration, since he received it from God and will be held to render it back to Him when He asks it back; and because man is essentially a servant in relation to God, but the condition of a servant necessarily requires that it not be in his own power to determine the time of serving. But the reason of the second is that to concur indirectly in the killing of oneself is the same as to place an action from which, beyond the intention, one's own death follows. But this must sometimes be licit, namely when the required conditions are verified, concerning which it was said in the tract on human acts, n. 8. Therefore. ... Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 64, art. 5. - Lugo, de just. et jur., disp. 10, nn. 9 and 17.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. It is not licit to mutilate oneself unless it is necessary for the preservation of the whole body, because man is not the lord of his members, but only their guardian, and whatever man is, it is wholly God's. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 373.

2nd. Likewise it is not licit to mutilate oneself for a spiritual good, or for avoiding any sin whatsoever. For as St. Thomas says: "Spiritual health can always be provided for otherwise than by the cutting off of a member, because sin is subject to the will. And therefore in no case is it licit to cut off a member on account of avoiding any sin whatsoever." Add that mutilation of this kind renders someone impotent for generating, yet does not exempt him from carnal temptations. But St. Alphonsus does not reject as improbable the opinion of those who say that mutilation of this kind is licit for the preservation of the voice, provided the moral danger of life is absent and it is not done to unwilling boys. - Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 65, art. 1. - St. Alphonsus, n. 374. - Baller., notes (a) and (b), p. 373.

3rd. It is never licit to macerate the body for shortening life, nor, even with such an end excluded, gravely to ruin health by immoderate and altogether indiscreet penances. Nevertheless, from virtue, it is licit to use penances ordinarily grave with a certain shortening of life; because, from the common opinion of the Doctors, for the sake of merit or the mortification of depraved nature some loss of longer life can be despised. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 371; and Hom. Ap., n. 2.

Question 1. Is someone held to use extraordinary remedies for preserving life?

Response. Negatively, and the reason is that an affirmative precept is not necessarily to be fulfilled in every possible way, but only in that way which is obvious and common; whence there is no obligation of preserving life except by ordinary means, namely those which neither bring great inconveniences, nor demand expenses immense according to the varied condition of each one, nor cause very bitter pains, etc. Thus, for example, you are not held, for the sake of preserving life, to suffer amputation of a leg or arm, or incision of the belly for extracting a stone. Nor is a virgin held to suffer an operation by the hands of a physician, even if life is endangered, when on account of shame this happens to her as something most grave, and instills in her a greater horror than death itself. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 372; and Hom. Ap., n. 2.

Question 2. Can a girl expose herself to danger of death for preserving virginity?

Response. Affirmatively, at least if death is not certainly going to follow, and this both on account of love of virginity and on account of the danger of sin which is often present in such an occasion. Indeed still more probably it must be affirmed, although death is certainly going to follow, and there is no proximate danger of consent, because even integrity of the body alone is valued very highly, and is a sufficient reason that some girl can permit herself to be killed. - I said can and not ought, because a girl of this kind is not held to undergo death for such a good, and therefore she could also permit her own violation, provided she resists positively by the will, and proximate danger of consent is absent. The reason is that this permission is not formal cooperation in the sin of another, but only material, and a just cause of permission is present, namely danger of death. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 368. - Baller., note (b), p. 371.

Question 3. Is it licit to set fire to a ship or tower, so that enemies may suffer grave damage, but with certain loss of one's own life?

Response. Affirmatively, at least more probably, because it is expedient that public harm be avoided or the common good procured even with the most certain harm of private persons. - Lugo, Lessius. - St. Alphonsus, n. 367.

Question 4. Can a guilty person, ordered by a judge, licitly inflict death upon himself?

Response. It is controverted. The common opinion denies. 1st. Because man would dispose of his life without the consent of the Lord, who gave the faculty of killing a man only in the cause of defense and in the cause of punishment; but the guilty person does not defend himself, nor can he exercise punitive justice toward himself; therefore he cannot kill himself. 2nd. Nature abhors this, since it is inhuman and cruel. - Cf. Lugo, disp. 10, n. 13. - Lessius, lib. 2, 19, nn. 25 and 26.

The other opinion probably affirms: both because the judge can entrust execution to whomever he wishes, and because no convincing contrary reason is brought forward: in the case he does not kill an innocent person, nor himself by his own authority. What prevents someone from bearing a twofold person, of the one punishing and the one punished? Certainly it is opposed to natural inclination, but this has force rather against the judge than against the guilty person. Even if the thing is cruel, it can often happen that by this death becomes easier; and surely it is difficult to prove conclusively that the guilty person in the case cannot inflict death upon himself. - Cf. Victoria, Relect. de homicidio. - St. Alphonsus III, n. 367. - Lehmkuhl, 733. - Ball.-Palm., vol. 2, p. 608.

Question 5. Is it licit for a woman to undergo ovariotomy, or for a man to undergo vasectomy?

Response. 1st. Affirmatively, in either case, if those operations are necessary for the health of the whole subject; for the member is for the subject. Thus commonly.

2nd. Negatively, in either case, if it is done precisely so that offspring may not be born. For thus the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office responded on May 22, 1895: "Whether the practice, whether active or passive, of a procedure is licit which intentionally proposes as its express end the sterilization of the woman. Response. Negatively"; therefore although the response concerns the woman, it certainly has force also for the man.

To induce sterility, or thus to deprive oneself of the power of generating and to impede the conception of offspring, or to effect that the semen is not prolific, is opposed to the principal intrinsic end of marriage, and to its good, namely offspring, to the natural end of the conjugal contract itself, to the intrinsic end of semen, and therefore is repugnant to the natural law, so that it cannot be made honorable by any good end. And hence Bossius: "Thirdly it is gathered that a husband or wife taking, or administering to them, a poison or potion of sterility, so that the man cannot generate or the woman conceive offspring, is a mortal sin against nature and the institution and law of marriage, so that it cannot be made honorable by any good end. ... The same is clear from the Bull of Sixtus V, Effrenatam; in which Bull Sixtus extended all penalties laid against those procuring abortion against all those who shall have given to women potions and poisons of sterility, and shall have furnished an impediment so that they not conceive offspring." Whence from the fact that a woman can no longer give birth, it is not thereby licit for her to take care that the tubes be cut or tied, and by equal reason it is not licit for a man unwilling to have offspring more numerous, or weak offspring, or any offspring at all, to undergo double vasectomy. - Nouvelle Revue Theol., v. 9, p. 432; v. 29, 367. - Diana, t. 5, tr. 6, 36, 2, 37. - Sylvius on 2-2, q. 64, a. 7, quest. 4, c. 3. - Sanchez, De Matrimonio, lib. IX, disp. 20, n. 2. - Azor, Ins. Mor., p. 3, lib. 11, chap. 4, q. 2. - St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 65, a. 1, ad 3. - Tabiena, Summa, v. uxor. - Turrianus, t. 2, disp. 26, nn. 46 and 47. - Eschbach, Disput. Phys. Theol., p. 371. The question is very ancient and the negative opinion was altogether most common.

I say. Sometimes it is licit to kill malefactors by public authority, but never by private authority. The reason for the first is taken not only from the practice of any legislation and from the universal consent of all, but also from the fact that God, the author of society, must be said to have conferred upon that same society the means absolutely necessary for conserving itself and for procuring the common good. But among these means the death of certain malefactors must often be numbered. Therefore. But the reason for the second is that, if it were licit to slay malefactors by private authority, all things would be filled with slaughters, and society itself would be wholly disturbed; therefore God cannot confer such authority, and accordingly the whole malice of homicide remains if ever any malefactor is killed by private authority.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. It is licit for no one to punish, by striking, someone not subject to his power, unless there is added at least the tacit consent of him who has the power, e.g., of a father over a son, of a teacher over a pupil; and the reason is that the act of punishing supposes the power of governing.

2nd. It is not licit for a father to mutilate or kill his own children for the sake of correction, nor for a master his own servants; the reason is that to punish by mutilation and killing, which inflict irreparable harm, certainly requires perfect power, which neither father nor master has.

3rd. It is not licit for guardians of public order to kill malefactors who are fleeing, even if they have already been condemned to death, because right order demands that for killing them there be had a special mandate from public authority. But if among us guardians of public order seem more easily excused if sometimes, yet not rashly, they discharge weapons against malefactors either resisting or fleeing, this must be ascribed either to the right of defending themselves or to the special mandate which they implicitly had.

Question 1. What is to be said of that manner of acting toward malefactors which among us is called "Lynch law"?

Response. It is altogether illicit; for the power of punishing malefactors belongs only to legitimate authority, and not to private citizens. That manner of acting is also contrary to the Constitution by which we are governed; for - Amendments, Art. 5 - it is said: "Nor (shall any person) be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Wherefore Kenrick says very well: "The power, which in some places has sometimes been assumed by citizens, of judging and punishing accused persons at will and immediately, even by capital punishment, is abhorrent from all justice and public order, and is an enormous crime." - And elsewhere: "They are to be judged to sin most gravely who, the authority of the laws having been despised, usurp to themselves the supreme right of life and death, with no form of judgment having preceded, or with an empty one." - Cf. Kenrick, tract. 3, n. 142; and tract. 8, n. 165.

Question 2. Is it licit for the state to render criminals sterile by performing vasectomy upon them, if they are men, or ovariotomy or oophorectomy, if they are women, precisely so that offspring may not be born?

Response. Vasectomy is an operation by which the vas deferens is cut; it is perfect when both vasa are cut. Of this we speak. This operation having been done, sexual desire remains and carnal copulation is completed as before, except that male semen cannot be ejaculated.

Those who enact this law desire solely to impede defective offspring, namely offspring which is not desirable to the state. When an examination of the matter itself has been made, and a judgment has been delivered by a legal commission that there is no probability that this guilty person will reform himself, and that procreation on his part is desirable, it will be legal to perform that operation which impedes procreation. The other conditions having been posited, the operation is performed. We say that this law is unjust:

because 1st. it supposes that the offspring will most probably be defective. But this is not established. Rather let the state take care to exercise its own office and provide the aids of Christian education, and let it not claim for itself the right to render such criminals sterile, who in no few cases are defective because the state has neglected its own most sacred duties toward God, religion, and citizens.

2nd. In order that it be just for the state to defend itself, it ought to be immune from the guilt which is found in these persons, and the danger ought to be imminent. But today the state is often not immune; nor is the danger imminent, because the offspring does not even exist, and if it is educated Christianly the danger will very often be removed.

3rd. In this matter of avoiding inconveniences from defective offspring, that is licit to the state which is necessary for its conservation. But it is not necessary for the conservation of the state that this operation be done.

4th. If the guilty person is treated in a Christian manner, there seems always to be not only probability, but a great hope that he will reform himself. For how many exist who in this way have been brought back to better conduct.

5th. If vasectomy is considered as a punishment, it is in no way to be admitted. For the defensive reason of the death penalty and of every punishment is the same as that which the sanction of law essentially contains, namely a psychologically efficacious bond by which the free wills of subjects may restrain themselves voluntarily from transgression of the law; and this reason is altogether lacking in the case; indeed this operation gives occasion to these criminals for indulging in lust more licentiously, with every burden of offspring removed.

6th. It is altogether cruel and certainly unusual to leave to a man the organ itself, the same sexual desire, indeed the power of elaborating prolific semen and of exercising the same act, with only the end and completion of the act taken away, viz. ejaculation and the possibility of procreation on account of which the act was instituted by God. Now from the Constitution of the United States a cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted on no one. - American Eccles. Rev. vol. 42, 43, 44. - Razon y Fe, 27, 28, 31. - Nouvelle Rev. Theol. vol. 42, 43. - Collationes Brugenses, Vol. 17. Thus DeBecker, Ferreres, Lehmkuhl, Vermeersch, Wouters, Schmitt, and others commonly against some whose affirmative opinion, that it is licit for the state to prescribe that this operation be performed in men, whether guilty or innocent, we judge to enjoy no probability. Concerning the right of the state you should by all means see Lugo, De just. et jur., disp. 10, nn. 78, 104 and passim. - Molina, De just. et jur., v. 4, tr. 3, dis. 5, n. 3 and passim. The conclusion is the same concerning ovariotomy.

I say. It is licit for each person to defend his own life even with the killing of an unjust aggressor, provided nevertheless that the moderation of inculpable defense is preserved. The reason is taken both from canon law, chap. Si vero 8, de sent. excomm., where it is said: "All laws and all rights permit force to be repelled by force"; and from natural law. For since each person has the right to preserve his own life, he must also have the right of employing the means which are necessary for this end and not otherwise illicit. But to kill an unjust aggressor is sometimes the sole means of saving one's own life, nor through this are any certain rights of anyone violated; since the aggressor, by freely and unjustly bringing into danger the life of another, cannot retain the right to his own life against the certain right of an innocent person. Therefore.

Yet I added that the moderation of inculpable defense is to be preserved, or that nothing ought to be done against the life of the aggressor unless it is absolutely necessary for protecting one's own life, because what necessity does not excuse is contrary to justice. - Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 64, art. 7. - St. Alphonsus, n. 380.

Question 1. Is it licit to kill a drunken or insane aggressor?

Response. Affirmatively, more probably, unless it is clear to you that he is in the state of mortal sin. The reason is that although a drunken or insane person is not formally your unjust aggressor, nevertheless he is materially unjust, nor is your right to life lost through his drunkenness or insanity. But if you know certainly - which surely will be very rare - that he is in the state of mortal sin, from which after frenzy or drunkenness he will be able to rise again, while on the contrary you morally believe that you are in the state of grace, charity requires that you prefer his eternal salvation to your temporal life. Yet nothing prevents, even in that hypothesis, you from striking or wounding him in such a way that, his life being safe, he becomes unable to do harm. Cf. Lugo, de just. et jur., disp. 10, n. 143.

Question 2. Is it licit to defend goods of fortune of great moment with the killing of the thief, if otherwise they cannot be retained?

Response. Affirmatively, more probably, and the reason is that each person has the right of preserving goods of great moment, and by that very fact of employing the means absolutely necessary for this. Besides, the precept of charity does not oblige one to prefer the goods of a neighbor, though of a higher order, except when the neighbor is in extreme necessity, but not when he spontaneously exposes himself to the danger of death and injures the rights of another. By this same reason it is concluded that an unjust aggressor can be killed for the defense of members. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 383 and following.

Question 3. Is it licit for a woman to kill an assailant of chastity?

Response. Affirmatively, because chastity is a good more excellent than riches; and accordingly if it is licit to kill an unjust aggressor of goods of fortune, this will be licit a fortiori for preserving chastity. But a girl cannot kill an aggressor against her honor after violation, because this would be to take vengeance; nevertheless she can strike him and treat him most harshly, especially because, unless in such a way she shows her constancy and displeasure, the wicked man will not easily depart, or will easily be able to return to soliciting. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 386.

Question 4. Is it licit to kill an unjust aggressor against honor?

Response. Negatively, altogether, if the injury has already been inflicted, in whatever way it has been inflicted, whether by words or by deeds; because this would not be to defend oneself but to take vengeance, which is licit for no one. It is also clear from the second part of prop. 30 proscribed by Innocent XI, which has itself thus: "It is lawful for an honorable man to kill an assailant who attempts to inflict calumny, if otherwise this calumny cannot be avoided: the same also must be said if someone strikes with a slap or with a stick, and after the slap has been struck or the blow of the stick flees." - One must also respond negatively if it concerns preventing or repelling an injury of honor inflicted by words only, both because the injury can then and usually does get repelled by other means, and accordingly killing is not necessary, and because otherwise an entrance would lie open to innumerable slaughters. - Besides, prop. 17 condemned by Alexander VII bears on this point, which sounds thus: "It is licit for a Religious or Cleric to kill a calumniator threatening to spread grave crimes about him or about his Religion, when another mode of defending does not suffice, as it does not seem to suffice if the calumniator is prepared publicly and before most grave men to impute the aforesaid things either to the Religious himself or to his Religion, unless he is killed." - I said by words only, for if an aggressor against honor attempts to pull the beard, soil the clothes, or do something similar, it will certainly be licit, with the moderation of inculpable defense being preserved, to repel the injury, and if indeed the obstinate aggressor, having been repelled, employs force and seizes weapons, it will surely be licit to oppose weapons to weapons. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 381 and 391. - Viva, on the cited propositions. - Lacroix, lib. 3, p. 1, n. 803. - Baller., note (b) and (c), p. 378.

Question 5. Is it also licit to kill an unjust aggressor against one's neighbor?

Response. Affirmatively, in every case in which it is licit to defend one's own life or other goods of great moment: indeed it is not only licit, but it ought also to be done by reason of charity. Yet rarely does a private person seem to be bound to this, on account of the great inconveniences which such killing ordinarily brings with it, excluding the case in which the person attacked is very necessary to society, or joined very nearly to you by blood. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 389 and 390. Baller., note (c), p. 377.

I say. It is never licit directly to kill an innocent person, whether by private or by public authority. The reason is both because the killing of an innocent person is an action injurious to the rights of God, who alone has supreme dominion over life, and accordingly intrinsically evil; and because it is injurious to the right which the innocent person has to life; and because it is positively prohibited by God himself; for it is said, Exod. xxiii, 7: "The innocent and just person you shall not kill." But this does not prevent that sometimes an action of itself good or indifferent can be posited, from which the death of an innocent person follows beyond the intention, according to those things which were said concerning the indirectly voluntary in the treatise on human acts, nn. 8 and 9.

You Will Ask. Is it licit for the state to render an innocent man or woman sterile, either by performing vasectomy on a man or ovariotomy on a woman, precisely so that offspring may not be born?

Response. Negatively, because it is not licit to mutilate innocent persons even for saving the state: just as it is not licit for an individual to render himself sterile precisely for this end, that offspring may not be born, so neither is it licit for the state. Because this would be to rule subjects despotically and thus to invert the natural end of the state. The commonwealth cannot convert the life of its members to its own utility and consume it for the sake of its own utility, because citizens are not ordered for the commonwealth, but the commonwealth is ordered for citizens and for their utility and good. Namely, the subject is not a slave: the former is governed politically for the utility of the subject; the latter despotically for the utility of the master. Thus Lugo, disp. 10, 77, 104. Again: "it is licit for no one to violate with impunity the dignity of man, of which God himself disposes with great reverence." Leo XIII, Rerum Nov. Now to the dignity of man certainly belongs the generative power. Indeed not only is it not licit for the state to act thus, but on the contrary, for the protection of bodily goods, the state itself is bound by its own force; and it is necessary to rescue the wretched from the savagery of men. "Rights indeed, in whomever they are, are to be preserved sacredly, and that each one may hold his own, public authority ought to provide, by warding off and avenging injuries. Except that in protecting the rights of private persons, regard must especially be had for the weak and the needy." Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum. No law of men can take away from man the natural and primordial right of marriage or circumscribe in any manner whatsoever the principal cause of nuptials established in the beginning by the authority of God. "Increase and multiply" (Gen. i, 28). Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum. But those who wish this law to be enacted surely circumscribe that cause. Thus St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 104, a. 5: "Now man is bound to obey man in those things which are to be done outwardly through the body; in which, however, according to those things which pertain to the nature of the body, man is not bound to obey man, but only God, because all men are equal by nature; for example, in those things which pertain to the sustenance of the body and the generation of offspring." All such laws are unjust.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. It is not licit to kill those lethally wounded, nor any other dying persons, lest they suffer longer; because, according to the known saying, evils are not to be done to obtain a good.

2nd. It is not licit to kill an innocent person in order to satisfy a tyrant demanding his death, even under penalty of the overthrow of a city, and even if he himself consented to his own death: because he cannot properly consent, since he does not have dominion over his own life. Yet more probably he could be compelled to hand himself over to the tyrant for the public good, and probably, if he refused, even be handed over. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 393.

3rd. It is not licit to kill envoys or hostages, even if the enemies who sent them have not kept the pledge given, and have unjustly killed the hostages or envoys sent to them; because they are innocent. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.

Abortion is the expulsion of an immature fetus from the womb of the mother; but a fetus is called mature when, with no other danger supervening, it can live by itself, even if it comes forth into the light before the ninth month.

I say 1st. It is never licit directly to procure abortion, even if the fetus were supposed to be still inanimate. The reason is that if it is animated, it is homicide properly so called; but if it is not animated, it is anticipated homicide, because an inanimate fetus is ordered from its own nature to forming a man. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 394. - Lacroix, n. 823. - Kenrick, tract. 3, n. 127. And this which we say concerning the expulsion of an immature fetus from the womb is likewise to be said concerning the extraction of an immature ectopic fetus from the cavity of the mother.

The placenta, as must be noted, together with the umbilical cord, is the organ of nutrition of the fetus in the cavity of the mother. Any expulsion separating the fetus from the placenta and umbilical cord destroys the anatomical relations necessary for the very existence of the fetus; for the placenta can be considered as a certain intimate union between the vascular system of the mother and of the fetus. To destroy this union is to destroy the fetus itself.

To expel the fetus is not only to put it in another place, but is to destroy the marvelous mechanism which makes, between the fruit of the mother and the mother, an internal vital communication, and therefore to kill the infant itself. Nor should you say, in fact it will die; you say rightly, but this does not give the right to kill it. - Cf. Besson., Nouvelle Rev. Theol. v. 45, p. 154, where he sets forth the argument excellently.

I say 2nd. Sometimes it is licit indirectly to procure abortion, or better to permit it, namely by supplying to a mother laboring under a grave disease remedies harmful to the fetus, if the following conditions concur, namely: 1st. that it concern a lethal disease; 2nd. that the remedies, harmful to the fetus, be of themselves directly and immediately efficacious for curing the disease of the mother; 3rd. that the administration of the remedies not impede the conferral of baptism, because the spiritual life of the fetus prevails over the temporal life of the mother. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid. Lacroix, n. 826. - Kenrick, tract. 3, n. 128.

Question 1. What is to be said of the craniotomic operation, which many physicians nowadays employ to save the mother?

Response. An operation of this kind is true homicide, and accordingly always and intrinsically evil. For if, according to St. Thomas, "a man ought not to kill the mother in order to baptize the child," a fortiori the child ought not to be killed so that the temporal life of the mother may be saved.

Nor should you say that an obliquely positioned fetus, or one presenting too large a head, can be compared to an aggressor, at least materially unjust; for the response is that it is so disposed by the sole course of nature and accordingly can in no way be called an aggressor. Otherwise both the mother herself, in relation to the fetus, and those who labor under a contagious disease, in relation to those who are well, would have to be called aggressors, and accordingly it would have to be lawful to kill them.

Nor should you appeal to authority, because if this was hitherto doubtful and slight, now it certainly will be none in Catholic schools, since the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, on May 31, 1884, declared that the liceity of craniotomy cannot be safely taught. But recently, namely Aug. 19, 1889, it was signified to the professors of the medical faculty of the Catholic University of Lille: "In Catholic schools it cannot safely be taught that the surgical operation which they call craniotomy is licit ... and any surgical operation directly killing the fetus or the pregnant mother." Cf. St. Thomas, p. 3, q. 68, art. 11, ad 3. Kenrick, tract. 3, n. 128. - Analecta jur. Pont., fascicle 133, p. 547, May 1876. - Ciarmadori, Opusculum de craniotomia. - Nouvelle Revue Theologique, vol. 17, p. 13; vol. 16, pp. 95 and following; pp. 62 and following; pp. 293 and following; vol. 22, p. 74. Amer. Eccl. Review, vol. 9, pp. 360 and following, and vol. 23, pp. 128 and following.

Question 2. Whether at least it is licit to accelerate birth when otherwise the life of the mother would be brought into danger?

Response 1st. If this acceleration takes place after the seventh month, it is entirely licit; indeed by many it is said also to be worthy of praise; for it profits not only the mother, but also the fetus, which can then be judged mature. - Cf. O'Kane, n. 213. - Dublin Review, No. 87, art. Obstetric. Morality, p. 118.

Response 2nd. But if birth is accelerated during that period of gestation in which the fetus can in some way be cast forth alive, yet necessarily must afterward die because it has not yet arrived at substantial maturity, it must be said that such acceleration scarcely, or not even scarcely, differs from craniotomy, and therefore is altogether to be condemned. For in that case to extract the fetus from the womb, or from the cavity of the mother if the conception is ectopic, is an action killing by its own nature, not otherwise than withdrawing air from an adult.

Nor should you say that the death of the fetus follows only indirectly, from the fact that it itself is not touched but only the membranes by which it is enveloped are torn, or the fibers are relaxed, or from the fact that such expulsion is not intended as an end: for the response is that someone is directly killed whenever his death is taken up as a means, whatever may be the kind of action by which it is procured.

Nor should you say that the weight of authority can be brought in favor of this acceleration; for although St. Alphonsus says: "it is licit, with cold water, if another cannot be had, to baptize a child soon about to die, even if it were feared that from this death would be accelerated," he permits this only because "such an action does not tend to killing but to ablution." But other Doctors speak either of a drug given directly for curing the disease of the mother, as Cardinal de Lugo, or of an inanimate fetus which, erroneously indeed, some thought to be as a part of the viscera of the mother. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, de Sacram. Baptis., n. 106. Lugo, de just. et jur., disp. 10, n. 133. - Salmant., tract. 13, cap. 2, n. 60. - Crolly, vol. 3, nn. 118 and following. - This solution, which has always been certain to us, receives special strength from the notable Response of the Holy Office, which has itself thus:

"Stephen Mary Alphonsus Sonnois, Archbishop of Cambrai, most devotedly prostrate at the feet of Your Holiness, most humbly sets forth what follows:

"Titius, a physician, when he was called to a pregnant woman lying gravely ill, commonly observed that no other cause of the lethal disease was present except the pregnancy itself, that is, the presence of the fetus in the womb. Therefore, in order to save the mother from certain and imminent death, one way was at hand for him, namely that of procuring abortion or the expulsion of the fetus. He was accustomed to follow this way, yet using means and operations which, of themselves and immediately, indeed did not tend to this, that they should kill the fetus in the maternal cavity, but only that, if it could be done, it should be brought forth alive into the light; although very soon to die, since it was still altogether immature.

"Now indeed, after reading what the Holy See wrote back to the Archbishop of Cambrai on August 19, 1889: 'it cannot safely be taught that any operation directly killing the fetus is licit, even if this would be necessary for saving the mother,' Titius remains doubtful concerning the liceity of the surgical operations by which not rarely he had hitherto procured abortion, in order to save gravely sick pregnant women.

"Wherefore, that he may consult his conscience, Titius suppliantly asks whether he can safely undertake the stated operations in the aforementioned repeated circumstances.

Wednesday, July 24, 1895.

"In the General Congregation of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition, the above-written petition having been proposed, the Most Eminent and Reverend Lord Cardinals, General Inquisitors in matters of faith and morals, the vote of the Reverend Lord Consultors having first been had, decreed that the response should be: Negative, according to the other Decrees, namely of May 28, 1884 and August 19, 1888.

"But on the following Thursday, July 25, in the audience granted to the Reverend Father Lord Assessor, Our Most Holy Lord approved the resolution of the Most Eminent Fathers reported to Him.

L. + S. J. Mancini Can. Magnoni

Notary of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition."

And the subsequent decree solves various doubts concerning the liceity of acceleration of birth, of the Caesarean operation, and of laparotomy.

"The Bishop of Sinaloa, prostrate at the feet of Your Holiness, humbly asks the resolution of the following doubts:

"I. Will acceleration of birth be licit whenever from the narrowness of the woman the exit of the fetus at its natural time would become impossible?

"II. And if the narrowness of the woman be such that not even premature birth is judged possible, will it be licit to provoke abortion or to perform the Caesarean operation at its own time?

"III. Is laparotomy licit when it concerns extrauterine pregnancy, or ectopic conceptions?

Wednesday, May 4, 1898.

"In the General Congregation held by the Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lord Cardinals, General Inquisitors against heretical depravity, the above-written doubts having been proposed, and the vote of the Reverend Lord Consultors having first been had, the same Most Eminent and Most Reverend Fathers judged that it should be written back:

"To I. Acceleration of birth is not illicit of itself, provided it is performed for just causes and at that time and in those modes by which, according to ordinary contingencies, provision is made for the lives of the mother and the fetus.

"To II. As to the first part, negatively, according to the decree of Wednesday, July 24, 1895, concerning the illiceity of abortion: but as to the second, that nothing stands in the way that the woman in question be subjected to the Caesarean operation at its own time.

"To III. When necessity compels, laparotomy is licit for extracting ectopic conceptions from the cavity of the mother, provided that provision be made seriously and opportunely for the lives of both fetus and mother, as far as can be done."

"But on the following Friday, the 6th day of the same month and year, in the usual audience granted to the Reverend Father Lord Assessor of the Holy Office, a report concerning all these things having been made to Our Most Holy Lord Leo XIII, Pope by Divine Providence, His Holiness approved the responses of the Most Eminent and Most Reverend Fathers.

J. C. Mancini, Notary of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition."

To the Question: "Whether it is sometimes licit to extract from the cavity of the mother ectopic fetuses still immature, before the sixth month after conception has been completed?" the Holy Office responded on March 5, 1902:

"Negatively, according to the Decree of May 4, 1898, by virtue of which provision must be made seriously and opportunely, as far as can be done, for the lives of the fetus and mother; but as to the time, according to the same Decree let the Orator remember that no acceleration of birth is licit unless it is performed at a time and in modes by which, according to ordinary contingencies, provision is made for the lives of the mother and the fetus."

Question 3. What is to be answered practically to those who question confessors about this matter?

Response. The whole truth must be manifested with a courageous spirit, if the question is made in good faith, and the person who questions is foreseen to wish to acquiesce; otherwise it is better to be silent and to permit only the material evil.

Question 4. Is it licit for a girl, immediately after fornication, to take a drug for expelling an inanimate fetus, lest she be killed by her father or lose her reputation?

Response. Negatively, altogether, both because this would be directly to procure abortion, and because it was condemned by Innocent XI in prop. 34, which has itself thus: "It is licit to procure abortion before the animation of the fetus, lest a girl, detected as pregnant, be killed or disgraced." - But those women who immediately after freely had copulation wash themselves to expel the semen lest they conceive, although they do not seem to be condemned for abortion, both because semen as soon as it is received cannot be called a fetus, and because that means does not seem efficacious, nevertheless would sin most gravely by another kind of sin, namely of onanism, or of frustrated nature.¹

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1087, n. 4.

Question 5. Would women violated by force be condemned in the same way if they attempted immediately and altogether, without any interval at all, to reject the received semen by washing themselves?

Response. Negatively, at least probably, and the reason is that it is licit to repel force unjustly inflicted as long as the infliction itself morally perseveres. - Cf. Lehmkuhl, vol. 1, n. 849.

Question 6. What if the very uterus of the pregnant mother is infected with a lethal disease?

Response. It is licit, as it seems to us, to remove the uterus, and although by that very fact the fetus dies, nevertheless the extraction itself of the uterus has a double effect, a good one, the health of the mother, and an evil one, the death of the infant. It is like the case of procuring indirect abortion, which, as we have seen, is licit under given conditions.

Question 7. Is it licit in any case to place an action having death alone as its effect, e.g., to kill a fetus by an electric needle?

Response. Negatively: for such an action is intrinsically evil. And hence for this reason it is not licit to destroy an ectopic fetus.

Question 8. What is to be said in doubt whether that which a woman carries is a fetus or rather a tumor, e.g., in ectopic cases?

Response. It seems it must be said that if the physician, truly and sincerely, after investigation has been made, doubts, and the mother is placed in danger of life, it is licit to remove that thing. For the mother is in possession; her right is certain, nor would men, with the principles of natural law considered, force this mother to undergo this death; in other words, it is not known whether that thing is the subject of a right, and it seems cruel to prefer it to the pregnant woman. But if it is established that a fetus is present, its right must be held equally certain, nor is it licit to perform the operation until it is morally known that death has occurred. In judging all these operations, the principle often stated must be kept before the eyes, namely concerning an indifferent or good action with a double effect, good and evil. - Cf. above, n. 8. Evils are not to be done that good things may come about. Finally: nor are means to be employed which tend directly to the killing of the fetus, and by which, when they have been employed, the evil effect, in certain cases, has the good as its immediate effect. - Cf. Response of the Holy Inquisition, July 24, 1895, concerning Titius, the Physician, n. 273.

You Will Resolve. - A pregnant woman is at the point of becoming blind, insane, or paralytic; pregnancy is the cause of the insanity, etc.; the fetus is not viable. A surgeon cannot advise abortion, nor does he have the right of extracting the fetus from the cavity of the mother. In the same circumstances a non-viable fetus is at the point of dying, indeed has entered into agony. There is besides a danger lest the infirmity of the mother become incurable, or there is some other grave motive. It is not licit for the surgeon to perform an operation by which the death of the infant is more quickly induced for improving the condition of the mother: i.e. the quicker death of the fetus is not to be employed as a means for the safety of the mother: the infant will die, but this does not give the right to kill him.

A woman carries her fruit, but the fetus is extrauterine. While the physician performs a grave operation upon her, he notices the abnormal seat of the pregnancy. He also understands that the fetus is viable. It seems to us that it must be said that the surgeon can licitly, for grave causes in this case, extract that viable extrauterine fetus, even if it has not yet attained the normal term of fetal life, provided that, using the operation begun for another end, he does not perform upon the fetus any death-dealing act.

A woman is pregnant, but the fetus is extrauterine. While the physician performs a grave operation upon her, he notices the abnormal seat of the pregnancy; the fetus is alive, but not viable. The surgeon cannot bring forth the fetus from the cavity of the mother, because this action would kill the fetus. The mother is at the point of dying from hemorrhage or eclampsia and the fetus is viable. Certainly artificial birth can be induced, provided that by this operation provision is made for the life of the mother and of the infant. But this birth cannot be so induced that the death of the infant is the natural effect of the operation and the means for removing the urgent danger of the woman in labor; i.e. it is not licit to kill the fetus in order to save the mother. The mother is at the point of dying; the fetus is viable. The mother is in agony and few moments of living remain to her, but the fetus probably will live beyond an hour. It is not licit for the surgeon, in order that the infant be brought forth into the light under better conditions, to perform an operation which by its own nature would kill the mother, so that her death would be the means of improving the condition of the infant.

The mother is at the point of dying. The proximate cause of death is hemorrhage, eclampsia, or another disease arising from pregnancy. The fetus is not viable. It is not licit to procure abortion nor to advise it. In the same circumstances, a fetus not yet viable is destined to imminent death. Besides, it has already entered into agony while several hours of probable life remain to the mother. It is not licit for the surgeon to perform an operation tending directly to the very death of the fetus, as a means for placing the mother in a better condition: in other words, it is not licit to procure abortion so that the mother may be saved.

A pregnant mother is at the point of becoming blind, or paralytic, or insane, or infirm in some other way. The cause of the blindness, paralysis, etc., is pregnancy. The fetus is viable. Certainly the surgeon can advise premature artificial birth, provided that provision is made for the lives of both mother and fetus. But in the same circumstances, on account of the imminent danger lest the infirmity of the mother become incurable, there does not belong to the surgeon the right of employing a means which by its own nature determines the death of the infant, so that premature birth may be induced.

That operation is called Caesarean by which the uterus of the mother is cut so that the infant may be extracted. Not rarely it happens that the fetus, on account of the narrowness of the mother, cannot be brought forth by the natural way; in this case either the mother is to be cut, or both she and he are to be left to the course of nature. Therefore the question is about section in these most grave circumstances. These things seem to be established. 1st. The operation is never licit if the incision would be killing of the mother, because it is not licit to kill the mother so that the infant may be baptized. 2nd. It is never licit if, while the mother is living, the infant outside the uterus probably at least could not live. For this would be to kill the offspring. 3rd. While the mother is living, it can licitly be done when these conditions have been verified: 1) that the mother cannot give birth naturally, or is about to die before birth with the greatest danger of the death of the infant before he can be baptized; and 2) that from the incision there does not arise for the mother a proximate danger of death. 4th. While the mother is living, the operation ought to be done if it is certainly established that the infant cannot be baptized unless the operation is done. But the greatest prudence is needed in imposing this obligation, lest the mother, abhorring such an incision, make shipwreck of both her own and her offspring's eternal salvation, dying in a state of mortal sin, good faith having been changed into bad faith. 5th. The mother is not bound to undergo the operation when baptism can be conferred upon the infant in the womb with solid probability, which can often be done; nor is she bound when she alone is about to perish; nor, if there is probable hope that the offspring will survive her once she has died, and therefore can be baptized; nor is the mother bound to permit the operation for preserving the temporal life of the infant; nor in uncertainty of a happy outcome. But if, 6th, the case is as it were desperate and it is certain that mother and offspring are about to die, in these most difficult circumstances the operation is licit, provided that from it there arise some probability of saving both mother and offspring; for thus provision is made for the life of both this one and that one in the best way possible.

If a pregnant mother has died, let the fetus be extracted as soon as possible, cautiously, and, if it is alive, let it be baptized: Rit. Rom. tit. II, cap. 1, n. 17. Therefore as soon as the mother is dead, the operation can licitly be done. Indeed, the mother being dead, the operation also ought to be done, for there is a grave obligation by reason of the office of assisting a neighbor placed in extreme necessity: Holy Inq., Feb. 15, 1780. The section must be done with careful solicitude, lest the mother, being only apparently dead, be killed, or lest the offspring die. What must be said concerning the duty of the parish priest or missionary is clear from the response of the Holy Inquisition given on Dec. 13, 1899, first commemorating the decree of Feb. 15, 1780: "This extraction of the fetus from the womb of the pregnant and deceased mother, although it is to be made known and urged, nevertheless His Holiness expressly cautions and prohibits that missionaries involve themselves in particular cases in ordering the section, much less in performing it. Therefore it will have been enough for missionaries to have published knowledge of it and to have taken care that those laymen who apply themselves to surgery learn thoroughly the manner of performing it; and then, when the case occurs, to have left the practice of the same to their burden and duty."

Dueling, properly so called, is a dangerous fight of two persons according to a previous agreement concerning place, time, and weapons.

I say. Dueling undertaken by private authority can never be licit; because not only is it repugnant to natural right, since God has given to none of men dominion over his own life or that of another, nor over members, outside the case of defense against an actual aggressor; but also to canon law, as is clear from Trent, sess. 25, cap. 19, where dueling is called: "A detestable usage, introduced by the devising of the devil." - I said private, because if it is undertaken by public authority for the common good, e.g., so that war may be settled, it will certainly be licit no otherwise than war. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 399 and 400.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. Certainly, practically speaking, there can be dispute concerning the conditions of a duel, all of which are required for the whole malice of the act and the incurring of penalties; but never concerning a cause which could legitimate the provocation or acceptance of it, since it is something intrinsically evil. Wherefore, once the existence of a duel has been proved in some particular case, no reason, however grave, will ever excuse.

2nd. It is not licit to undertake a duel by this rule, that when one person has been wounded, or a certain number of blows has been completed, the fight should cease; both because Clement VIII prohibited even non-fatal duels, and because those acting thus implicitly admit any outcome whatsoever of the fight and consequently contract the whole malice of dueling.

3rd. But it is licit to fight for mere defense, even by accepting weapons from the adversary, if death is threatened by him unless the fight is accepted, and there is not another way of escaping this danger; but it is not licit to betake oneself to another place, or to appoint another determined time for defense; because then a duel properly so called would be had.

4th. Those who, on account of an injury, suddenly growing hot with anger, and provoking one another to a fight, immediately come together, do not enter into a duel properly so called; because it is more truly a brawl than a duel, which must be done from an agreement concerning place and time. - Sacred Congregation, Oct. 5, 1744. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 401.

It is useful here to report the five propositions concerning dueling condemned by Benedict XIV in the year 1752, in the Const. Detestabilem. They are the following:

1st. "A military man who, unless he offers or accepts a duel, would be held as fearful, timid, abject, and unfit for military duties, and thence would be deprived of the office by which he sustains himself and his own, or would have to be perpetually without hope of promotion otherwise due and merited by him, would be free from guilt and penalty, whether he offers or accepts the duel."

2nd. "Those accepting a duel, or provoking to it, can be excused, even for the sake of protecting honor or avoiding human contempt, when they know certainly that the fight will not follow, since it is to be impeded by others."

3rd. "A leader or officer of the military accepting a duel from grave fear of loss of reputation or office does not incur the ecclesiastical penalties laid against duelists."

4th. "It is licit in the state of nature of man to accept and offer a duel for preserving fortunes with honor, when the loss of them cannot be repelled by another remedy."

5th. "The asserted license for the natural state can also be applied to the state of a badly ordered commonwealth, in which, namely, either by negligence or by the malice of the magistrate, justice is openly denied."

War is a fight of a multitude against a foreign multitude, for the sake of defending or vindicating the commonwealth. Hence it differs: 1st. from a brawl, which is a fight of a few against a few, and without authority, nor undertaken for the good of the commonwealth; 2nd. from sedition, which is a tumult or conflict of a multitude against the political society to which it belongs.

I say 1st. War is licit of itself, whether for repelling injury or for vindicating one's own right. The reason is that any society independent from another society ought to have a means of protecting itself against injury and of vindicating its own right; but sometimes no other means is available for obtaining this end except war. For since higher tribunals are lacking to which nations or Princes may have recourse, it remains only that, in order to obtain satisfaction from another society, they use war. - Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 40, art. 1.

I say 2nd. For a just and licit war, the following are necessarily required: 1st. legitimate authority, that is, supreme authority, acknowledging no other superior in civil matters, and the reason is that where a greater authority is had, this authority ought to judge concerning the dispute; 2nd. a just and grave cause, which is preponderant over the inconveniences that will follow from the war, e.g., a kingdom or province to be recovered, or a grave injury to the commonwealth to be repelled, or a rebellion of subjects to be repressed, etc.; 3rd. the due mode of waging war, namely that before war condign satisfaction be required from the adverse party; and if this is offered, it ought to be accepted as a matter of justice; for where war ceases to be necessary, it also ceases to be just. - Cf. St. Thomas, ibid.

You Will Ask. Can soldiers wage war with doubt concerning the justice of the war?

Response. If it concerns a subject soldier, or even a soldier hired before the war was declared, he can, indeed he ought to obey where the war is not evidently unjust, because in doubt one must stand for the superior. But if it concerns a soldier not yet hired, he is bound to inquire concerning the justice of the war, nor can he hire himself out in doubt concerning its justice. The reason is that no one can cooperate toward despoiling someone of a thing which he possesses, unless he is certain that it is unjustly possessed by him. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 408.¹

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1112, n. 58.

strike no one, wound no one; but because he knew that when they did these things as soldiers they were not homicides, but ministers of the law, and not avengers of their own injuries, but defenders of the public safety: he answered them: shake no one down, etc.; but be content with your wages.

John the Baptist was certainly speaking on behalf of men even of the New Testament; for he was the precursor of Christ.

IT IS PROVED secondly from the Heroes, praised in Scripture as saints, who waged wars: thus Abraham, Moses, Josue, Gedeon, Sampson, David, Josias, the Machabees, and others.

IT IS PROVED thirdly from holy Pontiffs, who praised wars waged by Christians, or urged that they be waged: Damasus, in Theodorus book 5, chapter 10; Gregory book 1, epistle 72; Chrysostom on Psalm 45; Nazianzen oration 3, on peace; Ambrose book 1 of Offices, chapters 40 and 41; Jerome on Micheas 4; see the Holy Doctor in the sermons of the Hexaemeron.

IT IS PROVED by reason, D. Bonaventure at the place cited, drawing on Aristotle 7 Politics, chapter 14, and D. Augustine epistle 207: because peace is necessary to the human commonwealth, that we and ours may have the means of living; but this is often impeded by acts of violence, which cannot otherwise be repelled than by war; and it is a law of nature that we repel violence, whence the opposing arguments collapse.

The Holy Doctor confirms all this on Luke 6, in these words: and he who strikes you on the cheek, etc., from D. Augustine book 1 of the City of God, chapter 21, where he says, expounding that precept: Thou shalt not kill: Against this precept they did not act who, by God's authority, waged wars, or who, bearing the person of public power, and according to its laws — that is, by the most just command of reason — punished criminals with death.

It is confirmed from the chapter Fortitudo 23, question 3, which is by D. Ambrose book 1 of Offices, chapter 27: Fortitude, which either defends the fatherland from barbarians in war, or at home defends the weak, or one's companions from robbers, is full of justice.

YOU WILL OBJECT first. It was said in Isaias 2 and Micheas 4 that wars are to be put away in the time of grace.

IT IS ANSWERED with D. Ambrose on Psalm 45 and D. Jerome on chapter 4 of Micheas, that what was foretold was the peace to come in the whole world at the time of Christ's advent, so that it might be prepared to receive the Gospel.

YOU OBJECT secondly that in the Gospel it is commanded: Matth. 5. Whoever strikes you on one cheek, offer him the other also. Matth. 26. Whoever takes up the sword shall perish by the sword. Rom. 12. Rendering to no one evil for evil.

IT IS ANSWERED from D. Augustine epistle 5 to Marcellinus, that this is forbidden lest it be done by private authority.

TAKE NOTE that in the Council of Nicaea, canon 11, those are condemned who, after first laying down the military belt lest they sacrifice to idols, returned again as a dog to its vomit, serving Pagan Emperors, Diocletian, Licinius, and others, who all dishonored the military belt of Christians unless they sacrificed to idols.

Some Fathers indeed condemn only unjust wars, or those which are occasions of sinning proximately, or dissuade men in religious orders, or urge them to enter religion, etc.

From these you have that wars even against the Turks are lawful; for if God uses the Turks for our exercise, he also uses pestilence and famine, and yet we are bound to defend ourselves, lest they overwhelm the Christian world with superstitious clouds. See Valentia at the place cited and Bellarmine, chapter 16. For the Turks are unjust possessors of Christian kingdoms.

Most excellently, after D. Augustine book 22 against Faustus, chapter 74, and epistles 5 and 207, the following wrote on this matter: D. Thomas here; Alensis part 3, question 76, member 3; Gandavus quodlibet 15, question 16; Gabriel book 4, distinction 15, question 4; Victoria relectio on the Law of War; Castro book 2 on the just punishment of heretics, chapter 14; Covarruvias relectio on the chapter Peccatum, on the rules of law, part 2, §§ 9 and 10; Bellarmine book 3 on the Morals of the Church, chapter 14; Bannes, Cajetan, and other Thomists here; Valentia question 16, point 1; Tannerus disputation 2, question 6, dubium 3; Sylvester and other Summists, under the word Bellum. The Canonists question 23, qq. 1, 2 and 3; and D. Bonaventure in the Mirror of the Soul, chapter 1, at the end, and in the Bible of the Poor, chapter 82, where from the Scriptures he gathers wondrous examples, outstandingly proving that the integrity and prayers of the Saints contribute more to victory than arms.

FIRST, then, the Holy Doctor requires three conditions for a just war in the Mirror of the Soul, chapter 1, from D. Augustine. The first is legitimate authority. So D. Augustine at the place cited, against Faustus, chapter 74. The second is a just cause; so D. Augustine question 10 on Josue. The third is a right intention; so D. Augustine epistle 207.

AS TO the first condition, only the Prince, or the Republic, ruling absolutely, can declare offensive war. Hence Princes who are parts of some whole dominion cannot do so: so Molina disputation 100, Tannerus number 30, and the common view. For defensive war, however, all peoples and Magistrates are admitted, because anyone may repel force with force.

AS TO the second, the cause must be against an enemy unjustly and gravely injuring, as D. Augustine admonishes at the place cited. I shall set out, moreover, the specific injuries for which war may be declared, which D. Bonaventure relates in the Bible of the Poor, chapter 82.

THE FIRST is if what is owed is denied: thus the sons of Israel made war on the Amorrhites, because they denied them an unmolested passage Num. 21, and D. Augustine notes this question 43 on the Book of Numbers.

NOR indeed did Julius Caesar have a just cause, on the ground that the Romans denied access to the city, as Alphonsus a Castro thinks book 2 on the penal law, chapter 14, and Covarruvias at the place cited, § 9: for he was bound to lay down his arms at the Rubicon, since he was a subject of the Republic commanding it. Nor is just war made against the Indians on the ground that they deny free access to their provinces. So Molina disputation 105, Tannerus number 34 — provided, however, they do not resist the preaching of the faith.

THE SECOND cause is for recovering one's own possessions. Thus David fought against Isboseth, 2 Reg. 2.

THE THIRD cause is to resist invaders of the Republic. Thus the Jews often fought against the Philistines, and the Machabees against Antiochus and Demetrius.

THE FOURTH, if they render aid to unjust enemies; thus David fought against Syria of Damascus, because it brought aid to Adarezer, 2 Reg. 8.

THE FIFTH, to avenge a public injury. Thus David fought against Hannon, who had dismissed the messengers with contempt, 2 Reg. 10.

THE SIXTH, against rebellious subjects, thus David 2 Reg. 20. Hence D. Gregory infers that war against pertinacious heretics is just, book 1 of the Register, chapter 72.

THE SEVENTH, if some defend public malefactors, as D. Augustine teaches, question 10 on Josue; thus in Judges 20 the Hebrews fought against the Benjamites, their own fellow-citizens.

THE EIGHTH, on account of a violated pact; you have an example in Jotham and Josaphat, 4 Reg. 3. Therefore the sole cause of a just war is injury — to be repelled by the right of defense, or compensated by the right of commutative justice, or avenged by the right of vindicative justice — and that, when due satisfaction is not otherwise rendered. So all agree with D. Augustine book 22 against Faustus, chapter 74.

Making war, however, against infidels not baptized, Castro and others approve; but the common opinion is that it is not lawful; for no Prince has a right to this except as a member of the Church, which has no right over those not subject to it.

The Archbishop of Valencia relates in his History of America that not a few armies of Christian warfare went astray in this, who, making war upon the most wretched Indians for the sake of winning them to religion, utterly destroyed that people even to extermination: the Gospel surely does not command that nations be destroyed with such savagery, but that they be redeemed with supreme humanity and patience; it would rather be fitting to spend one's own blood on their behalf by labor and long-suffering preaching than to draw their blood off into streams; for the Apostles, Christ commands, are to be as sheep, handing them not a savage sword, but the sword of the tongue — namely, the word of God, which is more penetrating than every two-edged sword.

One who makes a just war, however, CAN call others to his aid and partnership in the war; for so the Machabees demanded the alliance of the Romans, as Tannerus notes number 52; so also everywhere among the nations, while wars are waged, we have it as established that this is done. Yet I do not refuse that where the scandal of the Christian name threatens, it is not lawful; so Molina disputation 112, Azor tomus 1, book 8, chapter 25, question 14, and Tannerus as above.

But since the necessity of the one calling them is so well known that he is recognized as compelled to do so for his own defense, not to the injury of the faith, no one will deny that scandal will arise from it for anyone. By this is clear the answer to what Valentia objects disputation 3, question 16, point 2.

One CAN also lay ambushes, and is not bound to announce the battle beforehand, as the Holy Doctor notes in the Bibliotheca, chapter 82, which he proves by the examples of Abraham Genesis 14; Josue 8 and 10; and of Gedeon, Judith 8. So Tannerus.

In doubt, however, about the just cause, the condition of the possessor is the better one, as is commonly taught, according to Valentia. Nevertheless it is reasonable also to satisfy even the adverse party, as Victoria notes number 28, Molina disputation 103, Valentia question 16, point 2, Tannerus number 41.

TAKE NOTE, moreover, that a just cause once recognized does not mean war is at once to be declared, but satisfaction must first be sought, as is had in Deuteron. 20; otherwise the undertaking will be against justice, and consequently with guilt and the obligation of restitution. So Bannes dubium 8, Tannerus numbers 32 and 51, Valentia point 2, at the end.

If, however, neither party is in legitimate possession, the thing must be divided or done by the other according to the reasons, in proportion to compensation. See Tannerus number 43.

AS TO intention, it is so necessary that if the other conditions are present but this one is lacking, it does not give rise to the necessity of restitution. So, from the common view, Cajetan teaches, Bannes here, Valentia point 2, Molina tomus 1 on justice, disputation 123, Tannerus dubium 2, number 28.

War can indeed be just on both sides per accidens, if on one side there is invincible ignorance, in which way the wars of the Amorrhites with Israel seem to have been, as Tostatus teaches on Josue 10; and then, once the truth is recognized, they are bound to withdraw and restore those things that still survive, and by which they have been made richer; as Valentia notes. But Princes must first consult the learned; otherwise, in a matter of the gravest moment, they expose themselves to the danger of guilt. So Victoria on the law of war, number 20, Valentia question 16, point 2, Molina disputation 109, Tannerus disputation 2, question 6, dubium 4, number 37.

BEYOND the conditions stated, to the substance of a just war there follows the manner of conducting it. First, indeed, in the damages to be inflicted: necessary reaction is indeed allowed, both to repair the damages inflicted and to establish peace; yet not all excesses are allowed — for instance, to kill innocents, such as women and infants, as is decreed in Exodi 23, Deuteron. 20. But if God at some time commanded that even women and infants be killed — Josue 6, in Jericho; 1 Reg. 15, against Amalech — there was a special cause by the will of the supreme Lord. So Molina, Valentia, Victoria, according to Tannerus number 66.

BEYOND children and women, however, others must be presumed innocent, as is had in the chapter Innovamus, on truce and peace, from Alexander III: Innovamus, that Priests, monks, conversi, pilgrims, merchants, rustics, those going and returning, and the animals with which they plough and carry seed to the field, be let be with fitting service. To these are added Legates or Orators, in the chapter Paternarum 24, question 3. See there.

It would nevertheless be lawful per accidens, if the citadel could not otherwise be stormed, and that storming would bring very great advantage. So Tannerus number 67, with Victoria.

I. Hitherto of restitution in general: now restitution in particular is to be treated; and first of all restitution on account of voluntary homicide, in which two losses can be regarded. The first is the taking away of life or of members; the other is that which follows upon the privation of life or the mutilation of members. He who voluntarily snatches away another's life injures commutative justice — for the discourse is not now of mutilation or homicide which follows upon necessary defence. But life once snatched away, or a member cut off, cannot be rendered back. What therefore is to be done, that injured justice may be repaired? If the judge punish the slayer or mutilator, no other satisfaction is required: since the judge commands that all the losses which are to be repaired in justice be repaired. It is disputed therefore concerning what is to be restored by a slayer or mutilator not punished by a just judge.

II. QUESTION I. Is a slayer or mutilator bound to compensate a personal injury with goods of fortune? ANSWER. There is a twofold opinion. One denies that anything is to be restored on account of a personal injury, that is, on account of the mere taking away of life or the mutilation of a member. The other opinion, which is the more probable, affirms it. Because he who kills, mutilates, or injures another violates commutative justice. Therefore this justice ought to be repaired by that way which is possible. But although life or a cut-off member cannot be rendered back, it can nevertheless in some manner be compensated with goods of fortune. He who owes to restore a thousand, but can only a hundred, will he be free from the restitution of a part, because he cannot render the whole? As regards practice therefore, it is the confessor's part to hand down that a homicide or mutilator, besides the compensation both of ceasing gain and of emerging loss to be made to the heirs, should bestow something for the life or member taken away, should take care that sacrifices be offered and alms laid out, and should study to console and help with all his might the whole family of the slain or mutilated man.

III. QUESTION II. What losses ought a slayer to compensate? ANSWER. All the losses which follow from the killing or mutilation are to be made good. There are to be compensated the expenses of the cure, and all the gains which the slain or mutilated man could have obtained by his art, trade, or industry, when there are sons, or sisters, a wife, and other relations who suffer such losses from the killing or mutilation. But if there be no one who suffers loss, nothing is to be restored. Authors dispute how many years of life are to be reckoned in the slain man. To settle the matter in few words, all these things are to be subjected to the judgment of prudent men. Killings among nobles are wont to be made good by no compensation. If a homicide should pay the penalty of retaliation, the heirs would be liable to no restitution, because when the penalty of death is inflicted all things are reckoned remitted: so the common custom obtains. If anywhere an opposite reasonable usage prevail, it is to be observed.

IV. If one provoked to a fight kill the provoker with the moderation of a blameless defence, he is bound to restore nothing. But if he had gravely exceeded the limits of moderation, then he would owe to restore in proportion. If they have mutually provoked one another, nothing is to be restored, because each yielded his right. If one has provoked the other by casting up the mark of cowardice, the provoked slayer is not held to restitution, say many of the younger authors: because he could not refuse the duel without disgrace. This reason seems to me to fight with the Gospel. Wherefore to me the following opinion of Fr. Viva is false, unless all things deceive me, who in Vol. III, part 3, question 7, article 1, no. 2, says: “Although he sometimes sins by not fleeing against charity, if namely he could flee without loss of honour, yet he does not sin against justice. Therefore he is not held to restitution.” What? Does a Christian sin against charity when he cannot flee without loss of worldly honour, and yet not sin against justice? But who would not disapprove this doctrine? For he is bound to take to flight, while the way lies open, with the loss of that honour which is set in the opinion of a raving world.

V. QUESTION III. Whether from casual homicide there arises a debt of restitution? ANSWER. Titius wounded Sempronius with a wound by no means mortal: by the negligence of a surgeon or physician Sempronius dies. Titius is bound to compensate the losses which follow not upon the death but upon the wound. If nevertheless Sempronius die of the wound received because a surgeon is not found, Titius the wounder is bound to compensate the losses which follow the death. From homicide following by accident nothing is to be restored. A cleric exercises forbidden hunting, uses all diligence that he may avoid a homicide: if this follow, he is bound to restore nothing. If on the contrary the homicide followed from gravely culpable negligence, then all the losses would be to be restored.

VI. QUESTION IV. To whom is restitution of the losses which follow from homicide to be made? ANSWER. It is to be made to the heirs — not to the free heirs, but to the necessary. Brothers and blood-relations, though they succeed ab intestato, are not necessary heirs, and consequently to them no restitution is to be made. Wives, sons, and parents are necessary heirs, to whom restitution is to be made.

VII. Moralists disagree whether a homicide is bound to pay the debts of the slain man to his creditors. The more common opinion denies it, since no action is given to the creditors against the slayer or mutilator in the exterior forum, nor even in the interior. The circumstances nevertheless are to be regarded, and the counsels of wise men to be heard, when like cases occur, that in most grave delicts that which is just may be determined.

VIII. If a wounded lord be absolved, and before he dies remit, together with the injury done him, also the losses to be made good, the slayer is free from restitution. For the rest, although a wounded man be bound to remit every injury done him and to love his wounder, he is nevertheless not obliged to remit the losses thence emerging; nay, if his wife, sons, grandsons, or parents should be gravely in need, he would sin against charity if with so great a cost and detriment to his own he condoned the losses.

IX. QUESTION V. What ought a deflowerer of a maiden to restore? ANSWER. Authors commonly absolve a deflowerer from restitution when the maiden consented spontaneously, and is her own mistress. The civil laws appoint that a ravisher either endow or marry the maiden ravished, because they always presume that she was seduced by blandishments and fraud. And indeed in practice a ravisher is scarcely to be absolved except from marrying or endowing the maiden. The circumstances nevertheless are to be regarded. If the defloration be public, accomplished by threats or fraud, then not only is the stain of corrupted virginity to be compensated, but also the mark of infamy inflicted upon her parents. A deflowerer is not bound to give a whole dowry, but to increase the dowry to be given by the parents. If nevertheless the deflowered woman be poor, then a whole dowry is to be given by the ravisher. If a doubt occur whether the maiden had been previously deflowered, the safer part is to be chosen, because no one is presumed wicked unless it be proved. Wherefore even in a doubtful case the losses are to be compensated. Nay, if in fact she was not a virgin, but was nevertheless so reputed, and the ravisher defamed her, then the losses are to be compensated. But if from such intercourse she suffered no infamy, nothing is owed to be restored. The same which has been said of a maiden is to be said of an honourable widow.

X. If by entreaties, blandishments, and little gifts alone he draw a maiden into consent, authors commonly teach that he is held to nothing, as has been said, because all these do not take away liberty. If nevertheless the entreaties were so repeated, and the blandishments so assiduous, that they were equivalent to violence, then the losses would be to be compensated. Whosoever has deflowered a maiden under hope of marriage is bound to marry her, because this contract is onerous and binds both parties, even if the promise were feigned. For although a contract concerning a shameful thing be null, the penalty of the crime committed is nevertheless to be undergone.

XI. These things are absolutely true: but for the rest, if the girls of our time be regarded, they are not seldom so shameless, so stripped of modesty, so brazen, crafty, and bold, that they themselves attack young men and men, and they themselves circumvent, bewitch, and craze them with their blandishments and tricks, either to plunder their purse or to draw them into matrimony. Wherefore, for the repressing of so great an audacity of girls, a law ought to be established that the deflowered should mourn their ravished virginity in perpetuity. This is always to be held before the eyes, that maidens modest, bashful, lovers of solitude, and fleeing the meetings and conversation of youths and men, are violated by no one. If therefore they themselves are forward, and hawkers of their own virginity, that others may learn, they ought to be punished as a public example, not endowed; especially if the deflowerers be of a nobler and higher estate. This nevertheless I submit here to the judgment and decision of prudent men, that that may be determined which is expedient for the public good.

XII. QUESTION VI. What is to be restored on account of adultery from which offspring follows? ANSWER. When from certain signs it is evidently established that the offspring was conceived from union with the adulterer — either because the husband was absent, or because he was sick, or because he was impotent — then all the losses are to be compensated which the husband has suffered from the third year of age in rearing the boy: for in the first three years the mother, but afterwards until the time at which the son can provide for himself, the father is bound to feed the son. What if a doubt occur whose the offspring is? Some, resting upon that axiom, the condition of the possessor is the better, deny the debt of restitution.

XIII. What seem to me the more probable are the following. When the adulterer and the adulteress have perpetrated the adultery by mutual consent, both are held in proportion to feed the boy and to compensate the losses to the husband or his lawful heirs: if one fail, the other is held in solidum. On the contrary, if the adulterer provoked the adulteress, and drew her into adultery by blandishments and little gifts, then the adulterer alone, as the principal cause, is liable to compensation. The adulterer failing, nevertheless, the adulteress is held. When it is doubted whose the offspring is, then judgment is to be made in favour of the marriage. But if the doubt persist, and reasons equally probable or more probable persuade that the offspring is spurious, I should judge that compensation is to be made in proportion to the doubt.

XIV. When an adulteress admits two men, one after the other, and it is unknown whose the offspring is, who of these is held to compensation, when it is established that the offspring was conceived by the work of one or the other? De Lugo, López, Trullench, Sánchez, Soto, and others free both; this opinion the Salmanticenses and Cardinal Cozza also defend. This opinion is to me improbable. What? It is certain that one or the other is the true parent, and both shall go free! If each perpetrated adultery, each ought to undergo the penalty. If each had attempted homicide, though it were unknown which of them had in fact perpetrated the homicide, in what forum would each go free? Each perpetrated adultery, each exercised the procreative action. Therefore neither is innocent, although one begot the son. Therefore each is bound in proportion to feed the son and to compensate the losses. The arguments of the opposite opinion do not press. They would have him innocent who did not beget. But how innocent, if he committed adultery and posited the generative action? There are therefore two guilty. Therefore both are to be punished: both ought to concur in making good the losses; and one failing, the other is held in solidum.

XV. QUESTION VII. An adulterer knowing for certain that offspring was procreated from his adultery, what is he bound to render to the lawful sons? ANSWER. Diana, Henríquez, Soto, Ledesma, and others contend that an adulterer is not bound to compensate the losses which the lawful sons undergo in the portion of the inheritance or of the legacies which the spurious son receives, when he did not persuade the substitution of the spurious son. This opinion is commonly disapproved; and they teach that both the adulterer and the adulteress ought to compensate all the losses which come to the lawful sons by reason of the spurious son, even if the adulterer did not persuade the substitution. Since each was the cause why the spurious son is reputed lawful: therefore each is subject to the reparation of the losses. First therefore each ought to use all diligence that the losses of the lawful offspring be avoided, while this can be done without loss of reputation. If the wife have paraphernal goods, or others free, she ought to give these to the lawful sons. But if the adulteress possess no free goods, what then? Ought the adulteress to betray herself, that she may avoid the losses of the sons? If the adulteress conceive no morally certain hope of preventing the losses which threaten the lawful sons on account of the offspring procreated from adultery, she is not bound to disclose the crime to the spurious son, even if she cannot compensate the losses: since she would imprudently squander her reputation, while she prudently doubts that the manifestation of her crime would profit. Nor is it to the purpose that you object that a defamer ought with the loss of his own reputation to retract what he said, even when he doubts that his retraction will profit: since indeed the defamer injured his neighbour in reputation, and therefore ought in the same kind, with the loss of his own reputation, to make good the blackened reputation. But an adulterous mother inflicted losses upon her sons not in reputation, but in money. Wherefore while she cannot compensate in the kind of money, she does not seem bound to make good losses of this kind with the loss of her reputation and honour.

XVI. A son is not bound to give credence to a mother testifying, even with an oath, that he is spurious, as the common opinion holds: because the word of one witness does not bring in a necessity of believing, especially while she lays open her own shame, with detriment to him who believes. There is added that, since the son by the common persuasion and by his own is reputed lawful, he cannot by right be deprived of the inheritance unless it be established by certain witnesses and proved that he is spurious. If the woman be of a lower condition and of slight reputation, and a vast inheritance is to be taken by the spurious son, then she ought to reveal her crime, as all commonly teach: for indeed a woman of slight reputation can easily be induced to make the loss of it. On the contrary, authors commonly free an honourable woman of bright reputation from the manifestation of her crime, even if a vast inheritance were to be taken by the son. But as regards this, the circumstances are to be regarded, and, all things weighed, it is to be determined what is more expedient. For a certain rule can scarcely be assigned.

Caia, the wife of Caius and of infirm health, heard from a physician that at her next delivery the next offspring would very probably be death to her. Hence she was placed in distress, for she does not wish to deny the debt to her husband, but if she grants it, she will bring death upon herself. Therefore she goes to a physician of certainly not the best reputation and buys a medicine by which, taken once each month, she will be rendered safe, as the physician says, from the danger of future offspring. An outcome happy from her point of view proves the physician’s knowledge, but nevertheless also casts scruples into Caia as to whether it is lawful to take such a medicine, and she approaches her confessor to resolve them. Hence it is asked:

1. How are the direct and indirect killing of a human being distinguished? And is it lawful to kill an innocent person?

2. In a case in which either the mother or the fetus or both are certainly going to perish, is it ever lawful to procure abortion? Even of an inanimate fetus?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. How is direct distinguished from indirect homicide, and is it ever allowable to kill the innocent? Homicide is direct when it is intended, and it may be intended either explicitly or implicitly. It is intended explicitly when the homicide wishes to cause death; it is intended implicitly when an action is intentionally put which can not but cause death. Thus one would directly cause death who kept another under water for some time, though his primary intention might have been not to kill him, but to prevent him from calling out. On the other hand, homicide is indirect when it is not intended, though it is foreseen that it will follow from some act which is put for another purpose. It is never allowed to kill the innocent directly; it is allowed to do so indirectly, for a great and proportionate cause.

2. In a case where either the mother or the fetus, or both, must necessarily perish, is it allowable to procure abortion at least, if the fetus has as yet no soul?

Following the common opinion, we may put aside, as antiquated, the hypothesis of a living fetus not yet informed by a human soul. The human soul is infused into the fetus at the moment of conception, according to the common opinion. The answer, then, to the question proposed will be that it is never allowed to procure abortion of the immature fetus directly, since it is never allowed to kill the innocent directly. If the fetus, though not quite mature, may probably be saved, as it may be after about the seventh month or even earlier, by artificial means, it will be lawful to bring it to the birth for a reason grave in proportion to the danger incurred. Indirect abortion, like indirect killing of the innocent, is allowable for a sufficiently grave reason.

3. The case. Caia did wrong in taking medicine to prevent having another child. If the medicine acted so as to prevent conception, she sinned mortally; for as St. Alphonsus teaches (III, no. 394): “It is never lawful for a mother, on account of any danger whatsoever, to take a potion to impede conception.” If the medicine acted on the fetus after conception, Caia was guilty of infanticide. Her confessor should tell her that she is justified in refusing her husband, supposing the danger to life to be real, but that she may also allow him marital rights and commit herself to God’s providence. The latter course may be adopted with greater security than the advice of some doctors would lead one to suppose.¹

1 See Génicot, Theol. Mor., vol. ii, nn. 551, 553.

Caia, a Catholic mother of a family and already four months pregnant, was suffering from almost continual vomiting. The physician summoned to her declared that the indicated remedy for the vomiting was abortion, and that unless she procured it, she herself with the fetus would most certainly die within one or two months. If abortion were procured in time, the fetus could be baptized, and the mother herself would very probably be saved. Caia asked her confessor whether in the stated circumstances she could bring about abortion. Hence it is asked:

1. By what principal arguments is it defended that abortion is lawful in order to save the mother?

2. How is it proved that abortion is always intrinsically evil?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. What were the chief arguments by which it was argued that abortion is allowed in order to save the mother’s life?

We are not concerned here with the arguments used by materialists, who look upon the child before birth as a portion of the mother which may be destroyed if it threatens her life, and see no difficulty in killing one in order that the other's life may be preserved when both can not be saved. We are only concerned with theologians, some of whom thought that in such cases as we are now discussing medical abortion may be permitted. They defended this view on the following grounds: Abortion is usually caused by puncturing the membranes, and this may be done to relieve the mother when pregnancy is threatening her life, though the puncturing also causes abortion and the consequent death of the fetus. In a collision between the right to life of the mother and that of the fetus, the fetus may be said to cede its right in favor of the mother, especially as otherwise both would perish, and the fetus would not be baptized; whereas if aborted, it can be baptized.

2. How is it shown that abortion is always intrinsically wrong?

Direct abortion is always intrinsically wrong because it is direct killing of the innocent. For to cause abortion is to deprive the fetus of the medium in which alone its life can be preserved, which is to kill it directly just as much as thrusting a man under water or into a chamber exhausted of oxygen is killing him directly. As, then, the puncturing of the membranes is the direct killing of the fetus, it is not allowable, even when necessary to save the life of the mother; for evil may not be done that good may come. Nor can the fetus renounce its right to life in favor of the mother, and permit itself to be killed directly ; for not man but God alone is the Lord of life and death. In a collision of rights the owner of the better right takes something to himself which is his; his better right gives him no title to take away that which is another's, and so collision of rights can not be applied to justify direct abortion; it takes away the life of the innocent victim.

3. The case. From what has been said it is clear that Caia may not consent to abortion, as the fetus is not viable. She must ask the doctor to prescribe some other remedy or palliative which will at least save her conscience if not her life. This solution is confirmed by the decree of the Holy Office, July 24, 1895, which declared that such medical abortion as is described in this case is not lawful.¹

1 See Lehmkuhl, Theol. Mor., vol. i, n. 844, ed. 9.

Anna, a Catholic and married, because of deformity of the body is unable to bring forth offspring by the natural way. Hence the first was extracted by craniotomy, the second was brought forth alive by a Caesarean operation, and the third will come forth into the light after a short space of time; the surgeon wishes to extract it and at the same time to prevent future dangers by the operation which is called after Porro or Tait-Porro, by which the infant together with the uterus and appendages is removed by abdominal section. Anna therefore consults her confessor whether it is lawful or necessary to undergo the said operation. Hence it is asked:

1. Is a mother bound to lose temporal life in order to procure eternal salvation for her offspring?

2. Is the mutilation of a human being lawful?

3. Does Anna lawfully engage in married life?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. Is a mother bound to give her life for the eternal salvation of her child?

Yes; per se it is a general rule of charity that we must be prepared to sacrifice our temporal life for the eternal salvation of our neighbor, as St. John teaches: “We ought to lay down our lives for the brethren.”¹ This obligation, however, does not arise frequently, because in ordinary circumstances the necessity for doing so is not certain, nor is the expected result certain.

1 1 John iii. 16.

2. Is it lawful to mutilate a man?

No; except in so far as it is necessary to preserve the man’s life, or unless it is commanded by competent authority in punishment of crime, according to the law of the country. Otherwise as man is not the owner of his life or limbs, but the ownership of them belongs to God, man can not dispose of life or limb, because he can not dispose of what does not belong to him.

3. Does Ann lawfully lead a married life?

As she cannot bring forth children in the ordinary way it would have been better if she had never married, and even now that she is married it would be better if, by mutual consent, husband and wife abstained from marital intercourse. However, there is no strict obligation to abstain, as if children are conceived, they can absolutely be delivered either by Cesarian section, or perhaps after the seventh month by bringing on premature labor, without killing either mother or child.

4. The case. The operation of craniotomy on the first child was unlawful if the child were alive, for it is the direct killing of the innocent. Cesarian section, of course, is lawful in such cases of necessity. The operation called Tait-Porro is also lawful if it is necessary in order to save the mother's life, “provided that serious and timely provision be made, as far as possible, for both the life of the fetus and that of the mother.” If it is not necessary, and if ordinary Cesarian section would suffice, then it is unwarrantable mutilation of a human being.

Titius, a young Catholic physician, asked Paul, his confessor, whether he could safely follow the doctrine commonly handed down in medical schools concerning the manner of treating ectopic fetuses. For sometimes a fetus is conceived outside the uterus and begins to grow, and it cannot always be distinguished from a tumor. Its growth, however, constitutes a grave danger to the mother, especially when the enclosing membrane is ruptured. According to the doctrine handed down in medical schools, an electric fluid is introduced into the cyst, and thus the fetus, if any is present, is deprived of life, ceases to grow, and the mother’s life is saved. Titius therefore wished to know whether it is lawful to act thus, and, if it is not lawful, what must be done when the mother’s life is endangered by a tumor which probably is an ectopic fetus, or which certainly is an ectopic fetus. Hence Paul asks:

1. What is an ectopic fetus, and why is it dangerous?

2. How are the direct and indirect killing of a human being distinguished, and when is it lawful?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. What is an ectopic fetus and why is it dangerous? The proper place for the fecundated ovulum to settle and grow to maturity is the uterus, but sometimes it remains in the ovaries, sometimes in the Fallopian tubes, sometimes it falls into the abdominal cavity, and in these cases it is c called ectopic or extrauterine. An ectopic fetus can not be delivered in the ordinary way, and its growth becomes a serious danger to the life of the mother, chiefly on account of blood vessels being ruptured in the mother’s body by the continual growth of the ectopic fetus.

2. The first part of this question is answered above, p. 226.

Direct homicide is lawful by public authority in punishment of crime, or in a just war, and by private authority in self-defence. Indirect homicide may be permitted for some object of great importance.

3. The case. It is obvious that if an ectopic fetus is living, it will be direct and unlawful homicide to kill it with electricity. If it is uncertain whether a cause of danger to a woman is an ectopic fetus, or a tumor, or some other growth, laparotomy may be performed and the cause of danger removed as soon as the danger becomes imminent. For in that case the certain danger of the woman must be considered and guarded against in preference to the danger to the life of a fetus which is only probable and perhaps non-existent. Even when the danger certainly comes from the presence of an ectopic fetus, the same operation may probably be performed when its growth causes the danger to the mother to be imminent and the fetus is already viable.¹

1 See Antonelli, Medicina pastoralis, vol. i, n. 338; Lehmkuhl, Theol. Mor., vol. i, n. 1011, ed. 11.

On the other hand, when abortion is procured directly, the fetus is killed directly, and this is never lawful.

Caia came for confession to Paul, a missionary priest in England, to whom she disclosed that in the preceding year in Italy she had stood by at a duel in order to encourage a friend fighting a duel. Caia further said that she had not been able to obtain absolution from the parish priest in Italy, since he affirmed that the case was reserved to the Pope. In answer also to Paul’s question, Caia replied that she knew the Church forbids every participation in a duel under penalties, but that she had performed a work of charity which it would have been inhuman to refuse; indeed, that she would do the same thing again in the same circumstances. Paul, however, wishes to know what he can and ought to do in the case. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a censure, and what conditions are required in order that it be incurred?

2. How does a censure cease?

3. What is persistence in a censure, and what effects does it produce?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What is a censure and what conditions are required for incurring it?

The first part of the question was answered above, p. 349.

The conditions required that a censure may be incurred are: a sin grave internally and externally, completed, not altogether past, and committed with contumacy.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. ii, 369.

The second question was answered above, p. 353.

3. What is insordescence in a censure and what effects does it produce?

Insordescence is the obstinate remaining of an excommunicated person in his excommunication for a whole year without absolution. The Council of Trent decreed (Sess. XXV, c. 3 de Ref.) that such a person might be proceeded against as suspect of heresy. If he does not purge his heresy he should be declared a heretic after the lapse of another year.²

4. The case. The third of the excommunications reserved to the Pope by the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis is couched in these terms:

“ Those who commit duels, or simply provoke them, or accept them, or assist any of them in any way or give them favor, and those who watch them with intent, or allow them, or to the extent that they are able do not prevent them, of whatever dignity they may be, even royal or imperial.

It is obvious, therefore, that Caia had incurred this censure by being a spectator of the duel with the intention of giving courage to her champion. She seems also to have had sufficient knowledge that she was doing something prohibited under censure by the Church. She is. not yet penitent, and Paul’s first task will be to try to make her see the gravity of her sin and express her sorrow and repentance for it. When she is disposed he will be able to absolve

< Lehmkuhl, vol. ii, n. 1148.

her by virtue of the special faculties which confessors in England receive through their bishop from the Holy See. She does not seem to have fallen into insordescence, for she tried to get absolution before, and the case does not state that she remained a whole year under excommunication.

1. In a hilly country, two or three steps sometimes measure all the interval between the basins of two rivers, whose mouths are miles apart. In the crisis of an illness the merest trifle will turn the scale between death and recovery. In a nice point of law and intricate procedure, the lawyer is aware that scarcely more than the thickness of the paper on which he writes lies between the case going for his client or for the opposite party. To rail at these fine technicalities argues a lay mind, unprofessional and undiscerning. Hair-splitting, so far as it is a term of real reproach, means splitting the wrong hairs. The expert in any profession knows what things to divide and distinguish finely, and what things to take in the gross. Moral Science in many respects gives its demonstrations, and can give them, only "in the way of rough drawing," as Aristotle says. ([Greek: pachulos kai tupo], Ethics, I., iii., 4.) But there are lines of division exceeding fine and nice in natural morality no less than in positive law. The student must not take scandal at the fine lines and subtle distinctions that we shall be obliged to draw in marking off lawful from unlawful action touching human life.

2. It is never lawful directly to kill an innocent man. Understand innocent in the social and political sense, of a man who has not, by any human act (Ethics, c. i., n. 2, p. 1) of his own, done any harm to society so grievous as to compare with loss of life. To kill, or work any other effect, directly, is to bring about that death, or other effect, willing the same, either as an end desirable in itself, as when a man slays his enemy, whose death of its own sheer sake is to him a satisfaction and a joy, or as a means to an end, as Richard III. murdered his nephews to open his own way to the throne. We must then in no case compass the death of the innocent, either intending it as an end, or choosing it as a means. The assertion is proved by these considerations. To kill a man is to destroy the human nature within him: for, though the soul survives, he is man no more when he is dead. Now to destroy a thing is to subordinate that thing entirely to your self and your own purposes: for that individual thing can never serve any other purpose, once it is destroyed. The man that is killed is then subordinated to the slayer, wholly given up, and as we say, sacrificed, to the aims and purposes of him who slays him. But that ought not to be, for man is a person. Body and soul in him make one person, one personal nature, which human personality is destroyed in death. Now it is the property of a person to be what we may call autocentric, referring its own operations to itself as to a centre. Every person—and every intelligent nature is a person¹⁷—exists and acts primarily for himself. A thing is marked off from a person by the aptitude of being another's and for another. We may venture to designate it by the term heterocentric. A person therefore may destroy a thing, entirely consume and use it up for his own benefit. But he may not treat a person as a thing, and destroy that, either for any end of pleasure that he finds in destroying it, or in view of any gain or good, whereunto that destruction serves him as a means.

¹⁷ The exception apparent in the Incarnation is not relevant here.

3. In the above argumentation account has not been taken of God, to whom for His sovereign dominion all created personalities stand in the light of things, and may be destroyed at His pleasure. But account has been taken of the State, to which the individual is subordinate as a citizen, but not as a man and a person. It is permitted no more to the State than to the individual ever to destroy the innocent directly.

4. An effect is brought about indirectly, when it is neither intended as an end for its own sake, nor chosen as a means making towards an end, but attaches as a circumstance concomitant either to the end intended or to the means chosen. The case of a circumstance so attaching to the means chosen is the only case that we need consider here in speaking of indirect, concomitant, or incidental effects. The study of these incidents is of vast importance to the moralist. Most cases of practical difficulty to decide between right and wrong, arise out of them. They are best illustrated in the manner of killing. That one matter, well worked out, becomes a pattern for other matters in which they occur. (Ethics, c. iii., s. ii., p. 31.)

5. A man is killed indirectly, or incidentally, when he perishes in consequence of certain means employed towards a certain end, without his death being willed by the employer of those means, or in any way serving that agent to the furtherance of the end that he has in view. If a visitor to a quarry were standing on a piece of rock, which a quarryman had occasion to blast, and the man fired the train regardless of the visitor, the latter would be incidentally killed. Now incidental killing, even of the innocent, is not under all circumstances unlawful. Where the end in view is in the highest degree important, the means may be taken thereto, provided always that such an issue as the shedding of innocent blood be not itself the means discerned and elected as furthering the end: for no end however urgent can justify the employment of any evil means. (Ethics, c. iii., s. ii., nn. 3, 13, pp. 32, 36.) Suppose in the instance just given the quarryman saw that, unless that piece of rock where the visitor stood were blown up instantly, a catastrophe would happen elsewhere, which would be the death of many men, and there were no time to warn the visitor to clear off, who could blame him if he applied the explosive? The means of averting the catastrophe would be, not that visitor's death, but the blowing up of the rock. The presence or absence of the visitor, his death or escape, is all one to the end intended: it has no bearing thereon at all.

6. We must then distinguish between means and circumstances. The means help to the end, the circumstances of the means do not. When the end is of extreme urgency, circumstances may be disregarded: the means become morally divested of them. So I have seen an island in a river, a nucleus of rock with an environment of alluvial soil. While the stream was flowing placidly in its usual course, the island remained intact, both rock and earth. But when the water came rushing in a flood, which was as though the island itself had gone speeding up the river, the loose matter at its sides was carried away, and only the central rock remained. The ordinary flow of the river past the island, or the gentle motion of the island up-stream, keeping all its bulk, represents a man acting for an end to which reason attaches no great importance. He must then take a diligent review of all the circumstances that have any close connection with his action, to see if there is any that it would be wrong for him to will directly. And if there is, he must abstain from willing it even indirectly: that is, he must abstain from doing the action, which cannot be done without that objectionable circumstance attending it. On the other hand, the floating island being towed rapidly up-stream, with its loose sides falling away, portrays the condition of one acting for a purpose of imperative urgency: he considers the means to that end, and if they are good, he concentrates his will upon them and uses them, disregarding, or even deploring, but nowise willing or being responsible for, the evil concomitants which go with those means, but do not make for his end. Thus it is, that a circumstance which in ordinary cases goes to make the adoption of certain means reasonable or unreasonable, comes, in a case of great urgency, to weigh for nothing in the balance of reason, owing to the extreme and crying reasonableness of the end in view. Nor is this the end justifying the means, for that unhappy circumstance is never a means to the end. (Ethics, c. iii., s. ii., n. 8, p. 34.)

7. To illustrate by a diagram:

[Illustration:

C
( )
U
|
|
A—————————————————-E( )V
]

A, the agent, a bead on a wire, can move only on the line AE, that alone being the line of means to the end.

EV, reasonableness of end in view, attracting A.

UC, the amount of moral evil which the untoward circumstance would involve, if it were willed directly. This UC repels A, tending to jam it on the line AE, which is absolutely rigid.

AE, remoteness, difficulty, and uncertainty of the end in view.

AU, remoteness of untoward circumstance from means chosen, which A is just in the act of taking. Then, for lawful action, the reasonableness required in the end in view is represented by the variation—

[Illustration:
UC . AE
EV varies ———-
AU
]

We observe that when AU is zero, while UC . AE remains a finite quantity (representing an appreciable evil), then EV becomes infinite: that is to say, when the distance, difference, or distinction between the evil circumstance and the means comes down to nothing at all, and the evil thing actually is the very means taken, then an infinite urgency of end in view would be requisite to justify the using of that means: in other words, no end possible to man can ever justify an evil means.

Readings.—St. Thos., 2a 2æ, q.64, art. 6; Cardinal de Lugo, De Justitia et Jure, disp. 10, n. 125.