ARTICLE I: ON THE KILLING OF A GUILTY MAN OR MALEFACTOR

464. Principles. - I. It is licit to kill malefactors by public authority. The reason is that this is a necessary means for procuring the common good of the whole society, indeed for preserving society itself; which indeed for the most part cannot be obtained except by the death of wicked men. But God must be said to have conferred the power without which society could not stand. This is clear also from the practice of every legislation, from Sacred Scripture, and from the universal consensus of all.

II. But it is not licit to kill malefactors by private authority. Because no one can kill another without power; but private persons have received no power of this sort from God: for, lest all things be filled with slaughters, this power has been given to the Superior alone of the whole civil society. Therefore.

465. You will resolve. - 1° It is licit for no one to beat someone not subject to his power, unless there accede at least the tacit consent of him who has power, for example, of a father over a son, of a master over a disciple; for beating is a punishment; but this supposes gubernative power. Except, unless this be necessary for averting a present injury, as will be said below. - Reuter.¹

2° It is not licit for a father to mutilate or kill his own children, nor for a master his own servants, for the sake of correction; the reason is that to punish by mutilation and killing, which inflict irreparable damage, certainly requires perfect power, which neither the father nor the master has. - Billuart.

3° An elder brother cannot beat younger brothers, unless this has been commanded to him by the father, or unless, the father being dead or absent, he himself governs the family; because primogeniture does not confer such a right on him. - Billuart and others.

466. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Can those upon whom, from office, it is incumbent to apprehend or guard a malefactor kill him when he flees?

Resp. In the negative, even if he has already been condemned to death; because by force of their office they can only restrain the guilty man,² indeed with weapons among us, if there is need, even deadly ones, yet avoiding his killing as much as it will be possible.

Quaer. 2° Is it licit to kill a tyrant?

Resp. 1° It is certain that it is not licit to kill a tyrant of governance, or a legitimate Prince governing the people tyrannically, and even oppressing them: for it is necessary to obey masters even harsh ones.¹ - Thus commonly with St. Alphonsus.²

Resp. 2° Nor is it licit to kill a tyrant of usurpation, if he is already in peaceful possession of the kingdom. But the opposite sentence must be called improbable and false; because according to St. Thomas a usurper ought to be held as legitimate, at least in practice, if afterward the subjects acknowledge him as such. Besides, the public good requires that obedience be furnished to him for preventing disturbances and overturnings of the Republic.³

A tyrant certainly sins by usurpation of authority, whether while he makes laws, or while he pronounces law, or imposes tributes, etc. For he usurps to himself the authority of a prince, since he is not prince.

Nor does he sin only by invading the republic or provinces, but he also sins afterward by constantly preserving them oppressed and subject to himself; since he constantly oppresses and inflicts injury, not otherwise than as someone thrusting another unjustly into prison not only sins at the beginning, but also continually afterward, as long as he continues this calamity of another.

There is added also this, that while the tyrant sins by retaining usurped power, he at the same time has another obligation, namely of providing for the common good of the usurped province; and therefore he sins still more if, when there is need, he either does not pronounce law, or does not restrain the guilty, etc. The reason is that he harms the citizens still more gravely, and inflicts a greater injury; namely just as one who retains another's thing and uses it sins by using it, and at the same time sins by not using it, if use is necessary to the thing, lest it perish or become worse.

Corollary. - Laws which are made by a tyrant of usurpation, now peacefully holding another's dominion which he unjustly occupied, are of two kinds. For either they are directed against the legitimate prince, or they conduce to the tranquillity and prosperity of another's dominion. If the former, it is not licit to obey them, provided a most grave penalty is not imminent; for then one would not sin who, for example, took up arms or stood among the ranks until he could safely flee; yet, excepting the case of pure defense of one's own life, he could not strike the defenders of legitimate authority. If the latter, the subject can and ought to observe the laws (Haine, T. I. p. 69. q. 49): for the necessity of the republic, which cannot kill itself, requires this. Nor does he sin who seeks justice from a judge constituted by the tyrant: the reason is sought from "the will, at least interpretative and implicit, of the republic, which, while it cannot repel the tyrant and the judges constituted by him, tacitly confers on them the power of governing, and ratifies their laws and acts."¹ Cf. n. 369. q. 5°; n. 459; n. 1717.

When a tyrant of usurpation or his successors become just possessors, even though the prior prince does not consent or even protests, is difficult to say. Yet that this must happen at length sometime is clear even from this, that otherwise almost no prince now could be judged legitimate.

Resp. 3° Nor is it licit to kill a tyrant or unjust usurper, even if he is not yet in possession of the kingdom, except from the authority of the legitimate Prince, or from just defense, or in an act of war of the Republic against him; for it is never licit to kill a man by private authority. - Thus commonly, and it must be held certainly.² - Recall what was said in n. 459.