Article I. On Abortion

Before we speak about abortion, some things must be noted beforehand.

By the name fetus is understood the ovum of a woman fertilized by the semen of a man. Now it is freely disputed whether the rational soul, apart from a miracle, is infused at the very instant of fertilization or afterward; afterward, I say, that is, after the fetus has grown to the due organism of a human body.¹

A fetus regularly cannot live outside the uterus unless after seven complete months of gestation. Yet if artificial incubation takes place, sometimes there is hope that a fetus may go on living outside the uterus after six complete months of gestation. In these matters one can stand by the judgment of an expert.

¹ Those who deny that the soul is infused at the first instant of fertilization admit a miracle with respect to Christ and the Blessed Virgin Mary.

I. Notion. Abortion is the expulsion from the mother's uterus of a fetus not yet viable outside the uterus.

Abortion differs from acceleration of birth, or from premature delivery, which consists in this, that the offspring is brought forth artificially before nine complete months of gestation, but when it can live outside the uterus.

II. Division. Abortion is distinguished into direct and indirect. It is direct when the act of ejecting the offspring as such is either intended as an end, or is assumed as a means by which another end is obtained. Otherwise it is indirect.

III. Morality. 1. Direct abortion is to be judged as follows:

a) Direct abortion of an animated fetus is always gravely illicit. This is clear from the constitution Effrenatam of Sixtus V;¹ likewise from the encyclical Casti connubii of Pius XI;² likewise from the decrees of the Holy Office;³ finally from reason: namely, if the fetus is animated, direct abortion involves the killing of offspring, that is, its tearing away from the maternal uterus, whereby it happens that it can no longer live; it involves direct killing of offspring, because it involves an act which, insofar as it is killing or insofar as it is tearing away and expelling the offspring from the mother, is assumed as the means by which another end, for example the safety of the mother or avoiding disgrace, is obtained. It is commonly added that the fetus about to die is not baptized (St. Alphonsus, III, 394).

b) Direct abortion of a fetus not yet animated is likewise gravely illicit; for if the fetus is not yet animated, there is an action which is directly opposed to the good of the species, equally as is the disordered use of semen; indeed even more, because a fetus not yet animated approaches more closely to man than semen does. Hence abortion of a fetus not yet animated is reduced by some to homicide, and is called by them imperfect or anticipated homicide. There is added proposition 34 condemned by Innocent XI: it is lawful to procure abortion before the animation of the fetus, lest a girl discovered to be pregnant be killed or disgraced⁴ (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Objection 1. He who procures an abortion does not kill the offspring, but merely ceases to preserve its life.

Resp. I deny the assertion, since he who procures abortion positively places the offspring in that condition in which it cannot live. Such a manner of acting cannot be called a mere cessation from preserving the offspring.

Objection 2. A fetus which creates danger for the mother can be regarded as an unjust aggressor.

Resp. Since the fetus is merely present to the mother, and indeed with nature itself directing the matter thus, there can be no discussion of an aggressor of the mother.

What if it is doubted whether the fetus is dead?

Resp. Doubt about the death of the fetus easily persists. Some indeed judge that the death of a sufficiently developed fetus can be established by means of a stethoscope, which demonstrates that the pulsations of the heart have ceased; but from the recent opinion about apparent death, the said certainty does not seem to be had unless it is established that for a sufficiently long time, for example for an hour, the pulse of the heart has altogether ceased. With these things noted, I answer: in doubt whether the fetus is dead, direct abortion is gravely illicit, because, to use the words of St. Alphonsus, "it is intrinsically evil positively to expose an innocent person to danger of direct death" (III, 394), or because it is illicit to place an act which probably is directly killing an innocent person.

2. Indirect abortion likewise is per se gravely illicit; it becomes lawful if a grave cause is present, provided, however, that the hope of baptizing the offspring is not diminished.⁵ For the things said about indirect killing have force, since such killing is had in the case (n. 731). Moreover, a cause is required that is graver in proportion as the means employed has more influence on the abortion (St. Alphonsus, III, 394).

Corollary I. For saving the life of the mother, it is lawful to use a medicine which of itself tends equally to the cure of the disease and to abortion, because the act of taking medicine is not employed as a means of saving the mother insofar as that act is killing. Likewise it is lawful to extirpate a uterus infected with cancer, even if the death of the fetus must follow from this, because the extirpation is not assumed as a means insofar as it is killing the fetus (St. Alphonsus, III, loc. cit.).

Corollary II. Incision or puncture of the membranes of the fetus, so that the uterus may be replaced, seems illicit, because the act of cutting or puncturing is assumed as a means insofar as it is killing, that is, insofar as it is expelling the fluid without which the fetus cannot live, indeed also insofar as it is expulsive of the fetus. Make an exception if, as they contend can sometimes be obtained, the incision or puncture can be done in such a way that only part of the fluid flows out and ejection of the fetus does not follow.

Corollary III. Mothers sin gravely, objectively, who, with their condition considered, induce grave danger of abortion: by carrying heavy burdens, undergoing hard labors, indulging in vehement sadness or anger, dancing, riding, and so forth; likewise those who strike a pregnant woman, afflict her with vehement pain, or excite her to vehement anger. But if in the aforesaid cases abortion is intended, there is guilt of direct abortion.

Note 1. Since the illicitness of feticide carried out to save the mother is not so evident, good faith is not always excluded either among physicians or in the mother. Moreover, if good faith is present and there is no hope of fruit, the priest can be silent, unless there is danger of apparent connivance and thus harm can also be done to the common good. For the rest, baptism of the fetus should always be provided for as much as can be done. But those who procure abortion to avoid the disgrace of a girl, to forestall more numerous offspring, to strengthen the health of the mother, or to remove a light danger of death, should ordinarily be instructed, and, unless they are willing to renounce the perverse practice, should be sent away without absolution. The same must be said of those who induce abortion when sufficient provision can be made for the mother by acceleration of birth.

Note 2. Medicines which are usually prescribed for diseases commonly cannot influence abortion except remotely, so that, provided some good effect is intended, there is scarcely an obligation of abstaining from them. Several causes which are assigned by some, such as violent disturbances of the mind, excessive fatigue, riding in a carriage, and so forth, although for the most part they do not induce abortion, nevertheless are not done without moderate danger. But more dangerous are extensive abuse of intercourse, the wearing of garments constricting the uterus, baths that are too hot, and so forth.⁶

Note 3. Today indirect procurement of abortion is rarely necessary for saving the life of the mother, since provision can be made for both mother and offspring by Caesarean section, symphysiotomy, pubiotomy, and so forth.

¹ October 29, 1588.

² December 31, 1930.

³ July 24, 1895, decree of the Holy Office de abortus illiceitate; May 4, 1898 (Collect., n. 1898).

⁴ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1184.

⁵ This hope is commonly not diminished, since the fetus can usually be baptized either in the uterus (cf. treatise on Baptism) or after abortion has followed.

⁶ Surbled, La vie sexuelle, p. 230.

IV. Penalties against the crime of abortion. 1. Those are irregular by reason of delict who have procured the abortion of a human fetus, the effect following, and all cooperating (can. 984, 4°).

2. Those procuring abortion, not excepting the mother, incur, the effect following, excommunication latae sententiae reserved to the Ordinary; and if they are clerics, they are besides to be deposed (can. 2350, § 1). These matters are more fully explained in the treatise on ecclesiastical penalties.