Chapter — Konings, Theologia Moralis

CHAPTER I: ON THE KILLING OF ONESELF OR ON SUICIDE

¶461.
  1. Principles. - I. It is never licit for anyone directly, that is, from intention and by his own authority, to kill himself. This is clear 1° from the divine precept: You shall not kill.2 2° From the natural law. For man does not have direct dominion over his body, nor over his life, but only useful dominion, since he does not have these from himself, but has received them from God and must render them back to God alone when He demands them. Therefore the suicide violates the supreme dominion of God by destroying a thing not his own. He also harms society, of which he is a part, as St. Thomas says.3

II. Without divine authority it is never lawful to posit an external act, tending of itself immediately to one's own destruction, unless that act has another good and immediate effect, which alone is intended, and a most grave reason urges that that good effect be obtained. The reason is that where the physical act, even of itself indifferent, has no other effect than suicide, it now becomes evil, since then there is present no reason by which the precept of conserving life and of guarding against the danger of death would cease. Therefore in any case whatever it is prohibited.

III. It is licit to concur indirectly in the killing of oneself, or to posit an action from which, beyond the intention, one's own death certainly follows, provided from that action there follows equally immediately some good which compensates the loss of life, and this alone is intended. Sometimes we are bound to this.

Notes to n. 461. (1) Exod. 20. 13. (2) Exod. 20. 13. (3) 2. 2. q. 64. a. 5. Cf. Rutten, Eth. n. 182.

¶462.
  1. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is it licit to set fire to a ship or fortress, so that the enemies may suffer grave damage, but with certain loss of one's own life?

Resp. In the affirmative, at least more probably; because it is expedient that public damage be avoided, or that the common good be procured, even with most certain damage of private persons. Lugo, Lessius, St. Alphonsus.1

Quaer. 2° Can a virgin, in order to preserve chastity, expose herself to the danger of death?

Resp. In the affirmative, at least if death is not certainly going to follow; and this both on account of the love of chastity, and also (and this reason is valid for a woman in general, and not only for a virgin), on account of the danger of sin, which is often had in such an occasion. - Thus commonly. - Indeed, more probably still one must answer affirmatively, even if death is certainly going to follow, and there is not present a proximate danger of consent; because even the integrity of the body alone is very highly esteemed. - Laymann, St. Alphonsus,2 etc.

Quaer. 3° Is a woman bound to permit herself to be killed rather than violated?

Resp. In the negative, probably, at least speaking speculatively, provided she resist with the will positively, and a proximate danger of consent be absent. The reason is that this permission is not formal cooperation in another's sin, but only material; and a just cause of permission is present, namely danger of death. Yet this practice is not to be counseled, on account of the danger of consent, which can easily be present in that permission.

Quaer. 4° Is it licit for an accused man to present himself before the judge, even if he must certainly be punished by death?

Resp. In the affirmative. Because that action is of itself indifferent, indeed even honorable; for in the case to will to die is equivalent to willing the order of justice; and just as because of a just cause it is licit to desire death for another, and even to procure it in a legitimate mode, so also for oneself. - Lugo, Lessius, St. Alphonsus.1

Notes to n. 462. (1) L. IV. 367 and H. A. Tr. VIII. 1. (2) L. IV. 366 and H. A. Tr. VIII. 1.

¶463.
  1. You will resolve. - 1° Each one is bound to conserve life, since no one can cast away the gift of this life without sin, and it is equivalent not to conserve life and to take it away from oneself.

2° It is never licit to posit with the intention of killing oneself an action from which death, although only per accidens, is going to follow; because it is never licit to will a forbidden thing, and to reduce this will to act.

3° You are not bound to preserve life which is not necessary to the common good by remedies either extraordinary (for example, by expenses enormous for your condition), or bringing the greatest pain.2 Note, however, that sections, or so-called surgical operations, are accomplished today with happier success than formerly, and scarcely without some pain, by the help of chloroform. Capellmann, Medicina Pastoralis, p. 20.

4° A virgin is not bound to suffer an operation by the hands of a physician, even if life is endangered, when on account of modesty this happens to be most grave for her, and casts into her a greater horror than death itself.3

5° It is never licit to macerate the body in order to shorten life, nor, even with such an end excluded, to ruin health gravely by immoderate and wholly indiscreet penances. Yet it is licit, from the virtue of penance, ordinarily to use grave things with a certain definite shortening of life; because, according to the common sentence of the Doctors, on account of merit, or the mortification of depraved nature, some loss of longer life can be contemned.4

6° Craftsmen do not sin who ascend over the roofs of buildings and expose themselves to various dangers, where there is need; nor blacksmiths, who daily diminish life for themselves by handling fire; the reason is that they do this from a reasonable cause. - On the contrary, bold men sin gravely who from rash wagering and vain glory cast themselves without cause into grave risks, by climbing high, by lowering themselves downward, by bearing heavier burdens, etc., etc. - But whether those sin who, from a cause licit of itself, work too confidently in dangerous occupations cannot so easily be defined. Custom, character, caution, etc., can bring it about that for them there is no danger, or only remote danger.

7° It is not licit to mutilate oneself, unless it is necessary for the conservation of the whole body; because man is not the master even of his members, but only their guardian, and whatever man is, the whole is God's, nor does he have any other dominion over his body except useful or indirect dominion.1

8° It is not licit to mutilate oneself for a spiritual good, or for avoiding any sin whatever. For as St. Thomas says, "spiritual health can always be provided for otherwise than by the cutting off of a member, because sin is subject to the will. And therefore in no case is it licit to cut off a member for the sake of avoiding any sin whatever."2

9° More probably it is licit to cut off one's own hand bound by a chain in order to avoid death impending from a wild beast or a tyrant, or from fire; because the part ought to yield to the good of the whole man. - Lugo,3 Lacroix,4 Billuart, against others.


Notes to n. 463 - note sequence 1. (1) H. A. Tr. VIII. 2. (2) L. IV. 372 and H. A. Tr. VIII. 2. (3) L. IV. 372 and H. A. Tr. VIII. 2. (4) L. IV. 371 and H. A. Tr. VIII. 2. Notes to n. 463 - note sequence 2. (1) L. IV. 373. 374. (2) 2. 2. q. 65. a. 1. ad 3. (3) De Justitia disp. 10. n. 22. (4) L. III. P. I. n. 786. Cf. Mar. p. 372. n. 247.