Rash Judgement

658. Nature. Rash judgment, which is also called suspicion or temerity, is a firm assent of the mind, by which, from a light and insufficient reason, evil is thought of one's neighbor. It is called rash, because it is conceived without a sufficient reason and against the rule of prudence.

Suspicion in the broad sense is threefold: a. doubt, namely when, from a light reason, someone doubts concerning the probity of another; b. suspicion in the strict sense, namely when, from a light reason, someone inclines to think evil of another; c. rash judgment, namely when, from a light reason, someone firmly judges evil of another.

659. Malice. 1. Rash judgment is a sin against justice: Judge not, and you shall not be judged; Judge not, that you may not be judged.¹ For every man has a right that no one, without sufficient reason, think evil of him; therefore he who, from a light reason, judges evil of another violates this right.

2. Suspicion and doubt, if they are voluntary, are sins against charity, because charity requires that we think well of our neighbor unless a sufficient reason persuades otherwise. Yet they can also become sins against justice if, from suspicion or doubt, someone causes another an external injury.

3. Rash judgment is not, like detraction or insult, an external but an internal violation of justice; therefore the obligation of restitution does not arise from rash judgment as such. If, however, from rash judgment an external injury is committed, this must be repaired.

¹ Luke 6:37; Matt. 7:1 s.

660. Causes of rash judgment. They are commonly assigned as three:

a. A perverse disposition of the one judging, by reason of which he is prone to think evil of others. Thus proud men easily judge others to be proud; the impure, impure; the avaricious, avaricious.

b. Hatred, envy, jealousy, or another passion, by which one is impelled to believe evil readily of another.

c. Experience of the vices of men. Hence old men and those who have long dealt with men easily judge evil of others.

None of these causes, however, furnishes a sufficient reason for judging evil of a determinate person, unless signs are added from which that evil can be prudently inferred.

661. In order that rash judgment be a grave sin, it is required that it be:

a. Rash, that is, conceived from a light and insufficient motive.

b. In grave matter; but that matter is generally judged grave which notably injures reputation (n. 646); nevertheless graver matter is required to constitute grave judgment than grave detraction.

c. Firm: for if it is not firm but only doubtful, no grave injury is inflicted on the neighbor.

d. Deliberate, that is, he who judges rashly must advert at least confusedly both to the gravity of the matter and to the lightness of the motives, and nevertheless must will and command the assent of the mind.

Because of the lack of this last condition rash judgments are for the most part not grave sins, because men, unless led by hatred, are not accustomed to judge against sound reason; and sound reason does not judge without a sufficient motive.

Whether it is lawful to conduct oneself as if another were evil. It is not lawful with firm assent to judge another to be wicked unless this is certainly established; nevertheless, unless it is established that someone is upright by acquired virtues, it is not necessary that we positively hold him good in this sense, but it suffices that negatively we do not judge him evil. But supposing this state of mind, which suspends judgment, it is lawful, in order to avoid evil, to conduct oneself as if the other were wicked: for by this manner of acting nothing is done which would be illicit. And indeed he who acts thus does not positively judge or suspect that another is evil, but suspends judgment concerning his wickedness and positively judges only that it can happen that he is wicked; but by this judgment, so long as the contrary is not established, injury is inflicted on no one. Moreover, everyone has a right of guarding against damage which can befall himself or his own. Therefore it is lawful to lock up money, because it can happen that unknown guests are thieves.

WHEN we have some knowledge of a matter which does not amount to a certainty, various states of mind may be distinguished with respect to the mind’s inclination to form a judgement about the matter in question. If no reasons are known for either affirming or denying a proposition, or if there are as weighty reasons for one as for the other, the mind suspends judgement, and is said to be in doubt. Doubt, then, is the suspending of judgement about a matter apprehended by the mind. A doubtful conscience, therefore, will be a suspension of judgement about the lawfulness of some action.

If some slight reason draws the mind in one direction, we have then a suspicion about the matter. If there be a good solid reason or reasons for forming a judgement in a particular sense though there is not sufficient ground for certainty, and it is felt that the opposite may be true, the mind then forms an opinion on the matter.¹

Theologians distinguish a negative from a positive doubt. There is negative doubt when the mind suspends judgement for want of reasons on one side or on the other; if there is an apparent equality of reasons on either side, the doubt is positive. In this chapter we confine our attention to negative doubt, the sense in which the term doubt is usually understood in theology. A speculative doubt has reference to some question in the abstract apart from present action, as when I doubt whether it is allowed to fish on Sundays, though I have no intention of actually fishing: a practical doubt has reference to the lawfulness of an action which there is question of performing here and now.

A doubt about law has reference to the law’s existence or its interpretation; a doubt about fact has reference to fact.

¹ St Thomas, 2-2, q. 2, a. 1.

A JUDGEMENT is a firm assent of the mind to a proposition without fear of mistake, and if such an assent is given without sufficient grounds it is a rash judgement. The term, however, is used here only of judgements without sufficient reasons against the character of others, as that such a one is wicked, untrustworthy, a drunkard, and so on.

Such rash judgements, when they are formed deliberately with the consciousness that there is not sufficient ground for them, are sinful, and if the matter be serious they are gravely sinful. The reason is because all have a right to our good esteem unless they have forfeited it by their bad conduct; in judging others rashly we arrogate to ourselves an authority which we do not possess, and we use it unjustly against the character of our neighbour.” We thus violate justice, which in serious matters binds under grave sin.

Rash judgements, however, to which depraved human nature is so prone, are not usually grave sins in those who are striving to lead good lives. Rash and evil doubts, or suspicions, or opinions about others are frequent, but these, although wrong, are not as a rule gravely sinful, for they do not inflict serious harm on our neighbour’s reputation. 3° Jas. iv 11:

It is no sin to think that another is wicked or has committed a sin if we know it to be a fact. Nor are we obliged to think that all men are good until we know something to the contrary. We may suspend our judgement about such as we do not know sufficiently well to be able to say whether they are good or bad. We know, moreover, that there are many bad people in the world, and prudence suggests that we should be on our guard against all whom we do not know well, though justice and charity incline us to think no evil of anyone.

Rash judgements frequently arise from the malice of our own hearts, or from hatred and envy.¹ If we purify our own hearts from vice and wickedness, we shall think thoughts of others. kindlier

¹ Rom. ii 1.

I. Notions. Judgment or certitude, opinion, and doubt respectively involve firm assent, weak assent, and suspension of assent concerning the truth of some proposition. Suspicion is reduced to doubt (n. 215). They are called rash here if they are made without sufficient foundation and regard the evil of the neighbor (St. Alphonsus, III, 962).

II. Morality. 1. Judgment, opinion, and doubt, rashly conceived, are sins, and indeed against justice. This is clear both from Sacred Scripture, which at least teaches that they are sins,¹ and from the fact that he inflicts injury on the neighbor who holds him to be evil without sufficient reason.

2. With respect to the gravity of the sin, receive these things:

a) A rash judgment is a grave sin if the conditions to be explained are present; if any of these is lacking, there is only a slight sin. The conditions are:

alpha) That judgment is truly present, or that the assent is firm or quasi-firm; in other words, it is required that the matter be held as certain or morally certain (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 60, a. 3; St. Alphonsus, III, 962).

beta) That the judgment is about grave matter, i.e. about matter which, if it were revealed, would contain grave detraction (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

gamma) That the judgment rests on reasons which do not suffice for conceiving an opinion. If they suffice for opinion, there is no grave sin, even if the judgment is wholly firm (St. Alphonsus, III, loc. cit.).

delta) That the judgment is about a determinate and known person. Therefore grave sin is absent if you rashly judge that in some place some crime has been committed by someone indeterminate; or if you judge the same thing about a man who meets you, but is unknown to you (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Now, when these conditions have been fulfilled, there is grave sin, because there is grave injury; otherwise, if any of them is lacking.

b) Rash opinion, suspicion, and doubt ordinarily are only slight sins, because the injury, and consequently the sin, is only slight (St. Alphonsus, III, 963). Many make an exception if someone, on account of the slightest reason, should suspect or hold as probable that a grave and honorable person is guilty of an enormous crime: "as it would be, to suspect about a pious religious that he is a heretic, or that he has committed incest with his mother; or about a man commonly held as Catholic, that he is a Jew or an atheist. The reason is that perhaps a greater injury is inflicted on them by suspecting such things than if a certain judgment were had about them concerning ordinary grave offenses" (St. Alphonsus, III, 964; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 60, a. 3).

c) It is disputed whether or not detraction and rash judgment differ in species. Some deny it, because by detraction reputation is injured before others, by rash judgment before ourselves; which difference seems merely material. Others affirm it, because by detraction there is taken away before others the knowledge which they have of someone's goodness; by rash judgment I do not take away from myself the knowledge of someone's goodness, but I deny the assent of the intellect due to the knowledge had; which difference seems formal to the patrons of this opinion.

Corollary I. Since rash judgment, etc., are opposed to justice, they oblige to a certain species of restitution, namely that one lay aside the aforesaid judgment, etc., and judge better about someone.

Corollary II. Doubts about the uprightness of the neighbor are to be interpreted in the better part, unless someone prefers to abstain from judging. It can indeed "happen that he who interprets in the better part is more often deceived; but it is better that someone more frequently be deceived, having a good opinion about some bad man, than that he be deceived more rarely, having a bad opinion about some good man; because from the latter injury is done to another, but not from the former" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 60, a. 4, ad 1).

Yet these things do not prevent someone, if there is question of avoiding damage, from conducting himself as if the other were harmful; for prudence advises this.

¹ Luke VI, 37; Matt. VII, 1-2; Rom. XIV, 4; 1 Cor. XIII, 5.

(Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 37-42.)

The following sins are opposed to the peace of charity: (a) discord, which is opposed to peace in wills; (b) contention or quarreling, which is opposed to peace in words; (e) schism, war, fights and sedition, which are opposed to peace in works.

Discord.—As here understood, discord is a disagreement in the wills of two or more persons in matters pertaining to the divine good, or the good of the neighbor, and concerning which charity requires that they be in agreement.

(a) Discord is a disagreement in wills, that is, in wishes and desires. Hence, it is not the same as difference of opinion (see 1197), which is a disagreement in judgments.

(b) It is about matters in which agreement is necessary, that is, in which the law of God requires that all wish the same things, and have but one heart and soul. Thus, discord differs from disagreement about matters of supererogation. Examples: Titus and his wife are at variance, because Titus is unwilling to give any alms. Balbus and his wife are at variance, because she wishes him to give away in alms more than is strictly necessary. In the first husband there is discord, but not in the second.

(c) Discord is opposed to the divine good, or the good of the neighbor. Thus, it differs from a disagreement with another who is attacking the divine good or the good of the neighbor. The standard of concord is the divine will, and he only of the persons at variance is discordant who is not in harmony with the divine will.

(d) Discord is confined to those matters in which charity calls for agreement. If it be some other virtue that demands unanimity (e.g., justice), the disagreement is not discord in the special sense now employed, Thus, he whose will refuses consent to the command of a superior is disobedient; he whose will refuses to pay the debt due a creditor is dishonest.

There are two kinds of discord: (a) intentional discord, which is the act of one who knowingly and purposely contradicts in a matter about which charity requires that he agree;

(b) unintentional discord, which is a disagreement between persons, who both intend the divine good or the good of the neighbor, but who are divided in opinion as to what that good here and now requires.

Sinfulness of Intentional Discord.—(a) From its nature, this species of discord is a mortal sin, since it directly excludes charity. Hence, those who are guilty of discord shall not obtain the kingdom of heaven (Gal, v. 21). (b) From the lack of sufficient reflection or consent, the first impulses towards discord are not mortal sins.

Sinfulness of Unintentional Discord.—(a) From its nature, this kind of discord is not opposed to charity, nor is it sinful; for the concord of charity consists in a union of wills, not in a union of opinions. Thus, the disagreement between Paul and Barnabas about John Mark (Acts, xv. 39) was not sinful, although the difference of judgment indicated their human limitations. (b) From its circumstances, this kind of discord may be sinful, as when it is caused by culpable ignorance in matters of faith, or is carried on with obstinacy.

By whom is the sin of discord committed? (a) It is committed sometimes by one party only, as when one knowingly resists the will of another who wishes to perform a necessary act of charity. (b) It is committed at other times by both parties, as when each in defending his own good infringes knowingly on the charity due the other.

Is it lawful to promote divisions, when one’s purpose and the result will be good? (a) To promote division that takes away the concord of charity is never lawful, but a mortal sin: “There are six things the Lord hates, and a seventh which His soul detests, a sower of discord among brethren” (Prov., vi. 16, 19). (b) To promote division that takes away a concord of malice is lawful and praiseworthy. Thus, St. Paul introduced a dissension between the Pharisees and the Sadducees, who had been in agreement against him (Acts, xxiii. 6, 7). But the intention of the Apostle was to win the Pharisees to the defense of the Resurrection and of himself, not to incite the Sadducees to a denial of the Resurrection, and so there was no question of his using evil means for a good end.

The Origin of Discord.—(a) The disagreement with the will of a neighbor arises from envy. For he who considers the excellence of his neighbor as a lessening of his own excellence, is inclined to contradict the wishes of the neighbor, even if he recognizes them as good. (b) The preference of one’s own will and persistence in it are due to pride and vainglory. For he who unduly desires his own excellence or fame does not wish to yield to others or change his purposes. He feels that, even though he is in the wrong, he must not take what he regards as a position of inferiority.

The prohibitions of uncharitableness are as follows: (a) against hatred: “Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart” (Lev, xix. IT); (b) against sloth: “Bow down thy shoulder and hear her (wisdom), and be not grieved with her bands” (Ecclus., vi. 26); (c) against envy: “Let us not be made desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another” (Gal., v. 26), (d) against discord: “Speak the same things and let there be no schisms among you” (I Cor., i. 10); and (e) against scandal: “Put not a stumbling-block or a scandal in your brother’s way” (Rom., xiv. 13).

Whispering or Tale-Bearing.—Whispering (susurratio), also called mischief-making and tale-bearing, is a speech unfavorable to another person secretly made with the purpose of breaking up a virtuous friendship.

(a) It is unfavorable speech, that is, the whisperer says something to his listener that will turn the latter against the person spoken about. The thing attributed to the absent person may be either something evil or something that is only seemingly evil, but in either case it will be something displeasing to the listener. Whispering, therefore, does not necessarily include defamation.

(b) It is secret, that is, the whisperer speaks privately, and usually in the way of confidence to the person whose mind he wishes to impress. Often, however, he goes now to one of the friends, now to another, speaking in different senses to each, to make his work doubly effective. This kind of whisperer is known as double-tongued: “The whisperer and the double-tongued is accursed” (Ecclus., xxviii. 15).

(c) It is aimed at the breaking up of a friendship, that is, the whisperer intends to destroy the feeling of respect and affection which his listener has for the absent person, or even to instill into the listener’s mind a feeling of disrespect and dislike for the absent person. Whispering, therefore, is incomplete when it ends a friendship, and complete when it makes enemies of those who had been friends and sows discords and quarrels: “A passionate man kindleth strife, and a sinful man will trouble his friends, and bring in debate in the midst of them that are at peace” (Ecclus., xxviii. 11); “When the tale-bearer is taken away, contentions shall cease” (Prov., xxvi. 20). Whispering, then, differs from simple defamation, whose purpose is to steal away fame, for the mischief-maker intends to steal away friendship.

(d) It is directed against a virtuous friendship, for there is no sin but rather an act of charity in the effort to end a sinful or harmful friendship, as when a parent tries to keep his daughter away from a wicked man with whom she is infatuated, or his son away from a disorderly set whose companionship appeals to the youth (see 1353).

The Sinfulness of Whispering.—(a) Theological Species.—Whispering is from its nature a mortal sin, since it is hateful to God (the soul of the Lord detesteth “him that soweth discord among brethren,” Prov., vi. 19), and deprives man of the boon of a virtuous friendship, the greatest of external goods. “A faithful friend is a strong defence, and he that hath found him hath found a treasure. Nothing can be compared to a faithful friend, and no weight of gold and silver is able to countervail the goodness of his fidelity. A faithful friend is the medicine of life and immortality” (Ecclus., vi. 14-16). Whispering is a greater sin than contumely or defamation, since honor is less esteemed than friendship, and reputation is only a means to friendship.

(b) Moral Species.—Generally, whispering is a sin against justice on account of the unjust means (e.g., force, fraud, lies, detractions) to which it resorts; but from its nature it is only a sin against charity, for the injured party has no strict right to friendship, which is a free relationship that may be terminated at will by either of the parties.

Circumstances Which Affect the Species of Whispering.—Is the species of whispering changed by circumstances?

(a) The theological species is changed when the sinful act is imperfect in malice (e.g., when the whisperer had not reflected well on the evil that would be caused by him), or when the harm done is slight (e.g., when no enmity was caused and the friendship broken up was not strong or important to the friends). It is not a small matter, however, to destroy friendships that are very necessary, such as the friendship between husband and wife, between parent and child.

(b) The moral species is not subdivided, for, though there are different kinds of friendships (see 1111), whispering is not directed against the special features, but against the general character common to all of them, namely, unity of soul and mutual affection. Hence, the whisperer is not obliged to mention in confession whether the friendship he broke up was based on utility, or pleasure, or virtue. It is clear, however, that a new species may be added to whispering. Thus, he who separates husband and wife, intending to secure the wife for himself, is guilty also of adultery; he who separates a business man and his patrons, intending to attract the trade to himself, is guilty also of theft; he who separates ruler and subjects by his whispering, is also guilty of sedition, etc.

What are the sins and vices opposed to faith? - To faith is opposed unbelief, which generally is the lack of faith; and specifically it is the lack of faith in one not baptized; and this is threefold: negative, privative, positive. The first is lack of faith in one who has never heard anything about the true religion. The other is lack of faith in one who neglects to procure for himself knowledge of faith when occasion has been given. The third is lack of faith in one to whom faith itself has been sufficiently proposed, and who positively rejects it. - Although negative unbelief, as is clear, is not a sin, nevertheless it is a punishment of sin; because if he had done what was in him, God would not have hidden faith from him. But privative and positive unbelief is a most grave sin. The reason is that the former indirectly and virtually, the latter directly and formally, contains grave contempt and injury of the authority of God revealing. Faith besides is the beginning, foundation, and root of justification. Trid. s. 6, C. 8. Therefore he who voluntarily deprives himself of faith likewise deprives himself of justification, and accordingly sins very greatly.

Heresy is also opposed to faith, and it is twofold: formal and material. The first is a voluntary and pertinacious error against some truth of faith proposed by the Church, in one who has received faith. But the other is that by which someone adheres to error against faith, but without pertinacity. Moreover to err pertinaciously here is not sharply and tooth-and-nail to defend one's error, but to retain it knowingly and voluntarily, after the contrary has been sufficiently proposed; or when it is known that the contrary is held by the universal Church of Christ on earth, to which someone prefers his own judgment, whether this is done from vainglory, or from the lust of contradicting, or from another cause. Merely material heresy is not a sin, for that error proceeds from invincible ignorance of the truth. But formal heresy is a most grave sin, as unbelief itself, for the same reasons.

Finally apostasy is opposed to faith, which is total defection from the truth of the Catholic faith. Therefore it is not distinguished in species from heresy. For whether more or less of the material object of faith is rejected, the formal object is always rejected in the same mode. It is reduced to positive unbelief if someone, departing absolutely from faith, passes over to unbelief. And if someone passes over to a sect in which false worship of God is had, he also sins against religion. Non-Catholics are as many as are not Catholics. Their genus is threefold: schismatics, heretics, apostates. More broadly non-Catholics are also infidels.

Heretics and those suspect concerning the faith must be denounced to the Bishop or Inquisitor from C. Noveritis of Nicholas II, and from the natural law, since such a crime tends to common harm. L. l. 4, n. 249 seqq.; l. 7, n. 248. But the Bishop has the faculty of proceeding in a cause of heresy even against regulars, although exempt, C. 9, de Haeret. - Those who wish to be converted from heresy to the Catholic Church before absolution must abjure their heresy and make a public profession of faith, according to what is prescribed by C. Si qui voluerint 8, can. 1, q. 7, and the Roman Ritual. - An abjuration made privately before someone delegated by the Bishop, such as a notary, and some persons as witnesses, suffices. S. O. 8 Apr. 1786; 28 Mar. 1900; Struggl, q. 2, nn. 1, 9; Suarez, d. 16, s. 1; Lugo, d. 16, n. 187, 291 seqq.; d. 18, n. 3 seqq.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 5, 10, 11, 12; L. 17 seqq.; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., ed. 1, nn. 1682, 1683, 1689, and ed. 2, nn. 1341, 1496, 2079; E. M. 346.

351 bis. Note: 1. The books of Sacred Scripture whole with all their parts, as the Holy Synod of Trent, s. 4, reviewed them, are divinely inspired, and are sacred and canonical. 2. The heresies of schismatics and Orientals are reviewed in the Epistle of Pius X, Ex quo, 26 Dec. 1910, Acta Apost. Sed., v. 3, p. 117 seqq. 3. Modernism is the collection of all heresies. - Bishops must be vigilant that it be extirpated, if it has been present, and must take precautions lest it be present.

Bishops should impede the writings of Modernists from being published and read; especially they should not be permitted to adolescents in Seminaries and to hearers in Universities. - They should establish a council of vigilance, to meet with the Bishop every other month and on a stated day. It will belong to it to investigate judgments of modernism in books and in teaching; likewise to keep watch over books and periodicals, lest dangerous questions be treated in them with weak arguments and prejudged questions; finally, over all writings concerning social matters. - By Modernism there are condemned rash and false novelties against the doctrine of Sacred Scripture and constantly handed down by the Fathers and Catholic Doctors; but by no means is there condemned any modern invention which is proved by solid reason. - Those who are prone to the errors of modernism are to be excluded from Sacred Orders. Pius X, Enc. Pascendi, 8 Sept. 1907.

4. Several errors of Americanism are condemned. Its fundamental and chief error consists in this: "It is opportune, for attracting the wills of those who disagree, if certain heads of doctrine, as if of lighter moment, are passed over, or softened so that they do not retain the same sense which the Church has constantly held." Brief to Card. Gibbons, Archbishop of Baltimore, of Leo XIII, 22 Jan. 1899, Testem benevolentiae.

What is the eighth precept of the Decalogue? - The eighth precept of the Decalogue is: You shall not speak false testimony against your neighbor. Ex. 20:16.; Matt. 18:19. By this precept, insofar as it is negative, false testimony is primarily prohibited, especially in judgment; but secondarily every unjust injury of neighbor in the goods of reputation and honor is prohibited, which is reduced to false testimony as to a principal injury; such are rash judgment, detraction, contumely, lying. But insofar as it is affirmative, it commands that, all simulation and fallacy removed, simple and naked truth be spoken. Catech. Rom. n. 2.; L. 961.

What is reputation? What is rash judgment? Reputation is: the common opinion about the life, morals, and other qualities of someone, which can increase or diminish his moral estimation. Good reputation therefore is the common opinion about the virtue, wisdom, or deeds excellently performed by another; if this goes out into external verbal testimony, it is called praise; but if into testimony, whether verbal or real, it is called honor. Hence the good reputation of someone can be unjustly injured not only through detraction and contumely, but also through an internal rash judgment about some crime or moral defect of another. One must distinguish rash doubt, suspicion, opinion, and firm judgment. Rash doubt is had when someone without sufficient reason remains suspended, yet without inclining rather into judgment of vice than of virtue. Rash suspicion is given when someone without sufficient motive inclines rather into a judgment of vice than of virtue of another; yet he suspends actual judgment. Rash opinion is given when someone without sufficient motive elicits assent concerning the vice of another, yet with fear concerning the opposite. Finally, rash judgment is given when someone without sufficient motive elicits a determined judgment concerning the vice of another without fear concerning the opposite. L. 962, 965.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 60, a. 3.

What kind of sin is rash judgment? Rash judgment is a sin opposed to justice, and from its genus mortal.

The 1st part is proved, because anyone has the right not to be judged by another to be evil as long as he does not give to this other a sufficient motive of judging that he is evil; and therefore rash judgment from its generic concept, and with any other malice prescinded, is repugnant to justice. The 2nd part is proved, because good reputation is a notable good of man; and rash judgment, although it takes away the estimation of only one person, namely of the one judging, and not also the common estimation of others, nevertheless, since it always contains contempt of neighbor, hence even only partial injury of the aforesaid reputation is grave of itself, as detraction would be grave of itself even if made before only one person. He who judges another ill from slight judgments, in a grave matter, contemns him, which is a mortal sin. Hence in 1 Tim. 6:4, evil suspicions also are numbered among mortal sins. From its genus, because more often it is only venial on account of smallness of matter, whether according to itself or with respect to the persons about whom there is question, or on account of imperfection of the act. Matt. 7:1.; L. 962.; Lugo d. 14, n. 11.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 60, a. 3, 4.

When is rash judgment a grave sin? - In order that rash judgment be a mortal sin in the individual case, three conditions are required: 1. That it be firm and deliberate. 2. In grave matter. 3. Rashly conceived, without a grave indication, about a person known to you, not about an indeterminate person or one unknown to you. This is proved, because rash judgment, unless it is firm, in grave matter, and rashly conceived, is not a grave injury of neighbor against the reputation of neighbor; but if it is not sufficiently deliberate, it is not perfect on the part of the act and the consent of the will. Therefore, unless it has the aforesaid three conditions together, it is not perfect on the part of the act and the consent of the will. Therefore, unless it has the aforesaid three conditions together, it is not a mortal sin. L. 962.; Lugo d. 14, n. 11, 23.

What kind of sin is doubt, suspicion, rash opinion? Positive doubt, suspicion, or rash opinion about another's sin is of itself only venial. This is proved, because even an opinion, if it is fearful, concerning another's crime, speaking of itself, does not inflict grave injury on him, since, simply speaking, it does not take away by judgment another's reputation; for it is not a firm judgment. - Positive rash doubt is given when someone ought from graver motives to judge someone to be good and innocent; nevertheless from other lighter motives he positively doubts, or reflexively judges that it is doubtful whether he is good or evil, innocent or guilty.

Of itself, for per accidens it can sometimes become grave; if, e.g., these acts are concerned with very extraordinary sins, or graver ones by reason of the condition of the persons whom they regard, and the opinion or suspicion proceeds from slight indications, the doubt from very slight indications; because such opinion, suspicion, or doubt is a greater injury than even a firm judgment concerning less grave ordinary sins. Thus also such acts are a grave sin if they proceed from malevolence without cause; for then they proceed from contempt of another, and therefore are reckoned a grave injury. Moreover, because for the most part thoughts of this kind creep into the mind even without deliberation, whoever does not advert with full deliberation both to the gravity of the thing thought and to the lightness of the indications is excused from grave sin. 1 Cor. 13:5.; L. 963, 964.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 60, a. 3.; Cajetan ib.; Quodl. 12, a. 34.; Lugo d. 64, n. 17.

What of negative doubt? - A purely negative doubt concerning the innocence or crime of another is no sin. This is proved, because in such doubt, arisen from some indication concerning another's crime, no graver motive existing, no one is held positively to judge another to be good and innocent, and so to expose himself to the danger of error; and therefore by suspending every judgment concerning the goodness or malice, concerning the innocence or crime of another, he does not sin. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 60, a. 4.; Less. l. 2, c. 11, n. 32-36.; Lugo d. 14, n. 21.

Note: Practically, in doubt that axiom of prudent men is to be observed: In the order of caution worse things are to be presumed, but in the order of charity and justice better things. The reason of the first part is: because each one has the right to guard against evil, especially his own or that of his own; and therefore in the order of caution he can presume worse things, at least practically, and precisely in order to avoid evil. But this does not rest on a rash judgment against someone in particular, but on a general judgment by which someone thinks it can happen that someone who is judged good is truly evil. But the reason of the latter part is: because an error precisely speculative, against truth, is a lesser evil than a practical one against charity and justice; and therefore in the order of charity and justice toward another, better things are to be presumed. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 60, a. 4 ad 3.

1. Anastasius, greatly desiring to think and judge well of all, experiences on the contrary in himself a continual inclination to judging badly of others. And this is altogether vehement when evil indications appear, which, although absolutely they could be taken in a good sense, nevertheless he is inclined to take them in a bad sense from a certain judgment which spontaneously arises in his mind, namely that matters are not to be considered speculatively and in the abstract, but practically and in the concrete, not according to the possibility of the same matters, but according to the depraved nature of men.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Anastasius does not seem to be accused of grave sin; since he does not form a rash judgment concerning persons, but only has some suspicion, which, with attention to the subjective disposition of Anastasius deliberately to think and judge well of all, is rather indeliberate than at least fully voluntary. Besides, the aforesaid suspicion of Anastasius in particular cases does not seem altogether rash, since it arises from those evil indications. Nor truly, speaking per se, is suspicion a mortal sin.

For “in those things which are mortal sins from their genus, imperfect movements are not mortal sins, but venial. For adultery is mortal, namely when the will is complete, but not when it is incomplete; for not every movement of concupiscence is a mortal sin. But judgment is twofold, concerning things and concerning persons. Judgment concerning things is always a mortal sin, say to say that giving alms is evil. But judgment concerning persons, although sometimes it is false, nevertheless is not always a sin, except when it is altogether rash.... But when from a slight matter a firm judgment proceeds in the heart, sometimes it is a mortal sin, because it is with contempt of neighbor; but suspicion is something imperfect in the genus of judgment, and therefore is an imperfect movement, and therefore it is not mortal from its genus; although if it is done from hatred, it will sometimes be mortal.” S. Th. Quodl. 12. a. 34. But Anastasius is far from hatred. Therefore he is by no means to be disturbed as guilty of grave sin. — S. Th. 2.2. q. 60. a. 3; I. M. 1483.

Nevertheless that judgment of Anastasius, which spontaneously arises in his mind, is certainly not the right rule of judging, in doubt, concerning the malice of others. For from this very thing, that someone has an evil opinion concerning another without sufficient cause, he unduly contemns him, and consequently affects him with injury. But no one ought to contemn another, or inflict any harm whatever, without a sufficient compelling cause. And therefore where manifest indications do not appear concerning the malice of someone, we ought to hold him as good, by interpreting what is doubtful in the better part. But it would be otherwise if there were question of applying a remedy to some evil: for then, in order that the remedy be applied more safely, it is expedient that that which is worse be supposed, because a remedy which is efficacious against a greater evil is much more efficacious against a lesser evil. But to suppose is not determinately and definitively to judge evil concerning others. S. Th. 2.2. q. 60. a. 3, 4; I. M. 1485.

2. Aquilinus, in order often to excite the languishing conversation of friends, narrates the sayings and deeds of some persons, whence grave detraction against the reputation of others follows; but since he himself does not intend that, nor, as he himself says, does he narrate these things from an evil mind, he thinks himself at least immune from grave sin. But he has contracted so strong a habit of detracting from the reputation of others that sometimes he scarcely even adverts that the things which he reports can bring grave harm to others.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Aquilinus is guilty of detraction at least in cause. For it is evident that he himself sufficiently knows the depraved habit contracted, which he ought to strive efficaciously to uproot. By reason of actual inadvertence he can sometimes be excused from actual grave fault. For detraction can easily be venial not only on account of lightness of matter, or slight damage inflicted on the neighbor, but also on account of defect of sufficient advertence, on account of the sudden impulse of passion.

“Sins of speech,” says S. Th. 2.2. q. 73. a. 3, “have some lightness, insofar as they easily proceed from a slip of the tongue without great premeditation.” But Aquilinus is not to be excused from grave sin from the fact that without the intention of harming others, but from mere lightness of mind, he gravely detracts from others. For it makes no difference that detraction is not directly intended; it suffices that it is implicitly willed, namely if those things are advertently said from which detraction arises.

3. Guido constantly speaks about Iulius, and constantly reports his slight defects, which he sometimes exaggerates, at one time adverting that what he says is not true, at another almost inadvertently from his very slippery loquacity. Nevertheless Guido thinks himself immune at least from mortal sin, because in truth he says and manifests only slight things, and this seems to him to be done by himself without a malicious mind. — Does Guido sin gravely?

R. It can easily happen that Guido sins gravely. For by this very fact, that Guido reflexively considers his manner of speaking, whence he thinks himself at least immune from grave sin, that Iulius, concerning whom he speaks so easily and freely, does not seem to be any common person whatever, but a person of some note, and to whom perhaps grave damage can thereby be brought. Wherefore, for rendering a definitive judgment, it is necessary that Guido expose the personal conditions of Iulius. For if grave harm is brought to Iulius as to reputation, or even as to temporal goods from that manner of speaking, there is no doubt that Guido sins gravely both against charity and against justice. That he himself does not speak thus from a malicious mind does not of itself excuse from grave sin, objectively speaking, just as it does not impede real grave damage. Therefore Guido perhaps could then be excused from grave sin, but only on account of his subjective ignorance and some good faith. Nevertheless, without doubt, if in truth he gravely injures the reputation of Iulius and brings him some other grave damage, he himself is placed in a grave illusion. G. 427, 428; I. M. 1487, 1488.

4. Menander, a servant, was dismissed by his master Balduinus because of a hidden theft. When Lord Martinus wished to take Menander as a servant in his house, he asks Balduinus whether Menander is honest and faithful. Balduinus then opens to him the reason on account of which he dismissed him.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Balduinus could, without detraction, manifest the theft of Menander to Martinus. There was present a grave and sufficient reason for such manifestation, namely the grave damage of Martinus to be averted. In truth, the grave defects of others and grave sins can generally be manifested to some person, if this is done from a grave reason of averting grave damage, whether temporal or spiritual, from some community, or family, or private person. For then those whose defects and sins are revealed no longer have a right that they not be uncovered with the damage of others. Others also have a right, and a prevailing one, to avert damage of this sort from themselves; to whose right in the Case the right to one’s own reputation yields, for this right cannot exist with the injury of others.

Hence also a maidservant, e.g., who has left a master depraved in morals and dangerous to maids, can warn another maid who, ignorant of the matter and in good faith, is arranging to devote her services to the same master. Hence also generally someone can reveal the defects and sins of another by reason of grave damage of his own or of another to be impeded, although in this way a marriage is impeded, or the obtaining of an inheritance, or the obtaining of another benefice. — I. M. 1494; G. 426, 427.

5. Alexius, whatever evil he hears concerning others, in familiar conversation with his friends and companions, is accustomed at once to report to others. Hence it happens that discords and dissensions arise among friends and companions, and since no one dares to manifest to others the cause of his own displeasure, Alexius easily enjoys the friendship and confidence of all, and dominates all despotically. Alexius, adverting his own malice, often confesses that he has detracted from the reputation of his neighbor, nevertheless adding that the matter was of little importance, and was done rather for the sake of laughter and jest than with a malicious mind. Whence, easily receiving absolution, he frequently receives the sacraments of penance and the Eucharist.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Alexius is to be numbered among whisperers, an abominable race of men, since secretly they sow discords among brothers and friends. How many evils whisperers cause in families, in colleges, in seminaries, in religious communities, cannot easily be said. A whisperer and a double-tongued man is accursed; for he will disturb many who have peace. Eccli. 28:15. But Alexius, speaking per se, does not sufficiently confess his sin, or rather his continual sins. For the sin is not light, but grave, although perhaps the matter of detraction is light, by reason, namely, of the depraved effect gravely evil and harmful, i.e., of the grave displeasure engendered in the souls of his friends and brothers against friends and brothers, and of grave dissension and discord arisen among them. Alexius perhaps deceives himself in this so grave and delicate matter; but a prudent confessor ought not be content with so superficial a confession. Nor truly does Alexius sufficiently explain his sin by saying that he detracted from the reputation of his neighbor. For whispering is of a diverse species and graver than detraction. S. Th. 2.2. q. 74. a. 2; I. M. 1486.

465. • 1. Rash judgment is a firm assent conceived from slight indications concerning some sin or defect of the neighbor: it must be distinguished from opinion, which is a less firm assent and with fear of the opposite.

2. Rash suspicion is a certain inclination to assent concerning the evil of the neighbor from insufficient reason.

3. Doubt is a suspension of the mind determining itself to neither part.

466. Principles. - I. Rash judgment concerning the fault of the neighbor is a mortal sin from its genus against justice; for each one has a right to a good estimation of himself among individuals, nor must anyone be presumed evil until he is proved such: therefore he inflicts grave injury on the neighbor who rashly judges against him in a grave matter. Yet rather often it is venial on account of the smallness of the matter or the imperfection of the act.

II. For the gravity of rash judgment there is required, 1. that it be firm, or without doubt; 2. that it be fully deliberate and voluntary; 3. that it be in a grave matter concerning a determinate and known person; 4. that it be based on indications which are known to be slight and inept for judging. The reason for these things is that otherwise it would not be a true judgment, nor truly rash, nor gravely injurious to the neighbor. But often it is light on account of the defect of one of the conditions mentioned. - St. Lig., n. 962.

III. Rash suspicion and doubt about the stain of the neighbor are only venial from their genus. The reason is that, on account of the weak and easily movable adhesion, ordinarily they bring only light damage to the neighbor, since they do not take away reputation, but only diminish it and render it doubtful. - St. Lig., n. 963. - But if someone without reason, but from malevolence, persists in suspicion or doubt about a very grave matter, he will scarcely escape mortal sin. - St. Lig., n. 963.

467. Resolves. - 1. He does not sin gravely who judges sinisterly about the neighbor, if the judgment rests upon indications sufficient for prudent probability, because moral certitude and true probability do not differ so much that it should be considered a grave injury to hold as almost certain what is very probable. - St. Lig., n. 962.

2. He does not sin gravely who, in judging, does not attend fully to the insufficiency of the motives, although he notices that he judges less prudently; or if he admits only slight negligence in repelling the judgment. - St. Lig., ibid.; Hom. apost., n. 1.

3. He does not sin gravely who judges rashly about someone indeterminate among many, for example, of some group or community, or even about someone determinate indeed, but unknown to himself. - St. Lig., ibid.

4. You would not judge rashly if, hearing something from an upright and trustworthy man against the neighbor, you believed it. Much less if you only suspected or doubted, since much less is required for prudent suspicion or doubt than for prudent judgment; but otherwise if you heard something from a perverse man or one badly disposed toward another.

5. Suspicion or even doubt that is plainly rash, namely based on no reason, can be a mortal sin if it is occupied with sins very extraordinary and grave by reason of the condition of the persons whom it regards; because a suspicion or doubt of this sort is a greater injury than even a firm judgment concerning less grave sins. - St. Lig., n. 964.

6. It is lawful to forestall damages from fear that is not altogether imprudent; and thus, for example, you can keep your things under guard lest they be stolen by a stranger staying in your house; because although you cannot positively judge that this or that man is a thief, nevertheless you can most excellently consult for yourself, since you know certainly that there are sometimes thieves among men, although they are considered alien from theft.

365. 1. Notion. (A) The good estimation to which the neighbor has a right, as long as his malice is not clear, is injured as often as by slight and insufficient indications we think evil about him and give consent to this thought.

¹ St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 60, a. 2-4; Sotus, lib. III, quaest. IV, a. 3-4; Lugo, disp. XIV, n. 10-33; Sayrus, Clavis regia sacerdotum, Venice, 1618, lib. XII, c. 3; St. Alphonsus, n. 962-967; Carriere, n. 860-868; Ball. P., Tr. VI, n. 1056-1066; Lehmkuhl, n. 1185-1187; Haine, De Decalogo, q. 167-169; Noldin, n. 647-650.

(B) There are various grades toward rash judgment: (a) doubt concerning the neighbor's honesty, when we deliberately suspend judgment concerning his probity, and indeed from insufficient motives; (b) suspicion, by which, from slight indications, not indeed firmly, but with great fear of erring, we judge that the neighbor has done something evil; (c) opinion, by which not certainly, but probably, from insufficient motives, we pronounce that the neighbor has done something evil. - Rash judgment properly so called is a firm assent of the mind concerning the sin or fault of the neighbor conceived without sufficient reason. - Psychologically, the transition from doubt and suspicion into firm judgment is easily made.

In all these grades, rashness arises from this, that someone judges evil of the neighbor without sufficient reason; but if he were judging according to proofs and things alleged, doubting when a sufficient reason for doubting is present, or pronouncing certainly when moral certainty is present, the judgment would be prudent, not rash, and therefore not sinful under this head.

366. (C) The causes from which rash judgment proceeds are assigned as three by St. Thomas:² "In one way indeed from this, that someone is evil in himself; and from this very thing, as if conscious of his own malice, he easily thinks evil of others... In another way it comes from this, that someone is badly affected toward another; for when someone despises or hates someone, or is angry with him or envies him, from slight signs he thinks evil about him, because each one easily believes what he desires. In a third way it comes from long experience; whence the Philosopher says that 'old men are especially suspicious, because many times they have experienced the defects of others.'" - Therefore there are three causes: the depravity of the one judging himself; hatred and envy; experience of human frailty. The first two show perversity of affection and increase the malice of the act; the third diminishes the same.

² St. Thomas, q. 60, a. 3.

367. 2. Principle: Rash judgment properly so called in a grave matter is a mortal sin against justice.

It is explained; here there is question of rash judgment properly so called, that is: (a) certain, not indeed metaphysically but morally, insofar as it is firmly judged that the neighbor has done something evil; for if the judgment is only doubtful, generally the injury inflicted upon the neighbor is not grave.

(b) Deliberately brought forth, that is, after sufficient advertence of the mind, by which the one judging rashly attends to the gravity of the matter and the slightness of the motives, and nevertheless wills to give assent; therefore, if the judgment is sudden, conceived from levity rather than from malice, the sin will be only light; and under this head many rash judgments, grave of themselves, do not exceed venial sin.

368. (c) From insufficient motives; for he who from a grave or even probable motive judges sinisterly about another does not sin gravely; yet he sins lightly if, with all the circumstances considered, the judgment exceeds the limits of prudent assent. Hence in practice attention must be paid to the various circumstances of person, time, place, etc. - Thus if a man of depraved morals speaks lingerlingly with a suspect woman, it is not rash to judge that something evil is being transacted there; otherwise, if an upright man has conversation with the same woman; - if someone unknown secretly and at night enters another's dwelling, it is not rashly judged that a depraved intention is present in him; otherwise if by day a known person enters openly; - likewise if seditious men gather in a dark place and converse there in a low voice, they are deservedly judged to be conspiring toward something evil; otherwise, if there is question of upright men who are gathered in an open place.

(d) In a grave matter, for if the matter is light, the sin will be only venial. But matter is held grave which, with attention paid to the quality of the person and other circumstances, notably injures his reputation; e.g., if someone rashly judges that some soldier, who has several times fought a singular combat, provoked an enemy to a duel, the sin is not grave, since the soldier in question would by no means judge himself injured by this judgment; otherwise if the same judgment were made concerning a priest.

369. It is proved. (A) Each one has a strict right to preserving a good reputation and good estimation among others, as long as it is not morally certain that he is wicked; now that right is gravely violated by rash judgment clothed with those conditions which we have set forth above; since, in a grave matter, without sufficient motive, deliberately and certainly, we judge that the neighbor is guilty of some sin or vice, and unjustly deprive him of the good estimation to which he had a right among us.

This indeed will be better understood if we attend to the three things required for a judgment to be brought equitably: authority in the judge, accurate knowledge of the cause, and perfect integrity, or immunity from prejudices and passions; now these three things are lacking in rash judgment: (a) authority is lacking, since private men, superiors excepted, have received no mandate for judging others; (b) accurate knowledge of the matter is lacking, since by hypothesis the judgment is rash; on the other hand, often judgment is brought from fallacious appearances or from false testimonies of others, and not only concerning external acts, but also concerning intentions which are known to God alone; (c) integrity is lacking, since judgments of this kind for the most part arise from envy, hatred, or prejudices.¹

¹ Bourdaloue solidly develops this, Careme, Sermon for the Friday of the Fifth Week, on Rash Judgment.

370. Hence Scripture prohibits us from judging and condemning the morals of others: "Judge not, that you may not be judged: for with what judgment you shall judge, you shall be judged... Condemn not, and you shall not be condemned";² and especially lest, while we ourselves are bound by the same or greater sins, we judge severely concerning the lesser sins of others: "Wherefore you are inexcusable, O every man who judges; for in that in which you judge another, you condemn yourself: for you do the same things which you judge";³ hence he who judges his brother offends the law: "He who detracts from a brother, or who judges his brother, detracts from the law, and judges the law."⁴

² Matt., VII, 1-2; Luke, VI, 37.

³ Rom., II, 1.

⁴ James, IV, 11.

371. 3. Corollaries. (A) Rash doubt, suspicion, and opinion concerning the probity of the neighbor generally are only venial sins, because they do not utterly take away the good estimation of the neighbor, but only diminish it, and therefore do not inflict a grave injury.

Yet in a twofold case they can be mortal: (a) if they are deliberately brought forth concerning most grave sins, without any probable foundation, e.g., if someone rashly suspects that a pious priest is a heretic, or that an upright man and one above every exception is guilty of theft; for simple suspicion in the case inflicts grave injury;⁵ (b) if someone from envy or hatred, without sufficient motive, voluntarily fosters suspicions concerning a grave matter; for then the sin is grave, on account of the evil affection from which it arises.

⁵ A few theologians indeed deny this (in St. Alphonsus, n. 964), relying on the authority of St. Thomas, l. c., a. 3; but the holy Doctor there hands down a general rule, saying nothing about the exception; therefore his authority is alleged in vain.

372. (B) In relation to the mode of conducting oneself with respect to the neighbor: (a) we are not indeed bound, when there is reason for doubting whether the neighbor's actions are to be taken in a good or in an evil part, always to bring a judgment favoring the neighbor; but it is licit to abstain from judging.¹ (b) In the external mode of acting, we are by no means prohibited from applying precautions for guarding against our own or another's damage, just as if the neighbor were wicked; thus it is licit to lock money in a chest, lest it be stolen by servants or unknown guests; for since among men who are judged upright there are some who are in reality wicked, he acts prudently who uses precautions of this kind, without nevertheless doubting without reason concerning the probity of this or that individual.

¹ Yet charity counsels that, insofar as this can be done, we understand the actions of the neighbor in the better part; charity is kind, and does not think evil. I Cor., XIII, 4. - Faber discusses Christian kindness at length, Spiritual Conferences, on kindness, in French Confer. spirituelles, Bonte.

373. (C) All rash judgments, whatever the object concerning which they turn, are of the same moral species, because they violate the same right; therefore it is not necessary in confession to set forth the object of the rash judgment, but it suffices to declare whether the matter is grave or not.

199. Notions. With respect to acts of the mind not externally manifested and concerning the evil of one's neighbor, it is useful to distinguish four degrees, which are: doubt, suspicion, rash opinion, and rash judgment.

Rash doubt is the suspension of judgment concerning the evil of another without sufficient reason.

Rash suspicion (ungerechter Verdacht) is a certain inclination of judgment concerning the evil of another without sufficient reason.

Rash opinion is a probable and non-firm assent of the mind concerning the evil of another without sufficient motive. - There is not so great a difference between rash opinion and rash suspicion; for suspicion is nothing other than a weak opinion.⁴²⁷

Rash judgment (ungerechtes, freventliches Urteil) is the firm assent of the mind concerning the vice of another without sufficient reason.

These four acts of the mind are sinful for this reason, that they proceed not so much from an objective consideration of the matter as rather from an evil will bending the intellect without sufficient objective motives. The Angelic Doctor writes to the point: "Rash suspicion [the same holds for rash judgment] occurs from three things: in one way indeed from this, that someone is evil in himself; and from this very fact, conscious of his own malice, he easily thinks evil of others, according to that saying: A fool walking in the way, since he himself is foolish, judges all to be fools.⁴²⁸ - In another way it arises from this, that someone is badly disposed toward another; for when someone contemns or hates another, or is angry with or envies him, from slight signs he thinks evil things concerning him, because everyone easily believes what he desires. - In a third way it arises from long experience...."⁴²⁹

⁴²⁷ Cf. Billuart, De iure et iust. diss. 7, a. 2.

⁴²⁸ Eccles. 10, 3.

⁴²⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 60, a. 3.

200. Moral malice. Rash judgment properly so called is from its genus a mortal sin against justice.

I say: rash judgment properly so called, i.e., insofar as it includes firm assent and is distinguished from rash suspicion and opinion. For theologians dispute greatly whether rash suspicion and opinion also are from their genus mortal sins. Báñez, Sylvius, Medina, and others⁴³⁰ are cited for the affirmative opinion; Cajetan, Ledesma, Navarrus, Lessius, and others stand for the negative. This controversy is theoretical rather than practical, because in practice it is difficult to distinguish between rash judgment and rash opinion. Billuart treats this controversy excellently, as also the matter of rash judgment in general, thinking that rash suspicion is more probably a mortal sin from its genus.⁴³¹ - At least that rash judgment is from its genus a mortal sin is proved from the fact that everyone has a strict right to a good reputation and the esteem of others so long as he is not proved evil. But he who rashly judges concerning a vice of his neighbor acts against that right and unjustly esteems his neighbor lightly. Nor let anyone say that justice, since it concerns exterior things and operations, cannot be injured by a judgment which is an interior act. For justice is truly injured by those interior acts which of themselves are ordered toward just or unjust external things and operations. Thus the will to steal is an act of injustice, but the will to restore is an act of justice.

Bourdaloue⁴³² demonstrates excellently the unlawfulness of rash judgment, teaching, with the Angelic Doctor preceding him, that three things are required for lawfully rendering a judgment: authority in the judge, accurate knowledge of the case, and perfect freedom from prejudices. But in rash judgment legitimate authority is lacking, since private men are so often deterred in Sacred Scripture from rendering judgment: "Judge not, and you shall not be judged; condemn not, and you shall not be condemned."⁴³³ Accurate knowledge of the matter is lacking; otherwise there would no longer be a rash judgment but a just one. Freedom from prejudices is lacking, since judgments of this kind are accustomed to arise from envy, hatred, etc., as St. Thomas explained above.

All rash judgments are of the same moral species, because they all violate the same right, namely, the right to good esteem. Hence the particular matter of a rash judgment need not be set forth in confession.

⁴³⁰ The Angelic Doctor says: "From this very fact that someone has an evil opinion concerning another without sufficient cause, he injures and contemns him" (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 60, a. 4). But he who contemns another and injures him commits a sin which is from its genus mortal.

⁴³¹ L.c.

⁴³² Carême, "Sermon sur le jugement téméraire." St. Thomas had already taught the same, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 60, a. 2.

⁴³³ Luke 6, 37; cf. Matt. 7, 1 sqq.; Rom. 2, 1; Jas. 2, 4.

201. Required conditions. For rash judgment to be a mortal sin in the individual case, three things are required: 1. that it be perfectly deliberate; 2. that it be fully rash; 3. that it concern a grave vice of one's neighbor.

Because the first condition, namely, perfect deliberation, is lacking, he does not sin gravely who is ignorant or does not advert that he is judging from insufficient signs concerning the existence of a grave vice in his neighbor. Hence in persons of timorous conscience, who are not blinded by hatred nor are accustomed to consent firmly to suspicions or judgments of this kind, grave sin occurs most rarely in this matter.

Because the second condition, namely, full rashness, is lacking, those judgments concerning a grave vice of one's neighbor which rest upon true, although insufficient, indications are not mortal sins. For lawfully forming a judgment, however, indications inducing moral, but not absolute, certitude suffice. Since no one is presumed evil, indications ought to be interpreted in the better part, unless all the circumstances compel the contrary. Hence, e.g., if a lascivious young man has been seen speaking or playing secretly with a girl in a somewhat dark place, there is a sufficient indication for judging that some evil lies beneath; on the contrary, if the same young man is seen conversing with a girl in an open place and at midday, there is not yet a sufficient indication for suspecting some evil.

Because the third condition, namely, grave matter, is lacking, all judgments, even rash and deliberate ones, which concern vices not so disgraceful, are not gravely evil. Grave matter in rash judgment, as also in detraction, is only that which, considering the quality of the persons and the fact, is very disgraceful and gravely harmful to the honor, reputation, and good esteem of one's neighbor. Wherefore, e.g., rashly to think that some unruly maidservant is also a liar is not a grave sin; but rashly to judge that some bishop is a liar is a mortal sin.⁴³⁴

Note. 1. Although it is not lawful rashly to suspect or judge that one's neighbor is vicious, nevertheless it is not necessary to hold him positively good. Hence it is lawful to judge that he can become evil, and therefore to forestall damage which perhaps could come from others. Therefore it is lawful, e.g., to lock up money, to carry defensive weapons, to bar doors, etc.

2. A rash judgment which is conceived only interiorly and in no way manifested exteriorly is rarely a mortal sin, because the three conditions enumerated above are rarely present. But when a rash judgment is manifested to others, it will more easily be a mortal sin, because then the character of defamation is added.

⁴³⁴ Cf. Billuart, De iure et iust. diss. 7, a. 2.

536. • 1° Rash judgment is firm assent, conceived from light indications, concerning some sin or defect of one's neighbor: it must be distinguished from opinion, which is assent less firm and with fear concerning the opposite.

2° Rash suspicion is a certain inclination to assent concerning the evil of one's neighbor from an insufficient reason.

3° Doubt is a suspension of the mind determining itself toward neither part.

537. Principles. - I. Rash judgment concerning the fault of one's neighbor is a mortal sin from its own genus against justice; for each one has a right to a good estimation of himself before individuals, nor should anyone be presumed evil until he is proved: consequently he inflicts grave injury on the neighbor who judges rashly against him in a grave matter. Yet more often it is venial because of smallness of matter or imperfection of the act.

II. For the gravity of rash judgment it is required 1° that it be firm, or without doubt; 2° that it be fully deliberate and voluntary; 3° that it be in a grave matter concerning a determined and known person; 4° that it rests upon indications which are known as light and inept for judging. The reason for these things is that otherwise it would not be a true judgment, nor truly rash, nor gravely injurious to the neighbor. But often it is slight because of the defect of some one of the conditions commemorated.²

III. Rash suspicion, opinion, and doubt concerning the stain of a neighbor are venial from their own genus. The reason is that on account of weak and easily movable adherence they ordinarily bring only slight damage to the neighbor, since they do not remove reputation, but only diminish it and render it doubtful.³ - But doubt concerning an extraordinary sin is grave, because it inflicts a greater injury than certain judgment concerning an ordinary one.¹

538. You will resolve. - 1° He does not sin gravely who judges sinisterly about a neighbor if the judgment rests on indications sufficient for prudent probability, because moral certainty and true probability are not so distant that it is judged a grave injury to hold as almost certain that which is very probable.²

2° He does not sin gravely who, in judging, does not advert fully to the insufficiency of the motives, or to the grave matter of rash judgment, or admits only slight negligence in repelling the judgment.³

3° He does not sin gravely who rashly judges concerning someone indeterminate among several, for example of some assembly or community, or even concerning a determined person whom, for example, he sees from afar but does not know.⁴

4° You would not judge rashly if, hearing something from an upright and trustworthy man against a neighbor, you believed it. Much less if you only suspected or doubted, since much less is required for prudent suspicion or doubt than for prudent judgment; but otherwise if you heard something from a perverse man or one badly affected toward another.

5° Doubtful things are to be interpreted in the better part in this sense: that if in doubt about someone you wish to make a firm judgment, you are bound to make it in the better part, since in doubt he cannot be despoiled of his right; but not in this sense, that, a founded doubt having been left, you ought to conceive a firm judgment concerning him in the better part: for you are not bound to expose yourself to the danger of erring.⁵ Hence:

6° It is licit to guard against damages from fear not altogether imprudent; and so, for example, you can keep your things under guard, lest they be stolen by a stranger staying in your house; because, although you cannot judge positively that this or that man is a thief, nevertheless you can consult for yourself excellently, since you know for certain that there are sometimes thieves among men. Wherefore Superiors also deservedly observe subjects.

1191. DEFINITION. Rash judgment is a firm assent, arising from slight indications, by which some sin or defect is attributed to neighbor.

Other internal acts approach rash judgment: 1. rash SUSPICION, which is a less firm assent and with fear concerning the opposite; 2. DOUBT, which is a suspension of the soul determining itself to neither part. Yet these grades are not rarely used promiscuously.

"Rashness in judgments, suspicions, and doubts has place when we consider that which is against, and not that which is for; and when we give to indications or reasons contrary to our neighbor more weight than they really have; whence either we judge probable what is only possible; or certain what is doubtful; or grave what is light; or continuous what perhaps was committed once; or finally malicious what perhaps was done inadvertently or even reasonably" (Berardi, Theol. mor., III, n. 499).

1192. PRINCIPLES. I. Rash judgment concerning a grave evil of neighbor is a mortal sin from its genus. The reason is that a grave injury is done to neighbor when, without cause, he is held to be wicked; since each one has a right that a false crime not be imputed to him (III, 973). Whence it is said (Matt., 7, 1): Judge not, that you may not be judged. And (1 Cor., 4): Judge not before the time (that is, of judgment). - "In confession, however, it is not necessary to explain the species of the evil judged, since all (rash judgments) are opposed to one commutative justice, in the lowest species" (III, 962).

Rash judgment is VENIAL: a) if someone has great probability for judging sinisterly about neighbor; b) if the evil which is attributed to neighbor is not gravely injurious, for example that a soldier blasphemed; c) if the judgment is made concerning someone unknown or indetermined among several, for example if he is a member of a certain group; d) if someone judges from involuntary subreption, as often happens, not perfectly adverting either to the gravity of the object or to the insufficiency of the reasons from which he judges (III, l. c.).

1193. II. Rash suspicion and doubt per se are sins only venial. Commonly all these are only a certain incitement to assent; for in some way a good estimation of neighbor remains in the mind: therefore no grave injury is done to him, since he is not totally disturbed from possession of good reputation.

Yet per accidens the sin is more probably grave, "if without indications a suspicion were made concerning the gravest sins, as it would be to suspect concerning a pious religious that he is a heretic, or that he has committed incest with his mother; or concerning a man commonly held as Catholic, that he is Jewish or atheist. The reason is that perhaps greater injury

is inflicted upon them by suspecting such things than if a certain judgment were had concerning ordinary grave crimes of theirs." Likewise, suspicions put on GRAVE guilt if they proceed from contempt or gravely sinful hatred, or if they are manifested to someone with grave damage of neighbor (III, 963, 965). Cf. the things to be said n. 1195.

1194. III. He who has rashly suspected or judged is held from justice to reform his suspicion and his judgment. This is plain from the things said: for every injury of justice must be repaired, insofar as can be done (cf. n. 726).

Note. 1. "If sinister suspicions are going to have practical consequences to the great burden of neighbor (for example if it were a question of a Superior who, without such suspicion, would be about to confer a benefice on such a priest; or of a master who on account of the suspicion would be about to cast a servant out from his own service with the servant's greatest damage); then it does not suffice to take care that those indications which are against not be increased by the imagination, and that those which present themselves spontaneously in favor not be voluntarily rejected; but it is moreover necessary that, according to the gravity and possibility of the matters, inquiries be made, so that the truth may be discerned."

2. "Suspicions and judgments against neighbor can in some way be sins, although they are not rash; and this happens when someone willingly thinks about the defects and vices of others (especially if he studiously inquires about them) without any reason and excusable motive; for thoughts of this kind are against charity (charity does not think evil: 1 Cor., 13), they beget aversions, and they have nourishment from some passion" (Berardi, l. c., n. 500, 503).

For practice St. Alphonsus warns: "In this matter let the confessor advert that many rude persons accuse themselves that they have judged rashly. It is necessary to make it so that they know: a) When sufficient moments are present for thus judging about some action, the judgment is not rash, but just, and therefore is not culpable. b) These, for the most part, are not judgments, but suspicions, which masters and fathers of families are sometimes held to have, so that they may impede some sin: for example lest servants steal, lest daughters sin by conversing with men, and other things of this kind. Only let it be adverted that they not communicate suspicions of this kind to others without necessity" (H. Ap., IX, 2).

C. Rash judgment also is mortal sin:

1. if it is greatly important to the person that it not be formed;

2. if it proceeds from hatred;

3. if it is done with great malevolence;

4. if it is in great contempt of a superior or otherwise has grave consequences.

But it is required that it be formed with great temerity and be perfectly rash, i.e., that there be great disproportion between the reasons and the assent, so that firm assent is furnished by light motives.

S. Th., II-II, q. 60, a. 2, 3 and 4.

418. Rash judgment (vermetel oordeel) or suspicious judgment is that which someone pronounces concerning those things which are doubtful or hidden because of certain slight conjectures; whence in the matter of justice it is that by which from slight and insufficient motives we judge evil concerning another.

To rash judgment there can be an ascent of the mind through various degrees of suspicion: the first is doubt concerning the honesty of one's neighbor, when concerning his probity we deliberately suspend judgment from insufficient motives; it is not mere doubt or absence of adhesion, a mere suspension of judgment concerning the evil of another, but a positive act by which, namely, we will to doubt and judge that one must doubt; - the second is suspicion, by which from slight motives and with great fear of erring we incline to judging that one's neighbor has done something evil; - the third is opinion, by which, not certainly but as likely and with fear, from insufficient motives we judge that one's neighbor has done something evil: it is therefore an assent of judgment, but not firm, concerning the evil of another; - the fourth follows, rash judgment strictly so called, or a firm and certain assent concerning the evil of one's neighbor given without sufficient reason. But how from an insufficient motive there can be a certain judgment is understood from the fact that the discussion is not concerning certainty properly so called, or concerning an absolutely certain assent from an evident motive, but concerning a morally certain assent which arises from an impulse of the will; but this can move the intellect to a rash assent, by bending it to assent without sufficient objective motives, even determining it to adhere firmly because of slight motives, graver motives being set after them (n. 73).

In all the aforesaid degrees, rashness or imprudence arises from this, that someone without a sufficient motive judges ill concerning his neighbor; but if he judged according to things proved and alleged, doubting when there is a sufficient reason for doubting, opining when a grave reason is present although merely probable and not certain, or pronouncing certainly when the reasons are morally certain, the judgment would be prudent, not rash nor sinful.

419. The causes from which rash judgment proceeds are indicated by St. Thomas, q. 60, a. 3: It happens from three things; "in one way indeed from this, that someone is evil in himself; and from this very thing, as though conscious of his own malice, he easily thinks evil of others... In another way it proceeds from this, that someone is badly affected toward another: for when someone despises or hates someone, or is angry with him or envies him, from slight signs he thinks evils concerning him, because each one easily believes what he desires. In a third way it proceeds from long experience; whence the Philosopher says that 'old men are especially suspicious, because they have often experienced the defects of others.' But the first two causes of suspicion manifestly pertain to perversity of affection; the third, however, lessens the nature of suspicion, insofar as experience advances toward certainty, which is contrary to the nature of suspicion."

420. Thesis. Rash judgment strictly so called is a sin against justice, grave from its genus. - It is said:

1. judgment strictly so called, i.e., a firm and morally certain assent: for doubt or suspicion from its genus is not a grave sin but a light one;

2. rash, i.e., knowingly and deliberately uttered with advertence to the slightness and insufficiency of the motives;

3. it is a sin against justice, because it is a way of acting unjustly against one's neighbor. For an internal act also regards justice, insofar as of itself it is ordered to external things and operations just or unjust, as the will of stealing or of restoring. Thus internal rash judgment is ordered to an external judgment against reputation and honor (a. 3 ad 3);

4. grave from its genus: for it can be light not only from lack of deliberation or lightness, but also from smallness of matter, namely, from slight rashness.

Namely, mortal sin is not present except by great rashness, for which three conditions are required:

a) perfect deliberation or full advertence at least in a confused way to the gravity of the thing and the insufficiency of the motives; whence if the judgment is altogether sudden, or conceived rather from lightness than from malice, the sin will be light, as often happens among men of timorous conscience, who are not accustomed to consent to such judgments;

b) full rashness or notable disproportion between the reasons and the assent, so that certain assent is given to motives altogether slight; whence the sin is light if the motives are not sufficient but approach sufficiency. Concerning this in practice judgment must be made with all circumstances considered:

Thus if a lascivious youth is seen speaking or playing secretly with a girl and in a somewhat dark place, it is a sufficient indication for judging that there is something evil; on the contrary if the same youth, or an upright man, is seen conversing with a girl in an open place in the middle of the day. If an unknown man secretly and by night enters another's house, it is not rashly judged that an evil intention is in him, otherwise if openly by day, or if a known person even by night;

c) gravity of matter, which is to be attended to from the harm inflicted, because with the quality of the persons and fact considered it is very disgraceful and notably harmful to the honor, reputation, and good estimation of one's neighbor. Hence to hold a maidservant to be lying without reason is not a grave sin; on the contrary, to hold a bishop so; to hold an unknown soldier to be a fornicator is not grave; on the contrary, to hold a priest so.

It is proved: 1) Each one has a strict right to good reputation or the good estimation of others as long as he is not morally certainly proved evil. But that right is violated by rash judgment, which of itself is grave, because it imports contempt of one's neighbor and begets dishonoring. For he who judges evil concerning another, noticing that there is no motive for judging thus, maliciously contemns him. Thus St. Thomas says:

"If it concerns something grave it is a mortal sin, insofar as it is not without contempt of one's neighbor" (a. 3); "from this very fact that someone has an evil opinion concerning another, without sufficient cause, he unduly contemns him, and therefore injures him" (ibid. ad 2). Whence Lugo: just as we sin against justice by taking away the reputation of one's neighbor among others through detraction, so among ourselves by rash judgment. And thus it differs in species from detraction.

2. For a judgment to be justly borne, three things are required: the authority of the one judging, the right reason of prudence or accurate knowledge of the cause, and perfect integrity (S. Th., a. 2). But these three are lacking in rash judgment: a) authority is lacking, since it is pronounced by a private person without office, and in circumstances in which it is done without any necessity or due office; b) accurate knowledge of the thing is lacking, since by hypothesis the judgment is rash, pronounced not from objective consideration of the thing but from an insufficient motive; c) integrity is often lacking, since for the most part it is pronounced from prejudice, envy, hatred, or from one's own perversity, not from the inclination of justice.

3. Whence Scripture often prohibits us from judging our neighbor; which at least must be understood concerning an unfounded and rash judgment (Mt. VII, 1-2; Lk. VI, 37; Rom. II, 1; Jas. IV, 11).

421. Rash suspicion (lichtvaardig vermoeden, ongegronde verdenking), under which name among theologians there also comes either rash doubting or rash opinion, of itself and regularly is only a venial sin, because it is not something full in the nature of judgment and contempt, but incomplete.

Nevertheless exceptionally and by accident it can be mortal: 1) if deliberately and without any probable foundation it is made concerning a very grave sin (incest, sodomy, bestiality) as to men altogether upright, as if a pious priest were doubted to be a heretic: for suspicion concerning such a sin can be more injurious than certain affirmation concerning an ordinary sin; but it is so only because of the special circumstances joined to it; 2) if it proceeds from envy or grave hatred: for then it is grave because of the affection from which it arises.

422. Practical admonitions. - 1. Although, if there is a serious reason for doubting concerning the goodness of one's neighbor, we cannot judge or opine evil concerning him, nevertheless we are not bound positively to esteem him good (this belongs to greater charity) unless his goodness is truly established, but we can suspend judgment.

2. In the external manner of acting we are by no means prohibited, for forestalling our own or another's damage, from employing due precautions, just as if one's neighbor were dishonest; for example, to shut money in a chest lest it be secretly taken by servants or unknown guests. For this belongs to prudence. It is lawful to judge concerning someone that he can become evil, and consequently, common frailty being considered, to apply a remedy lest he become evil, and thus to forestall damage, without however positively doubting without reason concerning the probity of someone in particular.

3. Rash judgments, although they are concerned with a diverse object, are probably of the same species, because they violate the same right of one's neighbor; and consequently those objects are not to be declared in confession, but it suffices to indicate the gravity or lightness of the matter.

S. Th. II-II, q. 60; and 63, a. 1.

612. Judgment is the act of a judge, or of a superior judging, insofar as he is judge; this act pertains formally and more than the others to distributive justice. For distribution includes and supposes a judgment of authority concerning the goods of the community, with the common good nevertheless preserved, to be divided among members proportionately to their dignity, or concerning guardianship or protection to be conceded to them proportionately to the quantity of their goods and rights.

A judge, etymologically, is as it were one speaking right (ius dicens), whence he is a public person instituted for this: that he may speak right to those subject to him according to the prescription of law. Hence judgment:

1. In its primary signification and most properly imports the right definition or determination of right or of the just, which is the object of justice; and therefore judgment is an act of justice. But judgment is understood according to excellence: exercised publicly with solemnity, which is done authentically by the superior of society, or in his name by him who exercises judicial power in society: "judgment is in princes and judges";

2. Secondarily, it signifies such a judgment rendered internally or privately, even by private persons, in a matter of justice, namely, concerning the life, things, rights, or morals of others;

3. The name was broadened to signify a sentence or determination of the right in any matter whatever, whether speculative or practical: for in every assent or true determination of the mind there is equality or conformity of the intellect either to the thing or to right appetite. And thus, less properly, judgment belongs to any virtue: for it pertains to any virtue to judge in its own matter, but in this way judgment is rather the determination of the right than of the just.

613. Judgment is an act of justice. Billuart proves this thus:¹

¹ Diss. VII, a. 1.

1. "It belongs to justice to define and determine that which is just or equal to another: for this is its object. But judgment in the proper sense is nothing other than the definition and determination of the just. Therefore.

2. To define rightly in the matter of some virtue proceeds from the habit of such a virtue (q. 60, a. 1), insofar as the virtue inclines the affection to its object and the intellect judges conformably to the affection, because the affection makes the thing seem suitable to the intellect; whence it is commonly said, as someone is affected, so he judges concerning things: thus the chaste man rightly judges those things which pertain to chastity. Therefore to define rightly in the matter of justice, which is to judge, proceeds from the habit of justice."

Nor should it be said that judgment belongs to reason, not to the will, and therefore pertains not to a moral virtue but to prudence. For two things are required for right judgment: "One is the very virtue pronouncing the judgment, and thus judgment is an act of reason: for to speak or define something belongs to reason. The other is the disposition of the one judging, from which he has suitability for judging rightly; and thus in those things which pertain to just judgment it proceeds from justice, as in those things which pertain to fortitude, from fortitude. Thus, therefore, judgment is an act of justice as inclining to judging rightly, but of prudence as pronouncing the judgment; whence also synesis, pertaining to prudence, is called well-judging" (q. 60, a. 1, ad 1).

Therefore judgment, insofar as it regards the just according to all circumstances, is an act of prudence; but insofar as it formally regards right as an equal due to another, which is the proper object of justice, it is an act of justice, and indeed elicited by it, because it is immediately regulated by it, no other virtue mediating.

614. Judgment is lawful (Deut. XVI, 18-20; I, 16-17; Jn. VII, 24; Rom. XIII, 4; Acts V; I Cor. V, 3 sq.), provided it is clothed with due circumstances,² which are three: 1. that it proceed from the inclination of justice; 2. from the authority of the one presiding over a subject; 3. and that it be pronounced according to the reason of right prudence. When these are lacking, judgment is called either unjust or perverse, or usurped, or rash; and therefore in the Scriptures it is sometimes prohibited (Mt. VII, 1-2; Rom. II, 1; XIV, 3 sq.; Jas. IV, 11-13).

² Thus against the Waldenses and Anabaptists, saying that it is not lawful for Christians to exercise judgment.

Judgment is validly exercised even if the judge were to condemn concerning a sin of which he himself is guilty, because sin does not take away the authority of jurisdiction (Council of Constance, sess. 8, c. Wicleff); although he can sin by graver scandal if, being a public sinner, he judges thus.

615. Observations. 1. In judgments concerning persons, doubtful things are to be interpreted in the better part, not only negatively, insofar as the worse is not to be judged but one must at least abstain from judgment, and this must always be observed, as we already said where treating rash judgment; but also sometimes positively, namely, when a positive act of judgment is prescribed to be elicited concerning the goodness or malice of one's neighbor. For each one has the right to be esteemed good, so long as his malice does not sufficiently appear.

2. Judgment ordinarily must be exercised according to written laws. For "judgment is nothing other than a certain definition or determination of that which is just. But something becomes just in two ways: in one way from the very nature of the thing, which is called natural right; in another way from a certain agreement among men, which is called positive right. But laws are written for the determination of each right, yet in different ways; for the writing of the law contains natural right, indeed, but does not institute it: for it does not have force from the law but from nature; but the writing of the law both contains and institutes positive right, giving it the strength of authority. And therefore it is necessary that judgment be made according to the writing of the law; otherwise judgment would be deficient either from the natural just or from the positive just," q. 60, a. 5.

It is said: ordinarily; it would not have to be done thus if human law manifestly contradicted the natural law, or if in the case it tended to the detriment of the common good.

Rash judgment is a firm assent formed from slight indications concerning some sin or defect of a neighbor; but rash suspicion is a certain inclination to assent concerning the evil of a neighbor from an insufficient reason, or is a begun assent by which someone judges from an insufficient reason that probably some foundation for thinking badly of a neighbor lies hidden. Finally, doubt is a suspension of the mind determining itself to neither side concerning the honesty of a neighbor.

I say 1st. Rash judgment is a mortal sin from its genus. The reason is that each person has the right to good estimation of himself before individuals, nor ought he to be presumed evil until it is proved. - But for the gravity of rash judgment there is required: 1st. that it be firm, or without doubt; 2nd. that it be fully deliberate and voluntary; 3rd. that it be in a grave matter concerning a determined and known person; 4th. that it rest upon indications which are known as slight and unfit for judging. The reason for these things is that otherwise it would not be a true judgment, nor truly rash, nor gravely injurious to the neighbor. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 962.

I say 2nd. Rash suspicion and doubt are venial only from their genus. The reason is that on account of a weak and easily movable adherence they ordinarily bring only slight harm to a neighbor, since they do not take away reputation, but only diminish it and render it doubtful. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 963.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. He does not sin gravely who judges sinisterly concerning a neighbor if the judgment rests upon indications sufficient for prudent probability, because moral certitude and true probability are not so distant that it should be judged a grave injury to hold as almost certain what is very probable. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 962.

2nd. He does not sin gravely who, in judging, does not advert fully to the insufficiency of the motives, although he adverts that he judges less prudently, or if he admits only slight negligence in repelling the judgment. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.; and Hom. Ap., n. 1.

3rd. He does not sin gravely who judges rashly concerning someone indeterminate among many, e.g., of some gathering or community, or even concerning someone indeed determined but unknown to himself. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.

4th. Suspicion, or even plainly rash doubt, namely resting upon no reason, can be a mortal sin if it is concerned with very extraordinary sins and sins grave by reason of the condition of the persons whom it regards; because suspicion or doubt of this kind is a greater injury than even a firm judgment concerning less grave sins. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 964.

5th. It is licit to guard against harms from fear that is not altogether imprudent; and thus, e.g., you can keep your things under guard lest they be stolen by a traveler staying in your house; because, even if you cannot positively judge that this or that one is a thief, nevertheless you can very well provide for yourself, since you know certainly that there are sometimes thieves among men, although they are thought to be alien from theft. - Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 60, art. 4, ad 3.

Nota that suspicion, doubt, opinion, and judgment, where the evil of one's neighbor is in question, are often taken as one and the same by the learned and the unlearned. The reason of this confusion is, because all these acts are about the evil of one's neighbor and from insufficient indications, insofar as they are rash, as they are taken here.

However, if we speak strictly, all these acts are distinguished from one another. For doubt is, when the mind is moved toward either side, but assents to neither, and remains suspended between both. Suspicion is, when the intellect, receding from the doubt or mean, is more inclined to the assent of one side, yet so that it does not yet assent. Some do not distinguish it from opinion except by more and less, and will it to be a weak opinion or one with great misgiving ; opinion however is assent to one side with fear of the opposite side. Judgment is certain and firm assent to one side, without fear of the opposite side.

We treat here of rash suspicion insofar as it comprehends doubt and opinion, and the principal question is whether it is of its genus mortal sin, so that in the individual it is always mortal when it is fully deliberate concerning the grave evil of one's neighbor. There is difficulty also about the mind of Saint Thomas. That we may begin from the more certain,

I say 1°: Rash judgment is of its genus mortal sin. This is certain and common with the Author^{330 330} Hic q. 60, a. 3, o.

Proof. 1° from Scripture. Matt., VII, 1, it is said : Judge not, that ye be not judged. Luke, VI, 37 : Judge not, and ye shall not be judged. To the Romans, XIV, 4 : Who art thou that judgest another man's servant?

Proof. 2°. Rash judgment is not without injury and contempt of one's neighbor, and therefore is against justice and charity³³¹. Therefore it is of its genus mortal sin. ³³¹ Ibid.

It is confirmed. Everyone has the right that a good estimate be had of him by others, so long as he is not proved wicked. Now he who judges rashly of the evil of his neighbor acts against this right. Therefore he is against justice. Also against charity : 1° because against that principle of charity and right reason :

« What you would not have done to yourself, do not to another ; » 2° because it cannot be that he who thus judges of his neighbor be well disposed toward him.

I say 2°: It is more probable that rash suspicion concerning the evil of one's neighbor, insofar as it comprehends doubt and opinion, is of its genus mortal sin, and accordingly in the individual always mortal sin, when it is fully deliberate concerning the grave evil of one's neighbor.

Proof. That is mortal sin of its genus which is contrary to justice and charity. Now such is rash suspicion. Therefore. — Proof. of the minor. 1° Because, as Saint Thomas says³³², it is not without contempt of one's neighbor, and therefore does him an injury. 2° Everyone has the right to be esteemed upright by others, so long as his malice does not sufficiently appear. Now he acts against this right who rashly suspects evil of him, or doubts of his uprightness. Therefore against justice. Also against charity : 1° because he acts against this first principle of all social life : « What you would not have done to yourself, do not to another ; » 2° because it can scarcely be that he who rashly suspects evil of his neighbor be well affected toward him. Therefore. ³³² Ibid., ad 2 and a. 4, o.

The adversaries answer, and it is their chief foundation, that there is indeed injury and contempt, but incomplete ; because suspicion is something incomplete in the genus of judgment.

On the contrary. Grant that contempt is incomplete in the genus of judgment, thence it is not proved that this incomplete contempt is not mortal of its genus ; because, although it is incomplete in the genus of judgment, it is nevertheless complete in the genus of a perfectly deliberate act. So, v. g., fully voluntary doubt in matters of faith is an incomplete judgment and incomplete contempt in the genus of judgment ; but, because it is complete in the genus of a perfectly deliberate act, it is sufficient for mortal sin. So again detraction concerning one's neighbor before a single upright man only is incomplete contempt, and yet, according to the highly probable opinion, it is mortal sin of its genus. Or, if you will, detraction before ten is less complete contempt than detraction before twenty, and yet in both cases it is mortal sin of its genus.

Proof. 2°, and this chief refuge of the adversaries is more strongly shaken. Rash suspicion of the gravest evils of one's neighbor is in the individual mortal sin. Therefore rash suspicion of its genus is mortal sin. — The consequence is plain ; because what is venial of its genus, however much it be increased within its species, remains venial, nor becomes mortal unless by some circumstance it be drawn to another species, as theologians commonly teach after D. Thomas, Ia 2ae, q. 88, a. 5. — Proof. of the antecedent. Rash suspicion gravely contemns one's neighbor in the grave case and inflicts on him a grave injury. Therefore. — Proof. of the antecedent. No one exists who does not think himself gravely contemned and suffering grave injury, if someone without cause suspects of him, or even doubts, that he is a sodomite, incestuous with his mother, a heretic, a magician, a sorcerer, etc., so that he would rather lose a notable sum of money than have such a suspicion held of him. I appeal to the very adversaries as witnesses.

There remains the difficulty about the mind of D. Thomas.

The conclusion is therefore proved from D. Thomas, or rather the argument already made from him in the prior proofs is renewed. For, according to Saint Thomas here a. 3, c, rash judgment is mortal sin of its genus, because it is with contempt of one's neighbor. Now, according to the same holy Doctor in the reply to the second objection and in the body of the next article, suspicion also is with contempt of one's neighbor : « From this very fact, he says, that anyone holds an evil opinion of another without sufficient cause, he unduly contemns him, and therefore does him an injury » ; so that the holy Doctor speaks in exactly the same way of both. Therefore.

Serra answers that Saint Thomas speaks of suspicion in the second degree, in which it is taken for certain judgment.

On the contrary. Saint Thomas speaks of that suspicion of which he speaks in the argument to which he responds. But in the argument to which he responds, he speaks of suspicion as distinguished from certain judgment. It is plain to one reading the argument, which is thus : « By illicit judgment some injury is done to one's neighbor. But evil suspicion consists in the mere opinion of a man, and thus does not seem to pertain to the injury of another. Therefore the judgment of suspicion is not illicit. »

You will object : Saint Thomas here a. 3, c., distinguishing three degrees of suspicion, says : « The first degree indeed is, that a man from light indications begin to doubt of the goodness of someone, and this is venial and light sin ; it pertains, says Augustine, to human temptation, without which this life is not led!...³³³ » ³³³ Aug., in Ps. LXX enarr., n. 3.

I answer. Saint Thomas, like Saint Augustine on whom he is founded, is speaking of sudden suspicion not fully deliberate. Which is plain first from his very words : « That, he says, a man begin to doubt » ; for no one is said to begin to doubt who after full advertence deliberately doubts and continues to doubt, especially of the grave evil of his neighbor. Second it is plain from the reason he adduces from Augustine, namely that such suspicion « pertains to human temptation, without which this life is not led. » Moreover, rash suspicion fully deliberate of the grave evil of one's neighbor pertains not to human but to diabolical temptation, as Bannez well notes ; and it is false that the life of many is not led without such suspicions.

To be noted for practice.

That suspicion or rash judgment be mortal sin in the individual, three things are required : First, that it be perfectly deliberate ; second, that it be fully rash ; third, that it be concerning the grave evil of one's neighbor : if any one of these is wanting, there will be only venial sin.

As to the first, Sylvius notes, after Lessius and others, that for mortal sin in suspicious or rash judgment it does not suffice to suspect or judge howsoever deliberately ; but that you must advert to and know, or at least doubt that you judge or suspect, from insufficient signs and concerning a grave matter ; otherwise, he says, the judgment will not be voluntary, at least as regards its being rash or concerning a grave matter. This indeed I admit as regards the condition of the grave matter, not only on account of the said reason, but because then you do not gravely contemn your neighbor. As to the insufficiency of the indications truly, it must, I think, be restricted thus : unless, blinded voluntarily by malevolence, envy, hatred, or similar passion, regarding the insufficiency of the indications you neglect to examine them and precipitate your judgment ; for then you virtually advert to it, since you ought and can advert. And besides, otherwise there would scarcely ever be any rash judgment, since a man ill-disposed toward another easily persuades himself that the indications he has of the evil of an enemy are sufficient.

As to the second, rightly did I say that rash judgment is not mortal sin unless it be fully rash, since its whole malice arises from rashness : so that, if it were in no way rash, that is, if altogether sufficient indications were present, it would by no means be sin ; for then it would be prudent and reasonable judgment, nor through it would injury be inflicted on one's neighbor. For the neighbor has lost his right of reputation and good estimation with respect to him whose guilt is proved by sufficient indications.

But if the indications are not indeed altogether sufficient, yet approach near sufficiency, neither will it be mortal sin ; because great probability does not much differ from moral certitude : whence there will not be grave rashness, nor consequently grave injury.

And because to judge with certainty is somewhat more than simply to opine, to opine than to suspect, and to suspect than to doubt, therefore greater indications are required for judging than for suspecting, and for suspecting than for doubting.

As to the third, note that grave evil in this matter, as in the matter of detraction, is that whole and only thing which, the quality of persons and fact being considered, is highly disgraceful and gravely harmful to the honor, reputation, and good estimation of one's neighbor, whether sin or not ; because the malice of this sin consists in contempt of one's neighbor.

Although therefore mortal sin per se is grave matter, and venial sin light matter, nevertheless per accidens, from the quality of persons or of fact, the contrary often happens. For there are some who are not defamed among men even for certain mortal sins, nor are they ashamed themselves, but sometimes are counted to their praise, v. g., dueling or fornication with respect to a soldier, drunkenness with respect to a commoner in these parts, concerning which if you judge rashly you do not sin mortally, because with respect to them it is not grave matter. On the contrary there are some who are much contemned for venial sins, or even for things that are not sins : as if you judge rashly of a bishop or the supreme Pontiff that he is habitually a liar.

[On the contrary, S. Ligorius³³⁴ holds suspicion to be only venial sin of its genus. « Suspicion, he says, and rash doubt seem of their genus to be sins only venial, especially if they proceed from error of the intellect, whereby the indications are apprehended as sufficient. So Layman³³⁵, from Saint Thomas..., against many who think it mortal. The reason is, because commonly suspicion is only a kind of incitement to assent ; for there remains in the mind of the one suspecting in some way a good estimation of his neighbor. Therefore no grave injury is done him, since he is not wholly cast down from possession of a good name ; yet some injury is done, because he is rashly doubted. » I said, « especially if from error », because such, since it is not per se voluntary, nor pertinacious, merits excuse ; if truly from malevolence you persist in grave suspicion, it will be mortal, as Lessius etc. teach, on account of the gravity of the injury. However the same holds of positive doubting arising from malevolence, without cause ; for it proceeds from contempt of the other, and consequently is reckoned grave injury. »] ³³⁴ Lib. IV, n. 963. ³³⁵ N. 466, 3°.

With S. Ligori Gury agrees in this³³⁶. ³³⁶ Ubi supra, n. 964.

The same Doctor³³⁷ against Cajetan, Navarrus, and several others saying that suspicion howsoever rash can never reach mortal sin, holds as more probable the opposite opinion, « if suspicion or doubt were made without indications concerning most grave sins, as to suspect a pious religious that he is a heretic..., or a man commonly held as Catholic that he is a Jew or atheist. The reason, because perchance greater injury is inflicted on them by suspecting such things, than if a certain judgment were had of them concerning ordinary grave delicts ». And this accords with what Billuart said above concerning the third. ³³⁷

Thence it appears that disputants among themselves, whether evil suspicion be mortal or venial sin of its genus, agree in deciding that it can reach mortal sin, for diverse reasons, namely either from its nature, when grave matter occurs, or from aggravating circumstances. This must be retained, as regards practice, whatever be judged of the speculative question, about which it is licit for each to abound in his own sense.

[Note what S. Ligorius warns³³⁸ : « In this matter let the confessor observe that many simple persons accuse themselves that they judged rashly. He must bring it about that they know : 1° when sufficient grounds are present for judging thus of some action, the judgment is not rash, but just, and therefore not sin ; 2° very often, such judgments are those they are bound to hold, lest some sin be impeded, v. g. lest servants steal, lest daughters sin by consorting with men, and other things of this kind. Only let care be taken lest suspicions of this kind be communicated to others without necessity. »] ³³⁸ Homo apost., XI, 2.

A doubt can be interpreted in the better part in two ways: one way, negatively, by not declining into the worse; the other way, positively, by declining into the better.

I say 1°: Doubts about the evil of one's neighbor must be interpreted in the better part negatively. It follows from the preceding article and from the same principle.

Proof. By this very fact that someone has an evil opinion of another without sufficient cause, he despises him and injures him, as was said; which is illicit. Now he who does not interpret a doubt about the evil of his neighbor in the better part at least negatively, but declines into the worse, has an evil opinion of his neighbor without sufficient cause, since the reasons for doubting lie on both sides, and are therefore insufficient for suspecting or opining in the worse direction. Therefore.

The same is proved by all that we have said against suspicion and rash judgment.

I say 2°: Doubts about the evil of one's neighbor are not always to be interpreted positively in the better part, but only in certain cases.

Proof. 1° because the precept of judging one's neighbor well in doubt is affirmative, like the precept of honoring or loving him, which does not bind always.

Proof. 2°. Either there are sufficient reasons for doubting, or there are not. If the first, we can remain in doubt, suspending judgment and not declining to either side; because the doubt is not rash, but reasonable. If the second, the doubt must be rejected at once, because it is rash. But that is not our case; for we are dealing with a founded and reasonable doubt.

Nevertheless — and this is the second part of the conclusion — supposing that, with the matter doubtful on both sides, some act must be elicited concerning the goodness or malice of one's neighbor, that act must be done in the better part, and consequently the doubt must be interpreted positively in the better part; and the reasons of the first conclusion prove this directly.

DISCORD is a dissension of wills concerning the divine good, or the neighbor's good, which each is bound by Charity to will. The Angelic Doctor says the same, p. p. Centil. sect. 18., where he describes it thus: It is a will fleeing the judgment of wisdom, dissenting from what is said by others.

THEREFORE it is a mortal sin of its genus; for it is opposed to Christian peace, which is an act of Charity. Hence Galatians 5. names it among the works of the flesh, of which it is said: Those who do such things shall not possess the kingdom of God, and Proverbs 6: The seventh his soul detesteth, etc. He that soweth discords among brethren, as the Angelic Doctor shows in speculo animae, cap. 1.

MOREOVER it is the offspring of Pride, as St. Gregory teaches, 31. moral. cap. 31., and St. Thomas art. 2., St. Bonaventure loco cit.; often also of Envy, as St. Thomas says ad 2. It begets many evils, as is said, Matthew 12: Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made desolate. Where Jerome: As small things grow by concord, so the greatest crumble by discord, as St. Bonaventure reports, citing the place soon after.

WHENCE the Holy Fathers, as gathered by St. Bonaventure in Pharetra, Lib. 3. cap. 22., gravely reprehend it, chiefly St. Gregory in the Register, lib. 6. indic. 15. cap. 166., and Lib. 1. indic. 9. cap. 78., and Lib. 10. indic. 10. cap. 37., and Lib. 1. moral. cap. 4., and Lib. 22. cap. 6., and in Pastor. part. 3. cap. 1. admonit. 23. and 24., and Lib. 2. Dialog. cap. 3., and homil. 38. in Evang.; St. Jerome epist. 14., and on cap. 12. Matth., and on Michaeam, Lib. 2. cap. septimo; St. Augustine serm. 56. de verbis Domini, epist. 13. ad Macedon, and Lib. 9. confess. cap. 8.; St. Ambrose de Virginitate, Lib. 2. at the end; St. Isidore in Synon. cap. 8., and de summo bono, Lib. 3. cap. 51.; St. Chrysostom homil. 16. in Matthaeum; St. Bernard epist. 78. and serm. 71. in Cantica; the Gloss on 1 John, 3.; Boethius de Consol. Lib. 5. prosa 5. at the end. Hence he describes it wondrously in sermons.

The Angelic Doctor also brings many things from the Scriptures in Bibliis pauperum, cap. 50.

THE PRINCIPAL difficulty concerns Judgment, by which one judges evil of another; for to judge good of someone is rarely, and only per accidens, a fault.

THEREFORE I suppose that to judge something for a just cause is not a sin. This is commonly supposed by S. Bonaventure and S. Thomas and others, and it is proved by the Holy Doctor on John 12 with that text: Judge not according to the appearance, but judge just judgment.

BUT WHAT cause is required for judging rightly is left to the prudent judge, as Soto noted, Book 3 de Iustitia, quaest. 4. art. 3; Valencia disp. 5. quaest. 4. puncto 3.

THEREFORE I ASSERT: to judge deliberately that someone is evil, gravely harming his reputation, without a just cause, is mortal sin.

IT IS PROVED from the Holy Doctors, first from Matthew 7: Judge not, that you may not be judged. They confirm it from Bede on that passage, and from St. Augustine tract. 90. in Ioannem.

NEXT it is proved by 1 Corinthians 4: Do not judge before the time. So D. Thomas art. 3, and P. Bonaventure p. p. Centil. sect. 10, where he observes that rash judgment is measured according to the Savior's saying, Matthew 7: With what judgment you judge, you shall be judged. Where the Gloss says: If you judge anyone rashly with venial condemnation, you shall be condemned venially. If with mortal condemnation, you shall be condemned mortally. This, he says, is to be understood without prejudice to the opinion of others; for some say it is not mortal unless reputation is gravely harmed. Whence Valencia in the place cited, and Tanner disp. 4. quaest. 3. dub. 2. num. 18, with Aragon, just as they think it mortal to judge some light things of a Religious man, as that he is a liar; so they would not think it mortal to judge of a worldly young man that he has committed fornication, or of a soldier that he has killed someone unjustly, because the judgment is a grave evil insofar as reputation is gravely taken away or harmed. From similar things (they say) such men are not harmed. Valencia adds that it is also an undue and unjust judgment to judge rashly of the future, e.g. that man will perish, for that belongs to God, who perhaps will change that sinner's heart.

IT IS PROVED secondly by the Holy Doctor opusc. de profectu religiosi, Lib. 1. cap. 1, from Romans 14: But thou, why judgest thou thy brother's servant? and Luke 6: Judge not, and you shall not be judged. He defines rash judgment as when I believe something was done with an evil intention, when it could have been done with another intention; or when someone is judged gravely fallen on light indications. For this is to usurp the scrutiny of hearts, which is proper to God, as is said in Jeremias 17.

THE SAME Holy Doctor cites on Luke 6 the words alleged, where he adds Proverbs 17: He that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, both are abominable before God.

HE OBSERVES that to justify the wicked is abominable, not per se, but per accidens, when he is to be compared with another in order to something of justice, e.g. the distribution of honors, etc., and by that judgment an equality with another in good reputation is established or promoted, and the wicked man is preferred or made equal to the just, as the Holy Doctor noted in the places alleged, and Valencia puncto 1, and Navarre commentar. in Rubric. de Iudic. n. 47.

I ASSERT secondly: to judge of someone, even gravely, from light indications, but with fear/doubt, is not mortal sin. So S. Bonaventure in the places cited, and D. Thomas art. 3; Sylvester under the word Iudicium, quaest. 4; Cajetan on the said art. 3; Navarre loc. cit. num. 49 and following. So also Tanner loc. cit. num. 20, who says light indications are those by which a prudent man would not be moved to that judgment. So also Soto, Valencia, Aragon, and others.

IT IS PROVED by the Holy Doctor, because the neighbor is not gravely harmed.

HE OBSERVES, however, in the place cited on the Judgment of suspicion that it is threefold. The first is of violent suspicion, when no or few signs of good appear, but all of evil; and this is not a sin. The second of temerity; when many signs of good, few of evil; and it is a grave venial sin. The third, when many of evil, but few are signs of good; and this is a lighter venial sin.

HE NOTES also in the place cited, de profectu religiosi, that fear is sometimes confused with suspicion, although they differ: for fear is directed to caution, as when, without suspecting evil of anyone, I close the Monastery as a precaution.

VALENCIA ADDS that such a judgment with doubt can be mortal by reason of the person; as if you judge some gravest evil of a most honest man, even with doubt, as incest with his mother or sister.

HE NOTES also punct. 4. that one can doubt by standing in suspense; but such doubt can be a sin, even if only venial, when one is lightly grounded and hangs between the two, so as not to incline toward judging the good. He adds, however, with Soto loc. cit. that it can be mortal by reason of a most illustrious person, as if someone is in doubt about Blessed John the Baptist, whether he was a saint or sinned mortally, etc.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ADDS, moreover, that thoughts of this kind belong more to a Prelate, who by reason of his governance can prudently be in suspense or doubt, and likewise to one who is enlightened from above, of whom the Apostle says: The spiritual man judgeth all things; but it is not true of those "spiritual" men who, like Catos, everywhere stick in their nose and judge with a quince-like zeal — say rather with a dog-in-the-manger zeal.

The Whisperer is also called two-tongued (bilinguis), since he subverts his neighbors on both sides by whisperings, as it were with two tongues: Of this Ecclesiasticus 28.: The whisperer and the two-tongued is cursed; for he will trouble many who were at peace.

Whispering (susurratio) is occult detraction against one's neighbor, by which discord could arise among friends. Thus it is taken from St. Thomas, art. 1.; Valencia, disput. 5. quaest. 18.; Soto, l. 5. de Iust. quaest. 11. art. 3.; Sayrus, l. 12. cap. 5.; Filliucius, Tomo 2. tract. 40. cap. 5. num. 135.; Fagundez, l. 8. cap. 12.. Most excellently the holy Doctor in the Opusc. explicatio sermonum Theology penetrates the formal element of whispering-detraction, defining it thus: Whispering is the will of speaking, sowing discords among brothers.

That formal whispering is a mortal sin the holy Doctor proves in the Speculum animae, cap. 1. §. Machinatio, at the end, from that Proverb 6.: Six are the things which the Lord hates, and the seventh his soul detests. He who sows discords among brothers.

That it is worse than theft, detraction, and contumely is proved by Tanner, disp. 4. quaest. 8. num. 152., from St. Bonaventure, serm. 10. de Apostolis, and St. Thomas, quaest. 74. art. 1., from that Ecclesiasticus 6.: There is no comparison with a faithful friend, nor a weighing of gold worthy [of him], nor of silver, that could resist the goodness of his fidelity. Hence this argument is drawn. A sin is the worse, the greater a good it takes away: but whispering takes away a greater good than theft, detraction, or contumely: Therefore. The minor is proved, for it takes away friendship, a most precious good above riches, reputation, and honor: Therefore also the vice destructive of friendship is the worst. The minor is proved secondly from St. Bonaventure, serm. 9. de Sanctis Apostolis: That is always better which is more like the better, from Aristotle 3. Top. cap. 2. loco 32., and l. 2. de caelo text. 66. But Christian friendship makes one like God in an exquisite manner; whence John 15.: In this shall they know that you are my disciples, if you have love one for another.

The minor is PROVED thirdly from St. Bonaventure, ibid.: The end is nobler than the things that are toward the end; but CHARITY is the end of human life: Therefore it is nobler than fame, honor, and riches, which are only means. St. Thomas confirms it with the Scriptures gathered together, Rom. 13.: Owe nothing to anyone, except that you love one another; Therefore the fullness of the law is love. Psalm 81.: I have said: You are gods, and sons of the Most High. St. John always insisted: Little children, love one another, and if this be done, it suffices.; many excellent things he adds also in the sermon on Saints Philip and James. The same he repeats on Luke 11.: Which of you has a friend.

In the first sermon on St. Bartholomew he adduces the saying of Tully in the Laelius de amicitia, and of Valerius Maximus, l. 4. cap. 7., who say that friendship is to be preferred to kinship, and Tully concludes: Friendship is to be preferred to all human things.

See the holy Doctor also in collation 18. on cap. 3. of John.

He shows THE SAME on Luke 16. in these words: I know what I shall do, where the steward preferred friends to riches, because a friend is the light of life, he is a treasure. Eccl. 6, on the contrary enmity is like darkness and death. 1 John 2.: He who hates his brother is in darkness. Therefore he who breaks friendship and introduces enmity is the worst. Therefore Ecclesiasticus 29.: Lose your money for a friend.

This sin is against justice, at least if it is contracted by deceit, fraud, lies, or the revelation of secrets: The reason is, because everyone has a right to this good, which is to be preferred to others. Thus Fagundez, cap. 12.; Filliucius, tract. 40. cap. 5. num. 137.

You will ASK: Whether it is lawful to whisper to a Prince or Prelate, so that I may succeed him in friendship in place of another, of whom he speaks ill.

It is ANSWERED that it cannot be done. Thus Soto, l. 5. quaest. 11. art. 1.; Salon., 2. 2. quaest. 74. art. 1.; Sayrus, l. 11. cap. 5. from num. 5.; Fagundez, l. 8. cap. 12. num. 6.

The REASON is, because one's own good is not a sufficient reason to deprive another of his right; otherwise it would be lawful to steal. Next it is against the natural precept, that we do not do to another what we would not want done to ourselves.

You will ASK: whether he who dissuades one who wishes to resign a benefice, or to bequeath goods to someone, so that he assign those goods to himself, is a Whisperer.

It is ANSWERED that if he does not proclaim him unworthy, and only exhorts, he does not sin according to Fagundez, because the other does not yet have a right to those goods.

I. Hatred of God is twofold: one which is included in every sin; the other peculiar, which is described as an aversion from God, by which the will detests God insofar as he prohibits sins and inflicts punishments. This hatred of God is the gravest of all crimes, since it is opposed to the most excellent virtue of charity according to its primary act, namely the divine love. It is by its kind mortal, nor does it admit the excuse of parvity of matter; but it can turn out venial only from imperfect deliberation.

II. Hatred of the neighbor is an expressed malevolence, by which we wish him evil. It is by its kind deadly; yet it can become venial, both by parvity of matter and by imperfect deliberation — as if you wish a light evil to your neighbor, or if with imperfect deliberation you desire it for him.

III. It is licit to abominate the sinner, as sinner, according to Proverbs 29: The just abominate a wicked man. For then the sin is hated, not the man. For it is never licit to wish evil to a man, insofar as it is his evil, even with an inefficacious affection; nor is it licit to be saddened over his good, or to rejoice over his evil, as is plain from the proscribed thesis of Innocent XI recounted in the preceding chapter.

IV. Although it is never licit either to desire or to rejoice over the neighbor's evil, it is nevertheless licit, with an inefficacious affection, to wish some temporal evil to another, and to rejoice over it, insofar as this temporal evil conduces to his spiritual good — for instance, that he desist from sin, that he be called back to a better way — as St. Thomas teaches, on the third book, distinction 30, article 1, ad 4. For charity has an order, and each one ought to love himself more than another, and his kin more than strangers, and friends more than enemies, and the common good of many more than the good of one.

One can, without violating charity, wish some temporal evil to another, or rejoice if it should happen — not insofar as it is his evil, but insofar as it is an impediment of evils to another whom one is more bound to love, or to the Community, or to the Church. Similarly of his temporal evil, according as by the evil of punishment the evil of fault is frequently prevented. Hence it is licit to wish for victory in a just war, for the destruction of the Turks, for the common good of the Church or of the Principality; it is licit to wish that a punishment be inflicted by the judge on a malefactor, that he desist from inflicting harm on the Community or on a neighbor. Yet the utmost vigilance is needed in desires of this kind, however inefficacious, lest under the appearance of the common good the cupidity of private vengeance lie hidden. Similarly it is never licit to wish a lesser evil to oneself or to others in order to avoid a greater. Wherefore they gravely sin who deliberately desire death for themselves in order to avoid other troubles.

V. Question I. Is it a sin to speak ill of one's neighbor? Answer. He who with deliberate mind imprecates a grave evil upon his neighbor sins mortally. Weak women, and base men, frequently burst forth into these imprecations, and, to excuse themselves, allege the impulse of anger, as though anger were not a sin. That anger can at times forestall reason is true; but frequently, from a depraved habit and from grave negligence in restraining anger, women and men break forth into such curses. They often say, when their anger has cooled, that they are displeased at having hurled such curses; but this is not a sign that they did not sin: for when the anger has been poured out, the mind perceives the evil it has committed, and therefore is then displeased. Parish priests and Confessors, then, should instruct such persons, and show them the necessity of curbing the savage beast of anger: since their frequent curses flow from a depraved habit of becoming angry. But this wicked habituation does not excuse them, but accuses them. That Confessors may be able to discern whether they have offended gravely or lightly, let them weigh all the circumstances, the deliberation of mind, the scandal, the gravity of the evil wished, and the rest of that kind.

VI. Question II. What is discord? Answer. It is a dissension of wills from the divine good and the good of the neighbor, in which they ought to agree. It is opposed to concord, which unites hearts and wills. By its kind it is a mortal sin. For God, Proverbs 6, detests him who sows discord among brethren. It is required, however, that someone knowingly dissent from the good of God or of the Neighbor, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 37, art. 1. Wherefore there is no discord when one, in good faith, judges that this pertains to the honor of God and the utility of the Neighbor, and another judges otherwise. For this frequently happens even among the holier men themselves.

VII. Question III. What is contention? Answer. It is an altercation of words for impugning the truth; or it is an impugning of the truth with a confidence of clamor, as the Angelic Doctor says, II-II, q. 38, art. 1, where he opportunely adds: But if contention is called an impugning of falsity with a due measure of acrimony, then contention is praiseworthy. Acrimony must never be poured out upon persons, but only, with due sparingness, upon errors. This acrimony is like a seasoning, which must be used with great prudence and moderation, especially in vocal disputations. For when men dispute with mutual words, if they clamor with an immoderate outcry of voices, if they rub each other with mutual wit, the disputation easily ends in criminal contention, because the persons are present. But when errors are refuted in writing, often the authors of the errors are either dead or absent; therefore there is no danger of culpable contention. Hence it is that the mildest Fathers — Augustine, Bernard, and others — often used a style sprinkled with wit. For the reader is wearied by a cold reading; but, on the contrary, writing seasoned with a moderate pepper of acrimony sharpens his palate.

VIII. Question IV. What is Schism? Answer. It is a deliberate separation from the unity of the Church. Now he is separated from the Church who refuses either to communicate with her members, or to render due obedience to the Roman Pontiff, her visible head. Not every disobedient man is a schismatic, because pertinacity can be lacking. But every schismatic is disobedient; just as every heretic is a schismatic, but not conversely. Yet in practice these two crimes, schism and heresy, are scarcely separated, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 39, art. 1, ad 3.

IX. Question V. What is sedition? Answer. It is an aggressive war of one part of the Commonwealth against another part, or against its own Prince. It is by its kind a mortal sin, because it is gravely adverse to peace, to unity, and to the common good. Of war and duel I shall treat in explaining the fifth precept.