§ 7. On Rash Judgment

199. Notions. With respect to acts of the mind not externally manifested and concerning the evil of one's neighbor, it is useful to distinguish four degrees, which are: doubt, suspicion, rash opinion, and rash judgment.

Rash doubt is the suspension of judgment concerning the evil of another without sufficient reason.

Rash suspicion (ungerechter Verdacht) is a certain inclination of judgment concerning the evil of another without sufficient reason.

Rash opinion is a probable and non-firm assent of the mind concerning the evil of another without sufficient motive. - There is not so great a difference between rash opinion and rash suspicion; for suspicion is nothing other than a weak opinion.⁴²⁷

Rash judgment (ungerechtes, freventliches Urteil) is the firm assent of the mind concerning the vice of another without sufficient reason.

These four acts of the mind are sinful for this reason, that they proceed not so much from an objective consideration of the matter as rather from an evil will bending the intellect without sufficient objective motives. The Angelic Doctor writes to the point: "Rash suspicion [the same holds for rash judgment] occurs from three things: in one way indeed from this, that someone is evil in himself; and from this very fact, conscious of his own malice, he easily thinks evil of others, according to that saying: A fool walking in the way, since he himself is foolish, judges all to be fools.⁴²⁸ - In another way it arises from this, that someone is badly disposed toward another; for when someone contemns or hates another, or is angry with or envies him, from slight signs he thinks evil things concerning him, because everyone easily believes what he desires. - In a third way it arises from long experience...."⁴²⁹

⁴²⁷ Cf. Billuart, De iure et iust. diss. 7, a. 2.

⁴²⁸ Eccles. 10, 3.

⁴²⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 60, a. 3.

200. Moral malice. Rash judgment properly so called is from its genus a mortal sin against justice.

I say: rash judgment properly so called, i.e., insofar as it includes firm assent and is distinguished from rash suspicion and opinion. For theologians dispute greatly whether rash suspicion and opinion also are from their genus mortal sins. Báñez, Sylvius, Medina, and others⁴³⁰ are cited for the affirmative opinion; Cajetan, Ledesma, Navarrus, Lessius, and others stand for the negative. This controversy is theoretical rather than practical, because in practice it is difficult to distinguish between rash judgment and rash opinion. Billuart treats this controversy excellently, as also the matter of rash judgment in general, thinking that rash suspicion is more probably a mortal sin from its genus.⁴³¹ - At least that rash judgment is from its genus a mortal sin is proved from the fact that everyone has a strict right to a good reputation and the esteem of others so long as he is not proved evil. But he who rashly judges concerning a vice of his neighbor acts against that right and unjustly esteems his neighbor lightly. Nor let anyone say that justice, since it concerns exterior things and operations, cannot be injured by a judgment which is an interior act. For justice is truly injured by those interior acts which of themselves are ordered toward just or unjust external things and operations. Thus the will to steal is an act of injustice, but the will to restore is an act of justice.

Bourdaloue⁴³² demonstrates excellently the unlawfulness of rash judgment, teaching, with the Angelic Doctor preceding him, that three things are required for lawfully rendering a judgment: authority in the judge, accurate knowledge of the case, and perfect freedom from prejudices. But in rash judgment legitimate authority is lacking, since private men are so often deterred in Sacred Scripture from rendering judgment: "Judge not, and you shall not be judged; condemn not, and you shall not be condemned."⁴³³ Accurate knowledge of the matter is lacking; otherwise there would no longer be a rash judgment but a just one. Freedom from prejudices is lacking, since judgments of this kind are accustomed to arise from envy, hatred, etc., as St. Thomas explained above.

All rash judgments are of the same moral species, because they all violate the same right, namely, the right to good esteem. Hence the particular matter of a rash judgment need not be set forth in confession.

⁴³⁰ The Angelic Doctor says: "From this very fact that someone has an evil opinion concerning another without sufficient cause, he injures and contemns him" (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 60, a. 4). But he who contemns another and injures him commits a sin which is from its genus mortal.

⁴³¹ L.c.

⁴³² Carême, "Sermon sur le jugement téméraire." St. Thomas had already taught the same, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 60, a. 2.

⁴³³ Luke 6, 37; cf. Matt. 7, 1 sqq.; Rom. 2, 1; Jas. 2, 4.

201. Required conditions. For rash judgment to be a mortal sin in the individual case, three things are required: 1. that it be perfectly deliberate; 2. that it be fully rash; 3. that it concern a grave vice of one's neighbor.

Because the first condition, namely, perfect deliberation, is lacking, he does not sin gravely who is ignorant or does not advert that he is judging from insufficient signs concerning the existence of a grave vice in his neighbor. Hence in persons of timorous conscience, who are not blinded by hatred nor are accustomed to consent firmly to suspicions or judgments of this kind, grave sin occurs most rarely in this matter.

Because the second condition, namely, full rashness, is lacking, those judgments concerning a grave vice of one's neighbor which rest upon true, although insufficient, indications are not mortal sins. For lawfully forming a judgment, however, indications inducing moral, but not absolute, certitude suffice. Since no one is presumed evil, indications ought to be interpreted in the better part, unless all the circumstances compel the contrary. Hence, e.g., if a lascivious young man has been seen speaking or playing secretly with a girl in a somewhat dark place, there is a sufficient indication for judging that some evil lies beneath; on the contrary, if the same young man is seen conversing with a girl in an open place and at midday, there is not yet a sufficient indication for suspecting some evil.

Because the third condition, namely, grave matter, is lacking, all judgments, even rash and deliberate ones, which concern vices not so disgraceful, are not gravely evil. Grave matter in rash judgment, as also in detraction, is only that which, considering the quality of the persons and the fact, is very disgraceful and gravely harmful to the honor, reputation, and good esteem of one's neighbor. Wherefore, e.g., rashly to think that some unruly maidservant is also a liar is not a grave sin; but rashly to judge that some bishop is a liar is a mortal sin.⁴³⁴

Note. 1. Although it is not lawful rashly to suspect or judge that one's neighbor is vicious, nevertheless it is not necessary to hold him positively good. Hence it is lawful to judge that he can become evil, and therefore to forestall damage which perhaps could come from others. Therefore it is lawful, e.g., to lock up money, to carry defensive weapons, to bar doors, etc.

2. A rash judgment which is conceived only interiorly and in no way manifested exteriorly is rarely a mortal sin, because the three conditions enumerated above are rarely present. But when a rash judgment is manifested to others, it will more easily be a mortal sin, because then the character of defamation is added.

⁴³⁴ Cf. Billuart, De iure et iust. diss. 7, a. 2.