Article — Marc, Institutiones Morales

Article I: On Rash Judgment

¶1191.
  1. DEFINITION. Rash judgment is a firm assent, arising from slight indications, by which some sin or defect is attributed to neighbor.

Other internal acts approach rash judgment: 1. rash SUSPICION, which is a less firm assent and with fear concerning the opposite; 2. DOUBT, which is a suspension of the soul determining itself to neither part. Yet these grades are not rarely used promiscuously.

"Rashness in judgments, suspicions, and doubts has place when we consider that which is against, and not that which is for; and when we give to indications or reasons contrary to our neighbor more weight than they really have; whence either we judge probable what is only possible; or certain what is doubtful; or grave what is light; or continuous what perhaps was committed once; or finally malicious what perhaps was done inadvertently or even reasonably" (Berardi, Theol. mor., III, n. 499).

¶1192.
  1. PRINCIPLES. I. Rash judgment concerning a grave evil of neighbor is a mortal sin from its genus. The reason is that a grave injury is done to neighbor when, without cause, he is held to be wicked; since each one has a right that a false crime not be imputed to him (III, 973). Whence it is said (Matt., 7, 1): Judge not, that you may not be judged. And (1 Cor., 4): Judge not before the time (that is, of judgment). - "In confession, however, it is not necessary to explain the species of the evil judged, since all (rash judgments) are opposed to one commutative justice, in the lowest species" (III, 962).

Rash judgment is VENIAL: a) if someone has great probability for judging sinisterly about neighbor; b) if the evil which is attributed to neighbor is not gravely injurious, for example that a soldier blasphemed; c) if the judgment is made concerning someone unknown or indetermined among several, for example if he is a member of a certain group; d) if someone judges from involuntary subreption, as often happens, not perfectly adverting either to the gravity of the object or to the insufficiency of the reasons from which he judges (III, l. c.).

¶1193.
  1. II. Rash suspicion and doubt per se are sins only venial. Commonly all these are only a certain incitement to assent; for in some way a good estimation of neighbor remains in the mind: therefore no grave injury is done to him, since he is not totally disturbed from possession of good reputation.

Yet per accidens the sin is more probably grave, "if without indications a suspicion were made concerning the gravest sins, as it would be to suspect concerning a pious religious that he is a heretic, or that he has committed incest with his mother; or concerning a man commonly held as Catholic, that he is Jewish or atheist. The reason is that perhaps greater injury

is inflicted upon them by suspecting such things than if a certain judgment were had concerning ordinary grave crimes of theirs." Likewise, suspicions put on GRAVE guilt if they proceed from contempt or gravely sinful hatred, or if they are manifested to someone with grave damage of neighbor (III, 963, 965). Cf. the things to be said n. 1195.

¶1194.
  1. III. He who has rashly suspected or judged is held from justice to reform his suspicion and his judgment. This is plain from the things said: for every injury of justice must be repaired, insofar as can be done (cf. n. 726).

Note. 1. "If sinister suspicions are going to have practical consequences to the great burden of neighbor (for example if it were a question of a Superior who, without such suspicion, would be about to confer a benefice on such a priest; or of a master who on account of the suspicion would be about to cast a servant out from his own service with the servant's greatest damage); then it does not suffice to take care that those indications which are against not be increased by the imagination, and that those which present themselves spontaneously in favor not be voluntarily rejected; but it is moreover necessary that, according to the gravity and possibility of the matters, inquiries be made, so that the truth may be discerned."

  1. "Suspicions and judgments against neighbor can in some way be sins, although they are not rash; and this happens when someone willingly thinks about the defects and vices of others (especially if he studiously inquires about them) without any reason and excusable motive; for thoughts of this kind are against charity (charity does not think evil: 1 Cor., 13), they beget aversions, and they have nourishment from some passion" (Berardi, l. c., n. 500, 503).

For practice St. Alphonsus warns: "In this matter let the confessor advert that many rude persons accuse themselves that they have judged rashly. It is necessary to make it so that they know: a) When sufficient moments are present for thus judging about some action, the judgment is not rash, but just, and therefore is not culpable. b) These, for the most part, are not judgments, but suspicions, which masters and fathers of families are sometimes held to have, so that they may impede some sin: for example lest servants steal, lest daughters sin by conversing with men, and other things of this kind. Only let it be adverted that they not communicate suspicions of this kind to others without necessity" (H. Ap., IX, 2).