Article — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
Article First. On Rash Judgment
658. Nature. Rash judgment, which is also called suspicion or temerity, is a firm assent of the mind, by which, from a light and insufficient reason, evil is thought of one's neighbor. It is called rash, because it is conceived without a sufficient reason and against the rule of prudence.
Suspicion in the broad sense is threefold: a. doubt, namely when, from a light reason, someone doubts concerning the probity of another; b. suspicion in the strict sense, namely when, from a light reason, someone inclines to think evil of another; c. rash judgment, namely when, from a light reason, someone firmly judges evil of another.
659. Malice. 1. Rash judgment is a sin against justice: Judge not, and you shall not be judged; Judge not, that you may not be judged.1 For every man has a right that no one, without sufficient reason, think evil of him; therefore he who, from a light reason, judges evil of another violates this right.
Suspicion and doubt, if they are voluntary, are sins against charity, because charity requires that we think well of our neighbor unless a sufficient reason persuades otherwise. Yet they can also become sins against justice if, from suspicion or doubt, someone causes another an external injury.
Rash judgment is not, like detraction or insult, an external but an internal violation of justice; therefore the obligation of restitution does not arise from rash judgment as such. If, however, from rash judgment an external injury is committed, this must be repaired.
660. Causes of rash judgment. They are commonly assigned as three:
a. A perverse disposition of the one judging, by reason of which he is prone to think evil of others. Thus proud men easily judge others to be proud; the impure, impure; the avaricious, avaricious.
b. Hatred, envy, jealousy, or another passion, by which one is impelled to believe evil readily of another.
c. Experience of the vices of men. Hence old men and those who have long dealt with men easily judge evil of others.
None of these causes, however, furnishes a sufficient reason for judging evil of a determinate person, unless signs are added from which that evil can be prudently inferred.
661. In order that rash judgment be a grave sin, it is required that it be:
a. Rash, that is, conceived from a light and insufficient motive.
b. In grave matter; but that matter is generally judged grave which notably injures reputation (n. 646); nevertheless graver matter is required to constitute grave judgment than grave detraction.
c. Firm: for if it is not firm but only doubtful, no grave injury is inflicted on the neighbor.
d. Deliberate, that is, he who judges rashly must advert at least confusedly both to the gravity of the matter and to the lightness of the motives, and nevertheless must will and command the assent of the mind.
Because of the lack of this last condition rash judgments are for the most part not grave sins, because men, unless led by hatred, are not accustomed to judge against sound reason; and sound reason does not judge without a sufficient motive.
Whether it is lawful to conduct oneself as if another were evil. It is not lawful with firm assent to judge another to be wicked unless this is certainly established; nevertheless, unless it is established that someone is upright by acquired virtues, it is not necessary that we positively hold him good in this sense, but it suffices that negatively we do not judge him evil. But supposing this state of mind, which suspends judgment, it is lawful, in order to avoid evil, to conduct oneself as if the other were wicked: for by this manner of acting nothing is done which would be illicit. And indeed he who acts thus does not positively judge or suspect that another is evil, but suspends judgment concerning his wickedness and positively judges only that it can happen that he is wicked; but by this judgment, so long as the contrary is not established, injury is inflicted on no one. Moreover, everyone has a right of guarding against damage which can befall himself or his own. Therefore it is lawful to lock up money, because it can happen that unknown guests are thieves.