ARTICLE I: ON NATURAL LAW

166. • Natural law is the divine will, manifested by natural light, prescribing those things which are necessary for preserving right order.

Hence natural law is nothing other than eternal law intimated to rational nature through natural light, whether habitually through right reason, or actually through its dictate.

The object of natural law is everything which so agrees or disagrees with rational nature that it must necessarily be prescribed or forbidden by the Founder of that nature: namely, it embraces all those things which are conformable to eternal law. - Hence natural law is concerned 1° with the first principles of morals, for example, good is to be done; evil is to be avoided; do not do to another what you do not wish to be done to you; 2° with the secondary principles of morals, or the immediate conclusions of the first principles, such as generally are the precepts of the Decalogue; 3° with mediate, or more remote, conclusions.

167. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Can the object of the law of nature sometimes be ignored?

Resp. 1° The primary principles of morals can be ignored by no one. - 2° Likewise proximate conclusions, so that in these invincible ignorance cannot be given, except in children or the rude and for a brief time, or unless some circumstance apparently making the act honorable is added. - 3° But remote conclusions can be ignored, and often are ignored. Hence concerning these so many controversies among the Doctors are still agitated.¹

Quaer. 2° Can invincible ignorance be given concerning the malice of depraved desires in him who knows the malice of the act?

Resp. Negatively, at least as to efficacious desires. The reason is that to will what is evil, and indeed known as such, is to will what is known to displease God, and therefore is to will to displease him.

Quaer. 3° Is natural law mutable?

Resp. Negatively, and cases which seem contrary are of such a kind that either their matter is withdrawn from natural law by the will of God, or natural law does not obtain.

I said: 1) in which either their matter, etc. Namely, a twofold order of things must be distinguished. One is so founded in the very natures of things that not even God can change it, unless he were said to be able to deny himself. Therefore blasphemy, perjury, etc., cannot fail to be evil, and God would deny himself if he inverted this order. But the other order is one which, by reason of the dominion which belongs to God over all creatures, lies subject to divine power; and therefore, since it is not absolutely necessary, God can change it. Hence, since God is Lord both of the life and rights of man, and of all creatures which he has conceded to men for use, he can dispose concerning the life, rights, and things of men by taking away, transferring, etc., as it pleases him; therefore every malice will cease in taking away the life or goods of someone, if God has given this right and power to another. And this indeed is what some say: by the will of God it happens that matter is withdrawn from natural law. In this way matter was withdrawn from natural law when God commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son, or conceded to the Hebrews the spoils of the Egyptians, or gave them the precept of exterminating all the Canaanites. Say the same if a judge condemns a guilty person to supreme punishment; for he does this from power given to him by God; or if ecclesiastical power dispenses in a vow or oath; for it does this in the place of God (n. 158).

I said: 2) or natural law does not obtain. Thus a secret is to be kept by the law of nature, which nevertheless must be revealed if, when it is kept, grave damage threatens an innocent person or the republic; for the law of nature prescribes that a secret be kept only in that case in which it can be kept without grave damage to an innocent person or to the republic. Thus also the obligation of fraternal correction does not obtain where no fruit is hoped from it.