Article II: On the Sources of Morality

The sources or principles of morality are those things from which it comes about that a human act is good or evil, better or worse.

Three sources of morality are numbered, namely: 1° the object; 2° its circumstances; 3° the end of the agent. These three are altogether required for a good act; if even one is evil, the act will become evil. Hence the commonly known axiom: Good is from an integral cause; evil, from any defect whatsoever.

I say: are required. Yet, in order that goodness be imputed, it is required besides that it be directly willed; for "for the will to be good, it is required that it be good under the aspect of good, that is, that it will the good and on account of the good."¹ Wherefore it is imputed to no one for praise that, for example, he visited the sick only for the sake of conversation. Yet it is not required that it be intended explicitly and reflexively, or in a signate act, for example that you say or think: I will to fast because it is honorable; but it suffices that it be sought implicitly and equivalently, or in an exercised act, that is, that the act be apprehended as becoming, praiseworthy, worthy of reward, commended by pious men, or especially as a work, for example, of mercy, etc., and thus be done with a good intention. Cf. n. 31. Corol. 2. - On the contrary, in order that the malice of an act be imputed, it suffices that it be indirectly willed. Hence it is not necessary that the agent tend into the act as evil, because in that way scarcely anyone would sin; but it suffices that he intend an act to which malice is known to be annexed, although this malice in itself does not please him, or that he not avoid the act or the effect of the act which here and now he can and is bound to avoid; because by this very fact he virtually contemns the law and indirectly wills the malice. The reason for the difference is that good must be sought; but evil not only cannot be sought, but must be avoided; and it is not avoided by him who freely places an action to which evil is annexed. Hence he who voluntarily makes himself drunk, although he does not directly will the malice itself of drunkenness, but intends only the delight from drinking, nevertheless acts shamefully and sins. Haine, ib. p. 17. q. 42.