§ II. On the voluntary positing of causes releasing from obligation

139. • Causes releasing from observing the law can be posited either directly or indirectly, namely according as the agent is moved either by the end of withdrawing himself from the obligation of the law, or by another cause, with the impediment to observing the law nevertheless foreseen.

Moreover causes of this kind can be either present, or proximate, or remote, according as the law urges at that very time at which the cause releasing from obligation is posited, or shortly after, or only after a notable interval of time.

Principles. - I. Unless a special prohibition stands in the way, it is always licit to posit EXEMPTING causes, even proximate and present ones, and these directly. We gave the reason at n. 137.

II. It is never licit directly to posit or not to remove IMPEDING causes, even if only remote. The reason is that, so long as someone is subject to the law, he cannot will to infringe it without such a will being a violation of the law itself. Therefore excommunicated persons sin who do not seek absolution precisely for this reason, that, once absolved, they may not be held to Paschal Communion, or those who with this intention go away into a place where they will not be able to communicate in Paschal time.

III. Indeed it will not be licit even indirectly to posit or not to remove proximate or present impeding causes (which in morals are equated), unless a proportionate necessity is present from elsewhere; otherwise every law would be eluded. Thus he sins who gives himself over to sleep or sets out on a journey at the time when Mass is to be heard, or a little before, - or who on a fast day without just cause assumes some labor by which he is rendered impotent for fasting, - or the excommunicated person who does not seek absolution so that he may be able to satisfy the precept of Paschal Communion, - or he who, Paschal time having begun, does not communicate before he goes away into a place where he will not be able to communicate. Tailors and shoemakers likewise sin who on the day before a feast day do not prepare necessary garments and shoes, if they can do this without grave inconvenience.

IV. But more probably it is licit, even without reason, indirectly to posit remote impeding causes. The reason is that the legislator is not judged to will to restrict liberty so much. For it would be too grave a burden if everyone, long before the obligation of the law, were bound to abandon all works incompatible with that obligation, and to await the time of obligation.

But when a cause is to be judged as impeding proximately, and when only remotely, can scarcely, or not even scarcely, be established by some general norm. And indeed that which precedes the time of fulfilling the precept by the space of several days is usually held to impede remotely; but there must always be kept before the eyes both the mind of the legislator and the gravity of the matter prescribed, and also the judgment of prudent men and the practice of the good. L. I, 152.