Article — Konings, Theologia Moralis
ARTICLE I: ON RESTITUTION ON ACCOUNT OF HOMICIDE
- From homicide and mutilation a threefold damage can arise: spiritual, when the victim is deprived of the sacraments or of time for due preparation; natural, from life or members lost; temporal. From the first there exists an obligation of charity, as far as one can, of helping the soul of the killed person; indeed, according to distinguished theologians,1 also of justice, if that damage was foreseen in confused manner, for it is a question of a good from whose obtaining the killed person was impeded by an unjust means. Cf. n. 805. 1°. - For natural damage, since it cannot be estimated by price, more probably nothing is owed; nevertheless the confessor fittingly imposes something for penance or from equity. - Temporal damage is either of the injured person himself or of others.
Damage exists for the injured person himself: 1 on account of expenses for the healing of the wound; 2 on account of damage emerging and profit (pure, namely "clear gain") ceasing for the time during which the wounded man could not attend to his accustomed work or business. Both this (if it was foreseen) and that (unless they have been condoned by the dead person2) must be furnished: a. by any heirs whatever of the dead person; b. by the heirs of the killer or wounder; for the former succeed into the rights of the dead person, the latter into the burdens also of the killer or wounder. - On account of funeral expenses, since they would have had to be made at some time, nothing is owed, unless perhaps, on account of a killing inflicted outside the homeland, they had to be greater.
The others to whom damage can exist are understood of themselves only to be parents, wife, and children, insofar as they actually are deprived either of support or of profit to be perceived, with attention to the hope of life and the condition of the deceased. - Only, that is, not brothers, sisters, and the other blood-relatives, since not these, but only those constitute one moral person with the deceased, namely the family, so that by homicide damage is directly inflicted unjustly only upon them. Wherefore not even the one killed could condone to the killer the reparation of this damage. Nor are creditors of the deceased understood here; because if by his death they are frustrated of payment of the debt, this follows from the killing only by accident and remotely. - Of themselves, because if someone kills another, not I say foreseeing, but intending by this very murder to damage the brothers or creditors, or to impede the making of a will, the damage must be furnished. Cf. n. 692. 5° and (r) p. 475. - In reality, because if, for example, the wife has married equally advantageously, or she, the parents, children are supported by a friend of the killed man, no reparation of damage is owed to them as to support, since it was in fact not inflicted.2
Reparation of damage inflicted by homicide perpetrated without theological fault is also licitly sought from a judge. Cf. n. 747. III.
Notes to n. 807. (1) Lugo D. 11. n. 3. (2) That condonation is not contained in deposition of hatred. Notes to nn. 807-815. (1) Mar. p. 401. n. 303. Lugo, D. 13. n. 37-40. (2) L. IV. 656. Appendix annotation (τ), to n. 807. p. 329. col. 2. Crolly, de Juris alieni violatione n. 1269, explains the matter very well by this argument of common sense: "If ... Caius should say to Julius: Do you think that it is therefore not lawful for me to kill Marcus, who has violated my daughter, because he owes you money, Julius can reply" (and this response of common sense will indeed be consonant with those principles of theology on which St. Alphonsus relies): "I do not say to you, that it is therefore not lawful for you to kill Marcus because he owes me money, but that it is not lawful to do it in such a way that you prevent me from obtaining my just debt" (credit?).
- Questions. - Query 1° Does an obligation of justice remain in the heirs if a murderer is punished with death without having repaired the damages?
Resp. Affirmatively. For penalty satisfies vindicative justice, but not commutative justice. Therefore heirs must pay debts from commutative justice, unless the injured parties do not complain, provided nevertheless that the thing does not exist or the damage is not very grave.3
Query 2° Is he bound to restitution who kills another by exceeding the mode of just defense, or the MODERATION OF BLAMELESS DEFENSE?
Resp. Affirmatively, if he deliberately exceeded, because the invader has a right not to be unjustly killed; therefore the killer, by knowingly exceeding the limits of just defense, commits grave injury. - Thus the common opinion. S. Alph.,3 with Lugo,4 against some older authors cited by the same Lugo.5
Query 3° Is he bound to anything who kills another in a duel?
Resp. More probably negatively, whether he was the one provoking or the one provoked. For no injury is done to one knowing and willing, when the right can be remitted; but even one accepting the fight both willed and could remit temporal damage. Therefore... S. Alph.,6 Lugo,7 etc.
Others say that the one provoking is indeed bound to restitution if he killed the adversary, but not the one provoked. - But others obligate each one. But these opinions are not to be attended to in practice.
Query 4° To what are those bound who have ownership of railways and of ships which are moved by steam, if, the rules of prudence not having been observed, someone is killed or wounded in them?
Resp. They are bound to pay as much as the judge by equitable judgment decrees to be paid; and they sin and are bound to restitution if by fraud, deceit, and gifts, as often happens, they induce the judge to bring an unjust sentence.
Notes to n. 808 - note sequence 1. (2) L. IV. 659. (3) L. IV. 659. Notes to n. 808 - note sequence 2. (3) L. IV. 588. (4) D. 11. n. 65. (5) 23. n. 29. (6) L. IV. 585. (7) D. 10. n. 65.