ARTICLE I: ON SPECIFIC DISTINCTION

208. Preliminary Note. - Formal sins, of whatever kind they are, all agree in this, that they contain moral malice or repugnance with the eternal law of God. Nevertheless, since the eternal law of God, although one in itself, by order to the rectitudes which it demands and which are specifically distinct, is equivalently diverse and multiple (equivalently, namely, it is one thing insofar as it demands the rectitude of justice, another insofar as it requires the rectitude of charity, religion, etc.); hence also malice, or repugnance with the eternal law, by order to the same specifically distinct rectitudes, becomes wholly diverse and multiple (plainly, for example, the malice of theft will be one thing and the malice of blasphemy another, since theft is repugnant to the eternal law insofar as this demands the rectitude of justice, but blasphemy insofar as it requires the rectitude of religion); and therefore formal sins themselves too can differ altogether among themselves, and in fact do differ, according to the difference or diversity of moral malice contained in them.

From this understand how deservedly in Moral Theology there is treatment of the specific distinction of sins; and this all the more because, from the Council of Trent,¹ there is a strict obligation of divine law to expose, in Sacramental Confession, all mortal sins committed after Baptism according to species and circumstances changing the species.

With this premised, concerning the specific distinction of sins let there be a threefold question. And so:

209. • Quaer. 1° What sins differ among themselves in species?

Resp. Those sins differ in species which from the object, circumstances, or end of the one operating have malice or repugnance with the eternal law specifically diverse.

It is said: 1° which from the object, circumstances, or end of the one operating; because these three constitute the principles of morality, that is, the sources from which human acts take their goodness or malice, and the specific diversity of the same goodness or malice; as will be explained more broadly in the following number.

It is said: 2° specifically diverse repugnance; because repugnance diverse only in this sense, that it is notably greater or lesser, does not render sins distinct in species, as St. Thomas expressly teaches:² "more and less do not diversify species. . . . Hence to take another's thing in great or in small quantity does not diversify the species of sin. . . . Just as that which differs in whiteness according to more and less does not differ according to the species of color." - Indeed, greater repugnance, where it transfers sin from venial to mortal, is said to cause a theological or demeritory species, namely insofar as venial sin does not merit privation of grace and glory, as does mortal sin; but, a theological difference of this kind, which is taken according to guilt, as the Angelic Doctor observes,¹ cannot be a difference constituting diversity of moral species, about which we are treating here; for guilt, or penalty, as an effect follows fault, already constituted in its moral species.

Note. - Therefore, in order to know the specific distinction of sins, it is necessary accurately to know their specific repugnance with the eternal law. But since that repugnance, in so multiple a variety of sins, not rarely lies hidden rather obscurely, hence of itself:

210. • Quaer. 2° Whence can specifically diverse repugnance be discerned, and consequently the specific distinction of sins in particular?

Resp. For the solution of this question we assign four rules, commonly received by Theologians, and to each of them we add certain practical resolutions.

First Rule. - Sins which are repugnant to diverse virtues are distinguished in species; for just as any virtue has special and proper goodness, so also the sin repugnant to it has special and proper malice.

Resolves. - Therefore the following are distinguished in species: heresy, despair, hatred of God, perjury, fornication, theft, lying, etc.; because these sins are repugnant to diverse virtues, namely heresy to faith, despair to hope, hatred of God to charity, perjury to religion, fornication to chastity, theft to justice, lying to veracity.

211. Second Rule. - Sins which are repugnant indeed to the same virtue, but in a contrary mode, namely one by excess and the other by defect, are distinguished in species; for contrariety, as St. Thomas notes from the Philosopher,² "is a difference according to form," and therefore "contraries differ according to species." Nor does it matter that contraries are opposed to the same virtue, which is in the middle between them; for virtue has some likeness to one of the extremes, as between fortitude and daring, between prodigality and liberality; but between the extreme vices there is every kind of unlikeness.

Resolves. - Therefore the following are distinguished in species: despair and presumption, which are indeed repugnant to the same virtue of hope, but in a contrary mode, namely despair by defect, presumption by excess; likewise avarice and prodigality, which are opposed to the same virtue of liberality, but prodigality by excess, avarice by defect; similarly flattery and excessive harshness, of which the first by excess, the other by defect, departs from the same virtue of affability; - likewise sloth in learning due knowledge, which by defect, and excessive curiosity, which by excess, is repugnant to the same virtue of studiousness.

212. Third Rule. - Sins which are repugnant indeed to the same virtue and even in the same mode, for example by defect, but under a diverse respect, that is, according to various specifically distinct goods which are contained under the same virtue, are distinguished in species; for one and the same virtue, respectively to the diverse goods which it contains under itself, can have diverse rectitudes, and so, for example, one and the same virtue of justice obtains a wholly diverse rectitude according as it protects goods of fortune, or goods of reputation, or goods of life, etc.; since these goods themselves are specifically diverse in moral estimation. Therefore sins also, although opposed to the same virtue in the same mode, nevertheless respectively to the diverse rectitudes of this virtue can have diverse malices.

Resolves. - a) Therefore the following are distinguished in species: theft, rapine, detraction, contumely, homicide, all of which indeed in the same mode are repugnant to the same virtue of justice, but under a diverse reason; theft namely insofar as that virtue protects goods of fortune; rapine, insofar as it protects goods or inviolability of the person; detraction, insofar as it protects the good of reputation; contumely, insofar as it protects the good of honor; homicide, insofar as it protects the good of life. - b) Likewise local, real, and personal sacrilege differ in species, although they are opposed to the same virtue of religion in the same mode; for a sacred thing, a sacred person, and a sacred place are goods specifically diverse in moral estimation. - c) Thus also violation of ecclesiastical fasting by the eating of meat is distinguished in species from violation of the same fast by multiple refection; because the former violation is repugnant to the virtue of temperance insofar as it moderates the quality of food; but the latter, insofar as it moderates the quantity of food. - Finally from the third rule it can still be deduced that sins of commission and sins of omission are indeed not always, but for the most part, distinct in species, although they depart from the same virtue in the same mode; for ordinarily they injure diverse goods or offices of the same virtue. And so heresy (a sin of commission) and omission of a prescribed act of faith (a sin of omission) differ in species; despair and omission of an act of hope; hatred of God and omission of an act of charity.

Note. - When the diversity of goods of some virtue is sufficient so that by reason of this sins are judged distinct in species, must be sought both from the nature of the individual goods and from the common judgment of Theologians.

213. Fourth Rule. - Sins which are repugnant to several laws made from a diverse formal motive are distinguished in species; for since laws made from a diverse formal motive have for their end a diverse honesty of virtue, therefore the sins opposed to them have diverse malice in species. - Yet where sins are repugnant indeed to several laws, but laws made from the same formal motive, they are not distinguished in species; for several laws made from the same formal motive, and therefore diverse only from the number of legislators, according to common estimation morally constitute only one law.

Resolves. - a) Therefore one omitting Mass on a feast day which is also Sunday does not for that reason commit two sins distinct in species; because the hearing of Mass is prescribed by each law from the same formal motive of religion. The same must be said of one not fasting on some vigil which falls on a day of the Ember Days of Lent; because that threefold law of fasting was again made from the same formal motive of temperance. Likewise one must establish this concerning him who violates a vow or oath repeated several times; or even concerning him who commits homicide or theft, although each of these is repugnant to several laws, namely to the law of nature, to positive divine law, to ecclesiastical law, and to civil law; for these diverse laws prohibit homicide or theft from the same formal motive of justice, and therefore they are morally judged as one law.

b) On the contrary, he who on Saturday is held to fast from a vow, from the precept of the confessor, and from ecclesiastical law, if he does not fast, commits three sins distinct in species: the first against religion by force of the vow, the second against the virtue of penance by force of the precept of the confessor, and the third against temperance by force of ecclesiastical law; for this threefold precept of the vow, the confessor, and the Church was made from the diverse formal motive of the said virtues.

Note. - To discern rightly whether laws, several in number, were made from the same or from a diverse formal motive, before all else one must inquire what is proximately and immediately intended by the author of the individual laws; for that very thing is the formal motive - the form or soul - of the law. Thus, indeed, laws several in number are only numerically or formally diverse, according as the same or diverse honesty of virtue was proximately and immediately intended by their author. But of itself it is licit to presume (unless something else is established from the context of the law, circumstances, or interpretation) that the legislator proximately and immediately intends that very thing which is called the intrinsic motive of the law, or the end of the work, that is, that very thing to which the matter of the law, with attention to the circumstances, tends of its own nature; just as, for example, a fast imposed by the confessor after sins have been heard, with attention to this circumstance, by its own nature pertains to the virtue of penance; a natural fast before Holy Communion to the virtue of religion; an ecclesiastical fast to the virtue of temperance. . . . Hence the intrinsic motive of the law, or the end of the work, of itself is judged to coincide with the formal motive of the law. And therefore, if some other motive is added to the law which is called extrinsic, or the extrinsic end of the one operating, for example, if the legislator expresses that he was also moved to make the law from the motive of another honesty, to which namely the matter of the law can indeed be referred in some way, but nevertheless does not tend of its own nature; that extrinsic motive is judged secondary and remote only, but not immediate and formal, provided that from the context of the law, etc., the contrary is not established. Let the example here be the law of fasting of Ember Days, and the law of fasting on the vigil of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary. Each law has the same intrinsic motive (namely the honesty of temperance), and therefore the same formal motive; for although the Church was also moved to make the first law from the extrinsic motive of obtaining worthy Ministers from God, and to make the other from the extrinsic motive of honoring the Blessed Virgin Mary, nevertheless we rightly judge that the same formal motive remains for each law; because those extrinsic motives of themselves are only secondary and remote, nor has the Church anywhere signified that she prescribed the aforesaid fasts immediately and proximately from those motives, or wills them to be observed from them.

Note. - Nevertheless transgressors of such laws can by accident contract a new specific malice by reason of scandal or by reason of a depraved end or affection, for example, if they violate them from contempt of their extrinsic motive, of the priesthood, of the Blessed Virgin Mary, etc., from grave acedia, etc. The same should be observed in the resolutions of the following number.

214. • But as regards precepts strictly so called (cf. n. 97. 98), namely: precepts which parents impose on children, or masters on their domestics; all these are regularly judged to be imposed not from a diverse, but from the same formal motive of obedience, although their matters of themselves regard diverse virtues, for instance: if a parent prescribes for a son attendance at school, prayer, hearing Mass, etc. Hence children, by transgressing the precepts of parents, indeed sin several times against obedience; but of themselves they do not commit sins distinct in species, and therefore of themselves they also are not held in Confession to declare in precisely what matter they were disobedient to parents. - The same ordinarily seems to have to be judged concerning the ordinances of Regular Superiors, who, according to Reuter,¹ are not accustomed to command religious subject to themselves except from the same formal motive of obedience. Likewise you will regularly resolve the same concerning vows, which are as it were particular precepts imposed on oneself by the one vowing from the same formal motive of religion, so that one breaking two vows, for example, one of fasting and the other of praying the rosary, would not commit sins distinct in species, and therefore in Confession would satisfy by saying: "twice I broke a vow in grave matter." Make exception for a vow of observing a law.

215. • Quaer. 3° Can several sins distinct in species be found in one and the same act?

Resp. Since one and the same act physically, both from the object and from circumstances and the end of the one operating, can be repugnant to diverse virtues, or to the same virtue in a contrary mode or under a diverse respect, or even to several formally diverse laws; hence it is manifest of itself that in one and the same act there can be found several sins distinct in species, or several malices specifically diverse. And so, for example, the killing of a cleric in a church is a threefold sin distinct in species: one against justice, and two others against religion, namely according to the two diverse goods of this virtue which are violated: the sacred place and the sacred person. - Likewise he commits four sins distinct in species who, bound by a vow of chastity, sins with a married blood relative; because he violates four diverse virtues, namely justice, piety, religion, and chastity. Let the things handed down before in the Treatise on Human Acts be recalled here as to the individual principles of morality.