ARTICLE I: ON TAXES

816. Definition. - Tax is all that which is imposed by legitimate power commanding citizens to be paid for sustaining the common burdens of the republic.

Division. - Today that division of taxes especially obtains by which they are distinguished into direct and indirect. Those are called direct which immediately affect the person or his goods. Of this kind are real taxes, which are imposed upon fields and houses, and those which in some places are imposed upon the person and commonly are called personal, and those which in some regions are established upon movable wealth, and other things of this kind.

Indirect are those which fall immediately upon some action concerning some things, and mediately upon the persons who perform concerning those things an action which falls under the law imposing the tax, suppose they sell, buy, consume, introduce, etc., according as purchase, sale, consumption, introduction, etc., is taxed by law. To these are referred those things which in some provinces must be paid for right of succession, for recording of contracts, etc.

817. • Conditions required for the justice of a tax. Three are commonly recounted.

1° That it proceed from legitimate power, namely from that which is supreme in the republic; from the supreme Congress among us for the whole Confederation, but within the limits fixed by the Constitution;¹ from the legislative Assemblies of each State for the respective State, and, from faculty conceded to them by the supreme power of each State, from the colleges of Municipalities and Counties for the inhabitants of Municipalities and Counties.

2° That it be established from a just cause, namely of necessity or common utility.

3° That it be divided in due proportion. But this requires a) that, when the cause of the tax regards all equally, those who are richer be more burdened, and those who have lesser means pay less. But if the cause does not regard all equally, those whom it regards more must be more burdened. b) That proportion also be observed to the things upon which the tax is imposed. For if it is imposed upon an immovable thing, it ought not to exceed a moderate quantity, considering its fruits and the labors and expenses which are made concerning that thing. But if it is imposed upon movable things which are sold and bought or made by art, care must be taken lest such be things of this kind, or so great be the tax, that it redound to a greater burden of the poor, or of artisans, or of merchants, than they can conveniently sustain for supporting life and family.

818. • Obligation of the law of taxes in conscience. Laws which concern taxes, looked at generally, according to the opinion which S. Alph.² calls most common and more probable, are not merely penal, but oblige in conscience.

It is deduced 1° from Scripture.³ 2° It is clear also from reason; for the Prince is bound to bear the burdens of the Republic; therefore by parity subjects are bound to furnish the means necessary for promoting the common good. But of the patrons of this opinion, some teach that this obligation belongs to commutative justice, while others that it arises from legal justice, and that therefore those defrauding taxes are not bound to restitution, which exists from commutative justice alone.¹

Nevertheless there are not lacking those who judge tax laws universally merely penal. After the reasons of these have been set forth, S. Alph.² says: "But whether, on account of these reasons, which moreover do not seem contemptible, it" (the affirmative opinion) "is sufficiently probable, I leave to the wiser." And in the Hom. Apost.³ he concludes: "Yet notwithstanding this, I do not omit to advise the first" (denying) "opinion." - But the principal reason of those Doctors rests upon the universal custom of accepting and interpreting the law otherwise; to which today this is added, that the supreme moderators of empires nowhere appeal to conscience, indeed nowhere to the religion of peoples, but while they enlist for themselves innumerable armies of guards, overseers, and collectors for exacting duties and other taxes, they seem altogether to trust more in them than in the conscience of subjects. Cf. what was said n. 178.

819. • Practice to be observed with penitents as to tax laws.

The patrons of each opinion almost agree as to these things:

I. It is not expedient that the confessor ask penitents who are silent in Confession concerning taxes whether they are guilty of any defrauding, lest perhaps he uselessly inject bad faith into those who are in good faith.

II. "But speaking generally concerning all customs-duties, Lugo⁴ thinks that peoples must be warned to pay taxes, but after the fact they are not to be compelled to restitution of tax defrauded, if probably they persuade themselves that in so great a multitude of customs-duties they have paid something unjust, or have contributed competently to public necessities." Thus S. Alph.,⁵ reporting the opinion of Lugo, without reproving it by even a little word.

820. • III. The following are not to be urged to restore taxes:

1° Those from whom they were not asked, and this from custom legitimately received, beyond which laws do not oblige. Hence tolls which are paid for a bridge, for a public road, do not necessarily have to be furnished before they are asked. Therefore if there is no collector who asks the toll, while a merchant passes with all fraud set aside, he does not sin against justice by paying nothing. Thus S. Alph.¹ nearly reports the opinion of Sanchez, without reproving it.

2° Those who place secretly the action which falls under tax, so that the appointed collector does not come into knowledge of it, so that by thus evading the asking of the tax, its payment also is evaded; as when someone purposely hides merchandise which he carries into a region, and for which duty would have to be paid, or carries it in through trackless places and at inconvenient hours, or secretly sells merchandise, for which sale likewise tax would have to be paid. The reason is that if taxes are so received by the republic that they are not owed unless asked, why will someone not be able to hide himself lest they be asked from him? The collectors themselves, or those whose interest it is, ought to keep watch lest someone, for example, sell his goods secretly; for others are not bound to bring it about that their contracts come to the notice of tax-farmers or others. Molina with others cited by Lugo² holds this opinion, and other learned men cited by Sanchez,³ who calls it probable, and S. Alph.⁴ reports it.

3° Those who, when interrogated by collectors about what merchandise they carry or have sold, etc., lie by declaring less than the thing is; because when the tax-collector could proceed with the highest rigor by verifying the thing, if he does not do this, he sufficiently indicates that in the case he does not ask taxes with the highest rigor, and that he holds himself content with the declaration made. And Sanchez⁵ again calls this probable, and Molina holds it according to Lugo.

4° Those who do not pay taxes only doubtfully just, whether the doubt is negative (yet joined with some presumption concerning the injustice of the tax), or positive. The reason is that the Rules, "One must obey the Superior commanding in doubt," and "The law in doubt is presumed just," cannot be applied in the matter of taxes. Not the former, because all Doctors admit that a subject is not bound to obey in doubt when the precept (in the case, of paying a tax) is too difficult, or brings grave damage to him. Not the latter, since presumption fights against tax laws; for as many and very grave Doctors say, there are few taxes in which all the conditions necessary for their justice actually concur.

5° Those who are so poor that, if they paid the taxes, they could not feed themselves and their own, either because they perceive moderate profit from their business, or because they are burdened with numerous offspring, or because they are burdened by debts, or because they are hindered by other necessities. For natural right demands that someone feed himself and his own before paying taxes. Cf. S. Alph.¹

6° Those who do not pay duty on things serving for the proper use of themselves and of the family.² - I would add:

7° Those who against the power exacting taxes have a just title of compensation, and

8° Those who by force of ecclesiastical immunity, still in force (n. 112), are not bound to pay taxes.

821. • IV. The following must be condemned:

1° According to the common opinion of the Doctors, those not paying real taxes imposed upon lands and fields, provided nevertheless that the conditions required for the justice of the tax are certainly present. But a tax is called real which is not imposed only by reason of the person.

2° Those who would compensate themselves after a sentence of the judge, at least a definitive one, from which appeal cannot be made, and which cannot be weakened by any remedy of law.

3° Those who in any way corrupt those appointed to exact taxes, or judges to whose tribunal some tax case is brought; for they sin at least by cooperating in the sin of these.

4° Those who violently resist ministers exacting duties; for these sin 1° against obedience: He who resists power, resists the ordinance of God.³ - 2° against legal justice; for the law which regards taxes, even if it were sometimes held as merely penal, nevertheless gives to rulers a certain right to exact the fine if subjects are caught in fraud.

5° Those who through right and wrong practice defrauding as some kind of trade, and wander day and night even armed with a mind of resisting; for men of this kind become rebellious citizens and most harmful to society.

6° Nor must those be indulged who, although they never resist nor have a mind of resisting, nevertheless devote every zeal and work to the art of defrauding, and have it as a profession of life; for these are not rarely exposed at least to dangers of fortune and also of soul. - Cf. what we said 7. concerning Oath n. 374. 9°.

822. Questions. - Query 1° Do overseers sin against justice as often as they do not exact a tax?

Resp. Affirmatively, of itself generally, and indeed gravely in grave matter. The reason is clear, since they obligated themselves to watch properly and to exact taxes diligently. Wherefore, if they fail in their office, they are bound to restitution toward the Prince or Republic. - Thus commonly.

I said: generally, because according to several, those appointed to exact duties are not always to be condemned when at times they act more benignly in a light matter, especially with the poor, or even with those who otherwise pay diligently, or carry things for their own use.

Query 2° Are the same overseers bound also concerning fines which they ought to have inflicted upon those not paying the tax, or concerning the value of the merchandise itself, if at any time it ought to have fallen into confiscation, especially when tax-collectors could have inflicted such a penalty of themselves without another process and culpably did not do so?

Resp. Not a few probably affirm, because, they say, those guards in the case truly are the cause of damage which he feels who had a right to that profit which was decreed through the penalty; for through their fault he does not perceive it.

Yet the more common opinion denies it, because these guards are bound by force of office only to receive duties and to watch lest these be defrauded, but not to inflict fines upon those thus defrauding. Therefore they are not bound to restore these, even if by their negligence they are not paid, because the guards do not sin against justice in this. La Croix,¹ Lugo,² Gousset.³ This is also valid for the case in which the guards themselves could inflict fines by themselves; for even for this case the reasons brought forward seem to militate, and, by dissimulating or conniving with defrauders, as Lugo argues, l. c., they seem only to take upon themselves that damage which others inflict, and to constitute themselves as authors of that damage. Therefore they will not be bound to a greater restitution than if they themselves alone were truly authors of that damage.⁴ Cf. n. 776. q. 7°.

823. • Query 3° Are the overseers who consent to defrauding bound to restore in the first place, or those defrauders themselves who corrupt the overseers?

Resp. In the stricter opinion concerning the payment of a tax in conscience, the response to the question seems easy, and it must be said that guards are bound to restore only in the second place, and only after those who induced those guards to permit defrauding of the tax. But in the less strict opinion they seem to be bound in the first place.

Query 4° To whom must restitution be made, if at any time it must be made by reason of a tax defrauded?

Resp. To the injured party; therefore either 1° to the Federated States, the particular State, Municipality, County, in the manner in which we said n. 795. q. 6°; or 2°, if to these it cannot safely be made from some cause, to pious causes; or 3° to the tax-farmers, if it is a question of duties which the State, Municipality, or County has leased.