ARTICLE I: ON THE FORCE OF OBLIGATION

125. Principles. - I. Every true law induces obligation, at least to penalty; for in this law differs from counsel, that a subject cannot pass it over with impunity at his own pleasure. - Thus all.

II. Every human law can of itself oblige in conscience before God. The reason is that Superiors have been constituted by God with the power of commanding. Hence: He who resists power resists the ordinance of God. But those who resist acquire damnation for themselves.² Thus all.

It is said: can oblige, but not, obliges; the reason is that a law does not oblige beyond the mind of the legislator. Therefore if he intends to oblige under penalty alone, the law of itself will not oblige to fault. And this indeed Doctors commonly hand down as having force both concerning civil laws and concerning canonical laws.

III. Law obliges under grave or under light fault according to the gravity of the matter or of the circumstances, or of the end specially intended by the Superior.

IV. An affirmative law obliges always, but not for always; but a negative law obliges both always and for always, that is, at individual moments. For they differ in this, that (not so much by force of the words as by the direct and primary end) the former commands an act to be posited, the latter to be omitted. But it is impossible for a man always to posit some act, for example, of the love of God; but no impossibility can be alleged of always abstaining from some prohibited act, for example, hatred of God.

V. Divine positive law and human law generally do not oblige with a very grave inconvenience, or with grave harm which is accidentally joined with the observance of the law. It is established from natural and canonical right, from the practice of the Church, and from the consent of all.

126. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Can a legislator prescribe under light fault in grave matter, and conversely?

Resp. to the 1st. Affirmatively, at least more probably, because the obligation depends on his will, just as the law itself. - Thus commonly.¹

Resp. to the 2nd. Negatively, because the proportion between grave obligation and light matter is lacking. Except if the matter is not in every way light, but grave from the end, etc. - Thus commonly.²

Quaer. 2° What matter of law must be judged grave or light?

Resp. This must be gathered:

1° From the very words of the law. Thus its obligation is grave if in it it is said: we prescribe under grave fault, or under the indignation of God, or under the threat of divine judgment, or in virtue of holy obedience, or from the whole power.

2° From the matter itself, which will be grave by reason either of quantity, for example, in theft, or of quality, as a consecrated host, or of another circumstance of greater moment.

3° From the end; for if the end of the law is of very great moment, and the law greatly conduces to this end, the matter will be grave, even if that which is prescribed or prohibited is of itself something light. Otherwise, the matter will be judged light. Thus it is grave for one celebrating Mass if he omits to pour a few drops of water into the Chalice. But it will not be grave if on a day of fasting you eat one or another ounce of bread outside the meal.

4° From the gravity of the penalty imposed on transgressors of a mixed law; since penalty is proportioned to fault. It would be, for example, a penalty of perpetual prison; of excommunication, if it is latae sententiae. For it must be said otherwise more probably if it is only ferendae in matter not grave, since on one side that penalty, which is not incurred immediately, is not so great, and on the other side the matter, which is supposed light, does not of itself carry this. See n. 1662, 2°.

5° From the common judgment of prudent persons and from approved custom, which indeed is the best interpreter of laws.¹

127. • Quaer. 3° Can human law sometimes impede an obligation, otherwise valid, from being contracted?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively for the external forum. The reason is that sometimes the common good requires this; nor does natural law prohibit that, when the common good demands it, conditions be prescribed by which, if they are not observed, acts otherwise valid are invalidated. Thus civil laws annul testaments destitute of the prescribed solemnities. But cf. n. 915.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively also generally for the internal forum, if it is a question of ecclesiastical law. Thus the Council of Trent invalidates clandestine marriages, otherwise valid from mere natural right.

Resp. 3° As to civil laws and certain ecclesiastical laws which are founded on a presumption of fraud, it is disputed. Those who deny say that those laws are founded on a presumption of fraud alone, and when this is not present, before the sentence of the judge, the act invalidated by law will only be rescindable. Those who affirm say that they are founded not only on the presumption of fraud, but also on the danger of it, which is never not present. Each sentence is probable, but the latter is more probable. Hence, for practice, before the sentence of the judge, the rule of law must be applied: "In doubt the condition of the possessor is better." Thus, for example, someone can retain a thing due from a testament destitute of the solemnities of law until he is despoiled of it by the judge.²

128. • Quaer. 4° Is the violation of law in a light matter grave because of contempt?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if the contempt directly affects the legislator formally as such, because the authority itself from which laws obtain force is contemned, and consequently God himself, from whom authority flows, according to that word of Christ:³ "He who despises you, despises me."

Resp. 2° Negatively, if the contempt regards either not the legislator himself, but only the matter as light in itself, or indeed the legislator, but not as such, rather as a particular contemptible person, for example, imprudent, vile, idiotic, rude, unlearned. It is also clear in itself that one does not sin gravely if the act by which the precept is contemned is not sufficiently deliberate, but sudden. Hence mortal sin will rarely be present by reason of contempt.¹

129. • Quaer. 5° Does the application of law, or a sentence, which is founded on a false presumption of fact oblige in conscience?

Resp. 1° Negatively, if the application of the law is founded only on the presumption of a particular fact, of fault, fraud, or damaging; the reason is that if the fact is lacking, by that very fact the whole foundation of the obligation is lacking. Hence if you are condemned to pay money for damages which are falsely thought to have been inflicted by your donkey, you are not obliged to pay, except accidentally, for example, by reason of scandal; but then you can compensate yourself, even after sentence has been given.²

Resp. 2° If the law is founded on a presumption of the universal danger of fault, frauds, etc., its application always obliges in conscience, even with every fault excluded; because the common good requires that all be stably obliged. Otherwise evils would not be impeded efficaciously; and otherwise the law intends to forestall the danger of deception, and to render men more cautious. Hence you are held to pay a fine to which you are condemned for damage truly inflicted by your animal, even if that damage happened without your theological fault.³ - See the things to be said in the Treatise on Right and Justice, n. 753, q. 10°, 775, q. 3°, q. 4°. - Our laws are universally consonant.