ARTICLE II: ON THE MODE OF SATISFYING THE OBLIGATION OF LAW

130. Principles. - I. To satisfy any obligation, an intention of doing that which is prescribed is required if the law is affirmative, falling on an action rather than on some effect to be obtained, for example, a law prescribing the hearing of Mass on a feast day. The reason is that a law prescribing an action cannot prescribe anything except a human action, which cannot be posited except in a human mode. - But it is by no means required if the law is either negative, as a law prohibiting servile works on feast days, or indeed affirmative but falling on some effect to be obtained rather than on an action, as a law which demands the payment of a debt or the restitution of another's thing, which one fulfills who pays or restores in drunkenness. The reason is that a negative law intends nothing more than the omission of the work; but an affirmative law about which we are speaking demands nothing more than that the effect be obtained, namely equality of thing to thing.

Hence he cannot be said to have satisfied the precept of hearing Mass who was present at it drunk or sleeping; but indeed he who slept the whole day without food or drink cannot be said to have violated the law of fasting. Thus likewise he does not satisfy the precept who goes to church only that he may feed his eyes, speak with another, await a friend, accompany a mistress going or returning, or hear the music, while he only assists at Mass bodily. The same say of a boy only through fear of parents, or of anyone else carrying himself to church under compulsion; for these lack the intention of doing what is prescribed. It is otherwise if, although compelled, or principally induced by fear or another motive, they have gone to church and yet assist at Mass in the due manner. For by this very fact that they assist at Mass in this way, they have the intention of doing that which is prescribed. Nevertheless persons of this kind are usually sinning by reason of the contrary evil will, namely, of not assisting if either coercion, or fear, or that other principal motive had not been present.

131. • II. The intention of fulfilling the precept, or of acting from the motive of formal obedience, is not required; because the legislator prescribes only the positing or omission of the work.¹

Hence he satisfies who hears Mass while not knowing that it is prescribed on this day, or who indeed knows the obligation, but intends only here and now to satisfy devotion, with the proposal of hearing another Mass.² - Nor does it stand in the way that an act does not operate beyond the intention of the agent; for that has force only in those things which depend on the power of the one operating alone. Hence he does not satisfy who posits a work to be posited by force of a vow, or oath, or sacramental penance, while expressly intending not to satisfy.

132. • III. It is not required that the law be fulfilled from the motive of charity (which is never of precept), or in the state of grace, unless this is prescribed, as in the reception of the Eucharist. The reason is that the work is prescribed, but not the motive. It is established also from proposition 16 of Baius, condemned by Pius V (p. x).

IV. The intention of fulfilling the end of the precept is not required, unless that end precisely of itself is prescribed; because ordinarily the legislator does not prescribe the end, nor does he intend to prescribe it, but only the positing of the act. Hence the axiom: The end of the precept does not fall under the precept. - St. Thomas.¹ In other words: the intention of the legislator concerns two things: concerning one indeed, that which he does not intend to prescribe, but that to which he intends to lead by the precept of law; and this is virtue, which is the end of law. There is another thing concerning which he intends to make a precept; and this is that which, as a means, induces or disposes to virtue. Moreover, it is necessary that satisfaction be made to the latter intention so that the law be fulfilled, not to the former.

133. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Does he satisfy the obligation of a law who sins in fulfilling it?

Resp. Affirmatively, provided the act is honest in itself, and only evil from an extrinsic circumstance, so that the substance of the thing prescribed is posited. The reason is that the precept commands only the substance of the act, but not the mode. Hence he satisfies who during the Mass at which he is present by precept gives consent to a temptation of vain-glory, lust, theft, or any other sin whatsoever. Nevertheless, satisfaction is not made to the precept of Confession or Communion through a sacrilegious Confession or Communion, because then the very substance of the act is infected by sin. It is established also from proposition 14 condemned by Alexander VII (p. xiii). - St. Alphonsus² and others commonly against a few.

134. • Quaer. 2° Can diverse precepts be fulfilled a) by one act; b) by diverse acts posited at the same time?

Resp. to a) Affirmatively, provided 1° by that one act the whole of that is posited which is prescribed through the diverse laws; 2° the mind of the legislator is not otherwise.

It is said: 1° the whole of that be posited, etc. But the whole is judged to be posited if these diverse precepts fall on the same matter and have the same motive, as if the fast of a vigil falls in the Ember Days; otherwise, however, if they fall on diverse matter, or indeed on the same matter, but on account of a diverse motive, as a fast owed from penance and from ecclesiastical law.

It is said: 2° the mind of the legislator is not otherwise, etc. But the mind of the legislator can be gathered from the nature of the prescribed work, from circumstances, from the common sense of pious persons, etc. Thus you cannot hear several Masses imposed on you by the confessor at the same time, while they are celebrated at the same time on several altars, because such is not the presumed intention of the confessor, unless the confessor had regard to the fruit of the Sacrifice.² But he who is held to hear Mass on individual days from penance for one month satisfies by hearing one Mass on Sunday, because it is reasonably presumed that the confessor did not will to oblige the penitent to hear two Masses on the same day, unless he expressed this.³

Resp. to b) Affirmatively, if those acts are associable, that is, if they can be posited as such as are demanded, because then the whole is posited which is demanded. Thus you can recite the canonical Hours while hearing Mass, or pay the imposed penance, etc.⁴

135. • Quaer. 3° What must be done in the concurrence of two unassociable precepts?

Resp. Other things being equal, the greater must be observed before the lesser, which then ceases to oblige. Hence 1) a negative precept prevails over an affirmative, and therefore it will not be lawful to steal in order to assist the poor; 2) a natural precept prevails over a positive, and a divine over a human, and therefore Mass on a feast must be omitted lest a gravely sick person be deserted; 3) the law of a superior, for example, of the Pope, prevails over the law of an inferior, for example, of a Bishop; 4) ecclesiastical law prevails over civil law; 5) law resting on a stricter virtue, for example justice, prevails over law resting on a less strict virtue, for example charity, and therefore he who cannot both give alms and pay a debt is bound not to give alms. Yet I said: other things being equal; because account must always be taken of other circumstances which perhaps prescribe that the order be inverted, or change the case. Thus one must assist a poor person in extreme necessity before you pay a debt to a creditor not staying in the same necessity.

136. • Quaer. 4° Does an obligation cease when satisfaction has not been made to it at the determined time?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if the determination of time was made to finish the obligation. Thus, for example, if you did not fast on the day of a vigil, you sinned, but are freed from the law, because the burden is affixed to that day itself.

Resp. 2° Negatively, if the time was determined only for soliciting or urging the obligation. Thus he is not freed from the obligation of receiving Communion who did not satisfy it in Paschal time.¹