ARTICLE II: ON THE VALUE OF A DONATION UNDER A MODE, OF AN ALLECTIVE DONATION, AND OF A DONATION ON ACCOUNT OF A FALSE CAUSE

892. • By donation under a mode is understood a donation made with the addition of some burden, to be fulfilled by the donee in its own time, without nevertheless that fulfillment being a sufficiently expressed and properly so-called condition. Now, it is certain that the donee, once such a donation has been accepted, is bound in conscience to observe the mode imposed, and that he is bound to restore proportionately if by his own fault he has not observed the mode.

But, the mode not having been observed, the donation is neither invalidated nor can it be revoked by the donor. Yet one must insist by remedies of law that it be observed.¹ See n. 868. (w) p. 476.

893. • By allective donation here is understood a donation made by the donor for this end, that the donee not indeed be obligated, but nevertheless be excited and enticed to furnish something, for example, a donation made to a girl for eliciting her consent into illicit intercourse. - As regards the value of such a donation, see what was said in n. 834, q. 7°.

894. • By donation on account of a false cause is understood a donation made on account of a cause, whether present or past, which is thought certainly to be present, although in reality it is not present; for example, a donation made to Peter as to a poor man, while he is not poor, or a donation made to Peter as to a poor and upright man, while in reality he is indeed poor, but by no means upright. - As to the value of such a donation, it will be permitted to establish these things:

a) If the principal cause is false, the donation of itself is invalid, and the donee ought to restore the thing donated, unless perhaps it can reasonably be presumed that the donor after the fact is no longer unwilling that the donated things be retained. And thus, in the first example adduced, a donation made to Peter as to a poor man, so that poverty is the principal cause, when poverty is lacking, of itself falls, and therefore the things accepted by Peter must be restored to the giver or at least to others truly poor, unless it were permitted to presume otherwise concerning the will of the donor after the fact (n. 736, q. 5°).

b) If the secondary cause is false, the donation of itself does not seem invalid, but it can be revoked by the donor; but the donee himself, if he was the cause of the error, is bound to disclose the error, unless the donor is so affected that he can be judged not to wish to revoke, even if he knew the error. And thus, in the second example adduced, a donation made to Peter, principally as to a poor man and secondarily as to an upright man, poverty existing but uprightness lacking, of itself does not seem void, but only revocable; but Peter, if he was the cause of the error, namely by pretending that he was upright, while he is by no means upright, ought to disclose the error, unless it is permitted to presume otherwise concerning the will of the donor, as ordinarily happens in the matter of alms, in which poverty alone, but not uprightness, is usually considered as cause or condition (n. 736, q. 5°).

From what has been said it is clear that, for resolving cases of this kind of donation on account of a false cause in practice, one must carefully notice: a) what was the expressed intention of the donor in making the donation, and b) what is, or at least what is rightly presumed to be, his will after the fact. Cf. St. Alphonsus.¹