CHAPTER I: ON PROMISE

871. • Promise is a contract by which someone freely and spontaneously obligates himself to furnish or omit something gratuitously in favor of another. The conditions required for the obligation of promise are:

1° That there be present the will of obligating oneself, at least virtual and implicit, which anyone is judged to have who seriously wills to promise, even if he does not advert to the obligation.

2° That the consent of the same promisor be fully free and spontaneous, and therefore that every error and fraud about the substance and final cause, and every unjust coercion or fear, be absent. Cf. n. 853, III.

3° That the promise itself be manifested outwardly and accepted; since every pact ought to consist in the mutual consent of two or several into the same object; and from elsewhere no one is judged to will to obligate himself toward someone unless that one accepts.

872. Questions. - Query 1° What and how great is the obligation of a promise once accepted?

Resp. It is controverted among Theologians. There is given a threefold probable opinion, according to St. Alphonsus.¹

The 1st Opinion holds that a promise, of itself, obligates only under venial sin and from mere fidelity. The reason is that a gratuitous contract obligates only by the bond of fidelity, and fidelity does not seem to obligate under mortal sin, if other inconveniences are absent.

The 2nd Opinion says that a serious promise in a grave matter obligates under grave sin from justice, independently of the intention of the promisor. The reason is that a gratuitous promise is not of a diverse order from an onerous promise by reason of obligation.

The 3rd Opinion, the more common and more probable, teaches that the obligation of a promise depends on the intention of the promisor. Whence, if he intends to obligate himself from justice, he is obligated under mortal sin in grave matter; but if he intends to obligate himself only from fidelity, he is obligated only under light sin. Moreover, for grave matter in a promise they require a quantity fourfold greater than in mortal theft.

But it is certain that a promise by accident obligates from justice if one's neighbor suffers damage from the promise not observed, and that under grave or light sin according to the measure of the quantity of the damage. For example, I promised to give you a loan for consumption, which you gravely need, and you, trusting me, did not provide for yourself from elsewhere; or I took care that my son be educated, because you promised me the expenses, which afterward you refuse.¹

And these things indeed concern promise properly taken. For more often promises, such as are commonly made, obligate neither from justice nor from fidelity, because the one promising does not intend to obligate his faith strictly, but merely to announce his purpose.

873. • Query 2° What in doubt, whether someone wished to obligate himself under grave or under light sin according to the patrons of the third opinion?

Resp. More probably one must stand for the minimal part, because in doubt a certain burden is not to be imposed, especially in a promise, which requires the greatest spontaneity.² Except, as above, a promise seriously made and accepted in a grave matter, which by accident can obligate under grave sin from justice; as if there intervened the reason of grave damage coming to one's neighbor from the promise not observed (n. 872, § But it is certain).

Query 3° Can someone accept a promise through another?

Resp. Affirmatively. Someone can accept a promise through anyone chosen for that, or through a familiar, because he is judged to constitute morally one person with him. He can also accept a promise through another who conducts his care, for example, a father for a son of the family, a Religious for a monastery, a Prelate for his Church, a wife for her husband.

Query 4° When does the force of an accepted promise cease?

Resp. 1° If the promisee spontaneously condones, or cedes from his right. - 2° If the thing promised becomes illicit or useless. But if it was prodigal, it will obligate to observing what is not prodigal; but in an indivisible thing nothing is owed.¹ - 3° If the promisee does not stand by his own promises. - 4° If the state of things or persons is so changed that the promise does not seem to comprehend that event. - 5° If the cause which moved to promising in no way subsists.

874. • Query 5° Whether, or how far, does a promise obligate, if before execution the promisee or the promisor dies?

Resp. to the 1st. Distinguish. It obligates in no way if the promise was made principally in favor of the promisee; because, he being dead, the end intended in the promise ceases; but otherwise, if the promise was made chiefly with regard to the family of the promisee, or his heirs.

Resp. to the 2nd. When the promisor has died, a promise clothed with the due conditions is to be fulfilled by his heirs, because every real obligation ought to pass to heirs in the same manner and by the same title by which the promisor was obligated. Therefore the heirs will be held under grave or under light sin, from justice or fidelity, just as the promisor was held while he lived. Yet they will be able to be freed from every obligation if from the circumstances of the thing, or from signs, it is manifest that the promisor wished to obligate only himself personally. - Lugo, Reuter, etc.

Resolutions. - 1° Those things which are promised by a master to servants, beyond the annual stipend, as to be given at some time or left in the manner of a legacy, are often mere purposes. But if they are promises, they are made either only from gratitude, for example, for service faithfully furnished, or from justice, say, because of undue industry or work. If the master, before the promise is fulfilled, dies unexpectedly, in the former case it will not be licit to carry off the thing promised by occult compensation, since a strict right does not arise from fidelity; but it will be licit in the latter case, because in this case a strict right is born from the promise.¹ Besides, in this case the promise is deservedly judged a remunerative donation, which imports the payment of a debt rather than a gratuitous cession (n. 876).

2° One subscribing to a formula by which money is requested for erecting a church or some pious work signifies, according to the tenor of the formula, either a purpose, or a promise of giving, or a donation afterward to be executed. One not paying the money, in the first case, of himself sins in no way; in the second, venially; in the third, gravely. For the internal forum, the obligation is to be determined from the declaration of the penitent concerning the sense in which he understood or intended it, for example, merely courteously.²

Note. - A promise by our law is a naked contract (n. 828, 5°); but it is clothed if it rests on a consideration estimable by price. (y) p. 476.