CHAPTER I: ON THE NATURE OF SIN

197. Definition. - Sin is: A free transgression of any law obliging in conscience.

It is said: 1) free, or it ought to be in the power of the will of the agent to posit the act or not to posit it (n. 9).

It is said: 2) of law; for where there is no law, neither is there prevarication.

It is said: 3) obliging in conscience, or one to which nothing is lacking of those things which pertain to the essence of law (n. 100).

198. Division. - It is divided into original, concerning which in speculative theology, and personal. Personal sin is committed by the proper and physical will of the sinner, and

It is subdivided into actual, which is the sinful action itself, for example, blasphemy here and now uttered, and habitual, which is the stain of the soul adhering from actual sin and deforming it until it is deleted by penance; but each is either mortal or venial, according as it dissolves friendship with God or does not dissolve it.

Actual sin is 1° of commission or omission, according as it occurs by the positing of a prohibited act, or by omission of a prescribed act.

2° Against God, neighbor, or oneself, according as it specially and immediately is repugnant to God, or is opposed to duties by which a man can be bound toward any others whatsoever, or is opposed to the obligations which each one has toward himself.

3° Of malice, or ignorance, or infirmity, according as it is committed either from mere malice, or from vincible ignorance, or from mere frailty.

4° Formal, when the law is freely and knowingly violated; material, when the transgression of the law is wholly involuntary.

199. Principles. - I. For formal sin, besides the objective malice of the act, there is required advertence of mind and consent of will. And 1° indeed advertence of mind to the malice is required, because the malice of sin cannot be the object of the will unless it is known in some way by the help of the intellect: for there is no desire for what is unknown; 2° consent is required on the part of the will; for sin is perfected by the will, according to that saying of Matthew:¹ For from the heart come forth evil thoughts, adulteries, etc.

II. For actual sin there is necessarily required either actual advertence, or a neglect of advertence voluntary either directly or indirectly. For it is repugnant that a man sin unless in some way either here and now, or in the cause, at least confusedly, he advert to the sin. For nothing is willed unless it has been foreknown.

But a directly voluntary neglect of advertence is had, for example, in him who, as St. Thomas says,² "studiously wills not to know some things, so that he may sin more freely"; and likewise in him who neglects to advert either altogether or sufficiently, while he adverts, at least confusedly, that he either ought to advert, or ought not to apply that advertence which the matter to be done deserves. - But neglect of advertence will be indirectly voluntary in him who either deliberately wills to follow some passion, or does not retract a depraved habit, or, as the same St. Thomas says,¹ "on account of labor or on account of other occupations neglects to learn that through which he would be withdrawn from sin." Therefore there are imputed to fault in these also either "every depraved effect connected with such a passion," or "evil acts which proceed from an evil habit," or sins caused from that ignorance, although actually they do not advert to these while they follow, provided nevertheless they had foreseen them at least confusedly.² Cf. n. 5. 7.

Resolves. - 1° Vincible ignorance concerning some precept is a sin, and in a grave matter can be grave, if the negligence was notable: the reason is that every law obliges first to knowledge of itself, and therefore the precept is violated not only by an act opposed to it, but also by voluntary ignorance of it.

2° Evil acts have that malice which is apprehended. Hence if a thought occurs concerning such a malice, or one specifically such, this is truly contracted through an act of the will.

3° A sin foreseen in the cause, and then, the act having been morally interrupted, advertently committed, will be numerically twofold, namely 1° voluntary in the cause, 2° in itself.

4° If ignorance culpable in the beginning becomes invincible, the evil act is not a sin in itself, but the reason of sin must be taken from the cause alone. Moreover it will become invincible if no thought any longer occurs concerning past negligence or concerning actual ignorance, because then proximate and expedient power for dispelling the ignorance is lacking. Ignorance also becomes invincible if a doubt arising about it cannot be dispelled.

5° Those blinded and accustomed to sin, although on account of a defect of clearer knowledge then perhaps they sometimes sin less gravely in act than others, nevertheless are not excused, because a state of this kind, where there is no care of amendment, is voluntary and culpable in them.

6° A defect of sufficient advertence is only with difficulty to be admitted in those accustomed to sin and generally in those who operate according to their passions,³ because at least confusedly they advert to the malice of sin.